



4-331 (Rev. 11-13-75)


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**BULKY ENCLOSURE**

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~~XEROX COPY OF COVER LETTER ENCLOSED~~



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-5

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

January 31, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) FIRST-CLASS MAIL -- When first-class mail is packaged in brown envelopes or parcels (packages or boxes) and is not sent air mail or special delivery, it should be labeled "FIRST-CLASS MAIL" immediately above the address with a rubber stamp having one-quarter inch or larger letters or with labels obtainable from your local post office. This labeling should be done to avoid mail transit and delivery delays sometimes resulting from postal employees assuming such mail envelopes and parcels are third-class mail dispatches..

1/31/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-5

(B) MAILING LIST - FIELD OFFICE LISTS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS - Your attention is directed to Part II, Section 6 (G), of the Manual of Rules and Regulations. You are reminded that changes in your field office list are to be reported to the Bureau as they occur. They should be submitted in duplicate. Form for submission of changes should remain the same except that the page number on which the name appeared in the list originally submitted should be shown. Appropriate manual changes being prepared.

1/31/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-5

(C) FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY -- It is desired that you make the usual arrangements for the holding of state or regional Retraining Sessions for graduates of the FBI National Academy in your territory. Carefully prepared programs of training should be drawn up in order to insure that the graduates attending the Retraining Sessions will receive interesting, valuable and timely instructions. Emphasis should be placed on the training aspects of these Sessions.

The dates and places of your 1961 Retraining Sessions, together with the detailed programs to be followed, should be submitted to the Bureau by June 1, 1961, or thirty days in advance of your Retraining Session, whichever is earlier.

Your attention is directed to SAC Letter 58-75 (C) concerning the attendance of Bureau personnel at FBI National Academy Retraining Sessions. These instructions must be closely followed.

183-10291

(D) FBI'S ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1960 FISCAL YEAR -- Paragraph (C) of SAC Letter 60-49 dated October 18, 1960, advised that three copies of the FBI's Annual Report for the 1960 Fiscal Year were being sent each field office, and that the Bureau's Annual Report should not be distributed to outsiders until the Attorney General had released the Department's Annual Report.

The printed Annual Report of the Department of Justice for the 1960 Fiscal Year has now been made available to the public. Accordingly, you may distribute the Bureau's Annual Report to press contacts and other individuals who may have a special interest in the data contained therein. For your use in this regard, several additional copies of the FBI's Annual Report are being sent each field office.


Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

1/31/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-5

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-8

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

February 21, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) PERSONNEL MATTERS - CONTRIBUTIONS AND FLOWER FUNDS -- My attention was recently called to a complaint concerning excessive collections from our employees for gifts. Henceforth, there will be no collections for birthdays, showers, baby and wedding gifts, transfers, resignations, and the like. Your attention is directed to SAC Letter 60-24 dated 5-10-60 setting forth instructions regarding the proper use of the flower fund. Contributions to the flower fund from employees should be strictly voluntary and held to an absolute minimum.

2/21/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-8

(B) CRIME POSTER -- My Introduction in the March issue of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin pertains to the alarming rise in crime and calls upon the American public to lend assistance to law enforcement. The Introduction makes specific reference to a poster on crime which is designed to enlist the aid of the public and which is being introduced on the inside back cover of the March Bulletin. This black-and-white poster is available in an 8- by 10 1/2-inch size in large quantities to your office and to other law enforcement agencies, civic and service organizations, parent-teacher groups, etc.

A minimum of 100 copies is being sent under separate cover to each field office for the purpose of obtaining wide dissemination of this poster, and you should make every effort to see that the public in your territory is aware of its existence and has the opportunity to effectively use it. The public may obtain copies by writing to FBI Headquarters in Washington, D. C.

In order to control the release of this poster in line with our commitments to wire services, you may release this poster immediately upon receiving the copies of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin Introduction which are sent to your office each month.

(c) VOUCHERS -- FORMS -- TRAVEL VOUCHER, SF 1012; REVISED ISSUE - SUPPLIES -- Standard Form (SF) 1012, 1012a, b, and c, travel voucher forms, have been revised and requisitions for these are being filled with the revised issue. The revised issue is substantially different from the old form and, therefore, in requesting a supply from the Bureau, you should insure that your initial order includes SF 1012, 1012a, b, and c. You should continue to use the old form until your supply is exhausted.

For your guidance in the preparation of the new SF 1012, a sample voucher is enclosed.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-8

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(D) SPECIAL INQUIRIES FOR WHITE HOUSE, CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES -- In the future, you should not conduct neighborhood investigation on individuals being considered for positions of Cabinet rank. Further, neighborhood investigation should not be made on any other prominent persons without Bureau approval. In other investigations concerning persons not falling within these two categories, the field should be alert to any information which would indicate the possibility that a neighborhood investigation would be inadvisable, in which event the Bureau should be notified immediately prior to any neighborhood investigation.

In those cases in which no neighborhood investigation is being conducted, should information be developed which indicates the advisability of making a neighborhood investigation, you should immediately furnish pertinent facts to the Bureau for its consideration.

The Bureau expects that these instructions will be strictly adhered to.

(Security Letter on attached pages)

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SAC LETTER 61-8

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(E) STREAMLINING PROCEDURES - CHANNELIZING MEMORANDA -- Numerous channelizing memoranda, particularly in large offices operating a large number of live informants, are presenting an increasingly critical space problem and demands for extra file cabinets.

In June, 1960, the Chicago and San Francisco Offices were authorized to destroy channelizing memoranda following submission of reports in security cases on an experimental basis to determine the feasibility of adopting this practice throughout the field.

Based upon the favorable results obtained in these offices, particularly in savings in file space and streamlining of case files, the Bureau is authorizing the destruction of these channelizing memoranda following submission of reports in both individual and organizational security cases.

In devising procedures for the handling of this matter you should be guided by the following:

(1) The current procedure with regard to filing the original informant report, the filing of the master channelizing memoranda in the informant file and the serializing of channelizing memoranda in the substantive case files will be continued as at present.

(2) The Agent, at the time he dictates the report, will prepare a memorandum listing the channelizing memoranda to be destroyed by serial or serial scope and requesting the Chief Clerk's Office to destroy. The memorandum should indicate that pertinent information contained in the serials to be destroyed was incorporated in the report. It will not be necessary to set forth in this destruction memorandum the file and serial number of original informant reports or master channelizing memoranda as this information will be listed in the cover pages to the report. In the case of multiple volumes, the destruction memorandum should be prepared by the Agent in sufficient numbers so that one copy will appear in each volume of the multiple volume file being stripped.

(3) Prior to destruction, the Agent's recommendations with respect thereto are to be reviewed and approved by the Supervisor at the time he reviews and approves the report.

(4) Following destruction of the channelizing memoranda the Chief Clerk will so note on the memorandum. Thereafter, the memorandum will be filed in the case file as a permanent record of the serials destroyed.

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(5) Technical and microphone surveillance channelizing memoranda may be destroyed without the necessity of identifying in the cover pages of the report the exact location in the office files of the original information. The use of an asterisk identifies the source and the original information can be readily located.

The channelizing memorandum should not be destroyed in the following instances:

(1) When the original information is not contained elsewhere in your office.

(2) Do not destroy serial one of a file regardless of its nature.

(3) Do not destroy any serial containing indexing. It would appear that if indexing was necessary to channelizing memoranda, such indexing would only be done in the main case file as set forth in the title of the communication.

(4) Do not destroy serial showing "action" information. For example, opening, closing, posting, or instructions given by a Supervisor to an Agent concerning the case.

The destruction of these channelizing memoranda should be subject to close supervisory control by you to insure that all pertinent information contained in these memoranda is reported in the investigative report.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosure for (C)

2/21/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-8

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

March 1, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM -- I desire to insure that each office is fulfilling its obligations under this program and to be certain we have that type of coverage of the criminal underworld comparable to that which we achieved in our investigations of the Communist Party. To this end, the techniques which have proved so invaluable in the Internal Security field must be carefully considered and adapted wherever feasible to our criminal intelligence operations. Present policy regarding resources must be adhered to.

We must continue all-out efforts in our investigation of specific hoodlum subjects; however, it is imperative that you understand the necessity for maintaining on the criminal underworld intelligence coverage as effective and productive as has been established in other major intelligence operations. The personnel of each office concerned with criminal intelligence matters must be thoroughly briefed and indoctrinated so that they understand the Bureau's aims and the importance of obtaining true intelligence information on the underworld.

You should carefully evaluate this situation in the above perspective and follow through with a planned program to develop high-level live informants as well as sources who can produce significant information as to underworld activities.

It cannot be stressed too strongly that this matter is to receive your personal attention and that having understood the Bureau's objective, effective and vigorous action is to be exerted to accomplish the aims outlined.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC I TER NO. 61-12

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

March 7, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) LABORATORY MATTERS - PHOTOGRAPHY OF EVIDENCE -- The FBI Laboratory has noted a growing tendency of investigative personnel to use the FINGERPRINT CAMERA to photograph document, heel print, and similar evidence. Because of the small field ( $2\frac{1}{4}$  by  $3\frac{1}{4}$ ) covered by this camera, it is often impossible to record the entire area that must be photographed on one negative, making it necessary to record the evidence by sections on several separate negatives. In some instances even individual signatures or heel impressions have been reproduced in this manner. Such photography unnecessarily complicates examinations in the Laboratory and may hinder or limit the use of such evidence in a court of law.

Every field division has available Speed Graphic cameras equipped for document photography which can be adjusted to include an entire document or other evidence in one negative. To properly record evidence photographically, the Speed Graphic camera should be used whenever the area to be photographed is greater than  $2\frac{1}{4}$  by  $3\frac{1}{4}$ .

This matter should be brought to the attention of all investigative personnel, and it is expected that in the future documentary and similar evidence will not be recorded photographically by sections merely because it is more convenient to use the Fingerprint Camera. Of course, where large numbers of documents are to be photographed, the field should continue to use one of the 35 mm or other camera units designed for document photography.

(B) FUGITIVES - WOMEN IN CRIME -- The issue of "The American Weekly," which will be distributed throughout the United States on the weekend of March 11-12, 1961, will contain an article concerning five current female fugitives. The subjects featured will be:

Ruth Paige Bogli, origin Boston  
Dale Colvin, I. O. #3445, origin Little Rock  
Janett Carroll Crusenberry, I. O. #3076, origin Chicago  
Mary Catherine Lawson, Check Circular 26, origin New Orleans  
Ellen Yolenda Samuels, I. O. #3335, origin Denver

"The American Weekly" has a coast-to-coast circulation of approximately 17,500,000. Accordingly, it may be anticipated that a large number of leads will be received as a result of this article. Each office should insure that sufficient investigative personnel is available on March 11-12 to give immediate attention to all leads which are received. Be certain to advise the Bureau (Attention: Crime Records Division) of any positive results attained through the publication of this article in "The American Weekly" magazine.

(Security Letters on attached page)

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-12

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(C) ANTI-TRUJILLO ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES - INTERNAL SECURITY - DOMINICAN REPUBLIC -- Information has been received from a confidential informant that many young anti-Trujillo Dominicans and followers of the 30th of March Battalion, an anti-Trujillo Dominican exile group, are purchasing weapons in various places in New York City. According to the informant, the young anti-Trujillo Dominicans are making purchases of weapons singly and in diverse establishments in New York City so as not to attract attention.

In view of the above information, agent personnel should exercise caution in interviews and contacts with young anti-Trujillo Dominicans and followers of the 30th of March Battalion.

3/7/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-12

(D) REPORT WRITING - SECURITY CASES -- It has been noted that on occasions some field offices fail to include in security reports information previously submitted for dissemination by letterhead memoranda. Apparently this omission is made on the theory that to include it in a subsequent report would be repetitious and an unnecessary expenditure of time. Page 33, Part I, FBI Handbook, indicates the results of investigations in security cases should generally be submitted in reports, and page 31, Part I, FBI Handbook, defines a report as a written document containing the results of an investigation as of a certain date. According to this definition, a report should be complete in itself and should contain all pertinent and material information obtained since the submission of a previous report or since the inception of an investigation.

This is being called to your attention so that in the future there will be no misunderstanding and all field offices will, when submitting reports in security cases, include succinctly all pertinent and material information previously submitted for dissemination in letterhead memoranda. You are also cautioned that letterhead memoranda containing information which will later be placed in reports should only be submitted when it is believed expeditious dissemination of the particular information must be made and time is of the essence.

These instructions are intended to amplify and not to change in any way present rules relating to report writing.

Very truly yours,  
John Edgar Hoover

Director

3/7/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-12

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

March 14, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) BUREAU AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS -- There has been an increase of twenty-five accidents involving Bureau cars during the first seven months of fiscal year 1961 as compared with a like period in fiscal year 1960. Although the adverse weather conditions throughout the country during the past several months undoubtedly had a bearing on the increase, this upward trend is most undesirable and must be reversed. You should place increased emphasis on safe driving practices and insure that all Bureau drivers exercise the highest degree of caution in the operation of the Bureau's automotive equipment.

During the past two or three months there have been a number of reported brake failures on Bureau cars which contributed to accidents. Employees responsible for the operation, inspection and maintenance of Bureau cars must be constantly alert for any advance warning of possible brake failure and when such warning is noted the vehicle should be removed from service, thoroughly inspected and corrective action taken to insure the vehicle is in safe operating condition. Further, during the regular monthly inspection of Bureau cars increased emphasis should be placed on the inspection of the brakes.

A large metropolitan police department reported they had experienced a number of brake failures particularly while cars equipped with automatic transmissions were being used on high-speed chases and fast-moving surveillances. Inspection of the cars disclosed no mechanical defects; however, they discovered that some of their officers were "riding the brake pedal" with their left foot. This caused overheating of the brakes and resulted in temporary brake failure. You should caution all Bureau drivers against such a faulty driving habit.

3/14/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-13

(B) SPEECH MATTERS -- When declining invitations for field representatives to discuss the subject of communism, the utmost discretion and good judgment must be exercised at all times to preclude conveying the wrong impression as to why only headquarters representatives discuss this topic. You should tactfully point out that because of the complexity and nationwide scope of the communist threat, and the fact that a

specialized knowledge is necessary to thoroughly portray the latest fluctuations of this conspiracy from a national standpoint, it has been the Bureau's policy to restrict such speeches to those made by specialists in this field assigned to Bureau headquarters.

Bureau speakers must also meticulously refrain from discussing the subject of organized crime while handling speech commitments. The Bureau' long-standing policy of not commenting upon pending investigative matters can be pointed out in declining to discuss or answer questions on this topic. Published data, such as the Uniform Crime Reports, can, of course, be cited.

3/14/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-13

(C) FOREIGN LANGUAGE TRAINING PROGRAM -- The Bureau requires at the present time additional candidates interested in Foreign Language Training. Please review Section (B), SAC Letter No. 60-12, dated 2/23/60, and canvass your office for volunteers. Do not confine your survey to the languages mentioned in the last paragraph of that SAC Letter. It would be helpful if the Agents did not restrict themselves to the study of any one language but were available for an assignment which best suited the needs of the service. Please let the Bureau have the results thirty days from the date of this letter. Include your personal recommendation in each case. Mark your reply for the attention of the FBI Laboratory.

3/14/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-13

(D) FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM.-- The Bureau has been advised that in the near future the Civil Service Commission (CSC) will begin an evaluation of the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program. The objectives of this evaluation will be to insure effective administration of the program and to ascertain what improvements may be made in the Act, regulations, procedures and health benefits plans. The evaluation will include visits by CSC regional representatives to various Government field establishments. During these visits, CSC representatives plan on conducting oral interviews and having a representative number of employees fill out questionnaires for the purpose of determining the adequacy and effective operation of this program.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-13

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CSC has advised that regional representatives have been instructed not to interview FBI employees. Also, the questionnaires are to be administered by Bureau personnel to our employees who should not identify themselves on the questionnaire. You should assure that these instructions are followed.

Immediately canvass SAMBA members and advise the Bureau within thirty days of any suggested changes in the SAMBA plan for future consideration at the expiration of the contract period. If contacted by the CSC, you should also review the questionnaires executed by our employees for any additional suggestions and advise the Bureau.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-13

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(E) ANTITRUST -- The Attorney General recently stated that the Antitrust Division should emphasize criminal Antitrust cases and in connection therewith should utilize the services of the FBI to a greater extent and institute criminal prosecutions where possible.

It can be expected that this will result in an increase in the number of criminal Antitrust matters referred to the Bureau for investigation and may result in more requests by Antitrust attorneys to confer with Agents concerning these investigations. At this time it is not expected that there will be any changes in any current policies and procedures for handling Antitrust matters. We should continue to participate in such conferences and if travel of Agents is required, such will be authorized when justification exists.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-13

(F) CRIMINAL INFORMANTS - TOP HOODLUM COVERAGE -- CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM -- SAC letters 57-70 dated December 13, 1957, 58-64 dated October 14, 1958, and 59-48 dated August 4, 1959, pointed out the urgent need for informants who can give direct information relative to Top Hoodlums on a continuing basis, and the need for constant re-evaluation of our informant coverage in order that the Bureau will be fully abreast of hoodlum activities. Informants of this type should be developed not only to obtain new cases for prosecution but for utilization on a long range basis in order to provide continuous intelligence information concerning organized crime. Through well-placed informants we must infiltrate organized crime groups to the same degree that we have been able to penetrate the Communist Party and other subversive organizations. Our coverage in this field must be just as extensive and effective as that achieved in security matters. Our responsibilities in these areas cannot be over-emphasized.

Today the press, television, and radio along with the express interests of the Administration keep this phase of criminal activity in a position of prominence in the public eye. Certainly we cannot relax even momentarily our efforts in combating the criminal underworld including the prosecution of Top Hoodlums. The foundation from which we forge our attack must be kept strong and fresh with a full flow of information from well-placed informants.

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All Agents in conducting investigation of criminal matters should be constantly alert for the development of new informants and new potential informants who may be in a position to assist us.

You should at this time re-examine this category of your criminal informant coverage to insure ample notice of new developments, full exploitation of possible Federal violations on the part of Top Hoodlums and their associates, and complete intelligence coverage in the field of organized crime. Such coverage must be carefully scrutinized from a geographical standpoint as well as on the basis of concentration of population to make certain that no phase of criminal activity is overlooked. After you have analyzed your present coverage, you should immediately concentrate on any areas which may need strengthening.

By way of an affirmative and positive approach, you should direct your action against hoodlums under investigation in your office, concentrating on their acquaintances, associates, and henchmen with a view to developing them as criminal informants. From footholds thus gained, the pattern of penetration should be broadened by the addition of new informants.

The responsibility for maintaining a comprehensive and effective criminal informant coverage of the hoodlum element rests with you, and must receive your careful consideration and personal attention on a continuing basis.

You should advise the Bureau within fifteen days of this letter (1) the results of the analysis and re-evaluation of your informant coverage in Top Hoodlum matters, (2) areas requiring improvement, (3) steps taken toward improving informant coverage in these areas, and (4) future plans for enlargement of your criminal informant program with relation to coverage of Top Hoodlums.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-13

(G) EXTORTION MATTERS -- The Bureau desires to reiterate instructions which pertain to the submission of extortion letters to the Laboratory for examination. Present instructions are that extortion letters are to be promptly forwarded to the

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Bureau airmail registered or regular mail registered, whichever is the faster means of communication.

Failure to comply with these instructions creates the possibility of criticism being directed toward the Bureau since prompt examination of such evidence may effect an early solution. This matter should be closely followed so that these instructions are strictly adhered to.

(Security Letters on attached pages)

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-13

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(H) COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE UNITED STATES PEACE CORPS - INTERNAL SECURITY - C -- Your attention is called to the United States Peace Corps which has been established by the President for the purpose of training young people and sending them abroad to project the image of our democratic way of life in foreign lands.

We have received information to the effect that Philip Bart, National Organizational Secretary, Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), has stated that it would be wise to have some Communist Party youth get into the newly formed Peace Corps at its inception. You can understand what this would mean to the project and to our country should the CPUSA succeed in infiltrating the Peace Corps and using it for communist purposes.

In order that the Bureau may fulfill its responsibilities in the security field, it is necessary that you determine just what the communists are doing in this area in order that we may keep the appropriate departments of the Executive Branch of the Government promptly advised regarding any communist penetration into the Peace Corps. Information obtained in this regard should be submitted under instant caption.

In the event a communist infiltration type of investigation is warranted, you should be guided by instructions contained in Section 87E of the Manual of Instructions and submit your recommendations to the Bureau.

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(I) AFRICAN ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES - INTERNAL SECURITY - AFRICA -- Recent disturbances and demonstrations at the United Nations, New York City, and in various United States cities, protesting the "murder" of Patrice Lumumba, deposed Premier of the Republic of Congo, are clear evidence of the capacity of subversive and nationalist elements in the United States to stir up agitation among African nationalists, American Negroes and others in the United States whose sympathy with the spread of nationalism in Africa does not always take into account the underlying motivation behind such agitation. The possibility that diplomatic representatives in the United States of Soviet-bloc nations and of nations sympathetic to the Soviet bloc could have a behind-the-scenes part in such agitation must not be overlooked.

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In April of 1960 the New York Office exercised excellent initiative in recognizing that a pattern of activities in the United States favoring African nationalism was emerging and in instituting a semiannual reporting procedure to present an over-all picture of such developments. Several field offices were drawn into this reporting procedure; however, the recent demonstrations in the United States indicate the desirability of an alertness on the part of all field offices to activities of this type taking place in the various Bureau field office territories. In this connection, therefore, the Bureau desires to utilize this file to collect a concise and factual over-all picture from all field offices of just what pattern is developing in the activities of African nationals in the United States and in the activities of individuals and groups here who seek to exploit the issue of African nationalism. It must be borne in mind that the increasing influx of African students, who are attending educational institutions throughout the United States, requires we be most alert not only to agitational and organizational activities of the students themselves, but also to the problem of uncovering pressures brought to bear on them and/or efforts to organize them by nationalists or subversive elements or by representatives of other nations.

In view of current developments in captioned matter, reports should be submitted by each office on January 15, April 15, July 15 and October 15 of each year until further notice. Eight copies of reports should be furnished to the Bureau. After reports are submitted which will afford an over-all picture of the situation confronting each office negative reports should not be submitted but a letter should be submitted indicating there is no change in the existing picture.

This file should be utilized as a control file to present a concise picture of the problem. It is not designed as a catchall for reporting individual case activity. Any data warranting investigation of organizations, groups or individuals should be handled in separate case files and only that data pertinent to showing the over-all picture should be repeated in this file. Information concerning racist activities in the United States which are unrelated to African nationalist activities should not be included in reports in this case.

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Reports in this matter should utilize logical headings and subheadings in order to enable an organized presentation. The Bureau file number is 105-87964. The New York Office is the office of origin.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-13

(J) CUBAN ALIEN REFUGEE REPORTS -- Bureau has arranged for Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) offices locally to furnish copies of reports pertaining to Cuban alien refugees in the United States to Bureau offices at field level. These reports generally contain brief identifying data concerning the alien including his whereabouts at the time he was interviewed by INS. They are normally submitted on INS Form I-161. While active investigation of these individuals is not desired in the absence of allegations indicating they are procommunist, pro-Soviet, anti-American, pro-Castro or are engaged in activities which would bring them within our investigative jurisdiction, they represent an excellent potential from whom intelligence information can be obtained and sources of information developed.

Offices receiving these reports should carefully review them with the thought in mind of interviewing the alien refugees on a selective basis for the purpose of developing intelligence data and assessing their potential as informants or sources in Cuban matters. It is realized that many refugees may not have information; however, you should bear in mind that if there is an indication a refugee was involved in counterrevolutionary activities he probably has information concerning such activities in Cuba. If refugee was Cuban official, it would be logical to expect he would have information concerning communist and Soviet orientation of Castro officials. Likewise, if he was in public relations field he could be expected to have data dealing with Cuban propaganda activity. Prior to conducting such interviews, review your office indices and if the data received from INS or the data located in your files indicates that a check of Bureau files would be desirable prior to the interview, then an expedite check of Bureau files should be requested. Sufficient background data should be furnished to facilitate this check. Your interviews should be designed to determine the full scope of each refugee's knowledge and this should be clearly shown in reporting the results of the interviews. This will enable the Bureau and any other field office having a direct interest in the data to request additional information on specific points where desirable.

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Pertinent concrete information elicited from the refugees would be of interest not only to the Bureau but also to other Government agencies. For this reason you should submit the results of such interviews under an appropriate caption in a form suitable for dissemination, submitting nine copies to the Bureau. Where warranted, appropriate investigations should be instituted on the basis of data obtained from these refugees. There is no need to obtain Bureau permission for these interviews unless some unusual circumstance exists. Advise the Bureau of the results of all interviews conducted.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-13

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-18

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

April 4, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) FBI SUGGESTION PROGRAM -- In connection with the Bureau's Suggestion Program, it has been noted that a number of suggestions have been received which, although they appear meritorious on the surface, actually would create more paper work or other administrative burden than they would relieve if adopted. This is not meant to discourage creative thought on the part of our employees, but should be borne in mind when considering the merits of each proposal.

In addition, where savings of a tangible nature are anticipated through the adoption of a suggestion, a statement indicating, as far as possible, the amount to be realized in savings should be set forth in the suggestion or accompanying comments. This is necessary so that the suggestor may receive due consideration for recognition under the Incentive Awards Program if his suggestion is adopted. In the past, it has been necessary on occasions for the Suggestions Desk to go back to the Division where the suggestion originated and have this point covered. This causes delay in processing the suggestion and unnecessary communications.

4/4/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-18

(B) 1962 SESSIONS - FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY -- The Sixty-ninth Session of the FBI National Academy will begin on Monday, March 19, 1962, and will graduate on Wednesday, June 6, 1962. The Seventieth Session will begin on Monday, August 13, 1962, and will graduate on Wednesday, October 31, 1962. You will be instructed at a later date as to when you should submit the names of candidates for these two sessions.

4/4/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-18

(C) PROTECTIVE CUSTODY -- During the recent retrial of a Bureau case, a Government witness on cross-examination refused to reveal her current address because she feared for her own safety and that of her child. When Court was adjourned for the day the Judge ordered the FBI to take the witness into protective custody until she completed her testimony.

The protection of a witness is clearly within the function of the United States Marshal's Office. The arbitrary action of the Judge in this case is a most undesirable precedent and may be seized upon by other Judges in the future to involve us in a situation outside our primary duties.

In the event of a similar request in the future, you should advise the United States Attorney to point out to the Court the function of the United States Marshal with respect to the protection of witnesses.

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(D) LAW ENFORCEMENT INTELLIGENCE UNIT -- This organization is comprised of representatives of law enforcement organizations located for the most part in the Far West and particularly in California. However, recent additions in its membership included representatives from police agencies as far eastward as Ohio and Florida. These members exchange data on hoodlums, gangsters and organized crime. Collection and dissemination of information are handled through the California State Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation at Sacramento.

The Bureau has taken no part in the activities of the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU) since it was organized in 1956.

This organization is holding an annual meeting at Reno, Nevada, on April 13 - 14, 1961. The existence of the organization is being called to your attention in order that you will be acquainted with its operations in the event any information concerning it should be referred to your office. In the event you learn of any new agencies being accepted as members of LEIU or of any other information of interest concerning the organization, the Bureau should be advised. You should take no action with respect to the activities of this organization and no comment should be made with respect to the merits of LEIU.

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(E) REPORTING CHINESE NAMES AND USE OF CHINESE TELEGRAPHIC CODE (CTC) NUMBER - REPORT WRITING - INDEXING -- In those instances where a Chinese name is reported in a communication,

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either in the title or text, you should insure that the Chinese Telegraphic Code number, if available, is included. The first time the name appears in either the title or the body of a communication, the Mandarin, Cantonese or other available dialectal spelling should be given followed by the code numbers. The code number should appear in sequence in such a manner that there will be no question as to which name it attaches where the names of several persons are listed.

The title should, of course, include the name as it is actually used by the person himself. Index cards on Chinese names should include the CTC number when it is available. The CTC number is a valuable factor for identification or elimination purposes but it should not be relied upon to the exclusion of other information. Instances have occurred where two persons have the same number or where two numbers are ascribed to the same individual.

(Security Letter on attached page)

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(F) NATIONALITY GROUP COVERAGE - CUBA -- On February 13, 1961,  
THIRD AGENCY CONSIDERATION

Each field office should assure that all pertinent data relating to such individuals is referred on a continuing basis to the appropriate local office of INS in order that action by INS looking toward possible exclusion, deportation, expatriation or denaturalization may be properly considered.

You will note that INS investigative action in these matters requires specific clearance with the FBI. In view of INS objectives and in view of the tense Cuban situation clearance should be granted upon request unless INS investigation of a particular individual would definitely interfere with a pending investigation or jeopardize your own interests in an individual. When clearance for INS investigation is not granted the Bureau should be advised promptly by airtel under the caption of the individual case of the denial and the reasons therefor. Any pending action which prompts the denial should be expedited in order that clearance can be granted INS as soon as practical. When granting clearance for INS investigative action be certain that arrangements are effected whereby you will be advised by INS of pertinent data developed and of any proceedings instituted regarding subjects of interest to your office.

THIRD AGENCY CONSIDERATION

You will recognize, however, that some local offices of INS; in order to implement their instructions, may request data regarding the July 26th Movement and other organizations supporting the Castro cause. Pertinent data should be supplied.

Any problems experienced by field offices in connection with INS activities in this regard should be brought to the attention of the Bureau promptly.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-18

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

April 5, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) NONDISCRIMINATION - GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT POLICY - GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS -- By Executive Order 10925 dated March 6, 1961, the President abolished the President's Committee on Government Employment Policy and the Government Contracts Committee and in lieu thereof established the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity. The President reaffirmed the policy that there be no discrimination against any employee or applicant for employment in the Federal Government or with contractors doing business with the Government and delegated to the new committee the authority to implement this policy. A copy of the Executive Order is enclosed.

As regards rules for effectuating the policy and provisions of Executive Order 10925 throughout the Department, the Attorney General by Departmental Order 239-61 dated March 17, 1961, reaffirmed regulations in this regard prescribed by the Departmental Order 105-55 dated November 21, 1955. He specified that all references in that Order to the President's Committee on Government Employment Policy shall be deemed to be references to the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity. This instruction by the Attorney General means there is no substantive change in provisions for complying with the nondiscrimination program. Manual revisions are being prepared.

At this time I want to strongly remind you of the prime importance of insuring that each applicant for any Bureau position is given consideration based entirely on his merit and fitness and without regard for his race, color, religion, or national origin. In view of the ever-increasing challenges facing the Bureau and our country, it is absolutely imperative that we make the best use of the human resources available so as to assure that our responsibilities are discharged in the best possible manner. This requires alertness and application at every level of our recruitment program, from contact with possible applicants through interview and investigation, to insure that the best qualified are eventually extended appointments.

You should emphasize this to all personnel who have occasion to participate in handling Bureau applicant matters. I shall continue to expect you to implement this policy and to make certain that the best qualified applicants for Bureau positions anywhere in the service are referred to the Bureau for appropriate consideration.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

Enclosure

## Executive Order 10925

### ESTABLISHING THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

WHEREAS discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin is contrary to the Constitutional principles and policies of the United States; and

WHEREAS it is the plain and positive obligation of the United States Government to promote and ensure equal opportunity for all qualified persons, without regard to race, creed, color, or national origin, employed or seeking employment with the Federal Government and on government contracts; and

WHEREAS it is the policy of the executive branch of the Government to encourage by positive measures equal opportunity for all qualified persons within the Government; and

WHEREAS it is in the general interest and welfare of the United States to promote its economy, security, and national defense through the most efficient and effective utilization of all available manpower; and

WHEREAS a review and analysis of existing Executive orders, practices, and government agency procedures relating to government employment and compliance with existing non-discrimination contract provisions reveal an urgent need for expansion and strengthening of efforts to promote full equality of employment opportunity; and

WHEREAS a single governmental committee should be charged with responsibility for accomplishing these objectives:

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

#### PART I—ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

SECTION 101. There is hereby established the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity.

SEC. 102. The Committee shall be composed as follows:

(a) The Vice President of the United States, who is hereby designated Chairman of the Committee and who shall preside at meetings of the Committee.

(b) The Secretary of Labor, who is hereby designated Vice Chairman of the Committee and who shall act as Chairman in the absence of the Chairman. The Vice Chairman shall have general supervision and direction of the work of the Committee and of the execution and implementation of the policies and purposes of this order.

(c) The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Secretary of Com-

merce, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Administrator of General Services, the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Each such member may designate an alternate to represent him in his absence.

(d) Such other members as the President may from time to time appoint.

(e) An Executive Vice Chairman, designated by the President, who shall be *ex officio* a member of the Committee. The Executive Vice Chairman shall assist the Chairman, the Vice Chairman and the Committee. Between meetings of the Committee he shall be primarily responsible for carrying out the functions of the Committee and may act for the Committee pursuant to its rules, delegations, and other directives. Final action in individual cases or classes of cases may be taken and final orders may be entered on behalf of the Committee by the Executive Vice Chairman when the Committee so authorizes.

SEC. 103. The Committee shall meet upon the call of the Chairman and at such other times as may be provided by its rules and regulations. It shall (a) consider and adopt rules and regulations to govern its proceedings; (b) provide generally for the procedures and policies to implement this order; (c) consider reports as to progress under this order; (d) consider and act, where necessary or appropriate, upon matters which may be presented to it by any of its members; and (e) make such reports to the President as he may require or the Committee shall deem appropriate. Such reports shall be made at least once annually and shall include specific references to the actions taken and results achieved by each department and agency. The Chairman may appoint sub-committees to make special studies on a continuing basis.

#### PART II—NONDISCRIMINATION IN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT

SECTION 201. The President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity established by this order is directed immediately to scrutinize and study employment practices of the Government of the United States, and to consider and recommend additional affirmative steps which should be taken by executive departments and agencies to realize more fully the national policy of nondiscrimination within the executive branch of the Government.

SEC. 202. All executive departments and agencies are directed to initiate forthwith studies of current government employment practices within their responsibility. The studies shall be in such form as the Committee may prescribe and shall include statistics on current employment patterns, a review of cur-

rent procedures; and the recommendation of positive measures for the elimination of any discrimination, direct or indirect, which now exists. Reports and recommendations shall be submitted to the Executive Vice Chairman of the Committee no later than sixty days from the effective date of this order, and the Committee, after considering such reports and recommendations, shall report to the President on the current situation and recommend positive measures to accomplish the objectives of this order.

SEC. 203. The policy expressed in Executive Order No. 10590 of January 18, 1955 (20 F.R. 409), with respect to the exclusion and prohibition of discrimination against any employee or applicant for employment in the Federal Government because of race, color, religion, or national origin is hereby reaffirmed.

SEC. 204. The President's Committee on Government Employment Policy, established by Executive Order No. 10590 of January 18, 1955 (20 F.R. 409), as amended by Executive Order No. 10722 of August 5, 1957 (22 F.R. 6287), is hereby abolished, and the powers, functions, and duties of that Committee are hereby transferred to, and henceforth shall be vested in, and exercised by, the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity in addition to the powers conferred by this order.

#### PART III—OBLIGATIONS OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS AND SUBCONTRACTORS

##### SUBPART A—CONTRACTORS' AGREEMENTS

SECTION 301. Except in contracts exempted in accordance with section 303 of this order, all government contracting agencies shall include in every government contract hereafter entered into the following provisions:

"In connection with the performance of work under this contract, the contractor agrees as follows:

"(1) The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, creed, color, or national origin. The contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin. Such action shall include, but not be limited to, the following: employment, upgrading, demotion or transfer; recruitment or recruitment advertising; layoff or termination; rates of pay or other forms of compensation; and selection for training, including apprenticeship. The contractor agrees to post in conspicuous places, available to employees and applicants for employment, notices to be provided by the contracting officer setting forth the provisions of this non-discrimination clause.

"(2) The contractor will, in all solicitations or advertisements for employees placed by or on behalf of the contractor,

state that all qualified applicants receive consideration for employment without regard to race, creed, color, or national origin.

"(3) The contractor will send to each labor union or representative of workers with which he has a collective bargaining agreement or other contract or understanding, a notice, to be provided by the agency contracting officer, advising the said labor union or workers' representative of the contractor's commitments under this section, and shall post copies of the notice in conspicuous places available to employees and applicants for employment.

"(4) The contractor will comply with all provisions of Executive Order No. 10925 of March 6, 1961, and of the rules, regulations, and relevant orders of the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity created thereby.

"(5) The contractor will furnish all information and reports required by Executive Order No. 10925 of March 6, 1961, and by the rules, regulations, and orders of the said Committee, or pursuant thereto, and will permit access to his books, records, and accounts by the contracting agency and the Committee for purposes of investigation to ascertain compliance with such rules, regulations, and orders.

"(6) In the event of the contractor's non-compliance with the nondiscrimination clauses of this contract or with any of the said rules, regulations, or orders, this contract may be cancelled in whole or in part and the contractor may be declared ineligible for further government contracts in accordance with procedures authorized in Executive Order No. 10925 of March 6, 1961, and such other sanctions may be imposed and remedies invoked as provided in the said Executive order or by rule, regulation, or order of the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, or as otherwise provided by law.

"(7) The contractor will include the provisions of the foregoing paragraphs (1) through (6) in every subcontract or purchase order unless exempted by rules, regulations, or orders of the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity issued pursuant to section 303 of Executive Order No. 10925 of March 6, 1961, so that such provisions will be binding upon each subcontractor or vendor. The contractor will take such action with respect to any subcontract or purchase order as the contracting agency may direct as a means of enforcing such provisions, including sanctions for non-compliance: *Provided, however,* that in the event the contractor becomes involved in, or is threatened with, litigation with a subcontractor or vendor as a result of such direction by the contracting agency, the contractor may request the United States to enter into such litigation to protect the interests of the United States."

Sec. 302. (a) Each contractor having a contract containing the provisions prescribed in section 301 shall file, and shall cause each of its subcontractors to file, Compliance Reports with the contracting agency, which will be subject to review by the Committee upon its request.

Compliance Reports shall be filed within such times and shall contain such information as to the practices, policies, programs, and employment statistics of the contractor and each subcontractor, and shall be in such form, as the Committee may prescribe.

(b) Bidders or prospective contractors or subcontractors may be required to state whether they have participated in any previous contract subject to the provisions of this order, and in that event to submit, on behalf of themselves and their proposed subcontractors, Compliance Reports prior to or as an initial part of their bid or negotiation of a contract.

(c) Whenever the contractor or subcontractor has a collective bargaining agreement or other contract or understanding with a labor union or other representative of workers, the Compliance Report shall include such information as to the labor union's or other representative's practices and policies affecting compliance as the Committee may prescribe: *Provided,* that to the extent such information is within the exclusive possession of a labor union or other workers' representative and the labor union or representative shall refuse to furnish such information to the contractor, the contractor shall so certify to the contracting agency as part of its Compliance Report and shall set forth what efforts he has made to obtain such information.

(d) The Committee may direct that any bidder or prospective contractor or subcontractor shall submit, as part of his Compliance Report, a statement in writing, signed by an authorized officer or agent of any labor union or other workers' representative with which the bidder or prospective contractor deals, together with supporting information, to the effect that the said labor union's or representative's practices and policies do not discriminate on the grounds of race, color, creed, or national origin, and that the labor union or representative either will affirmatively cooperate, within the limits of his legal and contractual authority, in the implementation of the policy and provisions of this order or that it consents and agrees that recruitment, employment, and the terms and conditions of employment under the proposed contract shall be in accordance with the purposes and provisions of the order. In the event that the union or representative shall refuse to execute such a statement, the Compliance Report shall so certify and set forth what efforts have been made to secure such a statement.

Sec. 303. The Committee may, when it deems that special circumstances in the national interest so require, exempt a contracting agency from the requirement of including the provisions of section 301 of this order in any specific contract, subcontract, or purchase order. The Committee may, by rule or regulation, also exempt certain classes of contracts, subcontracts, or purchase orders (a) where work is to be or has been performed outside the United States and no recruitment of workers within the limits of the United States is involved;

for standard commercial supplies or raw materials; or (c) involving less than specified amounts of money or specified numbers of workers.

#### SUBPART B—LABOR UNIONS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF WORKERS

Sec. 304. The Committee shall use its best efforts, directly and through contracting agencies, contractors, state and local officials and public and private agencies, and all other available instrumentalities, to cause any labor union, recruiting agency or other representative of workers who is or may be engaged in work under government contracts to cooperate with, and to comply in the implementation of, the purposes of this order.

Sec. 305. The Committee may, to effectuate the purposes of section 304 of this order, hold hearings, public or private, with respect to the practices and policies of any such labor organization. It shall from time to time submit special reports to the President concerning discriminatory practices and policies of any such labor organization, and may recommend remedial action if, in its judgment, such action is necessary or appropriate. It may also notify any Federal, state, or local agency of its conclusions and recommendations with respect to any such labor organization which in its judgment has failed to cooperate with the Committee, contracting agencies, contractors, or subcontractors in carrying out the purposes of this order.

#### SUBPART C—POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AND OF CONTRACTING AGENCIES

Sec. 306. The Committee shall adopt such rules and regulations and issue such orders as it deems necessary and appropriate to achieve the purposes of this order, including the purposes of Part II hereof relating to discrimination in government employment.

Sec. 307. Each contracting agency shall be primarily responsible for obtaining compliance with the rules, regulations, and orders of the Committee with respect to contracts entered into by such agency or its contractors, or affecting its own employment practices. All contracting agencies shall comply with the Committee's rules in discharging their primary responsibility for securing compliance with the provisions of contracts and otherwise with the terms of this Executive order and of the rules, regulations, and orders of the Committee pursuant hereto. They are directed to cooperate with the Committee, and to furnish the Committee such information and assistance as it may require in the performance of its functions under this order. They are further directed to appoint or designate, from among the agency's personnel, compliance officers. It shall be the duty of such officers to seek compliance with the objectives of this order by conference, conciliation, mediation, or persuasion.

Sec. 308. The Committee is authorized to delegate to any officer, agency, or employee in the executive branch of the

Government any function of the Committee under this order, except the authority to promulgate rules and regulations of a general nature.

Sec. 309. (a) The Committee may itself investigate the employment practices of any government contractor or subcontractor, or initiate such investigation by the appropriate contracting agency or through the Secretary of Labor, to determine whether or not the contractual provisions specified in section 301 of this order have been violated. Such investigation shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures established by the Committee, and the investigating agency shall report to the Committee any action taken or recommended.

(b) The Committee may receive and cause to be investigated complaints by employees or prospective employees of a government contractor or subcontractor which allege discrimination contrary to the contractual provisions specified in section 301 of this Order. The appropriate contracting agency or the Secretary of Labor, as the case may be, shall report to the Committee what action has been taken or is recommended with regard to such complaints.

Sec. 310. (a) The Committee, or any agency or officer of the United States designated by rule, regulation, or order of the Committee, may hold such hearings, public or private, as the Committee may deem advisable for compliance, enforcement, or educational purposes.

(b) The Committee may hold, or cause to be held, hearings in accordance with subsection (a) of this section prior to imposing, ordering, or recommending the imposition of penalties and sanctions under this order, except that no order for debarment of any contractor from further government contracts shall be made without a hearing.

Sec. 311. The Committee shall encourage the furtherance of an educational program by employer, labor, civic, educational, religious, and other non-governmental groups in order to eliminate or reduce the basic causes of discrimination in employment on the ground of race, creed, color, or national origin.

#### SUBPART D—SANCTIONS AND PENALTIES

Sec. 312. In accordance with such rules, regulations or orders as the Committee may issue or adopt, the Committee or the appropriate contracting agency may:

(a) Publish, or cause to be published, the names of contractors or unions which it has concluded have complied or have failed to comply with the provisions of this order or of the rules, regulations, and orders of the Committee.

(b) Recommend to the Department of Justice that, in cases where there is substantial or material violation or the threat of substantial or material violation of the contractual provisions set forth in section 301 of this order, appropriate proceedings be brought to enforce those provisions, including the enjoining, within the limitations of applicable law, of organizations, individ-

uals or groups who prevent directly or indirectly, or seek to prevent directly or indirectly, compliance with the aforesaid provisions.

(c) Recommend to the Department of Justice that criminal proceedings be brought for the furnishing of false information to any contracting agency or to the Committee as the case may be.

(d) Terminate, or cause to be terminated, any contract, or any portion or portions thereof, for failure of the contractor or subcontractor to comply with the nondiscrimination provisions of the contract. Contracts may be terminated absolutely or continuance of contracts may be conditioned upon a program for future compliance approved by the contracting agency.

(e) Provide that any contracting agency shall refrain from entering into further contracts, or extensions or other modifications of existing contracts, with any non-complying contractor, until such contractor has satisfied the Committee that he has established and will carry out personnel and employment policies in compliance with the provisions of this order.

(f) Under rules and regulations prescribed by the committee, each contracting agency shall make reasonable efforts within a reasonable time limitation to secure compliance with the contract provisions of this order by methods of conference, conciliation, mediation, and persuasion before proceedings shall be instituted under paragraph (b) of this section, or before a contract shall be terminated in whole or in part under paragraph (d) of this section for failure of a contractor or subcontractor to comply with the contract provisions of this order.

Sec. 313. Any contracting agency taking any action authorized by this section, whether on its own motion, or as directed by the Committee, or under the Committee's rules and regulations, shall promptly notify the Committee of such action or reasons for not acting. Where the Committee itself makes a determination under this section, it shall promptly notify the appropriate contracting agency of the action recommended. The agency shall take such action and shall report the results thereof to the Committee within such time as the Committee shall provide.

Sec. 314. If the Committee shall so direct, contracting agencies shall not enter into contracts with any bidder or prospective contractor unless the bidder or prospective contractor has satisfactorily complied with the provisions of this order or submits a program for compliance acceptable to the Committee or, if the Committee so authorizes, to the contracting agency.

Sec. 315. Whenever a contracting agency terminates a contract, or whenever a contractor has been debarred from further government contracts, because of noncompliance with the contractor provisions with regard to nondiscrimination, the Committee, or the contracting agency involved, shall promptly notify the Comptroller General of the United States.

#### SUBPART E—CERTIFICATES OF MERIT

Sec. 316. The Committee may provide for issuance of a United States Government Certificate of Merit to employers or employee organizations which are or may hereafter be engaged in work under government contracts, if the Committee is satisfied that the personnel and employment practices of the employer, or that the personnel, training, apprenticeship, membership, grievance and representation, upgrading and other practices and policies of the employee organization, conform to the purposes and provisions of this order.

Sec. 317. Any Certificate of Merit may at any time be suspended or revoked by the Committee if the holder thereof, in the judgment of the Committee, has failed to comply with the provisions of this order.

Sec. 318. The Committee may provide for the exemption of any employer or employee organization from any requirement for furnishing information as to compliance if such employer or employee organization has been awarded a Certificate of Merit which has not been suspended or revoked.

#### PART IV—MISCELLANEOUS

SECTION 401. Each contracting agency (except the Department of Justice) shall defray such necessary expenses of the Committee as may be authorized by law, including section 214 of the Act of May 3, 1945, 59 Stat. 134 (31 U.S.C. 691): *Provided*, that no agency shall supply more than fifty per cent of the funds necessary to carry out the purposes of this order. The Department of Labor shall provide necessary space and facilities for the Committee. In the case of the Department of Justice, the contribution shall be limited to furnishing legal services.

Sec. 402. This order shall become effective thirty days after its execution. The General Services Administration shall take appropriate action to revise the standard Government contract forms to accord with the provisions of this order and of the rules and regulations of the Committee.

Sec. 403. Executive Order No. 10479 of August 13, 1953 (18 F.R. 4899), together with Executive Orders Nos. 10482 of August 15, 1953 (18 F.R. 4944), and 10733 of October 10, 1957 (22 F.R. 8135), amending that order, and Executive Order No. 10557 of September 3, 1954 (19 F.R. 5655), are hereby revoked, and the Government Contract Committee established by Executive Order No. 10479 is abolished. All records and property of or in the custody of the said Committee are hereby transferred to the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, which shall wind up the outstanding affairs of the Government Contract Committee.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
March 6, 1961.

[F.R. Doc. 61-2093; Filed, Mar. 7, 1961;  
10:06 a.m.]





PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC I TER NO. 61-24

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

April 27, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) NATIONALITY GROUP COVERAGE -- The increasing anti-United States attitudes and demonstrations stemming from the Cuban situation and "cold war" tensions are cause for concern and must be taken fully into account in connection with our investigative efforts.

There has been recent evidence of hostility and belligerence on the part of pro-Castro Cubans during attempted interviews by Special Agents. The Bureau has also received data indicating that the Communist Party of Mexico planned violent action against Special Agents of the FBI and Americans in Mexico. Subsequent data indicated the Communist Party of Mexico planned to prepare black lists of Americans in Mexico, to identify Special Agents of the FBI and agents of the Central Intelligence Agency and place them under surveillance, and to seize Americans and hold them as hostages in the event of war with Russia. Plans were made to conduct surveillances of members of the Communist Party of Mexico suspected of being informants. A war of nerves was contemplated involving planned damage to property and sabotage with wide-scale sabotage efforts planned in the event of war, including the organization, arming and training of militia from farm and labor elements to be used to defend Cuba if necessary.

This hostility and the grave steps contemplated undoubtedly were touched off as a part of an emotional reaction to the invasion of Cuba by anti-Castro elements. They are, however, clear evidence of what we should be prepared to contend with now and in the event anti-United States tensions increase. The planned actions of the Communist Party of Mexico demonstrate forcefully the capacity of a subversive organization to react militantly to an emergency situation. The activities of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in the United States reveal clearly the capacity of a nationality group organization to mobilize its efforts in such a situation so as to arrange demonstrations and influence public opinion.

Each Special Agent in Charge should assure that investigations and interviews related to nationality group activity are conducted with due caution and careful consideration of the safety of personnel handling this work. Care should be taken not to provoke hostility. Border offices should be particularly cautious in view of the militant hostility and reported plans of the Communist Party of Mexico.

The existing situation is such that all field offices must be most alert to the possibility of demonstrations by nationality groups which could lead to incidents involving

violence. Advise local police of such demonstrations at once and immediately advise Bureau under caption of particular matter indicating such action has been taken. The same instructions are applicable when data is received that individuals involved in nationality group situations may be illegally carrying arms.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-24

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-28

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

May 23, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) BOOKLET ENTITLED "HOW SERVICE STATIONS CAN HELP LAW ENFORCEMENT" -- Captioned booklet has been prepared by the Bureau for distribution to service station operators and other interested individuals throughout the country. Two thousand copies are being forwarded to each office, under separate cover, together with a copy of the press release which will be made from the Department on May 28. Those divisions having headquarters offices of major gasoline distributors should immediately contact the appropriate officials of these companies and call the booklet to their attention, pointing out that the booklet is available in quantity for distribution to their retail outlets. All offices should identify retail associations of gasoline dealers within their divisions and contact the appropriate officers to call the availability of the booklet to their attention. The June, 1961, issue of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin will include an item concerning the booklet. The Bureau will welcome the interest of other law enforcement agencies in distributing the publication.

5/23/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-28

(B) PERFORMANCE RATINGS -- A review of the annual performance ratings recently submitted clearly indicates that rating and reviewing officials have not completely familiarized themselves with instructions set out in the Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part I, Section 5, pertaining to performance ratings. Furthermore, in evaluating employee performance many rating and reviewing officials have failed to give due consideration to such important matters as disciplinary action, limited duty, voluntary overtime and the weight program. It was obvious some ratings had been written without sufficient preparation and care and had not been thoroughly reviewed before being transmitted to the Bureau. This resulted in needless delay in processing the ratings, as well as in unnecessary correspondence. Responsibility for the proper evaluation of employee performance and the accuracy of performance ratings rests with the rating and reviewing officials and hereafter they will be held strictly accountable for every error, deviation from instructions and failure to properly evaluate the employee's performance.

The following are some of the items which have been the source of considerable correspondence and are being set forth for your future guidance.

(1) Failure to give due consideration to administrative action taken against an employee during the rating period. Certainly an employee who has been the recipient of several letters of censure or has been the subject of more severe administrative action during the rating period is not entitled to an adjective rating of Excellent.

(2) Failure to give due consideration to the physical condition of an employee. It should be obvious that a Special Agent who has been on limited duty during the greater portion of the rating period is not entitled to a satisfactory rating in physical fitness nor is he entitled to more than a Satisfactory adjective rating since he cannot perform all of the duties required of a Special Agent and his assignments must be controlled. It is the personal responsibility of the rating and reviewing officials to insure that employees with physical limitations are properly rated.

(3) Some rating and reviewing officials have not given due consideration to the employee's efforts to comply with the Bureau's weight standards and to equitably share the work load. It is difficult for the Bureau to understand how an employee who has not complied with the weight standards or whose overtime has been consistently below the office average can be rated excellent or outstanding in attitude.

(4) There have been a number of instances in which ratings afforded employee on the rating guide and check list and/or the narrative comments have not supported the adjective rating afforded the employee. In some instances the ratings on the rating guide and check list have been inconsistent with the narrative comments. The fact that an employee is rated excellent or outstanding on the majority of the items on the rating guide and check list does not automatically entitle him to an Excellent adjective rating. It should be obvious that although all of the items on the rating guide and check list are important, some of the items, such as attitude, judgment, initiative, accuracy, industry, productivity, knowledge of duties, investigative ability, development of informants and sources of information and reporting ability, are of particular importance in evaluating employee performance and must be carefully considered in arriving at the adjective rating.

(5) There have been a number of instances in which the ratings on the subelements on such items as investigative ability, reporting ability, executive ability and ability on raids

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and dangerous assignments did not support the over-all rating on the particular element. If an employee is to be rated excellent on any one of these elements he must be rated excellent or outstanding on the majority of the subelements or the narrative comments must clearly reflect the reason why the employee is considered excellent in the particular item. If an employee is to be rated outstanding on one of these elements he must be rated outstanding on each of the subelements in which he is rated.

(6) In some instances the narrative comments were not complete or the information submitted was misleading. In this regard the Manual of Rules and Regulations specifically sets out information which must be included and questions which must be answered. Rating officials who have followed the format and answered the questions outlined in the Manual have experienced little difficulty in the preparation of performance ratings; however, those who erroneously assume a complete knowledge of the regulations invariably submit incomplete and inaccurate ratings. Particular attention must be given to the specific comments required on police instructors, sound men, resident agents, accountants, language ability, disciplinary action and administrative advancement to insure that complete and accurate information is set out. In regard to disciplinary action it is imperative that the rating official set out each item of administrative action, including the date of the action and the reason for it, and specifically note the items on the rating guide and check list which have been affected by the action.

(7) If an employee is a relief supervisor and has been used in this capacity during the rating period he should be rated on item 21, executive ability, and if he has not been used in this capacity during the rating period the narrative comments should so indicate.

(8) In those cases in which there has been a deterioration in the employee's performance or serious deficiencies are noted it is the responsibility of the rating and reviewing officials to submit a cover memorandum with the rating setting out recommendations for appropriate action.

(9) It is imperative that ratings be prepared in sufficient time to reach the Bureau by the due date which is reflected in the Manual of Rules and Regulations and that a rating be submitted on each employee when due. Performance

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ratings are a most important aspect of the administrative operations of the Bureau and it is essential that they be promptly submitted so that various personnel actions can be handled as expeditiously as possible.

I shall expect you to take immediate steps to insure that all performance ratings, whether administrative or official annuals, on all employees are properly prepared in accordance with instructions set out in the Manual of Rules and Regulations and that every aspect of an employee's performance is placed in its proper perspective in evaluating and rating the employee. Rating and reviewing officials will be held personally responsible for the accuracy and completeness of the performance ratings and the proper evaluation of the employee's performance.

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(C) IDENTIFICATION MATTERS - FINGERPRINTING SUBJECTS OF FBI CASES -- A number of field offices have written in concerning the new "Prisoner Record and Reporting System" placed in operation February 26, 1961, for U. S. Marshals and Bureau of Prisons institutions. As a result of this system, two marshals have asked FBI to either fingerprint each Federal prisoner twice or route fingerprints through marshal headquarters in the arresting area whenever subject is released by a U. S. Commissioner or Federal judge before marshal has opportunity to take custody.

I am strongly opposed to duplicate fingerprinting and also delays which would occur if arrest fingerprints taken by FBI cleared through marshal before being received by Identification Division. These objections were voiced to Executive Office for U. S. Marshals which agreed to our stand. It was pointed out that Special Agents of the FBI do fingerprint incidental to an arrest whenever the person apprehended is released on bond or otherwise, or it appears that he will be released before being placed in custody of a marshal. We should insure that this is done in each instance. Indicate on the reverse side of the fingerprint card three copies of reply for marshal in district of apprehension. This conforms with procedure already in effect whereby all U. S. Marshal fingerprint cards are answered in triplicate. Show city and state where correspondence is to be sent. Upon receipt, marshal will retain one copy of record and will deliver one

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copy to U. S. Attorney and to U. S. Probation Officer. Fingerprinting incidental to an arrest includes the situation where a Federal prisoner incarcerated in an area where there is no deputy marshal is released at a hearing or arraignment before marshal can obtain his fingerprints.

Executive Office for U. S. Marshals also has agreed to have all marshals discontinue forwarding to Identification Division disposition of arrest data in FBI cases. Requirement that office of prosecution is responsible for furnishing such data on Form R-84 remains unchanged.

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(D) FBIRA MATTER - INTEROFFICE FIREARMS COMPETITION (PPC), 1961 -- In connection with the Annual Interoffice Firearms Competition, I have approved holding the competition for 1961 during the third outdoor firearms training period. The trophy, won by the Anchorage Office in 1960, will be presented to the office with the highest average percentage score of all Special Agents assigned to the office on July 1, 1961, not on limited duty.

I want each Special Agent in Charge to again actively support this competition. The rules and method of reporting the scores and averages will be forwarded to your office in the near future by the President of the FBIRA.

(Security Letters on attached pages)

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(E) NATIONALITY GROUP COVERAGE - CUBA -- The failure of the recent invasion attempt by Cuban rebel forces has accentuated the problem of investigating anti-Castro and pro-Castro groups and individuals in the United States. In addition to discharging our security and criminal responsibilities we are faced with the necessity of acquiring and providing other agencies informative and valid intelligence data relative to the objectives and activities of both factions as well as data regarding key personalities. Key field offices handling Cuban matters have been instructed previously to give continuous and preferred attention to all phases of Cuban activity.

In order to discharge these investigative and intelligence responsibilities with maximum effectiveness it is essential that particular attention be afforded the development on a broadly expanded basis of sources and informants in a position to provide knowledgeable data regarding pro-Castro and anti-Castro activities. The need for broadened coverage in the anti-Castro field by the FBI is quite evident when it is recognized there is as yet no firm indication of the extent of guidance and direction, if any, which will be afforded anti-Castro activity in the United States by other agencies of the U. S. Government. Any pertinent developments in this regard will be brought promptly to your attention in order to assure proper coordination. Advise Bureau promptly in event any such data is received at a local level.

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(F) SOVIET-BLOC ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS - (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND DISRUPTION) -- Your attention is directed to SAC Letter 60-34(E) and SAC Letter 60-36(H) which furnished instructions for handling a counterintelligence program against the Soviet-bloc intelligence services aimed at neutralizing or disrupting their activities.

During a conference held at the Bureau May 8 and 9, 1961, attended by representatives of 18 field offices which handle the bulk of the Bureau's security work, it was noted that this program of harassment and disruption has been successful and the conference concluded that it should be continued and, if possible, expanded in the future. It was noted particularly that the Soviet-bloc intelligence services are very sensitive to adverse publicity and it was considered desirable to foster such publicity wherever possible in the future. You should, therefore, continue to furnish to the

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Bureau data regarding Soviet-bloc activities in those instances where you believe some effective counterintelligence action can be taken. It is suggested that agents handling individual cases be alerted to this possibility and that each case individually be considered for such action particularly in those instances where Soviet-bloc officials travel throughout the United States on reconnaissance trips, to make public appearances before various groups, or to attend conventions, scientific exhibitions, et cetera. However, no action should be taken without Bureau approval unless previously authorized.

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(G) SECURITY INDEX -- It has been suggested that in the case of Security Index (SI) subjects the labor union affiliation, if any, be shown on the SI cards.

This matter was discussed at a recent Internal Security - Espionage Conference held at the Bureau and attended by representatives of 16 field offices. It was the opinion of the Conference that the listing of such information on the SI cards would materially facilitate any future surveys that need be conducted in connection with infiltration of subversives into labor unions.

This matter should be handled as the cases are opened for semiannual verification of residences and employments. If it is determined that a subject is affiliated as either a member or officer of a labor union, that information should be set out on Form FD-122 under the heading, "Employment" and submitted to the Bureau in order that such may be added to the SI cards.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-29  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

May 29, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) DIRECTOR'S TESTIMONY ON MARCH 6, 1961, BEFORE THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS - FISCAL YEAR 1962 -- Copies of my testimony before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations on March 6, 1961, regarding the 1962 appropriation request of the FBI, will be sent to your office in the near future. These copies are to be made available to the personnel of your office who desire to review a copy. There will be about one copy for every two employees in the supply furnished.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-29

(B) POISON CONTROL CENTERS -- A "Directory of Poison Control Centers" dated April, 1961, issued by the U. S. Public Health Service is being forwarded to you separately. Retain this pamphlet for ready reference purposes in the event you need immediate advice concerning antidotes to counteract ingestion of poisons pending arrival of a physician. The directory lists facilities available throughout the U. S. Make certain employees in your office are aware of the existence of this pamphlet.

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(C) RAIDS - ARM BANDS FOR USE IN - SUPPLIES -- Immediately check to make certain your office has an adequate supply of the standard arm band to be utilized in raids as provided for in the Bureau's manuals. You should insure a supply sufficient to provide fifty per cent of your Agent personnel with them. Should your supply not equal that minimum, immediately requisition same.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-29

(D) TRAINING - MOTION-PICTURE FILMS -- The Bureau is considering producing four new training films in color. In order to insure that the proposed films serve the best interests of the Bureau in the field of training for our own personnel as well as for law enforcement in general, each Special Agent in Charge and Seat of Government division should submit suggestions concerning a topic for these films. Your consideration should be based on what films we presently have available for use, whether you believe these films are dated and should be replaced and also what you feel the

actual need is at the present time for training films. The ideal topic for the new training films should be one that would be conducive to use by the Bureau in training its own personnel as well as in field police training. Your comments and suggestions should be sent, attention Training and Inspection Division, within thirty days.

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(E) BORDER STOPS - SUBJECTS DEPARTING U. S. -- Due to heavy volume of traffic at most crossing points along Mexican and Canadian borders, requests to border offices to place stops should be made only on a highly selective basis. Any exit stop placed with border officials must be placed with respective immigration or custom officials of the Mexican or Canadian Government. At the heavily traveled border crossing points, particularly on the Mexican border, very little control is exercised by these officials and Americans frequently are not stopped. Mexican Tourist Cards are required only for individuals bound for the interior of Mexico. Requests for exit stops should be limited to important cases where direct liaison with foreign officials or surveillance by Bureau Agents is justified. In making requests, border offices should be furnished with approximate time and place of crossing, full description of subject, including photograph, and vehicle.

(Security Letter on attached pages)

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(F) CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES -- The Castro regime has received a tremendous boost as a result of its defeat of the anti-Castro forces during the recent invasion of Cuba. Castro's prestige has risen not only among his followers in this country but also throughout many of the Central and South American countries. His followers in the United States have benefited prestigewise from his victory and as a result we have had a resurgence of pro-Castro activities, particularly involving the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. We can expect this activity to increase, particularly in the intelligence and propaganda fields.

One of the major problems in our Cuban work is that of intelligence activities. Heretofore Cuban intelligence activities in this country have been aimed primarily at the various anti-Castro groups. The continued drift of Cuba into the Soviet orbit and the continued dependence of the Cuban Government upon Russia and its satellite countries for economic and military assistance could conceivably result in the undertaking by Cuban intelligence of activities against the United States itself. We must be prepared to meet any such threat.

Perhaps the most effective means of fighting this Cuban intelligence problem is through good source, informant and double agent coverage. Since the break in United States - Cuban relations in January, 1961, we have been hampered to some degree by our loss of special coverage on Cuban diplomatic establishments in Miami, New York and Washington, D. C. Other sources have compensated for this loss to some degree; however, we cannot fulfill our obligations unless there is a continuing effort to develop new sources, informants and double agents who can keep us abreast of developments in the Cuban intelligence field.

One phase of this coverage which warrants special mention is that of double agents. There is a definite need for improvement in this type coverage and the Bureau expects key offices involved in Cuban work to lead the way in the development and utilization of double agents. The Bureau believes that the present time would be ideal to infiltrate double agents into the pro-Castro ranks. Individuals utilized could use approach that although they have been anti-Castro in the past they are now disenchanted with the leaders of the various anti-Castro groups; they do not agree with the United States role in the recent invasion of Cuba by anti-Castro forces; and they now feel that Castro's policies are best for Cuba. One special segment of present anti-Castro individuals who might be utilized along these lines are those who have recently returned from

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anti-Castro training camps abroad. These individuals might have a special appeal to the pro-Castro forces since many of these individuals are ostensibly disheartened by the recent unsuccessful invasion of Cuba.

The problem of Cuban intelligence activities can be solved only if the field offices involved afford these cases vigorous investigative attention and have coverage which will supply needed data. The Bureau expects that field offices involved in Cuban work will keep on top of this situation not only that we may discharge our own investigative responsibilities but also that we may develop intelligence data of special interest to other Government agencies.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

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PERS L ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-31

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

June 6, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) TRAINING - POLICE TRAINING FILMS -- Recently, there have been several errors by the field in connection with handling of police training films. Since Bureau receives so many requests for the use of our films, it is necessary that we frequently change the instructions in regard to forwarding them; accordingly, it is imperative that Bureau instructions be accurately followed so that no office is deprived of the use of films.

In some instances field offices have requested that films be sent direct to law enforcement officers, and those individuals have returned the films to Bureau after use even though Bureau had instructed that the films be forwarded elsewhere. When you request that films be sent direct to a law enforcement officer, you should instruct the officer to either return the film to your office or contact your office before forwarding it. If you cannot rely upon the officer to do so, you should not request that films be sent direct to him.

You should make certain that all employees in your division responsible for handling films realize the necessity of prompt, accurate forwarding of films. Appropriate administrative action will be taken in those instances in which Bureau instructions are not followed.

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(B) INTERNATIONAL SERVICES OF INFORMATION FOUNDATION, INC. (ISI) -- The ISI, which has its headquarters in Baltimore, Maryland, and an office in Elizabeth, New Jersey, was organized in 1946. It is headed by Ulius Louis Amoss, a former colonel in the Air Force. A number of other former officers in various branches of the Armed Forces of the United States are listed as officers in ISI, and, according to one official, former military officers are used to solicit contributions to finance the organization's activities. These individuals reportedly are paid a 25 per cent commission on all funds they collect.

ISI is a private intelligence agency which publishes a pamphlet entitled INFORM for distribution to its subscribers. Data appearing in the pamphlet appears to be a rehash of old information which has been given a sensational slant. Amoss formerly was connected with the Office of Strategic Services and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the latter group has described him as a "flop and fabricator." A limited investigation on both ISI

and Amoss has been conducted but no information indicating an espionage or Registration Act violation was developed.

Should any representatives of ISI contact your office, you should accept any information volunteered, but under no circumstances should they be afforded any assistance. No comment regarding ISI or Amoss should be made to persons outside the FBI without specific Bureau approval. Inquiries should be answered in accordance with instructions contained in Section B of SAC letter No. 61-20.

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(C) AUTOMOBILES - SEMIANNUAL MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT - FORMS FD-111 AND FD-111A -- In connection with the preparation of the above forms, a number of errors are being made. Therefore, the following items are being brought to your attention:

1. Only the original of these forms is to be submitted to the Bureau. They are to be prepared in typewritten form.
2. On cars transferred to or from an office, only the data concerning mileage, operating and maintenance costs incurred by your office during the period cars were in your possession should be reported by you.
3. Gallons of gasoline and mileage should be reported in whole figures only.
4. The purchase, installation and maintenance cost of special equipment is to be included in the proper column on Form FD-111.
5. The amount shown in the "Subtotal" column under "Direct Maintenance and Repair" should include only the cost shown in the columns captioned "Commercial," "Government," and "Due to Accident Damage."
6. Reports are late in reaching the Bureau. You are reminded that Forms FD-111 and FD-111a are to reach the Bureau no later than July 15 and January 15.

You are to give closer attention to the preparation of future reports to insure their accuracy.

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(D) TRAINING - POLICE-PUBLIC RELATIONS SCHOOLS -- Your attention is directed to SAC letter 61-27, (A), captioned "Training - Police Administrative Schools," in which the Bureau's interest in command-level schools was set forth. To further aid the Field in furnishing command-level schools to local law enforcement agencies, there is attached a curriculum used by one of the Field Divisions in giving a command-level school on Police-Public Relations. The Bureau has noted an increasing interest in this particular subject by local law enforcement agencies, and such curriculum on Police-Public Relations may meet the need for this timely subject by most local law enforcement agencies.

It is requested that you furnish the Bureau any suggested topics suitable for command-level schools. It should be noted that if the command-level schools program is to be successful, it will be necessary to vary the central topic from year to year to eliminate repetition and maintain the interest of local law enforcement officers for this type of school. All suggestions pertaining to topics for command-level schools should be sent, Attention: Training and Inspection Division.

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(E) INTERVIEWS - EXCESSIVE LENGTH -- In spite of repeated instruction on the subject, it is necessary at this time to again call attention to the provisions of Part I, Section 9 D, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations prohibiting prolonged interviews of employees who are involved in allegations of misconduct or improper performance of duty. Such interviews must be conducted efficiently and concluded without undue delay so that the interviewees will have no cause for complaint about the length of time they are questioned. All Bureau officials will be expected to insure that this rule is carefully observed at all times.

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(F) INTERVIEWS WITH SUBJECTS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS - INCOME TAX MATTERS -- In interviewing subjects of criminal investigations where the possibility exists the subject may have evaded payment of income taxes or there is an apparent irregularity relating to the payment of income taxes, consideration should be given to inquiring of the subject as to whether he filed an income tax return for the pertinent period and where it was filed. Such an inquiry should not be made, of course, where there is a possibility that it will prejudice our case. In the event any information of interest to the Internal Revenue Service, Treasury Department, is obtained as the result of such an inquiry, it should, of course, be promptly referred to the local office of the Internal Revenue Service, and to the Bureau in form suitable for dissemination.

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(G) COMMITTEE FOR NONVIOLENT ACTION - SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT OF 1948 -- Recently the Committee for Nonviolent Action (CNVA) circulated copies of a leaflet captioned "THIS IS THE SAN FRANCISCO-MOSCOW WALK FOR PEACE." The leaflet contained a statement of "proposed action" and urged recipients to consider "Not serving in the armed forces and not registering for the draft."

The contents of the leaflet were taken up with the Department and the Department's reply stated:

"It is our view that the publication and/or distribution of copies of the leaflet might, under some circumstances, be in violation of 50 U.S.C. App. 462. However, we do not believe that investigation of this matter would be warranted unless it becomes apparent that the organization is making a concerted effort to persuade particular registrants, or those required to register under the Universal Military Training and Service Act, to evade military service. We would appreciate being advised of any information of that nature that may come to your attention."

In view of the Department's opinion if information is received indicating the organization is making a concerted effort to persuade registrants, or those required to register to evade military service, furnish the information to the Bureau in report form.

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When information is received from a United States Attorney's Office or from a local board that a registrant is in violation of the Selective Service Act of 1948, as a result of the propaganda issued by the CNVA, conduct full investigation in accordance with existing Bureau instructions concerning a delinquent registrant. Each such registrant should be thoroughly interviewed to identify other registrants who may be in violation of the act, persons who distributed the leaflet, and the actual author or authors of the leaflet. Upon completion present the delinquent registrant violation to the appropriate United States Attorney for his prosecutive opinion. When submitting the closing report include in the synopsis specific data showing registrant became delinquent as a result of following the advice of the CNVA.

When information is received that a nonregistrant is counseling, aiding, or abetting a violation of the Selective Service Act of 1948 in furtherance of the activities of the CNVA interview complainant thoroughly and submit a closing report to the Bureau for referral to the Department. These reports on nonregistrants should contain a dual caption as: John Doe - Committee for Nonviolent Action. The character will be Selective Service Act of 1948.

Five copies of reports on registrants as well as nonregistrants should be submitted to the Bureau and one copy of each closing report should be submitted to the New York Office since the headquarters of CNVA are located in New York City.

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(H) CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM -- DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION -- In view of the position which has been taken by the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice restricting the dissemination of reports submitted under the Criminal Intelligence Program to the Department, your attention is being directed to existing instructions concerning the prompt dissemination of information of interest to other governmental agencies.

Even though reports in the Criminal Intelligence Program are disseminated only to the Department, there has been no change in the instructions as to dissemination contained in part 2, section 5 of the Manual of Rules and Regulations. Dissemination to other governmental agencies required under this manual section must be handled on a timely basis and you should insure that all agents conducting investigations under the Criminal Intelligence Program

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are thoroughly familiar with this section of the manual. If any instances should arise where you consider dissemination inadvisable, the Bureau should be promptly advised.

As you are aware, the Department of Justice has sought the cooperation of other investigative agencies of the Federal government in furtherance of the Attorney General's attack on organized crime. As a result, other agencies, particularly the Internal Revenue Service, will be investigating notorious hoodlums and racketeers who are also being investigated under our Criminal Intelligence Program. You will already have disseminated to Internal Revenue Service information received indicating a possible tax violation on the part of these subjects. If Internal Revenue Service or another Federal investigative agency seeks further information from you, there is no objection to your disseminating such information under the provisions of the manual section previously referred to provided, of course, such dissemination will in no way interfere with the Bureau's interests. Where time is of the essence or where the information to be disseminated is relatively simple, there is no objection to this dissemination being made orally. A proper record should be made in your file covering such dissemination. If, however, the material is voluminous, an appropriate dissemination memorandum should be prepared in keeping with existing instructions and copies of such memoranda should be supplied to the Bureau.

You will, of course, recognize that as your investigation progresses additional information which should be disseminated may be developed. It would also appear that as you are advised by Internal Revenue Service or another Federal investigative agency as to developments in its investigation of a subject, information in your file not previously disseminated may become sufficiently pertinent to warrant further dissemination by you.

The Bureau is cooperating wholeheartedly with the Attorney General's drive on organized crime and to this end desires each Special Agent in Charge to insure that all information which should be disseminated to another Federal investigative agency is promptly forwarded to that agency in line with the manual instructions previously cited.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-31

(I) CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM - RESULTS OF CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCES AT THE SEAT OF GOVERNMENT -- It was the consensus of those in attendance that recent Criminal Intelligence Conferences

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held at the Seat of Government (SOG) provided an extremely valuable exchange of ideas and a sounding board to resolve mutual problems. Agents attending these conferences exhibited an excellent knowledge of their subject matter, which enabled informative and stimulating discussion of the activities of the organized hoodlum element in this country. The free exchange of ideas and investigative techniques gained through experience in criminal intelligence matters proved beneficial to all in attendance.

The following were some of the major areas covered in these discussions:

#### PROPOSED LEGISLATION

Keen interest was evidenced in some of the provisions of proposed legislation which would enable the Bureau to carry current investigations to a logical prosecutive conclusion. It was emphasized that the Bureau must now lay necessary groundwork in contemplation of the passage of proposed legislation in order that we will be in a position to move swiftly and efficiently when our responsibilities in this field are extended through a broadening of our jurisdiction.

Proposed legislation to combat organized crime and racketeering, now before Congress, comprises generally eight proposals which will either create new legislation or extend current legislation over which the Bureau has investigative jurisdiction.

Proposed legislation covering interstate and foreign travel in support of racketeering enterprises would prohibit travel in interstate or foreign commerce for the purpose of distributing the proceeds of any unlawful activity; committing any crime of violence to further any unlawful activity; or otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on of any unlawful activity. The term unlawful activity is defined as any enterprise involving gambling, liquor, narcotics, or prostitution offenses or extortion or bribery in violation of Federal or state laws.

A proposed amendment to the Obstruction of Justice statute would broaden this statute to make it a violation for any individual by force, threats, or injury to endeavor to intimidate any person who had furnished information to, or from whom information had been sought, by any investigative agency.

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of the United States. It would also make it a violation to wilfully furnish false and misleading information to any investigative agency of the government.

Proposed legislation covering the interstate use of wire communications for wagering would make it unlawful to lease, furnish, or maintain any wire communication facility with the intent that it be used for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest or to knowingly use such facility for any such purpose.

Proposed legislation covering the interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia would make it unlawful to transport interstate any record, ticket, certificate, bill, slip, token, paper, writing, or other paraphernalia designed for use in bookmaking or wagering pools with respect to a sporting event or any numbers, policy, bolita, or similar illegal games.

A proposal compelling testimony in certain labor racketeering cases would compel a witness to testify and afford him immunity against self-incrimination regarding matters on which he is compelled to testify in connection with the Hobbs Act (interference with interstate commerce by extortion or robbery) and Section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act (bribes by employers to union representatives).

Proposed amendments to the Fugitive Felon Act would broaden this statute to include all crimes punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year under the laws of the place from which the fugitive flees.

A proposed amendment to the Johnson-Preston Act, covering Interstate Transportation of Gambling Devices, would enlarge the description of gambling devices to include any machine or mechanical device designed primarily for use in connection with gambling. This proposal would also enlarge the category of persons to whom registration and filing provisions apply; it would grant immunity in specific instances to individuals involved in order to secure their testimony, and would extend the act to include transportation in foreign commerce.

It is emphasized that the above provisions are strictly in a proposal stage. However, a general knowledge of the contents of these proposals should be of value in shaping your investigative approach in this program.

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## BROADENING OUR INTELLIGENCE BASIS

It was concluded at these conferences that we must extend our intelligence coverage through the various echelons in the organized underworld to complement highly concentrated coverage we have attained and are perfecting on the top leaders of organized crime in this country. Our investigations have identified the top men to date as falling generally in older age groups. When these leaders are removed by prosecution, death, or normal underworld attrition, it will be necessary to be aware of the makeup of the younger element who will replace them. Our position, both from an intelligence standpoint and in consideration of future prosecution, will be greatly enhanced if we obtain this broader coverage of hoodlum groups at various levels.

In view of the possibility of our jurisdiction being extended to cover interstate gambling operations, it is also important that we develop a well-rounded picture of the integral functions of major gambling operations which would be of interest under the Interstate Gambling Activities classification. This will require that all offices are fully aware of the makeup, operational detail, and control of large scale gambling operations within their areas making use of interstate wire communication facilities for gambling purposes. As previously pointed out, these investigations will be aimed primarily at the top gamblers and hoodlums in control of such operations, and we cannot under any circumstances conduct investigation of a legitimate news service or other completely legitimate communications firm.

Other special groups which should be designated for special attention are labor racketeers who are influencing or controlling labor unions, either directly or through intermediaries, and hoodlums who specialize in the domination of racket activities on the United States water fronts.

## INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

It was generally agreed that the most productive and valuable coverage achieved to date in the Criminal Intelligence Program has been through the establishment of highly confidential sources in key locations. Such sources have provided insight into the organized hoodlum element which was unavailable through other means. From results obtained to date, there can be no question that such sources are invaluable and that our efforts should be concentrated on the establishment of additional comparable sources in order to afford a more complete picture of the inner workings and relationships of various hoodlum groups.

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Experience has shown that the most complete and intelligible information is obtained from a combination of highly confidential sources and live informants. Each operates as an invaluable adjunct to the other, as demonstrated by some of the best criminal intelligence operations we have in existence in various cities to date. Fragmentary information obtained from a highly confidential source, when interpreted and further identified through well-placed live informants, has become meaningful and extremely significant in our tracing of hoodlum activities. Conversely, isolated bits of information initially furnished by live informants, when fully exploited through the establishment of a highly confidential source, have proven extremely valuable in filling in our picture of underworld activities.

For these reasons, the importance of both of these types of sources cannot be overemphasized, and every effort should be made to improve our coverage in both areas.

With regard to the development of new live informants, you should be constantly alert and ready to fully exploit any opportunity offered to develop as informants highly placed members of the organized hoodlum element. It is recognized that the development of such an individual may result in unusual conditions or requests being presented by the potential informant. Such situations should be evaluated in proportion to the individual's potential value in this program, and the possibility of developing a live source on an upper level of the organized hoodlum element should not be dismissed arbitrarily.

COORDINATION OF INFORMATION OFFERING PROSECUTIVE POTENTIAL  
AND DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION

Among topics of primary importance discussed at these conferences was the goal whereby our criminal intelligence investigations will reach their culmination in successful prosecution of the leaders of organized crime. It is of paramount importance to understand that our current investigations must be coordinated and reported in such a way to provide the Department with necessary bases for prosecution. All information developed which may offer potential violations of statutes covered by other agencies should be promptly disseminated in keeping with existing instructions. Additionally, we must insure that our investigations are intelligently planned and sufficiently thorough that we will develop any possible violation of Federal law over which this Bureau has investigative jurisdiction. We must also be prepared to take full advantage of any new legislation which would provide the Bureau with extended jurisdiction to effectively combat the organized hoodlum element.

6/6/61

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## HOODLUM ACCOUNTS IN SWISS BANKS

The problem of tracing hoodlum funds was discussed and it was determined that information has been developed in a number of offices that top hoodlums are using numbered accounts in Swiss banks to maintain concealed cash reserves. Extreme difficulty has been experienced in developing full information concerning such accounts because of Swiss laws guaranteeing the secrecy of these accounts. In such instances, where it appears that a subject is dealing with foreign banking institutions, investigation should be conducted at correspondent banks in this country to determine if records of pertinent transactions may be available at the correspondent bank.

## THUMBNAIL SKETCHES

Discussion concerning the availability of a ready reference on hoodlums under investigation made it apparent that there is a need to maintain in each office a brief sketch on all hoodlum subjects under investigation throughout the Bureau. This investigative aid would list an up-to-date description, aliases, criminal associates, and other descriptive data, together with a brief documentation of the hoodlum. This sketch would be valuable in coordinating hoodlum investigation between field offices and in the preparation of reports. You will be advised in the near future of the mechanics of maintaining this Bureau-wide list of hoodlums under investigation.

It was also concluded during these discussions that all investigations of the organized hoodlum element will be referred to under the caption "Criminal Intelligence Program" and that the use of the caption "Top Hoodlum Program" in communications on these matters should be discontinued.

-----

This series of conferences demonstrated that our Criminal Intelligence Program has to date developed excellent coverage of the upper level organized criminal element in specific areas, and that this desired coverage must be extended throughout the country. This must be done to insure that the Bureau has a continuing broad and comprehensive picture of the activities of the organized hoodlum element in the United States.

6/6/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-31

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With the extension of this required coverage, you must organize your investigations to insure that you are fully exploiting your intelligence information for prosecutive potential. You must be mindful at all times that this program must ultimately result in the prosecution of key underworld figures, and you must employ every means at your disposal to bring about the early stages of this goal at the earliest possible date.

(Security Letter on attached pages)

6/6/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-31

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(J) REPORT WRITING -- STREAMLINING - SECURITY REPORTS -- The possibility of streamlining periodic reports in Security Index (SI) cases without losing accuracy or essential data was discussed at an Internal Security - Espionage Conference held at the Bureau on May 8-9, 1961, and attended by representatives of 16 field offices. As a result of recommendations submitted at this Conference, the Bureau is authorizing the utilization of a narrative-type statement setting forth the activities of a subject over a specified period of time as reported by informants. This particular report is susceptible to use primarily in those cases of extensive activity in subversive organizations.

For your utilization in discussing this matter with Agents engaged in security work, there is attached a sample report that should be utilized as a guideline for submission of reports in SI cases.

The type reporting described above and in the attached sample is not to be utilized in Smith Act of 1940 cases or Internal Security Act of 1950 cases with the exception of key facility cases.

This change in reporting procedure in no way relieves you of the responsibility of reporting in detail specific items of pertinence, such as information tending to establish a subject's knowledge of the basic aims and purposes of the subversive organization with which affiliated or information tending to establish that a subject holds revolutionary and/or anarchist beliefs.

The narrative statements must be statements of facts and not conclusions.

You will continue to use inserts, for example Form FD-302, recording the results of an interview, in accordance with current practices.

The location of the original informants' reports and/or channelizing memoranda from which the information reported is obtained will be shown on the cover pages of the report by file number and serial scope.

6/6/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-31

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Although the attached sample of the report does not include the Form FD-305 as part of the cover pages to the report, you should continue to use Form FD-305 in SI cases in accordance with current instructions.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures for (D) & (J)

6/6/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-31

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S A M P L E  
**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

<b>REPORTING OFFICE</b> CHICAGO	<b>OFFICE OF ORIGIN</b> CHICAGO	<b>DATE</b> 4/26/60	<b>INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD</b> 4/5-22/60
<b>TITLE OF CASE</b>  HAROLD P. PARKER, aka Harold Parker, Roy Brown, Ray Follett, Roy Follett		<b>REPORT MADE BY</b>  IDENTITY DELETED	
		<b>TYPED BY</b>	
		<b>CHARACTER OF CASE</b>  SM - SWP	

**REFERENCE:** Report of IDENTITY DELETED dated 4/8/59, at Chicago.

-C-

INFORMANTS

<u>IDENTITY OF SOURCES</u>	<u>Location</u>
DELETED	A) 134-259-922 thru 1109
	A) 134-1339-2 thru 25
	A) 134-236-462 thru 526

<b>APPROVED</b>	<b>SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE</b>	<b>DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW</b>			
<b>COPIES MADE:</b>  4 - Bureau (100-369005) (RM) 3 - Chicago (100-19416)					
<b>Dissemination Record of Attached Report</b>		<b>Notations</b>			
at Hand.					
File					
File					

COVER PAGE

S A M P L E

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONCONFIDENTIAL

## Copy to:

Report of: ~~IDENTITY DELETED~~  
Date: April 26, 1960

Office: CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Field Office File #: 100-19416

Bureau File #: 100-369005

Title: HAROLD P. PARKER

Character: SECURITY MATTER - SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY

Synopsis: HAROLD P. PARKER was a member of the Chicago Socialist Workers Party (SWP) Branch during 1957 and 1958; since 2/59, PARKER has been actively engaged in SWP activities at Chicago, in a leadership capacity, and has regularly attended Chicago SWP Branch affairs; during the pertinent period, PARKER has contributed money to the SWP, sold "The Militant," spoken as an SWP representative, served as the Chicago SWP Branch Acting Organizer, Financial Secretary, Fund Drive Director, and on the Local Executive Committee of this Branch.

- C -

CONFIDENTIAL

S A M P L E

CG 100-19416

IDENTITY OF SOURCES  
DELETED

A) 134-147-163 thru 281

A) 134-98-677 thru 740

65-645 - 65-90

A) 134-951-100 thru 119

DOCUMENTATION OF ORGANIZATIONS

Source

Organization

IDENTITY OF  
SOURCES DELETED

Militant Labor Forum

Young Socialist

Young Socialist Alliance

Young Socialist Alliance,  
Chicago

-B-  
COVER PAGE

CG 100-19416

DETAILS: AT CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

I. BACKGROUND

A. Employment

HAROLD PARKER continues to be employed as a chemist at the Stepan Chemical Company, 3250 South Kedzie Avenue, Chicago.

IDENTITY OF SOURCE  
AND SPECIAL AGENT  
RECEIVING INFORMATION  
DELETED

B. Residence

HAROLD PARKER continues to reside at 8035 South Kostner Avenue, Chicago.

(CG T-1, 4/20/60)

C. Identification Record

The records of the Bureau of Records and Communications, Chicago Police Department, were reviewed and revealed no information identifiable with HAROLD PARKER, subsequent to March 11, 1959.

(Investigative Clerk (IC)  
IDENTITY DELETED  
4/12/60)

D. Credit Record

A check was made at the Chicago Credit Bureau, Incorporated, and revealed no information pertaining to HAROLD PARKER, subsequent to March 4, 1957.

IDENTITY DELETED 4/6/60)

II. CONNECTIONS WITH THE  
SOCIALIST WORKERS  
PARTY (SWP)

A. History of Activities in, Attendance at  
Meetings of, and Positions Held in the SWP

Unless otherwise indicated, all SWP affairs mentioned in this report were held in Chicago.

HAROLD PARKER uses the name RAY or ROY FOLLETT in connection with SWP activities and is a member of the Chicago Branch Socialist Workers Party (CBSWP) and has actively engaged in CBSWP activities on a regular basis during the period from February, 1959, to April, 1960. PARKER attended 50 SWP scheduled activities including meetings, forums, socials, Local Executive Committee (LEC) meetings, conventions and conferences. During this time, PARKER served as Chicago Branch Local Executive Committee (CBLEC) member, Chicago Branch Financial Secretary, Chicago Branch National Fund Drive Director, and acting Chicago Branch Organizer. PARKER was recommended for National Committee (NC) SWP. During the past year PARKER served as an SWP speaker, panelist, and writer, a panelist and chairman of Militant Labor Forums, a characterization of which appears as an appendix hereto, and also active in the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) for the purpose of pushing for action within the organization and not for reforming or changing the NAACP on SWP instructions. PARKER pledged \$100.00 to SWP National Fund Drives on three separate occasions during 1959-60 and pledged \$20.00 to SWP Special National Fund Drive. During 1959-60 PARKER was in contact with FARRELL DOBBS and attended SWP meeting at which TOM KERRY talked on democratic centralism and its functions in the SWP.

CG T-1

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

FARRELL DOBBS and TOM KERRY were described in the April 5, 1961, edition of the "Militant," a weekly newspaper of the SWP, as National Secretary and National Committee Member, respectively, of the SWP.



CG 100-19416

HAROLD PARKER was a member of the CBSWP from 1957 through 1960 and actively participated in SWP affairs on a regular basis during 1959 and 1960. In addition to verifying PARKER'S positions in the SWP, reported his attendance at 20 scheduled SWP activities during 1959-60. PARKER was introduced at a Militant Labor Forum panel discussion on December 10, 1960, entitled "Is There a Road to Peace or is There Peace?" as an SWP member writer for the "Militant."

PARKER was in attendance at a December 16, 1959, CBSWP meeting at which FARRELL DOBBS gave a 1960 election campaign report stating that the 1960 election campaign would be the most aggressive political propaganda campaign that the Party has ever attempted, the reason being the changing attitude of the workers, i.e. they are becoming more aggressive and receptive to radical ideas. DOBBS said that at the present time some of the workers are so aggressive that the labor leaders are forced to go along with working class ideas.

CG T-2

HAROLD PARKER was a member of the CBSWP during 1959-60 and actively participated in SWP activities on a regular basis. Verified PARKER'S SWP positions and activities at 36 scheduled SWP activities.

CG T-3

HAROLD PARKER was a member of the CBSWP during 1959-60 and actively participated in SWP activities on a regular basis. Verified PARKER'S SWP positions and activities at 40 scheduled SWP activities.

CG T-4

HAROLD PARKER was a member of the CBSWP during 1959-60 and actively participated in SWP activities on a regular basis. Active participant in 27 scheduled SWP activities. PARKER stated that the SWP wanted him to become a member of the National Committee of the SWP but because of family complications he was unable to accept. He stated, however, that if it became a choice between his family and the National Committee, he would want to be a National Committee member. PARKER attended CBSWP Semiannual Conference in June, 1960, and was elected to the CBLEC,

CG 100-19416

the governing body and policy-making group of the CBSWP. During January, 1960, PARKER was selling the "Militant" at various steel mills in the Chicago area.

At a meeting of the Chicago CBSWP on December 2, 1959, and following the Branch financial report by PARKER, MARJORIE SWABECK, described by source as a member of the CBSWP, gave the educational concerning the "PERMANENT REVOLUTION." She stated that there was nothing permanent about a revolution, however, the conditions for a revolution are permanent. She added that these conditions must be taken advantage of and worked at by the working class, adding that the Theory of the Permanent Revolution serves as a guide for future actions.

CG T-5

PARKER was in attendance at a Militant Labor Forum held April 2, 1959, at which EDITH FOX reported on a recent trip to Washington, D. C., as a delegate to the Unemployment Conference. FOX stated that the working class in America should build a labor party and immediate steps should be taken against unemployment.

CG T-6

EDITH FOX was in 1959 a member of the SWP, Detroit, Michigan.

CG T-1

HAROLD PARKER was a member of the CBSWP during 1960. Reported in attendance at five SWP meetings during 1960.

CG T-7

CG 100-19416

B. Activities in the Young Socialist Alliance

PARKER was present at 12 meetings of the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) in Chicago during the year 1960. He was present as an observer and did not actively participate in the affairs thereof.

CG T-3

Characterizations of the YSA and the YSA, Chicago, appear as appendices hereto.

PARKER'S name was in possession of the YSA, Chicago, during October, 1959.

CG T-4

MILITANT LABOR FORUM

On April 20, 1960, a source advised that the "Militant Labor Forum" is a paper organization set up by the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) in Chicago, Illinois, for SWP members and sympathizers. Open meetings are held, under the auspices of this Forum, on an irregular basis and are geared to the activities that the SWP is pursuing at a particular time, e.g., unemployment, election campaigns, etc.

The leaders of the various committees, set up within the Chicago SWP Branch, are in charge of the "Militant Labor Forum" and schedule meetings under the name of the Forum in order to conceal the SWP sponsorship of same. The meetings of the Forum are generally held at Chicago SWP Headquarters, although the Forum also sponsors other affairs, such as meetings, socials, and picnics, held at other locations.

The SWP has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order #10450.

APPENDIX

"YOUNG SOCIALIST"

The "Young Socialist" (YS) is a monthly publication, self-described in the May, 1960, issue as the newspaper of the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA).

The YS maintains headquarters at 45 East 7th Street, New York City, and the mailing address is PO Box 471, Cooper Station, New York 3, New York.

APPENDIX

- 8 -

THE YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE

The May, 1960, issue of the "Young Socialist" (YS), page one, column three, disclosed that during May 15-17, 1960, a national organization entitled the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) was established at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This issue stated that this organization was formed by the nationwide Supporter Clubs of the publication YS.

The above issue, page six, set forth the Founding Declaration of the YSA. This declaration stated that the YSA recognizes the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) as the only existing political party capable of providing the working class with political leadership on class struggle principles and that the supporters of the YS have come into basic political solidarity with the SWP on the principles of revolutionary Socialism.

A confidential source advised on May 11, 1960, that the original YSA was an organization formed during October, 1957, in New York City, by youth of various left Socialist tendencies, particularly members and followers of the SWP. The leaders of this group were the guiding forces in the establishment of the national organization.

The source further advised that the YSA is dominated and controlled in its leadership and ranks by members of the SWP. The source added that the SWP considers the YSA as the leading force in the radical youth field and its current and future hope in regard to recruits and the promulgation of the SWP movement throughout the United States.

The headquarters of the YSA are located at 45 East 7th Street, New York City.

The YS is a monthly publication, self-described in the May, 1960, issue as the newspaper of the YSA.

The SWP has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order #10450.

APPENDIX

CG 100-19416

YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE - CHICAGO,  
aka Young Socialist Supporters,  
University Young Socialists

A source advised in late November, 1959, that the Young Socialist Alliance - Chicago (YSA - C) had its origin in a series of informal discussions held in Chicago prior to June, 1959, among individuals who were close to the Socialist Workers Party (SWP).

This group in June, 1959, obtained recognition from the "Young Socialist" Editorial Board of New York as the official Young Socialist Supporters (YSS) group in the Chicago area.

In September, 1959, the YSS group in Chicago formally adopted the name "Young Socialist Alliance - Chicago" in accordance with the 1959 National Young Socialist Supporters Youth Plenum directive, which directive was designed to give a sense of national unity to the various clubs.

The YSA - C as of November, 1959, proclaimed itself to be a city-wide revolutionary youth organization designed to build Socialism in America and aimed toward youth on college campuses in the Chicago area and as being independent of all adult groupings.

A second source advised in April, 1960, that at the second National Conference of Young Socialist Supporters Club (YSSC) held April 15-17, 1960, at which the Chicago group was represented, a new national socialist youth organization, known as the Young Socialist Alliance, was formed with the Chicago group being an affiliate.

According to a third source in May, 1960, the YSA - C, also known as the University Young Socialists (UYS) and the YSS, was considered the youth group of the Chicago Branch SWP and affiliated with the national organization of the YSA in New York. YSA officers as of May, 1960, were current members or sympathizers of the Chicago SWP.

The SWP has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order #10450.

## APPENDIX

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CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Chicago, Illinois  
April 26, 1960

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No. 100-19416

Title: HAROLD P. PARKER

Character: SECURITY MATTER - SOCIALIST WORKERS  
PARTY


Reference is made to the report of Special Agent Ralph D. Harmon dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

CG T-6 is a municipal agency engaged in collecting security information in the Chicago area.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.





JUNE  
PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 61-C  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

June 19, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RE: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA  
PROSECUTIONS UNDER THE  
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

On June 5, 1961, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the registration provision of the Internal Security Act of 1950 and ordered the Communist Party, USA, to register with the Attorney General as a communist-action organization. In view of the definite possibility of prosecutive action against the Party and against selected Party officers and members should they fail to register as ordered, the Bureau desires to reiterate and enlarge upon instructions previously issued in No Number SAC Letter J dated October 19, 1951, captioned "Communist Party - USA (Brief), Prosecution of Communist Party Functionaries under the Smith Act."

Since it is a cardinal rule of evidence that conversations between a subject and his attorney are in the nature of privileged communications, technical and microphone surveillances in operation on Communist Party functionaries arrested for violation of the Smith Act of 1940 were discontinued immediately following such arrests. Notwithstanding this fact, the possibility was recognized that occasions might arise when conversations between subjects and their attorneys, or between the attorneys themselves, might be intercepted by technical or microphone surveillances which continued in operation on unrelated individuals and/or organizations.

Accordingly, the field was instructed in referenced No Number SAC Letter J that should such conversations occur, they were to be completely disregarded by the employees assigned to technical and microphone surveillance coverage. Such conversations were not to be monitored and no record whatever was to be made of their occurrence.

While it is true that the Department has not as yet furnished the identities of those Party officers or members who will be prosecuted should they fail to register, the Supreme Court decision is being widely discussed in Party circles and it is possible that Party leaders and/or members may be in communication with attorneys regarding defense plans and strategy on the possibility an indictment might be returned against the Party as an organization or against themselves as individuals. Therefore, the instructions set out in No Number SAC Letter J are being reiterated and emphasized

as applying to possible prosecutions under the Internal Security Act of 1950 and are to be placed into immediate effect. The question of the discontinuance of specified technical and microphone surveillances will be faced when the necessity for such action occurs.

In addition, the possibility also exists that confidential informants, particularly those operating on a high level in the Party, may be present when defense plans are being discussed by Party attorneys. The first time an informant attempts to report information of this nature, he should be advised that the Bureau does not desire to receive such information and the informant should not, in the future, attempt to report it.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

6/19/61  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 61-C

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

June 20, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) TRAINING -- POLICE TRAINING FILMS -- Since the films "Arrest" and "Margin of Victory" are old and outmoded, Bureau desires that they no longer be used. Commitments already made for the use of these films should be handled; however, no further commitments should be made.

Those offices having permanent retention copies of these films should destroy them after present commitments for their use are handled.

6/20/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-33

(B) SUPPLIES - LABELS -- The Bureau has decided to stock perforated labels (three inches by one inch in size) which come in rolls of 1000 complete with appropriate dispenser. These will be made available for use by the field in addressing envelopes, wanted flyers, identification orders and similar communications particularly where no Addressograph plates are available. In order that enough labels may be stocked to anticipate the needs of the field, you should advise the Bureau of the amount of labels needed for a three months' supply. Replies should be directed to the attention of the Property Management Unit, Administrative Division, by July 1, 1961.

6/20/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-33

(C) TELETYPES - ENCODED TELETYPE MESSAGES -- Since teletypes are transmitted through telephone company facilities data contained therein, which in many instances includes information developed and received from confidential techniques and sources, is accessible to a limited number of communication company employees. There has been a tendency by some field offices to submit plain text rather than encoded teletypes in instances involving the Criminal Intelligence Program and other type cases where the Bureau's operations and investigations could be seriously hampered or impaired if the teletypes were intercepted by unauthorized persons. You should immediately instruct responsible personnel in your office that teletype messages of this type should be encoded and remind them of current rules and regulations involving matters of this type as set out in the Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part II, Section 4G, 4b. This will be closely followed at the Bureau.

(D) CONFIDENTIAL VOUCHERS - SECURITY INFORMANTS - CRIMINAL INFORMANTS -- In the audit of confidential vouchers it has been noted that a substantial number contain errors which either require a suspension or the return of the voucher to the field office for correction. In order to keep to a minimum the number of errors in confidential vouchers, the following items are set forth for your guidance:

#### RECEIPTS

1. Receipts for payments to informants should be obtained in all instances if possible. In the event a receipt cannot be obtained for a particular payment, complete circumstances should be set forth on the blue slip at the time reimbursement is claimed.
2. Receipts reflecting payment to informant should clearly reflect the date of payment, purpose, that is, whether for services or expenses or both and the amount for each. The period covered should be shown when the informant is paid on a period basis and the name of the Special Agent from whom the money was received. The receipt must be signed by the informant receiving the money and should not be witnessed by another Agent.
3. If necessary to make corrections on the receipts, such corrections must be initialed by the informant and not the Agent.

#### BLUE SLIPS

1. Each blue slip prepared in connection with payments to informants should reflect date of payment, Bureau case title, date of the authorization under which the payment was made, period covered and purpose of payment.
2. The first blue slips submitted in connection with a payment to an informant who has previously been used by another field division should reflect the identity of the other field division when known.
3. Vouchers and blue slips in the name of either the SAC or the ASAC must be signed by him personally. The name appearing on the voucher and the name appearing on the blue slip must always be in agreement. The

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-33

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signature of the payee on the voucher must be in agreement with the typed name of the payee as reflected on the face of the voucher.

The above should be called to the attention of all employees of your office who have occasion to make payments to confidential informants or sources as well as those employees who handle the preparation of confidential vouchers.

As you are aware, upon request the Bureau must make available to the Federal courts receipts covering payments to informants who are used as witnesses. In view of this, it is imperative that receipts be submitted in good order. Unless immediate adherence to the Bureau's regulations concerning the preparation and execution of receipts is effected, it will be necessary to take administrative action against those employees who do not comply with these instructions.

6/20/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-33

(E) OFFICE SOCIAL ACTIVITIES -- I wish to emphasize the personal responsibility incumbent upon each division head to see that any outside social or recreational function sponsored by a divisional office is not attended by persons who may potentially cause embarrassment through their attendance at such functions. Each division head should be alert to see that no undesirable persons are invited to such functions and that they be held at respectable, reputable locations.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-33

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(F) KIDNAPPING AND MAJOR CASE SQUAD INVESTIGATIONS -- In order to more adequately utilize the experience of those Special Agents filling key positions on kidnapping squads, the Bureau requested that several of these Agents prepare memoranda setting forth the duties involved in their special assignment. A total of ten memoranda was prepared and used in recent specialized schools held at the Seat of Government. The Agents attending these schools were most enthusiastic over these memoranda. It is, therefore, believed that these ten memoranda dealing with the specialized duties of key personnel on a kidnapping or major case squad will be of value to the entire field. There are enclosed ten memoranda captioned as follows: "Duties of #1 Man," "Report Writing," "Preparation of Ransom List," "Liaison at Victim's Home," "Technical Installations in Victim's Home," "Laboratory Expert on the Major Case Squad," "Equipment," "Setting up Chief Clerk's Office on Special Assignment Cases," "Law Enforcement Liaison," and "Liaison with the Telephone Company."

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures for (F)

6/20/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-33

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KIDNAPING AND MAJOR CASES  
DUTIES OF #1 MAN

The #1 Man is the immediate assistant to the Inspector or person in charge of the case and serves in the capacity of executive officer, taking whatever action is necessary to implement the instructions of the Inspector.

In the absence of the Inspector or official in charge, the #1 Man is to supervise and be in charge of the entire investigation. To carry out this responsibility there must be a close working arrangement between the Inspector and the #1 Man so that both are fully informed at all times.

Generally the Inspector should see everything coming in on the case, including memos, letters and other communications, while outgoing communications can usually be handled by the #1 Man. Of course, any outgoing communication of importance or unusual significance would be brought to the Inspector's attention. In addition, the #1 Man reviews all incoming material prior to the assignment of leads and preparation of lead cards so that he has a complete knowledge of all the facts in the case and the action being taken to develop further information.

Among the various duties performed by the #1 Man are the following:

1. Receive official telephone calls pertaining to the case.
2. Consult with Agents and key personnel on matters not of sufficient importance to be brought to the immediate attention of the Inspector in charge.
3. Plan and supervise the investigation.
4. Assign leads.
5. Assign duties to the Night Supervisor.
6. Keep current notations during the day on all major developments and have them available for the Inspector in charge or Bureau official.
7. Supervise matters assigned to him by the Inspector.
8. Keep informed of all developments and keep Inspector in charge current of all developments.

Usually the #1 Man would have the following personnel and operations under his direct supervision:

1. Report supervisor
2. Lead supervisor
3. Night supervisor
4. Personnel officer
5. Equipment supervisor



6. Sound man and/or radio technician
7. Laboratory supervisor
8. Identification supervisor
9. Reception Agent, if one is used
10. Research officer
11. Clerical employees
12. Reports and outgoing communications
13. Files
14. Indexing
15. Bulky exhibit files
16. Reference index
17. Running memorandum
18. Daily summary

The space arrangement should be such that the #1 Man is located immediately adjacent to the Inspector. The report supervisor and lead supervisor should be located immediately adjacent to the #1 Man. A stenographer should be located nearby so that important matters can be placed on record immediately.

Immediately upon reporting at the office handling a major case, the #1 Man should confer with the Inspector and then follow up to see that the various administrative assignments are made to provide for

the proper handling of the case. In this regard it probably will be necessary for the #1 Man to confer with the personnel in key positions to insure they understand their duties and to clarify any particular problems or procedures. Thereafter, the #1 Man should immediately review all pertinent developments in the case so he will have complete information concerning the developments to date and be in a position to carry out his responsibilities.

## REPORT WRITING

The work of a report writer on a special assignment falls into three general categories:

1. Assembling and preparing reports on the case.
2. Preparation of a daily teletype summary to the Bureau.
3. Other special projects assigned by the Inspector or Agent in charge of the case.

### I. REPORT WRITING

Generally speaking, reporting investigation conducted by a special squad follows the reporting procedures set forth in the Manual for other cases. However, there are certain suggestions which can be followed which will facilitate the report writing.

1. Do not wait to write long reports on a variety of subjects. It makes for better reports and is easier for reference purposes to limit each report to one phase of the investigation or even a part of one phase. For instance, the first report in a kidnaping case might well cover the predication and initial investigation, another report cover the investigation at the crime scene, another on the background of the victim and family, another on miscellaneous suspects and other reports on various phases of the investigation as they develop. It is probable that near the end of the investigation, as the case begins to come to a close, reports will be written covering a variety of subjects.

2. Even though it may seem unnecessary at the beginning, a table of content for each report will prove helpful. The more that the table of contents is set out in detail, the more helpful it will be.

3. Because of the manner in which leads are assigned, it is unnecessary and actually of no use to set out leads in reports written while the case is being handled by the special squad. A short statement that leads are not being set out but are being assigned and handled as developed should appear in the administrative section of each report.

4. Dissemination of copies of reports to other offices will depend on the circumstances of each case. If the case appears to have nation-wide ramifications, it would be well to send one copy of each report containing the basic facts to each office so that it will not be necessary to repeat this information as later leads are set out by teletype or airtel. In some cases, this dissemination can be limited to offices in the general area of the country surrounding the office of origin. In any event, it is not necessary to provide widespread dissemination of later reports dealing with specific projects as the investigation progresses. Copies of these reports can be limited to offices which are known to have an interest in that particular phase of the investigation.

5. Leads for other offices will usually be set out by telephone, teletype, airtel or letter. While other offices should be expected to advise the results of their investigation by a similar communication, they should also be instructed to report the results of their investigation in regular report form. It would be a mistake to allow auxiliary offices to RUC investigation by letter or airtel since the office of origin would soon become bogged down in paper work.

6. The office of origin should have additional copies of each report run off for working copies. These can be bound in file covers by the clerks and made readily available to agents on the squad without the necessity of having to charge out a file each time it is necessary to refer to a report. They will also be available for squad members to read in their spare time, if any, in order to familiarize themselves with the case. These working copies should be accounted for and destroyed when the special terminates. The number of working copies prepared will depend on the size of the special squad. Four copies have been found to be sufficient for a squad of from twenty-five to thirty-five men.

7. Usually considerable work will have been performed by the office of origin before the special squad arrives. In order that reporting will be uniform and prepared properly, the report writer should prepare a memo of reporting instructions to be

distributed to all agents and stenos immediately upon his arrival. These instructions should be discussed verbally at the first available conference of agents and should also be discussed verbally with stenographers in order that any misunderstandings can be clarified. These instructions should include the following items:

a. Interviews and other investigation conducted which can reasonably be expected to be used as testimony should be reported on an FD-302. In many cases, there has developed a tendency to use an FD-302 in situations where there is only a possibility of the information being used as testimony. This clutters up the report with a series of disjointed short items. Exercise judgment in the use of an FD-302 and do not use it indiscriminately.

b. Investigation conducted which does not go on an FD-302 should be reported on a narrative type insert. It is well to begin the insert with a short explanatory statement as to the basis for the investigation conducted. For instance: "John Jones, 312 Main Street, Los Angeles, California, was interviewed by SA Thomas Smith, inasmuch as Jones' name had been found on a piece of paper in possession of subject's wife." This not only makes the report clearer but is also of assistance to the report writer in preparation of the report.

c. Each narrative type insert should be limited to one subject matter, since as mentioned above, reports will usually be written about one phase of the investigation and each

report will be broken down into logical sections. The insert should be dictated in a form suitable to go into a report without change or deletion. Do not include administrative matters, etc.

d. All FD-302s and narrative inserts should be prepared on stencils. The steno should be instructed to make two proof sheets since it is sometimes necessary in complicated matters to hand one proof sheet to an agent for assistance in covering leads suggested by the insert. White proof sheets are easier to read than yellow sheets.

e. A 3 x 5 card should be attached to each FD-302 or insert which has on it the particular project or phase of the investigation to which it applies. This assists the report writer in segregating the stencils into appropriate sections of the report.

f. Each agent should dictate any leads suggested by the insert or FD-302 he is submitting. These should be narrative type lead cards in triplicate with a short statement similar to an abstract, showing the predication for the lead. See memo on setting up Chief Clerk's Office for example of this type of lead.

g. Each agent should indicate to the steno all names, license numbers, serial numbers or any other data which should be indexed and instruct the steno to prepare index cards in duplicate.

8. Complaints received, suggestions, administrative matters and other similar data which cannot go into a report verbatim should be dictated in memorandum form. The number of copies will depend upon the way the case is set up administratively,

bearing in mind that in many cases a copy of the memorandum will be necessary for a subfile. Therefore, a minimum of original and two copies.

9. As FD-302s, inserts and memoranda are typed they should be delivered to the Inspector in charge or SAC immediately. He and the number one man will read them and pass them on to the lead supervisor who will remove and handle the lead cards. The Inspector in charge or the lead supervisor will mark memoranda for routing and they will go to the Chief Clerk for serializing and routing. Stencil FD-302s and narrative type inserts go from the lead supervisor to the report writer. The report writer should then segregate them as to subject matter and use in the preparation of the report. It will be recalled that there will be a duplicate set of index cards attached to each stencil. Undoubtedly there will be considerable information in the stencils which should be in the special indices in order to be of use. In order to solve this problem, the report writer will remove one set of index cards and turn them over to the Chief Clerk. These will be "red flashed" by making a small red pencil mark where the serial number would ordinarily appear. This index card will then be filed in the special indices. An agent seeing a "red flash" index card with no serial number will then know that the material indexed is on a stencil in possession of the report writer and can refer to it there. When a report is prepared, the appropriate "red flash"



index cards are marked with the serial and page number. The other set of index cards which had been attached to the stencil is similarly marked and placed in the regular office indices at that time. In other words, in the interval between when a stencil is prepared and when it finally is incorporated into a report, there is an index card in the special indices with the special red marking so that all data submitted by the Agents is indexed at all times with no time lapse.

## II. DAILY TELETYPE SUMMARY

A teletype should be sent to the Bureau each night summarizing developments which have occurred during the day. This is necessary even though the Bureau might have been informed by telephone of developments. This procedure should be followed until the Bureau instructs to the contrary. The report writer should make notes during the day of developments which should be included in this teletype and each night should confer with the Inspector in charge prior to preparing the summary.

## III. SPECIAL PROJECTS

The report writer is responsible for various "paper work" projects and research which become necessary in a case and which are usually assigned by the Inspector in charge. Examples of such projects which have been necessary in some cases are as follows:

1. Memorandum to all Agents outlining certain phases of the case with which they should be acquainted such as description of property in possession of the victim, explanation of the basis

for various investigative projects being conducted and similar memoranda.

2. Communications to all offices or selected offices outlining investigative projects desired and the basis for them.

3. Special research and file review projects desired by the Inspector in charge. As an example, in one case an analysis was made of the financial status of subject at the time of the crime based on past earnings and expenses. In another case a chart was prepared of the whereabouts of all subjects for the pertinent period of one week for assistance in interviews and checking their stories.

4. When the subject is identified, plans should be made for the preparation of a prosecutive summary report. It will assist in the preparation of the report if the report writer keeps a rough draft compilation of evidence developed and the names of potential witnesses so that when the time comes for the preparation of the report much of the data will be available in outline form. Summary reports are often required with a minimum of notice and this procedure will assist in expediting the preparation.

SUBMITTED BY SA CHARLES G. CAMPBELL,  
San Francisco

PREPARATION OF RANSOM LIST

IN KIDNAPING CASES

INTRODUCTION

May it be stated here that this treatise is not intended to be all inclusive but to be considered as a supplement to well-established procedures currently outlined in the Manual of Instructions.

## OBTAINING FUNDS NEEDED

With the apparent ever-increasing amount of ransom money being demanded which is usually in currency of small denominations and in consideration of the limited time element presented under the twenty-four hour presumptive clause, and further, in consideration that the Subject may make a payoff request within a very few days after the abduction, it has become increasingly clear that obtaining funds in the quantity and type needed for the best interest of the investigation is a major problem of paramount importance.

Consistent with suitable banking arrangements available and/or desirable to the victim's family and the Bureau case and depending on the amount and type of currency needed, an early conference with a member of the family and/or their banking representative should be held to determine identities of persons who are responsible on the family side for preparation of the ransom money and whether the proper type of currency is readily available in amounts needed.

If not, immediate steps should be taken to obtain such money; it being sometimes necessary to obtain funds from other Federal Reserve Districts. Here, working directly with a Federal Reserve Bank can be very advantageous. If it is necessary to sort a large volume of currency to insure that all bills are of particular denomination of the ransom money or of the same type and series, much more currency than the amount specified in the ransom demand will be needed.

For instance, in a recent case three million dollars in bills of ten and twenty dollar denominations were assembled and sorted to obtain therefrom the necessary five hundred thousand dollar ransom. Here, the expert staff of currency sorters employed in a Federal Reserve Bank were not only extremely helpful but necessary and in a situation of this kind are of inestimable value.

Such a conference as indicated above will often be valuable in conveying to the family and its bankers an appreciation of the investigation and evidentiary problems arising in these cases and avoids such instances as recently occurred where a family banking representative thought that just to fill a suitcase with currency of the denomination and total amount demanded would be all that is necessary.

It was found in one recent case where the ransom demanded was five hundred thousand dollars in ten and twenty dollar bills that the local bank, although quite a sizable institution, could not supply these funds, let alone in bills of the same Federal Reserve District as is sometimes desirable. Neither could the local Federal Reserve Bank of this district supply the necessary funds of the type needed.

Calls to other Federal Reserve Banks determined they had no such amounts on hand of the same series or type.

Finally, to assemble the required amounts in ten and twenty dollar denominations, the local Federal Reserve Bank had to obtain funds

from another unit of the Federal Reserve System totaling some one and one-half million dollars which, when combined with a like amount on hand, provided the sorting staff with sufficient currency to make up the ransom amount in bills of the desired type.

Here, the cooperation between Federal Reserve Banks enabled the delivery by plane of the requested amount from a city some seven hundred miles distant in a matter of approximately four and one-half hours.

#### PHOTOGRAPHING THE RANSOM MONEY

It is believed experience has shown that automatic feed Recordak equipment of a type having an odometer counter and which will handle paper of the texture of used currency, is most satisfactory for photographing the ransom currency. The counter provides a check of the number of bills photographed in a given package and will provide an alert if there is an inaccurate count.

It is considered absolutely necessary that, as soon as it is determined, the preparation of a ransom and a ransom list may be or is necessary, steps be taken through the nearest Recordak representative to make one or more of these machines available for installation at a suitable scene of operations, preferably away from either the Bureau Field Office or any temporary Bureau headquarters set up on the case. A suitable location may be found in the vault or other isolated section of the

bank through which the ransom money is being prepared. In this connection and in the interest of security and secrecy, a Federal Reserve Bank, if one is in the vicinity, may offer the best advantages from several standpoints, namely:

1) If a large sum must be assembled of a certain kind of currency, it would probably not be on hand at any one private banking institution and may have to be obtained through the Federal Reserve Bank.

2) Banking connections of prominent families are usually known to many bank employees and may be known to the press. These individuals may exhibit an interest in the ransom money preparation which could possibly be detrimental to the investigation and which could probably be avoided if a Federal Reserve Bank is used.

3) In all probability considerable night work will be necessary for several dozen persons. They can be assembled at a Federal Reserve Bank without arousing the curiosity of outsiders more effectively than at a private bank, particularly where it is known the family has its banking interests.

The mere obtaining and installation of the proper type of recording equipment does not insure a successful photographic operation. The mechanical adjustments on the machine, particularly the feeding mechanism where used currency is the subject material, is very critical.

The Recordak representative should effect these adjustments, photograph a trial number of bills which should be processed immediately to insure proper operation.

In this connection and in the actual operation of photographing the ransom money, attention is invited to instructions set forth in the Manual of Instructions concerning the obtaining of a clearance from the United States Secret Service before photographing money.

The Recordak representative should also provide training and instructions to the individuals who will operate the equipment on the loading, changing and removal of film reels. These photographers or operators should be banking employees working under the guidance of Bureau agents.

Exposed film should be identified as follows:

- 1) Before photographing each package of one hundred bills, a photo of a 3 x 5 card should be taken on which is clearly shown the name of the bank employee, photographer, date and identity of the case.
- 2) Each reel of film sent to the FBI Laboratory, whether developed or merely exposed, should be handled by Agents as evidence. If the film is only exposed this should be plainly indicated on the package containing this particular reel to avoid accidental exposure because there may not be another opportunity to photograph this portion of the money again.



It is suggested that if facilities are at all available for developing the Recordak film locally that exposed film be immediately processed for the following reasons:

- 1) Will insure that photographing equipment is functioning properly during the operation.
- 2) That operators are efficient.
- 3) Will provide immediate opportunity for scanning results in a viewer for partially or completely superimposed bills, which when photographed were in such position as to obscure portions of or all of the identifying currency serial numbers. Further, it will also indicate instances where for some reason or other, the bill happened to be photographed face down, thereby obscuring identifying characteristics.
- 4) Where superimposition is discovered it permits rephotography of that group of one hundred bills which should be done rather than trying to photograph only the bills involved.

Photographing of the face of the ransom currency should begin at the earliest possible time and not delayed for the handlisting of the bills. In fact, a bundle of one hundred bills can be photographed in seconds, thus permitting the hand listing to begin virtually simultaneously.

It should be borne in mind that, in the event of an early, unexpected or premature demand for the ransom payoff is made, that the photographic record of the money would be better than none or even better than a partial handwritten list.

If photography is the only record available and it is done with the insertion on the film of proper identifying cards with each package of one hundred bills such film could be used for identifying the ransom money at a later time and conceivably as evidence in court.

#### HAND LISTING OF BILLS

In addition to the instructions set forth in the Manual the following is offered:

A lined tablet sheet of approximately legal size and having thirty-three or more lined spaces is suitable for preparing the handwritten list of bills and is usually readily available in most banking institutions or at local stationery stores.

The top margin of this sheet can be used for identifying data and by drawing two vertical lines down through the lined spaces, the sheet can be divided into three columns, each with thirty-three lined spaces for recording bill serial numbers. This gives spaces for ninety-nine bills of the one hundred bill package.

At the head or top of the third column the vertical line dividing columns two and three should be extended upward a distance of a lined space and then to the right to the edge of the page. This will be the space on which the serial number of the sixty-seventh bill of the package will be entered thereby keeping the bills listed in the order making up the package.

The reason this is suggested is that it provides an instantaneous visual check to insure that:

1) The particular package has one hundred bills in it and:

2) That all one hundred have been handlisted. In a recent

case where currency was shipped from an auxiliary bank and some thirty thousand bills prepared, some of the currency had a musty odor and was somewhat damp to the touch. Apparently it had been stored in a damp place.

Some of this money was not usable because the Recordak machine would not handle it properly in this condition.

In photographing that portion of the money which could be used and apparently due to some dampness, two of the bills were superimposed so perfectly that only the upper one was photographed and the bank employee doing the photography did not check the odometer count or possibly did not have it properly reset so that the fact that only ninety-nine bills were photographed in that package came to his attention.

When this package of bills was handlisted the bills were apparently still together since the page on which the package was listed contained only ninety-nine serial numbers. This was not immediately noted and when the lists and films were sent to the Bureau for the preparation of the ransom list it was discovered one bill was missing.

Since the ransom was not paid in this case, the money was returned to the bank several months later and meanwhile apparently dried out.

The package having the handlisting of only ninety-nine bills was examined and found to actually contain one hundred bills.

If the pages for the handwritten list had had one extra space as above described or some other simple method of assuring a proper count had been used it is believed this missing bill would have been found and listed due to the simple visual check made possible by the system outlined.

If a sheet is used having more than thirty-four lined spaces it is suggested the same easy check can be effected by drawing a line horizontally across the first and second columns thirty-three spaces down and then a line across the third column thirty-four spaces down.

## MISCELLANEOUS

If possible, the photographing and handlisting of the various packages of currency should follow the same sequence to aid the data processing section of the Bureau in locating errors or questionable entries.

This may not be one hundred per cent possible because instances will occur when it will be necessary to re-run a package of bills through the Recordak machine some time after they were originally photographed and after other packages had been exposed.

For instance, when proof viewing, if this is possible, some superimposed currency may be noted necessitating that particular package of bills be photographed again. As of possible aid to the data processing section in reconciling possible errors and discrepancies, the following is suggested:

The 3 x 5 card bearing the identifying data as to file number, date, name of photographing bank employee, etc., will be photographed at the beginning of each "bundle" of ten packages of currency and also photographed again before each package of bills are photographed.

This card could have, say in the left lower corner, the Roman numeral I followed by a small Arabic numeral 1 and photographed prior to the running of the first package of one hundred bills. For the second package of one hundred bills the Arabic figure 2 would be added after the Arabic numeral 1 and this same procedure followed on up through the tenth package of bills.

The card would then be placed on the face of package one which would be the top package of a bundle of ten packages which would then be assigned for handlisting.

The ten packages of this bundle could then be identified on the particular sheet on which these particular bills are handlisted by merely entering the package number on the sheet.

For the second bundle of ten packages the Roman numeral II would be used and the Arabic system 1 through 10 repeated.

This system could also be repeated for each denomination of bills processed.

Care should be taken that the 3 x 5 cards are not included with the ransom money when it is finally assembled. Cards should be removed at the time the handlisting operation occurs and not replaced on the bundles. A simple control system should be set up to insure that all cards are retrieved before the ransom money is packaged.

In a recent case where time was limited and in order to be certain the photography was being properly handled, exposed film was processed immediately after exposure by the local Recordak agency. Since there was the possibility all handwritten lists would not be completed before a pay-off demand came, in which case it was conceivable the film might be the only evidentiary record of the money, the film was escorted through the Recordak processing laboratory by the bank employee who did the photography and who could appear as a competent witness if need be.

It is suggested that after the photography and preparation of the handwritten list has been in progress for say, three hours, a check be made to determine the amount of work accomplished which would then

give an estimate of approximately when completion of the ransom money processing could be expected. This check could be made repeatedly throughout the operation insofar as is considered necessary and would serve as a barometer by which it could be told whether or not more employees and machines are needed. It also will provide information which can be furnished the Bureau as to about when it could expect to receive the films and handwritten lists.

TECHNICAL INSTALLATIONS  
IN VICTIM'S HOME

The victim's residence was served by a private telephone line which traveled underground from the road to the residence, entering the residence in a crawl space located underneath the bedroom areas of the house. There were four extension telephones, one in victim's wife's bedroom, one in the bedroom occupied by victim's two daughters, one in the kitchen and one in the basement recreation room.

Prior to the Bureau's officially entering the investigation on February 10, 1960, two deputies from the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office had been assigned to the victim's residence by the Jefferson County Sheriff. These deputies had connected a recorder to the telephone extension located in the basement recreation room by taping the microphone of the recorder to the ear piece of the telephone handset. Arrangements had been made with the person designated to answer the telephone to pick up the handset of the upstairs extension at the end of the third ring, at which time one of the deputies would turn the recorder on and lift the receiver of the recreation room extension telephone.

The sound-trained Agent went to victim's residence on the evening of February 10, 1960. A 1948 Ford panel truck was used to take this Agent and the equipment to victim's residence. The following was the equipment taken:

1. Western Electric 500 C/D telephone instrument with Audio Development Co. transformer #114A.



2. Two Magnecord PT 6 amplifiers and four Transport units.
3. Two Magnecord transfer switches.
4. One Magnecord voice-operated relay.
5. FM radio dispatcher unit.
6. Lineman's test set.
7. Supply of magnetic recording tape.
8. 100 foot spool of two-conductor wire.
9. Tool box with flashlight, tools, tape and miscellaneous items.
10. Mile Ray light.

Due to the layout of victim's residence and due to the fact that victim's wife and four children had friends coming to the residence to visit them, the kidnap telephone installation was made in the basement recreation room in place of the extension telephone located there. This area of the house was the only place Agents could remain out of sight of visitors visiting members of victim's family. Making the installation in this room made it necessary for the person designated to answer the telephone, one of the victim's brothers or the brother of victim's wife, to come down to the basement recreation room to answer the telephone when it rang. The other three extension telephones were disconnected in the terminal block located in the crawl space under the house. This was done to prevent anyone from picking up the handset of one of the telephone extensions located on the main floor of the house while a telephone call was being received on the kidnap telephone installation, thus causing a disturbance on the line.

Following discussion with victim's wife regarding the plans for the family during the time the victim was missing, victim's wife made arrangements for the children to live elsewhere and she discouraged most of her friends from making visits to her residence. This provided more security for the Agents and the recording equipment at victim's residence. The kidnap telephone instrument was then moved to victim's wife's bedroom where one Agent remained on duty at all times, along with the person designated to answer the telephone.

The victim's wife's bedroom, in which the kidnap telephone installation was made, was located about 90 feet away from the recreation area at the far end of the house. It was connected to the Magnecord recording equipment in the recreation room and this was accomplished by running a two-conductor wire from the "Bridge In" of the Magnecord amplifier in the recreation room through the furnace room and through the crawl space under the house to victim's wife's bedroom. The wire was routed into the room through the hole in the floor used by the Telephone Company in the original installation of the telephone extension located in this room and was connected to the transformer attached to the Western Electric 500 telephone instrument. A connection was made from the ground terminal of the transformer to a nearby electrical outlet box. A lineman's test set was connected to the red and green terminals of the telephone connecting block along with the kidnap telephone instrument. The switch on the lineman's test set was taped to prevent it from being switched from the monitor position which would have permitted the feeding of extraneous noises on the line. This test set was used

by the Agent on duty in this room to listen in on the calls while they were being received and permitted him to give the proper prearranged signals to the person receiving the call.

A Magnecord amplifier and two Transport units with a transfer switch and a voice-operated relay were used in this recording of the telephone calls. Another Magnecord amplifier and two Transport units were set up next to the ones being used for the recording and a connection made from the "Bridge In" of the Magnecord amplifier in use to the "Bridge In" of the Magnecord amplifier maintained as a stand-by. In the event a failure had occurred in the Magnecord amplifier while a call was being recorded, the recording operation could have been continued by switching the motor-control switch of the Magnecord Transport unit set up as a stand-by to the "forward position."

A direct, private, unlisted and nonpublished line had been installed which permitted Agents at victim's residence to communicate directly with Headquarters Office. The instrument at victim's residence was located in the basement recreation room and the instrument at Headquarters Office was located on the desk of the Special Agent in Charge of the Special. When the handset of either of these instruments was removed from the cradle, the other instrument would ring. This arrangement permitted rapid, direct communication between victim's residence and the Headquarters Office. The instrument at victim's residence was located near the recording equipment and the SAC of the Special could listen in on a telephone

call at victim's residence while it was being recorded by holding the handset of the telephone instrument, connected to the direct line, near the speaker of the Magnecord amplifier.

When a telephone call was received at victim's residence the SAC of the Special or the person designated to remain in charge in his absence was notified by use of the direct line to have the Telephone Company continue the tracing of the call or to discontinue the tracing operation, depending upon the identity of the caller.

Locating the recording equipment in the basement recreation room away from the main living area provided security for the recording operation and for the Agent operating the equipment when visitors came to victim's residence. At the same time, the Agent operating the equipment could provide security for the ransom package containing the \$500,000 which had been placed in a basement storeroom near the recreation room.

An FM radio dispatcher unit was set up in the basement recreation room for the purpose of communicating with Headquarters Office or with Bureau automobiles, should the occasion arise. This unit was also utilized to test the concealed radio units in the automobile that was to be used by a person handling the ransom package. Radio installations had been made in this car and this car was stored in victim's residence garage and the radio equipment was tested every 24 hours by the sound-trained Agent on duty at victim's residence.

## LABORATORY EXPERT ON THE MAJOR CASE SQUAD

The Laboratory expert's primary function on a Major Case Squad is that of technical advisor and consultant to the Inspector in Charge of the squad and the #1 Man on the one side, and the investigating agents on the other. It is his duty to assist in resolving any problems relating to physical evidence collected during the course of the investigation. The basic responsibilities of a Laboratory expert on a Major Case Squad are as follows:

1. Be available to answer any questions arising with regard to proper handling of physical evidence.
2. Supervise packing and shipment of physical evidence to the Laboratory for examination.
3. Conduct preliminary examination of physical evidence with the purpose of eliminating useless requests of the Laboratory and furnish the investigating agents with the results of preliminary examinations for investigative guidance.
4. Dictate inserts on Laboratory matters.
5. Dictate leads arising as a result of collection and/or examination of physical evidence.
6. Periodically, review the subsection of the case file entitled "Laboratory Matters" in order to be certain that all leads which may have arisen from Laboratory examinations have been dictated

and are being covered by the investigating agents. In this connection, it is also the responsibility of the Laboratory expert to see that the subsection of the case file entitled "Laboratory Matters" is up to date and current at all times.

7. Organizing and supervising projects arising as the result of location of physical evidence. For example, furnishing technical instruction to an investigating agent to assist him in obtaining handwriting and typewriting specimens and in eliminating typewriters obviously different from that used in preparing a questioned ransom letter in a kidnaping case.
8. Preparing or supervising preparation of exhibits, charts, memoranda, et cetera, which can be used by the investigating agents in the search for significant handwriting, typewriting, et cetera.
9. Conferring with the Inspector in Charge and #1 Man of the Major Case Squad regarding all Laboratory matters in order that they may have the benefit of any suggestions for projects or other investigations which should be conducted or considered based on Laboratory findings or collection of physical evidence. For example, the Laboratory expert may, through his technical knowledge and experience, be in a position to suggest a certain line of

*inquiry which may not be readily apparent to the Inspector in Charge or #1 Man.*

- 10. Provide all necessary technical assistance in connection with crime scene searches such as co-ordinating the collection, preservation and identification of all physical evidence. It is also his responsibility to see that the necessary graphs, charts and photographs are prepared at the crime scene.*
- 11. Work in close cooperation with the official photographer on the Major Case Squad to see that reproduction facilities, such as cameras, Auto-stating equipment, Photostating equipment and dark room are available and are in readiness for any photographic or copying work which may be necessary.*
- 12. In connection with kidnaping cases, to handle all extortion and crank letters which may be directed to the victim and see that they are properly identified, photocopied and forwarded to the Laboratory for examination.*
- 13. Perform any other duties which are requested by Inspector in Charge and #1 Man in so far as primary responsibilities permit. The Inspector in Charge of the Major Case Squad should attempt to avoid nontechnical assignments to the*

Laboratory man which will make him unavailable to properly perform his duties pertaining to the Laboratory aspects of the case.

As can be seen from the list of responsibilities of the Laboratory expert set forth above, any Laboratory man assigned to a Major Case Squad should be well-rounded in all phases of the Laboratory's work in order that he can properly handle his responsibilities. When a Laboratory man is assigned to a Major Case Squad and prior to his departure from the Laboratory in Washington, he should confer with the various section and unit chiefs of the Laboratory at the Bureau regarding any technical activity which he may encounter in the field. He should also carefully check the list of equipment and supplies which will be necessary for him to take with him on his assignment to the field. No set list of materials can be arbitrarily drawn up; such a list depends entirely on the case in question, the availability of facilities in the field, and the availability of technical equipment in the field.

Upon arrival in the field on a Major Case Squad, the Laboratory expert should, if possible, arrange for suitable working space, so arranged that his technical equipment is readily available and working conditions are such that a minimum of distraction is present.

The above observations are set forth for the guidance not only of the Laboratory expert assigned to a Major Case Squad but also for the guidance of the Inspector in Charge of the Major Case Squad and the #1 Man.



## EQUIPMENT

At the inception of COORNAP, an inventory was made of all supplies available in the Denver Office. Efforts were made to immediately correct obvious omissions. The following items were received from other offices or the Bureau:

Shoulder pack transmitters and receivers

MX Unit - transmitter and receiver

Decoy package

Concealed automobile transmitter

Of particular importance among the items assigned to the Denver Office were the Handie Talkies, the twenty-five watt transmitter and receiver and Motorola pocket receivers and transmitters.

In addition to the above, the Bureau forwarded the infrared viewer, together with infrared lenses for mile ray lamp and floodlight.

Additionally, the small items which it was felt might be necessary in the event of a pay off or concurrent investigation were assembled in one suitcase, as follows:

Flashlight

Large rolls of two types of twine

Paper clips

Rubber bands

Pencils

Fingerprint dusting kit with spare camel's hair brush

Scotch tape

Two pair of rubber gloves

Tweezers

Rulers

Spray lacquer

Cellophane envelopes

Plain envelopes

Portable fingerprint kit

Writing tablets

Evidence tags

Spare batteries

Compasses

Magnifying glass

Plaster of Paris

Because of the mountainous and unoccupied area in which the kidnaping occurred and in which it was felt that if the victim were murdered a body might be buried, shovels, an ax and a pick were also obtained. A heavy hammer and stakes were obtained in anticipation of the necessity of roping off an area for a crime-scene search.

All of the equipment which it was anticipated might be used in the investigation was maintained separately from the regular office equipment so that it could be immediately issued without searching through cabinets or other receptacles before issuing. Each item of equipment was charged to the Agent to whom issued by the equipment supervisor or a designated alternate. A separate charge-out book was maintained.

As kidnaping in COORNAP occurred in February, at the beginning of extremely inclement weather, it was felt that clothing for outdoor surveillance of pay off should be obtained. Contact was made with one of the sporting goods stores and the following items were obtained on a loan basis:

Three parkas

Three pair of men's down underpants

Three hand warmers

One can of fluid for hand warmers

One pair of khaki pants

Contact was also made with one of the large department stores and the following items which were not available at the sporting goods store, were obtained:

Three pair of insulated boots

Three pair of quilted, insulated underwear

Six pair of wool and cotton socks

Three pair of knit wool gloves

Two pair of heavy work pants

Three hoods for face covering

The hand warmers were felt necessary because it was felt that Agents' hands should be warm and facile in the event of an emergency.

In addition, the department store made available the top half of a male mannequin as it was felt that the male mannequin could be dressed in clothing and possibly placed on the front or back seat of an automobile in the event of a pay off or other activity at night.

All of these items were obtained on a loan basis, and at the time it was determined that no pay off would be made the articles of clothing were returned without charge to these stores.

Arrangements were made with the managers of these two stores, and with the managers of hardware, radio and electrical stores, to permit twenty-four hour contact in the event an emergency arose. It was found that the operators of these stores were cognizant of the Coors' investigation but were not told in any instance that the FBI was actually working on this case. They neither asked for nor were given an explanation for the requests. The individuals operating these stores were all known to the Agents of the Denver FBI as reliable persons, and no record of their names was found in the indices. Even though it was probably assumed by them that this request was made as the result

of the disappearance of Adolph Coors, III, no mention was made of this case in contacting them as publicity had appeared to the effect that the family of the victim had requested all law enforcement agencies to cease investigation.

As Agents were on twenty-four hour duty at the office for a considerable period of time and thereafter worked extraordinarily long hours, it was considered necessary to have food and coffee available at the office. A coffee percolator was obtained on a loan basis from one of the coffee suppliers. Arrangements were made for the delivery of food to the office by a restaurant as the building in which the Denver FBI Office is located is locked after regular office hours; and, additionally, local newspapers had reporters posted at the building on a twenty-four hour basis. As a consequence, it was necessary for Agents, particularly those coming in on special, to come to and leave the office space by a circuitous route in an effort to avoid being seen by these reporters. These Agents were able to obtain food and return with it to the office. In larger towns the problem of obtaining food on a twenty-four hour basis is not acute. In a smaller town where twenty-four hour restaurant service is not available, it would probably be necessary to lay in a larger stock of food for night consumption or make arrangements with a restaurant owner to have food available on a twenty-four hour basis.

The problem of darkroom facilities did not arise in the Denver Office during the actual investigation of COORNAP while the special was on, but subsequently when it was necessary to prepare a summary report containing numerous blown up photographs, it was determined that the darkroom facilities of the Denver Office were inadequate. Because this work can be done at night or on weekends, a request was made of the Denver Police Department for the use of their darkroom. This darkroom was made available and adequately handled the large number of photographs which had to be prepared. The possibility of utilizing police darkrooms should be considered, particularly if headquarters are being set up for an office other than the FBI headquarters city.

Agents designated by the Bureau to come to Denver on special in COORNAP from the Salt Lake City, Albuquerque and Butte Offices, brought with them five automobiles which operated on the same radio frequency as the Denver Office. It was necessary in order that these automobiles not be conspicuous that Colorado license plates be obtained. In addition to obtaining these license plates, it was necessary to obtain current brake and light stickers which are placed on windshields of automobiles in Colorado. These items were necessary, of course, to conform with Colorado law and so that the cars would not be conspicuous. This should be remembered in the event of specials in cities such as Kansas City where tax stickers are placed in the windshield of automobiles.

It was felt necessary to designate one of the automobiles of the Coors family as the automobile which would probably be used for a pay off. The automobile which it was thought could be most easily duplicated was so designated. This was a 1958 Impala owned by Bill Coors, brother to the victim. Contact was made with numerous car dealers in the Denver area but none had in his possession an automobile identical to the car owned by Bill Coors. A Police Captain in a suburban town, who was known to be a used-car salesman on the side, was contacted and he located an automobile similar in appearance. It was necessary to have this car partially repainted to achieve a two-tone effect and to place a radio aerial on the right front fender. Additionally, it was necessary to remove one dealer's metal identification plate from this car and replace it with a plate identical to that appearing on Bill Coors' car.

As the possibility existed that the pay off would necessitate a loose surveillance, would occur in the mountainous farm or cattle-raising area of Colorado or in metropolitan Denver, different arrangements had to be made. A taxicab was rented and a taxicab driver's hat was obtained. Arrangements were made for immediate delivery from one of the truck rental firms of a cattle truck or farm truck in the event one was necessary. The taxicab and the Chevrolet Impala, rented to duplicate Bill Coors' car, were both stored at a garage near the office where they could be obtained on a moment's notice.

Arrangements were also made that if necessary a truck of one of the local public utilities would be available for use in the event a stationary surveillance in the city area was necessary.

The automobile of Bill Coors was equipped with the concealed automobile transmitter (CAT). This unit was located under the front seat beneath the seat springs. It was activated by means of the speaker switch of the regular car radio at the lower center of the dash. The microphone was concealed under the speaker grill at the center of the dash. The broadcast receiver of the regular car radio was disabled by removal of a fuse. The antenna of the CAT unit was connected to the exhaust pipe at the left rear of the car and additional antenna was spread under the car body.

In both Bill Coors' car and in the car which simulated it, Handie Talkies were also placed under the front seat and connected by coaxial cable to the regular automobile antenna. This antenna was then regulated to the proper length to handle the Handie Talkie. The speaker of the Handie Talkie was concealed under the seat but was immediately available, and the switch controlling this Handie Talkie was placed in such a position that it could be easily reached by the driver.



It was felt necessary to have a car simulating Bill Coors' car as it was not known if he and his automobile would be immediately available on a twenty-four hour basis. The simulated car, of course, was always kept available.

As it was not known if Adolph Coors, III, would be returned alive or would be killed by his kidnaper, the identities of competent physicians were determined in Denver and the surrounding counties. These individuals can usually be determined either through personal contact of the Agents in the office or through contact with the various local law enforcement agencies. The same is true of autopsy surgeons who are usually known to local law enforcement officers or coroners. It should also be borne in mind that it possibly may be necessary to obtain the identities of coroners in areas considered pertinent to the investigation. In the COORNAP case these men were contacted early in the investigation and their cooperation solicited. It was found that each was cooperative and indicated that he would not notify the papers or other publicity media, realizing the necessity of a thorough crime-scene search before the public invaded the area.

Timetables of the various public transportation facilities were obtained, but arrangements were also made with ranking officials at various airlines in Denver to bump passengers in the event that was necessary in the handling of COORNAP.

Joseph Corbett had told friends that he hunted in the Golden Gate Canyon area northwest of Golden, Colorado. Inasmuch as a yellow Mercury was earlier reported as pertinent in this investigation and prior to its discovery burned on a dump in New Jersey, investigation was conducted in Colorado in an effort to locate this car. As the car was reported a bright yellow in color, use was made of a slow flying airplane to search the Golden Gate area, and also the area contiguous to victim's home and the bridge from which he disappeared. Consideration was given to use of a helicopter. This type of machine was not used, however, because of danger in the high rugged mountain area where up drafts and down drafts might have easily wrecked the plane. The aircraft was obtained through the services of a Colonel with the U. S. Air Force who was also the liaison man with the Civil Air Patrol.

As it was felt that Corbett might demand payment of ransom in the mountainous area with which he was reported familiar, contact was made with stables for the rental of horses. In addition, it was felt that guides might be necessary and contact was made with State Game Wardens, U. S. Forestry Service Rangers and particularly with some of the old-time prospectors and wood cutters in the mountainous area. These men were constantly available for assistance.

In COORNAP demand was made for \$500,000 ransom. The only communication received did not specify the type of container the money should be placed in. A footlocker, measuring 31" by

16 3/4" by 12 1/2", was found to hold the demanded ransom in mixed bills. A footlocker of this sort, not metal, was obtained from a local manufacturer. A hole was cut in the center of the bottom of the footlocker so that the switch of the ransom decoy package would fit within this hole. The switch was built up so that it would protrude beyond the side of the footlocker. A cloth similar to the cover used on the footlocker was obtained from the manufacturer and substituted for the cloth torn when the hole was cut in the bottom of the footlocker. This cloth was placed on the footlocker loosely so that it would not activate the switch. The footlocker was then packed with seventy pounds of newspaper which was the approximate weight of the bills. The ransom decoy package was placed in the footlocker so that it would be in an off position when the footlocker was resting on its bottom. In order to obtain additional transmitting range, a loop antenna was placed around the inside of the trunk lid. This was made of two turns of Belden indoor aerial wire; a condenser was connected in series with the loop to tune it. This condenser was mounted at the center of the back edge of the lid of the footlocker in place of a rivet which was removed. The condenser could then be tuned by a small screwdriver from either the outside or inside of the trunk. The loop antenna was connected by a low impedance line to a coupling loop 2" in diameter and consisting of two turns. Lining paper matching the interior of the trunk was obtained from the manufacturer and used to cover the antenna and connecting wires.

As twenty-five Agents were sent to the Denver Office on special, it was necessary to obtain maps for these Agents in order to facilitate their becoming acquainted with the area. This required obtaining regular State maps which are obtainable through service stations, and also maps of the City of Denver and surrounding suburbs. Before the discovery of the skeleton remains of Adolph Coors, III, a detailed search was made of the mountainous area where the Laboratory stated samples of soil found under the car destroyed by Corbett, originated. A contact was made with the Geological Survey for quadrangle maps of the entire mountain area, and the maps were obtained and supplied to the Agents making this search. These maps were coordinated with county maps obtainable through the State Highway Department. A team of four Agents was assigned to each quadrangle map area which covered approximately seventy miles. These Agents were instructed to travel every road in the quadrangle and talk to all residents, and to search all mines, buildings, caves or other places where a body might be concealed.

Nine stenographers and clerks were sent to the Denver Office on this special. It was necessary to obtain office equipment for these employees. This equipment was obtained primarily from the General Services Administration on a loan or rental basis.

At the time the skeleton remains of Adolph Coors, III, were found it was necessary that a detailed crime-scene search be conducted. This search covered a large area in rugged mountainous terrain. A regular crime search line was established with one man acting as anchor on each end of the line. In order to keep both Agents anchoring the line in contact with the office, the men anchoring the line each carried a Motorola pocket receiver and transmitter. With these items they were able to maintain contact with a two-way automobile stationed in the vicinity, which in turn was able to contact the office approximately thirty miles away.

The equipment man should maintain close contact with all personnel on the special, particularly the Special Agent in Charge. All requests for any equipment should be channeled through the equipment supervisor as he may have the equipment available in the office or have made arrangements for it to be available at some supplier. It is suggested that the equipment supervisor be an Agent assigned to the local office because of contacts already available.

## LIAISON AT VICTIM'S HOME IN KIDNAPING CASES

### PREFACE

The comments contained herein are based on one actual experience of being in a kidnaped victim's residence. Accordingly, it is to be recognized there are many different circumstances, conditions, problems and types of people that will differ in each individual case. It is to be noted that the material in the manual on this topic covers most any situation. The following is offered as Agents' experiences of having been in the COORS' residence for some seventeen days beginning February 11, 1960, three days after ADOLPH COORS, III was kidnaped.

On February 9, 1960, the following note was received  
by MARY COORS, the wife of victim:

"Mrs. Coors:

"Your husband has been kidnaped. His car is by Turkey Creek.

"Call the police or F. B. I.: he dies.

"Cooperate: he lives.

"Ransom: \$200,000 in tens and \$300,000 in twenties.

"There will be no negotiating.

"Bills: used / non-consecutive / unrecorded / unmarked.

"Warning: we will know if you call the police or record the  
serial numbers.

"Directions: Place money & this letter & envelope in  
one suitcase or bag.

"Have two men with a car ready to make the delivery.

"When all set, advertise a tractor for sale in Denver  
Post section 69. Sign ad King Ranch, Fort Lupton.

"Wait at NA 9-4455 for instructions after ad appears.

"Deliver immediately after receiving call.

Any delay will be regarded as a stall to set up  
a stake-out.

"Understand this: Adolph's life is in your hands. We have no desire to commit murder. All we want is that money. If you follow the instructions, he will be released unharmed within 48 hours after the money is received."

The ad was placed in an issue of the Denver Post which was first available to the public on the night of February 13, 1960.



## PREPARING TO GO INTO VICTIM'S HOME

In preparation for going into the victim's home, it is essential that all information available relative to the entire case, as known as of that time, be obtained as well as background of family and conditions in the residence.

Some consideration should be given to wearing apparel.

The following are a few of the items which were found to be useful:

Washable, quick dry underwear

Quick dry shirts

Respectable pair of lounging shoes with soles that will not  
make excessive noise when walking around the house

Adequate sleeping garments

Personal toilet items.

The following equipment was used and found to  
be desirable:

Stationery and writing supplies

Typewriter

Dictaphone

Camera

Sidearms and shotgun

Complete kit for taking fingerprints

Technical equipment necessary to handle the specific situation should be selected by Agent making the installation.

It was found that two recordings of each telephone conversation was essential, indicating additional recording units would be necessary.

Sufficient attachments for the private phone line to the Field Office enabling each Agent in the residence to simultaneously enter into conferences with the Person in Charge of the case.

Monitoring instrument to be attached directly to the phone on which incoming calls are to be received at the residence.

Arrangements should be made to discreetly enter the home of the victim.

## PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED AT VICTIM'S HOME

On arrival at the COORS' residence, on February 11, 1960, local law enforcement officers had departed and a log was established which would continue to reflect activities there during the stay of the Agents. First contact at the residence was made with JAMES GRANT, a lawyer and the brother of MARY COORS, victim's wife. He advised that a number of family friends were visiting and that the four COORS' children and some of their friends were in the house. Other friends were expected to arrive. During the initial conversation with GRANT, it was noted that numerous phone calls were being received from family friends. MARY COORS joined the latter part of the conversation with GRANT and it was explained to them that it was necessary now to have more privacy in the residence. It was agreed the guests would be excused.

Shortly thereafter, the guests left. The Agents were shown through the residence for the purpose of familiarizing them with it. For a detailed description of the house, blueprints were obtained and are probably still available in the Denver Office.

Briefly the house may be described as located in a rather remote mountain side location, outside of a suburban community of Denver, known as Morrison, Colorado. The residence is not in direct view of any other habitation, but is situated in the foothills in such a manner that it could be watched from numerous locations in higher surrounding terrain. The house itself is large with four bedrooms on the main floor. Three of the bedrooms in line. Adjacent to the main entrance there is a stairwell down to a daylight basement of considerable proportions. The bedroom on the extreme end of the line of bedrooms is a large room with private bath and dressing room. It was normally occupied by Mr. and Mrs. COORS. The two bedrooms in line, separated by a bath and adjoining the master bedroom, were occupied by the two COORS' girls and the other one by the two COORS' boys. The fourth bedroom on the first level was separated from these and normally unoccupied. The remaining space upstairs composed of a large living room, dining room, kitchen and utility room. The basement, occupying less space than the first floor, consisted of a furnace room, large recreation room that was furnished with complete kitchen facilities in one corner and normal recreation room furniture. The basement also had a combination bedroom - office and a bathroom. Adjoining the bedroom - office, is

a room completely enclosed in cement with the exception of one door from the office, and originally designed as a bomb shelter. It contained a deep freeze and a few personal items in storage.

The garage is located to the side of and directly attached to the house near the front entrance. It is accessible from a door between the end of the garage and the inside of the house. The doors are electrically controlled. These controls are on the inside of the garage located directly adjacent to the door entering the house. The garage contained space for three automobiles and storage area.

The normal phone service used by the COORS' family consisted of a private line with extensions in the bedroom used by Mr. and Mrs. COORS, one in the kitchen and the third extension in the recreation area downstairs.

During the tour through the house, MARY and JIM brought up the question as what should be done about the friends of MARY COORS expected to arrive within the next few minutes, most of those coming were bringing food and et cetera. It was suggested that if they could be reached by telephone, they be requested not to appear. This MARY COORS did.

The four children, ranging in ages of 10 to 18, presented a problem in the residence, in that they were making and

receiving numerous phone calls, and using the entire residence without being able to understand any imposed restrictions. For security reasons and the general peace of mind of all, it was decided by MARY COORS and JIM GRANT that if the children's grandparents, Mr. and Mrs. COORS, SR., were willing, the four children should stay at their residence. This was arranged and the COORS' children remained at the grandparents' residence until the Agents departed the victim's home.

In regard to the numerous phone calls that were being received by MARY COORS, it became obvious that something would have to be done to avoid possible interference with the kidnaper's call. Also each time the phone rang, it completely interrupted the entire household until the identity of the caller was known. In this connection, MARY COORS telephonically contacted two or three of her friends instructing them to call other people who would be most likely to contact her telephonically, requesting them to refrain until further notice. In addition, she asked JOE and BILL COORS, brothers-in-law, to contact their immediate family with the same request.

The servant arrangement consisted of two maids, one appearing primarily as a house cleaner, and the other as a laundry servant. Neither lived in and the arrival of both entailed

an automobile trip to the bus stop by MARY COORS. It was decided that one full-time maid living in would be more adaptable to the situation for purposes of security and convenience. MARY COORS selected the maid to be kept, that selection being based on long time acquaintanceship and her ability as a servant and cook.

This reduction of the household members and visitors left MARY COORS, JIM GRANT and THELMA HOFFMAN, the maid. In addition, on a schedule of 24 hours each, JOE and BILL COORS were to alternate being in the residence.

The first evening it was noted that MARY COORS was becoming increasingly nervous, sometimes almost hysterical. The following day, with JIM GRANT'S assistance, MARY COORS invited a friend as a permanent house guest.

All of the above arrangements, with the exception of having MARY COORS invite her friend in to stay, were undertaken and accomplished on the first afternoon the Agents arrived. During this same period of time, a considerable number of requests were made of MARY COORS for specific bits of information or things she was to do. Some would be forgotten by her. It was the Agents' experience in the residence with all members of the family, that it was more desirable to make one specific request or resolve one problem at a time rather than a number of them.

The schedule of service people who should call at the residence was established so that there would be no Agent personnel in sight when they arrived. MARY COORS' doctor was identified and places where he would be available at all times established. This was for the primary purpose of being able to locate him should she require his attention.

Living quarters for the three Agents was established in the daylight basement. Inasmuch as two Agents were scheduled to be awake at all times, the one bed in the office with adjoining bath was sufficient. One end of the recreation room, out of sight of the stairwell and windows, was used for installation of private line and recording equipment.

It was felt it was necessary to reduce the number of telephone extensions to avoid any individual answering the phone except the one selected to receive the kidnaper's call. Due to the physical layout of the house, the extension in the recreation room was left in service as it was available only to the Agents. As the person answering the phone, should the kidnaper call, would be one of the family, the extension in the master bedroom was designated for this purpose. With MARY COORS' consent, this room was converted into an office for the purpose of receiving phone calls and most generally was occupied by one Agent and the member of the family



who was expecting to receive the call at the time. This separation turned out satisfactorily in that it left the recreation room private for the Agents' use with the technical equipment, dictating, use of the private line and other general official activities, eliminating the necessity of anyone but Agents to be there. The phone extension in the kitchen was disconnected. The other three bedrooms upstairs were used by MARY COORS and her friend, JIM GRANT and the COORS' brother in the residence, and the maid.

## PLANS TO RECEIVE KIDNAPER'S CALL

MARY COORS was anxious to receive the phone call but it was felt by the Agents present that she would be the least capable of carrying on a conversation with the kidnaper.

JIM GRANT, age 42, Harvard Law graduate and practicing attorney in New York, left the impression with the Agents that he was the most desirable individual to receive an incoming call from the kidnaper.

JOE COORS and BILL COORS, who alternated at the residence, were to relieve JIM GRANT during the time he was to sleep. GRANT was actually around and available to answer the phone from 10:00 A. M. until 2:00 A. M. During the rest of the 24-hour cycle, either JOE or BILL COORS was present for this purpose. In giving instructions to the persons that were to answer the phone, it was not necessary to include questions that would determine whether or not the victim was alive, inasmuch as the family had agreed that they wanted to pay the ransom money irrespective of whether they had proof that he was alive. It was desirable to retain the caller on the phone as long as possible to afford the possibility of tracing the phone call.

Several questions were formulated, the answers of which would determine if it was the kidnaper calling, were typed and left by the

phone that was to be used for incoming calls. In addition, on the same desk attached to the phone was a monitoring instrument giving an Agent across the desk a chance to hear both sides of any telephone conversation coming into the residence. This was in addition to monitoring and recording equipment in the recreation room. This instrument was designed so the Agent could only listen and was unable to talk in it or have any other room noises interfere. To facilitate the Agent having control over this conversation without unduly interrupting a member of the family receiving the call, a prompting board was improvised. On this board, which was a door from the basement, was large printed phrases, as prompters, to help the person taking the call to prolong the conversation and to obtain pertinent information from the kidnaper. Some of these phrases were:

SLOW DOWN

READY TO PAY

WILLING TO PAY

REPEAT THAT

PERSONAL ITEMS

ROADS ARE BAD - SNOW

HOW DO I KNOW YOU ARE THE KIDNAPER

JIM GRANT had a tendency to static-repeat phrases made to the person he was talking to. He was encouraged and so were JOE and BILL COORS on all conversations to static-repeat the phone conversation.

There was never any intention that all these phrases should be used in any one conversation. A baton type pointer was available for the Agent to point to particular phrases which would be applicable at that point in the conversation. Also on the desk to facilitate the person carrying on the conversation was a copy of the ransom note, typed questions, and a memo scratch pad and a crayon was available to write reminders to the individual accepting the call.

Mock practices were conducted with all three individuals who were expected to possibly take the call. In addition, prior to the series of family calls being eliminated, the element of repeating, slow down and other phrases on the board were used without interfering with personal calls coming in.

## INTERVIEWS OF MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY

Members of the family in the residence were repeatedly and almost constantly interviewed in a conversational manner. These interviews covered all subject matters pertinent to the case. The close association for many hours within each 24-hour period made it possible to handle interviews and problems in strictly a conversational manner. This arrangement seemed ideal in that it was possible to stay abreast of the family's thinking. At the same time, it was imperative that each Agent in the residence be consistent with each other and advise the Person in Charge in order that all problems could be handled in an acceptable manner without contradiction.

It was felt necessary to note the answer to questions propounded to members of the family by each Agent to avoid repeating the same question to the same member of the family unnecessarily.

In eliminating personal items the victim could have had on his person at the time of his abduction, a complete inventory was made of his personal effects in the residence including clothing, as well as those personal items in his office.

Hair specimens were obtained from victim's personal brush and comb.

With MARY COORS' permission, all records and papers in the residence were reviewed.

Members of the family were photographed and fingerprinted.

The following items and information were obtained and developed in the course of interviews of members of the family:

Photo of victim

Wearing apparel at time of abduction

Hair specimens of victim

Personal items in possession at time of abduction

Identity of retailer that could identify personal items in his possession at time of abduction

Identity of doctors and hospitals relative to medical history of victim

Dental history

Financial status of victim and wife

Identity of friends and associates of victim and family

Identity of servants and service people

Friends of family

Activity of victim and family immediately prior to the kidnaping

Identity of possible suspects

Identities of banks, investment houses, stockbrokers, etc.

Education of victim

Background and membership in organizations maintaining permanent records

Hobbies, recreation, social activities of victim

Family history of all members of family, immediate relatives and victim

Background of all servants

Normal activity and daily itinerary of family.

## HANDLING OF RANSOM MONEY AT RESIDENCE

On the evening of February 12, the prepared ransom money in the amount of \$500,000 was delivered to the residence by bank officials. It arrived in a sealed canvas bag and was accepted at the residence by BILL COORS. It was placed in the bomb shelter room previously described. This room had been selected because it was not accessible from the outside of the house and the one inside door could be locked. In this room was placed two footlockers, one of which was to be used to deliver the money in. These two lockers had been marked for future identification prior to arrival in the residence. One of them contained a radio sounding device, the other had no equipment. Also in this room was placed the original ransom note and an exact facsimile. The money was left in the sealed canvas bag. Depending on the circumstances and instructions immediately prior to delivery, it was to be placed in one of the footlockers with one of the notes. The door of this room was locked at all times after the above articles were placed therein. The key on a string was worn around the neck of the member of the family who was on duty to receive the call from the kidnaper. The foreseeable things to be done immediately after receiving a call from the kidnaper were divided among the Agents in the residence. The additional preparation of the money and placing it into the automobile in the garage



was to be handled by one Agent and the COORS' brother on duty at the time. The money was never delivered. It was accepted by bank officials in the residence for return to the bank. It was in the original sealed bag, avoiding the necessity of recounting the money.

It should be pointed out that the Person in Charge was constantly advised by private telephone line of all arrangements and activity described. This was done on a continuing basis.

The Person in Charge kept Agents in the residence informed in detail as to his general thinking, and problems which could occur involving the family. These telephone conferences on things that might happen in the future made it possible for the Agents in the residence to answer questions and make decisions with the family. He in turn was advised of each question asked by the family and the answer given. Through this manner, the Agents and Person in Charge were consistent with the family in all matters.

The technical equipment making it possible for all Agents at the residence to simultaneously carry on a conversation with the Person in Charge eliminated the necessity of paraphrasing his instructions and ideas and added to their ability to act in harmony.

The individual Agents in the victim's home also kept each other advised of all conversations with and questions asked and answers given to members of the family.

MISCELLANEOUS QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED  
IN THE VICTIM'S RESIDENCE

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Due to the arrival some days after the kidnaping, many of the necessary things had been done in connection with the residence assignment. Those items are mentioned in the manual and are not being repeated here.

Agents, prior to entering the residence, in a conference with the Person in Charge reached the conclusion that there was a strong likelihood the victim was not alive.

On entering the residence, they felt that it was imperative to receive as clear and detailed telephone call from the kidnaper as possible. It was also felt necessary to associate with the family in a manner that would result in them taking no action that would interfere with the investigation of the case.

The family were continually reassured that the answers to their questions and problems were given them by the Agents present, with the full knowledge and consideration of the Person in Charge. It was pointed out that the Person in Charge had much experience in kidnaping cases, and in turn, on their behalf, was consulting with FBI officials in Washington, D. C., including Mr. HOOVER himself.

In one instance, the family inquired as to the necessity of the detailed coverage of the expected telephone call from the kidnaper.

In this instance, as well as every other opportunity, it was pointed out to the family that the safe return of the victim was the first and primary object of the FBI. That the necessity for complete coverage of the phone call was first to make sure that clear instructions were obtained from the kidnaper in order that they could be complied with, resulting in the release of the victim. That, secondly, the coverage might assist in leading to the identification and apprehension of the individual responsible for the kidnaping.

The Agents in the residence were frank at all times in answering the various questions and problems and tried to avoid leaving any impression of mystery and evasiveness in their actions and conduct.

JIM GRANT, after some time had elapsed and no contact from the kidnaper had been received, asked the question, are you actually going to pay the money to the kidnaper when it is recognized the victim is dead? It was pointed out to him that was a decision to be made by the family and they had already reached the decision that the money would be paid whether or not he was alive.

Getting necessary items in and out of the house was handled by BILL and JOE COORS, in that they exchanged shifts daily, this presented no problem.

Permission to intercept and open all mail addressed to the COORS' residence had previously been obtained and this was handled at the Post Office. It placed no particular responsibility on the Agents in the residence. However, contents of the extortion letters intercepted at the Post Office were relayed over the direct line to the Agents in the residence and were made known to the family for their decision as to complying with them. No particular problem was encountered in having them reach a decision. When practical, these notes were presented in the A. M. in that MARY COORS could respond more logically than later in the day.

The identity of several individuals were furnished by members of the family as suspects. Particularly BILL COORS would pursue the results and inquire in connection to these suspects very persistently. Although few of the suspects from the very beginning had any logical basis, it left a better impression with the family when they could be advised rather promptly that that individual had been eliminated as a suspect and why. Bearing in mind that at this stage of the case, a very limited investigation was being conducted, it is believed where logical, these suspects reported by the family should be eliminated.

After the children had moved to the grandparents' residence, they continued to be some bother to MARY COORS in making requests of her for permission to go various places such as

school, skiing and visiting friends.

There were Agents stationed at the grandparents' residence and after advising them of the children's bother to their mother, they were able to eliminate it.

News Releases: The two COORS' brothers and Mr. COORS, SR., as a matter of business policy and custom, had lunch each day in the COORS, SR. residence located and adjoining their place of business. At that time, they would discuss problems and have a mutual agreement as to the solution. That custom continued over in regard to this case. The major decisions that were reached in this case concerning the family were reached at a conference of the COORS' family, including MARY COORS and JIM GRANT, with the Person in Charge being present. These conferences were held in COORS, SR. residence, usually shortly after the lunch hour. In regard to press releases, the COORS' family, in connection with their business, had a press representative. The handling of the press releases were cleared through him and he in turn would clear with the Person in Charge prior to any release being made in connection with this case. On one occasion later in the stay of the Agents in the residence, MARY COORS wanted to make a final appeal through the press for the kidnaper to contact her. The fact that she was thinking of this release was known to the Agents in the residence a day or so ahead and finally she presented to them a copy of her proposed release. At the suggestion of the Person in Charge, some changes were made by MARY COORS and it was handled as stated above.

The family had decided that BILL or JOE COORS, under no circumstances, would personally deliver the ransom money. JIM GRANT had volunteered to help in any way he could, including delivering the ransom money. The Person in Charge of the investigation had decided that JIM GRANT and one of the Agents in the residence would jointly deliver the ransom money. In the event the ransom money was to be delivered, one Agent, as previously described, was to handle the final packaging of the ransom money. One Agent immediately on the conclusion of the call was to transcribe verbatim the phone call for the use of the Person in Charge. The third Agent was to furnish verbally this information to and receive the final instructions from the Person in Charge.

CECIL KENDRICK was the friend that MARY COORS selected to have stay with her and who did stay with her for the first week. On arriving at the COORS' residence, which was the next day after the Agents arrived, she was cautioned about security features, but was given a free rein to console and help MARY COORS in any way she thought best. However, she was cautioned as to the possibility that the victim might not be alive and to bear this in mind in offering MARY any assurance on this point. CECIL KENDRICK had to leave the residence for personal reasons and another friend, JAN PHIPPS, took her place in the residence and she was given similar instructions.

The possibility that the kidnaper might not recontact the family was recognized from the outset by the Person in Charge.

Actually the kidnaper did not recontact the family. This resulted in one of the principal problems for the Agents in the residence. The problem being to assist the family in deciding on a date they would no longer wait for a call and all out active investigation could begin.

This problem was not actually broached by the Agents in the first instances. During the last several days of their stay in the residence, on different occasions, individual members of the family would open this subject. The problem would then be discussed with that member in a specific and frank manner. The actual date was decided on in a family conference at the COORS, SR. residence, the Person in Charge being present.

Having a bearing on this problem, was one of the most frequent questions asked by individual members of the family from the outset. Is "AD" alive? The answer would consist of enumerating the factual circumstances. From the beginning, their conclusions would be that he probably was not alive, yet this same question would be put to an Agent a short time later. Never was there any encouragement that he was alive given to the family.

Another question: When will he (the kidnaper) call? Here again, no encouragement was ever extended to the family. The point was made that if "AD" was dead resulting in the kidnaper losing

his security, there might never be a call.

It is believed the frank approach to these questions, as well as all others, from the outset, materially assisted in having some influence with the family and their thinking in resolving their problem of terminating the wait for a contact by the kidnaper.



SETTING UP CHIEF CLERK'S OFFICE ON  
SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT CASES

When a major case has occurred and the investigation is to be handled as a "special," of course, the SAC of the office involved and the Bureau have discussed the matter as to the number of Special Agent personnel necessary. In addition, discussion is had as to the number of extra stenographers and at least four clerical employees should be borne in mind as being necessary to handle the "paper work" in connection with the handling of a "special."

The field office in which the major crime has occurred has already opened a case, for example, a kidnaping, and undoubtedly the first serial appearing therein will be a memorandum of some Special Agent reflecting that he received a call from someone advising that a particular individual has been kidnaped or disappeared.

Probably the next serial, or Serial #2, will be a copy of a teletype to the Bureau or a memorandum reflecting a telephone call with the Bureau.

Subsequent serials will reflect, as a rule, memoranda of different Agents as to what they have done or information they have received.

In connection with the handling of a "special," arrangements should first be made to obtain some particular section of the office which will be away from other Agents of

the office and away from the public so that the inspector or man in charge of the "special" can have his group in one space. The temporary Chief Clerk's Office (CCO) should, of course, be allocated a corner or section of that area, and the office in question should already make arrangements to have brought in a number of extra file cabinets and other office supplies which are used in the operation of a CCO.

Generally in the regular CCO, files contain a number of serials; for example, one file or volume may possibly contain 75 to 100 serials. However, in connection with a "special," it has been found that if each volume contains only 25 serials, this helps a great deal; that is, Volume No. 1 should have Serials 1 to 25, Volume No. 2 should have Serials 26 to 50, and so forth. The reason for breaking down these volumes containing only 25 serials is that as the case progresses Agents will have to refer to references and previous serials and if several Agents have to look in one volume which would contain a hundred serials, it would involve a loss of time, and so forth, whereas smaller volumes will be more readily available.

In addition to starting these volumes containing only 25 serials, sub-files should immediately be opened in order to channel into that sub-file an extra copy of a memorandum, airtel or teletype..

For example, as soon as a "special" is started, there will be a number of communications referring to Agents, stenographers and clerical employees leaving their headquarters city

for the office where the "special" is being handled. Instead of having all of these communications put in the regular investigative file, this type of communication should be placed in a sub-file which can be given a number, for example, Sub-file A, and it can be entitled "Personnel Matters." With this sub-file in existence, any subsequent correspondence relating to personnel should be placed in that file and no copies be placed in the regular investigative file. Then, if the person in charge of the "special" or his assistants need any information regarding personnel, the same is readily available in one volume.

At about the same time the Bureau will probably issue instructions that a weekly communication should be forwarded to the Bureau setting forth cost data, and a sub-file should be opened for that phase. In other words, the Bureau will issue instructions to the office where the "special" is being handled to notify all offices to submit weekly communications relative to the extra cost involved. All of these communications should be placed in that particular sub-file and no copies should be placed in the main investigative file. For example, this section can be called Sub-file B and it can be entitled "Cost Data."

As soon as the newspapers start publishing their articles, there will be many newspaper articles and a sub-file should be opened which, for example, can be Sub-file C entitled "Newspaper Clippings." A copy of every newspaper item should be placed in this sub-file and, of course, an extra copy be

forwarded to the Bureau daily. In addition, these newspaper clippings should be reviewed for possible leads and all pertinent names appearing therein should be indexed. These newspaper clippings will, of course, be properly mounted, serialized and initialed before being placed in this sub-file.

The Bureau will generally issue instructions to submit a daily teletype summary, and it has been found advisable to place the regular copies in the regular investigative file; but an extra copy should be placed in a sub-file, for example, Sub-file D, entitled "Daily Summaries." By having an extra copy in this sub-file, one can readily refer to that file which will contain a day-by-day summary of the activities that have been described to the Bureau.

Of course, another sub-file should be opened which should contain instructions relative to the logs that are maintained at the commencement of the "special" in order that all such information will be readily available in one sub-file. It is also advisable to open a sub-file to contain an extra copy of "Narrative Memoranda."

Inasmuch as the telephone company will be contacted immediately and interviews will be had with various telephone officials, all of which will be recorded in memorandum form, it is deemed advisable to open a sub-file, which can be entitled "Confidential Telephone File," and all copies of memoranda submitted regarding the installation of telephones, contacts with the phone company, and so forth, should be

placed in this file and no copies at all be placed in the investigative file. Again, if one desires to know what has been done in connection with the telephone situation, this one sub-file is readily available and should contain all pertinent data.

As a rule, neighboring offices will be instructed by teletype or telephone calls to ship in to the interested office extra equipment that might be needed and in order to have this information available and in one file, a sub-file should be opened, which probably can be entitled "Equipment," and copies of all communications, and so forth, can be placed in this file so that the property man or Agent in charge of the property can readily have available and in one file all information relative to equipment that has been shipped in, rented or obtained from other sources.

If the major crime receives publicity, as it undoubtedly will, there will be many communications prepared relative to contacts with the press, TV or radio stations, and it has been found advisable to open a sub-file, which can be entitled "Press Services," and in this file a copy of the memoranda should be placed, whereas the original and other copies will be in the investigative file. Again, if any question comes up regarding the press, and so forth, a copy of every communication is in this one sub-file, which will be readily available.

A similar sub-file should be opened which can be entitled "Western Union." This sub-file should reflect results of contact with Western Union officials and, again, all copies of such communications should be placed in this sub-file.

In connection with a kidnaping case, the question of circularizing arises, and it has been found advisable to open a sub-file, which can be entitled "Ransom Circularization," and in this file should be placed an extra copy of each communication relating to this phase of the investigation. Of course, the original and other copies are in the investigative file, but, again, by having an extra copy in the sub-file, the person handling that particular phase will have at his fingertips copies of all communications relating to that matter.

When the unknown subject is identified and, for example, a wanted flyer or identification order is prepared, it has been found that the office supervisor in the case will on a number of occasions instruct other offices to circularize, for example, bus depots, barber shops, and so forth. When this is done, the other offices will send a letter or communication advising that the particular circularization has been done, and it has been found of an assistance to have a sub-file opened entitled, for example, "Wanted Flyer Circularization," and an extra copy of that communication is designated for that sub-file.

At the start of a kidnaping case, of course, written authority will be obtained from the victim's family or close

friends relative to checking mail at the Post Office, and it has been found advisable to open a sub-file, which can be entitled "Post Office File," and place therein all communications or memoranda relating to this phase of the investigation and do not place copies in the regular investigative file. If the person in charge, or someone else, desires to know what the situation is relative to the inquiry made or set up at the Post Office, this file will have all information in it.

It has also been found advisable to open a sub-file which will contain a copy of all memoranda or other communications which more or less contain "policy matters" or instructions given by the Bureau to the person handling the special assignment or contain suggestions, and so forth. The originals, of course, which would be memoranda, teletypes or airtels, would be placed in the investigative file, but a copy should be placed in this sub-file so that the same will be readily available to the person in charge or his assistants if any information is desired as to Bureau policy or instructions.

In addition, of course, an exhibit and 1-A files are opened and maintained similar to that in the regular field division office.

It has also been found advisable to open another file and to entitle it "Informants." As time goes on, all

offices, especially the office handling the "special," will be asked to contact all criminal informants, potential criminal informants, and other sources, and the office in question will probably submit an extra copy of FD-209 reflecting a contact with an informant, and instead of putting that in the investigative file, it should be designated for the sub-file. Likewise, other offices will from time to time send an airtel or letter reflecting results of their informants and, again, all copies should be placed in this sub-file.

At the commencement of each "special," as a rule, inquiries are conducted regarding transportation facilities and, as a result, much information, pamphlets, and so forth, will be obtained relative to airplane, train, bus, and other means of transportation, and it has been found advisable to place all copies of such information in a sub-file, which can be entitled "Transportation," so that the Special Agent handling that particular phase will have readily available in one file all such data.

Many green sheets, of course, will be prepared containing bulky exhibits and other pieces of evidence, and a sub-file should be opened containing an extra copy of those so that they will be readily available at any time.



As the case progresses, undoubtedly criminal records will be obtained from the Identification Division of the Bureau, and it has been found that instead of placing them in the investigative file that a sub-file should be opened and all criminal records be placed in this sub-file and, of course, indexed to that sub-file. Here again, one will have in a particular volume, or volumes, nothing but identification records which will be more readily available than having to go through the investigative file for them.

In connection with a kidnaping, the victim's family or relatives will undoubtedly receive a number of letters from "nuts," "crackpots," and from respectable people, and it has been found advisable that instead of placing these in the regular investigative file that a sub-file should be opened and they should be placed therein and, of course, indexed and serialized so that one, again, will have in one volume all such letters that have been received.

In connection with a kidnaping, one probably will receive at least one or more letters, and it has been found advisable to open a sub-file which will contain either photostatic copies or photographic copies of such letters which are known to come from the kidnaper. The purpose of this sub-file is so that Agents in connection with their

investigation can readily read and observe the type of communication that was sent and, of course, this file will have photographic copies and not the original.

As a rule in connection with a kidnaping case, there will be a large number of other extortion letters which are received and, of course, when it is readily known that such type of letters do not come from the kidnaper, separate Extortion (9) cases should be opened and handled by the personnel in the office and not by the men on the special assignment. However, in order to keep a record as to such letters, and so forth, it has been found advisable to open a sub-file and to see to it that an extra copy of the main communication to the Bureau is placed in this file. For example, in connection with a kidnaping case, the first crackpot letter that is received can be given number "1," the next number "2," and so forth, then, as these new "9" cases are opened and a letter is sent to the Bureau in that "9" case, an extra copy should be designated for the sub-file and one can thereafter pick up this sub-file and readily observe just what other extortion letters have been received.

As the case progresses, one will receive many FBI Laboratory reports, and it has been found that instead of placing these in the regular investigative file that a sub-file should be opened and all copies should be filed in that sub-file after being serialized, indexed, and so forth,

so that one will have in one sub-file every FBI Laboratory report that has been submitted.

A similar sub-file can be opened up which should contain Latent Fingerprint Section communications.

Of course, a photograph file is also opened and maintained similar to that of the exhibit file.

The opening of the main investigative file and these sub-files, of course, is to conform with Bureau instructions relative to the operations of a CCO, and the items appearing in these sub-files, of course, are serialized, stamped, initialed, and so forth, and are indexed.

The main purpose in having such sub-files referred to above is so that during the early stages of the investigation of the major case, one can readily "put his finger" on certain communications or correspondence that the person in charge or his assistants may want to quickly or readily refer to.

Each major case may present different problems and in some types of cases one may want to open additional sub-files which again should contain only a copy of the communications or memorandum. For example, in almost every kidnaping case much investigation will be conducted relative to identifying the type of paper, and it has been found that in addition to filing the original and copy of the communication or memorandum in the main investigative file that

an extra copy be designated for a sub-file which can be entitled "Ransom Paper Project." The Agents handling that particular phase of the investigation will readily have available in one sub-file copies of all communications relating to that phase. The same would apply to possibly identifying a typewriter if a typewriter was used in the preparation of the ransom letter or letters.

After the regular investigative file and whatever sub-files that are needed are opened, the problem arises as to seeing to it that the information appearing in these files can be readily found and located when needed.

By this time, some clerical employee will have been designated as the Chief Clerk of the "special," or, as in some cases, a regular Chief Clerk will be brought in to the office where the "special" is being handled and at that time indices will have to be set up and organized.

The regular index in the ordinary CCO is broken down alphabetically by the name of the person or firm and then there will be indices for motor numbers of automobiles, guns, and a few other items; however, in connection with a "special," the Chief Clerk or one of the other clerks who will handle that phase should be instructed to immediately set up a number of other type of guide cards. For example, index cards will, of course, be filed alphabetically;

automobiles will be indexed and filed by motor number. The same should apply for guns, typewriters, and other items. In other words, special guide cards should be placed therein, for example, "Guns," "Typewriters." As the case goes along, one may want other breakdowns and guide cards can be placed therein. For example, guide cards can be made for the words "Bodies," "Bloody Cars," "Evidence," "Phone Numbers," and numerous other items.

In connection with the indices maintained in a "special," one should see to it that such items are marked for indexing and are indexed because as the case progresses many times an individual will recall some incident relating to a bloody car or a telephone number or to something else but cannot recall the name of the person involved; however, by having such breakdowns in the indices, one can readily refer to them and find the communication in question.

In addition, instead of making one index card, two index cards should be made. For example, Serial #1 will probably contain a memorandum of a Special Agent to the SAC reflecting that a Mr. JOHN SMITH, for example, of say Jones and Company, phoned and stated that his nephew, JOHN BLACK, was believed kidnaped and that JOHN BLACK is the president of Black Corporation. In

connection with this particular memorandum, which would be Serial #1 probably, one would readily see that the individual marking such communication for indexing will underline all four of the above names and duplicate index cards should be made with a little identifying data on each card, and the copy of these index cards will be filed in the "speical" indices while the original will subsequently be forwarded to the main CCO in that particualr field division for filing in their main and permanent indices.

The CCO of the field division, not the temporary special CCO, when they receive the above original four cards, should receive instructions that they are to search those cards, and if there are any references, they should be placed on the Indices Search Slip, FD-160, and returned to the "special squad" so that they can be assigned out and such references reviewed to determine whether or not any of the information may be of interest or value to the regular office or to the "special squad."

The regular CCO should also be instructed that after they have once received the index card, for example, on JOHN BLACK, and the clerk notes that there already has been a card filed referring to the "special case," they need not send back any additional Indices Search Slips, but only when they receive an index card bearing

a new name which has not been indexed to the "special case."

Say for example, the first memorandum, or Serial #1, made reference to the person phoning in stating that he had heard there was a "body" found in a certain lake and that he did not know whether that body might belong to the victim or not. The person marking communications for indexing would, of course, underline the word "body" in blue so that the clerks in the temporary CCO handling the "special" would then know that Serial #1 should be indexed under the caption of "Body." This procedure should likewise be followed for any similar breakdowns as mentioned above.

In addition, the CCO in charge of the "special squad" should obtain a file box,  $4\frac{1}{2}$  x  $5\frac{1}{2}$  x 10", in which 3"x5" cards can be filed. In this box there should be prepared guide cards for each of the field offices and they should be filed in alphabetical order, including guide cards for legal attaches, as well as a separate guide card for the Bureau and a separate guide card for the office in which the "special" is being handled: for example, Volume I which contains Serial #1, mentioned heretofore, which is a memorandum of a Special Agent in that office prepared for his SAC. The 3"x5" index card behind the office, for example, Denver, where the special

is being handled, should have typed in the center of the 3"x5" card, on top, "Denver."

On the first line on this card should be placed a little resume as to that particular serial. For example:

"S.1 SA BROWN memo 6/1/60, SAC re JOHN SMITH phoning re disappearance of JOHN BLACK.

For example, Serial #2, in Volume I, would probably be the office teletype to the Bureau or would be a memorandum reflecting a phone call to the Bureau, and the guide card marked "Bureau" will have an index card and similar information will be placed on that card for Serial #2.

As the volumes containing the investigative file are made and each contains 25 serials, one of the clerical employees should be designated to see to it that this particular index box, with cards, is maintained up-to-date and as quickly as possible. The purpose of this particular box of cards is to show what communication has been sent to or received from a particular office or to the Bureau. For example, the Bureau guide card will later on have a number of cards and one can, by readily looking at these cards, get a resume or idea as to the gist of those communications referred to, and if the person in charge or one of his assistants asks for a particular piece of correspondence, by checking this special indices one can



readily find the same.

It is to be noted that separate index cards are not made for each serial. For example, behind the guide card marked "Bureau" will be at first only one index card and on that index card will be typed a resume of the contents of the communications, say, for example, for ten different serials, and that card, of course, is marked in the upper right-hand corner "1." When that card is filled, card "2" is placed behind it, card "3," and so forth.

To reiterate, the person in charge asks for a communication received from the Miami Office three weeks previously and one can go to this index box, look behind "Miami," look up and down the few cards that are there, and can readily locate the communication he is interested in.

In this box the section for the office where this "special" is being worked out of will, of course, have numerous cards and it has been found on many occasions to be of assistance to refer to that guide card, say, for example, "Denver," when looking for some communications, especially when the name of the person is not recalled, and by glancing up and down these cards one will quickly and readily find the communication desired. One clerical employee can generally be kept busy merely handling this phase of the project, as such employee, as new volumes are made, will take a volume and take this index box with the

cards and add such information on the necessary cards. To further explain it, for example, the New York Office sends a communication in to the Denver Office reflecting an interview with THOMAS JONES. This communication, after being serialized, is noted by the clerk who will add the serial number onto the index card of the New York Office showing that serial number so and so relates to interview with THOMAS JONES.

Going back to the special indices which are being maintained, it was mentioned before that the original card will go to the front office or to theCCO in that division while the copy will be retained in the special indices.

The special indices, of course, should be informative and should not merely contain the name of an individual, an automobile, an address, or something like that, and the serial number to which it relates.

For example, the inspector's assistant or No. 1 man, or whatever title he has, who handles the mail consisting of teletypes, reports, airtels and memoranda, generally should mark for indexing, by underlining in blue pencil, what items in that communication he believes should be indexed. Of course, at first, preference should be given to over-indexing, and by that is meant that in a particular communication almost every name, whether of

an individual or a firm, should be indexed. On many occasions telephone numbers of suspects or underworld characters should be marked for indexing, as well as possibly their addresses. In the meantime, of course, the special indices will have guide cards for such telephone numbers, addresses, and so forth. In addition, if the communication makes reference to a body or to some other item, that should be marked for indexing.

In other words, when that piece of correspondence leaves the desk of the inspector's assistant, No. 1 man, or whatever he is called, it is underlined in blue and, of course, is marked with other notations as to a copy being designated for a certain Agent or a lead slip to be made, and so forth, and these items will be mentioned later.

If a capable clerical employee is obtained, such employee can be given instructions as to how to maintain the informative index, and after such employee gets the "knack," that employee can handle this phase of the work, thereby saving the services of a Special Agent who would otherwise have to dictate the same to a stenographer.

Such clerical employee in the temporary CCO of the "special," when he gets that communication, will, if there has been no previous index card made, make two index cards for the name of the suspect. The original, as mentioned before, will go to the regular CCO in that division; however, on these two cards the clerk will type a brief narrative,

for example, that Serial 25 reflects the suspect THOMAS WHITE was interviewed by the New York Office on a certain date and established an alibi. If the communication made reference to a body being found in a lake, the clerk would automatically know that under the guide card for "Bodies" there would be an index card and on that index card he would put a sentence or two reflecting what that communication said regarding the body referred to therein.

In other words, a clerical employee properly instructed can maintain this special indices which has been set up for the "special squad." In addition, if these clerical employees are instructed properly, they will be always on the alert for tying in names, addresses, telephone numbers, and other items as such information is being recorded on such cards.

For example, the indices may have a card for a certain individual being an ex-convict and as being a possible suspect. A week or two later another communication comes to that clerk's attention wherein references is made to a similar name of an individual who might have had a suspicious car in his possession. As those two names are matched up, an alert clerical employee will call it to the attention of someone who can determine what further action can be taken.

The person in charge of the clerical employees, who can be referred to as the temporary Chief Clerk, will, of course, see that the communications, memoranda, and so forth are serialized

and disseminated into the proper files or sub-files and so forth, and will also see that the operation of the temporary CCO is being handled in accordance with Bureau instructions for a regular CCO.

A fourth clerical employee will always find other similar duties and, as mentioned before, if at least four clerical employees are assigned at the start, one can, as a rule, keep up with the indexing, serializing and recording, as this is an important phase of the Bureau's work, and if there are not enough clerical employees, these matters get behind and one will never get caught up.

Bulky exhibits, of course, should be filed and retained in accordance with existing Bureau instructions, and in some cases it is advisable to obtain a large metal cabinet into which can be placed items and evidence which is obtained in connection with the "special." This locked cabinet should, of course, be located in the temporary CCO so that such items are available to the Agents on the "special" rather than having to go into the special room generally maintained by the office in question.

In connection with "special" assignments, it is well to immediately notify all offices to furnish at least three copies of all reports, teletypes, airtels, memoranda, and so forth, in order that an extra copy may be available for the sub-files if occasion arises.

SETTING UP OF LEAD BOXES ON  
SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT CASES

In connection with a special assignment in a field division, the official in charge of the special assignment will generally designate a Special Agent to handle the leads.

The first thing that should be done is to obtain about eight wooden or metal index card boxes,  $4\frac{1}{2} \times 5\frac{1}{2} \times 10$ ", which will contain 3"x5" index cards. The first box to be set up should be a box containing guide cards and these guide cards should contain the typewritten name of each Agent who is going to work on the "special."

On a special assignment a number of Special Agents will be brought in from other offices and, as a rule, a certain number of Special Agents from the local office in which the crime was committed will be assigned to work under the inspector in charge or other Bureau official. At first, one generally is not acquainted with all personnel and it is a good idea to prepare these guide cards by color, possibly type the name of the Agents in on special assignment on a card which will have a white background and say, for example, the Agents assigned to the local office will have a green background tab. The person handling the leads will then readily know as to what Agents are local Agents and as to what Agents are visiting, which will greatly assist him at the commencement of the case.

In addition, at the end of the guide cards should be set up guides for the Resident Agents who from time to time will be covering leads in connection with this "special." This box, of course, containing these guide cards, should be marked "Agents."

Another similar box should be set up containing guide cards for the Bureau and all offices. These guide cards should be filed alphabetically, with the Bureau guide card at the front.

As it will be noted, the above two index boxes relate to Special Agents and to offices, and into these two boxes will be placed the lead cards, to be described hereinafter, which are prepared for a Special Agent covering a lead or for a particular office which has been requested to cover a lead. In addition to these two boxes, sometimes the individual handling this phase of the investigation might desire to have two similar extra boxes made; that is, one for the Special Agents and one for the Bureau and field offices, in order that a copy of the lead slip, after the lead has been covered, can be placed behind the Agent's name or behind the office; however, maintaining these two boxes involves extra work and sometimes is not essential.

The two or three extra lead card boxes should then have placed therein guide cards under

various headings, which will be explained in more detail hereinafter.

After the inspector or Bureau official handling the case looks over each piece of correspondence, such as teletypes, airtels, letters, memoranda, or reports, he will generally make some notations thereon as to "leads," or other comments as to what he believes should be done or not done and after he initials it, it is routed on to the Special Agent assigned to reviewing same to make up leads.

For example, an airtel will come in from an eastern office stating that someone there reported JOHN BROWN as being a suspect inasmuch as JOHN BROWN is an ex-convict and lives in the same city where the crime occurred. On this communication, for example, an airtel, a notation is made, such as: "Make suspect lead card." The communication is then marked for indexing with blue pencil and such pertinent information will be underlined, such as the suspect's name, possibly his address or telephone number, license number of his car, if given, and motor number of car, if given. If it is known to whom the lead is going to be assigned, the second copy should then contain the name of the Agent who will get the lead and a notation is made thereon: "Lead slip to follow." If there is any question as to the handling of that lead, and so forth, there will be written opposite



the name of the Agent a notation to see the particular Special Agent assigning that lead.

The original of this communication, which will contain possibly comments or notations of the inspector or Bureau official handling the case, as well as the blue markings, and so forth, should always be retained in the investigative file and the second copy should be charged out to the Agent who is to handle the lead. The third copy, of course, can likewise be retained in the investigative file unless some reason exists that the third copy should be placed in one of the sub-files previously discussed, and if so, a notation is made on the original and copy of the effect that a copy has been designated for a particular sub-file.

The communications, memoranda, and so forth, after being properly marked for indexing, and so forth, will then be picked up by the Chief Clerk handling the special assignment and that party will serialize these communications into volumes containing only 25 serials apiece. As mentioned heretofore, these volumes will then be taken by the other clerical employees and index cards will be prepared, as related previously.

The Special Agent or individual handling the leads will also several times a day take these particular volumes and dictate lead cards.

For example, an Agent will pick up Volume V,

containing Serials 101 to 125. This volume, which has 25 serials, will have the original of each communication in it; that is, the teletype, report, memorandum, or airtel, and, as mentioned above, the same will have notations as to which communications lead slips should be made for. The Agent will then dictate lead slips to a stenographer and the lead slips should be typed in triplicate and not in duplicate. In the upper right-hand corner, of course, will be the file number and the serial number to which the communication relates. On the left-hand side should be the city or village in which the lead is to be covered. In the center of the lead card will be placed the sub-heading; for example, as mentioned in the above communication, the suspect's name would be placed in the center with the word "Suspect" after it.

The Agent dictating the lead should then give a little resume as to what the lead is about and if any specific instructions are to be given. For example, say that SA BROWN was routed the copy of the communication referred to above which had a notation for him to either see the "lead man" or else it might have the notation: "Lead slip to follow." In dictating this lead, one would say something as follows after having the above three headings filled in on the lead slip; that is, city, suspect, serial number:

"SA BROWN has copy above reflecting Mrs. MABEL WHITE, 1000 Peach Street, City, phoned on a certain date and believed above should be considered as suspect inasmuch as he is ex-convict and lives in vicinity where victim worked or lived. Check office and special case indices. Ascertain whereabouts pertinent date. Show photo, compare prints, handle as regular suspect."

After the stenographer types this lead, consisting of three copies, it is advisable to blockstamp either the front or back of it and place the Agent's name to whom the lead is assigned on all three copies. If one knows that a certain Agent is to get the lead, he can dictate that to the stenographer at the same time and she can type the Agent's name and date on the lead in addition to the blockstamp.

When this lead is dictated, a notation is then made on the original communication that this lead was dictated and one can merely write the word "done" with his initials and date after the notation: "Make suspect lead slip."

When these leads are returned by the stenographer, the original, of course, should be placed in the lead box for "Agents" behind the name of the Agent in question.

The second copy of this same lead is then routed to the Agent who is to handle the lead or investigation.

One will still have a third copy of this lead and, as mentioned above, there will be extra lead card boxes and inasmuch as this lead relates to a particular suspect, an index tab card should be made on which will appear the name of this suspect and that is filed in the lead box alphabetically and the third copy of the lead slip will be placed behind that.

In other words, if an inquiry is made as to who was handling a certain suspect, one can go to this box and look under the name of the person - suspect, and there will be a copy of that lead slip in that section reflecting the name of the Agent to whom assigned.

In some major cases one may have many, many suspects who have to be investigated and checked out and there will be a number of these tab cards with the name of the suspect appearing thereon.

As each "special" case develops, one may want to have different projects or breakdowns. For example, one may want to have a breakdown entitled "Crime Scene."

In regard to the crime scene investigation, possibly ten Agents may be assigned to it or in that area and as these leads are made, the original, as mentioned above, is placed behind the Agent's name, the second copy

is given to the Agent, and the third copy goes behind the section entitled "Crime Scene." By picking up these leads behind the section "Crime Scene," one may readily note or observe what Agents have assignments that relate to that particular matter.

For example, one may desire to set up a subsection entitled "Hats," inasmuch as a hat may have been found at the scene of the crime. Although one Agent may possibly be assigned to handle and coordinate the hat project, still there might be a hundred leads made for individuals to be checked out who bought or owned similar hats. One can see that as these leads are made up and assigned to say twenty Agents, the original lead slip is behind the Agent's name, the second copy goes to him, and the third copy would go behind the subsection "Hats."

Each special assignment case presents its own problems as to what subheadings have to be placed into these lead box sections and the following are a few:

Victim's home affairs

Victim's business affairs

Victim's route men

Typewriter project

Paper project

Dodge project

Bloody car project

Body project

Hideout project

Terrain search project

By having these leads set forth above, one can look into the one box for Agents and readily account for, and observe, each lead that is assigned to that particular Agent or what project he is handling or working on.

Each Special Agent working on the squad, of course, will have the second copy of the lead slip and at any time he can be called to the desk and have his leads compared and checked with the ones appearing behind his name.

The third copy, as mentioned above, will be in the various boxes under the various projects.

If possible, it is best to line up the suspects and projects in alphabetical order; that is, the first sub-card could be for a suspect named JOHN ABBOTT, the next sub-card in back of him could be MIKE BLACK, the third sub-card would be "Crime Scene." In other words, these sections of the index boxes should be placed alphabetically if possible.

By having the above type of setup, one can readily find or know who is working on certain projects or who is handling certain suspects.

When an Agent handles a lead, say, for example, on a certain suspect, and he dictates, it is well to have

instructions issued to have the Agent's lead card, which is the second copy, marked by him that it is either covered or done and have him place his initials in the blockstamp and give it to the stenographer so it will accompany the memorandum or stencil or communication that he has prepared, and when it comes back over the desk, that lead slip is then noted. If it is marked "done" or "covered," the original lead slip behind the Agent's name in the Agents' lead box should then be removed.

If one has the extra box, described above, containing the guide cards for Agents' names, this original can then be placed in that box, which can be referred to as a "closed" box, behind the Agent's name. If this box is maintained, it gives a ready reference as to all leads that have been assigned to an Agent while working on the "special;" however, as a rule, it does not serve any other purpose and sometimes is not used.

With the original lead slip being filed in the box referred to above, one should then go to the other lead box, under the name of the suspect, which will contain the third copy of the lead slip. That lead slip can then be destroyed and it should be replaced with the second copy of the lead slip containing the Agent's initials and notation that the lead was done.

Say, for example, one wants to note or obtain a brief resume as to what was developed at the crime scene area, one can refer to the index box and look at all of

the lead slips behind "Crime Scene," and if and when that investigation is done, all of those lead slips should be marked "done" or "covered" and have the Agent's initials thereon, and by looking at this group of lead slips, one will get a brief resume as to whom was talked to in that area or what evidence was found, and so forth. Once in a while one will ask as to what was the name of a certain person interviewed down near the crime scene, and by glancing through these closed lead slips, one can possibly come up with the name as it will probably appear on one of the leads.

As mentioned previously, one will also have a lead box containing leads for other offices, which lead box should have guide cards filed alphabetically. Instructions will have to be given to the stenographers first that whenever they prepare a teletype, airtel, or letter, they should prepare an original and one copy of a lead slip for that office, which lead slip is prepared in a similar manner to that prepared for leads to Agents; however, in the upper left-hand corner instead of having the name of the city or village, there should appear the name of the office which will be covering the lead and not the name of a particular city in a field division.

Say, for example, an Agent handling TOM BROWN - Suspect, has information which has to be checked out and



verified by another office. He will dictate an airtel setting forth his information and specific lead. The stenographer, after being instructed, will automatically prepare this lead slip with a little resume of the information appearing thereon, and as that airtel comes over the desk, and after being signed, the copies with the lead slip will be routed on to the CCO handling the special assignment; however, it is advisable to make a notation in the lower left-hand corner, on the top of the copies, for example, "NYC lead made." The lead slip is not detached but goes along with the copies of the correspondence, and in the CCO handling the special project, after that communication is serialized, the serial number is placed on these two lead slips, in pencil, and then the lead is sent back to the desk and, of course, the original of the lead will be placed behind the tab, for example, "New York," and the second copy of the lead will be placed behind the tab for that particular suspect in the lead box. The Agent handling this suspect or dictating the airtel does not need a copy of this lead for the reason that he should be aware as to what he is doing and has done regarding that suspect. He also knows that at any time he can come to the desk and look in the index lead box and look behind the name of his

suspect and he will see copies of the various leads that have been made in connection with that suspect and will give him a bird's-eye view as to what leads are outstanding in other offices regarding his suspect.

By having this office lead box, one can keep tabs on other offices to see that they are covering all leads they have been instructed to handle, and if such leads are delinquent, their attention can be called to same by routing slip or other communication.

When a particular office covers a lead and their communication comes over the desk, the original lead slip behind the name of that office is then pulled and it is advisable to make a notation thereon, for example, "Done NYC airtel (certain date)." Inasmuch as that lead makes reference to a certain suspect, the guide card for the name of the suspect should be referred to and the original lead slip can be placed behind that guide card reflecting the investigation was done.

As mentioned above, the remaining copy, instead of being destroyed, can be placed in the "closed" box for all offices, which will give one a picture of what leads other offices have covered.

As will be noted from the above lead cards and boxes, if someone is later on interested in re-checking back on a particular project or suspect,

he can look in the lead boxes, under the name of the suspect, to determine what leads have been set out and, of course, they will contain the serial number which he probably wants, or else he can go to the regular indices which are maintained in the CCO for the "special squad" and check those indices, which will give a resume as to the different communications.

Especially at the start of the investigation, many leads will be made, some of which may not need to be covered later and many leads will be unassigned. An index box or two will have to be obtained and proper breakdowns or sub-headings placed therein, for example, "Suspects," "Dodge Car Project," "Typewriter Project," and so forth. The leads, as they are typed, consisting of three copies, and which are unassigned, will then be placed behind the respective sub-headings, such as "Typewriter Project," "Hat Project," and so forth. As investigation progresses, one can then look in these lead boxes and see what leads should be assigned as they are filed behind the various subheadings.

As one knows, in a special assignment case more important leads have to be handled at first, but some types of leads cannot be handled until certain phases of other investigations have been completed, and if there are special leads like this, they should be placed in a separate subheading, properly marked and identified, to be given special attention later on when an active or open investigation is made.

In regard to lead cards or slips being retained for a minimum of thirty days and thereafter being destroyed at the discretion of the officer in charge of the investigation, it is believed well to retain all such lead slips until the case has actually been disposed of and closed, as oftentimes reference is made to inquiries that were made many months previously.

LAW ENFORCEMENT LIAISON  
MAJOR CASE AND KIDNAPING TRAINING

In any major case, including kidnaping, close liaison would be established with law enforcement agencies in the area where the crime was committed. This liaison should include closest possible relationship with state, county and city police, to insure that any information coming to the attention of these agencies is obtained without delay.

To effect this coverage the inspector or official in charge of the investigation will immediately assign Special Agents, probably on a twenty-four hour a day basis, to the headquarters of the city police department, the state police headquarters; and in a case which occurs in a rural county, to the appropriate county sheriff's office.

Initial arrangements should be made through the head of the respective department. Ideally, some officer in each police agency will be assigned to handle the case for his department. At the time of the initial contact, the Agent should explain the necessity of his being immediately advised of all information possibly related to the case. The Agent should request that instructions be issued that information received should be immediately brought to the Bureau Agent's attention. It should be specifically requested that all communications, such as telephone calls and letters, be referred to a particular officer's office and that all individuals calling in person at the department be sent to that office so that the Agent will be able to immediately obtain and furnish the information to the Number 1 Man on the case.

It should be pointed out that the information desired should include any reports pertaining to suspicious persons who could have committed the offense. The officers should be requested to furnish the identity of any individual and any information in their records concerning individuals in their jurisdiction who have come to their attention and who might be considered suspects. They should also be requested to furnish information concerning missing persons or the disappearance of persons from the area under suspicious circumstances, particularly when these occurred at the time of the crime.

The officers should be alerted as to the items which might be pertinent to the case and should be requested to be on the lookout for and to furnish any information concerning abandoned automobiles, as well as reports as to the location of clothing, guns, typewriters, jewelry or other items found, which might be connected with the case. The officers should be requested to immediately advise of any reports received of automobiles containing bloodstains or of any unanswered suspicious reports pertaining to bloodstains anywhere.

The officers should be requested to report murders and suicides, and it should be pointed out that advice is particularly desired if a report is received of a finding of a body that is possibly the victim. Arrangements should be made to instruct all patrolmen, investigators and dispatchers so that if a report of the finding of a body is received, the member receiving this initial information should see to it that nothing is done to disturb the area, and also insure the area is closely guarded and not disturbed.

The police should be asked to preserve the crime scene until Bureau Agents arrive and make a thorough crime-scene search. In cases of sheriff's offices or other rural police, it may be well to point out the advisability of having available about 500 feet of rope for possible use in protecting the area where the body is found.

There will be other special projects that the Agents will be required to handle at the local law enforcement offices, which might include:

- (1) Examination of stolen car and stolen license reports and a check to see if any of these stolen automobiles or licenses could have been used in the crime. Particular attention should be given to cars stolen before the crime and not yet located.
- (2) A check may be required of Auto Theft Bureau records for suspicious automobiles of a particular make or description similar to automobiles observed in the vicinity of the crime scene.
- (3) A check of identification records of the various departments would be required on all suspects developed during the investigation of the various projects.

Under an ideal situation when the Bureau enters a major case, the law enforcement body in whose area the offense occurred would state they were taking no action independent of that being taken by the Bureau, that they would turn all information over to the Bureau and would render all possible assistance to the FBI.

In the Coors kidnaping case, however, the sheriff in whose county the offense occurred, even though his department was conducting little or no active investigation, furnished stories to the press, radio and television on a daily basis, claiming to be making inquiries and to be investigating clues. The sheriff himself was soon determined to be thoroughly unreliable and uncooperative. On the other hand, his undersheriff, NA, and Captain of Investigations, both competent and reliable officers, were completely cooperative. Liaison was set up with the undersheriff and Captain of Investigations, and no contact was had with the sheriff on official matters.

The Agent should furnish no information concerning the case to local officers other than such information as is necessary to carry out a specific inquiry. In other words, information should be furnished only on a "need-know" basis. Any inquiry by the local officers as to the status of the investigation could be answered by replying that the case is still under active investigation, but that any pertinent developments of interest to local authorities will be made known to them.

It should be borne in mind that local law enforcement officers and other local officials will possibly not afford proper secrecy to information pertaining to major cases which have publicity appeal due to the interest of these officers and officials in politics and in receiving publicity. Experience has shown that each department has its chain of command in such a way that subordinate officers must advise their superiors of significant information. Then too, in a major case agreements



will exist between the various agencies as to action to be taken. For instance, if a body of a victim is located in a particular county, the coroner will immediately advise the sheriff and the District Attorney. These local officials most likely will immediately advise the press media.

From the above, it is apparent that all possible arrangements must be made to protect the crime scene and as thorough an investigation conducted of the area as possible prior to the arrival of the coroner, Sheriff and District Attorney, as the entry of these individuals into the case will preclude any further possibility of investigating without being hampered by press and curiosity seekers.

When a major case such as a kidnaping occurs, members of the press will be stationed on a twenty-four hour a day basis at the headquarters offices of the law enforcement agencies in the area. Any Bureau Agent stationed at these headquarters must take every precaution to be sure that no remark or action on his part provides a story prejudicial to the best interests of the case.

Kidnapings, of course, are ordinarily cases of national interest, therefore every local politician may desire to get into the picture in order to enhance his political future. For instance, the Sheriff and District Attorney of the county in which the kidnaping occurred will undoubtedly attempt to drain every possible iota of publicity out of the kidnaping without any consideration as to whether or not their seeking of publicity interferes

with the conduct and investigation of the case. For example, a kidnaping may occur in one county and the remains of the victim may be found in a second county. In such a case it becomes necessary to have arrangements in both counties to handle any situation which might arise.

In the Coors case, the District Attorney and the Sheriff of the county in which the kidnaping occurred, as well as the county in which the remains of the victim were found, were all publicity seekers. Under the laws of the State of Colorado, when any human remains are discovered the coroner of the county must be notified immediately. In COORNAP, a man who was firing a pistol in the county discovered the clothes of the victim and immediately reported his finding to the Denver Office. This, of course, presented the problem as to whether or not the coroner of the county in which the clothes were found should be notified. If so, it would be incumbent on the coroner to immediately notify the District Attorney of his county. This problem was resolved by maintaining absolute silence and taking twenty-six Agents into the wooded area and making a thorough search for skeletal remains. This silence was maintained for three days. Meanwhile, such bones as were found were submitted to a pathologist who agreed to maintain absolute silence and at the end of three days advised the Denver Office that some of the bones which had been found were of human origin. Upon this discovery it was believed it was absolutely essential the coroner in whose county the remains had been found should be notified. It was explained to the coroner that a search of the area which surrounded a dump resulted in the location of numerous bones and that it was not until

after examination by the pathologist, whose report had just been received, that definite knowledge existed that human skeletal remains had been found.

This, of course, caused considerable consternation and angered the Sheriff, District Attorney and coroner in the county in which the remains were found. The Sheriff publicly announced he felt this was a most uncooperative attitude on the part of the FBI. The District Attorney came to the Denver Office and demanded all evidence in this case be turned over to him, threatening the SAC with grand jury action, subpoenas and various other types of threats; however, the evidence was not turned over to him. At a later date he was given a list of the evidence which had been obtained by the Bureau. The Sheriff of the county in which the evidence was found finally, after his first outburst, had nothing further to say in the matter; however, the Sheriff of the county in which the kidnaping occurred made a considerable amount of news by flying out to Seattle to pick up the subject of the case who was returned to Denver by Bureau Agents. This Sheriff then took his grievance to the press and finally ended up by stating his office was no longer open to Agents of the Bureau.

This matter is being included in this write-up since it is very pertinent to anticipate in advance exactly how law enforcement officers and agencies are to be handled in the event they become obstreperous. It is also to be noted the District Attorney in both counties mentioned above, were candidates for re-election and as a consequence tried to use this case to enhance their chances for re-election; however, because of the

Bureau maintaining its silence and no-comment attitude in connection with the case and because of the loud ravings of these individuals, both were defeated for re-election.

In conclusion, it should again be pointed out that the primary purpose of establishing an Agent at headquarters of police departments or other law enforcement agencies at the time of a kidnaping or other major case is to insure that any information received by these departments is immediately routed to the FBI.

### LIAISON WITH THE TELEPHONE COMPANY

The immediate problem in setting up a tracing operation is to determine the bounds within which it will be necessary to operate. In the Coors case, the Special Agent in Charge of the Special Squad determined at the outset that no interruption of service or noise on the Coors' telephone line could be evident to any person telephoning the residence. The life of the Victim was in the balance. How do you go about setting up a tracing operation under these conditions?

Here is how it was done in Denver:

### CONFERENCE WITH TELEPHONE COMPANY OFFICIALS

Original contact was made with the Chief Special Agent of the Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. (M S T & T Co.) on the day the Bureau entered the case. This individual had a wide knowledge of telephone procedures and was acquainted with key technical and managerial personnel of the company. These people are the essential ingredients for a successful tracing operation.

The Chief Special Agent called a meeting of key personnel to map out a workable tracing arrangement. In attendance were.

1. Chief Special Agent
2. Supervising Service Foreman of the toll equipment section. This foreman in Denver is responsible for supervision of all toll equipment including the Direct Distance Dialing (DDD) equipment. His is a very technical type of position and his knowledge of long distance circuits and procedures is almost unlimited. The equipment under his supervision is valued at

\$15,000,000. His long distance equipment accounts for a great portion of telephone company revenue.

3. Plant Superintendent having responsibility for the area in which the Coors residence telephone was served.
4. Supervising Service Foreman of the telephone exchange from which the Coors residence was served.
5. District Traffic Superintendent who is responsible for all Denver long distance operations.
6. Two sound trained FBI Special Agents.

The meeting was held at one of the local telephone exchanges in the office of the Plant Superintendent. This was done to avert the possibility of press notice. Our requirements for coverage of the Coors residence telephone were discussed in detail. Ways and means of securing such coverage were left to the individuals most familiar with each operation. None of the individuals were able to state specifically at the meeting just exactly how the complete operation would be undertaken but all left the meeting with a firm idea of the problems involved and immediately began to develop a workable system of tracing the calls.

COORS RESIDENCE, NATIONAL 9-4455, MORRISON, COLORADO

The Coors residence was served from the Morrison, Colorado, telephone exchange. Morrison is a suburb some fourteen miles from Denver. The telephone exchange at Morrison is normally unattended except during daylight hours. The equipment in use at this exchange is known as "step-by-step" equipment. This means simply, each time a digit of the telephone number is dialed, the switching equipment "steps"

for each dial pulse until the connection is made.

A direct call to the Coors residence telephone could be made from any other telephone in the Morrison exchange (NAtional 9) by dialing the number. The NAtional 9 area consisted of the small town of Morrison, several smaller mountain communities and twenty-eight isolated public telephone pay stations throughout this mountainous area.

It became necessary at this point to establish twenty-four hour a day coverage at the local exchange so that supervisory telephone company personnel could visually trace all local telephone calls to the residence. The entire telephone exchange building was blacked out so that no one would be aware that any activity was in progress within the building.

Long distance calls to Morrison, (and this included those from Denver) were routed over thirteen long distance operator trunks and through Direct Distance Dialing equipment at the toll section of the Denver telephone building.

It was necessary that a means be found so that the supervisor on duty at the exchange could be alerted of all calls going to the Coors residence telephone. This was accomplished by placing a "ringer" across the Coors telephone line. The "ringer" is merely a telephone bell which rings in an identical manner to that of the bell on the telephone at the Coors residence. It has no effect on the telephone circuit.

When the "ringer" rang, the supervisor on duty could determine in a matter of seconds whether the call to the Coors residence was coming from a local NAtional 9 telephone or whether it was an incoming call by long distance.

If the call was being made from a local number within his own exchange, he could visually trace the call within a matter of seconds and determine from what local area telephone the call was being made.

If the call was coming by long distance from Denver, he could immediately determine on which of the thirteen trunks from Denver the call was coming in on.

This is the only tracing he could do.

Local calls were simple to trace. All equipment in the exchange was contained in one small room.

Long distance calls were a different matter. The Morrison supervisor needed to immediately notify the toll section at Denver so that tracing operations from that point could be started.

#### CENTRAL CONTROL POINT

The tracing operation was controlled from the office of the Supervising Service Foreman of the toll section at the Denver main telephone building. This office and associated equipment occupy an entire floor of the main telephone building. Doors to this space can be opened only by authorized personnel through use of a coded dialing system. It is a key facility.

The office was equipped with two toll tandem lines as well as four local telephone lines. Denver had not converted to Direct Distance Dialing (DDD) at the time the Coors case began, but the toll tandem lines could do the same thing as DDD, only better. It might be well to furnish a brief summary of DDD as this is necessary to explain how the toll tandem operates and a toll tandem line is the key to the successful operation of a tracing system such as was used.



With DDD, to call the FBI in San Francisco from Denver, it is first necessary to dial 112. This serves to actuate the DDD equipment. Then it is necessary to dial 415, which places the call into the San Francisco main toll center equipment. Then it is necessary to dial KLondike 2-2155, the actual number of the San Francisco office.

As soon as this operation is completed, an operator comes on the line to secure the number from which you are calling. This is for billing purposes. As soon as she has done this, the call is put through without any further action on the part of the calling party. (This is known as a CAMA operation, Customer Automatic Message Accounting.)

Some cities have a completely automatic system in which all data necessary for billing purposes is punched on a tape and no operator breaks in to secure the number of the calling party. (This is known as AMA operation, Automatic Message Accounting.)

The toll tandem cuts out one whole operation of DDD. To call our San Francisco number, it is only necessary to pick up the tandem, dial the area code of 415, plus the number of the San Francisco Office. No operator comes on the line to secure the number as no toll charge is necessary. It's almost like making a local call, except for the extra three digits. The toll tandem line is used almost exclusively by supervisory toll personnel to talk to other supervisory toll personnel in distant cities, much as the ordinary individual dials local calls. This is truly an investigative aid, but to the telephone company it is merely a means to secure instant communication to any city in the United States. Only three toll tandem lines were available in the telephone building, two in the toll tandem supervisor's office

and the other in the office of the President of M S T & T Co.

From the toll tandem office, the central control point of the tracing operation, (except for local Morrison, Colorado, calls within the NATIONAL 9 exchange), it became necessary to devise a system of rapid communication between Denver and Morrison as all calls to Morrison could appear at several different places in the main Denver telephone building.

Let us consider this communications problem:

When the Morrison exchange supervisor located a call coming to the Coors residence on one of the thirteen long distance trunks from Denver, quick action had to be taken at the Denver exchange to locate the particular call while the calling party was still on the line, otherwise no trace could be made of the call.

The only available means of communication from Denver to Morrison was by way of one of the thirteen long distance lines, but this wasn't fast enough. It meant lifting up a phone at Denver or Morrison and calling the other by long distance. Only two phones were available at the Morrison exchange and during the time a call was being received at the Coors residence, the supervisor was much too busy trying to trace the call to stop and get on the telephone.

The answer was the installation of a continuously operating telephone circuit between the Denver toll office and the Morrison exchange through use of one of the thirteen long distance lines.

At the Morrison exchange, a telephone handset was mounted in the center of the equipment room.

At the Denver toll office, a speaker telephone set was installed.

A speaker telephone is the type used by many executives to free their hands when making telephone calls. It consists of a small speaker and a built-in microphone so that the user of such a set can talk in a normal tone of voice and anyone in the room can hear the incoming conversation over the speaker. No handset is used.

Thus, when a call came to the Coors residence over long distance equipment from Denver, the supervisor on duty at Morrison immediately determined on which of the thirteen long distance trunks the call was coming from and shouted the number of the trunk into the speaker phone system to alert the supervisor on duty at Denver.

The supervisor at the Denver toll office then had to take prompt action to trace the call. His problem was magnified somewhat because each long distance call to the Coors residence could originate in one of three ways and there was no way of telling which way was in use until checks were made at various equipment centers within the telephone building. It was a matter similar to locating a fire in a building when you don't know on which floor the fire is burning.

Originating points were as follows:

1. Through a Denver long distance operator. (Two floors of equipment and operators and an overload long distance exchange located at an east Denver exchange some five miles away.)
2. Through terminal grade trunks from a number of cities in Colorado, Wyoming and New Mexico. (Located on one floor.)
3. Through Direct Distance Dialing equipment. (Located adjacent to the toll tandem office.)

Each had its own separate problems of tracing and each will now be covered in some detail:

A. LONG DISTANCE OPERATOR CALLS

Telephone company craft employees were kept on duty twenty-four hours a day in the equipment room at Denver where the thirteen trunks from Morrison, Colorado, originated. When a trace alert arrived from Morrison to the toll tandem office, the craft employee was notified by loud speaker to visually determine where a particular call was coming from. For example, if he was notified that a call was coming in on Trunk 7, the craft employee went to Trunk 7 where he could determine whether the call was coming from a Denver long distance operator or from a long distance operator in some distant city. He would immediately relay this information back to the toll tandem supervisor's office.

If the call originated from a Denver long distance operator, the toll supervisor would call the three Denver Chief Operators, each responsible for a unit of long distance operators. Each Chief Operator would then unobtrusively walk down a line of long distance operators and pick up all their long distance toll tickets, locate the one directed to the Coors residence and notify the toll supervisor where the call was coming from as the originating telephone number appears on the toll ticket.

It might be noted at this point that the picking up of toll tickets by the Chief Operator is a normal procedure but the timing in a tracing operation is most important. Any lag would result in searching through a greater number of toll tickets.

The Chief Operators were briefed as to what they were doing but the many long distance operators were unaware that a tracing

operation was in progress.

One small loophole existed in this system but it could not be avoided other than by direct tracing of each call and this could not be done in this case. Why? To make a direct trace, it is necessary to "hold-up" or "slug" each circuit involved in the call, starting at the called party and following it back to the originating point. This would very likely alert the calling party because of the clicks which would be heard on the line every time a "slug" was inserted into the switching mechanism. It would mean having telephone company employees on duty twenty-four hours a day at each telephone exchange in the city of Denver and surrounding suburban areas. Each employee would have to be able to communicate instantly with each other employee. A direct trace can be made only from one exchange to the next and a call may go through many exchanges. A "slug" must be inserted at each exchange before you can go on to the next exchange. This takes time and manpower of such magnitude that it is not feasible for any extended period of time. The call can be traced only while the actual call is taking place. As soon as the calling party hangs up, the trace is lost except to the points where the call has been "slugged."

The loophole mentioned was this: the calling party merely had to give the long distance operator an incorrect number for the one from which the call was actually being placed, but this in itself is a risk for the calling party. An alert long distance operator can detect that a wrong number is being given and will refuse to place the call under such circumstances. She might not check a call coming from AComa 2-1234 if the calling party said he was calling from AComa 2-1235,

but if the calling party was calling from BELmont 3-1234 and he said he was calling from AComa 2-1234, he would not get away with it. Even in the first example, the operator, if suspicious, could re-dial the number AComa 2-1234 and if this line did not show a busy signal, the ruse would not work. Even in the first example where a wrong number was given, we would still have the city the call came from if long distance and at least the approximate area if a local call. During the operation of the tracing system, no incorrect numbers were noted and all were traceable.

If the call originated from a distant city long distance operator, the supervisor used the facilities of the toll tandem in his office. He dialed the distant city Chief Operator, briefly explained his problem, giving no more information than was necessary, and asked the Chief Operator to collect all pending toll tickets and locate the one directed to NATional 9-4455 at Morrison, Colorado. This is not an unusual procedure and the toll supervisor has a job of such responsibility that a Chief Operator will not ordinarily question his orders. In the few instances where a Chief Operator in a distant city hesitated, the Denver toll supervisor was prepared to call his counterpart toll supervisor in the distant city. Usually, the mere statement that he was prepared to make such a call or that he would call the Chief Special Agent or a Traffic Superintendent (the Chief Operator's boss) was enough to resolve the hesitation. The cardinal principle here involved, is that a toll tandem supervisor knows his way around, knows telephone company parlance and operating procedure. If he can't get the job done one way, he knows who to

contact to get the job done. As a result, no failures were involved in obtaining the pertinent toll ticket in a minimum of time.

#### B. CALLS THROUGH TERMINAL GRADE TRUNKS

A terminal grade trunk is one by which a long distance operator in a distant city can dial a number in the same manner as a long distance operator located in Denver. Thus, for example, a long distance operator in Cheyenne, Wyoming, could plug into a Denver terminal grade trunk and place a call to Morrison, Colorado, in the same manner as a Denver long distance operator. It is just an extension off the Denver long distance board, although it covers a lot of miles. This did not create much of a problem as the craft employee soon recognized that a terminal grade trunk was being used and he notified the toll tandem supervisor who then placed a call to the Chief Operator in the distant city and the same procedure was followed as outlined above.

#### C. DIRECT DISTANCE DIALING (DDD) EQUIPMENT

When the Coors case occurred, Denver was not equipped to handle DDD calls but all the equipment for this method of dialing was installed in the toll office and the system of tracing calls which went through this equipment was developed by the Supervising Service Foreman of the toll section and several of his toll supervisors. As will be recalled, the Supervising Service Foreman of the toll section attended the original meeting of telephone company officials.

He returned to his office late in the afternoon, held over several of his toll supervisors, and they all went to work on the problem.

By 3:00 A.M., the system was completed, tested and placed into operation. The ingenuity of this operation cannot be over-emphasized

as it eventually saved countless hours of manpower and alerted toll personnel in Denver that a call was proceeding to the Coors residence even before the Coors telephone rang.

Tracing became an instantaneous operation.

The technical aspects of this system are much too extensive for review at this point, but in layman's language the following took place:

The DDD equipment in Denver is described as a 4A Crossbar System. The crossbar switching system was developed by Western Electric and the Bell Telephone laboratories after years of research, but even when it was being installed a few years ago, it was obsolete because of newer advancements in the electronic field.

Each crossbar office is equipped with a machine known as a Trouble Recorder. This machine helps the crossbar system to locate all mechanical and electrical malfunctions in the entire system.

If a trouble condition develops in one particular circuit, the crossbar system tries to route the call through another circuit, and in most instances succeeds.

As soon as any malfunction occurs, the trouble recorder ejects a punched card and an alarm bell rings. A trained craft employee needs only to glance at the punched card to determine that a particular circuit is not functioning properly and immediately proceed to make the necessary repairs.

Any large toll office prides itself in keeping the crossbar equipment operating in a most efficient manner. In fact, each trouble card ejected cuts down their "Index" which to them is what statistics are to the Bureau.



The tracing system developed used the trouble recorder machine to trace the incoming calls. Every time a call went to the Coors residence or to eight other adjacent numbers, a trouble card was ejected. This card would show the routing of the incoming call and a tracing operating could be started even before the Coors telephone rang.

The card was ejected because a trouble condition "trap" showing a continuity failure was placed on the first attempt to ring the Coors telephone. This is known as a "first trial failure."

But remember, when a failure occurs, the crossbar system doesn't give up but makes a second trial attempting to place the call by a different circuit. The "trap" was so set up that on the second trial, the call to the Coors residence was completed. The important thing was that the essential routing instructions for a tracing operation were punched into the trouble recorder card which had been ejected on the first trial.

The time lapse between "trials" is not great. It takes from 500 to 750 milliseconds to make the second trial so there is no observable delay in the call. Note, however, that from the crossbar equipment the incoming call to the Coors residence had to go through the step-by-step equipment at Morrison, Colorado. Since it takes a call approximately ten seconds to go through the step-by-step equipment, we got a ten second running start on the tracing operation.

As to actual procedure, as soon as the trouble card dropped in the crossbar equipment room, a craft employee determined the routing instructions from which he could determine from what distant city the call was being originated. He called the toll tandem supervisor by inter-com. The supervisor placed a call to the Chief

Operator of the distant city and asked her to pick up the pertinent toll ticket. On almost all occasions, the calling number was known before we knew whether the call was worthy of tracing or not.

As time went on, the trouble cards being dropped for our operation began to cut into the "Index" of the toll section to such an extent that permission was granted by officials of the company to discount all the cards caused by our tracing activities.

As a matter of evidentiary nature, each trouble card was filed away for future reference. Craft employees marked each card with the time, date and their initials as well as the routing information.

A log was maintained in the toll tandem supervisor's office by the toll supervisors, marking down the date, time, routing information, results of the trace and the fact that a discontinuance of the trace was received.

These logs and cards assumed some importance later in the Coors case when the SAC noted that a call had been received from Atlantic City during the early stages of the tracing operation at a time prior to the discovery of Corbett's car near Atlantic City. Through quick checking of the logs and cards, it was determined that this call had been placed by a college friend of Mrs. Coors.

#### MODIFICATIONS MADE IN THE TRACING SYSTEM AS TIME PROGRESSED

As time went on, officials of the telephone company became somewhat alarmed at the added expense to them of continuing the tracing operation.

Toll supervisors were on duty twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Under ordinary conditions, these supervisors were not on

duty during weekends, except when major trouble occurred or when extensive revamping of the system was required. Additionally, these supervisors are usually out inspecting equipment and directing the work of the craft employees in the equipment room. Since one of the supervisors had to remain in the toll tandem supervisor's office at all times to handle the tracing operation, it cut down on his normal supervisory duties.

To alleviate this situation, a Special Agent of the telephone company was assigned to handle the tracing operation during the day. If any particular problem arose, one of the toll supervisors was not too far away.

A sound trained FBI agent was on duty from 4:00 P.M. until the next morning. After familiarizing himself with the operation he was able to handle the tracing operation during the occasional absences of the toll supervisor. Week-end duty was handled on a voluntary basis by the individual toll supervisors and all volunteered. Since they were paid on a yearly salary basis, no overtime or premium pay was involved insofar as the telephone company was concerned.

The big problem arose in justifying the use of a craft employee in the equipment room twenty-four hours a day. His sole duty was to determine on which Denver-Morrison trunk a particular call was on. He could do nothing else. His entire salary had no return to the telephone company. Further, as a craft employee, he was entitled to premium pay for working nights, special shifts and on weekends.

With the success of the tracing operation through use of the trouble recorder system, a way was found to eliminate the craft employee. Recall that all calls through the crossbar system were

automatically traced through use of the trouble recorder card. Craft employees were on duty twenty-four hours a day at the trouble recorder, irrespective of our operation.

If all calls could somehow be routed through the crossbar system, the craft employee making checks on the long distance operator calls and the terminal grade operator call, could be eliminated. This was done.

Each long distance operator in Denver had access to the thirteen trunks to Morrison, Colorado by which she could dial a NATIONAL 9 number by plugging into an unused Morrison circuit and dialing the number involved. This she did as a creature of habit when she had a call going to Morrison.

She could just as easily plug into a crossbar circuit and place her call through the crossbar system. So, the District Traffic Superintendent authorized the "blacking out" of all these Morrison operator trunk outlets. This became a matter of disabling each of these operating circuits at each long distance operator position by removing the sleeve from each circuit and placing plugs in the associated holes on the long distance board. Each long distance operator was then instructed to place her Morrison calls through the crossbar circuits.

This left the terminal grade trunks of which there were 170 scattered throughout the Rocky Mountain area. The terminal grade trunks were the property of the long lines department of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company and were a revenue making proposition for A T & T Co., but not necessarily for Mountain States. The terminal grade trunks would be made inoperative anyway as soon as Mountain States changed over to DDD on April 23, 1960. The district Traffic Superintendent authorized the "turning down," or placing out of service,

all the terminal grade trunks. This took a few days to accomplish, but the end result was that all calls to Morrison, and coincidentally to the Coors residence, were all routed through the crossbar system where an automatic trace was available.

From that time on, the tracing system could be kept up indefinitely without a great monetary loss to the telephone company and it was so continued until March 14, 1960.

#### COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE SAC OF THE SPECIAL

When the Special Squad was being organized, it became evident that the telephone facilities of the Denver Office would be taxed to the utmost.

The criminal squad room of the Denver Office was vacated for the Special Squad. The SAC's office was placed in the adjacent criminal supervisor's office.

A call was placed to the M S T & T Co. Denver-Metropolitan equipment supervisor, a long time contact of the Denver Office. He immediately proceeded to the Denver Office with a crew of installers to design an expanded telephone system for the office.

The criminal supervisor's office had a two button telephone set with two incoming lines. Each of these lines was brought out to another two button telephone set so that the ASAC of the Special could listen to each call if necessary.

An additional telephone with a direct outside unlisted number was installed so the SAC could make direct outside calls without going through the office switchboard. Another telephone was installed for the SAC's secretary.

A way had to be found to arrange instantaneous telephone communication with the Coors residence. This is where the Denver-Metropolitan Equipment supervisor's knowledge of telephone circuitry came to the fore.

Thirteen telephone circuits existed from Denver to Morrison. One of these circuits was being used full time for the Inter-com system between the Morrison telephone exchange and the Denver toll office. None of the other lines could be released for our use as they were all needed for long distance traffic.

To call the Coors residence from the Denver FBI Office it was necessary to dial the operator, as on a regular long distance call and delays occurred on every call.

The equipment supervisor recalled that a wealthy Denver manufacturer had a summer home in the mountains, served by a leased long distance line from Denver through which his mountain mansion could be dialed directly from Denver.

The line was not in use during the winter months but because of the owner's stature in the community, the line was never used for any other purpose. The equipment supervisor promptly "borrowed" this line and had it looped into the Morrison exchange thereby giving us the direct long distance line from Denver to Morrison via the mountain mansion.

Then our equipment supervisor borrowed a technique which is not used very frequently in telephone installations. It resembles the old hand-cranked country telephone set in a sense except you don't need the hand crank. He installed a "ring-down" phone in the SAC's

office and a companion "ring-down" phone in the Coors residence at Morrison.

To communicate, all that was necessary was to lift up either phone and the one on the other end of the line rang.

To complete the communications picture, there were four incoming lines to the toll tandem supervisor's office, all dialable from Denver.

So, we can now follow the action as it took place every time an incoming call arrived at the Coors residence in Morrison:

As soon as the phone rang, the Special Agent on duty at the Coors residence was alerted to listen to his Magnecorder and record the incoming conversation. If he could determine that the call was legitimate and not worthy of tracing, he would lift up his "ring-down" phone and advise the SAC the trace was not necessary. The SAC would then dial one of the numbers of the toll tandem office and advise the agent or the telephone company employee on duty that it was not necessary to trace the particular call in progress.

To prevent any delay in case all the lines to the toll tandem office were busy (and this happened on occasion) a dispatcher radio unit was installed in the toll tandem office so that the tracing operation could be discontinued by calling on the Denver FM radio system using suitable pretext language.

This dispatcher unit was also used to communicate with Bureau radio cars during the period of time when a number of pay telephone locations were being covered in the Denver area.

A dispatcher unit was also installed at the Coors residence at Morrison in the event of a breakdown of telephone circuits.

SPECIALIZED COVERAGE:

PAY STATIONS IN THE NATIONAL 9 AREA

Early in the case it was obvious that a call could be placed to the Coors residence from any one of a number of pay telephones located in the NATIONAL 9 exchange without going through an operator.

By checking telephone company records, it was found that twenty-eight pay telephones existed in the NATIONAL 9 exchange. Many were located outside and some in very isolated places. These ranged, according to telephone company records, from such places as:

"Inside booth at Tabor Bar, Main Street, Morrison, Colorado";

"Outside booth, inter-Canyon Fire Department, mounted on telephone pole number 649, about three miles above Tiny Town at Fender Junction, where you turn off to Phillipsburg, Colorado";

"Outside booth, M S T & T Co. ball park, Morrison Road, east edge of town about where you cross to go to Soda Lake, on Pole number 9-26."

A team of Agents visually observed each of these locations through use of a telephone company truck and all locations were pinpointed on a map in the Denver Office.

In addition, supervisors at the Morrison exchange marked each of these telephone terminals for quick reference in the event that a call was received from one of the booths.

MULTIPLE PAY STATIONS IN DENVER AREA

Recognizing that a call might be made from a crowded area in Denver through a pay telephone, a survey was made of all locations in



Denver where three or more pay stations existed. This was accomplished through review of telephone company records.

Seventeen locations were found where multiple pay stations existed. For instance, the Denver Union Station had a total of twenty-eight pay stations located in three different banks of booths.

Stapleton Air Field, the main Denver airport, had twenty-three pay telephones located in four different banks of booths.

#### DENVER TOLL TICKET SURVEY

Since the subject of the case might place a call to the Coors residence to give instructions for a payoff, and then place a long distance call to the location where the victim was being held, all toll tickets on long distance calls made from Denver, Colorado and some suburban areas were photographed through use of a Recordak machine set up in the main telephone company building.

Two agents were busy handling this operation as approximately 600,000 toll tickets were photographed from February 13, 1960 through March 1, 1960.

Toll tickets were picked up on a regular basis and processed through the Recordak machine so that no delay would occur in transferring the toll tickets to the telephone company's accounting center in Denver where the tickets are sorted for billing purposes.

It is well to note here that unless the toll tickets are photographed immediately before the accounting breakdown is made, the tickets are sent to all parts of the country for billing purposes and they are effectively lost forever insofar as obtaining data which might later be of interest to the investigation.

## CRANK CALLS

Several crank calls were made to the Coors residence during the tracing operation period. We were successful in tracing these calls. The Chief Special Agent's Office was particularly helpful in these instances in furnishing us with long distance toll tickets placed by the persons who made the crank calls.

Crank calls were made to the Victim's father's home in Golden, Colorado, where the Coors Brewery is located. These calls were usually of short duration.

In one instance, the caller stated he would call later the same evening. The telephone company Chief Special Agent, a supervising service foreman and an FBI Agent attempted to make a direct trace when the incoming call came in. The call was traced back to a telephone exchange in West Denver, but the call was of such short duration that it "fell-off" before the trace could be completed. We did know that the call was coming from a pay telephone in West Denver on a particular street and with sufficient manpower on the street, the caller probably could have been identified.

How do you say thanks to all the telephone company employees, many of whom gave up their week ends to assist in covering this essential operation?

While the sound trained agent working with telephone company personnel is able to verbally express the appreciation of the whole office and of the Bureau, letters of appreciation from the Director are most effective.

Anyone visiting the Denver toll tandem office today will notice

a framed letter from the Director, addressed personally to the Supervising Service Foreman commending him and individually mentioning the names of each foreman under his supervision who so ably assisted the Bureau.

A visit to the office of the Chief Special Agent will reveal a framed photograph of the Director addressed to him personally.

The above two are examples of ways in which the Bureau's gratitude was expressed. Other such letters were directed to key personnel of M S T & T Co., including the President. You can be assured that these expressions of gratitude are treasured long after the remembrance of sacrificed week ends have faded away.

The question now arises, if a similar situation arose today, could the same job be done with DDD equipment?

According to our now firmly established sources, it can be done, but each future case will have its own individual problems. The answer can be given by the telephone company personnel involved when the specific problem is advanced.

The best advice that can be given is to locate the proper key personnel, particularly those responsible for the operation of the toll tandem office, set out the problem involved and let them arrive at the proper method of handling the particular case.



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-34

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

June 21, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) CRIMINAL INFORMANTS-CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM -- SAC Letters 57-70 dated December 13, 1957, 58-64 dated October 14, 1958, 59-48 dated August 4, 1959, and 61-13 dated March 14, 1961, pointed out the urgent need for criminal informants who can give direct information relative to individuals under investigation in connection with the Criminal Intelligence Program.

An analysis of available information developed to date concerning the structure of organized crime in this country reveals a decided need for the further clarification and expansion of facts now known concerning the identity of the leaders of the organized hoodlum element, and the manner in which this element functions. To successfully complete our intelligence picture of the controlling forces which make organized crime operative, it is now urgently necessary to develop particularly qualified, live sources within the upper echelon of the organized hoodlum element who will be capable of furnishing the quality information required.

The most significant information developed to date indicating organization among the nation's hoodlum leaders has been obtained from highly confidential sources in Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia concerning the existence of a "commission" of top leaders of the organized hoodlum element exerting a controlling influence on racket activities in this country. Additional information concerning the "commission" has also been developed recently from a highly confidential source in Newark. The Chicago and New York sources have discussed the "commission" as being composed variously of six, nine, and twelve members. The Chicago source accounts for a nine- or twelve-man commission by discussing increases in "commission" membership resulting in expansion of this group to either nine or twelve men. Both the Chicago and New York sources list as members Vito Genovese, Thomas Luchese, Joseph Profaci, Carlo Gambino and Joseph Bonanno. The Chicago source indicates Samuel Giancana is a member, with the New York source furnishing information that there is a "commission" member from Chicago without naming him. Genovese, Luchese, Profaci and Gambino are all Top Hoodlums from the New York area. Giancana is a Chicago Top Hoodlum; Bonanno is a Phoenix Top Hoodlum residing in Tucson, and formerly from Brooklyn, New York.

In addition, the Chicago source names hoodlums believed identical with Joseph Zerilli, Detroit Top Hoodlum; John La Rocca, Pittsburgh Top Hoodlum; Raymond Patriarca, Boston Top Hoodlum; and Steve Magaddino, Buffalo Top Hoodlum as "commission" members. The Chicago source suggests that Joseph Ida, Newark Top Hoodlum who has

returned to Sicily, was a "commission" member representing the Philadelphia area. The Philadelphia source identifies Angelo Bruno, Philadelphia Top Hoodlum, as the current representative of the "commission" in that area. This source also discusses Bruno traveling to New York to receive instructions from the "commission." Information recently received from a highly confidential source in Newark indicates that Gerardo Catena, Newark Top Hoodlum, has been placed on the "commission" in the recent past.

The New York source identifies Carlo Gambino as the current chairman of the "commission," indicating that he is occupying this position in place of Vito Genovese, while Genovese is in prison. The Chicago source previously indicated that Genovese appeared to occupy the top position prior to his incarceration. The New York and Chicago sources have mentioned Albert Anastasia, deceased New York hoodlum, as a former "commission" member, and the New York source has identified Frank Costello, New York Top Hoodlum currently in Federal Prison, as a former "commission" member prior to his loss of favor as an underworld power.

Both the Chicago and New York sources have used the term "avugat" to denote a "commission" member; "avugat" is a shortened version of the full Italian word "avvocato" which, literally translated, means "attorney."

Enlarging upon the "commission's" power and influence regarding organized criminal activities throughout the country, the New York source explained that there were two hoodlum leaders, referred to as the "boss" and the "underboss," in each major population area throughout the country and in Canada, who are responsible to the "commission" for activities in their respective areas. In explaining this progression of authority, the source cited as an example the mob leadership in the Philadelphia area in years past. In the period referred to, Joseph Ida was identified as the "boss," and Marco Reginelli, deceased hoodlum leader, as the "underboss," with these local leaders answerable to Albert Anastasia, a "commission" member at that time. Other examples of "bosses" identified by this source were Santo Trafficante in Florida and Joseph Civello in Texas. Trafficante is a Tampa Top Hoodlum and Civello, a Dallas Top Hoodlum. According to this source these local leaders, the "bosses" and "underbosses," operate to a degree on their own, making their own decisions in underworld matters involving activities in their own areas. However, they are ultimately answerable to the "commission" in case of problems or disputes, with the "commission" functioning as an arbitration board.

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In areas of great population or importance there appears to be additional second and third echelon leaders corresponding to the positions of "boss" and "underboss" in other areas. For example, the New York source has identified at least six New York hoodlum subordinates of Joseph Profaci, a "commission" member, as his "capirigime." This Italian word literally translated means "heads of the regime," and is used to denote mob bosses working on a level below a "commission" member, or "avugat." The New York source has also identified several well-known New York hoodlums as "capirigime" working under Vito Genovese, another "commission" member.

The Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia sources strongly suggest that the "commission" either appoints, or at least has final approval over the appointment of local "bosses" and "underbosses." The Chicago source discussed Vito Genovese traveling about the country in connection with a number of "promotions" within the organization, and mentioned frequent changes of the "boss" in Philadelphia during a comparatively short period. The Philadelphia source furnished corresponding information concerning a change in leadership in that area occasioned by the "commission."

This information, made possible through the establishment of these sources, has been invaluable in providing insight into the top echelon of organized crime in this country. However, as pointed out above, there is an urgent need for amplifying information which will reveal full details concerning the operations of these inter-related organized criminal groups throughout the nation.

Our urgent need for new live sources strategically placed in the upper echelons of organized crime is brought into clear focus by the fact that no information regarding the "commission" has been reported by any live criminal source to date. This, of course, suggests a problem of some delicacy in seeking information from live informants, since we must avoid the danger of informants "playing back" information they may obtain through questions asked them.

#### TOP ECHELON INFORMANT PROGRAM

To insure that the Bureau meets its responsibilities in connection with the Criminal Intelligence Program, it is mandatory that the development of quality criminal informants be emphasized and the existing program be implemented and greatly expanded.

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You are again reminded that the penetration and infiltration of organized criminal activity is a prime objective of the Bureau, and to accomplish this it is necessary to give a renewed impetus to the development of quality criminal informants.

We have learned through our experience in conducting investigations in connection with the Criminal Intelligence Program that the best source we could possibly obtain would be a criminal informant who is highly placed in organized crime.

The Bureau is therefore inaugurating the following program in an effort to develop criminal informants of the type mentioned above.

Effective immediately the following offices must designate a squad of Special Agents to work exclusively on the development of criminal informants who are in a position to furnish valuable information regarding cases currently under investigation in connection with this program, and to furnish quality criminal intelligence information: Chicago, Detroit, Kansas City, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Miami, Newark, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and San Francisco.

The selection of Agent personnel to participate in this program is of vital importance. The Agents selected must have demonstrated in the past their ability in this field and should be mature, aggressive, resourceful, and possess the necessary knowledge of criminal activities in your area to intelligently accomplish the objectives.

In addition to the above qualities an enthusiastic approach to this program is a basic essential which must be evidenced by all Agents whom you designate to participate.

To insure the success of this program, it is necessary to utilize Special Agents with the will and desire to employ new approaches and means to secure the Bureau's goals.

It is your personal responsibility to select the Special Agents to participate in the program and to advise the Bureau within one week of their names.

#### SELECTION OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

Your selection of potential criminal informants in connection with this program should be based upon a combination

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of a particular hoodlum's qualification by virtue of his position in the organized hoodlum element, and upon circumstances indicating his possible vulnerability to development. A few examples of the type hoodlum who should be considered for development are:

Chicago

Louis Kanne  
Henry Susk

Detroit

Richard Zalmanowski  
John J. White

Kansas City

Alex Presta  
Phillip Simone

Las Vegas

George Gordon  
Eugene Richard Warner  
Lou Ledderer

Los Angeles

John Battaglia  
Alfonso Rocco Pizzichino

Miami

JFK Act 6 (4)

Newark

Pasquale Masi  
Salvatore Paci

New York

Mike Scandifia  
Max Courtney

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Philadelphia

Felix DeTulio  
Antonio Pollina

Pittsburgh

Arthur G. Nelson  
Frank Valente

San Francisco

Aladena T. Fratianno

These are cited only as examples of the types of individuals who would be in a position to furnish the information required. You are undoubtedly aware of other hoodlums, who for various reasons may be susceptible to an approach.

The eleven offices participating in this program should submit to the Bureau within one week the identities of hoodlums you have selected for concentrated attention. Each office, with the exception of the New York Office, should submit a minimum of five names; the New York Office is to submit a minimum of ten names.

SUGGESTED APPROACHES

To properly develop informants of this caliber, varied approaches can and should be utilized, dependent upon the individual under development. The following methods are being set forth as possible guidelines.

Background Investigation

A penetrative investigation of each individual selected as a target for development as an informant should be conducted prior to any approach of the individual.

In many instances this information will be available to your office as a result of previous investigations. Do not overlook possibilities of obtaining additional information from your criminal informants and sources.

Through these investigations you should determine background, marital status, girl friends, hobbies, personalities,

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relatives, financial affairs, criminal record, current criminal activities, et cetera of each individual selected for development.

Be alert to the possibility of utilizing as informants, individuals currently incarcerated who were formerly associates of Top Hoodlums. The offer of assistance to these individuals' families could induce their cooperation.

A review of all these facts should assist materially in planning the development period.

### Payments

The Bureau will authorize substantial remuneration for informants who can provide information concerning hoodlums who have national stature. Payments in this instance will be made for quality criminal intelligence information and you will not be restricted in making payments to just those instances which involve a substantive violation over which the Bureau has jurisdiction.

It is apparent that hope for financial reward will not be a motivating force which would induce most selected targets for development to cooperate; however, under certain circumstances this could be a most effective means and should not be overlooked.

### Compromising Situations

It is imperative that full exploitation be made of circumstances which place a potential informant in a position where it would be advantageous to him to furnish information to the Bureau.

#### a. Prosecution

Awareness of an individual under development that he is liable to either Federal or State prosecution could be a compelling reason for such an individual to cooperate with the Bureau.

#### b. Deportation

Fear of deportation is a fact that could motivate many of the selected targets for development to be susceptible to development as informants. This may well be one of the effective approaches which could be used against older top echelon hoodlums.

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c. Personal Reasons

These will vary with the individual under development. Some examples could be: concern over the criminal activity and possible prosecution of children, wife, girl friends, et cetera. Fear of pressure being exerted from associates or rivals in organized criminal activity.

Confidential Basis

It should be made crystal clear to the individuals under development in connection with this program that any information furnished by them will be handled on a strictly confidential basis. You should insure that no dissemination is made of information obtained from such sources unless the informant can be fully protected. In the implementation of this program, the Bureau's objective of penetration and infiltration of the top echelon of organized criminal activities and the continuous flow of quality criminal intelligence information should be constantly kept in mind.

This program presents a definite new challenge to the field which to be met calls for new and untried methods and situations may arise which will be evaluated by the Bureau based upon the realization of the need for unusual and extreme methods. The offices participating in this program must of necessity display the initiative and ingenuity to provide the impetus to realize the Bureau's objective.

Every office is being advised of this program since in the future it may be appropriate to expand it to include additional offices.

All offices instructed to designate a squad of Special Agents to participate in this program should advise the Bureau within thirty days of the progress made.

The Bureau will analyze the preliminary information obtained and within a three months' period, a conference at either Seat of Government or in the field will be held to evaluate the progress made and to redirect the program as a result of the experience gained to date.

These special assignments will not eliminate the responsibilities of all Special Agents to fully participate in the criminal informant program.

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This program has, as its primary purpose, the development of quality criminal intelligence informants. The two most important components of this program are the selection of individuals for development as informants and the designation of the Special Agents who will participate.

I cannot stress too strongly the urgent necessity of each Special Agent in Charge providing the personal leadership which will insure the success of this program.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

July 11, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) INCENTIVE AWARDS - FBI FORM BOOK -- The Civil Service Commission has revised the Incentive Awards Program regulations as they relate primarily to awards for suggestions or contributions where tangible savings are involved. The table for determining the amount of such awards has been changed to (1) increase the minimum award from \$10 to \$15, (2) provide for \$50 minimum tangible benefit to qualify for an award and (3) increase the amount of award where more substantial savings are realized. The changes have little effect on awards involving intangible benefits resulting from employee contributions and performances other than to increase the minimum award from \$10 to \$15. Minimum awards will not be granted for intangible benefits unless the employee's contribution compares favorably with minimum awards granted where tangible benefits are involved.

Suggestions which deal with maintenance or repair, items of supply which could be procured through simple requisition, or offer no specific means to improve operations cannot be considered suggestions within the limits of the program. Similarly, ideas to improve working conditions which could and should have been corrected in the normal course of work and proposals which are trivial in nature or which would cost more to process than any saving they could achieve, will not be evaluated under the suggestion program but will be returned to the appropriate supervisor for oral acknowledgment.

The foregoing which became effective July 1, 1961, should be brought to the attention of all employees. Form FD-255 is being revised and upon receipt of a supply of the revised form which will be forwarded under separate cover one copy should be placed in the FBI Form Book and you should destroy all copies of this form not bearing the current revision date. You may continue to submit recommendations on an old FD-255 form until you receive a supply of the revised form.

7/11/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-37

(B) AUTOMOBILES - 1961 - PLYMOUTH - TRUNK LIGHT -- The Bureau has recently learned of the following technique being used by car thieves to gain entry to the trunk of the 1961 Plymouth:

Remove the two screws which hold the light (over the license plate) in place; push the bulb aside, and insert a screwdriver and remove the lock retainer clip. Once the retainer clip is removed the cylinder can be removed and the trunk opened.

The Chrysler Company has advised that the screws holding this assembly should be the "one-way" type; that is, they can be tightened but not loosened. A rivet can also be used for this purpose. Any vehicle not having "one-way" screws will be so equipped by an authorized Plymouth dealer at no cost. Insure that all 1961 Plymouths in your division are protected against entry in the above manner.

7/11/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-37

(C) INTERVIEWS - CONFESSIONS AND SIGNED STATEMENTS -- At the request of the Criminal Division and the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice, a new rule will be followed, effective immediately, in giving defendants or prospective defendants and witnesses copies of confessions and signed statements which they have previously furnished to the Bureau. The rule will be, as stated by the Department, that:

"...subsequent to the formal referral of a matter to the United States Attorney, any such request, whether made by the prospective defendant or his counsel, should be referred to the interested United States Attorney. He can then determine, after consultation with the Criminal Division, if deemed necessary, the potential adverse impact upon the criminal proceeding should there be an untimely release or inspection of the statements in question."

For the purposes of this rule, a case will be considered as formally referred to the United States Attorney when facts are presented to him and he indicates the likelihood of ultimate prosecution.

Requests made prior to formal referral for copies of signed statements and confessions will be honored as in the past. If a defendant, prospective defendant or witness, interviewed after formal referral, offers to give a signed statement or confession only upon condition that a copy will be given to him, the statement or confession should be taken and a copy furnished unless the United States Attorney can readily be reached for an opinion and advises to the contrary.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-37

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The rule for defendants and prospective defendants will be applied to witnesses also, owing to the fact that witnesses sometimes become defendants and vice versa.

In the event of an inquiry from the United States Attorney concerning this new policy, you should advise him that it was put into effect at the request of the Department.

7/11/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-37

(D) FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY -- In view of the extremely heavy demand for attendance at the National Academy, the size of each class will be increased to 80 men, effective with the August, 1961, class. The standards for attendance at the Academy are not to be lowered in any fashion to fill a class.

Although there have already been nominated for the August class a sufficient number of candidates to make up a class of 80 men, it will be permissible for you to make recommendations to the Bureau for additional representatives at the August Session. These will be given consideration if the size of the class permits.

(Security Letter on attached pages)

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(E) SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION CHARACTERIZATIONS - INTERNAL SECURITY - C  
Set forth below are up-to-date thumbnail sketches of organizations and publications, each of which is of use to various field offices. You are instructed that the sketches set forth in SAC Letters 58-41 (F), 58-81 (K), 59-8 (C), 59-43 (M), and 60-34 (F) should no longer be used. In the event an office needs to characterize an organization not mentioned in this letter, listed in the various issues of the "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications" published by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, or designated by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450, a request should be made of the office of origin to furnish the required characterization. You are instructed that in describing a local affiliate of a national organization, in addition to characterizing the local affiliate, it will be necessary to set forth separately the characterization of the parent organization.

The evaluation and identities of the sources should be handled in accordance with instructions set forth in Part I, Section 49B 2m (1) (d), page 64, of the FBI Handbook.

For the purpose of evaluation all sources utilized in the preparation of the sketches listed below should be described as having furnished reliable information in the past.

In each sketch utilized below, the field office submitting the sketch has advised that careful consideration was given to each source concealed.

"A TENY" ("THE FACT")

A source advised on May 2, 1961, that "A Teny" ("The Fact") is a Hungarian-language newspaper which closely follows the Communist Party line and has done so since at least the late 1940's. This newspaper is published monthly in Los Angeles, California.

Source: DELETED

COMMITTEE TO SECURE JUSTICE FOR MORTON SOBELL

"Following the execution of atomic spies Ethel and Julius Rosenberg in June, 1953, the Communist campaign assumed a different emphasis. Its major effort centered upon Morton Sobell, the Rosenbergs' codefendant. The National Committee to Secure Justice in the Rosenberg case - a Communist front which had been conducting the campaign in the United States - was reconstituted as the National Rosenberg-Sobell Committee at a conference in Chicago in October, 1953, and then as the National Committee to Secure Justice for Morton Sobell in the Rosenberg case'...."

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("Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications" dated January 2, 1957, issued by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, page 60.)

In September, 1954, the name "National Committee to Secure Justice for Morton Sobell" appeared on literature issued by the Committee. In March, 1955, the current name, "Committee to Secure Justice for Morton Sobell," first appeared on literature issued by the Committee.

The 1960-61 Borough of Manhattan telephone directory lists the "Committee to Secure Justice for Morton Sobell" as being located at 940 Broadway, New York, New York.

#### FOUR CONTINENT BOOK CORPORATION

According to the records of the Foreign Agents Registration Section, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., the Four Continent Book Corporation, 156 Fifth Avenue, New York City, is registered under the provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended. One of the foreign principals listed in this registration is the Mezhdunarodnaja Kniga (International Book), Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

#### JULY 26TH MOVEMENT OF NEW YORK

The July 26th Movement is a revolutionary organization founded and led by Fidel Castro, now Prime Minister of Cuba.

NATION OF ISLAM, formerly referred to as the  
Muslim Cult of Islam, also known as Muhammad's  
Temples of Islam  
FRUIT OF ISLAM  
MUSLIM GIRLS TRAINING

#### Nation of Islam

In January, 1957, a source advised Elijah Muhammad has described his organization on a nationwide basis as the "Nation of Islam" and "Muhammad's Temples of Islam."

On May 5, 1961, a second source advised: Elijah Muhammad is the national leader of the Nation of Islam (NOI). Muhammad's Temple of Islam No. 2, 5335 South Greenwood Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, is the national headquarters of the NOI. In mid 1960 Muhammad and other NOI officials, when referring to Muhammad's organization on a nationwide basis, commenced using either "Mosque" or "Temple" when mentioning one of "Muhammad's Temples of Islam."

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The NOI is an all-Negro organization which was originally organized in 1930 in Detroit, Michigan. Muhammad claims to have been selected by Allah, the Supreme Being, to lead the so-called Negro race out of slavery in the wilderness of North America by establishing an independent black nation in the United States. Members following Muhammad's teaching and his interpretation of the "Koran" believe there is no such thing as a Negro; that the so-called Negroes are slaves of the white race, referred to as "white devils," in the United States; and that the white race, because of its exploitation of the so-called Negroes, must and will be destroyed in the approaching "War of Armageddon."

In the past, officials and members of the NOI, including Muhammad, have refused to register under the provisions of the Selective Service Acts and have declared that members owe no allegiance to the United States.

On May 5, 1958, the first source advised Muhammad had, upon advice of legal counsel, tempered his personal statements and instructions to his ministers concerning the principles of his organization in order to avoid possible prosecution by the United States Government; however, he did not indicate any fundamental changes in the teachings of his organization.

On May 17, 1961, a third source advised: Muhammad had, early in July, 1958, decided to de-emphasize the religious aspects of the teachings of Islam and to stress the economic benefits to be derived by those Negroes who joined the NOI. This policy change, according to Muhammad, would help him acquire additional followers and create more interest in his programs.

Sources: DELETED  
DELETED  
DELETED

#### Fruit of Islam

On May 5, 1961, a source advised that the Fruit of Islam (FOI) is a group within the Nation of Islam (NOI) composed of male members of the NOI. The purpose of the FOI is to protect officials and property of the NOI, assure compliance of members with NOI teachings and to prepare for the "War of Armageddon." Members of the FOI are required to participate in military drill and are afforded the opportunity to engage in judo training.

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The FOI is governed by a military system wherein the members are controlled by general orders similar to those issued by regular military organizations.

Source: DELETED

### Muslim Girls Training

On May 19, 1960, a source advised that the Muslim Girls Training (MGT) is a group within the Nation of Islam (NOI) and is composed of all female members of the NOI. The MGT is similar in structure to the Fruit of Islam (FOI), which is composed of male members of the NOI, in that the MGT has officers similar to military organizations to whom other female members are accountable. MGT members receive instructions in homemaking, hygiene, calisthenics, and other subjects such as Muslim history and the English language. There also exists a Junior MGT, which is composed of female members of the NOI who are between the ages of 15 and 19 and who are afforded military-type drill.

Since 1957, various officers and "sisters" of the MGT have, at meetings of the MGT, used the term MGT so that it also means General Civilization Class. General Civilization Class refers to classes conducted within the MGT.

The above refers to activities of the MGT at Muhammad's Temple of Islam No. 2, 5335 South Greenwood, Chicago, Illinois.

On May 17, 1961, another source advised that the MGT is a group within the NOI which is composed of all female members of the NOI. The MGT is similar in structure to the FOI, which is composed of male members of the NOI. In theory, the MGT exists in all Temples of the NOI and is patterned after the MGT at Muhammad's Temple of Islam No. 2, Chicago. General Civilization Class refers to the collective group of classes held within the MGT.

Sources: DELETED  
DELETED

### NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO ABOLISH THE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES COMMITTEE

On May 3, 1961, a source advised that the National Committee to Abolish the Un-American Activities Committee was organized in August, 1960, at Los Angeles, California, to stimulate new and utilize all efforts of interested individuals and organizations in a national campaign to promote public education leading

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to political action to abolish the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HCUA). The National Committee to Abolish the Un-American Activities Committee will not duplicate the work of other Civil Liberties organizations, which include the abolition of the HCUA as a part of their program, but will encourage the coordination and consolidation of all their efforts for abolition, and will promote new efforts in those Congressional Districts where education and political action for abolition have not been initiated.

Frank Wilkinson is the Field Representative of the National Committee to Abolish the Un-American Activities Committee. According to the source, Wilkinson periodically confers with Dorothy Healey, Chairman, Southern California District Communist Party, and is in close touch with other leading communist functionaries in the Los Angeles area.

Another source on September 17, 1952, advised that Frank Wilkinson was a Communist Party member as of September, 1952.

Sources: DELETED

#### POLITICAL AFFAIRS

In "The Worker," an east coast communist weekly newspaper, issue of March 5, 1961, the editor of "Political Affairs" identified the latter publication as an organ of the National Committee of the Communist Party, USA, published monthly.

#### PROGRESSIVE YOUTH ORGANIZING COMMITTEE

On February 9, 1961, a source advised that the Progressive Youth Organizing Committee (PYOC) was established at a national socialist-oriented youth conference held in Chicago, Illinois, December 30, 1960, through January 1, 1961. This conference was the result of a mandate issued by the National Executive Committee, Communist Party, USA, calling for a youth conference to establish an organizing committee whose objective would be to set up a national socialist-oriented youth organization. The conference scheduled a convention to be held within a year to found a new national socialist-oriented youth organization. The PYOC has its office in Room 638, 80 East 11th Street, New York, New York.

Source: DELETED

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RUSSKY GOLOS PUBLISHING CORPORATION

A source advised on April 27, 1961, that "Russky Golos" is a Russian language newspaper which has consistently followed the Communist Party (CP) line and supports the same issues as the CPUSA. It is published by the Russky Golos Publishing Corporation at 130 East 16th Street, New York City. It was incorporated in the State of New York on January 11, 1917.

The source said that "Russky Golos" was formerly the organ of the "Russian Section" of the International Workers Order (IWO). Since the dissolution of the IWO by the New York Courts in 1954, the "Russian Section" is no longer known as such, but has been organized into Russian Cultural and Aid Society groups which continue to support "Russky Golos" financially and look on "Russky Golos" as the organ of these groups.

The CPUSA and the IWO have been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Source: DELETED

TASS NEWS AGENCY

Tass News Agency is an official Soviet Government news gathering organization, with headquarters in Moscow, Russia, and branches throughout the world.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

7/11/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-37

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

July 18, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) TRAINING - FILMS -- Since the films "The FBI," "The FBI Front" and "You Can't Get Away with It" are old and outmoded, Bureau desires that they no longer be used for police training purposes, or in connection with speeches.

Commitments already made for the use of these films should be handled; however, no further commitments should be made. Those offices having permanent retention copies of any of these films should destroy them after present commitments are handled.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-38

(B) FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM -- The "open season" enrollment period between the first and sixteenth inclusive of October, 1961, will provide an opportunity for all eligible employees to change plans if they so desire. Also, during this period an employee who previously elected not to enroll may register to enroll, provided he is otherwise eligible.

The Bureau has been advised by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) that training sessions will be conducted by their regional offices starting on or about August 15, 1961, for the various Government field establishments in preparation for the "open season." This training will cover "open season" regulations, plans and procedures; changes in Health Benefits plans and other items of interest to agency representatives with Health Benefits responsibilities. You should assure that your representative or representatives responsible for the supervision of this program in your office are in attendance in order to be properly prepared for the forthcoming "open season." If not previously advised, it is suggested that you contact the appropriate CSC regional office in order to be apprised of the date and location of the training conference.

Subscriber kits for maintaining records of medical expenses required for claiming supplemental benefits are being made available by Blue Cross-Blue Shield for employees who are enrolled in the Service Benefit Plan. These kits can be obtained from the local Blue Cross-Blue Shield office and should be furnished to employees presently enrolled in this plan. A supply of these kits should be maintained for distribution to new enrollees. Similar kits have been made available to SAMBA members.

(C) TELEPHONES - SECURITY OF FBI TELEPHONE LINES -- Individuals having background as telephone men and electricians could be a good source of information to individuals or organizations engaged in subversive, criminal or racial activities if these individuals or organizations choose to use their training and background in an attempt to monitor FBI telephone facilities. Therefore, you are instructed to immediately review the security procedures involving telephone lines used by your office to insure that maximum security is maintained.

There is a present requirement that field office telephone lines be checked quarterly and resident agency lines annually. These security checks should not be performed on such a highly regular basis that a pattern is established as to the time they are conducted. As you are aware, these checks are a precautionary measure and cannot guarantee absolute security of office and resident agency lines. Since these checks guarantee security only at the time they are performed, personnel should be most circumspect as to the nature of their conversation over outside telephone lines.

It is noted that a security check of telephone lines requires a review of confidential telephone company records and physical observation of the Bureau telephone lines located with the telephone company central office (a space accessible only to telephone company employees), and it is necessary to have the cooperation of the telephone company officials and craftsmen. Careful consideration, therefore, should be given to the attitude and background, particularly regarding security, racial and criminal matters, of local telephone company employees contacted in that these individuals are also in a position to assist any person or group interested in tapping telephones.

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(D) LAW ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCES - 1961 BANK ROBBERY AND INCIDENTAL CRIMES -- SAC Letter 61-26 (C) advised that it might be necessary to include data concerning any legislation which might become law prior to September 1, 1961, in the programs of Law Enforcement Conferences scheduled for 1961. This legislation is still pending and is being closely followed. You will be immediately advised in the event any of the legislation passes so that you may include discussions of it in your conference programs.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-38

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To aid you in the preparation of 1961 conferences, there will be an article in the August issue of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin concerning bank robberies. Reprints of this article along with others from past Law Enforcement Bulletins and a selection of booklets will be furnished each office for distribution at these conferences. A national press release concerning the conferences will be made prior to September 1, 1961. Suggested press release will be furnished each office well enough in advance for local use.

Each Division should promptly furnish the Bureau by routing slip to the attention of Crime Research Section, the total attendance expected, and sufficient material for distribution at the conferences will be furnished by the Bureau. In addition, at the completion of your conferences you should advise the Training and Inspection Division the names of the chief executives of local law enforcement agencies attending your conferences. Names of other prominent persons in attendance should be included on this list.

Upon completion of the conference, furnish the Bureau, attention Training and Inspection Division, comments of participants, and any suggestions or criticisms which would be of assistance in planning future conferences of this type.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-38

(E) USE OF IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE INTERPRETERS --  
In an effort to improve existing interpreting facilities available to the field, the Bureau has discussed with Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) headquarters the number and type of interpreters used by INS and whether or not its interpreters could periodically be used by the Bureau. INS has available throughout the field, principally in larger cities, a small staff of interpreters who are full-time employees of INS. Additionally, each local INS office maintains a roster of private individuals who can be used by INS on a contract basis in emergency situations. The latter individuals are paid when necessary on an hourly basis. No investigation of the latter group is conducted although, in some instances, INS makes a national agency check if repeated use of a particular individual is contemplated. INS has no objection to the Bureau's use of either its employees or the nonemployee type, pointing out that, where employees are involved, arrangements could be worked out on a local level and, in the nonemployee type, the INS local office will provide the

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-38

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identities of specific individuals capable of handling interpreting work and the Bureau could make its own arrangements regarding the use of these individuals. To implement its offer of assistance in this regard, INS is sending appropriate instructions to each INS field office.

As initially indicated, INS interpreting assistance, as well as that available locally through other intelligence agencies of the Government, previously approved, is to be used only when Bureau personnel qualified to handle interpreting work or already established Bureau sources utilized as interpreters are not available or the expense of securing one from another Bureau field division cannot be justified by the routine nature of the particular interview involved. Further, you are aware that outside interpreting assistance is sought and utilized only in routine, nonsensitive, exploratory interviews and, in these instances, if unresolved questions develop or the individual being interviewed begins to produce sensitive data, the preliminary interview should be gracefully terminated and steps taken to conduct a reinterview with qualified Bureau interpreting personnel.

In substance, therefore, if a need arises in your office for an interpreter in a routine, nonsensitive investigative matter and no previously established interpreting source is readily available, you may consult the nearest local office of INS and determine if the desired interpreting assistance can be provided. If the individual recommended by INS is not an employee, his name should be checked through field office indices, through local informants and established sources, credit and criminal checks made and Bureau indices checked. If financial reimbursement to this individual will be required, Bureau approval must be obtained. Once you have established a satisfactory relationship with an individual interpreter in this category, no further contact with INS concerning his use is necessary.

In order that the Bureau might assess the potential value of this step, each office should maintain statistical data showing the number of times INS employee-interpreters are utilized by your office, the language involved, the number of hours they expend on behalf of the Bureau, the number of interviews they participate in and any unusual or exceptional services performed. No statistical data is necessary concerning the nonemployee type. A letter containing requested statistical data covering the last six months of 1961 should be submitted to the Bureau by January 15, 1962. A second letter covering the first six months of 1962 should be submitted by July 15, 1962.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover

Director

7/18/61

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-39

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

July 25, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) COMMUNICATIONS - MESSAGE PRIORITIES - ENCODED MESSAGES -- Discretion, common sense and good judgment should be used in assigning the priority "Urgent" to teletype and radio messages. Assigning an "Urgent" priority to a message which does not require immediate action serves only to delay the handling of messages which are actually of an urgent and important nature and require immediate action.

The sending of a nonurgent matter in encoded form with an "Urgent" priority is a serious mistake in judgment, especially if it is sent when skeleton shifts are on duty after regular hours or on weekends. Encoded communications cannot be read, evaluated, or their real urgency determined until they are actually decoded. The receipt at any office of a nonurgent communication in encoded form bearing an "Urgent" priority may delay the decoding and delivery to officials and supervisors of an urgent and important communication received at the same time.

Lengthy encoded communications should not be sent to the Bureau or to a field office on Friday concerning matters requiring no action until the following Monday. Matters of this nature should be transmitted by airtel, using airmail and special delivery where appropriate.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-39

(B) ILLUSTRATED BROCHURE ("VISUAL PRESENTATIONS") - COOPERATIVE FUNCTIONS OF EXHIBITS SECTION -- Re SAC Letter Number 60-43 (E), September 13, 1960.

Requests for visual aids have moderately increased as a result of the dissemination of captioned brochure; however, requests for investigative and prosecutive aids are not widely distributed, indicating a need for all field divisions to be continually alert to the value of utilizing the specialized services available through the Exhibits Section. For example, approximately fifteen divisions regularly request the preparation of artists' conceptions of unknown subjects, charts and diagrams for antitrust and price-fixing investigations, scale drawings for use in Federal Tort Claims Act cases, three-dimensional scale models in criminal prosecutions, et cetera.

A copy of this brochure is now being made available to each United States Attorney in attendance at the United States Attorneys' Conferences in Washington, D. C. It is to be noted that the requirement of obtaining prior Bureau approval for discussing possible services of the Exhibits Section with United States Attorneys has been removed from all brochures (last paragraph, page III) furnished to the United States Attorneys. Requests for the preparation of demonstrative evidence should be brought to the Bureau's attention whenever the United States Attorney is of the opinion that visual aids are required in the prosecution of those cases wherein the FBI has primary investigative jurisdiction.

50

In the interest of assisting law enforcement agencies to fully realize the advantages of utilizing visual aids in connection with investigative and prosecutive matters, it is desired that your office will, when the occasion arises, exhibit the brochure and discuss with police officials the extent to which the Bureau has developed the use of trial exhibits in bringing cases of national importance to satisfactory conclusions. Due to the limited staff of specialized technicians maintained to prepare trial exhibits in Federal violations, the services of the Bureau's Exhibits Section cannot be honored in cases where the FBI is without jurisdiction.

In the event police officials indicate an interest in obtaining a copy of this brochure, the Bureau should be advised of your recommendation.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-39

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(C) FUGITIVE PROGRESS LETTER -- Furnish Bureau by tenth of month number of probation violator cases obtained as result of Bureau's expanded jurisdiction in such matters. Furnish results to date within one week of receipt of this letter. Thereafter incorporate under above caption along with other data presently submitted in one letter with following subheadings:

- (1) Unlawful flight complaints filed
- (2) Identity of replacements for Ten Most Wanted Fugitives Program
- (3) Fugitive deadlines missed
- (4) Probation violator cases obtained as to:
  - a. Cases wherein Bureau had original jurisdiction, and
  - b. Cases obtained under expanded jurisdiction

Submit original and one copy. No abstract is required.

(Security Letters on attached pages)

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-39

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(D) REPORT WRITING - STREAMLINING - SECURITY REPORTS -- Reference is made to SAC Letter Number 61-31 (J) dated June 6, 1961.

Referenced SAC Letter authorized the utilization of narrative-type statements in security reports. It was pointed out that this particular type reporting was susceptible to use primarily in cases of extensive activity in subversive organizations.

A review of reports submitted subsequent to referenced SAC Letter reveals that attempts are being made to utilize narrative-type reporting in cases in which little subversive activity has occurred. In such instances the reports must be detailed in order to present as complete a picture as possible of the subject's activities in order that a proper determination may be made with respect to his Security Index status.

Instances have been noted of attempts to weave into one narrative statement information received from more than one source. This practice is contrary to the instructions contained in referenced SAC Letter.

In reporting that a subject has attended meetings of a particular organization during a certain period of time, the number of meetings must be specified.

When reporting a subject's attendance at a specific affair, set forth not only the date of the activity but the date the information was received. Likewise, in utilizing a narrative statement to report a subject's activities, you must specify the period of time covered. Following identification of the source to which the information in the narrative statement is attributed, specify inclusive dates of the informant reports; for example, T-1 (July 1, 1960, to June 15, 1961).

I want to again stress the necessity for reporting in detail all information tending to establish a person's knowledge of the basic aims and purposes of the subversive organization with which affiliated, as well as all information tending to establish that a subject holds revolutionary and/or anarchist beliefs.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-39

(E) EAST GERMAN INTELLIGENCE -- A recent defection of an East German Intelligence Service (EGIS) staff officer who was assigned to the Hauptverwaltung Aufklaerung (HVA) has furnished insight

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-39

concerning present and prospective EGIS activities in the United States. The defector was assigned to the section of HVA which is concerned with operations against continental United States and South America.

According to this source's knowledge, HVA has agents inside the continental United States number of agents residing in South America and targeted against United States installations there have thus far been identified by him. to the source's knowledge, HVA agents are presently located in the United States, he is providing information on a number of who are targets for HVA recruitment or have already been recruited by the HVA. All of these recruited agents are presently residing The source did furnish the names of individuals of interest to HVA who are currently residing These individuals are currently the subjects of investigation by

Prior to his open defection, this source furnished information that an effort was being made by the EGIS to recruit who reside in the United States. Fulfillment of this would be accomplished by (a) METHODS

### THIRD AGENCY CONSIDERATION

7/25/61  
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In view of the above and the EGIS plan concerning immigrants to the United States, all offices are instructed to give close attention to investigations concerning immigrants who formerly resided in . . . Instructions concerning these investigations as set forth in Section 105 E of the Manual of Instructions should be given close adherence.

Regarding EGIS interest in visitors from the United States to East and West Germany, for some time the Bureau has had available information concerning ~~DATA IDENTIFYING TECHNIQUE DELETED~~ individuals in the United States and East and West Germany as provided by the ~~IDENTITY OF SOURCE DELETED~~

Much of the information received is of a business or personal nature and is furnished to the field office covering the individual's residence for information. In the future, offices receiving information from this source should give particular attention to indications of recent or future travel to East and West Germany. In the event of indicated travel, a discreet investigation should be conducted to obtain background data and information concerning the individual's employment and activities. The results of such inquiries should be furnished to the Bureau. If the investigation indicates the subject to be a likely prospect for EGIS recruitment, the results should be accompanied by your recommendation for or against interview of the individual subject. While interviews will not normally be considered of individuals prior to travel to East Germany, in exceptional cases where unusual informant potential might exist, these also should be submitted for consideration.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

7/25/61

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PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 61-D

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

July 24, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7

One set of AFSAM 7 key lists for months of September, October and November, 1961, being forwarded separately to all divisions except Washington Field which will receive none; three copies being furnished Bureau's Emergency Relocation Site; and three copies Seat of Government Code Room.

Acknowledge receipt of key lists promptly by routing slip, indicating serial numbers which appear thereon; return address label of individual tamperproofed envelope containing keys even though torn when package opened; and destroy, by burning, each monthly sheet thirty days after last effective date thereof, advising Bureau promptly by routing slip, attention FBI Laboratory, this has been done.

It is essential address label mentioned above be returned in order to control security of shipment.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director





PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-42

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

August 8, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) FBI SUGGESTION PROGRAM -- A decline in the number of suggestions submitted under the FBI Suggestion Program was experienced during fiscal year 1961 when 700 suggestions were submitted in comparison to 1870 during fiscal year 1960. Of the latter total 910 were submitted to the Suggestions Desk, while 960 were handled by the various employees' streamlining committees. SAC Letter 60-45 (G) dated 9/27/60 instructed that all suggestions were to be submitted directly to me without consideration or recommendation by streamlining committees. However, even limiting consideration to the 910 suggestions handled by the Suggestions Desk in fiscal year 1960, there was still a decrease of 210 suggestions in fiscal year 1961. In addition the percentage of adoptions decreased from 35.66% to 31.4% and awards and estimated savings from \$900 to \$641 and \$78,888.73 to \$22,284.67 respectively.

Following is a comparison of submissions by each field office and legal attache office for fiscal years 1960 and 1961 respectively:

<u>Office</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>Increase or Decrease</u>
Albany	12	11	- 1
Albuquerque	16	10	- 6
Anchorage	1	7	+ 6
Atlanta	11	5	- 6
Baltimore	21	1	-20
Birmingham	2	5	+ 3
Boston	9	10	+ 1
Buffalo	2	1	- 1
Butte	1	0	- 1
Charlotte	7	7	
Chicago	9	13	+ 4
Cincinnati	43	16	-27
Cleveland	2	3	+ 1
Dallas	15	3	-12
Denver	2	5	+ 3
Detroit	7	9	+ 2
El Paso	9	3	- 6
Honolulu	4	5	+ 1
Houston	0	1	+ 1
Indianapolis	7	3	- 4
Jacksonville	8	4	- 4
Kansas City	8	7	- 1
Knoxville	2	5	+ 3
Little Rock	7	11	+ 4

<u>Office</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>Increase or Decrease</u>
Los Angeles	17	13	- 4
Louisville	4	3	- 1
Memphis	3	2	- 1
Miami	5	5	
Milwaukee	3	4	+ 1
Minneapolis	3	6	+ 3
Mobile	9	9	
Newark	22	12	-10
New Haven	8	2	- 6
New Orleans	11	2	- 9
New York City	29	18	-11
Norfolk	2	2	
Oklahoma City	1	1	
Omaha	8	1	- 7
Philadelphia	11	5	- 6
Phoenix	12	8	- 4
Pittsburgh	7	9	+ 2
Portland	4	6	+ 2
Richmond	5	4	- 1
Saint Louis	3	7	+ 4
Salt Lake City	5	3	- 2
San Antonio	1	3	+ 2
San Diego	4	6	+ 2
San Francisco	17	14	- 3
San Juan	3	6	+ 3
Savannah	23	9	-14
Seattle	23	19	- 4
Springfield	12	2	-10
Tampa	0	8	+ 8
Washington Field Office	13	17	+ 4
Las Vegas		0	

<u>Legat Offices</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>Increase or Decrease</u>
Bonn	0	0	
Havana	1		- 1
London	2	1	- 1
Madrid	1	0	- 1
Mexico City	0	0	

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<u>Legat Offices</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>Increase or Decrease</u>
Ottawa	0	0	
Paris	0	1	+ 1
Rio de Janeiro	0	0	
Rome	0	0	
Tokyo	2	7	+ 5

The foregoing figures are paradoxical. The degree of participation in the Suggestion Program is a good indication of the interest of each office in the improvement of the Bureau's operations. With the expansion of our work and the new challenges we face almost daily, it is inconceivable that the tempo of suggestions should decline. The fact that thirty offices fell appreciably behind last year's figures is, in the absence of sound reasons to the contrary, an apparent indictment of the personal leadership afforded by SACs, ASACs, and supervisory personnel to this vital program.

Fresh ideas calculated to promote greater economy and efficiency in all our operations should be the concern of every member of our organization and it is the particular responsibility of those in supervisory capacities to encourage and spur the submission of worthwhile ideas. The aim and purpose of our efforts should not be to generate suggestions for the sake of numerical increase in submissions but to make certain that the Bureau receives the benefit of substantial, qualitative, constructive ideas designed to insure that our resources are used to the best possible advantage. To this end, the Bureau is at all times interested in receiving any suggestions concerning ways to stimulate the Suggestion Program.

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(B) LEGAL ATTACHE OPERATIONS - MANILA, PHILIPPINES -- Effective August 13, 1961, the Bureau is establishing a Legal Attache Office in Manila, Philippines. The areas which Legal Attache, Manila, will cover, together with areas covered by the other foreign offices, are set out alphabetically below. The Bureau desires to re-emphasize that domestic field offices should exploit our foreign offices to the fullest extent possible in connection with requested coverage by foreign offices of leads developed in the course of domestic investigation. In addition to specific leads, all field offices should remain alert for information of general interest to our foreign offices. The Legal Attaches have advised that there has been a lack of

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such information, particularly in the criminal field, and this information is of great value to the Legal Attaches as "trading material" with their sources abroad.

Countries Covered

Offices Covering

Algeria	Paris
Argentina	Rio de Janeiro
Austria	Bonn
Balearic Islands	Madrid
Belgium	Paris
Brazil	Rio de Janeiro
Canada	Ottawa, and border offices under certain circumstances
Canary Islands	Madrid
Costa Rica	Mexico City
Denmark	London
El Salvador	Mexico City
England	London
Formosa	Tokyo
France	Paris
Germany	Bonn
Gibraltar	Madrid
Greece	Rome
Guatemala	Mexico City
Honduras	Mexico City
Hong Kong	Tokyo
International Zone of Tangier	Madrid
Italy	Rome
Japan	Tokyo
Luxembourg	Paris
Mexico	Mexico City
Monaco	Paris
Morocco	Madrid
Netherlands	Bonn
Nicaragua	Mexico City
Northern Ireland	London
Norway	London
Okinawa	Tokyo
Philippines	Manila
Portugal	Madrid
Republic of Ireland	London
Scotland	London
Singapore	Manila
South Korea	Tokyo

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Spain  
Sweden  
Switzerland  
Thailand  
Turkey  
Uruguay  
Wales

Madrid  
London  
Paris  
Manila  
Rome  
Rio de Janeiro  
London

For further information on the functions and responsibilities of the Legal Attaches and the proper manner of setting forth leads to be covered by Legal Attache Offices, you should refer to Section 102, E, of the Manual of Instructions.

(Security Letter on attached page)

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(C) TRAVEL CONTROLS - CUBA -- Section 87D, page 33, Manual of Instructions, details the procedure to be followed concerning foreign travel by subjects of current or past security investigations and certain other individuals with subversive backgrounds. A volume of data concerning travel to Cuba by U. S. citizens and resident aliens of the United States not previously of security interest to us is being received at the Bureau. Current regulations, in effect since January 19, 1961, require that U. S. citizens possess valid passports specifically endorsed to authorize travel to Cuba before departing for that country. Resident aliens must have authorization from Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) before performing such travel. Section 1185, Title 8, U. S. Code, and Part 53, Title 22, Code of Federal Regulations, are applicable and Section 1185 provides penalties of not more than \$5,000 fine or more than five years' imprisonment, or both, when illegal travel is performed by U. S. citizens. INS has authority to deny re-entry to resident aliens who did not have specific authority to leave the United States for Cuba.

Existing instructions in Section 87D, Manual of Instructions, still apply in cases where travelers to Cuba fall within the specified categories. In cases not covered by provisions therein the field should, upon receipt of information indicating unauthorized travel to Cuba has occurred, conduct sufficient investigation to positively identify the individual involved, review indices, attempt to determine reason for travel through available sources, and furnish Bureau memoranda suitable for dissemination under individual captions containing the results thereof. Copies of the memoranda should be furnished INS locally in cases involving resident aliens and naturalized citizens. All offices should remain alert for information concerning violations but no investigation in addition to that outlined above is desired without specific Bureau instructions.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover

Director

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-42

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-47  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

September 5, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY APPLICANTS - PUBLICITY -- In connection with appointments of local police officers to the FBI National Academy, it is customary for me to address a letter to the head of the police agency of each applicant who is to be invited. At the same time, you are authorized to release pertinent facts concerning such appointments to the press. In order to obtain wider press coverage of such appointments, you should consider the advisability of personally congratulating officers invited to the FBI National Academy and arranging for the taking of appropriate photographs. It would then be possible for these photographs and pertinent data concerning the applicant and the FBI National Academy to be released to interested news outlets in your area. This procedure can best be followed when the invited officers are from areas close to your headquarters city. In those cases where the officers reside in outlying areas, the suggested procedure would be inadvisable.

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(B) AUTOMOBILES - 1960-1961 PLYMOUTH CARS-PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE -- The contract garage in one of the Bureau offices recommends repacking the rear wheel bearings in Chrysler-product cars at 10,000 mile intervals, although the Plymouth Service Manual reflects this is not necessary. This service was performed on two Bureau vehicles as a preventive-maintenance measure. Subsequent contact with the Chrysler Motor Company reflects their engineers do not feel this service necessary or warranted and they do not recommend. Under no circumstances should the rear wheels be repacked as a maintenance procedure without prior Bureau approval.

(C) FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY - SIXTY-NINTH SESSION -- The 69th Session of the FBI National Academy will begin on Monday, March 19, 1962, and will graduate on Wednesday, June 6, 1962. It is desired that you submit to the Bureau by October 13, 1961, the names of the candidates from your territory whom you desire to recommend to attend that session. Your attention is called to instructions previously given as to the procedures to be followed in nominating candidates to attend the Academy, and it is desired that you strictly comply with existing instructions.

All candidates recommended for attendance at the Academy must be personally known to the SAC. The SAC must have conducted a formal interview with each candidate being recommended unless such

candidate has been previously interviewed and favorably recommended by the former SAC within the preceding six months. It will not be necessary, however, for the present SAC to reinterview any candidates he, himself, interviewed even though more than six months have elapsed since the time of the first interview.

You may designate more than one candidate for the 69th Session since there is a possibility that your first candidate may not be accepted or that two or more representatives will be accepted from your office. In your letter listing your candidates, you must specifically set forth the results of the reviews of your field office indices concerning the applicants and their law enforcement agencies.

I want to emphasize the fact that the Bureau is desirous of accepting at the National Academy only those candidates who are outstanding both as to personal appearance and ability. The weight standards for National Academy applicants are the same as for our own personnel. Applicants must be within the desirable weight limits as set forth on form FD-300.

You are again reminded that the fingerprints of National Academy applicants are to be submitted at the time the results of the formal interview are forwarded to the Bureau. You should make a notation on the fingerprint card that the fingerprints are those of a National Academy applicant. The card should be forwarded to the Bureau, Attention: Training and Inspection Division.

I shall expect each SAC to give very close personal attention to the selection of candidates for attendance at the National Academy.

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(D) PERSONNEL - REFRESHMENTS DURING PERIODS OF OFFICIAL DUTY -- SAC Letter 58-55 (B) dated September 18, 1958, sets forth instructions concerning the use of refreshments during periods of official duty. The spirit and letter of the regulations as dictated by good judgment prohibit employees from partaking of refreshments, including such items as food, coffee, soft drinks, milk, orange juice or the like at any time they are signed in on the register as being on regular official duty. This applies to Agent and clerical personnel.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-47

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I find it necessary at this time to reiterate that food and drinks are to be partaken of only during official rest periods, lunch periods and at Bureau-authorized parties occasioned by the anniversary or retirement of a Bureau employee. Anniversary parties are not to include birthday parties or gatherings incidental to transfers, and parties marking anniversaries in the Bureau should include those on the occasion of which a Service Award Key is presented, such as the twentieth, twenty-fifth, thirtieth, and thirty-fifth. Such parties are to be held only during the last hour of the working day.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-47

(E) ERROR IN CALENDAR - THANKSGIVING -- The General Services Administration calendars issued to Bureau personnel show Thanksgiving as being November 30, 1961. This is erroneous, Thanksgiving being November 23, 1961. Employees should be appropriately notified.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-47

(F) LEAVE - COMPENSATORY - RECORDING AND CHARGING -- Effective with the pay period commencing September 17, 1961, compensatory leave earned in lieu of payment for authorized overtime must be recorded and charged in multiples of 15 minutes. No compensatory leave is to be recorded before regular working hours unless at least 15 minutes is worked; the same rule will apply to time worked after regular working hours. If work of 15 minutes or more is performed both before and after regular working hours, it may be combined. However, the total claimed must be in multiples of 15 minutes.

This does not change present regulations that compensatory leave cannot be earned by Wage Board employees or Agents receiving Fringe Benefit payments. No compensatory leave may be claimed by any employee for voluntary overtime, travel overtime or in lieu of holiday pay.

(Security Letters on attached pages)

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-47

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(G) CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTIES - SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION CHARACTERIZATION -- The following subversive organization characterization should be utilized effective immediately in characterizing the Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties. The sources utilized in the characterization are all described as having furnished reliable information in the past and the New York Office has advised that careful consideration was given to each source concealed.

CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTIES

A source advised on June 11, 1961, that a meeting of the National Executive Committee (NEC), Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), was held on June 10, 1961, at Communist Party headquarters, 23 West 26th Street, New York, New York. According to the source, the main topic of discussion at this meeting was the Communist Party's plans in regard to combating the June 5, 1961, decision of the United States Supreme Court, requiring the Communist Party to register with the Attorney General of the United States as a communist-action organization pursuant to the provisions of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, and the Court's decision of the same date upholding the April 21, 1955, conviction of Junius Scales under the Smith Act provision covering membership in the Communist Party. This source further advised that during this discussion a special Communist Party defense committee was formed and it was decided that this committee would have an office, which would be managed by Miriam Friedlander who according to the source is a member of the CPUSA National Committee.

Another source advised on June 14, 1961, that at a meeting of the CPUSA National Board and invited guests held on that date at Communist Party headquarters, New York City, it was announced that the Communist Party defense committee would have an office at 22 East 17th Street, New York, New York, under the name of the Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties (CCFCL).

A third source advised on July 20, 1961, that at a meeting of the Communist Party defense committee held on that date at Communist Party headquarters, New York City, the purpose and scope of the CCFCL was discussed. It was stated that this committee has been set up to serve as a national coordinator and service center for every effort being made by whatever source to repeal the McCarran and Smith Acts. In addition it has been set up to reverse the Supreme Court's decision of June 5, 1961, or secure an indefinite stay of any enforcement of the law by the Department of Justice.

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It is to engage in generating a popular defense movement to mobilize legal assistance of any organization or individual whose "democratic rights are infringed upon by these laws." This committee wants to encourage the creation of local organizations or groups to work in support of any one of the above-stated objectives. The committee will also serve as an exchange center of material and provide speakers for any local organization.

Sources: DELETED  
DELETED  
DELETED

9/5/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-47

(H) CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES -- The Manual of Instructions, Section 105 E, sets forth current Bureau instructions regarding investigations of Chinese entering U. S. as citizens or permanent resident aliens who were 17 years of age or older at the time they departed Communist China.

Arrangements are now in effect whereby we can cover a third group, namely, those who enter the U. S. on student visas. The control file for this program is "Chinese Who Have Formerly Resided in Communist China Entering U. S. on Student Visas, IS - CH," Bureau file

### THIRD AGENCY CONSIDERATION

Legal Attache furnishes this information to the Bureau and the visa recipient's name is checked through Bureau indices and results furnished to appropriate Bureau field division covering visa recipient's destination, together with two copies of Legal Attache, Tokyo, letter which includes appropriate instructions regarding investigation.

It is important to keep in mind the objectives of Bureau programs regarding individuals who have formerly resided in Communist China. Purposes of our investigations are to identify Chinese Communist Intelligence agents, obtain intelligence information of interest to Bureau and other Government agencies, develop informants and double agents, and acquaint reputable Chinese with Bureau's responsibilities and jurisdiction with regard to the internal security of the United States, thus effecting a broad over-all coverage

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-47

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consisting of individuals ready and willing to assist the Bureau in matters pertaining to Chinese Communist regime.

Recently, information was received from a confidential source abroad of a new Chinese Communist method to surreptitiously infiltrate target areas. This operation is called "Detouring Tactics" and consists of sending espionage agents by indirect routes to their ultimate destinations. Such agents reportedly leave Communist China at Hong Kong, British Crown Colony, and proceed to transit areas such as Singapore, Malaya, Burma and Indonesia. The intelligence agents are under instructions to find employment in Hong Kong as teachers in order to establish a reputation for respectability prior to continuing to various transit areas en route to their ultimate destination.

It is incumbent upon all personnel engaged in security investigations to be fully aware of the grave responsibility of the Bureau in the area of Chinese security matters. SAC Letters 58-72 (L) and 58-81 (J) advised the Chinese Communists had approved a decision to expand intelligence operations particularly in the U. S. Although we have received no indication to date of any organized Chinese Communist Intelligence activity in the U. S., we must assume that Chinese Communists are actively pursuing their intention of eventually carrying out organized intelligence activities in this country. The importance of developing sufficient informant and source coverage in order that such activity will be promptly brought to our attention is obvious.

In all probability, the greatest handicap to Chinese Communist Intelligence activities in the U. S. is the absence of a legal establishment in U. S. or adjacent areas. We must assume that the Chinese Communists recognize this handicap and are endeavoring to overcome the inherent difficulties resulting from this situation. Obviously, if the Chinese Communists can establish a diplomatic post in the U. S. such as a delegation to the UN, they will then be in a position to initiate intelligence operations. However, we must not overlook possibility that Chinese Communists, failing to establish diplomatic establishment in the U. S., may work through establishments set up in the future in Latin America or possibly even Canada. It is, therefore, vitally important that the investigations we are currently conducting in the Chinese security field be pursued with enthusiasm, imagination and a determination to accomplish Bureau objectives.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-47

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

September 26, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) REDESIGNATION OF NAMES OF U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE UNITS -- Pursuant to orders issued by the Department of the Army, effective July 25, 1961, all U. S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps Groups and Counter Intelligence Corps Detachments were designated respectively as Intelligence Corps Groups and Intelligence Corps Detachments. Also, those Army intelligence units previously known as Military Intelligence Groups are now to be known as Intelligence Corps Groups. Pursuant to these orders, the designation Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) will no longer be used by the Army.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-55

(B) REPORT WRITING - FD-302 DUPLICATING MASTERS -- It has been suggested that, in those instances in which the Form FD-302 is prepared on a duplicating master with report page numbers thereon, the stenographer place two asterisks at the top of the master (not to appear in the body of the finished product) as an indication to the clerk who runs off the copies to prepare one copy without the report page numbers thereon. This would apply to the FD-302 form itself and any subsequent pages of each FD-302. It is suggested that this procedure be applied by those field offices which find this to be a problem, since it involves little time or effort on the part of the stenographer or clerk.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-55

(C) PERSONNEL MATTERS - FIELD ELIGIBILITY LIST -- Effective immediately, the current employment of those applicants being considered for a field office eligibility list should not be verified during the initial investigation. It is realized that quite frequently such applicants are amenable to verification of their employment, knowing there are no existing vacancies in that office at the time they apply. Nevertheless, to insure that dismissal action will not be taken by the present employer as a result of an inquiry by the Bureau, the foregoing instructions must be rigidly adhered to. Upon Bureau approval to fill a clerical need in your office, this phase of the investigation should be done in connection with the applicant whom you choose from your eligibility list. The contents of this SAC Letter should be immediately brought to the attention of all personnel engaged in the handling of applicant matters. Appropriate manual changes will be furnished subsequently.

(D) CONFIDENTIAL FUND - IMPREST FUND -- During the course of a recent inspection of a Bureau field division, it was noted that an Agent had received funds from the Confidential Fund of the office to be used in paying for confidential services rendered to the Bureau; however, contact with the payee was not made promptly and the Agent did not return the funds to the office account for a period in excess of 45 days. During the audit of the Imprest Fund, it was noted that an Agent had received funds from the Imprest Fund cashier for miscellaneous office purchases and that after five and one-half months had elapsed, no receipts reflecting purchases had been furnished by the Agent. These two incidents indicate poor judgment on the part of the Agent in not promptly handling these transactions.

Undue delays in handling matters involving the Confidential Fund and Imprest Fund will not be tolerated. It is the responsibility of every Bureau employee to carry out his assignments with promptness and in accordance with existing regulations and it is your responsibility to see that all employees comply with these instructions.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-55

(E) TRAINING - LAW ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCES - DEMONSTRATIONS OF POLYGRAPH AND COMPOSITE PICTURE IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS -- It was recently brought to the attention of the Bureau that an SAC intended to present demonstrations on a Composite Picture Identification System and on the Polygraph by non-Bureau personnel at a scheduled FBI Law Enforcement Conference on Bank Robbery and Incidental Crimes. The Bureau has carefully evaluated Composite Picture Identification Systems and has neither endorsed nor adopted any such system for identification purposes in unknown subject cases. A demonstration of such a Composite Picture Identification System at a Bureau-sponsored conference might serve as a tacit endorsement and is therefore undesirable. By SAC Letters 60-43 (E) dated 9/13/60 and 61-39 (B) dated 7/25/61, you were advised of the services of the Exhibits Section at the Seat of Government. It was clearly set forth that you should utilize artists' conceptions which could be prepared by the Exhibits Section. You were also advised that there were illustrated brochures describing the services of this section available for distribution to United States Attorneys and police officials. You should be completely familiar with these SAC letters and fully utilize these facilities.

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By Bureau letter to all offices captioned POLYGRAPH RESEARCH dated 12/9/60, the field was fully apprised of instructions concerning the use of the Polygraph. To reiterate previously furnished instructions, in no instance does the Bureau desire to have a demonstration of the Polygraph and Polygraph Techniques before any FBI-sponsored conference or training school attended by persons other than Agent personnel of the FBI. These instructions apply regardless of whether the demonstration is to be given by Bureau personnel or an employee of a local law enforcement agency.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-55

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(F) DISSEMINATION OF CRIMINAL MATTERS TO THE U. S. ARMY --  
Effective immediately information concerning criminal matters  
of interest to the Army is to be disseminated to the  
appropriate Provost Marshal rather than G-2. This does not  
affect the dissemination of information concerning espionage,  
sabotage, subversive and related matters to the appropriate  
G-2. There is attached a listing of major command Provost  
Marshals and the territory covered by their respective offices  
which you are to utilize in dissemination of pertinent infor-  
mation to the Provost Marshal.

(Security Letter on attached page)

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-55

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(G) RESERVE INDEX - FORM FD-154 -- When annually verifying information on individuals included on Section A of the Reserve Index, Form FD-154 (Verification of Information on Security Index Card) may be used. The form is readily adapted by the simple expedient of striking through the words "Security Index" in the title and paragraph one of the form and inserting the words "Reserve Index" in their place. The letter "a" should be added to the words FD-122 to denote the proper form to be submitted to the Bureau in these cases.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosure for (F)

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-55

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MAJOR COMMAND PROVOST MARSHALS  
AND  
THEIR AREAS OF JURISDICTION

Territorial Jurisdiction:

MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON:

Office of the Provost Marshal  
Military District of Washington  
United States Army  
Washington 25, D. C.

District of Columbia, the  
counties of Arlington, Fairfax,  
King George, Prince William,  
Stafford, Westmoreland, and  
the city of Alexandria in the  
State of Virginia; and the  
counties of Calvert, Charles,  
Montgomery, Prince Georges,  
and Saint Marys in the  
State of Maryland.

FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY:

Office of the Provost Marshal  
First United States Army  
Governors Island  
New York 4, New York

Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts,  
New Hampshire, New Jersey,  
New York, Rhode Island, and  
Vermont.

SECOND UNITED STATES ARMY:

Office of the Provost Marshal  
Second United States Army  
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland

Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland,  
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia,  
and West Virginia (less  
territory listed under Military  
District of Washington, and  
Fort Campbell, Kentucky).

THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY:

Office of the Provost Marshal  
Third United States Army  
Fort McPherson, Georgia

Alabama, Florida, Georgia,  
Mississippi, North Carolina,  
South Carolina, and Tennessee  
(plus Fort Campbell, Kentucky).

FOURTH UNITED STATES ARMY:

Office of the Provost Marshal  
Fourth United States Army  
Fort Sam Houston, Texas

Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico,  
Oklahoma, and Texas.

Territorial Jurisdiction:

FIFTH UNITED STATES ARMY:

Office of the Provost Marshal  
Fifth United States Army  
1660 East Hyde Park Boulevard  
Chicago 15, Illinois

Colorado, Indiana, Illinois,  
Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota,  
Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota,  
South Dakota, Wisconsin, and  
Wyoming.

SIXTH UNITED STATES ARMY:

Office of the Provost Marshal  
Sixth United States Army  
Presidio of San Francisco,  
California

Arizona, California, Idaho,  
Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah,  
and Washington.

UNITED STATES ARMY, ALASKA:

Office of the Provost Marshal  
United States Army, Alaska  
APO 949, Seattle, Washington  
(Fort Richardson, Alaska)

State of Alaska.

UNITED STATES ARMY, HAWAII:


Office of the Provost Marshal  
United States Army, Hawaii  
APO 957, San Francisco,  
California  
(Schofield Barracks, Hawaii)

State of Hawaii.

UNITED STATES ARMY, CARIBBEAN:

Office of the Provost Marshal  
United States Army, Caribbean  
Fort Amador, Canal Zone

Canal Zone and Puerto Rico.



PERSONAL ATTENTION

SAC LETTER NO. 61-56

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

October 3, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION - WORK-RELATED INJURIES (FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1961) -- Attached is a tabulation concerning work-related injuries caused by accidents which occurred during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1961. Insure that every possible step is taken to prevent accidents from occurring. Try to improve your safety record. Where you observe a preponderance of accidents occurring in any particular category, concentrate your efforts on such category and adopt safety measures to insure these accidents will be reduced in the future. You will be furnished with similar statistics at the end of this current fiscal year so you can measure your progress. Bear in mind that every work-related injury which results in medical or other expense must be absorbed from the Bureau's appropriated funds.

10/3/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-56

(B) BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA - COOPERATION WITH -- The Boy Scouts, under its Explorer Scouts program, has started a nationwide plan to provide specific training for various Scout groups interested in particular professions or industries. Various industries and professional organizations are being called on to sponsor Scout groups, and in one instance, a Field Office has been requested to serve as a sponsor of a group interested in law enforcement work.

While the Bureau is in accord with the aims of this program, it is felt it would be improper and unwise for the FBI to officially sponsor any Boy Scout group. Should you be approached regarding this program, you may offer full cooperation in the nature of providing lectures, showing movies or slides, and conducting the group on a tour of your office. Should an employee of your office be requested to serve as a counselor of such a group, he may do so; however, such activities must be confined to nonworking hours.

(C) CRIMINAL INFORMANT PROGRAM -- I have noted during the last six months that the number of potential criminal informants (PCIs) has decreased approximately eight per cent over the preceding six-month period. I have also noted that during this same period the number of Agent days being used in the development of informants has decreased over five per cent. These are unhealthy conditions. Rise in crime, new legislation, and added emphasis on organized crime make it necessary that our criminal informant coverage be increased proportionally. An insufficient number of individuals under development as potential criminal informants can only result in the future deterioration of our criminal informant coverage.

It is incumbent on every Agent engaged in criminal investigations to actively participate in this program. Individuals should be selected for development who have the potential as quality informants. Every consideration should be given to the development of gamblers, bookmakers, and individuals who have definite ties with the criminal underworld. While these individuals are more difficult to cultivate as informants, the results in the long run will be much greater. Individuals under development should be contacted frequently and when they agree to cooperate should be given definite assignments.

You should advise the Bureau within 10 days of the receipt of this letter what action you are taking to improve the criminal informant program in your office.

(Security Letter on attached page)

10/3/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-56

- 2 -

(D) SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION CHARACTERIZATION - "THE WORKER" --  
Re SAC Letter 58-5 (I), January 28, 1958, which instructed that  
"The Worker" was to be characterized as an east coast communist  
weekly newspaper.

Inasmuch as "The Worker," commencing with its midweek  
edition of September 26, 1961, is now being issued twice weekly,  
the following is being adopted as the thumbnail sketch for  
this publication.

"'The Worker' is an east coast communist newspaper."

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosure for (A)

10/3/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-56

- 3 -



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-62

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

October 24, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) OVERTIME -- I have noted with concern the increased amount of overtime being performed by some field investigative personnel and I firmly believe the overtime could be materially reduced if field supervisory personnel would see to it that such overtime as is necessary in the type of work handled by the Bureau is equitably shared by all agents.

It has been noted that in some offices the daily overtime of some agents exceeds three hours per day, whereas other agents in the same offices render a much less average overtime. If all agents were required to share the work load, the average would drop accordingly.

I want all overtime reduced to an absolute minimum, consistent with our responsibilities. At the same time, I feel very strongly that such overtime as is necessary should be shared equitably by all investigative personnel.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 61-E

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

October 26, 1961 WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7

One set of AFSAM 7 key lists for months of December, 1961, January and February, 1962, being forwarded separately to all divisions except Washington Field which will receive none; three copies being furnished Bureau's Emergency Relocation Site; and three copies Seat of Government Code Room.

Acknowledge receipt of key lists promptly by routing slip, indicating serial numbers which appear thereon; return address label of individual tamperproofed envelope containing keys even though torn when package opened; and destroy, by burning, each monthly sheet thirty days after last effective date thereof, advising Bureau promptly by routing slip, attention FBI Laboratory, this has been done.

It is essential address label mentioned above be returned in order to control security of shipment.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director





JUNE  
PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 61-F  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

November 7, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RE: RADIO FREQUENCY MICROPHONE-  
TELEPHONE DEVICE (RFMT)

No Number SAC Letter V, Series 1952, dated July 14, 1952, advised that the FBI Laboratory developed an instrument which imposes a radio frequency on a telephone line and converts the telephone instrument into a microphone without entering the premises where the telephone is located. You were instructed to admonish your Security Supervisors and Sound-Trained Agents that this technique has been classified "Top Secret" and that it should not be discussed with other than Agent personnel in these two categories.

The device has recently been reclassified as "Secret." It will, therefore, not be necessary to continue the former practice of keeping this device in the personal custody of an Agent at all times when it is not stored in an approved field office space. Henceforth, when the device is not operated under the personal custody or supervision of an Agent, it may be placed in a steel cabinet which cabinet is equipped with a steel lockbar and a changeable three-number, manipulation-proof, combination dial-type padlock. The cabinet must be bolted or otherwise securely affixed to the floor of a closet or equally secluded space. The closet or secluded space must not have a window or other similar opening and must be equipped with a door that can be securely locked with a cylinder-type lock having no less than five pins with all the keys to the lock being under the exclusive control of Bureau personnel. The closet or secluded space must be in an apartment or area under the exclusive control of the Bureau and arranged so that equipment servicing can be performed at any time during the day or night without jeopardizing the security of the installation. The doors to the closet and all doors and windows in the controlled space must be equipped with a fail-safe type alarm device that will alert monitoring personnel to unauthorized entry.

This technique will operate successfully only under certain conditions. It will be necessary that a detailed survey of the telephone company subscriber equipment and telephone cable facilities serving the subscriber be made in each instance prior to installation of the equipment. This survey should be forwarded to the Bureau, attention FBI Laboratory, for review. If an installation appears feasible, a specially trained technician from the Laboratory or from key points in the field will be sent to make the installation.

Use of this equipment will be approved only on a most selective basis. It will be necessary, therefore, for all requests to use the device to be supported by adequate information reflecting the essential need to obtain this coverage and the reasons why such coverage is not feasible by other means. All communications concerning this equipment should be captioned "RFMT" and transmitted as "JUNE" material.

The use of RFMT in the unattended manner described above will permit running it into a central plant for monitoring. It is recognized that the monitoring of this and other types of microphone surveillances at a central point will result in a saving of man power to the extent that it will release any men who are otherwise on equipment guard duty when the subject is inactive. However, in general, this saving will be at the cost of some loss of intelligence because of the loss of intelligibility inherent in running the wires over a longer distance. There is, of course, no saving in man power during periods when the subject is active as there is no method which will reliably signal the presence of a conversation in the microphone target area and it is, therefore, imperative that the individual microphone surveillances be separately manned during the periods when the subjects are active. This is in contrast with the case of telephone surveillances where there are technical differences which permit us to have a signalling device to reliably indicate the presence of conversations so that monitoring personnel can restrict their attention to those lines which are active and thus can be reduced to a minimum consistent with the volume of traffic.

I will hold each SAC personally responsible for the security of RFMT equipment assigned his office and for adequately covering each microphone and telephone surveillance operating within the field office territory.


Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 61-F  
11/7/61

- 2 -



JUNE  
PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 61-G  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

November 29, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.


RE: TECHNICAL AND MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCES -  
CHANNELIZING MEMORANDA

No Number SAC Letter dated December 22, 1949, established the "June" procedure for handling information obtained through these techniques. The Special Agent to whom the case is assigned, after reviewing the log, dictates necessary excerpts from the log in paraphrased form for inclusion in future reports. For purposes of uniformity, this dictation should take the form of channelizing memoranda which should be disseminated to the appropriate files. In accordance with SAC Letter No. 61-8 dated February 21, 1961, these memoranda may be destroyed following submission of reports containing the information in both individual and organizational security cases.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

December 19, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE COURT JUDGES -- The Committee on Law Enforcement for The National Council of Juvenile Court Judges currently is communicating with law enforcement officials throughout the country seeking their views on the juvenile problem. One SAC already has received an inquiry from a member of the Committee in his territory and it may be assumed that similar inquiries will be made of other SAC's. Liaison has been established with The National Council of Juvenile Court Judges, and there has been frequent contact with Judge James P. Gossett of Gooding, Idaho, Chairman of the Committee on Law Enforcement, regarding the work of this Committee. Should you receive any inquiry from a member of this Committee, you should advise the individual that our views already have been furnished to the Committee Chairman. Copies of any communications you receive relating to this matter should be sent to the Bureau, Attention: Crime Records under the caption "The National Council of Juvenile Court Judges."

12/19/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-71

(B) TELECOMMUNICATIONS SURVEY BY GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION (GSA) - TELEPHONES AND TELETYPES -- The Bureau does not intend to utilize local GSA communications facilities and will not give further consideration to the Bureau's possible participation in the Federal Telecommunications System until such time as that system has been completely implemented and definite information can be obtained regarding the type of service and priorities which are actually available at that time and specific cost data can be furnished to the Bureau to permit a determination as to whether economies can be effected. In view of this, the Bureau does not desire to participate in the local surveys being conducted by GSA at present since such surveys require considerable employee time on the part of our telephone operators and have a tendency to interfere with day-to-day operations.

If any requests are received from GSA or local telephone companies for permission to conduct such surveys or to furnish any other information concerning our communications system, you should tactfully advise them the Bureau does not wish to participate in the surveys and decline to furnish the information.

The Bureau's position has been cleared with GSA authorities in Washington, who have advised that their field installations will be instructed by them not to request the FBI to participate. If you receive any additional requests for information in connection with this program, you should immediately advise the Bureau. You should not discuss with other agencies the fact that the FBI is not participating in these surveys.

12/19/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-71

(C) FIREARMS - CARRIED ABOARD AIRCRAFT -- As an answer to the recent hijackings of aircraft by the use of firearms carried on board those aircraft by passengers, Congress passed Public Law 87-197 which prohibits unauthorized persons from carrying weapons aboard aircraft.

Advice has been received from the Department that this statute does not apply to Department of Justice personnel authorized to carry weapons. In this connection, the Attorney General has issued the following instructions:

"1) All Department of Justice personnel who are authorized to carry arms and who have them on their person while travelling by air should present proper credentials to the ticket agent or flight attendant when boarding the aircraft, unless to identify themselves would, in their judgment, compromise the success of their mission.

"2) When it is not feasible to inform the carrier that they are carrying weapons, Department of Justice personnel must act with the utmost discretion to avoid giving cause for alarm to air carrier personnel or their fellow passengers."

Each SAC will be held personally responsible for insuring that these instructions of the Attorney General are immediately brought to the personal attention of all Special Agents and insuring complete understanding of these instructions and full compliance with them.

12/19/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-71

(D) SOUTHERN ASSOCIATION OF INVESTIGATIVE AGENTS -- By SAC Letter 61-68(C) you were advised of the formation of the Southern Association of Intelligence Agents. The name has since been changed to the Southern Association of Investigative Agents.

12/19/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-71

(E) PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM ON STRENGTHENING OF COORDINATION OF GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE WASHINGTON -- In a memorandum for heads of departments and agencies dated November 10, 1961, the President stated that as an integral part of present steps to increase the effectiveness and economy of Federal agencies he wants coordination of Government activities outside Washington, D. C., significantly strengthened. As a first step in bringing Federal officials outside Washington closer together the President has directed the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission to arrange for establishment of a Board of Federal Executives in each of the Commission's ten administrative regions, the headquarters cities of such being Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Chicago, St. Louis, Dallas, Denver, San Francisco, and Seattle.

The purpose of the Boards will be to make possible closer and stronger coordination of activities across departmental and agency lines and to implement opportunities to pool experience and resources and to accomplish savings. The areas of interest involved are management and budgetary procedures, personnel policies, recruitment, office space use, procurement activities, public information duties, natural resources development, protection of equal rights, urban development activities, manpower utilization, etc. Each Board will establish liaison with State and local Government officials in its region.

You may be invited to attend conferences by the Board in your region and if so, it will be satisfactory for you to attend but only as an observer, advising the Bureau thereafter as to what transpired. Should you receive any request to actively participate in this program or for anything that would commit the Bureau to a course of action, such should be promptly brought to the attention of the Bureau for consideration.

12/19/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-71

- 3 -

(F) CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM - DISSEMINATION OF REPORTS TO UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS -- Effective immediately copies of all reports in Interstate Transmission of Wagering Information, Interstate Transportation of Wagering Paraphernalia and Interstate Transportation in Aid of Racketeering investigations and related investigations under the Criminal Intelligence Program (Anti-Racketeering and Interstate Gambling Activities) will be furnished to the appropriate United States Attorney.

All pending cases in these categories will be immediately reviewed and copies of all reports prepared to date will be submitted to the appropriate United States Attorney. No reports submitted prior to September, 1960, are to be disseminated since these were not prepared in form suitable for dissemination.

In view of the wider dissemination of these reports, it is essential that meticulous care be afforded to their preparation in order to afford informants and highly confidential sources maximum protection and to prevent the possibility of exposure.

In Interstate Transmission of Wagering Information, Interstate Transportation of Wagering Paraphernalia and Interstate Transportation in Aid of Racketeering matters, the Criminal Division of the Department will retain authority to authorize prosecution, in accordance with existing policies.

You should insure that instructions set forth herein are given close personal attention and the requirements complied with as expeditiously as possible.

12/19/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-71

(G) CRIME ABOARD AIRCRAFT - SPECIAL CIVIL AIR REGULATION NO. SR-448A -- Attention is directed to Subsection (1) of Section 1472, Title 49, (Federal Aviation Act of 1958 as amended) which deals with carrying weapons aboard aircraft and specifically prohibits carrying a concealed, deadly or dangerous weapon on or about the person aboard an aircraft being operated by an air carrier. This Section further prohibits an attempt to commit such an act. The Statute excepts from this prohibition "law enforcement officials of any municipal or state government, or the Federal Government, who are authorized or required to carry arms, and...such other persons as may be so authorized under regulations issued by the (Federal Aviation Agency) Administrator."

12/19/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-71

- 4 -

In accordance with the authority granted by the Statute, the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) has issued Special Civil Air Regulation No. SR-448A, which in part states as follows:

"Except for employees or officials of municipal, State, or Federal Governments who are authorized or required to carry arms, and except for those crewmembers and such other persons as may be authorized by an air carrier, no person, while aboard an aircraft being operated by an air carrier in air transportation, shall carry on or about his person a deadly or dangerous weapon, either concealed or unconcealed."

In effect, the FAA has granted the air carrier the right to determine who shall be permitted to carry concealed weapons aboard aircraft. Whereas SR-448A is considerably broader than Subsection (1), Section 1472, Title 49, since it covers unconcealed weapons, the Statute limits violations within FBI jurisdiction to concealed, deadly or dangerous weapons.

In view of the provisions of Special Civil Air Regulation No. SR-448A, you should insure in conducting investigations under this Statute that the air carrier has not granted authority for the individual in question to carry weapons aboard aircraft.

12/19/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-71

(H) "TROPIC OF CANCER" - INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF OBSCENE MATTER -- For your information, law enforcement agencies in many parts of the country have initiated steps to remove from circulation in their respective jurisdictions the book "Tropic of Cancer" by Henry Miller. Several field offices have inquired of the Bureau as to this book being a suitable vehicle for prosecution under the Interstate Transportation of Obscene Matter Statute.

This is to advise that after having carefully reviewed this book the Department has concluded that Federal prosecution would not be warranted. You should be guided accordingly.

(Security Letter on attached page)

12/19/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-71

- 5 -



(I) FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE -- Richard Gibson, national leader of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC), pro-Castro group with headquarters at New York City and with chapters in approximately 20 cities throughout the United States, recently advised a New York source that the FPCC leadership was concerned about FBI interviews of its members. Gibson further commented that the FPCC plans to make a legal issue on the next occasion when an FPCC member is contacted at his place of employment by the FBI. In view of the foregoing, specific Bureau authority should be secured prior to interviews of FPCC members at their places of employment. These instructions, however, are in no way intended to discourage field from recommending interviews of FPCC members, where warranted. In the event it is not feasible to conduct such interviews away from the individual's place of employment, the Bureau should be furnished full details in this regard when submitting recommendations for interview.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

12/19/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-71

- 6 -



PERSONAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 64-G

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

November 25, 1964

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

RE: SECURITY INFORMANTS AND SOURCES -  
INCOME TAXES

No Number SAC Letter 64-E dated July 6, 1964, advised that effective January 1, 1965, all field divisions must utilize the Bureau Federal income tax withholding plan for payments to security informants and sources. In order to place the plan in effect, you were to discuss the matter with each informant and source where circumstances warranted using the procedure and advise the Bureau by November 1, 1964, of the identity of each exempted informant and the method used by each such individual in reporting his Bureau income.

Communications being received from the field indicate that the plan is being utilized for many informants but, at the same time, there are a great many instances where the informant has not had any difficulty in reporting his Bureau income in the past and, therefore, these informants are being exempted by the field from the withholding plan. The procedure was devised by the Bureau to afford informants a method of reporting Bureau income in a secure manner and should be utilized wherever necessary to prevent any embarrassing situations in the future such as those which occur when an informant finds it necessary to disclose his receipt of income from the FBI in response to inquiries from Internal Revenue Service or it is later found that taxes have not been paid on Bureau income. There should be no further instances of this type and you are reminded that if situations do arise in the future where it is learned informants are not reporting Bureau income and they have not used the withholding procedure, administrative action will be considered by the Bureau in each such case.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

66-39 not requested  
by number however  
66-30 requested  
with 6/21 date  
which is date  
of 66-39

Hold for any  
clarification

N. B.

59-74 Not requested  
by number however

55-74 requested  
with 12/10/74  
date; which is  
date of 59-74

Hold for any clarification



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
MEMORANDUM 59-74

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

December 10, 1974

## MEMORANDUM TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE:

(A) **INFORMANT MATTERS** -- As you are aware, the handling and developing of informants is one of the most vital phases of the Bureau's work. The need for quality of informants cannot be overstressed. Many of our informants are paid for their services, which involves considerable sums of monies. These factors alone demand close supervision in order to fulfill our responsibilities, particularly to insure that all informants receiving compensation are paid on the basis of the value of information furnished, services rendered, and expenses incurred in connection with obtaining information for the Bureau.

Accordingly, each Special Agent in Charge is to insure that all pending informant files are to be reviewed personally by appropriate supervisory personnel on a regular periodic basis not to exceed a period of 60 days. This review must include the informant's file and its subfiles. During this review care must be exercised to ascertain that the information furnished from informants has been recorded, indexed, evaluated, channeled, that full value has been received, and all necessary action has been taken. These instructions should be called to the attention of all Special Agents in your office handling informants and sources.

Manual changes to follow.

12-10-74

MEMORANDUM 59-74

(B) **INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF AUTO THEFT INVESTIGATORS (IAATI)** -- Recently a communication was received from captioned organization indicating the IAATI had sent a communication to all of our field offices soliciting membership in that group. I was requested by the group to approve membership in the association and communicate my approval to all SACs. I have advised the IAATI that it is not within the purview of my official duties to endorse, recommend, or approve membership therein by FBI Special Agents. There is no prohibition against an Agent's joining this group but any decision regarding membership must be made solely by the Agent on an individual basis.

Clarence M. Kelley  
Director

12-10-74

MEMORANDUM 59-74



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER 66-39  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

June 21, 1966

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) INTERVIEWS WITH WITNESSES - SUSPECTS AND SUBJECTS -- Under no circumstances will the Bureau condone unnecessarily lengthy interviews with witnesses, suspects, and subjects by Special Agents. In accordance with existing Bureau instructions, such interviews must be handled in a businesslike manner, carefully prepared and thoughtfully planned. It is imperative that all pertinent information be obtained in a minimum of time and every effort should be made to avoid recontacts unless good judgment, common sense, and sound investigation make them necessary. You are to insure all Agent personnel fully understand and comply with these instructions.

6-21-66

SAC LETTER 66-39

(B)

(B) VICE PRESIDENT'S YOUTH OPPORTUNITY TASK FORCE - MISCELLANEOUS -- The Bureau, as well as numerous other agencies of the Government, was requested by this Task Force to furnish various data concerning 45 cities throughout the country. Bureau Field Offices are headquartered at 35 of the localities. Data furnished concerning these headquarters cities included the name of the Special Agent in Charge; total employees and estimated annual payroll for the Field Office; total number of investigative matters handled for the fiscal year 1965; limited crime statistics for 1965 under the Uniform Crime Reporting Program; names of local officials, such as the chief of police, contacted by you at the headquarters city; and the identity of contracts amounting to over \$10,000 during the current fiscal year. The Field Offices for which such data were listed were contacted by the Bureau as to the identities of the local officials.

It is not known what use the Vice President's Youth Opportunity Task Force may make of the information furnished. Should you receive some inquiry or receive information that others whose identities were furnished have been contacted as a result of the information made available to the Task Force, you should promptly advise the Bureau.

(C) AUTOMOBILES - DEFECTIVE BRAKES -- In the recent past several serious automobile accidents involving Bureau vehicles were found to have been caused by defective brakes. While there was substantial property damage in all these accidents, fortunately none of the occupants sustained serious physical injury. It cannot be stressed too strongly that the proper functioning of the brake system is of prime consideration in maintaining Bureau vehicles. No other one factor is so important in the safe and efficient operation of our equipment.

While it is neither necessary nor practical to pull all wheels and inspect brake linings and wheel cylinders or the master cylinder on a time or mileage basis, certain conditions do warrant such inspection. For example, the majority of our vehicles have self-adjusting, power brakes. The brake pedal travel should be maintained at no less than two-thirds of the full position at all times. During the monthly inspection, or at any other time it is found necessary to adjust the foot brake to maintain required travel, a check should be made concerning the condition of the brake linings. The same thing applies when it is necessary to adjust the parking brake. Further, at any time it is found necessary to replenish the fluid in the master cylinder, an inspection should be made to determine the reason for adding fluid. In addition to the foregoing, good judgment dictates that a detailed inspection should be made of the brake system any time it is necessary to remove wheels for packing bearings or for other reasons or on any occasion when there is some reason to believe there is a possible brake malfunction.

In view of the serious nature of accidents which can result from brake failures, it is desired this matter be brought to the attention of all personnel operating Bureau vehicles. They should be instructed to be particularly alert for any indication of possible brake malfunction. At any time there is a question as to the safe condition of the braking system it should be resolved by performing whatever inspection is necessary and taking any corrective action required.

6-21-66

SAC LETTER 66-39

(D) INTERVIEWS -- The Bureau has noted recent isolated instances wherein during interviews with subjects or suspects they were asked to furnish a signed waiver attesting to their consent to be interviewed with the aid of the polygraph,

6-21-66

SAC LETTER 66-39

- 2 -

as well as instances wherein such consent was verbally discussed. Since the Bureau has not been approving the use of the polygraph, there should be no discussion of it in interviews or otherwise. No waivers or facsimiles thereof should be requested. Insure that all investigative personnel are appropriately advised.

6-21-66  
SAC LETTER 66-39

- 3 -

(E) CRIMINAL INFORMANT PROGRAM -- Live, high-quality informant coverage in all areas of the Bureau's jurisdiction is a constant urgent necessity. Increased investigative responsibilities and necessary curtailment of certain investigative techniques emphasize that continued attention must be placed on the Bureau's Criminal Informant Program. During discussion at the recently completed Criminal Informant In-Service School it was recognized that to meet the challenge of successfully infiltrating criminal activities with live informant coverage we must increase the number of quality informants, exercise careful control of their activities in our behalf and insure that payments to informants are commensurate with the value of data received from them.

The importance of the development of quality informants should be the subject of continued concentration by each office. Good informants can be an excellent source for developing violations which otherwise might not come to our attention. In addition, as you are aware, there are many situations where solution of cases can be accomplished only through information developed by informants. Thus, the better the informant coverage in all areas of criminal activities, the better will we be able to carry out our responsibilities and make the most effective use of Agent investigative time. Therefore, I want you to give this matter your continuing personal attention. It is your responsibility to insure that newer Agents are given necessary guidance and training in the development and handling of criminal informants. Continue to keep on the alert for situations which might be the basis for developing new informants. Make certain all Agents assigned criminal investigations are well-grounded in the fundamentals of selection, development and utilization of informants. Agents of proven ability and experience in cultivation of informants should be encouraged and given the opportunity to participate in your informant training program.

One measure of the effectiveness of the Criminal Informant Program of a particular office is the analysis made of accomplishments reported which can be credited to informants. Make sure your office is reporting all accomplishments attributable to informants. It is obvious from reviewing material at the Bureau that this is not being done in all instances. In this connection, refer to Section 108 H (1), Manual of Instructions, regarding submission of Monthly Progress Letter and also

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to SAC Letter Number 65-44 (D) dated 8/17/65.

Selection and payment of individuals as informants must be accompanied by good judgment. Due to the type of individuals we are dealing with in most instances, effective control must be exercised at all times and Agents handling informants must continually be on the alert to anticipate and avoid possible situations which could be a source of embarrassment. This is particularly true of individuals to whom payment is the inducement to furnish information.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 65-8  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

February 23, 1965

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) VOICE IDENTIFICATION -- The Laboratory, over a long period of time, has closely followed the possibilities of identifying individuals by analyzing and comparing known and questioned recordings of their voices. Recently the Laboratory acquired additional facilities for analyzing recorded speech and will conduct voice analysis examinations as an investigative aid in Bureau cases.

The technique is still considered to be in the experimental stages and it is not sufficiently authenticated by quantitative tests and experience to serve as a unique means of identification with subsequent court testimony to that effect. It is, however, felt that it is at a stage to offer investigative guidance in selected Bureau cases.

Known and questioned recorded material for examination should be forwarded to the FBI Laboratory, attention Electronics Section. A verbatim transcript of the recorded material should accompany the submitted material. Foreign language recordings should be accompanied by a verbatim transcript as well as the English translation.

Attached are details for guidance in the preparation of the material for submission.

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(B) TELEPHONIC COMPLAINTS -- The Bureau has noted a number of instances wherein obviously intoxicated persons have called our field offices to register a complaint or demand an investigation.

In such instances or where the caller is abusive or incoherent, it is suggested that the caller be advised courteously and firmly that he should come to the FBI office personally at his convenience to furnish the details of his complaint or information.

As you are aware, it is a vital necessity that in all our contacts with the public we display courtesy and real concern for the problems brought to us. However, we have neither the time nor the duty to listen to telephonic abuse or alcoholic ramblings. You should, of course, continue to make a record of all calls received by your office and where a situation exists indicating the need to request the caller to come to the office to furnish information, the memorandum recording the call should show the reasons why this course of action was followed.

(C) OUTSIDE EMPLOYMENT -- Regulations require that the Bureau be advised when an employee terminates outside employment. Furthermore, at the time an employee asks approval for such employment, it must be indicated on the formal request (Form FD-331) that the employee has been advised of his responsibility to notify his supervisor upon termination.

A recent survey disclosed a number of instances wherein the Bureau had not been advised of the termination of outside employment or that the employee had decided not to accept employment which had been approved. Each Division head must insure that all employees approved to engage in outside employment are impressed with their responsibility to promptly advise the Bureau when it ceases or that it was not accepted. Form FD-331a should be used for either purpose.

Hereafter, each Division must advise the Bureau by January 15 of each year that verification has been made that each employee authorized for outside employment is still so engaged. An administrative tickler is to be maintained to this effect. Authority is granted to maintain a copy of each FD-331 submitted to the Bureau or some other tickler for following on authorizations granted. In those cases where your annual check reveals a failure on the part of an employee to promptly advise of the termination or nonacceptance of outside employment, submit his written explanation together with an appropriate recommendation for administrative action.

2-23-65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-8

(D) MAILING LIST OF FIELD DIVISIONS -- The Bureau has been advised of the failure of a field division to afford proper attention to the change of address of another field office as indicated on the official Bureau mailing list of field divisions. As a result, official Bureau mail was misdirected and opened by unauthorized persons. Accordingly, each Special Agent in Charge is reminded of his personal responsibility to insure that when a revised mailing list of field divisions is received from the Bureau reflecting changes of addresses, prompt and appropriate changes are made in office mailing procedures. Current changes on each mailing list are indicated by an asterisk.

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Special Agents in Charge will be held personally responsible for making timely notification to the Bureau whenever changes occur relative to any of the items on the Bureau's official mailing list of field divisions.

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(E) TELEPHONES - ECONOMY - SEMIANNUAL DESK-TO-DESK TELEPHONE SURVEY -- The first semiannual desk-to-desk telephone survey for the current calendar year should be conducted immediately in lieu of the usual survey time, which is April.

Your report, indicating whether or not a saving was accomplished during the survey through elimination of telephone equipment and facilities, and itemizing facilities removed and monthly saving for each item removed, should be submitted with fully executed Form FD-344 signed by you to reach the Bureau no later than March 10, 1965.

Include in your report an explanation for any increase in total fixed costs since last previous submission of FD-344.

In reporting results of this survey in your division do not report savings accrued from removal of equipment or facilities prior to the survey, or equipment and facilities ordered removed by Bureau Inspector unless ordered out of service by the Inspector during the survey, in which case the Bureau should be advised of the fact that it was ordered removed by an Inspector.

Bureau Inspectors are continuing to find surplus telephone trunks, telephone instruments, etc. in field headquarters and resident agencies. This indicates a number of SACs are not giving sufficient personal attention to communications economy. You must personally insure that this survey is thorough, and that every piece of telephone equipment not absolutely essential to your operations is eliminated.

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(F) NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY ACT MATTERS -- According to figures recently released by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, bankruptcy filings throughout the country reached an all-time high as of June 30, 1964; namely, a total of 171,719 were filed during Fiscal Year 1964. This figure is broken down to ninety per cent nonbusiness bankruptcy filings and ten per cent business bankruptcy filings. Present economic conditions in certain sections of the country could result in a continual increase in bankruptcy filings. Correspondingly, the Bureau has and should be experiencing a case increase in this classification.

You must insure that all investigative personnel, during their daily contacts with various sources including criminal informants and potential criminal informants, are constantly on the alert for possible violations of the criminal statutes of the National Bankruptcy Act.

Regarding complaints received from the Bankruptcy Court, you should continue to have an Agent, experienced in the handling of bankruptcy matters, contact the various referees, in the judicial district covered by your office, on an annual basis to insure that each referee is promptly referring cases in accordance with Section 3057, Title 18, U. S. Code. Your contacts with referees should continue to be a matter of record in your 49-O file.

The Bureau has experienced an increase in planned fraudulent bankruptcies involving hoodlums and you must insure that criminal informants and potential criminal informants, close to the hoodlum element, are fully cognizant of the Bureau's interest in this violation. For your information the two most frequently used schemes by the hoodlum are:

(1) The hoodlum has a front man open a business such as furniture, jewelry, or produce and so forth, stocks the business with merchandise on short term credit, orders additional merchandise on the established credit and sells the merchandise quickly below cost. Usually in this type of case the front man disappears from the business and the defrauded creditors eventually place the business into involuntary bankruptcy.

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(2) In another scheme a legitimate businessman who cannot meet his financial payments, possibly due to gambling debts or sudden business reversals, finds himself with a racketeer partner and the racketeer then uses the legitimate businessman's credit to carry out a fraudulent bankruptcy scheme.

✓  
Credit Bureaus such as Dun and Bradstreet have proven to be excellent sources of these cases and it is usually brought to their attention through an avalanche of inquiries from creditors.

Prompt investigation in bankruptcy cases is essential, especially in cases involving missing assets or records. You must be certain that investigative personnel handling such cases afford them expeditious attention.

(Security Letter on attached page)

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(G) DEVELOPMENT OF SOURCES IN RACIAL MATTERS - AMERICAN LEGION CONTACT PROGRAM - PLANT INFORMANT PROGRAM -- In our over-all current efforts to increase the quantity and quality of coverage of racial matters, the use of the American Legion Contact and Plant Informant Programs has been given serious consideration. The selfish utilization of the current Negro struggle for civil rights is not restricted to those individuals described as subversive because of affiliation with the Communist Party, USA, or other left groups. As an example, hate groups such as the Klans, are exploiting the tension developed in the South as the result of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Appealing to prejudice and bigotry, the promotion of "white supremacy" is the primary goal of these right extremists with specific targets including the foreign-born, Catholics and Jews. Bearing in mind our responsibilities in this field, not only to get evidence and intelligence data, but to be aware of all related data on which preventive measures may be taken, you should take the following steps:

Where feasible and you consider it to the Bureau's advantage, contacts and informants included in these two programs should be advised of the Bureau's interest and responsibility in covering activities which may be considered racial in nature. This should be done during the next scheduled meeting. A prerequisite to initiating this program is a thorough knowledge of current instructions pertaining to racial matters, sources and informants, particularly those specific instructions concerning acts of violence. The individuals contacted should be made sufficiently familiar with the Bureau's desires in this matter so as to avoid the receipt of nebulous information. Along this line, you should take no steps that might diminish our efforts of gathering intelligence data, even though there is no immediate and apparent Federal violation. We have a definite responsibility of advising appropriate governmental agencies on both a national and local level of information relating to racial incidents. Extreme care must be exercised to insure there is no misunderstanding of the Bureau's position and goal in the racial field. Of particular importance is the insurance that there is no basis for misinterpretation resulting in a false impression that our action infringes upon the freedoms of speech and assemblage of a person or group. To the contrary, our concern includes the guarantee of civil rights and equality under law for all.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

Enclosure for (A)

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February 23, 1965

**RE: VOICE IDENTIFICATION**

In submitting tape recordings of known and questioned voices a verbatim transcript should be prepared by the field. The transcript should accompany each submission.

When obtaining voice recordings for comparison, it should be borne in mind that it is desirable to obtain as many of the same words and word combinations used in the questioned recording as feasible. Several utterances of word combinations used by the unknown subject are valuable to voice comparisons as the ability to identify a voice is dependent upon the quantity and quality of the material as well as word content. It is also desirable that the same words and same word sequence be obtained in order to create an environment as nearly like that of the questioned recording as possible. The vocal transition from one word to another influences the voice picture, therefore best comparisons are achieved when words are used in the same sequence.

Insure that the recording is as good technically as possible. The recordings should be made at any of the standard tape recording speeds such as 3.75 inches per second, 7.5 inches per second, etc. Best results will be obtained if the recordings are made with a full track recorder at 7.5 inches per second using standard recording tape. If possible, do not use "extended play," "long play," or tapes with a base thickness less than 1.5 mils.

Recorded material should be protected against accidental erasure during transit by placing the recording in a metal can or metal foil designed for this purpose or by placing the tape in a box so that there is a minimum of three inches between the reel of tape and the outside of the shipping carton. The cans and foil are available at the Bureau on request.





**PERSONAL ATTENTION**  
**SAC LETTER NO. 65-10**

**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE**  
**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

**March 9, 1965**

**WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535**

(A) **EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION - SAFETY POLICY FOR THE FEDERAL SERVICE** -- Advise all employees that on 2-16-65 the President issued a Safety Policy for the Federal Service. The purpose of such policy is to safeguard Federal employees from personal injuries, reduce cost of injuries, eliminate waste of materials; and it is both humanitarian and practical. The policy seeks improvement concerning safety records. It includes the promotion of safe practices on and off duty and includes protection to visitors to Government buildings, installations, parks, forests and other facilities. The President has urged Federal agencies to cooperate with State and local governments, management, labor, and safety organizations in developing and applying safety standards responsive to any changing conditions and the pace of technological progress.

Although the Bureau has maintained an effective and extensive safety program for years, we must make every effort to reduce the number of work-related injuries. You must stress accident prevention to all employees during periodic office conferences. Each injury sustained in your office should be most carefully analyzed and if it appears it could have been avoided, immediate steps should be taken so that such type of accident will not recur. You and every member of your office should remain alert to accident potentials daily and take positive steps to remove accident hazards. You should give this subject matter your personal attention and make every effort to reduce the number of work-related injuries on a continuing basis in the future. During periodic office inspections, your administrative file will be checked for compliance.

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(B) **INVESTIGATION OF RACIAL MATTERS AND HATE GROUPS - CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS** -- During the course of our current investigations into racial matters, Klan and similar hate-type groups, information is often obtained which would indicate possible violations of criminal laws over which the FBI exercises investigative jurisdiction. It is imperative that investigative personnel conducting such inquiries be alert to the FBI's responsibilities in the criminal field.

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT SENT TO  
NATIONAL ARCHIVES (JFCARCA)  
DATE 8/5/94

Specifically, information has been received with increasing frequency indicating hidden caches of weapons which may have been stolen from the United States Government. Explosives and ammunition bearing United States Government markings have frequently been reported in the hands of individuals active in hate-type organizations. More often we have received information concerning the location of machine guns or other automatic-type weapons, the mere possession of which is a violation of Federal law.

As you are aware, violations of the National and Federal Firearms Acts come within the FBI's investigative jurisdiction when information pertaining thereto is developed during the course of another Bureau investigation.

Accordingly, you should alert all personnel with respect to these investigative possibilities particularly in connection with violations of the Theft of Government Property Statute and the National and Federal Firearms Acts. When during the course of an official investigation we receive information pertaining to possible violations of these statutes, a separate investigation should be initiated, investigation vigorously pursued looking toward prosecution in United States District Court and reports submitted properly indicating the criminal character of the case.

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(C) LEGAL ATTACHE'S OFFICE - BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA --

A Legal Attache's Office has been established in the Embassy of the United States at Buenos Aires, Argentina. This new office will handle the Bureau's work in Argentina and Uruguay, countries formerly covered by the Legal Attache's Office in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

Leads requiring investigation or other action in Argentina or Uruguay should be forwarded to the Bureau for referral to the Buenos Aires Office.

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(D) APPLICANT, SPECIAL INQUIRY, AND PERSONNEL INVESTIGATIONS - ELIMINATION OF SUB B FILES -- Reference is made to SAC Letter No. 53-11 dated 1/29/63 instructing that in applicant-type cases a separate sub B file be utilized to have filed therein letters concerning rumor, gossip or unverified information developed in that particular case. Subsequent changes in report writing procedures have resulted in such information being reported separately in cover pages (administrative pages) of reports or in letter-head memoranda. There is no longer any need to file this data in separate files. Accordingly, the use of sub B files for this purpose should be discontinued.

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(E) CRIMINAL INFORMANTS - FBI FORM BOOK -- SAC Letter 64-56 (E), dated 11/17/64 drew attention to the need for consistent reporting by field offices of accomplishments attributed to informants. As was pointed out, the Monthly Progress Letter is the proper vehicle for reporting this information and should be all-inclusive for the month. To assist the field in compiling and making uniform reports and to adapt the information at the Bureau to Automatic Data Processing equipment, several changes in procedure and format are necessary. These changes are explained hereafter; however, in implementing these new procedures it is imperative to completely report these statistics in the Monthly Progress Letters since the automation of the recording process will preclude follow-up correspondence by the Bureau with subsequent loss of credit to the submitting office.

The deadline for submission of these letters is being changed to conform to the deadline for submitting the Monthly Administrative Report (Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part II, Section 3E8). Thus these reports are to be submitted by the third business day following the end of the month for which prepared.

Separately, the Bureau is furnishing each office a supply of forms (Form FD-374) which will replace the current Monthly Progress Letters. Three copies of the form are enclosed. Place one in the FBI Form Book. The original only (no abstract) will be furnished to the Bureau each month.

The form has thirteen items divided into two major groups, Administrative Accomplishments and Statistical Accomplishments. The

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five items under Administrative Accomplishments are self-explanatory; however, the symbol numbers of the informants added and deleted under items two and three must be set forth. Under Statistical Accomplishments the statistics reported are those attributable to information furnished by criminal informants and potential criminal informants. Each item represents the total for the month concerning the subject of the item and where no statistics have been accumulated, insert the word "none." Item seven is included in the total of item six. Item eight is not included in the totals of either items six or seven. Items eleven through thirteen are to be reported as the total dollar value of stolen property recovered or confiscated as a result of information furnished by criminal informants or potential criminal informants.

The statistics reported in items nine, ten, twelve and thirteen are the accomplishments of other law enforcement agencies as a result of our referral to them of information furnished by an informant, or potential informant.

To support the total figures reported on Form FD-374 attach additional pages, as necessary, headed by the name of the submitting field office and the date. The information reported on these pages should be divided into three categories; namely, "Bureau Matters," "Local Matters," and "Other Federal Matters." Under each category list three columns: symbol number or identity of the potential criminal informant, title and character of case, and the nature of the statistic being credited to the informant. If, as in the case of local, State, or other Federal violations, there is no case title, this information may be omitted; however, the description of the statistic should include enough information to identify the type of violation. If two or more statistics result from one informant on one case, list the statistics separately opposite the informant.

An example of the format follows:

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	<u>Albany Office</u>	<u>Date: March 2, 1965</u>
<b>I. Bureau Matters</b>		
AL 123-C	John Doe ITSP	subject arrested
AL 456-C	Pete Smith- Fugitive TFIS	fugitive apprehended
PCI John Brown	Albert Pink SSA-48	subject located
PCI Henry Black	Unsub, Theft of Hamilton Watches TFIS	\$700 stolen watches recovered

**II. Local Matters**

AL 789-C	John Green arrested for local burglary
PCI Don Duncan	\$475 stolen hams recovered from Safeway robbery.

**III. Other Federal Matters**

AL 246-C	Abe Salpen arrested as narcotics subject. \$700 narcotics recovered.
AL 805-C	John King arrested for passing counterfeit bills.

Appropriate Manual changes are forthcoming

(Security Letters on attached pages)

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(F) COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY - TELETYPE MESSAGES -- You have been advised on previous occasions of the need for protecting Bureau communications of all kinds to insure there is no compromise of classified or other highly confidential information.

Impress on all your personnel who originate and transmit outgoing teletypes that these messages should be encoded where the information being transmitted would be classified for dissemination outside the Bureau, or concerns highly confidential information of such nature as to make it imperative that it not be disclosed outside the Bureau. Review with these employees now and periodically the instructions in this regard in the Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part II, Section 4, G, 5.

In some instances, where highly confidential information is contained in only a limited portion of the message text, it may be possible to transmit the nonconfidential information by plaintext, followed immediately with transmission of the confidential material in a fully encoded, entirely separate message. In these instances, do not refer to the encoded message in the plaintext one.

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(G) AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND THE SECRET SERVICE CONCERNING PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTION -- There is attached a copy of the "Agreement Between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Secret Service Concerning Presidential Protection" dated February 3, 1965. This Agreement has been signed by Mr. James J. Rowley, Chief, U. S. Secret Service, and me. The contents of the attached Agreement and the Appendices thereto should be carefully studied by you and discussed in detail with all investigative personnel to insure full compliance with the terms of the Agreement.

In the case of individuals falling within the terms of the Agreement and who are subjects of pending investigative interest in which reports are normally prepared, one copy of each report prepared in each case should be disseminated to Secret Service locally and similar dissemination will be made at the Seat of Government. In these cases an extra copy of the report should be designated for the Bureau. In other instances in which reports would not normally be submitted, letterhead memoranda may be utilized in effecting dissemination to Secret Service in accordance with prior practice.

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You will note that Appendix A to the Agreement requires the Bureau to indicate the reason or reasons for referral to Secret Service by a statement of the class or classes in Appendix B which the individual referred fits. Therefore, in all cases in which dissemination is made in the field you should indicate in the cover communication of transmittal to the Bureau of the document disseminated the specific category or categories in which the individual falls. Letterhead memoranda disseminated to Secret Service showing only changes in status such as residence and/or employment, however, need not be categorized.

Dissemination in Security Index cases will be handled as in the past with the exceptions that investigative reports rather than letterhead memoranda will be furnished and the subjects will be categorized in accordance with the terms in the Agreement.

Your attention is directed to paragraph two, Section II, of the Agreement dealing with subversive organizations or other groups whose activities are inimical to the welfare of the United States. To date Secret Service has not requested reports on any organizations under investigation by this Bureau other than those concerning which we are already disseminating information and reports to Secret Service. In carrying out the terms of this Agreement, the field must be alert during the course of the investigation of an organization for information indicating a plot against the person of the President. Upon receipt of such information complete details must be immediately furnished to the nearest office of Secret Service and the Bureau should be advised at the same time by teletype of the information furnished and the fact it has been so disseminated. An immediate attempt should be made to verify the information but no evaluation of the information should be attempted. A letterhead memorandum should be prepared at once which should include complete details disseminated and the identity of the Secret Service officer to whom given. The memorandum should be promptly disseminated locally and sufficient copies furnished the Bureau for dissemination at the Seat of Government. Thereafter, copies of all letterhead memoranda and reports should be disseminated locally to Secret Service on a continuing basis and extra copies of such communications should be furnished the Bureau for dissemination to Secret Service at the Seat of Government.

Appropriate Manual changes are being prepared.

Very truly yours,  
John Edgar Hoover  
Director

Enclosures for (E) & (G)

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February 3, 1965

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND  
THE SECRET SERVICE CONCERNING PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTION

I. Purposes of Agreement

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) maintains the most comprehensive files in the United States on subversive organizations or individuals and on actual or possible criminal violations by individuals. It also originates itself and receives daily from other sources large numbers of reports on individuals and organizations. One purpose of this agreement is to specify that portion of the information on file with the FBI, or received or originated by it, which the Secret Service desires to receive in connection with its duty to protect the President.

The Secret Service has statutory authority to protect, or engage in certain activities to protect the President. The FBI has general jurisdiction in this country over subversion against the United States and will make available to the Secret Service information it may request or information which by its nature reveals a definite or possible threat to the President's safety. On the other hand, the authority of the Secret Service to protect the President can be interpreted to authorize it to investigate subversive organizations and individuals who might constitute a risk to the President. A second purpose of this agreement is to insure the most effective protection for the President by establishing a clear division of responsibility between the duties of the FBI and the Secret Service. Such division will also avoid compromises of investigations or sources and needless duplication of effort.

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT SENT TO  
NATIONAL ARCHIVES (JFKARCA)  
DATE 8/5/94 *dlw*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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II. General Responsibilities

The Secret Service undertakes to identify individuals who, because of their individual propensities or characteristics, are dangerous to the person of the President and to arrange for their neutralization as required. To assist the Secret Service in identifying such individuals, the FBI agrees to furnish the Secret Service information as set out in Section III of this Agreement.

The FBI will inform the Secret Service of the identity of organizations under investigation as subversive or possibly subversive and will furnish Secret Service with reports on such of these groups as Secret Service shall request. In connection with the FBI's responsibility to investigate such organizations or any other groups whose activities are inimical to the welfare of the United States and, therefore, warrant investigation, the FBI will be alert to and promptly notify the Secret Service of any information indicating a possible plot against the person of the President. Thereafter, it is the responsibility of the Secret Service to initiate such action as is necessary to neutralize such a plot.

The term "subversive" wherever used in this Agreement or Appendices hereto shall mean persons or groups who knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise or teach the duty, necessity or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the Government of the United States or the government of any state, district or possession thereof or the government of any political subdivision therein by force or violence or by the assassination of any officer of any such government.

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III. Information on Individuals to be Referred by FBI

In addition to the information already furnished, the FBI undertakes to furnish or make available from its central files to the Secret Service, all information which falls into the categories set forth in Appendix A to this Agreement, which, based on information available, can be identified with individuals coming to its attention henceforth of the classes set forth in Appendix B to this Agreement. The information to be furnished may be furnished in more than one report, and in case of emergencies should be furnished as soon as it is available.

This Agreement shall be reviewed annually by representatives of the FBI and the Secret Service, or at such more frequent occasions as either the FBI or the Secret Service may request, to make certain that the system of referrals is both practicable and productive. Revisions may be made on the authority of the Director of the FBI and the Chief of the Secret Service.

IV. Investigation and Neutralization of Individuals Referred by FBI

The Secret Service agrees that it will conduct no investigation of any referrals of individuals identified as members of subversive groups without notifying the FBI although where time for consultation is not available it may take action with respect to any such individual for the purpose of temporarily neutralizing that individual as a possible threat to the President. Any information obtained by the Secret Service through investigation of such individual will be referred to the FBI.

The FBI will not conduct investigations of individuals directed solely at establishing whether such individual is a danger to the President. FBI

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Agents will, however, in conducting investigations of subversive or other individuals be alert to and report information received as is specified in Appendix A to this Agreement, concerning any individual which would place him in one or more of the classes in Appendix B to this Agreement.

The Secret Service undertakes to neutralize or arrange for the neutralization, as required, to protect the President from all individuals referred by the FBI. In order to effect the best possible security of the President, the Secret Service and the FBI will take such steps as are necessary to insure that the terms of this Agreement are fully carried out.

Federal Bureau of Investigation

By J. Edgar Hoover  
Director

United States Secret Service

By James J. Rowley  
Chief

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Appendix A

Information to be Furnished on Individuals Referred

1. Identification Data - to the extent available - name or names of individual, address, photograph (or statement as to availability of such), physical description, date and place of birth, employment and marital status.
2. Reason or Reasons for Referral - statement of the class or classes in Appendix B, which the individual referred fits.
3. Information in FBI Files - a summary or excerpts, as appropriate, of such portions of any FBI file on an individual referred which cause him to fit any class or classes in Appendix B.
4. The Secret Service will make a specific request in each instance where a check of the FBI identification records is desired.

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Appendix B

Types of Individuals to be Referred

1. Individuals who have made threats of bodily harm against, or have attempted to cause bodily harm to, officials or employees of Federal, State or Local Governments or foreign government officials while they are residing in or planning an imminent visit to this country; provided that such threats or acts are made against the Government official or employee because of his official status, shall be reported.
2. Individuals who threaten or attempt to redress a real or imaginary grievance against Federal, State or Local Governments or any employee or official thereof by other than legal means.
3. Individuals who, because of their background and training, are potentially dangerous; or individuals identified by the FBI as members or participants in a communist movement and those under active investigation as members of such other subversive groups or other organizations whose activities are inimical to the welfare of the United States and, therefore, warrant investigation as the FBI and the Secret Service from time to time jointly designate.
4. U. S. citizens or residents who defect from the United States to countries in the Soviet or Chinese Communist blocs and return.
5. Subversives, ultrarightists, racists and fascists who meet one or more of the following criteria:

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- (a) Evidence of emotional instability (including unstable residence and employment record) or irrational or suicidal behavior;
  - (b) Expressions of strong or violent anti-U. S. sentiment;
  - (c) Prior acts (including arrests or convictions) or conduct or statements indicating a propensity for violence and antipathy toward good order and government.
6. Individuals involved in illegal bombing or illegal bomb-making.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI

DATE:

FROM : SAC,

**Note:** Items 1 thru 10, list **total numbers**;  
Items 11 thru 13, list **dollar value**;  
or indicate **none** if applicable.

SUBJECT: CRIMINAL INFORMANT PROGRAM  
MONTHLY PROGRESS LETTER

### Administrative Accomplishments

1. Informants Listed at Beginning of Month \_\_\_\_\_

2. Informants Added During the Month \_\_\_\_\_  
(List Symbol Numbers here.)

3. Informants Deleted During the Month \_\_\_\_\_  
(List Symbol Numbers here.)

4. Informants Listed at End of Month \_\_\_\_\_

5. Potential Informants Being Developed \_\_\_\_\_

### Statistical Accomplishments

6. Subjects Arrested, FBI Cases \_\_\_\_\_

7. Bureau Fugitives (included in Item 6) \_\_\_\_\_

8. Subjects Located, FBI Cases (not included in Items 6 or 7) \_\_\_\_\_

9. Subjects Arrested, Other Federal Agencies \_\_\_\_\_

10. Subjects Arrested, State and Local \_\_\_\_\_

11. Merchandise Recovered, FBI Cases \_\_\_\_\_

12. Merchandise Recovered, State & Local \_\_\_\_\_

13. Merchandise Recovered, Other Federal Agencies \_\_\_\_\_



In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 65-A  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

May 4, 1965

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

**RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AGAINST  
CHINESE COMMUNIST INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES (CHICOIN)**

Captioned case is used as control file to handle general matters pertaining to Bureau's efforts to penetrate Chinese Communist (Chicom) intelligence activities in the United States. Information has been received by the Bureau from foreign and domestic intelligence agencies indicating the Chicoms are endeavoring to obtain legally and illegally through various western countries, intelligence data pertaining to industry, science, research and political and military matters.

At the present time, the Bureau is exploring the following procedures to combat Chicom intelligence activities in the United States. The purpose behind these undertakings is to create in the Chicom Intelligence Service an intelligence interest in our informants resulting in our penetration of Chicom intelligence activities in the United States. Reliable Bureau Chinese informants are being approached for the purpose of putting them in personal contact with Chicom diplomatic establishments abroad and with the New China News Agency in Canada and Mexico, which has been used by the Chicoms as an intelligence cover in the past. Other Bureau informants have sent communications, under the Bureau's direction, to friends and agencies in Communist China. Chinese informants in scientific and technical fields are being recruited to be put in personal contact with Chicom representatives attending scientific and technical conferences abroad. Arrangements are presently being made to place other Chinese informants in contact with known and suspected Chinese intelligence agents in Hong Kong and to possibly send Bureau informants into Communist China.

Although the procedures referred to above have involved the use of existing Chinese security informants, the Bureau does not desire that our efforts to penetrate Chicom intelligence activities in the United States be restricted to the use of Chinese. In view of the fact the Chicoms are presently engaged in efforts to foment revolutions and to collect intelligence in various parts of the world, including Africa, Asia and Latin America, an excellent opportunity is presented to use existing informants of other nationalities, including orientals, other than Chinese, or to develop such informants for use against the Chinese Intelligence Service. All offices



should be alert to such possibilities and immediately advise the Bureau of any instances where such informants may be used against the Chinese Intelligence Service.

A conference on Chinese matters held at the Bureau on April 8-9, 1965, attended by representatives of Bureau offices handling the majority of Chinese investigative matters, unanimously approved continuation of the procedures referred to above. Any additional ideas, procedures or programs which are suggested by this letter and which may be of assistance in combatting Chicom intelligence activities in the United States should be furnished the Bureau.

The procedures outlined above should be brought to the attention of all investigative personnel handling security matters. Intelligence operations growing out of captioned matter should be handled by individual case and should not be handled in the Chicoin control file.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

5/4/65

NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 65-A

- 2 -



PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 65-B  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

May 11, 1965

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

RE: BUREAU TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT -  
EQUIPMENT SYNOPSIS

There are being transmitted directly to the SAC of each office appropriate copies of an Equipment Synopsis summarizing Bureau technical equipment available to the field for use as investigative aids. This summary, which includes photographs as well as a brief description of each respective piece of equipment and a summary of its application, has been made up by the FBI Laboratory primarily in order that the SAC, ASAC, and other nontechnical supervisory personnel may have available for convenient reference such information to assist in planning and carrying out field investigative responsibilities.

This material has been prepared at substantial effort. In order to insure that most productive use is made of this Equipment Synopsis, it is necessary that the SAC, ASAC, and such other Supervisors as the SAC may designate become personally thoroughly familiar with its contents through careful study. Each SAC and ASAC will be expected to be thoroughly cognizant of the various items of equipment which are available and thus be in position to coordinate the use of such equipment with maximum effectiveness.

For purposes of accounting for the copies of the Equipment Synopsis furnished, the material is prepared in the form of an addition to the already existing Handbook of Technical Equipment. By being a part of the Handbook of Technical Equipment, cross-referencing between the Synopsis and the more detailed technical information contained elsewhere in the Handbook has been facilitated. Each page of the Synopsis bears a notation at the bottom of the page referring to the corresponding, more detailed technical description of this equipment elsewhere in the Handbook, or where applicable, instructs that the Bureau be contacted for additional details due to the complex nature of the particular technique or item of equipment.

Appropriate pages will be added or other revisions made as needed from time to time, as new equipment is developed or existing equipment is modified. The initial issue of the Equipment Synopsis has been extended to include information on newest techniques and equipment currently being processed for distribution to the field in the immediate future.

As in the past, in the event a technical problem is encountered in which assistance over and above that immediately available to your office is required, such need should be made known promptly to the Bureau in order that appropriate consideration may be given to sending a Laboratory expert to the scene, or otherwise providing necessary assistance.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

5/11/65

NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 65-B - 2 -



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 65-31

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

June 2, 1965

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) DOMINICAN SITUATION (NATIONALITY GROUP COVERAGE - LATIN AMERICA)-- For your information, Bureau has established a Legal Attache in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic who has already begun to make a valuable contribution to the over-all efforts of the United States in making certain that the Dominican Republic does not become another Cuba. If the United States succeeds in its efforts to keep communists out of the new Dominican coalition government which is in the process of being formed, current United States policy in the Dominican Republic could very well become the established course of action for all other countries in Latin America threatened with communism.

The responsibilities which have been placed upon the Bureau in developing intelligence data in the Dominican Republic, as well as in other Latin-American countries, are not only tremendous but may be the heaviest and most far-reaching burden the FBI has ever been asked to assume in the intelligence field. To guarantee our complete success, teamwork is a must.

Accordingly, first we must do everything possible to assist Legal Attache. Santo Domingo, in his immediate task of developing quality sources of sufficient quantity to effect maximum coverage in the Dominican Republic.

/ In this regard, each office and Legal Attache must furnish to the Bureau within five days of the receipt of this letter under the caption of "DOMSIT" (code word for "Dominican Situation") the following:

1. Identities of any established sources (former or current) who are now in the Dominican Republic.
2. Persons in Dominican Republic known to personnel of your office who appear to have good source potential.
3. Identities of any current security sources (regardless of nationality) who may be available for assignment (temporary or permanent) in the Dominican Republic if such is considered feasible by Legal Attache, Santo Domingo.

Any leads for purpose of checking background of potential sources for Santo Domingo must receive priority attention and results submitted by teletype.

In addition to the Dominican requirements placed upon the Bureau, your attention is directed to over-all need for additional informants and sources in the Latin-American field. The reputation the Bureau has gained during recent Dominican crisis is due in large part to the results achieved in developing Dominican sources through a concentrated informant development program over the past several years.

In view of critical state of unrest in Latin America today, each office should survey its informant coverage in this field. If substantial numbers of nationals of any Latin-American country reside within the territory covered by your office, Bureau expects that you will have coverage sufficient to alert you to exile organizational activities of political nature, plots to overthrow existing governments, and general intelligence data concerning the countries of interest. Informant development in this field is considered most important and any weaknesses which now exist must be overcome promptly by instituting an aggressive informant development program.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

6/2/65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-31

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 65-36  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

June 29, 1965

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(A) FEDERAL EMPLOYEE HEALTH SERVICES -- With increasing frequency, field offices are being contacted by General Services Administration relative to establishment of Health Service units in Federal buildings, occupying agencies to participate on a reimbursable basis. Such centralized services are purportedly arranged when providing them would insure increased efficiency and economy to the Government without hampering program activities or essential internal administration of the agencies. Bureau has consistently taken the position that we are not interested in participating in such programs. Experience has indicated that records are inefficiently maintained and unavailable regarding employees who use such units.

Accordingly, in the future when such approaches are made by General Services Administration or any other agency, you should respond by stating the Bureau is not interested. If necessary to furnish such declination of interest in writing, you are authorized to sign the appropriate communication as authorized agency officer. Reasons for declining are generally not requested and in no instances should be furnished without prior approval. Bureau should be informed of each such request together with the response you made.

6-29-65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-36

(B) FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY APPLICANTS - STATE AGENCIES -- I find it necessary to reiterate instructions previously issued by SAC Letter 58-46 (G), POLICE RELATIONS - STATEWIDE AGENCIES, on August 5, 1958.

Where we have more than one field office covering parts of the same state and an applicant is nominated from a state agency to the FBI National Academy, the office making the nomination should send a copy of their recommendation to the other field offices covering that state for a check of their files to determine if there is any reason why the candidate should not be accepted for the FBI National Academy.

It will be incumbent upon offices covering the same state to keep each other advised of any derogatory information developed concerning a member of a state agency from which nominations to the FBI National Academy might be made.

(Security Letters on attached pages)

**(C) CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES - EFFORTS TO RECRUIT CUBAN REFUGEES TO GATHER INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION** -- During recent months, a number of Cuban refugees residing in the United States have received unsolicited mimeographed letters which requested the addressee to cooperate with the Cuban Government by gathering information of an intelligence nature which the addressee was requested to furnish to the Cubans by means of secret-writing letter. All of the letters received by the refugees to date have been postmarked at New York City and the sender has utilized fictitious names although a number of the return addresses utilized actually exist.

The above mimeographed letter sets forth an accommodation address in Cuba to be utilized by the addressee as well as detailed information concerning the preparation and mailing of secret-writing letters to the accommodation address.

In most cases, the recipients of these letters have recently been in contact with Cuban authorities regarding permission to visit Cuba or other matters requiring action by a Cuban Government agency. The FBI Laboratory has determined that all mimeographed letters received to date were prepared on the same mimeograph machine and investigation is being conducted in an effort to identify the person or persons responsible for this activity.

Since it appears that efforts to recruit Cuban refugees for the purpose of gathering intelligence information on behalf of the Cuban Government may become widespread, the code name **CODENAME** has been assigned and communications regarding investigation of the above-described activity should be so captioned. Bureau file in this matter is **FILE #** . Offices receiving information concerning the above-described activity should promptly bring this information to the attention of the Bureau and any pertinent material obtained should be forwarded to the FBI Laboratory for appropriate examination.

6-29-65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-36

**(D) SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION CHARACTERIZATION - PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY - PROGRESSIVE LABOR MOVEMENT** -- SAC Letter 64-39 dated July 30, 1964, furnished the field with a characterization of the Progressive Labor Movement. At its recent first national convention this organization changed its name to the Progressive Labor Party.

6-29-65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-36

- 2 -

Set forth below is an up-to-date characterization of the Progressive Labor Party which henceforth should be used in characterizing this organization.

PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY (PLP)  
PROGRESSIVE LABOR MOVEMENT (PLM)

A source advised on April 20, 1965, that the PLP, formerly known as the PLM, held its first national convention April 15-18, 1965, at New York City, to organize the PLM into a PLP. The PLP will have as its ultimate objective the establishment of a militant working class movement based on Marxism-Leninism.

"The New York Times," City Edition, Tuesday, April 20, 1965, page 27, reported that a new party of "revolutionary socialism" was formally founded on April 18, 1965, under the name of the PLP. The PLP was described as an outgrowth of the PLM. Its officers were identified as Milton Rosen, New York, President, and William Epton of New York and Mort Scheer of San Francisco, Vice Presidents. A 20-member National Committee was elected to direct the party until the next convention.

According to the article, "The Progressive Labor Movement was founded in 1962 by Mr. Rosen and Mr. Scheer after they were expelled from the Communist Party of the United States for assertedly following the Chinese Communist line."

The PLP publishes the "Marxist-Leninist Quarterly," a theoretical magazine; "Progressive Labor," a monthly magazine; "Challenge," a New York City newspaper; and "Spark," a west coast newspaper.

The June 1, 1965, issue of "Challenge," page 6, states that, "this paper is dedicated to fight for a new way of life - where the working men and women own and control their homes, factories, the police, courts, and the entire government on every level."

The source advised that the PLP utilizes the address of General Post Office Box 808, Brooklyn 1, New York, but also utilizes an office in Room 622, 132 Nassau Street, New York City, where PLP publications are prepared.

6-29-65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-36

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\* \* \* \* \*

The source is SOURCE who has furnished reliable information in the past. After careful consideration it was deemed necessary to conceal the source.

-Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

6-29-65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-36

- 4 -



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 65-37

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

July 6, 1965

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

(A) UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS - SUGGESTIONS -- A complicating factor in the anticipated increase of criminal cases going to trial in the Federal courts with the implementation of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, is the continuing process of appointment of new Assistant United States Attorneys. Many are initially inexperienced in the handling of criminal matters and must rely on "on-the-job" training to gain necessary knowledge and experience.

Offices which do not now utilize a similar program should consider the appointment of the new Assistant United States Attorney as an opportunity to afford that individual a tour of our facilities and offer an explanation of the facilities and our jurisdiction and responsibilities. We can thus assist in his indoctrination and training and at the same time encourage his assistance and cooperation. Such a program, if instituted, should utilize experienced Special Agent or supervisory personnel in the contact with the newly appointed Assistant United States Attorney.

7/6/65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-37

(B) PHOTOGRAPHIC COVERS - FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN -- Please refer to SAC Letter 64-62 on submitting suggestions for by-line articles for the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin.

You will note commencing with the July, 1965, issue some changes in the format, make-up and style of the Bulletin have been made which should improve its appearance, increase reader interest and help to maintain the magazine as the country's foremost law enforcement publication. One major change is a photograph on the front cover. The success of this change will depend primarily on the quality and nature of the photographs used. Accordingly, I desire that each SAC give special attention to this particular phase of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin program.

Generally, the cover photograph should relate to an inside feature or major article. Beginning immediately, each office having an outstanding request for a by-line article must endeavor to include among

the illustrations submitted with the manuscript to the Bureau a photograph deemed suitable for use on the cover. The Bureau realizes that there will be instances when this will not be possible. These should be the exception rather than the rule. Set forth below are some salient points for your guidance in selecting and/or making cover photographs.

The photographs should possess physical qualities which make them reproduce well. They should be glossy prints, black and white with sharp graduations between the two colors. The pictures should be in clear focus. Their size when reproduced on the cover will be approximately six inches deep and six and one-half inches wide. For best results, glossy prints 8 x 10 inches are preferable since reducing the size results in sharper quality than reproductions of equal size or larger. Look for pictures that communicate, pictures with movement and story value. Cover pictures should be simple yet dramatic in composition, and their message should be grasped by the reader immediately. They should have some special significance to the article with which they are connected and/or the magazine as a journal of law enforcement. As a general rule, the Bureau does not plan to use portrait-type pictures of authors or law enforcement personalities on the cover. Avoid photographs of massed groups or those that are otherwise cluttered. Photographs of officers in action, when properly attired in uniform, are acceptable if their meaning is readily clear.

The Bureau, of course, through photographic facilities at the Seat of Government will be alert to those occasions when cover pictures can be obtained here. However, the more appropriate and significant shots must come from the source of the articles used. Make certain that the authors of by-line articles are aware of our needs and wishes in this regard; however, as with the manuscripts, no commitment should be made as to the final use of the pictures since many factors enter into the selection of cover stories.

Since only twelve top-quality cover photographs will be needed each year, I fully expect all SACs to assist in this project so that each month the Bureau will have several exceptional and outstanding photographs from which to choose.

(Security Letters on attached pages)

7/6/65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-37

- 2 -

(C) LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959 - SECURITY MATTER - INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950 - LABOR --

On June 7, 1965, the United States Supreme Court held Section 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 to be unconstitutional. The Department has advised that this decision precludes any possible criminal prosecution under this Section, and it is, therefore, not requesting further investigations of possible violations of Section 504.

All Offices should immediately carefully review present cases bearing the caption "Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959-Security Matter," to determine if the cases may also involve a possible violation of Section 5 (a) (1) (E) of the Internal Security Act of 1950. If no possible violation of the labor provision of the Internal Security Act of 1950 exists, the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 cases may be closed administratively. In all cases where a possible violation of the labor provision of the Internal Security Act of 1950 exists, the character "Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959-Security Matters," should be deleted, and future reports and letters should be submitted under the caption, "Internal Security Act of 1950-Labor."

The above does not alter or affect current Bureau instructions relative to matters handled under the character "Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 - Investigative Matters."

7/6/65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-37

(D) DESCRIPTIVE DATA OF AUTOMOBILES IN INVESTIGATIONS INVOLVING SOVIET-BLOC AND YUGOSLAV REPRESENTATIVES -- In all cases in which it is necessary to obtain descriptive information concerning an automobile in the course of an investigation involving Soviet-bloc and Yugoslav representatives in this country, the repository of the records of motor vehicles of the state in which the vehicle is registered should be checked. If the color of the vehicle is not included in the records, the color, when otherwise determined, should be added to the description. This description should be made a matter of record in the case file to which it pertains and maintained so that it will be readily available to investigative personnel who may have need of it. When it is ascertained that a subject will be traveling away from his city of assignment by automobile, and physical surveillance is contemplated, interested offices should be advised of the license number, make, year, model and color of the vehicle. In the event the automobile

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SAC LETTER NO. 65-37

has any known obvious body damage or other physical characteristics which would make it more readily recognizable, this information should also be made known to interested offices. In the interest of accuracy, when descriptions are developed solely from the observation of Agents conducting physical surveillances, the descriptions of the vehicles in question should be checked against the descriptions available from repository of motor vehicle records to insure that any discrepancies which may have occurred are promptly resolved and called to the attention of interested offices.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

7/6/65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-37

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**PERSONAL ATTENTION**  
**SAC LETTER NO. 65-41**

**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE**  
**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

July 27, 1965

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

*In Reply, Please Refer to*

*File No.*

(A) FEDERAL INCOME TAX RETURNS -- Henceforth all requests for tax information and tax returns shall, without exception, be submitted to the Bureau for processing As indicated in Section 9., page 5a, of the Manual of Instructions. when a case is in the hands of a United States Attorney, he should be requested to obtain any material he desires from the Internal Revenue Service directly.

7/27/65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-41

(B) AGREEMENTS FOR TOUR OF DUTY OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES -- Effective immediately, all agreements for initial and subsequent tours in foreign offices and San Juan, Anchorage and Honolulu must be for a duration of three years. Agreements signed prior to this date, however, will remain in effect for the period specified in the agreement. The Bureau should be notified of the intention of each employee at least three months prior to the expiration date of his agreement.

7/27/65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-41

(C) PERSONNEL - MEMBERSHIP OF BUREAU PERSONNEL IN PRIVATE CLUBS - PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS - CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 -- Bona fide private clubs are exempt from the Public Accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Act does not define "bona fide clubs," and there have not yet been any court decisions on this point.

The Bureau has primary investigative jurisdiction in this regard, and at the request of the Department we have investigated a number of restaurants that operate as clubs. In one city it was found that Agents belonged to three of the clubs investigated. Such a situation obviously has potential for embarrassment.

While the Bureau has no intention of interfering with membership in legitimate organizations, all personnel should be cautioned to be most circumspect in the organizations they join and the organizations they may attend as guests, especially those which may be subsequently found by the courts to be in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Although no hard and fast rules can be established, each employee will be expected to exercise sound judgment in this regard. Certainly membership should not be held in any club formed for the purpose of evading the Civil Rights Act of 1964 nor should a Bureau employee attend such a club as a guest. The purpose of evading the Act could readily be inferred with regard to those restaurants which converted to a so-called club status either after or shortly before the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The above should be discussed with all personnel.

7/27/65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-41

- 2 -

(D) BUREAU APPLICANTS - ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW AGENTS' CLASSES -- The following New Agents' Classes are being scheduled for the remainder of fiscal year 1966: October 25, 1965; November 29, 1965; January 3 and 31, 1966; February 28, 1966; March 21, 1966; April 25, 1966; May 23, 1966; and June 27, 1966. You are reminded at this time of your continuing responsibility to insure that only above-average applicants are recommended favorably for the Special Agent position.

7/27/65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-41

(E) FUGITIVE INVESTIGATIONS -- Outstanding results again were achieved in fugitive investigations during the past fiscal year. The field's effectiveness in carrying out fugitive investigations, including the apprehension of many armed individuals, was in keeping with the finest traditions of the FBI. In a number of instances Agents were called upon to perform under extremely adverse, hazardous conditions. Bureau Agents exhibited courage and excellent judgment in several potentially explosive situations and thereby prevented injury to persons near the scene, as well as to the Agents themselves. The esprit de corps manifested in these difficult fugitive investigations, which frequently involved all offices, is highly encouraging for the continued outstanding performance in fugitive investigations. Throughout the year our work in this very important and critical area has met with wide acclaim as was evidenced by numerous letters from public officials and private individuals. This was particularly true with respect to the Bureau's successful handling of investigations to locate fugitives who killed or assaulted law enforcement officers.

It can be anticipated that there will be no lessening in the number and serious nature of challenges which will have to be met in our fugitive work during the ensuing fiscal year. To meet these challenges it is important that we take every precaution to constantly maintain our abilities at the highest possible peak. In planning and carrying out fugitive assignments, give adequate thought to the utilization of seasoned personnel to assist in giving experience to newer personnel and rounding

7/27/65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-41

- 3 -



out the capabilities of the younger Agents. Also, in squad meetings and other conferences, consideration should be given to discussion of particular situations or techniques which have proven productive and successful in fugitive investigations. Future specialized fugitive schools at the Seat of Government will provide the forum for the mutual exchange of experiences between offices to the end that our personnel will be better equipped to handle these dangerous fugitive assignments.

(Security Letter on attached pages)

7/27/65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-41

- 4 -

(F) NATIONALITY GROUP COVERAGE - CHINA -- In order to insure that we are covering all possible avenues of Chinese Communist intelligence penetration, you should set forth the following in future letters concerning Nationality Group Coverage - China:

1. A) An analysis of Chinese population in your Division with particular attention directed towards number of Chinese fraternal organizations and estimated membership, number of family associations and estimated membership, diplomatic establishments, Chinese student organizations, Chinese Study Centers, Chinese libraries, Chinese language classes and other areas of activity by persons of Chinese origin. Also include in this analysis the number of Chinese students at colleges and universities as well as the identities of the institutions of learning.

B) Identities of informants, PSIs or confidential sources who can provide information in these areas, with the specific area of coverage by each informant noted.

2. A listing of informants you have developed in logical target areas of Chinese Communist intelligence in your divisions with particular emphasis on scientists and other highly trained and educated individuals who possess knowledge, skills and access to information desired by the Chinese Communist government. In this regard several offices have received lists of scientists, including many of Chinese origin, who are attending conferences abroad at which Chinese Communist delegates will be present. It is also suggested that you keep a subject's informant potential in mind during investigations of Chinese aliens entering the United States.

3. A listing of organizations or individuals who are active in support of Communist China and informants reporting on each.

7/27/65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-41

- 5 -

You should contact the Immigration and Naturalization Service to obtain Chinese alien population figures and available information concerning Chinese in the United States on student visas.

It is my desire that we establish quality informant coverage in this field. You should insure that steps are taken to establish such coverage so that all possible Chinese Communist activities are covered.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

7/27/65  
SAC LETTER NO. 65-41

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 65-40

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

July 20, 1965

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) FBI SUGGESTION PROGRAM -- The following tabulations show the results of participation by the field in the FBI Suggestion Program during Fiscal Year 1965:

OFFICE	Suggestions	Adopted	Submissions		1964 Total	Change
			Agents	Clerks		
Albany	0	0	0	0	3	- 3
Albuquerque	12	1	6	6	11	+ 1
Anchorage	5	0	2	3	9	- 4
Atlanta	6	0	2	4	9	- 3
Baltimore	17	5	11	6	12	+ 5
Birmingham	6	1	3	3	2	+ 4
Boston	16	0	11	5	5	+11
Buffalo	7	0	2	5	2	+ 5
Butte	6	0	4	2	10	- 4
Charlotte	13	3	7	6	28	-15
Chicago	23	6	13	10	14	+ 9
Cincinnati	24	5	15	9	22	+ 2
Cleveland	15	4	8	7	18	- 3
Dallas	8	0	3	5	6	+ 2
Denver	7	0	4	3	5	+ 2
Detroit	15	1	7	8	10	+ 5
El Paso	12	5	2	10	16	- 4
Honolulu	2	0	0	2	10	- 8
Houston	4	1	2	2	5	- 1
Indianapolis	2	0	0	2	4	- 2
Jackson	2	0	2	0	0	+ 2
Jacksonville	0	0	0	0	5	- 5
Kansas City	12	1	8	4	16	- 4
Knoxville	6	1	3	3	6	---
Las Vegas	15	5	4	11	2	+13
Little Rock	3	1	1	2	6	- 3
Los Angeles	12	4	8	4	16	- 4
Louisville	10	1	8	2	3	+ 7
Memphis	6	1	2	4	6	---
Miami	6	0	3	3	9	- 3
Milwaukee	3	0	2	1	9	- 6
Minneapolis	4	0	4	0	6	- 2

<u>OFFICE</u>	<u>Suggestions</u>	<u>Adopted</u>	<u>Submissions</u>		<u>1964 Total</u>	<u>Change</u>
			<u>Agents</u>	<u>Clerks</u>		
Mobile	2	0	0	2	6	- 4
Newark	7	1	4	3	15	- 8
New Haven	7	1	5	2	7	---
New Orleans	10	2	9	1	2	+ 8
New York City	31	7	22	9	50	-19
Norfolk	6	2	4	2	6	---
Oklahoma City	20	2	19	1	17	+ 3
Omaha	3	0	2	1	2	+ 1
Philadelphia	15	2	5	10	11	+ 4
Phoenix	10	1	8	2	10	---
Pittsburgh	8	0	5	3	8	---
*Portland	14	3	7	7	1	+13
Richmond	6	1	4	2	6	---
Saint Louis	11	3	3	8	8	+ 3
Salt Lake City	5	0	4	1	4	+ 1
San Antonio	9	1	4	5	8	+ 1
San Diego	4	0	3	1	17	-13
San Francisco	17	2	12	5	31	-14
San Juan	6	1	4	2	6	---
Savannah	25	1	11	14	26	- 1
Seattle	19	1	18	1	20	- 1
Springfield	24	7	7	17	23	+ 1
Tampa	27	1	10	17	33	- 6
*Washington Field	25	10	21	4	26	- 1
Bern	3	0	2	1	3	---
Buenos Aires	0	0	0	0	0	---
Bonn	1	0	0	1	4	- 3
London	1	0	1	0	1	---
Manila	1	0	1	0	3	- 2
Mexico City	2	0	1	1	8	- 6
Ottawa	0	0	0	0	2	- 2
Paris	7	2	5	2	5	+ 2
Rio de Janeiro	1	0	1	0	0	+ 1
Rome	3	1	1	2	12	- 9
Santo Domingo	0	0	0	0	0	---
Tokyo	7	3	5	2	15	- 8
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>616</b>	<b>101</b>	<b>355</b>	<b>261</b>	<b>681</b>	<b>-65</b>

7/20/65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-40

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It should be noted that the Jackson Office was activated July 10, 1964, and Legal Attaches' Offices at Buenos Aires and Santo Domingo were established March 9, 1965, and June 2, 1965, respectively.

An asterisk preceding the office designation denotes that the office has a suggestion awaiting final resolution.

While there was a slight decline in the over-all total of suggestions submitted from 1089 in Fiscal Year 1964 to 1042 in Fiscal Year 1965, the percentage of adoptions was a respectable 29.2% and the anticipated tangible savings of almost \$45,500 surpassed the previous year's total.

I urge all of our employees to continue their support of this highly important program.

7/20/65  
SAC LETTER NO. 65-40

(B) REPORT WRITING - TITLES -- Part I, Section 49A, 6a, Page 42, of the Agents' Handbook and Part II, Section 4D, 1f, Pages 7 - 8a, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations set forth existing policy regarding information to be included in titles of Bureau reports.

The Bureau has noted an increasing number of investigative reports from the field have not set forth proper title information as directed by the manual provisions. Full, complete, and accurate title information is necessary for the proper and efficient processing of mail. You are directed to call to the attention of all appropriate personnel these manual provisions to insure the submission of correct title information.

7/20/65  
SAC LETTER NO. 65-40

(C) EVIDENCE - SUBMISSION OF -- Volume I, Section 8, Pages 1 - 3, of the Manual of Instructions sets forth existing policy regarding the submission of evidence to the Bureau for examination.

Bureau has noted recently a number of field offices are not properly marking as evidence the material being submitted. Instructions as set forth in the manual should be reiterated to appropriate personnel to insure that evidence being submitted for examination is properly identified as such.

7/20/65  
SAC LETTER NO. 65-40

- 3 -

(D) QUALITY WITHIN-GRADE INCREASES - FISCAL YEAR 1965 -- You are advised that during the fiscal year 1965 the Bureau granted 817 quality within-grade increases to its employees.

7/20/65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-40

(E) LIAISON COVERAGE IN FRENCH WEST INDIES AND FRENCH GUIANA BY SAN JUAN OFFICE -- Direct liaison has been established between our San Juan Office and a French official service in Guadeloupe, French West Indies, which will arrange for the handling of security, applicant, or criminal leads in the French West Indies or French Guiana. Leads for investigation in those areas should hereafter be referred to SAC, San Juan.

7/20/65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-40

(F) CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT OF 1964 - TRAINING - ARRESTS - SEARCHES AND SEIZURES -- The Special Agents who attended the Specialized In-Service on Legal Matters have completed the training and returned to their offices. During the two weeks at the Seat of Government they were given courses of unusual length and intensity in all of the principal areas of criminal law applicable to the work of this Bureau. The purpose was to fully acquaint one Agent from each office with the constantly increasing complexity of the law and the rules which it is necessary that we follow. As you were advised earlier, it is anticipated that the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, effective August 20, 1965, will accentuate some of our problems with the criminal law.

Each Special Agent who received this special training has been advised that he will be required to repeat the instruction bearing on arrest, search and seizure, and confession problems to all of the Special Agents assigned to his field office. This training must occupy a minimum of eight hours. The training program should not be given in eight hours on one day. It is suggested the lectures be given in two-hour sessions. Field Divisions with resident agencies may desire to arrange this training on a regional basis in their territories. You should make appropriate arrangements for this to be done, which includes allowing the instructor adequate time to prepare his own lecture material from the notes and case citations given to him. The decisions cited during the training at the Seat of Government must be reviewed by the instructor so that he will be familiar with them.

7/20/65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-40

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In teaching the subject of search and seizure the instructor may use the services of any other Agent who was given special training in that subject at the Bureau in 1962.

The required training for all Special Agents assigned to your office must be completed within 90 days of the date of this letter. Advise the Bureau by letter, attention of Training Division, upon completion.

7/20/65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-40

(G) OPTIMIST INTERNATIONAL RESPECT FOR LAW PROGRAM --  
Several months ago Dr. Carl L. Bowen, President of Optimist International, spoke with me about an idea his organization had to generate citizen support of law enforcement and to combat public apathy toward crime and the victims of crime. I liked the idea and promised our support and assistance.

Since that time personnel at Bureau Headquarters have worked with Optimist International staff members, counseling them on various phases of the program and providing information. I sent a representative to New Orleans to speak before the organization's convention on June 23, 1965, when the Respect for Law program was officially adopted.

Briefly, the program calls on local Optimist clubs to endeavor to mold public opinion through publicity and speeches. Its main objectives are to combat public apathy toward crime and criminals and to rekindle proper respect for the law; to encourage citizens to cooperate with law enforcement and to serve willingly as witnesses and on juries; and to acquaint the public with the duties and needs of law enforcement and to recognize outstanding services rendered by law enforcement officers.

Optimist International is preparing a handbook to send to each of its clubs with instructions and various other material needed for the implementation of this program. This suggests that local officials contact various representatives of law enforcement in their areas, including the FBI, as well as judges, clergymen and others.

You may be called on to participate in a radio or television interview or panel-type program regarding crime and the need for citizen support of law enforcement. Such requests should be handled as any other

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SAC LETTER NO. 65-40

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request for a public appearance. It you are called on for any statement regarding the Respect for Law program you should merely state that the FBI has assisted and counseled Optimist International in the creation of the program and that we support the stated aims. It should be clearly understood that the program was conceived and organized by Optimist International which is solely responsible for it.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

7/20/65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-40

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PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 65-C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

July 30, 1965

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

RE: TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT

Recently the indiscriminate use of certain items of so-called "bugging and snooping" equipment by certain Federal agencies has been the subject of Congressional criticism and has resulted in a great deal of publicity. As you are aware, the Bureau has always required that prior Bureau approval be obtained before utilizing telephone or microphone surveillances and other highly confidential techniques. In order that there may be no misunderstanding of the Bureau's desires in this area, the requirement for prior Bureau approval is being restated to specifically include, in addition to microphone and telephone technical surveillances, the utilization of any technical equipment for covert gathering of intelligence without the knowledge of the subject, such as X-ray mirrors, night viewing devices, concealed cameras, special surveillance trucks, portable concealed recorders, et cetera. The examples set forth are not meant to be all-inclusive, but are merely examples of the type of activity this current instruction is intended to cover. Each SAC will be held strictly responsible to insure that this instruction is carried out.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 65-D  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

August 9, 1965

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

RE: TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT

This is to reiterate long-standing instructions that technical equipment be maintained under tight inventory control at all times.

Each SAC will be held personally responsible for the accuracy of the entire inventory, particularly with reference to microphone and recording devices and other technical equipment for covert intelligence gathering purposes. Each SAC will also be held strictly accountable for rigid administrative controls to insure the proper use of this equipment with prior Bureau authority.

When equipment is no longer currently needed in your division, it should be promptly called to the Bureau's attention as available for return or possible use elsewhere.

During inspections your maintenance of these inventory records and your control over the use of technical equipment will be critically examined by the Inspector. The Inspector will also conduct an independent audit of your technical inventory records and will require full justification for all technical equipment maintained in your office as well as for the use to which it has been put since the last inspection.

You should afford this matter your continuing personal attention.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 65-E  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

August 12, 1965

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AGAINST  
CHINESE COMMUNIST INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES (CHICOIN)

In order that we may effectively combat the threat of Chinese Communist (Chicom) intelligence activity directed against the United States, the Bureau has embarked on an aggressive effort designed to place Bureau informants in a position to penetrate Chicom intelligence. You were provided previous information concerning this procedure in No Number SAC Letter 65-A dated May 4, 1965.

This endeavor represents a challenge to the resourcefulness and ingenuity of every Agent handling Chinese Communist matters. It is my earnest desire that all offices participate fully in this procedure, being alert to every opportunity to seize the initiative against this most dangerous enemy.

The following is set forth for your future guidance:

I. Direction of Bureau Informants to Areas of Chicom Activity

Each office should be constantly on the alert for opportunities to utilize established, reliable informants in this endeavor and to recruit new sources for future use in this procedure. Be especially alert to the use of Latin-American, Negro, and other non-Chinese sources.

Since these informants may be given very sensitive assignments, they should be brought into the Chicoin procedure with extreme care and under no circumstances should an informant be made aware that his mission is part of an over-all program. Contacts with informants should be well planned and well concealed and the utmost discretion should be exercised in insuring the informant's security.

In line with sound intelligence practice, these informants should normally be given test assignments to insure their reliability and determine the extent of their cooperation. Be constantly on the alert for possible compromise of the informant, especially if close relatives reside in China.

Upon selection of an informant for operation under the Chicoin procedure, field offices should advise the Bureau in complete detail of the plan you wish to initiate. Be certain to estimate and justify expenditure of funds involved.

Upon receipt of Bureau approval, submit the informant's identity, description, travel dates, and time and place of contemplated contact in a letterhead memorandum accompanied by a photo, if available.

## II. International Conferences

New York, San Francisco, and Washington Field Offices have been forwarding to all interested offices lists of United States delegates to international conferences attended by Chicom delegates.

The initial communication should have the dual caption "CHICOIN" and the name and place of the conference in the title. Delete "CHICOIN" from subsequent communications. Airtels should be used only if time demands.

Upon receipt of identities of United States residents planning to attend such conferences, offices involved should review indices. If the individual is an established source, he should be contacted and instructed on how to react to any intelligence recruitment approach and to be alert for such approaches to others in attendance from the United States.

It is not necessary to contact other persons on these lists; however, you should note that these individuals may possess excellent potential for future informant development.

The Bureau should be advised of all such contacts with these established sources and should you develop a specific plan for placing them in contact with a Chicom delegate, Bureau authority should be requested.

Should your office files contain information that an attendee has indicated a sympathy for Communist China or would likely be susceptible to a recruitment approach, you should open an individual case file, advise the Bureau by airtel and accompanying letterhead memorandum, and alert any sources who may be planning to attend the same conference.

8/12/65

NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 65-E - 2 -

### III. Directed Correspondence to the China Mainland

Several selected sources have been corresponding with individuals or government agencies in Communist China under Bureau direction. This is part of a long-range program to bring our sources to the attention of Chicom intelligence. It is aimed at promoting a personal meeting between our sources and Chicom intelligence at some future date and offices directing such correspondence should bear this in mind. While it is desirable to limit the number of sources engaging in such correspondence at any one time, all offices should be on the lookout for sources who can logically engage in this procedure.

Bureau authority should be requested prior to initiating correspondence.

In order to achieve the fullest measure of success in Chicoin, all offices should be constantly searching for new ideas and techniques to use in placing Bureau informants in touch with Chicom intelligence.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

8/12/65

NO NUMBER SAC. LETTER 65-E - 3 -



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 65-44

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

August 17, 1965

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) FLU INOCULATION PROGRAM - 1965-66 -- Inoculations which immunize against flu viruses for the coming fall and winter have again been recommended by the Surgeon General, U. S. Public Health Service. Such protection is considered especially important for persons engaged in essential occupations; for such groups of persons at all ages who suffer from chronic debilitating disease; older age groups; pregnant women and those in more crowded living arrangements. Flu shots will again be available to Bureau employees on a voluntary, cost-free basis. With the increased responsibilities placed upon the Bureau, employees should be urged to participate in this program. Your program should begin during September, 1965, if at all possible and should be completed by the end of the year.

There will again be no exceptions to your ordering vaccine from the Bureau, which is being supplied with vaccine in disposable, prefilled, single-dose syringes by a major drug firm. These syringes permit instant use as they contain premeasured doses and eliminate danger of cross-contamination. The Surgeon General's Advisory Committee again recommended that those vaccinated since July, 1963, need receive but a single dose of the vaccine. When ordering, specify the total number of employees requiring one shot and the total requiring two shots. The second shot should be administered approximately two months after the primary shot where applicable. Any particular vaccination problem should be resolved by the physician selected to supervise the program. Following completion of the program, any surplus should be returned to the Bureau. Submit your orders promptly.

Adult Waiver Form 3-343 or Minor Waiver Form 3-343a must be presented at the time the inoculation is received. Washington Field Office inoculations will again be handled by Seat of Government. The Imprest Fund may be used to pay for doctors' or other professional services provided these do not exceed \$100 for one day. If the charge is in excess of this amount, submit to the Bureau in accordance with existing procedures. Insure the doctor is well aware of the vaccine used which is again of the Polyvalent type, as well as of the recommended number of shots and interval between the initial and booster shots. Upon completion of the program, promptly advise the Bureau of your (a) total personnel; (b) number inoculated; (c) cost of doctor's fee (Bureau will have over-all cost of vaccine). Waiver forms are not to be placed in personnel files, but should be retained six months after which they should be destroyed.

(B) FIREARMS - PERSONALLY OWNED - .380 AUTOMATIC PISTOL --  
Inasmuch as the .380 automatic pistol (or 9 millimeter short cartridge  
for European weapons) fires a projectile having a muzzle energy of only  
199 foot-pounds, authority for Special Agents to carry this weapon in  
lieu of service revolvers should not be granted.

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SAC LETTER NO. 65-44

(C) ARREST AND ARRAIGNMENT - CONFESSIONS - RIGHT TO COUNSEL --  
It is generally believed by judges and other observers that after the Criminal  
Justice Act of 1964 takes effect on August 20, 1965, a larger percentage  
of criminal defendants in the Federal courts will be represented by counsel  
from the preliminary hearing forward. This prospect raises the question of  
an investigator's legal and ethical right to interview a defendant, for evidence  
of his own guilt, without consent of the defendant's counsel.

The Department of Justice has advised that neither the law nor  
any canon of professional ethics forbids an interview with an accused, held  
to obtain evidence of his own guilt, even where the accused already has  
counsel and counsel is unaware that the interview is being held. This applies  
to the accused in all cases, no matter whether interviewed before arrest,  
after arrest, after arrest and preliminary hearing, or after arrest and  
indictment. In each such case the canons of professional ethics do not apply  
to an FBI Agent or other investigator, and the accused can waive the  
presence or consent of counsel provided only that his choice to do so is  
made knowingly and intelligently.

The Department suggests, however, that at the beginning of an  
interview with an accused at any stage after preliminary hearing (when  
counsel probably has been appointed or retained) the interviewing Agent  
should specifically inquire of the accused whether counsel has been  
appointed for him or retained by him. If the answer is in the affirmative,  
the accused should be told that he has the right to confer with the named  
counsel before discussing his case if he wishes to do so. In other words,  
his waiver of counsel retained by him or appointed for him should be a  
waiver of specific counsel rather than a waiver of the right to counsel  
generally as in the case of an accused who has no counsel.

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It also is the view of the Department that all waivers of right to counsel and other rights, no matter the circumstances under which given, are "preferably" obtained in writing. After the warning is given orally - with specific mention of the right to silence as well as the right to counsel - it can be set out in writing, dated, signed, and witnessed. The interviewer may then proceed with the usual interview, and signed confession where possible.

If the accused will not sign the waiver but is willing to discuss his case, the interviewing Agents should read the waiver to him and then witness it as having been read to him and agreed to by him orally.

No warning or waiver of rights of any kind is required for interview of an accused for the sole purpose of obtaining evidence concerning the guilt of someone else.

Effective immediately, you will be guided by the above instructions.

8/17/65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-44

- 3 -

(D) CRIMINAL INFORMANT PROGRAM -- SAC Letters 64-56 (E) dated 11/17/64 and 65-10 (E) dated 3/9/65 dealt with reporting statistical accomplishments attributed to informants. SAC Letter 65-10 (E) inaugurated use of Form FD-374 for the Monthly Progress Letter to uniformly report these statistics and compile them through use of Automatic Data Processing equipment.

Inasmuch as statistics reported in this fashion are automatically recorded at the Bureau, accuracy and completeness in preparing Form FD-374 are of paramount importance for appropriate credit to be given to each field office. A six-month comparison of statistics found in active correspondence from the field with statistics reported in the Monthly Progress Letters revealed thirty-four field offices have failed at one time or another to incorporate all statistics in the Monthly Progress Letters. The accumulated total of statistics missed is impressive, i. e., twenty-eight subjects arrested in FBI cases, twelve automobiles recovered, etc.

Although the Bureau has separately corresponded with delinquent field offices concerning these unreported statistics, it is obvious all offices should re-examine administrative procedures for accumulating and reporting these statistics. Every effort should be made to eliminate inaccurate and incomplete compilation of the Form FD-374 and, as a result, unnecessary follow-up correspondence from the Bureau.

It is of value to every field office to obtain credit for each statistic attributed to its informants. These statistics are recorded at the Bureau on a monthly comparison chart which is used to evaluate the effectiveness of the program in each field office and on a Bureau-wide basis. This emphasis on statistics, however, should not cause any sacrifice in accuracy and all Agents should be reminded that the field office files should clearly document all statistics reported and attributed to informants.

(Security Letters on attached pages)

8/17/65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-44

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(E) SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS -- The complex issues involved in both domestic and international matters are placing an increasing daily burden on the Bureau, particularly in regard to internal security matters, to obtain and disseminate pertinent information at all levels of the Government. To date, the Bureau has been able to fulfill its responsibilities primarily because we have developed, through unique and imaginative approaches, live sources who are in a position to furnish us with the desired information. As the demands upon us for information intensify, it becomes increasingly imperative that we develop even more high-level sources familiar with all phases of the internal security problems confronting us. In this regard, I would like to remind you that there is no substitute for aggressive, penetrative, hard-hitting investigative efforts aimed at the development of outstanding sources through whom we can continue to obtain the type of information which will enable the Bureau to stay on top of the situation in all areas of the internal security field where we are expected and, in fact, where we have a responsibility to be knowledgeable. I expect you to continually stress the value of live informant coverage and to emphasize programs designed to provide high-level informant coverage in all subversive groups.

8/17/65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-44

(F) INVESTIGATION OF STUDENT GROUPS ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES -- With the opening of the schools and colleges this fall, we can expect a resurgence of the new radical movement which emerged on college campuses throughout the nation during the past year. This movement has presented the Communist Party and other subversive organizations with an opportunity to expand their influence among youth. In order to fulfill our responsibilities in the internal security field, we must keep abreast of the activities of these subversive groups on college campuses.

It must be recognized, however, that we are dealing with an extremely controversial situation; and we must conduct the necessary investigations of these groups in such a manner that the Bureau will not be subjected to even unwarranted charges of interference with academic freedom, invasion of privacy, and the like.

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SAC LETTER NO. 65-44

- 5 -

You should insure that a sound basis exists for the investigation of the activities of any organization which is in any way connected with an institution of learning; and Bureau authority should, of course, be obtained before instituting any such investigation. A sharp distinction must be made between student radicalism and unconventional views on the one hand and subversive activities on the other. It must be made clear to all concerned that the Bureau is interested only in persons and organizations engaged in subversive activities on the campus and is not interested in the legitimate activities of student groups. Because of the delicate nature of these investigations, it is essential that we use a confidential approach and work through established reliable sources rather than conduct open investigations that can result in criticism. Stress must be placed on more ingenuity, more care, and greater protective steps so that the Bureau will not be charged with violating academic freedom or with invasion of privacy.

I wish to reiterate that personnel engaged in this work must exercise sound mature judgment, prudence, and extreme care in conducting investigations regarding subversive groups on college campuses.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

8/17/65  
SAC LETTER NO. 65-44

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

August 25, 1965

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(A)~ SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION CHARACTERIZATIONS - INTERNAL SECURITY - C -- Set forth below are up-to-date thumbnail sketches of organizations and publications, each of which is of use to various field offices. No attempt is made to include all sketches which have been furnished to the Bureau for approval; only those sketches which are believed to have field-wide application are set forth.

In the event an office needs to characterize an organization not mentioned in this letter, listed in the various issues of the "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications" published by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, or designated by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450, a request should be made of the office of origin to furnish the required characterization. In describing a local affiliate of a national organization, in addition to characterizing the local affiliate, it will be necessary to set forth separately the characterization of the parent organization.

The evaluation and identities of the sources should be handled in accordance with instructions set forth in Part I, Section 49B 2m (1) (d), page 65, of the FBI Handbook.

For the purpose of evaluation, all sources utilized in the preparation of the sketches listed below should be described as having furnished reliable information in the past. In each sketch utilized below, the field office submitting the sketch has advised that careful consideration was given to each source concealed.

AMERICAN COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION

The April, 1965, issue of the "ACA News," official publication of the American Communications Association (ACA), shows that the ACA is located at 18 John Street, New York, New York.

The "Report of the International Executive Board, ACA, CIO" at the 5th National Convention, Chicago, Illinois, April 8 through 13, 1940, discloses the ACA had its origin at the 3rd National Convention of the American Radio Telegraphists Association (ARTA) held in New York City in August, 1937. At this convention, it was agreed to change the name of the union from ARTA to ACA. This change was ratified by the union members on March 10, 1938.

The "Directory of National and International Labor Unions in the United States, 1955," published by the United States Department of Labor, lists on page 4 unions expelled from the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) on charges of communist domination. ACA was listed as having been expelled on June 15, 1950.

"AMERICAN DIALOG"

A source stated during June, 1964, Joseph Felshin advised former subscribers to the magazine "Mainstream" that "Mainstream" had ceased publication with its August, 1963, issue and had been replaced by a new bimonthly publication entitled "American Dialog" with Joseph North as editor.

It is to be noted that the July-August, 1964, issue of "American Dialog," Volume I, Number I, contains the statement in its masthead, "American Dialog is published bimonthly by Dialogue Publications, 853 Broadway, New York... Copyright 1964, by Dialogue Publications, Inc...."

A second source advised during December, 1959, that on December 13, 1959, Joseph Felshin attended the 17th National Convention of the Communist Party, USA (CP, USA), held from December 10, 1959, through December 13, 1959, in New York City.

This second source advised on May 27, 1963, that Joseph North was present at an enlarged meeting of the National Executive Committee of the CP, USA, held in New York City on May 23, 1963.

8-25-65  
SAC LETTER NO. 65-47

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The Address Telephone Directory for the Borough of Manhattan, New York City, as published by the New York Telephone Company on April 6, 1965, lists Dialogue Publications, Inc., as being located at 853 Broadway, New York, New York.

(The characterization of "Mainstream" contained in the "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications" issued by the House Committee on Un-American Activities dated December 1, 1961, must be used whenever the above thumbnail sketch is utilized.)

Sources: -----

AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR MARXIST STUDIES

A source advised on April 9, 1963, that on April 7, 1963, at a meeting of the New England District Committee, Communist Party, United States of America (CP, USA), held in Boston, Massachusetts, Herbert Aptheker stated he was developing an organization called American Institute for Marxist Studies (AIMS), which would eventually legalize the CP. He stated AIMS would publish literature on history, science, physics, archeology, and other subjects which would be put out quarterly with various supplements.

A second source advised in December, 1959, that Herbert Aptheker was elected to the National Committee, CP, USA, at the 17th National Convention of the CP, USA, held in December, 1959.

A third source advised on June 7, 1963, that on June 3, 1963, Herbert Aptheker spoke at the CP, USA, New York District Board meeting concerning AIMS. Aptheker stated that AIMS would unite and strengthen the CP although the CP would not be connected with it. He stated AIMS was being formed to operate within the scope of the McCarran and Smith Acts and would legally bring Marxist material and opinions to the attention of American scholars and the general public.

A fourth source advised that as of May 7, 1965, AIMS was located at 20 East 30th Street, New York City.

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SAC LETTER NO. 65-47

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Sources:

AMTORG TRADING CORPORATION

Amtorg Trading Corporation (ATC), according to records of the New York County Clerk, is a New York corporation formed in 1924. It has acted since then as a buying and selling agency in the United States for the Soviet Government. Since 1949, it has been registered with the United States Department of Justice under the provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended.

COMMITTEE TO SECURE JUSTICE FOR MORTON SOBELL

"Following the execution of atomic spies Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, in June, 1953, the 'Communist campaign assumed a different emphasis. Its major effort centered upon Morton Sobell, the Rosenbergs' codefendant. The National Committee to Secure Justice in the Rosenberg Case - a Communist front which had been conducting the campaign in the United States - was reconstituted as the National Rosenberg - Sobell Committee at a conference in Chicago in October, 1953, and then the National Committee to Secure Justice for Morton Sobell in the Rosenberg Case'..."

("Guide to Subversive Control Organizations and Publications," dated December 1, 1961, issued by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, page 116.)

In September, 1954, the name "National Committee to Secure Justice for Morton Sobell" appeared on literature issued by the Committee. In March, 1955, the current name, "Committee to Secure Justice for Morton Sobell" first appeared on literature issued by the Committee.

The Address Telephone Directory for the Borough of Manhattan, New York City, as published by the New York Telephone Company on April 6, 1965, lists the Committee to Secure Justice for Morton Sobell as being located at 150 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York.

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SAC LETTER NO. 65-47

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FOUR CONTINENT BOOK CORPORATION

According to the records of the Foreign Agents Registration Section, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., the Four Continent Book Corporation, 156 5th Avenue, New York City, is registered under the provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended. One of the foreign principals listed in this registration is the Mezhdunarodnaja Kniga (International Book), Moscow, USSR.

FREEDOMWAYS ASSOCIATES, INCORPORATED

The records of the New York Secretary of State, Albany, New York, show the certificate of incorporation of Freedomways Associates, Inc., was filed on March 2, 1961.

The Winter, 1965, issue of "Freedomways" is self-described as "A Quarterly Review of the Negro Freedom Movement," published by Freedomways Associates, Inc., 799 Broadway, New York City. This issue lists John Henrik Clarke as Associate Editor, Esther Jackson as Managing Editor and John L. Devine as Art Editor of the publication.

A source made available information on July 1, 1964, disclosing that John Henrik Clarke attended the first and founding meeting of the American Institute for Marxist Studies (AIMS) which was held on December 19, 1963, and continued on January 10, 1964.

This source also made available information on August 14, 1964, disclosing Clarke is an "associate" of AIMS.

The Winter, 1963, issue of "Freedomways," page 44, states that Esther Jackson became one of the leaders of the Southern Negro Youth Congress (SNYC), which existed from 1937 to 1949. The SNYC has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

According to a second source, Esther Jackson is the wife of James Jackson, whom the source identified on October 14, 1964, as being a member of the National Committee of the Communist Party, USA (CP, USA).

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On January 30, 1961, Sylvia M. Brenner Devine, 415 South 50th Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, advised that her former husband, Jack Devine, mentioned on December 17, 1960, he was still in the CP and the CP is his whole life.

On July 24, 1963, a third source described John Devine as a CP member.

On May 24, 1961, a fourth source advised that a report was given on "Freedomways" at a meeting of the National Board, CP, USA, held on that date. It was stated that the original plan called for the publication to be openly Marxist, but that it was later decided it would not be avowedly a Marxist publication. Editorials are in the hands of a mixed group of Marxists and non-Marxists. It was stated that the central purpose of "Freedomways" is to develop a theory and positive criticism of currents in the Negro movement, as well as to raise the level of understanding and discussion taking place in Negro life today and to project a socialist and pro-Soviet orientation.

On May 25, 1961, the fourth source advised that "Freedomways" was set up for the CP, USA, by James Jackson.

Sources:

#### FRUIT OF ISLAM

On May 7, 1965, a source advised the Fruit of Islam (FOI) is a group within the Nation of Islam (NOI) composed of male members of the NOI. The purpose of the FOI is to protect officials and property of the NOI, assure compliance of members with NOI teachings, and to prepare for the "War of Armageddon." Members of the FOI are required to participate in military drill and afforded the opportunity to engage in judo training. The FOI is governed by a military system wherein the members are controlled by general orders similar to those issued by regular military organizations..

Source:

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"INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST REVIEW"

The November 27, 1961, issue of "The Militant," a weekly newspaper of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), described the "International Socialist Review" as "a magazine reflecting the viewpoint of the SWP."

The Spring, 1965, issue of "International Socialist Review" described the magazine as a quarterly publication located at 116 University Place, New York City.

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

INTOURIST

Intourist, 355 Lexington Avenue, New York City, on June 23, 1959, in registering with the United States Department of Justice under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, listed its business as "travel" and its principal as "V. A. O. Intourist, Moscow, USSR."

"LABOR TODAY"

In January, 1962, a source advised that on January 13, 1962, Gus Hall, General Secretary of the Communist Party, USA, remarked that a Party-supported trade-union publication would be issued in the near future and would appear under the name "Labor Today."

On January 5, 1962, records in the Assumed Name Section of the County Clerk's Office, Wayne County, Detroit, Michigan, indicated Certificate Number 145344, issued for conducting business under an assumed name, was issued to "Labor Today" (a bimonthly publication) having a business address at 12065 Wyoming, Detroit 4, Michigan. A certificate was filed on January 2, 1962, and the names of the persons listed as owning, conducting and transacting the business were: Charles H. Walters, 9309 Memorial, Detroit, Michigan, and Eve Neidelman, 19972 Marlowe, Detroit, Michigan.

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A second source advised on December 15, 1961, that Charles Walters was then a member of the Michigan District Communist Party (MDCP) State Committee. This source advised on September 18, 1959, that Eve Neidelman was then a member of the MDCP State Committee.

A third source advised on September 21, 1961, that as of September 17, 1961, Eve Neidelman was a member of the North-West Section Club of the MDCP.

The Founding Statement contained in the first issue of "Labor Today" (Spring, 1962), indicated two additional issues would be forthcoming in 1962 and beginning in 1963 "Labor Today" would appear regularly as a "bi-monthly journal."

The masthead of "Labor Today," Volume 4, Number 2, April-May, 1965, issue describes the publication as "An Independent Journal of Discussion." Its managing editor is Charles H. Walters and business and editorial offices are located at 12065 Wyoming, Suite 5, Detroit, Michigan.

Sources:

### MARXIST YOUTH PUBLICATIONS, ASSOCIATES

The masthead of "Communist Viewpoint" discloses it is published by Marxist Youth Publications, Associates, 23 West 26th Street, New York, New York. It is self-described as a publication of the Youth Division, Communist Party, United States of America.

### MAY 2 MOVEMENT

A source advised on March 3, 1965, as follows:

The May 2 Movement (M2M) is the name used by the May 2 Committee which was organized on March 14, 1964, at New Haven, Connecticut, by a group of young people participating in a symposium, "Socialism in America," being held at Yale University. The original aim of the M2M was to plan and execute a demonstration in New York City on May 2, 1964, demanding withdrawal of United States troops from Vietnam.

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The M2M is dominated and controlled by the Progressive Labor Party (PLP) and has as its aims and purpose the embarrassment of the United States Government by meetings, rallies, picketing demonstrations and formation of university-level clubs at which a Marxist-Leninist oriented approach and analysis are taken of United States domestic and foreign policies.

This source advised on May 19, 1965, that the current headquarters of the M2M is 640 Broadway, New York City, Room 307.

Source:

### MUSLIM GIRLS TRAINING

On May 19, 1960, a source advised the Muslim Girls Training (MGT) is a group within the Nation of Islam (NOI) and is composed of all female members of the NOI. The MGT is similar in structure to the Fruit of Islam (FOI), which is composed of male members of the NOI, in that the MGT has officers similar to military organizations to whom other female members are accountable. MGT members receive instructions in homemaking, hygiene, calisthenics and other subjects, such as Muslim history and the English language. There also exists a Junior MGT which is composed of female members of the NOI who are between the ages of 15 and 19 who are afforded military-type drill.

Since 1957, various officers and "sisters" of the MGT have, at meetings of the MGT, used the term MGT so that it also means General Civilization Class. General Civilization Class refers to classes conducted within the MGT.

The above refers to activities of the MGT at Muhammad's Temple of Islam, Number 2, 5335 South Greenwood, Chicago, Illinois.

On May 3, 1965, another source advised that, in theory, the MGT exists in all temples of the NOI and is patterned after the MGT at Muhammad's Temple of Islam, Number 2, Chicago.

Sources:

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## NATION OF ISLAM

In January, 1957, a source advised Elijah Muhammad has described his organization on a nationwide basis as the "Nation of Islam" and "Muhammad's Temples of Islam."

On May 7, 1965, a second source advised Elijah Muhammad is the national leader of the Nation of Islam (NOI); Muhammad's Temple of Islam Number 2, 5335 South Greenwood Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, is the national headquarters of the NOI; and in mid-1960 Muhammad and other NOI officials, when referring to Muhammad's organization on a nationwide basis, commenced using either "Mosque" or "Temple" when mentioning one of "Muhammad's Temples of Islam."

The NOI is an all-Negro organization which was originally organized in 1930 in Detroit, Michigan. Muhammad claims to have been selected by Allah, the Supreme Being, to lead the so-called Negro race out of slavery in the wilderness of North America by establishing an independent black nation in the United States. Members following Muhammad's teachings and his interpretation of the "Koran" believe there is no such thing as a Negro; the so-called Negroes are slaves of the white race, referred to as "white devils," in the United States; and the white race, because of its exploitation of the so-called Negroes, must and will be destroyed in the approaching "War of Armageddon."

In the past, officials and members of the NOI, including Muhammad, have refused to register under the provisions of the Selective Service Acts and have declared that members owe no allegiance to the United States.

On May 5, 1958, the first source advised Muhammad had, upon advice of legal counsel, tempered his personal statements and instructions to his ministers concerning the principles of his organization in order to avoid possible prosecution by the United States Government; however, he did not indicate any fundamental changes in the teachings of his organization.

On May 3, 1965, a third source advised Muhammad had, early in July, 1958, decided to de-emphasize the religious aspects of the teachings of Islam and to stress the economic benefits to be derived by those Negroes who joined the NOI.

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This policy change, according to Muhammad, would help him acquire additional followers and create more interest in his programs.

Sources:

NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO ABOLISH THE HOUSE  
UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES COMMITTEE

The "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications" issued December 1, 1961, by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, page 115, contains the following citation regarding the National Committee to Abolish the "Un-American Activities Committee (NCAUAC).

"Cited as a 'new organization' set up in the Summer of 1960 to 'lead and direct the Communist Party's 'Operation Abolition' campaign. Seven of the national leaders of this group have been identified as Communists."

A source has advised that the NCAUAC changed its name on March 3, 1962, to include the word "House" in its name, thereby becoming known as the National Committee to Abolish the House Un-American Activities Committee (NCAHUAC).

A second source advised on June 28, 1965, that as of that date the NCAHUAC continued to function with headquarters at 555 North Western Avenue, Los Angeles, California.

Sources:

"POLITICAL AFFAIRS"

"Political Affairs" is self-described as the theoretical journal of the Communist Party, United States of America.

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PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY

(Utilize the current approved thumbnail sketch set forth in SAC Letter 65-36 (D), dated June 29, 1965.)

REVOLUTIONARY ACTION MOVEMENT

On November 3, 1964, a source made available a document entitled "The Revolutionary Action Movement Manifesto," the document having been obtained by the source from an individual known to be a member of the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM).

This document stated, in part, that RAM was officially organized in the Winter of 1963 by Afro-Americans who support the revolutionary objectives of Robert F. Williams, now residing in Cuba, and his concept of organized violence to achieve the liberation of the Afro-American people in the United States. This Manifesto disclosed that RAM had oriented its program to one of education and political revolution and the organization of a "black" political party with revolutionary objectives, having recognized the need for a "black revolution" that could and would seize power. RAM philosophy is described in this document as one of revolutionary nationalism, that is, one involving the struggles of the nonwhite races of the world against exploitation and enslavement by the white capitalist and imperialist nations.

Regarding Williams, it should be noted that on August 28, 1961, a Federal warrant was issued at Charlotte, North Carolina, charging him with Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution for the crime of kidnapping. Subsequent to the issuance of this warrant, Williams fled the United States to Cuba, where he now publishes a monthly newsletter entitled "The Crusader" from Havana.

This source in September, 1964, advised RAM is dedicated to the overthrow of the capitalist system in the United States, by violence if necessary, and to its replacement by a socialistic system oriented toward the Chinese communist interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. RAM is entirely nonwhite in membership, clandestine in nature, and owes its primary allegiance to the "Bandung World," that is, the nonwhite races of the world rather than to any national entity, as such.

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On November 16, 1964, a second source advised he learned recently from an RAM member that the organization began in Detroit, Michigan, largely under the impetus of Don Freeman, described as the "Father" of RAM and referred to as RAM's "Black Stalin." Freeman served as RAM Chairman, with Maxwell Stanford, now of New York City, formerly of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, serving as RAM Field Chairman.

This source stated in May, 1965, there has been no formal headquarters, as such, for RAM but that headquarters have been with Freeman since he has played such a dominant role in the leadership of and has directed the policies and activities of the organization.

Within recent months, according to the second source, dissension within RAM has become evident and some dissatisfaction with Freeman's leadership has arisen. So far as is known, however, he remains the titular leader of RAM.

To date, according to the second source in May, 1965, RAM has organized units and membership in several of the larger cities in the United States east of the Mississippi River and the organization is currently active in attempting to recruit new members and expand its sphere of influence.

Sources:

#### SOVFOTO AGENCY

According to the records of the Foreign Agents Registration Section, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., the Sovfoto Agency, Room 1008, 25 West 43rd Street, New York, New York, is registered with the Department of Justice as agent for Mezhdunarodnaja Kniga (International Book), Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), for the sale of Soviet books, articles, stories, and plays for publication in the United States and Canada. Sovfoto is also registered as an agent for Fotokhronika Tass (the telegraphic agency of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) for the sale of Soviet newspapers and photographs and for eleven other foreign principals, including China Photo Service, Peking, China. Other names also used by Sovfoto are Eastfoto Agency and Am-Rus Literary and Music Agency.

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STUDENT COMMITTEE FOR TRAVEL TO CUBA

"The Columbia Owl," weekly student newspaper of Columbia University, New York City, December 12, 1962, issue, page one, contained an article entitled "Students to Visit Cuba During Holidays." This article stated in part that the Ad Hoc Student Committee for Travel to Cuba was formed October 14, 1962, by a group of students from New York City universities, the University of Wisconsin, Oberlin College, and the University of North Carolina, who stated that as students they would like a chance to see and evaluate the situation in Cuba for themselves and had received an offer of transportation and two weeks' stay in Cuba from the Federation of University Students in Havana, as guests of the Federation. The Committee accepted the offer and applied to the State Department of the United States for passport validation which was refused; however, over fifty students planned to defy the State Department ban and go to Cuba.

A source advised on December 6, 1962, it was learned the Ad Hoc Student Committee for Travel to Cuba had recently been formed by the Progressive Labor Group.

A second source advised on September 13, 1963, that during the Summer of 1963, fifty-nine individuals traveled to Cuba; the leaders of the group were members of the Progressive Labor Movement; and the trip was planned and organized by Progressive Labor Movement members.

A third source advised on October 9, 1963, the Student Committee for Travel to Cuba was utilizing Post Office Box 2178, New York, New York, as its mailing address.

On March 12, 1965, Philip Abbott Luce, 504 West 55th Street, New York, New York, a self-admitted member of the Student Committee for Travel to Cuba Executive Committee and the Progressive Labor Movement National Coordinating Committee, advised as follows:

The Student Committee for Travel to Cuba (SCTC) was formerly known as the Ad Hoc Student Committee for Travel to Cuba and the Permanent Student Committee for Travel to Cuba.

Luce was a leader and participant of the 1963 trip to Cuba and an organizer of the 1964 trip to Cuba and both trips were sponsored by the SCTC.

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By the Spring of 1964, the Executive Committee of the SCTC was considered to be members of the Progressive Labor Movement.

No trip to Cuba or China was being planned by the SCTC for 1965.

Sources:

### TASS NEWS AGENCY

The Tass News Agency is the official Soviet Government news-gathering organization with headquarters in Moscow, USSR, and branches throughout the world.

### "THE MILITANT"

"The Militant" is a weekly newspaper of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), which has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

### UNITED ELECTRICAL, RADIO AND MACHINE WORKERS OF AMERICA

The "UE Shop Steward Guide," United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE) Publication Number 212, Sixth Edition, 1952, discloses on pages 32-34, "UE - the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America" was established in 1936 at a convention in Buffalo, New York. At that time the organization was called the United Electrical and Radio Workers of America. Shortly thereafter, a large group of American Federation of Labor machinists' locals joined the UE and the full name became the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE).

The UE is known as an "International Union" because companies of both the United States and Canada are under contract.

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"100 Things You Should Know About Communism and Labor," prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities, United States House of Representatives, Washington, D. C., 1951, discloses the following information: In 1944, the Committee on Un-American Activities found the "United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (CIO)" to be one of the unions which was described as having "Communist leadership...strongly entrenched." The "United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America" was listed as one of the unions which was expelled from the Congress of Industrial Organizations in 1950 because of its communist domination.

The "Internal Security Annual Report for 1957, Report of the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate," on page 61, refers to UE as "one of the strongest Communist controlled unions in America."

The international headquarters of UE is located at 11 East 51st Street, New York, New York, according to the April 19, 1965, edition of "UE News," official organ of UE.

#### "YOUNG SOCIALIST"

The "Young Socialist" is a magazine published five times a year by the Young Socialist Alliance. The October, 1964, edition, the initial edition utilizing the magazine format, indicates that this magazine succeeded the "Young Socialist" newspaper in an effort to provide "more facts on more general issues than a small newspaper can."

The newspaper "Young Socialist" has been described as the official organ of the Young Socialist Alliance.

The "Young Socialist" maintains headquarters at Room 631, 41 Union Square West, New York City, and the mailing address is P. O. Box 471, Cooper Station, New York, New York, 10003.

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YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE

The May, 1960, issue of the "Young Socialist" ("YS"), page 1, column 3, disclosed that during April 15-17, 1960, a national organization entitled "Young Socialist Alliance" (YSA) was established at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This issue stated this organization was formed by the nationwide supporter clubs of the publication "YS."

The above issue, page 6, set forth the Founding Declaration of YSA. This declaration stated YSA recognizes the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) as the only existing political leadership on class struggle principles, and that the supporters of the "YS" have come into basic political solidarity with the SWP on the principles of revolutionary socialism.

A source advised on May 7, 1965, that the original YSA was an organization formed during October, 1957, in New York City, by youth of various left-socialist tendencies, particularly members and followers of the SWP. The leaders of this group were the guiding forces in the establishment of the national organization.

The source further advised on May 7, 1965, YSA is dominated and controlled on a national basis by the SWP through having SWP members comprise exclusively the National Executive Committee (NEC) and through an official SWP representative at all YSA NEC meetings. The YSA, in reality, is the youth and training section of the SWP and the main source of new SWP members.

The headquarters of the YSA is located in Room 631, 41 Union Square West, New York City.

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Source:

W.E.B. DU BOIS CLUBS OF AMERICA

A source advised on October 26-27, 1963, a conference of members of the Communist Party, USA (CP, USA), including national functionaries, met in Chicago, Illinois, for the purpose of setting in motion forces for the establishment of

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a new national Marxist-oriented youth organization which would hunt for the most peaceful transition to socialism. The delegates to this meeting were cautioned against the germ of anti-Soviet and anti-CP ideologies. These delegates were also told that it would be reasonable to assume that the young socialists attracted into this new organization would eventually pass into the CP itself.

A second conference of over 20 persons met in Chicago on December 23-29, 1963, for the purpose of initiating a "call" to the new youth organization and planning for a founding convention to be held in June, 1964.

A second source has advised that the Founding Convention for the new youth organization was held during the period of June 19-21, 1964, at 150 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California, at which time the name W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America was adopted. Approximately 500 delegates from throughout the United States attended this convention. The aims of this organization, as set forth in the preamble to the constitution, are: "It is our belief that this nation can best solve its problems in an atmosphere of peaceful co-existence, complete disarmament and true freedom for all peoples of the world, and that these solutions will be reached mainly through the united efforts of all democratic elements in our country, composed essentially of the working people allied in the unity of Negroes and other minorities with whites. We further fully recognize that the greatest threat to American democracy comes from the racist and right wing forces in coalition with the most reactionary sections of the economic power structure, using the tool of anti-communism to divide and destroy the unified struggle of the working people. As young people in the forces struggling for democracy, we shall actively strive to defeat these reactionary and neo-fascist elements and to achieve complete freedom and democracy for all Americans, thus enabling each individual to freely choose and build the society he would wish to live in. Through these struggles we feel the American people will realize the viability of the socialist alternatives."

The constitution further states this new organization shall be a membership organization open to individuals or, if five or more people so desire, a chapter can be formed which shall in turn be guided by the policies and principles of the parent organization.

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The second source advised in April, 1965, the headquarters of the organization continues to be located at 1953 1/2 McAllister Street, San Francisco, California.

Both sources have advised that at the Founding Convention two officers were elected: Philip Chapin Davis - President; Carl Ellenger Bloice - Publications Chairman.

A third source advised on October 26, 1962, Philip Davis attended a CP recruiting class held at 1579 Scenic Avenue, Berkeley, California.

A fourth source advised that Carl Bloice, reporter for the "People's World," was, on April 3, 1964, elected to the newly organized San Francisco County Committee of the CP.

The "People's World" is a west coast communist newspaper published weekly in San Francisco, California.

Sources:

"WORKERS WORLD"

On May 3, 1965, a source advised the "Workers World," published twice monthly, is the official newspaper of the Workers World Party, with editorial offices located at 46 West 21st Street, New York, New York.

Source:

WORKERS WORLD PARTY

On April 17, 1959, a source advised that on February 12, 1959, a Socialist Workers Party (SWP) minority group, under the leadership of National Committee member, Sam Ballan, split from the SWP.

The source stated this minority group, referred to as the Marcyites, after many years of program and policy

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differences on varied issues concerning tactics and interpretation of political events split from the SWP on the grounds that the Party was liquidating itself by departing from the Marxist precepts of Leon Trotsky and retreating from the fight for the world socialist revolution. The final issue which ultimately forced the split was the minority's opposition to the SWP regroupment policy which involved cooperation with the Communist Party (CP) periphery - individuals characterized by the minority as petty-bourgeois.

The minority program, according to the source, advocates unconditional defense of the Soviet Union and has as its goal the building of a revolutionary party with a complete proletarian orientation for the purpose of overthrowing capitalism in the United States and throughout the world.

On May 12, 1960, the source advised this minority group had chosen the name Workers World Party.

On May 3, 1965, a second source advised the Workers World Party, which maintains headquarters at 46 West 21st Street, New York, New York, supports the People's Republic of China in its ideological dispute with the Soviet Union.

The SWP and the CP have been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Sources:

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 65-50

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

September 7, 1965

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(A) U. S. SAVINGS BONDS - CHANGE IN METHOD OF DATING -- There is enclosed Department Circular Number 677, Second Revision, Amendment Number 10, issued by the Treasury Department on August 12, 1965.

This Circular advises of a change in rules on average-dating of savings bonds and is self-explanatory. The primary purpose of this change is to effect significant paper work savings by minimizing the use of the \$25 bond denomination. The advantage to employees will be the possibility of an earlier issue date for bonds of \$50 or more in denominations which, of course, creates an earlier point for the beginning of interest earnings and an earlier maturity date.

All employees of your office should be advised of the contents of the enclosed Circular.

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(B) DISSEMINATION OF CRIMINAL INFORMATION TO OTHER AGENCIES -- Reference is made to SAC Letters 59-30 (E), 59-43 (I), 60-17 (C), 63-43 (A), and 64-52 (F).

A review of the monthly tabulation of items of criminal information disseminated to other Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies during July, 1965, reveals a substantial drop from the number of items disseminated during the first month of the previous fiscal year.

While it is anticipated that the reduction represents a temporary situation, I would like to stress at this point the importance to the Bureau, in particular, and to law enforcement, in general, of an effective program of mutual cooperation in this vital area. Experience has shown that the exchange of such information not only improves the Bureau's working relations with other investigative agencies but also frequently results in the uncovering of criminal violations within our jurisdiction as well as theirs.

Each Special Agent in Charge should immediately examine his own dissemination program in order to make certain that all Agents and supervisory personnel are aware of the importance of promptly furnishing appropriate information to other agencies and of claiming full credit for all items disseminated in the statistical summary submitted to the Bureau under this program at the end of each month. The results of this program are being closely followed at the Seat of Government.

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(C) LATENT FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE TAPE -- A new pressure sensitive tape has been made up for use throughout the Bureau to label containers such as envelopes and boxes which enclose evidence to be treated for latent fingerprints. The purpose of the tape is twofold - to "flag" evidence to be treated for latent fingerprints so that it is handled properly and to serve as a label which can be marked and identified by Agents collecting evidence. The tape contains a small block which is provided for pen or pencil notations.

Each office is being furnished fifteen rolls of this tape under separate cover. The rolls are of a size that fit in regular tape dispensers. You should advise all Agents in your office concerning the purpose and use of this tape.

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(D) ASSIGNMENT CARD SYSTEM -- Effective immediately the Master Assignment Cards shall be maintained under lock at all times they are not actually being worked on. During evening and night shifts it will be permissible for the senior clerical employee on duty to have access to the cards.

If your office is operating an approved four-card system, the copies filed behind the name of the Agent to whom case assigned need not be maintained under lock.

The case ticklers maintained by the supervisors must also be maintained under lock except when actually in use.

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Also effective immediately all closed files and referred upon completion files must be pulled on tickler and personally checked by the supervisor. The extent of actual review of closed files and referred upon completion files is optional, but of primary importance is that the supervisor actually should see each file prior to destroying the tickler. Each supervisor must assume full responsibility for the status and existence of each file.

Appropriate manual changes will follow.

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(E) FEDERAL RESERVE ACT MATTERS - BANK TERMINOLOGY -- There is enclosed for each office a pamphlet entitled "Bank Terminology" to be utilized as reference material in connection with the handling of Federal Reserve Act cases. It is felt that the contents of this pamphlet will help to standardize the terminology used in Federal Reserve Act investigative reports and will tend to eliminate the use of colloquial expressions in such reports. Agents handling this classification should familiarize themselves with this pamphlet and should be encouraged to utilize the standardized terminology where possible.

(Security Letter on attached pages)

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(F) VISITORS TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND CONTACTS WITH CHINESE COMMUNIST DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS -- In connection with the Bureau's intensified efforts to cover Chinese communist activities in the United States, arrangements have been made with other U. S. intelligence agencies, as well as with friendly foreign intelligence services, to provide the Bureau with the identities of U. S. residents (either citizens or resident aliens) who have traveled to Communist China or plan such travel or who have been in contact with Chinese communist diplomatic establishments abroad. Other U. S. agencies, as well as Western intelligence services, are sharply accelerating coverage of Chinese intelligence activities abroad and the Bureau has already started to receive the identities of U. S. citizens and resident aliens visiting Communist China or in contact with Chinese communist establishments overseas.

With regard to individuals in contact with Chinese communist diplomatic establishments abroad, you should follow the same procedures and investigative policies as are applicable to contacts with Soviet and satellite establishments abroad (set forth in Section 105K, pages 22a - 29, of the Manual of Instructions). Bureau authority should be obtained prior to interviews of subjects in such cases. With regard to visits by U. S. citizens and resident aliens to Communist China, in view of the restrictions on travel to Red China and in view of the pronounced and violent anti-U. S. attitude of the Chinese Communist Government, such visits raise a strong suspicion of subversive activity in the absence of special circumstances. We know from Chinese communist defectors that the Chinese communist intelligence services often seek to recruit persons for intelligence purposes during visits to the Chinese Mainland. Therefore, these cases should be thoroughly investigated and analyzed to resolve whether the individual in question is serving as a Chinese intelligence agent or may be otherwise acting on behalf of Red China. In addition, the objectives of these cases include the possible development of informants and sources, the acquisition of positive intelligence data concerning Communist China, and the prompt notification to other interested U. S. and friendly foreign intelligence services of information of interest. As soon as information is received indicating that a U. S. citizen or resident alien has traveled to Communist China or plans such travel, an investigation should be initiated to develop pertinent background data, including current residence and employment, and whether the individual has access to classified information. . Passport

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records of the Department of State should be checked at the outset of such investigations to ascertain whether the individual has a passport validated for travel to Communist China. As soon as this is determined, pertinent information should be submitted to the Bureau in a letterhead memorandum to facilitate advice to interested U. S. and friendly foreign agencies.

If the individual in question has a valid passport for travel to Communist China, no further investigation should be conducted. Otherwise, appropriate security informants should be contacted and logical inquiries made to determine the reason for the travel and consideration should be given to an interview of the subject. Bureau authority is necessary prior to such interviews. Appropriate manual changes are being prepared.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosure for (A) and (E)

9-7-65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-50

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 65-54

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

September 28, 1965

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

(A) CHANGE IN AIR FORCE OFFICER SERIAL NUMBERS -- The Department of the Air Force has advised that effective October 1, 1965, serial numbers of all Air Force commissioned and warrant officers, both male and female, will be changed. The numeric portion of the serial numbers will remain unchanged, but the letter prefixes will be changed to FR for regular officers; FV for reserve officers; FG for Air National Guard officers; and FY for officers without component. All suffixes will be deleted.

Serial numbers of enlisted personnel will remain unaffected until sometime in 1967.

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(B) AIRLINE TRAVEL - FREE BAGGAGE ALLOWANCE - GTRS -- At the present time, certain United States scheduled airlines have received approval for increasing the free baggage allowance for travel solely within the United States and/or Canada. These changes are not applicable to international travel nor to any domestic portions of international travel. For those airline carriers who have received approval for the change in baggage allowance the new concept is generally as follows:

Checked Baggage - One piece of baggage not to exceed 62 inches in total dimensions plus one additional piece of baggage not to exceed 55 inches in total dimensions. Any article exceeding 36 x 26 x 18 inches in total dimension will not be accepted as baggage.

Unchecked Baggage - One or more pieces of baggage which, if measured together as one piece, do not exceed 45 inches in total dimensions; provided that such additional piece(s) of baggage are carried on board the aircraft, retained in the passenger's custody, and capable of being stowed under the passenger's seat.

Note: The above dimensions for both checked and unchecked baggage are the sum of the length, width, and height of the article(s).

Charges for extra or over-sized pieces are as follows:

<u>Adult one-way Jet Coach Fare</u>	<u>Charge for each extra or over-sized piece</u>
\$ 25.00 or under	\$2.00
25.01 - \$ 50.00	3.00
50.01 - 120.00	4.00
120.01 - 200.00	5.00
over \$200.00	6.00

In addition to the above modifications involving free baggage allowance, some airline carriers have elected to remain under the weight concept for baggage but have received approval from the Civil Aeronautics Board to increase the free baggage allowance from 40 to 50 pounds.

In view of these changes, it will be necessary to determine in each instance the type of free baggage allowance offered by the carrier to be used to insure the proper preparation of the Government Transportation Request. Generally, charges for excess baggage are handled by the various airlines on Government Excess Baggage Authorization forms and airlines are modifying these forms to correspond with the above-described changes in baggage allowance. However, in those instances where a Government Transportation Request is issued to cover transportation and/or charges for extra baggage, and transportation is to be procured from an airline which operates under the pieces concept for baggage allowance, entries on the Government Transportation Request should be made in accordance with the following:

1. Where the extra or over-sized baggage is to be transported between points the entire service for which is furnished by the carrier honoring the transportation request, there should be entered in the space on the transportation request following the words "transport not over" the number of pieces of extra or over-sized baggage. Also, the abbreviation "lbs." should be deleted and word "pieces" inserted in lieu thereof.

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2. Where the extra or over-sized baggage is to be transported between points, the service for which is furnished by more than one carrier and the excess baggage allowance concept is different as to the carriers involved, there should be entered in the space on the transportation request following the words "transport not over" the words "see reverse." On the reverse of the transportation request in the space reserved to further identify services required there should be entered the number of pieces of extra or over-sized baggage, the points between which it will move, and the carrier(s) that will furnish the service.

These changes in the free baggage allowance by the airline carriers do not remove the requirement that all charges involving excess baggage be completely justified by the traveler. This matter should be brought to the attention of all personnel in your office who have occasion to issue Government Transportation Requests.

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(C) DEPARTMENTAL APPLICANTS INVESTIGATIONS OF CANDIDATES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY -- Effective immediately, Departmental Applicant investigations involving candidates for appointment to the Federal judiciary should develop as much information as possible concerning a candidate's leanings toward civil rights. In this connection, the Department has requested the following items be covered during our investigations:

- (1) Possibility of candidate belonging to any racially prejudiced organizations.
- (2) Check of newspaper morgues to ascertain previous statements made by him relative to racial matters.
- (3) Contact with civil rights leaders in candidate's community to ascertain their feelings regarding the candidate.
- (4) Interview of Negroes in community who are personally familiar with candidate, particularly employees of the candidate, to ascertain employee's opinion as to whether candidate is fair in his profession as an attorney.
- (5) Interview of church people, i. e., priests, ministers, rabbis, etc.
- (6) Interview of U. S. Attorney in candidate's judicial district.

In the event any question is raised by persons contacted in connection with the above inquiries, they should be advised that such inquiries are being conducted at the specific request of the Deputy Attorney General.

(Security Letters on attached pages)

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(D) ROMANIAN DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES -- The Department of State has advised that the official designation of the Rumanian Embassy, Washington, D. C. , has been changed from "Embassy of the Rumanian People's Republic" to "Embassy of the Socialist Republic of Romania." The Department of State considers the correct spelling of the current Romanian Government to be "Romania" and all future Department of State correspondence will carry the spelling of the country as such.

In view of the above, the character of Romanian cases in the future should be carried as "Internal Security - Romania" and "IS - RO."

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SAC LETTER NO. 65-54

(E) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) - DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE -- You previously have been informed regarding CIA's Contact Division which has had offices in various U. S. cities and which is openly identified as being connected with CIA. This division has been responsible for the overt collection of positive intelligence gained through interviews of aliens, travelers, businessmen, etc. The division has not been engaged in any operational activity such as the development of double agents. For your information, CIA has reorganized this division and it is now called the Domestic Contact Service.

An examination of CIA's activities in the area of overt collection of positive intelligence has indicated that the Bureau can strengthen its position by having our field offices establish direct contact with the local offices of the Domestic Contact Service. This particularly applies to those situations where the Bureau and CIA both have an interest in Soviet-bloc and Yugoslav nationals, excluding those who are connected with embassies or the United Nations. We recognize that CIA has a responsibility for collection of positive intelligence (i. e. information regarding Soviet-bloc capability in a particular research field) which might be acquired from such visitors but we cannot condone any CIA activity which might interfere with Bureau operations. You therefore are authorized to establish liaison with local offices of the Domestic Contact Service.

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In each case when you initiate any inquiry or investigation of a visiting Soviet-bloc national, you should obtain from the local Domestic Contact Service the nature and extent of CIA interest and all pertinent information which CIA has gained or may acquire in the future relating to our internal security responsibilities. If you feel that CIA activity conflicts with Bureau objectives, you should so advise the Seat of Government, clearly setting forth your reasons. In this connection, there may be instances where continuing CIA pursuit of positive intelligence would conflict with the Bureau's discharge of its internal security functions.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

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SAC LETTER NO. 65-54

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**PERSONAL ATTENTION**  
**SAC LETTER NO. 65-53**

**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE**

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

September 22, 1965

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(A) VISIT OF POPE PAUL VI TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK CITY -- The Department of State has advised that His Holiness Pope Paul VI will arrive in New York City on or about October 4, 1965. The Department of State requested the FBI to make available any information of a nature reflecting the presence of any effort designed to cause physical harm or embarrassment to Pope Paul VI during his visit. His trip to the United States will be limited to New York City and it is believed he will not remain in the United States for more than two days.

This matter should be handled by all offices within the instructions set forth in Section 105 J, Page 4p, of the Manual of Instructions. Information received, bearing upon this matter, should be furnished to the Bureau by appropriate communication depending upon the nature of the information developed.

9/22/65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-53

(B) LAW ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCES, 1965 - RESPONSIBILITIES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IN 1965 -- Law Enforcement Conferences in 1965 will concern facets of the tremendous responsibilities facing all levels of law enforcement at the present, and how the profession can better equip itself to handle those responsibilities. Conferences should be held during October and November, 1965; schedule sufficient conferences to adequately cover your territory; wherever possible, utilize sites that are readily accessible to law enforcement and others invited to your conferences. Inform adjacent offices of your conference plans; border offices may invite friendly foreign law enforcement personnel. Conference agenda should be limited to four to six hours, should be of the open-forum type, with audience participation encouraged. Qualified representatives from local and state law enforcement may be utilized as panelists; names of such people should be checked through your files and the Bureau advised of the results prior to their being invited. Attendance of undesirables should be avoided and representatives of commercial concerns should not be invited.

You are authorized to prepare and forward friendly but business-like circular letters of invitation to those agencies and individuals included on your law enforcement mailing list. Bureau will issue a national press release regarding these conferences; you should make no local press releases regarding them until authorized by the Bureau.

Agenda of your proposed conferences, listing speakers to be invited, as well as dates and sites, should be submitted to the Bureau on a UACB basis at least ten days before your first conference. Conferences should be closed to all but duly constituted law enforcement representatives and those having a bona fide connection with the administration of criminal justice. Designate a period, either immediately before or after each conference, to be open to news media representatives, during which you should explain the purposes and general format of your conferences; interest of news media should be encouraged.

Material for distribution at your conferences, such as Law Enforcement Bulletin reprints, booklets, etc., should be ordered by routing slip from Crime Records Division as early as possible. For economy reasons, Bureau will be unable to prepare special posters or displays; do not incur expenses for rental of space, etc., without prior Bureau authority.

Set forth hereafter is a suggested agenda; you should preside at each conference personally.

#### I. Opening Remarks . .

By SAC; should set tenor of conference; problems besetting law enforcement such as constantly rising crime rate, public apathy; interest of Federal Government in developing all law enforcement resources; President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice; Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965; no simple solution.

#### II. Improving and Maintaining Law Enforcement's Public Image

May be presented by carefully selected panel comprised of competent municipal, state and Federal law enforcement representatives. Advance importance of law enforcement activities having effect on good public relations; courtesy, physical appearance of personnel, periodic police agency reports, press releases, speeches by departmental representatives, training programs (departmental, state programs, FBI National Academy, FBI field assistance), unnecessary use of force, promotions based on merit, programs to elicit cooperation of public, not only be right, but look right, etc.

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### III. Scientific Aids to Law Enforcement

Advent of the computer (Bureau will forward available data); the law enforcement laboratory and the identification bureau; where and how such aids are available; common problems encountered by law enforcement in obtaining maximum utilization of scientific aids (proper collection, identification, preservation and forwarding of evidence). Remarks should not concern services of FBI Laboratory and Identification Division exclusively, but Bureau's interests should be tactfully advanced. Consider use of case examples.

### IV. Cooperation -- The Backbone of Effective Law Enforcement

Consider use of panel, including FBI representative. Importance of all levels of law enforcement presenting unified front against lawless; prompt referral between agencies; use of services of other agencies where available (Bureau representative should tactfully advance desirability of prompt referral of matters within Bureau's investigative jurisdiction; use of Unlawful Flight assistance, etc.).

### V. Summation by SAC

Within a week following your last conference, advise Bureau of results of all conferences, giving total number in attendance, number of agencies represented, dates and places where conferences were held and total number of conferences completed. Summary letter should contain specific statements of interest by those in attendance, as well as all suggestions for the improvement of law enforcement conferences. Forward to Bureau only sampling of newspaper publicity received, and any unusual publicity items noted. Correspondence regarding conferences should be directed to attention Training Division, under caption "Law Enforcement Conferences, 1965, Responsibilities of Law Enforcement in 1965."

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

9/22/65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-53

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 65-58

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

October 19, 1965

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(A) FEDERAL EMPLOYEES OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE PROGRAM -- Reference SAC Letter 65-36 of 6-29-65. Civil Service Commission is taking steps to develop captioned program as a part of which there would be a sharing of employee health services by agencies in a given locality. Personnel of your office and of certain Resident Agencies may be contacted by other agencies for completion of questionnaires prepared by the Commission in conducting surveys incident to this matter.

Bureau has taken steps to be excluded from the proposed program since the Commission proposal incorporates the same disadvantages as the proposal outlined in referenced SAC Letter. Accordingly, should Bureau personnel be approached by representatives of other agencies as to the initial survey or as to possible interest in participation, inquirers should be advised Bureau does not plan to participate in such a program. Bureau should be kept informed of any developments in this program coming to your attention.

10-19-65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-58

(B) "THE STORY OF THE F. B. I." - WONDER BOOKS SERIES FOR CHILDREN -- The publishers have released the children's book on the FBI entitled "The Story of the F. B. I." This is a well-written, informative book which emphasizes the Bureau's dedication to the preservation of America's freedoms. It is 48 pages in length and contains some 60 photographs illustrating the overall work of the FBI. It has a striking red cover on which is a picture depicting a hand displaying an FBI badge.

As a result of contacts made with the publishers, this book is being made available to the FBI Recreation Association at a reduced price, thereby making it possible to offer it to our employees at \$. 50 per copy. The Crime Records Division will handle the distribution of this book.

You should canvass the employees in your office to determine the number who are interested in purchasing this book at the reduced price. Each field office should submit its order, along with one check



covering the total order in your office figured at \$. 50 per copy, by routing slip to the Crime Records Division. This check should be made payable to the "FBIRA."

Since a number of employees have already indicated an interest in purchasing this book as a Christmas gift for young people, orders requiring delivery before Christmas should reach the Bureau no later than November 8, 1965. Regular orders can be submitted any time after this date.

10-19-65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-58

(C) ABC TELEVISION SERIES FEATURING THE FBI -- Reference is made to SAC Letter 65-3 dated January 19, 1965.

According to American Broadcasting Company officials, the television series entitled "The FBI" has been extremely successful after its first four programs. One of the national television rating services has reported that of the 34 new shows carried this year, "The FBI" is No. 9, which is a spectacular rating.

10-19-65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-58

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(D) SPECIAL SEMINAR OF UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS ON ORGANIZED CRIME - CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM -- On October 11, 1965, a special seminar of United States Attorneys on organized crime was held at the Department of Justice which was attended by approximately 15 United States Attorneys from key organized crime offices and by representatives of the Department and the Bureau.

Some of the United States Attorneys present at this meeting indicated a feeling they should more actively coordinate and direct investigative activities concerning organized crime matters. They stated that because of the difference in organized crime cases distinguishing them from ordinary criminal violations the United States Attorneys should be furnished with all of the raw detailed information which is supplied by informants and highly confidential sources in order that they would be in a position to spearhead and direct the Criminal Intelligence Program.

In view of this indicated desire by these United States Attorneys to assume authority over organized crime investigations and to direct the conduct of investigative cases, Bureau representative at this point reasserted the FBI's responsibility for maintaining the control and direction of cases within our jurisdiction. It was pointed out that the Bureau has the primary responsibility in its investigations just as the United States Attorneys are responsible for matters involving prosecution and that the Special Agents in Charge of our respective offices would not be permitted to relinquish the direction of our organized crime investigations to any outside agency, including United States Attorneys. With respect to the observations as to information from all sources being included in reports, your attention is called to previous instructions issued by the Bureau that information received from highly confidential sources is not to be set forth in investigative reports in the Criminal Intelligence Program. These instructions are still in effect and you should continue to follow them in the preparation of reports in this category.

It was emphasized at the seminar that in organized crime matters we would be glad to conduct any additional logical investigation which United States Attorneys might desire in a given case or to discuss with them at any time any situations which might arise in connection with a particular case under investigation.

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Your attention is being called to this matter in order that you may be alert to any indication of such a situation developing in your territory and to assure you remain aware to the necessity for insuring that there is no encroachment on the Bureau's responsibility for the over-all direction of our organized crime investigations.

Each Special Agent in Charge must follow this matter very closely and promptly advise the Bureau of any developments of significance coming to your attention in this regard.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

10-19-65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-58

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER 65-68

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

December 21, 1965

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) CORRECTING ERRORS IN COMMUNICATIONS -- Several recent instances have been noted at the Bureau of field offices ignoring provisions of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part II, Section 4(P), Page 60. It is reiterated that amended pages of a communication are not to be sent to outside agencies. Corrections are to be brought to the attention of outside agencies by letter and then only when necessary to clarify the substance and meaning of the information previously disseminated. This Section also provides for the SAC to take the initiative in fixing the responsibility, obtaining explanations and recommending administrative action when substantive errors are detected by the field.

You are aware of my desire for communications directed outside the Bureau to be free from error. Every reasonable step should be taken to insure that the individual who dictates a communication has an opportunity to proofread it prior to dissemination. Supervisory personnel must also increase their efforts to detect evident errors. When corrections are necessary, you will be expected, in the future, to comply with the regulations cited above.

12/21/65  
SAC LETTER 65-68

(B) LIAISON WITH U. S. SECRET SERVICE -- Secret Service Headquarters has advised that in the future when the President travels outside of Washington, D. C. , to make public appearances, the local Secret Service field office will advise the FBI field office of details of the visit. This notification will include times of arrival, departure and routes of motorcade, including a route map if available. This will be done to keep the Bureau advised of the Secret Service plans involving Presidential travel.

Upon receipt of such travel information you should advise all Agents and insure that any information in their possession as to location and pertinent actions of security and other subjects of interest to Secret Service has been disseminated to that Agency.

12/21/65  
SAC LETTER 65-68

(C) TRAINING - AGENTS' ANNUAL TECHNICAL TRAINING - 1966 -- Enclosed for each office are five copies of captioned training program.

(Security Letter on attached page)

(D) CHINESE MATTERS -- Various agencies at headquarters level have indicated a desire to receive copies of reports and letterhead memoranda containing results of our investigations of Chinese individuals and organizations. Accordingly, for purpose of dissemination at the Seat of Government, it is desired that effective immediately an original and eight copies of each report and letterhead memorandum in Chinese matters prepared for dissemination be furnished the Bureau.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures for (C)

12/21/65

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER 65-63

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

November 23, 1965

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) TRAINING - POLICE -- By SAC Letter 63-50, dated 10/1/63, you were furnished copies of a pamphlet setting forth policies, rules and regulations regarding police training. Enclosed are ten copies of a revised version of that pamphlet; all copies now being retained in your office should be destroyed. All personnel in your division who have police training responsibilities should be thoroughly familiar with the contents of this pamphlet. It should also be circulated among other Agent personnel for information purposes.

11/23/65  
SAC LETTER 65-63

(B) FBIRA MATTER - INTEROFFICE FIREARMS COMPETITION (PPC) - 1965 -- I am pleased to announce the results of the 1965 FBIRA-sponsored Interoffice Firearms Competition (PPC). The Las Vegas Division has won the overall competition with an average score, including handicap, of 101.476% (95.936 + 5.54). The "J. Edgar Hoover Practical Pistol Course Trophy" is being sent to Las Vegas where it will remain until the winner of the 1966 competition is determined. A plaque is also being forwarded to Las Vegas, which is to be permanently retained by that Division.

In addition to the overall winner, plaques for permanent retention will be presented to the second- and third-place winners, Minneapolis 101.15 (95.46 + 5.69) and Norfolk 100.92 (93.81 + 7.11), respectively. Again this year, divisions were divided into groups according to the Agent participants and the office having the highest average, plus handicap, in each group is being cited for "honorable mention." Excluding the first three winners, the division in each group winning the citation is as follows:

Group 1 - Seat of Government

Group 2 - Baltimore

Group 3 - Albany

Group 4 - Milwaukee

The relative standing of each office, according to group, is as follows:

<u>Group 1</u>			<u>Group 2</u>		
	<u>Net</u>	<u>Gross</u>		<u>Net</u>	<u>Gross</u>
1. Seat of Government	92.86	100.23	1. Baltimore	92.16	99.92
2. Detroit	93.36	99.97	2. Charlotte	93.77	99.85
3. Miami	91.08	99.29	3. Cincinnati	93.07	99.53
4. Newark	93.34	99.04	4. Seattle	93.79	99.09
5. Chicago	93.38	98.96	5. Denver	91.71	99.02
6. Los Angeles	91.60	98.26	6. Kansas City	91.88	98.89
7. Washington Field	90.19	98.24	7. Atlanta	90.75	98.68
8. San Francisco	91.76	98.12	8. Pittsburgh	91.85	98.50
9. Philadelphia	89.72	97.88	9. Boston	91.24	98.49
10. New York	88.86	96.55	10. Jacksonville	92.97	98.40
			11. Cleveland	90.24	98.22
			12. Dallas	90.84	97.50
			13. Jackson	89.61	97.41
			14. Buffalo	90.23	97.39
			15. New Orleans	90.80	97.11
			16. Louisville	87.50	95.03

<u>Group 3</u>			<u>Group 4</u>		
	<u>Net</u>	<u>Gross</u>		<u>Net</u>	<u>Gross</u>
1. Albany	91.60	99.75	1. Milwaukee	92.46	100.12
2. Springfield	93.24	99.53	2. Knoxville	94.12	99.82
3. St. Louis	91.68	99.51	3. San Antonio	90.23	99.74
4. Tampa	91.68	99.30	4. Little Rock	93.36	99.52
5. Anchorage	96.94	99.11	5. Omaha	92.80	99.12
6. Butte	92.40	99.04	6. Salt Lake City	92.35	99.04
7. Phoenix	92.30	98.80	7. Portland	93.09	99.03
8. Birmingham	91.20	98.46	8. Honolulu	92.00	98.51
9. Albuquerque	93.15	98.20	9. Memphis	90.88	98.30
10. Savannah	90.40	98.19	10. Mobile	90.97	97.56
11. Richmond	90.00	98.10	11. El Paso	89.43	97.49
12. Indianapolis	91.28	97.71	12. Houston	88.17	97.08
13. New Haven	91.08	97.29			
14. San Diego	90.48	96.95			
15. San Juan	89.43	96.44			
16. Oklahoma City	88.36	96.36			

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The increase in participation by Agent personnel, and the enthusiasm generated in the overall competition for the "J. Edgar Hoover Practical Pistol Course Trophy" are indeed heartening. This year, the overall average has increased from 91.06 in 1964 to 91.14 in 1965.

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SAC LETTER 65-63

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(C) BUREAU APPLICANTS - RECRUITMENT PROGRAM - SELECTIVE SERVICE STATUS -- SAC Letter 65-38 authorized the field to utilize SSS Form 725 (March 10, 1965) prepared by the Selective Service System, which is authorization by the registrant for release of information contained in his Selective Service records. Any question concerning the availability of Selective Service records should be resolved by having applicant execute above release.

Due to the increased quotas being placed on local draft boards because of the situation in Viet Nam, prior to instituting an investigation on a male clerical applicant registered by Selective Service, you must now check his draft board to determine his current classification and tentative induction date. This will prevent unnecessary expenditure of manpower in those instances where applicant is subject to immediate induction. Induction quotas given to draft boards are always subject to change necessitating revision in draft board policy; however, if at all possible, projected date of induction should be determined.

If applicant has student deferment and is being considered for employment at Seat of Government, it should be ascertained if he will be continued in student classification if he moves to the Washington, D. C., area with the intention of attending school while working full time. It has been noted some colleges will not allow a student who is employed full time to carry more than 12 semester hours of study. Also, some draft boards will not consider registrants for student deferment who are not enrolled as full-time students. General policy in the Washington, D. C., area is a student employed full time is not allowed to carry more than 12 semester hours of study. Although the Bureau does request occupational deferments for Special Agent personnel, it will not request occupational deferments for clerical personnel.

As you have been previously advised, if a Special Agent applicant has had no prior military service, his status must be completely resolved prior to arranging his physical examination. If he is immediately available for military service or has been deferred or rejected from military service because of his attendance at school, critical occupation, physical defect(s), etc., it is necessary to contact his board at the outset to determine if an occupational deferment would be granted the applicant if offered an appointment as a Special Agent. If the applicant has been deferred or rejected because of physical defect(s), he should be informed that he may also be disqualified for Bureau employment and it will be incumbent upon him to

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bring this information to the attention of the examining facility so that a complete evaluation can be made as to his prior medical history. This policy should now be extended to include the processing of male clerical applicants, exclusive of determining whether an occupational deferment will be granted. Clerical applicants should bring pertinent medical information to the attention of their own personal physicians for their evaluation.

If there is any doubt as to whether or not the applicant should be processed for employment, it should be immediately referred to the Bureau. All information secured from draft board records must be reported on FD-263 (Cover Page). See Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part II, Section 4, C 18.

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(D) CHRISTMAS POST OFFICE FRAUD CASES - FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT -- Establish immediate liaison with local postal inspectors in line with previous years (SAC Letter 64-56G) to assure prompt referrals of indicated false statements in applications for temporary Christmas employment. In view of numerous retirements by the end of December, 1965, which will seriously reduce the permanent employees of the Post Office Department, it is expected that post offices will employ many temporary Christmas employees to meet their obligations during the coming Christmas season.

Insure that the United States Attorney is given all pertinent facts including the point that these are not merely a series of isolated frauds but in the aggregate cause considerable expense to the Government through costs of investigating applicants and consequent need for recruiting replacements. In addition, the danger to the integrity of the mails through the hiring of criminals for such jobs is obvious.

The United States Attorneys' Manual, Title II, Page 68, urges vigorous prosecution of wilful falsification or concealment of facts material to employment of applicants for positions with the Federal Government.

These cases must be given vigorous, thorough and careful investigative attention by all offices. Although streamlined procedures are desirable to insure efficient handling of these cases, they should not be

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treated as routine matters. Particular attention should be paid to concealment of the more aggravated types of criminal records and those involving felony convictions.

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SAC LETTER 65-63

(E) MOTOR VEHICLE SEAT BELT ACT -- Reference is made to SAC Letter Number 64-26, dated 5/19/64, wherein you were advised of the provisions of new legislation (Public Law 88-201) dealing with minimum standards for seat belts for use in motor vehicles.

The Secretary of Commerce published in the Federal Register dated 12/11/64, the standards for seat belts as required by Public Law 88-201. He set out the effective date for the criminal provisions as one year after the date of publication in the Federal Register. These criminal provisions will therefore be effective 12/11/65.

The Justice Department has now advised that the Commerce Department, through the National Bureau of Standards, will conduct all necessary scientific and technical tests. Commerce has informed Justice it will work out routine inspection procedures for the spot checking or sampling of seat belts.

The Bureau has pointed out to the Department that as this law is regulatory, with responsibility for setting up standards and testing placed with the Commerce Department, complainants alleging defective seat belts will be referred to the Commerce Department. The Bureau also informed the Department of Justice that no investigation will be instituted by the FBI until Commerce advises Justice its tests reveal that its standards have not been met and the Justice Department specifically requests the FBI to initiate investigation. The Department has agreed this procedure should be followed and has informed that all U. S. Attorneys are being so instructed.

In line with the above, all complainants under this legislation are to be referred to the Commerce Department and no investigation is to be initiated except upon specific instructions from the Justice Department through the Bureau.

(Security Letter on attached pages)

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**(F) CHINESE COMMUNIST INTELLIGENCE BIOGRAPHICAL DATA**

**ALBUM** -- In order to concentrate our investigative efforts on those persons who are most likely to be involved in Chinese communist (Chicom) intelligence activities and to provide an aid in identifying contacts of Chicom intelligence, a Chinese Communist Intelligence Biographical Data Album is being established at Seat of Government to catalog all known, probable and possible Chicom intelligence agents by name and description. Albums are also to be maintained at New York, Newark, New Haven, Washington Field, Chicago, Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, El Paso and Tokyo offices.

Each office should immediately review pending and closed cases concerning individuals possibly involved in Chicom intelligence activities and evaluate each case considering the following factors:

**KNOWN INTELLIGENCE AGENTS**

- A. Subjects have been identified by reliable sources or investigation as having conducted intelligence assignments for the Chicoms and the nature of the assignment is known.
- B. Employees of the Chinese Communist Government whose activities are such that it is evident they are engaged in intelligence activities.

**PROBABLE OR POSSIBLE INTELLIGENCE AGENTS**

- A. Persons identified by sources of unknown reliability as engaged in Chicom intelligence where there appears to be a basis in fact for the allegation.
- B. Persons identified by reliable sources as having some undetermined relationship with the Chicoms.
- C. Persons who receive funds from Communist China.
- D. Persons who have considerable contact or who associate closely with Chicoms, particularly with Chicom intelligence personnel.
- E. Persons who are known to be in sympathy with the Chicoms.
- F. Persons who receive business favors or other gratuities from the Chicoms.

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G. Persons in written contact with Communist China or Chicom diplomatic establishments, particularly where it appears that cryptic phraseology is in use.

H. Persons who travel to Communist China for unexplained reasons.

I. U. S. citizens who have returned to this country after residence in Communist China.

J. Individuals in the U. S. under false documents.

K. Subjects who, during interview, provide information inconsistent with known facts or with previously furnished information, giving the impression of attempting to conceal areas of their background.

It is recognized that none of these factors considered individually are sufficient to denote a person as a probable Chicom intelligence agent. They should be considered as part of an accumulation of evidence or logical indicators of intelligence activity.

After review of these cases, submit a letter with the dual caption "Chinese Communist Intelligence Biographical Data Album, Internal Security - China" and the subject's individual case title. Set forth the subject's residence, employment, description and briefly summarize your reasons for recommending the subject for this album. Also enclose 14 current photographs of the subject.

The decision to include a subject in the album will be made at Seat of Government, after which appropriate communications and photographs will be forwarded to those offices maintaining duplicate albums, including Quantico, with appropriate categorizing. Each office will be advised of the results of the Bureau's action on recommendations concerning its subjects.

Also included in this album will be known Chicom intelligence agents in Canada, Mexico and residents of other areas who have been known to travel into the U. S.

Do not restrict case review to subjects of Chinese origin, but be particularly attentive to persons active in subversive groups following the Chinese communist line or who are already on the Security Index for pro-Chicom sentiments.

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SAC LETTER 65-63

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Once a subject is included in this album, every effort should be made to obtain handwriting specimens, fingerprints and minutely detailed descriptive data.

This album will be in continuing operation and cases concerning Chinese security matters should be constantly evaluated in relationship to the album.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures for (A)

11/23/65  
SAC LETTER 65-63


- 9 -

XEROXED

1962

Reviewed by J. Dick  
8/11/75

Access Section  
8/13/75 SPJ



PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 62-A

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

January 8, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

RE: BUREAU CODES - AFSAM 7

Four sets of AFSAM - 4545 - 2/TSEC rotors for use with Bureau's coding equipment are being furnished each office with the exception of San Francisco which receives six sets and Washington Field which receives none; twelve sets being furnished Code Room and fourteen sets Seat of Government Relocation Site. These will become effective March 1, 1962, replacing the KAR-110 rotors presently in use. Appropriate key lists being distributed separately.

Upon receipt of rotors carefully inspect package for evidence of tampering. Notify Bureau immediately of any irregularity. Acknowledge receipt by routing slip, listing serial numbers of each set; return to Bureau in a sealed envelope marked for the attention of the FBI Laboratory the address label on inner wrapping, even though torn in opening; and make appropriate inventory adjustments by FD-222. Promptly check rotors by actual use in AFSAM 7 pursuant to AFSAM 7 Manual of Operation and Routine Maintenance, Section IV, A, and afford rotors secure storage with other AFSAM 7 material.

Rotors being furnished you are Type A as described in Section II, A, of Manual of Operation and Routine Maintenance and should be assembled as described therein. During assembly of Type A rotors, particular attention should be given to insuring that the metal retaining rings are properly seated on the rotor cores with the release tabs facing outward.

Retain KAR - 110 rotors presently in use until April 2, 1962, on which date they should be packaged securely and forwarded to Bureau, attention FBI Laboratory, by Railway Express, Protective Signature Service. Anchorage, Honolulu and San Juan use Registered Airmail, Return Receipt Requested.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

February 14, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES PREPARED LOCALLY BY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES -- The various local military intelligence agencies throughout the country issue and disseminate domestic intelligence summaries on a regular periodic basis which contain a review of security matters within the military area where prepared. These summaries are compiled from research and analysis of domestic intelligence information received from various sources including data which was disseminated to these agencies by our various offices located in the region covered by these military groups. In order to insure that our information is being used properly and to make certain that any data set forth in these summaries which could cause potential embarrassment to the Bureau is called to the Bureau's attention, it is essential that these summaries be promptly reviewed by the appropriate offices upon publication. In making the review, particular attention should be paid to information involving matters of nationwide newspaper controversy and that which is of such a highly important nature that it is possible its improper use could prove embarrassing to the Bureau. Any such information noted should be promptly called to the Bureau's attention under the caption of the subject matter involved, together with observations and recommendations as to what steps have been or should be taken to correct the situation. The above-mentioned summaries are not to be confused with military briefing or training documents prepared solely for use within the various military intelligence agencies.

Each Special Agent in Charge must advise the Bureau by February 27, 1962, the following information: (1) the arrangements he has made to obtain copies of all the above-described intelligence summaries issued by the local military intelligence agencies covering the region in which his office is located; (2) the administrative procedures set up to insure prompt review of these summaries upon receipt in order that the Bureau may be immediately advised if they contain information which might be detrimental to our best interests; and (3) the title of each summary which will be received, together with the identity of the issuing military agency and the frequency of publication of each.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 62-B

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

February 8, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7

One set of AFSAM 7 key lists for months of March, April, and May, 1962, being forwarded separately to all divisions except Washington Field which will receive none; three copies being furnished Bureau's Emergency Relocation Site; and three copies Seat of Government Code Room.

Acknowledge receipt of key lists promptly by routing slip, indicating serial numbers which appear thereon; return in a sealed envelope to the Bureau, attention FBI Laboratory, FBI Annex, the address label on individual tamperproofed envelope containing keys even though torn while opening package; and destroy, by burning, each monthly sheet thirty days after last effective date thereof, advising Bureau promptly by routing slip, attention FBI Laboratory, FBI Annex, this has been done.


It is essential address label mentioned above be returned in order to control security of shipment.

Key lists being distributed at this time are for use with AFSAR 4545-2/TSEC rotors. However, you are to retain the KAR 110/TSEC rotors assigned to your office until April 2, 1962, at which time KAR 110/TSEC rotors should be packaged securely and returned to the Bureau, attention FBI Laboratory, FBI Annex, by Railway Express, Protective Signature Service. Anchorage, Honolulu and San Juan use Registered Airmail, Return Receipt Requested.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL

NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 62-C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

February 19, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

RE: MICROPHONE INSTALLATIONS -  
COMMON WALL PENETRATION


Penetration of a common wall between two buildings or between two rooms within the same building for the purpose of establishing a microphone surveillance is a well-established technique. Where physical conditions are such that access can be had to a common wall of the target area, this technique must be thoroughly explored and given consideration as a means of securing desired microphone coverage. Common wall penetration is particularly adaptable to those conditions where access to an area to be afforded microphone coverage is not possible or where peculiar security problems preclude the use of more direct methods available for installation of concealed microphones. No survey made for the purpose of determining feasibility of installing a concealed microphone can be considered complete until the possibility of utilization of this technique has been fully explored.

Careful analysis of each condition encountered will reveal that in most instances penetration of a common wall can be achieved without benefit of specialized tools or sophisticated drilling equipment. The particular approach and solution to each individual common wall penetration problem will depend largely upon the ingenuity and fortitude of the individuals making the microphone installation. In some situations, due to the nature of materials used in wall construction, thickness of walls or unusual security problems the need for specialized equipment to facilitate wall penetration may be indicated. Should a survey for microphone installation reveal that the latter condition exists, you should submit specific details to the Bureau, attention of the Laboratory. Analysis of details may enable the Laboratory to supply you with drilling tools or devices which will facilitate penetration of the particular common wall in question.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-16

**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE**  
**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

March 8, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) PERSONNEL MATTERS - FLOWER FUNDS -- SAC Letter 60-24 dated 5-10-60 authorized all field and Seat of Government divisions to maintain a flower fund on a voluntary basis. Disbursements were to be confined to the purposes for which the fund was established, such as to purchase flowers or appropriate gift for employees in case of illness and to provide flowers to immediate families of employees when a death occurs. The fund is not to be utilized to purchase a gift for an employee who resigns or is transferred. Bylaws or other administrative devices with reference to the fund were to be amended to comply with these instructions. SAC Letter 61-8 dated 2-21-61 called attention to the above instructions regarding proper use of the flower fund and instructed that there be no collections for birthdays, showers, baby and wedding gifts, transfers, resignations and the like. Furthermore, contributions to the flower fund should be strictly voluntary and held to an absolute minimum. Each field and Seat of Government division is to promptly advise the Bureau whether these instructions are being complied with or submit explanation for any deviation. Two copies of the bylaws of the flower fund should be submitted. Also advise whether any other fund exists from which similar expenditures are being made and, if so, identify the fund and submit two copies of the bylaws. Results should be submitted by airtel directed to the attention of the Personnel Section and should reach the Bureau within three days of receipt of this letter.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-20  
**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE**  
**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

April 3, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) POSITION CLASSIFICATION MATTERS - UTILIZATION OF CLERICAL PERSONNEL IN LIEU OF SPECIAL AGENTS - MASTER DESCRIPTIONS FOR INVESTIGATIVE CLERKS AND STANDARDIZED WRITE-UPS FOR EIGHT CLERICAL OPERATIONS -- Refer to SAC Letter No. 61-58 (B), dated 10-17-61, and subsequent Bureau correspondence related thereto. Bureau has studied program on a field-wide basis and has prepared master descriptions for Investigative Clerk positions in grades GS 5, 6, and 7; a supplemental standard for these positions; standardized write-ups for eight clerical operations; and list of additional duties which should be performed by clerical employees, all of which are attached to enclosed Instructions for Implementation. Carefully review all material enclosed and follow instructions set out therein. This material voids any descriptions for these particular operations which you may have submitted previously in connection with captioned program.

All material required by enclosed instructions should be submitted to Bureau within 10 days after receipt of this letter.

4/3/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-20

(B) GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT POLICY -- There are enclosed two copies of Departmental Order 265-62 dated March 19, 1962, which sets forth regulations effectuating the nondiscrimination policy in the Department of Justice. The new Departmental Order supersedes Departmental Order 105-55 which heretofore has been maintained permanently on an appropriate bulletin board or boards in your office. Accordingly, Departmental Order 105-55 should be replaced by Departmental Order 265-62 which must be maintained permanently on an appropriate bulletin board or on whatever bulletin boards in your office necessary so that each employee will have ample opportunity to observe and read it. You should familiarize yourself with the contents of the new Departmental Order and it is suggested that it be used as background for your comments on this subject at employee conferences. If you need additional copies of the new Order, submit a request for the attention of the Personnel Section. Manual revisions are being prepared.

(C) IDENTIFICATION MATTERS - LATENT FINGERPRINT MATTERS -- The following devices and materials available on the market and advertised for use in connection with developing and recording latent fingerprints have been evaluated in the Identification Division. The results are being furnished for information of all Agents and should be of particular interest to personnel handling police schools:

"ID Fingerprint Powder" (Spray Powder)

This is essentially a fingerprint powder packaged in an aerosol can similar to those used for household insecticides, the powder being blown onto the surface. The entire surface is coated and then brushed to reveal the latent prints. The gray powder tested compared favorably with ordinary gray powder. The black powder does not produce as good a visual contrast as ordinary black powder. The sole advantage noted was its rapid application to large areas. Disadvantages are the danger of overcoating; powder sometimes issues in clumps or drops which will not brush off; powder settles on everything in an eight-to ten-foot radius in inside use; and would obviously be more expensive than regular powder to use.

"Magna Brush"

This is a device for applying magnetic fingerprint powder with a magnetic pencil instead of a brush. The pencil comes in a kit with four small bottles of powder. It cannot be used on iron or steel and due to the manner of application its use would be limited to small areas. Tests show that it will not perform any better than ordinary powders.

Application of Fingerprint Powder with Cotton

When exceptionally large surfaces are to be examined, the application of fingerprint powder by means of a wad of cotton may speed the job. A handful of cotton (obtainable in one pound rolls) should be torn from a roll so that it has a ragged wispy edge. This is used in the manner of a fingerprint brush by dipping the wad of cotton into a layer of fingerprint powder which has been spread out on paper and then dusting the powder over the surface. No pressure is to be exerted on the cotton during this operation. Any latent impressions made visible should be "cleaned up" with a fingerprint brush, not with the cotton. This technique should be used only on large areas and is in no way meant to displace the routine application of powder with the brush.

4/3/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-20

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This information does not alter the long-standing prohibition against wrapping latent-bearing surfaces in cotton or cloth for shipment.

#### Etching Latent Prints on Glass with Hydrofluoric Acid

This process requires specially constructed equipment and a laboratory hood to dispose of escaping vapor. A rather detailed experimental report on this method shows that its success is dependent on the type of glass, the rate of etching is difficult to predict or control, requires two to six hours' exposure to acid vapor, and the results at best are not better than those achieved by the use of photography or fingerprint powder. This is a laboratory novelty.

#### "Foto-Focuser"

This is a metal attachment for fastening to the lens of a 4 x 5 inch "Graphic" camera to photograph latent prints natural size, as is done with the fingerprint camera. With the bellows properly adjusted, a latent print is in correct focus when it is flush with the end of the "Focuser." It has been suggested that this device would make the fingerprint camera unnecessary. A "Graphic" camera with the "Focuser" does not, of course, equal the fingerprint camera in simplicity and ease of operation. Some of the disadvantages found in the use of this device are constant slippage of the track lock when pressure is applied to hold the camera against a latent print, the obscuring of a sizable margin of the negative by the edges of the "Focuser"; excessive length and weight of the camera unit--21 1/2 inches and 8 pounds compared to 12 inches and 6 pounds for the fingerprint camera; exposures are all flash shots with over-exposure probable if made in ordinary room illumination or brighter light; extra expense of larger film and flash bulbs.

#### Possible Adaptation of Polaroid Camera to Fingerprint Work

Polaroid photographs do not show the sharp detail obtainable by conventional photographic methods. Test shots of inked fingerprints made with this camera do not show good ridge definition.

4/3/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-20

- 3 -

(D) VISIT OF THE SHAH OF IRAN TO THE UNITED STATES IN APRIL, 1962 -- The Shah and Empress of Iran are expected to arrive in the United States about April 10, 1962, on a State visit. Appropriate offices will be advised of the Shah's exact itinerary when it is available.

The Bureau has received information to the effect that dissident Iranian students in this country might possibly undertake an assassination attempt against the Shah during his visit. Moreover, the State Department has expressed concern as to the possible adverse effects of any large-scale demonstrations which might occur during the Shah's visit.

All offices should be most alert for any information regarding anti-Shah demonstrations, possible threats to the Shah or his party, or other data of intelligence interest in connection with his visit. Sources in a position to acquire such information should be alerted to the need for prompt reporting. Any data concerning possible violence or demonstrations should be immediately disseminated to local police authorities as well as to appropriate State Department security representatives locally. Bureau should be expeditiously advised of all such information received, including action taken locally.

4/3/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-20

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(E) BUREAU APPLICANTS - SPELLING TEST FOR SPECIAL AGENT APPLICANTS -- In order to test the spelling ability of all Special Agent applicants, three spelling tests have been devised and are being forwarded to each office under separate cover. One of these should be administered to both Bureau employees and outsiders who apply for the Special Agent position. They should be submitted to the Bureau at the same time other examinations are forwarded. You should be guided by Section 6 A, 2 b, Manual of Instructions, in affording these tests the necessary security.

4/3/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-20

(F) BUREAU APPLICANTS - SPECIAL AGENT EDUCATIONAL AND AGE REQUIREMENTS -- Effective immediately the minimum age for the Special Agent position is being lowered from twenty-five to twenty-three years. In addition, the Bureau will consider for the Special Agent position Bureau employees currently on the rolls who have at least three years of continuous Bureau service and who possess either a four-year college degree or a Bachelor of Commercial Science Degree from a resident school.

Employees with a Bachelor of Commercial Science Degree must have successfully completed the Bureau Accounting Course at the time they apply. Upon application they must obtain a satisfactory grade on the Bureau Accounting Examination and the Academic Achievement Test. Employees with a four-year college degree must obtain a satisfactory grade on the Special Agent Law Examination and the Academic Achievement Test.

For the completion of Bureau records all division heads at the Seat of Government and all Special Agents in Charge should submit to reach the Bureau by April 16, 1962, the names of all employees who are now qualified under the above or who will qualify by October 1, 1962. Submit this information on Form FD-311, which specifically outlines the data necessary regarding each employee so listed. Employees meeting these new requirements and who are available for the New Agent Classes already scheduled, that is April 16, 1962, May 21, 1962, and June 25, 1962, should be processed immediately.

4/3/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-20

- 5 -

I want it clearly understood that interviews with Special Agent applicants must be most penetrative and only those applicants meeting the high standards of the Bureau are to be favorably recommended. No applicant should be recommended unless he creates an excellent initial impression and possesses the necessary maturity to properly handle the responsibilities of the Special Agent position.

4/3/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-20

(G) FEDERAL BANK ROBBERY AND INCIDENTAL CRIMES STATUTE-NIGHT DEPOSITORY THEFTS -- In the past, United States Attorneys have rendered divergent opinions as to whether a theft from a bank night depository constitutes a violation of the Federal Bank Robbery and Incidental Crimes Statute. This divergency of opinion often stemmed from the crucial question of whether deposits so made were within the care, custody and control of the bank. In most instances final determination hinged on the contractual relationship existing between the depositor and the bank.

United States Attorney's Bulletin, Volume 10, Number 6, dated March 23, 1962, states that, though the issue is not free from doubt in that there have been no test cases in the higher courts, thefts from bank night depositories are a violation of the statute regardless of the contractual relationship between the bank and the depositor. The view expressed resolves the question of care, custody and control with the comment that a bailment relationship is established between the depositor and the bank at the time the deposit is made. The element of notice to the bank, necessary for this bailment, is presumed since the bank in providing the night depository facility invites its use.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover


Director

Enclosures for (A) & (B)

4/3/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-20

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

April 10, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) IDENTIFICATION MATTERS - CHARGE ON FINGERPRINT CARDS -- For many years Bureau has encouraged fingerprint contributors to use specific narrative offenses, rather than mere code citations, in space for "Charge or Offense" on arrest fingerprint cards in order that data in our identification records may be readily understood by law enforcement or governmental officials who read them. Growing tendency noted on part of Agents to write only U. S. Code citations in space for "Charge or Offense" on arrest fingerprint cards. Hereafter fingerprint cards received in Identification Division from Field bearing only U. S. Code citations will be returned for addition of narrative offense. Manual and Handbook changes follow.

4/10/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-21

(B) IDENTIFICATION MATTERS - LATENT FINGERPRINT MATTER -- Transparent lifting tape has not been recommended in the past for lifting latent prints primarily because of the deterioration of the adhesive surface in storage. However, tests conducted during the past year with a tape manufactured by the Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company known as Mending Tape #810, matte (dull) surface, have disclosed no deterioration qualities. This tape, available in 2-inch widths, has proven very satisfactory and is much more economical than the rubber tape presently being used. After the latents have been lifted, the tape should be placed on either black or white cards to contrast with the color of powder used. Steps are presently being taken to have this tape available upon request through the Bureau's Supply Section.

4/10/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-21

(C) "THE INVESTIGATOR" - ADMINISTRATIVE - GENERAL -- As a result of a suggestion, it is planned to include photographs of the buildings which house our field divisions in issues of "The Investigator." Accordingly, each office should submit a photograph which will depict a suitable over-all view of the building in which it is housed. These photographs should be sent attention, Crime Records Division, to reach the Bureau no later than April 30, 1962. Credit for submission of an item to "The Investigator" will be given for these photographs. It is also intended to make an album of these photographs for the benefit of newly assigned Special Agents; therefore, each photograph should be printed in an 8- by 10-inch size. It will be incumbent on the field to keep the album up to date in the event of any changes in location.

(D) PERSONNEL - CONDUCT AND ACTIVITIES OF EMPLOYEES - TAX OBLIGATIONS -- The Chairman of the U. S. Civil Service Commission has recently urged that all Federal employees be reminded that taxes due the Federal, state and local governments are obligations of the highest priority and that willful neglect in this regard is incompatible with continued employment in the service. As you are aware, existing Bureau regulations require that our employees comply with all tax laws to which they are subject. In accordance with the request of the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, all employees should be reminded at this time of their obligation to file the necessary tax returns and to pay the taxes promptly when due.

4/10/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-21

(E) AUTOMOBILES - PARKING BRAKE - PLYMOUTH AUTOMOBILES -- Prior to the 1962 model, the Plymouth automobiles did not have a parking lock mechanism on the transmission. The only device to hold these vehicles in position while parked is the parking brake. There have been a number of instances where for one reason or another the parking brake failed to hold allowing the vehicle to roll away and oftentimes causing considerable damage.

If at all practical the wheels of these vehicles should be turned into the curb or other barrier when parking on an incline where there is a possibility of the vehicle rolling. Particular attention should be paid to the adjustment and effective holding power of the parking brake and it must be maintained in top working order at all times. In this connection each time these vehicles are lubricated the nut and bolt assembly on the parking brake drum should be inspected for proper tension and adjustment. Any corrective action necessary should, of course, be taken at that time.

4/10/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-21

(F) PERSONNEL MATTERS - FLOWER FUNDS - FBIRA FUNDS -- Authority is being continued for field offices to maintain flower funds to provide for flowers or gifts in the event of illness, hospitalization or death of employees or immediate relatives. Gifts in lieu of flowers can include items like books, fruit or bed jacket in case of illness and in case of death Mass cards or contributions to church or favorite charity. Gifts from flower funds, FBIRA

4/10/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-21

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funds or through individual collections are not to be provided in connection with resignations, transfers, departure on military or maternity leave, weddings, birthdays, baby gifts (other than gift in lieu of flowers during confinement of mother), anniversaries and the like.

The management of flower funds is to be incorporated into the office FBIRA and formal bylaws are to be prepared regarding the operation of each local FBIRA including at a minimum, (1) provision for selection of an FBIRA committee, (2) clear definition of items or purposes for which expenditures are authorized and where possible amounts to be expended - in connection with expenditures from FBIRA fund for flowers and gifts in lieu of flowers, set forth circumstances under which such items will be provided, definition of immediate relatives to be included and maximum amounts authorized, (3) provision for approval of each expenditure by SAC in addition to FBIRA Representative, (4) manner of sustaining fund, (5) provision for annual audit by each office, (6) provision for maintenance of records reflecting the expenditures and authority therefor.

Two copies of the bylaws so formulated are to be promptly submitted to the Bureau where they will be reviewed for conformity with Bureau policy and the purposes of the FBIRA. Subsequent amendments are to be submitted to the Bureau and will be considered approved unless the submitting office is advised to the contrary. FBIRA funds will continue to be audited during each inspection and records showing source of income, expenditures and authority therefor will be reviewed for compliance with bylaws, Bureau and FBIRA policy.

4/10/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-21

(g) TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT -- INFRARED NIGHT VIEWING EQUIPMENT -- The offices listed below were recently supplied with a new piece of investigative equipment designed to assist in viewing objects or persons at night:

Atlanta	Denver	Minneapolis
Buffalo	Detroit	New Orleans
Chicago	Kansas City	New York
Cincinnati	Los Angeles	Philadelphia
Dallas	Miami	Phoenix
San Francisco	Seattle	Washington Field

4/10/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-21

- 3 -

This equipment is completely portable, being packed in one luggage-type carrying case. The viewing unit operates on one size "C" flashlight cell, and will give efficient service from 50 to 100 hours. The unit is supplied with a pistol grip for ease of handling, and for prolonged periods of use can be mounted on a camera tripod. The wet-cell battery supplied with the unit will operate the infrared light source for approximately 4 1/2 hours. An object or an area can be viewed on a clear, dark night at distances up to 250 yards from the viewing position. Offices should advise the Bureau regarding conditions under which the equipment was used along with observations as to value of the equipment as an investigative aid.

These night viewers are available for loan to other divisions whenever a need for this type of equipment develops in an investigative matter. This information should be brought to the attention of all active Sound-trained Agents in your division. They should initial the office file copy of this letter to indicate that they are familiar with its contents.

4/10/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-21

- 4 -

(H) CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM - NECESSITY OF AFFORDING PROTECTION TO HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS AND TECHNIQUES -- It is mandatory that our highly confidential informants and techniques are afforded complete protection at all times. When attributing information to these sources, care must be exercised in order that our operations are not impaired through the divulgence of their identities.

In this regard, there has been a tendency by some field offices when reporting information from these sources to submit plain text rather than encoded teletypes. In those instances when information is reported which could compromise our informants, your teletypes must be encoded to insure adequate protection is afforded our sources and their identities are not disclosed under any circumstances.

The importance of protecting our informants also applies to data attributed to confidential sources which is set forth in your reports and memoranda. It is of paramount importance in preparing material which is disseminated to other agencies that meticulous care be taken to afford these informants maximum protection by appropriately paraphrasing the material contained therein. You should follow this closely in your office in order that this is properly handled in all material prepared by you which is disseminated outside the Bureau.

The importance of properly recording information received from our informants must be brought to the attention of responsible personnel to insure our confidential sources are adequately protected at all times.

4/10/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-21

(I) BUREAU APPLICANTS - SCHEDULE OF ADDITIONAL NEW AGENT CLASSES AND EARLY APPOINTMENT TO ALL SPECIAL AGENT APPLICANTS -- Additional New Agent Classes are being scheduled for August 6, 1962, September 10, 1962, October 15, 1962, and November 26, 1962. Inasmuch as some applicants have indicated they are interested in Bureau employment but not until a date sometimes as much as six months in advance, the Bureau is adopting the policy on a trial basis of initiating consideration of Special Agent applicants up to six months prior to their availability date. This is an expansion of the early appointments that can be offered to law

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school students as set forth in SAC Letter 61-70 (I) dated December 12, 1961. When an appointment has been made to an applicant more than sixty days prior to the entry on duty date, supplemental credit and criminal checks will be requested by the Bureau, as well as inquiry at applicant's school or employment, to insure that he remains in good standing. You should evaluate the results of this trial and submit your recommendation to the Bureau on August 1, 1962, regarding its continuance.

(Security Letters on attached pages)

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SAC LETTER NO. 62-21

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(J) SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION CHARACTERIZATION - "POLITICAL AFFAIRS" -- The March, 1962, edition of "Political Affairs," which is published monthly by New Century Publishers, Inc., 832 Broadway, New York 3, New York, is self-described in the masthead on page one as "A Theoretical Organ of the Communist Party, U. S. A." In the future, whenever it is necessary to characterize this publication it should be stated that it is self-described as a theoretical organ of the Communist Party, USA.

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SAC LETTER NO. 62-21

(K) SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION CHARACTERIZATIONS - INTERNAL SECURITY - C -- The annual submission of thumbnail sketches concerning subversive organizations is due at the Bureau June 1, 1962. The appropriate instructions are contained in the FBI Handbook, Part I, pages 63-67. These instructions should be carefully reviewed and followed during the preparation of the sketches and transmittal letter.

The Committee on Un-American Activities, United States House of Representatives, has published a revised "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications," dated December 1, 1961, to supersede the "Guide" published on January 2, 1957. Copies of this revised "Guide" are being obtained and will be distributed to the field within 30 days. All offices should review this revised "Guide" before submitting thumbnail sketches to avoid the submission of any sketches on organizations which are now listed in the new "Guide." After receipt of the new "Guide," the characterizations of organizations and publications included therein should be utilized in the future, except for those organizations designated under Executive Order 10450, as the characterizations in the January 2, 1957, "Guide" are now obsolete.

Do not resubmit a characterization on a defunct organization if the Bureau-approved characterization shows this organization is defunct. These organizations should be identified in Item I of the cover letter. Effective immediately, withhold the piecemeal submission of characterizations on individual cases and include these sketches with the annual letter due June 1, 1962, to eliminate extra work at the Seat of Government and in the field and to insure better control.

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Insure sketches are concise and complete, and are prepared and forwarded in sufficient time to reach the Bureau by the deadline date.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-22  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

April 17, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) PERSONNEL FORMS - FBI PERSONNEL STATUS FORM FD-285 -- Reference is made to Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part I, Section 16, A 2, which sets out data required to be submitted on Personnel Status Form FD-285. Section F of this form is being deleted so that there will no longer be any yearly listing of offices of preference on this form by Special Agent, Special Employee and Radio Personnel. The Bureau has on record the current offices of preference of such personnel. Henceforth, any employee entitled to list such offices of preference may send in designated changes at any time. Special Agent, Special Employee and Radio Personnel should utilize Form FD-314. Clerical employees are to use Form OF-10.

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(B) ADMINISTRATION OF OFFICES - ASSIGNMENT CARDS -- As a result of a suggestion, the following procedure with regard to the maintenance of assignment cards is brought to the attention of all offices for their information and use wherever practical.

Following preparation of the monthly administrative report:

(a) Assignment cards of cases that will remain current at the end of the month should be filed in accordance with present procedures.

(b) Assignment cards of cases that will be delinquent at the end of the month will be filed in the same manner, except that a divider will be placed between them and the current cases.

In this fashion the assignment card box will then consist of two separate parts and the cases that will be delinquent can be readily differentiated from those that will be current. This will allow delinquency lists to be prepared early in the month thus giving Agents earlier notice to clear these cases of their delinquent status. Throughout the month as a delinquent case is posted, the assignment card will be transferred from the "delinquent" section to the appropriate place in the "current" section.

(C) FEDERAL LAW ON SEARCH AND SEIZURE - TRAINING DOCUMENT #61 --  
Captioned training document will be distributed to all offices in the near future. It will serve two purposes. First, it will provide the necessary text for use by those law-trained Special Agents in your office who are designated to discuss the subject of search and seizure before police school groups. Second, and perhaps more important, it will give all investigative personnel a ready source of information on what the Federal law does and does not permit by way of search and seizure in a case under investigation.

You are to maintain this training document in such a manner that it is readily available at all times for both of its intended uses. Copies may be charged out to Special Agents and they may be kept in Resident Agencies. You will note that the document contains no classified information and no references to Bureau policy. The entire text is a matter of law only.

You should encourage the investigative personnel of your office to use this training document as a source of information on handling search and seizure problems in their cases, and to be sufficiently familiar with its contents that they fully understand the principal points of law involved. This training document should be viewed not as something to be put on the shelf and consulted infrequently but as a statement of the principles of law with which every Special Agent should be fully familiar at all times.

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(D) SUPPLIES - PURCHASES FROM GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION RETAIL STORES -- The General Services Administration (GSA) has opened Interagency Retail Stores in selected cities throughout the continental United States. These are self-service stores stocking approximately 1,200 administrative supply items and some standard forms. These retail stores do not in any way replace regular agency requirements which are met through submission of purchase orders at regular intervals. The retail stores are primarily to meet emergency needs for standard supply items which otherwise might be purchased in the open market at much higher prices.

The few retail stores now in operation have proven very successful in effecting important economies throughout the Government. The opening of more such stores may be expected in

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the near future. Should GSA inquire of your office as to the interest of the Bureau in these stores, to determine the feasibility of setting up a store to serve Government needs in your locality, you should advise them that the Bureau would participate to the degree that emergency purchases only would be made in this manner.

The retail stores operate in much the same manner as a self-service supermarket. Using a charge-plate, for identification and billing, the purchaser will select items required, exit past a checkout clerk who will register the cost of each item purchased.

In the event retail stores are opened in your GSA region, your office would be advised by GSA direct, together with instructions regarding the obtaining of the charge-plate. The Bureau must insist that the charge-plate issued be used only for identification, not for charging items. Cash payment from your imprest fund is authorized. Purchases made in this manner should be restricted to emergency requirements. The submission of quarterly requirements to the Bureau, through the purchase order forms, remains unchanged.

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(E) SOLAR RESEARCH CORPORATION - 3200 N.E. 12TH AVENUE - OAKLAND PARK, FLORIDA - JACK NORMAN HOLCOMB, PRESIDENT -- Solar Research Corporation advertises itself as a manufacturer of "special security and intelligence devices." Principal items of equipment are those used for concealed listening devices (bugs), wire tapping and recording, most of which have been displayed to the Bureau. Holcomb advises company will sell only to duly constituted law enforcement agencies on presentation of official orders and payment vouchers. He states the company intends to hold bugging and wire-tapping school for selected police officers in the Spring of 1962. He claims his considerable experience is the basis of material used to prepare detailed, illustrated manuals on how to install, operate and record bugs and wire taps with the company's equipment.

He has solicited the Bureau's opinion of Solar equipment and whether its production and sale to police agencies would interfere with Bureau operations. The Bureau has advised him it expresses no opinion on merit of equipment, does not endorse or recommend any particular product or company, and in no way indicates to any organization what products should or should not be produced. Holcomb has been instructed that neither he nor his company is to indicate the Bureau is interested in Solar products nor are they to use the Bureau's name to promote sales of their equipment.

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In addition to his own admission, Bureau records show that in 1955 Holcomb was acquitted by a Los Angeles County jury on charges of wire tapping in a divorce case for lack of specific evidence as to who actually did the tapping. Two codefendants, on Holcomb's acquittal, changed their pleas from guilty to not guilty and had the charges dismissed. In 1956 he offered his services to the police department, sheriff's office and private detectives in Houston, Texas. He is an auxiliary police officer at Oakland Park, Florida, and has used his equipment to assist local police departments and sheriffs' offices in that area.

Any dealing with Holcomb or any individual or company selling Solar products should be most circumspect. In no event should it be indicated that the Bureau is interested in Solar products except for the purpose of keeping abreast of new developments in the law enforcement field. Any use of the Bureau's name to promote Solar sales should be promptly reported.

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(F) DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT OR MOTOR VEHICLES - FALSE REPORT --

It should be re-emphasized to all investigative personnel that interviews in false report cases under the Destruction of Aircraft or Motor Vehicles Statute must be searching and thorough to insure that all pertinent facts are developed with regard to the circumstances of the threat.

This is particularly important, for example, in a case where the subject alleges he was only joking when he falsely claimed to have a bomb as he was about to board an aircraft. The circumstances under which he made the false statement may have warranted a person who heard the statement to infer that the subject intended to convey the idea that his purpose was to damage or destroy an aircraft. The intent, which must be considered as an element of this offense, is not the frame of mind claimed by the subject, but that which must be attributed to him as a result of the natural import of his words and the face value of his actions.

Information concerning the reaction of witnesses to the subject's false statement is necessary for the United States Attorney and the Department to enable them to make prompt decisions as to prosecution. If a witness indicates that he did not take the subject's false statement seriously, the facts on which he based his disbelief should be determined.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

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SAC LETTER NO. 62-22

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PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 62-E  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

April 26, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7

One set of AFSAM 7 key lists for months of June, July, and August, 1962, being forwarded separately to all divisions except Washington Field which will receive none; three copies being furnished Bureau's Emergency Relocation Site; and three copies Seat of Government Code Room.

Acknowledge receipt of key lists promptly by routing slip, indicating serial numbers which appear thereon; return in a sealed envelope to the Bureau, attention FBI Laboratory, FBI Annex, the address label on individual tamperproofed envelope containing keys even though torn while opening package; and destroy, by burning, each monthly sheet thirty days after last effective date thereof, advising Bureau promptly by routing slip, attention FBI Laboratory, FBI Annex, this has been done.

It is essential address label mentioned above be returned in order to control security of shipment.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director





UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

May 8, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY - 1963 SESSIONS -- The dates for the National Academy classes to be held in 1963 are as follows: for the 71st Session, Monday, April 1 to Wednesday, June 19 and for the 72nd Session, Monday, August 19 to Wednesday, November 6.

5/8/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-27

(B) TRAINING - POLICE - SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS ON SEARCHES AND SEIZURES -- To be of assistance in the planning of your forthcoming schools on searches and seizures for local law enforcement agencies, the following model agenda for a one-day school is suggested. This is the same agenda used by the six divisions conducting the pilot program on searches and seizures and was found to be quite satisfactory.

- |      |   |         |
|------|---|---------|
| I.   | History of Federal Search<br>and Seizures Law | 1 hour  |
| II.  | Search of Persons                             | 1 hour  |
|      | A. By Search Warrant                          |         |
|      | B. Incidental to a Lawful Arrest              |         |
|      | C. By Consent                                 |         |
| III. | Search of Premises                            | 3 hours |
|      | A. By Search Warrant                          |         |
|      | B. Incidental to a Lawful Arrest              |         |
|      | C. By Consent                                 |         |
| IV.  | Search of Vehicles                            | 2 hours |
|      | A. By Search Warrant                          |         |
|      | B. Incidental to a Lawful Arrest              |         |
|      | C. By Consent                                 |         |
|      | D. Search on Probable Cause Alone             |         |
|      | E. Search on Lawful Impoundment               |         |
| V.   | Penalties for Illegal Searches and Seizures   | 1 hour  |

This agenda is sufficiently flexible to allow it to be tailored for schools of greater or lesser duration.

5/8/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-27

(C) AUTOMOBILES - TWO-WAY FM MOBILE RADIOS -- SAC Letter 57-40, dated July 9, 1957, pointed out the possibilities of explosion and fire in the trunk of an automobile due to the ignition of accumulated gasoline fumes by a spark from a two-way radio transmitter. This SAC Letter instructed that adequate steps be taken to insure that gasoline tanks on two-way radio cars were free from leaks which would permit fumes to enter the trunk compartment.

It has been noted during recent radio equipment maintenance inspections in several field offices that some two-way radio automobile installations have the two-way unit installed in the main part of the trunk directly above the gasoline tank. This is considered a very undesirable practice since there is very little space between the floor of the car trunk and the gasoline tank and it is quite easy to puncture the gasoline tank during the course of the radio installation. No instances of gasoline fumes in the trunks of cars were noted during the maintenance inspections. However, the inherent danger is such that you are instructed that all future two-way radio installations in cars must have the radio unit mounted in such location and in such manner that there is no chance of any mounting screws penetrating the gasoline tank. Also, all field Electronic Maintenance Technicians should be instructed to carefully inspect all present two-way radio installations to assure that there is not now any gasoline fume leakage into automobile trunks and that the installations are completely safe in all other respects.

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SAC LETTER NO. 62-27

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SAC LETTER NO. 62-27

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(D) CRIMINAL INFORMANTS - SECURITY IN CONTACTING -- It has recently come to the attention of the Bureau that top hoodlums and their associates may attempt to surveil Bureau Agents in an effort to identify our informants and other confidential sources.

You are again reminded that Agents should be most circumspect in contacting informants and other confidential sources to prevent their identity from becoming known. Any information received concerning attempts on the part of the hoodlum element to identify our informants and sources should be immediately brought to the attention of the Bureau.

5/8/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-27

(E) CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CRIMINAL MATTERS (CRIMDEL) -- The Crimdel program has been transferred from the Central Research Section of the Domestic Intelligence Division to the Criminal Intelligence and Organized Crime Section of the Special Investigative Division. Therefore, it is no longer necessary for you to include the initials "CRS" after the word "Crimdel" in the caption of your submissions.

As you are aware, the Bureau recently started issuing a number of letters captioned "Criminal Intelligence Digest" for Agents working in the field of organized crime. It is expected that this letter will be expanded in the future and that both it and the "Nationwide Criminal Activities" letter will be published by the Criminal Intelligence and Organized Crime Section on a continuing basis.

5/8/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-27

(F) FUGITIVES - UNLAWFUL FLIGHT INVESTIGATIONS -- A recent case points up the continuing need for the highest standards in the identification of fugitives by state officials requesting our assistance under the Fugitive Felon Act.

An eastern office was requested by a state prosecutor to apprehend a fugitive whom he identified by name and FBI number. After the individual identified by the local prosecutor had been apprehended as a result of an FBI alert, he denied his guilt. The local prosecutor discovered by further investigation that the person whose apprehension he had requested was not the individual responsible for the state crime.

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SAC LETTER NO. 62-27

The primary purpose of the Fugitive Felon Act is to permit the FBI to locate and apprehend fugitives who flee across state lines to avoid state justice. We do not have the responsibility of solving or investigating the state crime; however, we must be ever alert to detect any possibility that state officials have requested location of a person other than the one responsible for the state offense. In many instances, we will be interviewing persons who are also witnesses in the state case for the purpose of developing fugitive leads, background information and contacts of the subject. In connection with such interviews, we must be alert to any information which would suggest an erroneous identification may have been made by local authorities. Should such occur, the facts should be immediately brought to the attention of local authorities and the U. S. Attorney, and immediate steps taken to correct the situation, promptly furnishing full facts to the Bureau.

In an important area of our assistance to local authorities under the expanded Fugitive Felon Act, namely confinement cases, which include state parole violator fugitives, there is already a positive identification with a known fingerprint record. This identifying information should be obtained at the outset of the investigation.

An aggressive discharge of our responsibilities under the act requires the establishment of effective liaison with state parole and penal authorities.

As pointed out in the Manual of Instructions, Section 49, the Department has advised the Fugitive Felon Act is broad enough to include state parole and probation violators who flee interstate to avoid confinement after their probation or parole has been revoked for a state offense within the provisions of Title 18, Section 1073. Application of the act in such cases is not directed at the state parole or probation offense itself, which in some instances may not be a felony, but is directed toward the state offense for which the subject was originally convicted. Accordingly, in any case where the prior conviction was for a felony, the act might be applied.

The Department has given considerable latitude and discretion to U. S. Attorneys in the enforcement of the act and has not limited its application to a particular list of state crimes. The Department rather has advised U. S. Attorneys that the act may be applied except where the purpose of the local statute is the enforcement of a civil obligation, or where the local law or application thereof is discriminatory.

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SAC LETTER NO. 62-27

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To be of maximum assistance to local authorities, you must insure prompt referral of cases from prosecutors, penal authorities and state parole officers, and must be alert to recognize any possibility that local authorities have made an improper identification.

(Security Letters on attached pages)

5/8/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-27

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(G) SECURITY INFORMANTS AND SOURCES - PAYMENT OF INCOME TAXES --  
As a result of contemplated prosecutions under the Internal Security Act of 1950, Departmental attorneys are interviewing many informants and former informants as prospective witnesses in a number of our offices. This is to again remind you that Section 107, N, 6, Manual of Instructions, requires that informants who receive compensation for their services to the Bureau should be advised that such compensation must be reported as income when filing income tax returns.

When an informant or former informant is initially considered as a potential witness in a Bureau case, it is desirable when advising him of the approaching interview by Departmental attorneys to ascertain prior to such interview all necessary information concerning his tax status. If he has not paid his taxes, obtain all pertinent details and promptly submit your recommendations for handling this situation.

5/8/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-27

(H) SECURITY INFORMANTS - CHANNELIZING INFORMANT STATEMENTS --  
The following method for preparing informant statements, which are orally received and where multiple channelization is involved, is being brought to your attention for use if suited to the needs of your office.

Where the number of copies to be channelized requires the use of Multilith equipment, it is suggested that when typing up the original of the statement for authentication by the informant, the plain paper, devoid of Bureau markings or identification, should be inserted in the typewriter backed by Multilith Reproducing Carbon Paper, No. 200-837-100A, and a Multilith master in that order. In this manner as the original is typed, the same impression is recorded on the Multilith master. Then, after authentication of the original by the informant, the master is available to run off the requisite channelizing copies.

The cost to the Government of the aforementioned brand of carbon paper is about \$2.67 per 100 sheets which are 10 inches by 13½ inches in size. Experimentation with this paper, which is designed for one-time use, has disclosed that, by cutting it in half and using each half twice by reversing it top to bottom after each use, each full sheet may be used four times. The Bureau does not stock this paper; therefore, each office desiring to make use of this system is authorized to purchase it locally.

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SAC LETTER NO. 62-27

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(I) CIRCUIT RIDERS, INC. -- It has recently come to the Bureau's attention that Circuit Riders, Incorporated, has published a book entitled "A Compilation of Public Records of 658 Clergymen and Laymen Connected With the National Council of Churches." A copy of this book was mailed directly to the Special Agent in Charge at one of our offices, and it is possible that other offices may receive copies of this book. For your information, the Circuit Riders is an organization made up primarily of laymen in the Methodist Church whose objective is to combat communism in the Methodist Church; however, the organization has no official connection with that Church. Myers G. Lowman is the Executive Secretary of the organization, and in recent years he has leveled numerous charges against clergymen, indicating they are sympathetic toward communism. Lowman has been critical in the past of speeches on communism by a Bureau official and while we accept information from Lowman, contacts are most circumspect with him.

Lowman, through his organization, has disseminated several other books of a similar type as the current one, which is a compilation of affiliations of the officers and clergymen of the National Council of Churches in pacifist organizations, one-world groups, socialist organizations, popular-front-type of action groups and communist front organizations, publications, petitions, et cetera. The reliability of the material in Lowman's book has not been established, and you should, therefore, appropriately mark this book, if you should receive a copy, to the effect that there has been no corroboration of the material it contains and the FBI should in no instance utilize it as a source by itself. In all cases, the original source, if there is one, should be utilized rather than the book.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

5/8/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-27

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In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 62-F  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

May 9, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RE: TRAINING  
AGENTS' TECHNICAL

The Bureau desires that, at this time, you make arrangements to assure that Special Agents of your office having a need to know, namely, those engaged in security and criminal intelligence work, are aware of MISUR equipment currently available for field use. This presentation should be handled by a qualified, sound-trained Agent.

The sound-trained Agent should display available, representative MISUR equipment assigned your office. If samples of MISUR equipment are not readily available, he should describe the various specialized MISUR equipment set forth in the "Handbook of Technical Equipment." All MISUR equipment described in this manual is available to the field for authorized installations.


As a matter of information, a general distribution has been made to the field of FBI Laboratory-designed MISUR equipment, such as the MITE, MATE and MOUSE. Additional sophisticated MISUR equipment, presently under development by the FBI Laboratory, such as the "WASP" will be distributed to the field and included in the "Handbook of Technical Equipment" as soon as production is accomplished.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director





UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

June 5, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO MEXICO - JUNE 29 - JULY 1, 1962 -- President and Mrs. Kennedy will make an official visit to Mexico City, Mexico, June 29 to July 1, 1962.

In connection with this trip all offices should be alert for any data concerning possible threats to the personal safety of the President, Mrs. Kennedy, and members of his group. You should also be alert for information concerning anti-American demonstrations or any intelligence data of interest concerning this visit.

Sources and informants in a position to acquire the above-mentioned data should be alerted to the necessity for prompt reporting, and the Bureau should be immediately advised if any such data is received. Communications in this matter should be submitted under the above caption.

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SAC LETTER NO. 62-32

(B) SUPPLIES - BUREAU REPRINTS -- In order to clarify the proper method of ordering Bureau publications, attention is directed to the Field Publication List previously distributed to field offices. The following publications should be ordered from the Property Management Section, Administrative Division, by means of Form FD-218: Application Blanks; "Benefits of Working for the FBI"; "Facts About a Career in the FBI"; "How to Become a Fingerprint Technician with the FBI"; Job Descriptions (Clerical-Stenographic, Electronic Maintenance Technician, Laboratory [Technician], Laboratory Aide, Photographer, Radio Operator, Special Agent). All other publications listed in the Field Publication List should be ordered by routing slip from the Crime Records Division, Attention, Correspondence and Tours Section.

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SAC LETTER NO. 62-32

(C) BIENNIAL REPORT ON VOLUME OF RECORDS - FEDERAL RECORDS ACT OF 1950 -- In accordance with Federal Records Act of 1950, the Bureau is required to furnish on a biennial basis a statistical summary of its records holdings to the Department of Justice for submission to the National Archives and Records Services of the General Services Administration.

It is emphasized that this survey is conducted on a biennial basis and thus covers a two-year period. Those offices which submitted volume of records statistics for the fiscal year 1960-61 should be certain that those figures submitted by them for 1960-61 are included in the current survey.

In order for the Bureau to compile this summary, each office must furnish the following statistics in the order set forth below:

- (1) Volume of records in cubic feet on hand as of 7-1-60.
- (2) Volume of records in cubic feet on hand as of 6-30-62.
- (3) Volume of records in cubic feet disposed of during the period 7-1-60 to 6-30-62.

This figure should include space reacquired as a result of consolidation or by conversion to shelf filing, as well as space reacquired by destruction of files.

All records must be taken into consideration. Records are defined as anything not being retained on a temporary basis.

Ticklers, preliminary work sheets, reference books, etc., are examples of nonrecord material.

The Bureau is required to submit this statistical data to the Department of Justice no later than 7-20-62; therefore, the field should furnish the figures to the Bureau no later than 7-6-62. It is not necessary to wait for the close of the fiscal year to make the above computations.

For additional information as to how to compute the cubic feet of records, refer to SAC Letter No. 59-36 (C) dated 6-9-59.

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SAC LETTER NO. 62-32

(D) FBIRA MATTER - INTEROFFICE FIREARMS COMPETITION (PPC)  
1962 -- The Annual Interoffice Firearms Competition for 1962 will be held during the third outdoor firearms training period. The "J. Edgar Hoover Firearms Trophy" will be presented to the office having the highest average percentage score of all Special Agents assigned to the office on July 1, 1962, not on limited duty.

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SAC LETTER NO. 62-32

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In addition, I have approved a suggestion whereby the field offices will be divided into groups according to Agent complement. The winning office in each category will be cited for honorable mention.

The rules and method of reporting scores and the group categories of offices for purpose of determining honorable mention citations will be forwarded to you in the near future by the President of the FBIRA.

6/5/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-32

(E) USE OF FORM FD-217 TO OBTAIN BUREAU FILE NUMBER -- Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part II, Section 4, Page 3, Paragraph 14, requires that Form FD-217 be used by the field to obtain the Bureau file number when additional correspondence with the Bureau can be foreseen. Use of the Bureau file number on correspondence from the field reduces processing time and costs at the Seat of Government and is an aid to identification of the case both in the field and at the Seat of Government.

A number of instances have been noted at the Bureau where Form FD-217 is not attached to correspondence being submitted, the Bureau file number is not quoted, and it is apparent that additional correspondence will be had with the Bureau. You should insure that personnel in your office are properly utilizing Form FD-217 and that they are quoting the Bureau file number on correspondence when it is available. For your information, it is not necessary to quote the Bureau file number on applicant-type correspondence.

6/5/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-32

(F) TRAINING - POLICE - STATE ACCREDITATION -- Many instances have come to the Bureau's attention where funds have been made available for police training by state boards of education if certain requirements have been met. One requirement often is that all instructors participating in these schools be accredited to teach by the state board of education. Some offices have felt that FBI instructors should be given this accreditation and overtures of blanket accreditation for all FBI instructors have been made in at least one instance. Such accreditation is usually in the form of a vocational teaching certificate.

6/5/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-32

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It is felt that this would be an opportune time to explore the requirements and procedures for obtaining state accreditation for our police instructors. SACs having offices covering capitals in states where police training is under the regulations of state boards of education should discreetly, through established sources, determine the requirements for state accreditation of police instructors.

The information obtained should be furnished the Bureau by June 22, 1962. Offices covering state capitals should send information copies of their communications to other offices in the state.

6/5/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-32

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(G) CRIMINAL INFORMANTS - DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATION -- Reference is made to SAC Letter 62-19 (J) dated March 27, 1962, emphasizing the constant critical need for top quality informants. Many informants throughout the field supply a vast amount of information consistently which enables the Bureau to successfully conclude highly important matters. Many of these informants because of their intimate knowledge of criminals and criminal activities beyond their immediate communities have been successfully used in penetrating illegal operations in distant areas.

A survey of offices operating the most productive informants revealed these informants were developed as a result of initially carefully selecting individuals close to criminal operations and thereafter expending sufficient time and effort to further their development. The initial approach was for the ostensible purpose of interviewing the prospective informant as a suspect in a pending matter. The elimination of the potential informant as a suspect fostered a climate conducive to his further development since many criminals are apprehensive of being "set up" because of their past records. It was found that an extensive period of careful handling was vital to the exploitation of full potential of the informant. During this period, background concerning the individual under development was obtained to the extent that the prospective informant was convinced that the FBI was aware of the most minute details of his activities.

In most instances at the outset financial reward was not an important factor in the development of top flight informants. However, after the individual committed himself to cooperate, money became "all important" in maintaining his continued interest and productivity. Obtaining signed receipts presented no problem and was felt to be beneficial in most instances. Once payments were started to the informant, promptness in paying for information appeared to be more important to the informant than the actual amount paid.

Without exception respect for the FBI was the high motivating factor in his assumption of the informant role. In some cases distrust of police officers in the early stages of development included FBI Agents. This had to be overcome by a confident mature approach of the Special Agent in portraying the Bureau's high standard of operation and role ✓

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of the confidential informant in bringing about the Bureau's successful accomplishments. Discussion with the informant as to the safeguards utilized by the Bureau to protect informants and how arrests and recoveries could be effected without disclosing an informant's identity were essential points in establishing the necessary confidence to induce the prospective informant to actively produce information for the Bureau.

In connection with the development and the subsequent handling of the informant it was frequently necessary to insure no action was taken by him which would arouse the suspicion of his criminal associates. Of necessity the Special Agent must exercise a high degree of ingenuity and maturity in guiding the informant.

An interesting facet of the criminal mind on which Special Agents have been able to capitalize is the intense dislike harbored by criminals for certain types of other criminals. Frequently the thief has contempt for the narcotics vendor; the armed robber intense dislike for the confidence man, and so on.

Giving the informant a sense of importance, showing respect for his judgment, accepting his past, and instilling a sense of accomplishment serve to promote the spirit of cooperation which results in increased productivity. Although some information may be trivial, it was important to take copious notes even on the most minute piece of information to impress the informant and to later evaluate his reliability.

The above is to assist you in this important phase of our operations which has such a direct bearing on our overall accomplishments.

(Security Letter on attached pages)

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(H) ESPIONAGE AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS <sup>3/4</sup> SURVEILLANCES OF SOVIET-BLOC PERSONNEL -- For years Soviet officials in the United States have made numerous and repeated trips throughout this country aimed at obtaining valuable data regarding our air bases, missile sites and other important defense installations. In recent years they have coordinated their activities in this regard with the satellite countries and in this way are getting coverage of areas in the United States closed to Soviet travel.

In connection with our responsibility in regard to coverage of Soviet-bloc activities, these Soviet-bloc officials have been placed under surveillance. Many offices have participated in these surveillances, and it appears that this activity on the part of the Soviet bloc will continue.

On May 16, 1962, a number of newspapers in the United States carried an Associated Press article, date line Moscow, May 15, 1962, reporting that a correspondent for "Izvestia," the official Soviet Government newspaper, alleged that during a recent tour of the United States he was constantly shadowed by the "American secret service." He also alleged newspaper reporters and television men had "close business connections with the FBI" because reporters met him at the railroad station in Portland, Oregon, when he arrived there. He alleged he was under heavy surveillance in Seattle, Washington, and furnished license numbers of two automobiles he alleged were conducting surveillance of him in Los Angeles, California.

The Bureau determined that the allegations of the Soviet correspondent were completely false and undoubtedly were an attempt by the Soviets to embarrass this Bureau and to curtail our counter-intelligence operations. There is a definite possibility other Soviet-bloc personnel may make similar charges in the future and in this connection may attempt to obtain proof of their allegations, such as obtaining photographs of Bureau cars or surveillance agents. It is known that bloc personnel have made numerous attempts to do this in the past.

We do not intend to allow a false allegation by the Soviet bloc to alter coverage of their activities. Our surveillances undoubtedly have hampered the Soviets in collection of intelligence data in the United States, and we can expect them to create or utilize any incident they can as a basis for protest against our coverage.

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It is desired, therefore, that the above facts be called to the attention of all agents. It should be pointed out that while the Bureau desires our coverage of Soviet-bloc officials to be as complete as possible, the surveillance must be discreet and every precaution must be taken to avoid giving the Soviets a basis for protest.

You should impress upon agents handling surveillances of Soviet-bloc personnel in the United States that they must constantly exercise keen alertness, careful planning and good judgment in handling all facets of our surveillance operations.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover


Director

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*h* PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 62-G  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

July 25, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7

One set of AFSAM 7 key lists for months of September, October, and November, 1962, being forwarded separately to all divisions except Washington Field which will receive none; three copies being furnished Bureau's Emergency Relocation Site; and three copies Seat of Government Code Room.

Acknowledge receipt of key lists promptly by routing slip, indicating serial numbers which appear thereon; return in a sealed envelope to the Bureau, attention FBI Laboratory, FBI Annex, the address label on individual tamperproofed envelope containing keys even though torn while opening package; and destroy, by burning, each monthly sheet thirty days after last effective date thereof, advising Bureau promptly by routing slip, attention FBI Laboratory, FBI Annex, this has been done.

It is essential address label mentioned above be returned in order to control security of shipment.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

June 12, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) PRESENTATION OF CASES TO THE U. S. ATTORNEY -- Your attention is again directed to the need of carefully analyzing each matter which is brought to the attention of the U. S. Attorney for an opinion as to prosecution. Your attention has been previously directed to the fact that unwarranted and premature presentations of matters to the U. S. Attorney should not occur. It is a responsibility of your office to present a well-rounded and sufficiently developed set of facts to the U. S. Attorney in order that he may have the benefit of the investigation conducted by your office into a particular allegation.

The facts in each case should be carefully weighed in order to preclude presenting to the U. S. Attorney facts which have not been fully analyzed and developed in order that an appropriate decision may be reached by the U. S. Attorney as to whether (1) the facts, as alleged, warrant further investigation; and (2) whether prosecution is warranted.

Any report which is prepared reflecting the opinion of the U. S. Attorney should fully and completely set forth his opinion and you should continue to confirm any opinion obtained from the U. S. Attorney by an appropriate communication to the U. S. Attorney reflecting his opinion.

This matter must receive your most careful attention and consideration.

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SAC LETTER NO. 62-33

(B) VOLUNTARY OVERTIME (VOT) -- TIME IN OFFICE (TIO) CARD FORMS (FD-329) -- Discrepancies and omissions continue to be noted in connection with the FD-329 forms from some offices. It is imperative that the following entries be completed: Work Type, Total Possible Work Days, Subtract Time Absent, Net Total Days Worked, Certification for Fifteen Per Cent Premium Overtime Pay, Initials of Division Head and Squad Number, where applicable. Entries for VOT and TIO must be legible and mathematically correct.

The FD-329 forms for Agents under transfer are to be forwarded promptly to the new office of assignment with the Time and Attendance Card.

Each office must forward forms to the Bureau in one package as soon as possible but no later than the close of the fifth working day of the following month. Cards are not to be held for the purpose of recording VOT performed while attending In-Service training. Such VOT will be reported by the Training and Inspection Division. Failure to adhere to these instructions will be cause for administrative action.

6/12/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-33

(C) TRAINING - POLICE - JUVENILE DELINQUENCY - YOUTHFUL CRIMINALITY SCHOOLS -- At present there are 47 police instructors in 35 divisions qualified to teach on the subject of juvenile delinquency and youthful criminality. An analysis of the police training program relating to this topic discloses that there have been very few such specialized schools held in recent years. With the amount of juvenile crime that exists and the interest of law enforcement and the public in this problem, it is believed that every effort should be made to expand our police training efforts in this field. While you should not solicit schools, you must make every effort to let all cooperative law enforcement agencies know that these specialized schools are available from the FBI and that these schools are available at the Command Level, the Supervisory Level and the Patrolman Level.

You should immediately assure that the Agent personnel in your division qualified to lecture on juvenile delinquency and youthful criminality have current knowledge of all facets of the juvenile problem. You should insure that your existing reference materials and lecture outlines are not outdated and they should be reviewed for currency prior to scheduling of any specialized schools on this topic.

In organizing these schools, you should consider using National Academy graduates with specialized experience in juvenile work and acceptable outside experts as well as our own police instructors as lecturers. It is expected that each such school will be of a high quality and will utilize the best possible lecturers available. The curricula for these schools must be set up with great care to assure that we present a current factual school on the existing problems and means of combating juvenile delinquency and youthful criminality.

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(D) INFORMATION CONCERNING HOUSING CONDITIONS IN WASHINGTON, D.C., AND VICINITY - FBI FORM BOOK - BUREAU APPLICANTS -- Attached is a supply of the revised form FD-273, "Information Concerning Housing Conditions in Washington, D. C., and Vicinity." Copies of the old form in your possession should be destroyed. Place one copy in the FBI Form Book.

A new form, "Notification of Acceptance of Appointment and Request for Temporary Housing Accommodations," has been prepared and will be enclosed with each appointment letter. Appointees should execute this form indicating acceptance of appointment. If temporary housing accommodations are desired prior to entry on duty, appointees should also execute portion of this form pertaining to temporary housing reservations. At the time the agent contacts the appointee to determine if they have any problems in connection with their appointment, he should instruct the appointee to immediately execute this form and forward to the Bureau.

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SAC LETTER NO. 62-33

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(E) BUREAU APPLICANTS - ADDITIONAL NEW AGENTS' CLASS FOR 7-16-62 --  
A New Agents' Class is being scheduled for July 16, 1962. This class will be in addition to those already scheduled for June 25, 1962, August 6, 1962, September 10, 1962, October 15, 1962 and November 26, 1962.

(Security Letters on attached page)

6/12/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-33

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(F) SECURITY INFORMANTS' - CONTROL -- Department representatives have been interviewing security informants as possible witnesses in prosecutions under the Internal Security Act of 1950. In many cases, security informants have shown considerable reluctance to testify except in the event of a national emergency for fear of physical harm, social and business reprisals and other personal reasons. Instructions are now outstanding for informants to submit their information in such form that if they are called upon to testify their written statements will be available for introduction in court to back up their testimony.

Despite the fact that they realize they may be needed as witnesses in the future, some informants are reluctant to testify for the reasons noted above.

It is the responsibility of the Special Agents handling security informants to condition them to the fact that someday the knowledge they possess may be needed as evidence in court to assist our Government in combatting the evil of communism. All Special Agents handling security informants must, as a part of our over-all informant program, psychologically prepare the informants for the fact they may, at some future date, be called upon to render a still further contribution to their Government by testifying to the information they have furnished concerning security matters.

The proper indoctrination of informants in this regard is absolutely essential since it is incumbent upon the Bureau to provide witnesses whenever the Department initiates prosecution in security cases.

6/12/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-33

(G) SECURITY INFORMANTS - PAYMENTS FOR EXPENSES -- The exorbitant financial demands by the Nation of Islam (NOI) on its members was the subject of discussion at the Internal Security-Espionage Conference held at the Seat of Government on May 28-29, 1962. It was noted that each temple of the NOI sets the amount of dues which members must pay and also requires numerous other collections. Members are threatened with expulsion if they do not meet these demands. Informants in some cases, however, have been able to remain in the organization without making all these payments. All offices should carefully analyze the necessity for informants in any temple to pay the maximum required contributions of the NOI. Instruct informants to curtail their expenses and whenever possible have informants create the impression among the temple officials that they are having financial problems. Work closely with the informants in this regard and caution them that the Bureau will not automatically approve their expenses.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures for (D)

6/12/62

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

June 19, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) VOUCHERS -- TRAVEL - MAILING ADDRESS -- In order to facilitate the distribution of expense checks to employees, a change is being made in present regulations which require that Washington, D. C., be shown on the travel voucher in the space headed "Mailing Address." Effective July 1, 1962, all travel vouchers are to show, in the "Mailing Address" space, the headquarters office to which the check is to be sent. Names of resident agency cities should not be used. Where, because of a pending transfer or other factor, there is a question as to which office should be shown as the mailing address, list the office to which the employee is going unless there will be a delay of more than twenty days in leaving the office to which assigned at the time the voucher is prepared.

Appropriate manual changes will be forthcoming.

6/19/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-34

(B) PERSONNEL - CONDUCT AND ACTIVITIES - FBI PARTICIPATION IN PISTOL COMPETITIONS - FIREARMS -- The FBI's leadership in the firearms training field has been established through our police training schools and not in competitive shooting. The Bureau has no objection to employees participating in pistol matches where the individual is not identified as being an FBI employee and where the individual participates on his own time, using his own revolver and ammunition, and pays his own registration fee and travel expenses. Unfortunately, newspaper writers do not differentiate between an individual shooting as such and an individual representing the FBI; therefore, no Bureau employee will participate in a pistol match where he has to identify himself on registration as an employee of the FBI. No team of Bureau employees will be entered in a match as an FBI team or as representing the FBI without my personal approval. The wearing of distinctive clothing or caps with FBI lettering or insignia of any type is prohibited.

6/19/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-34

(C) NEWS MEDIA CONTACTS -- SAC Letter 61-61 (F) dated 10-24-61 instructed that quarterly reports be submitted by each field office summarizing contacts with news media. The quarterly reports

submitted to date indicate substantial improvement throughout the field in contacts with news media, and quarterly reports will no longer be required. Hereafter, each field division will submit an annual report to reach the Bureau by May 15, in which a detailed summary of activities designed to maintain good relations with all types of news media is set forth. This report should contain the number of daily and weekly newspapers, radio and television stations in the division, together with the total number of contacts which have been made with representatives of these media. The report should specify the number of items such as Introductions to the Law Enforcement Bulletin and other material distributed during the year. It should also set forth future plans the division has for further developing its program for maintaining good relations with news media.

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(D) PAYROLL - FEDERAL WITHHOLDING TAXES - FORM W-4 -- Form W-4 as revised July, 1960, provides for the listing opposite Item 6 of any extra Federal income tax to be withheld from the biweekly pay of an employee in addition to that which would normally be withheld. The first five items on the revised form, providing for the listing of personal and dependent exemptions, have not changed. It is no longer necessary or desirable that a memorandum be written requesting extra Federal income tax be withheld from an employee's salary since the revised W-4 Form is sufficient. The receipt of a new W-4 Form from an employee voids the previous W-4 Form as well as any other request for the withholding of additional taxes; therefore, complete information should be shown opposite each of the six items on the W-4 Form when submitted. Item 6 should show the entire amount of any additional tax to be withheld, including any amount previously authorized. Amounts listed opposite Item 6 must be in full dollar amounts. This form must always contain the personal signature of the employee. Form should include the payroll number. In the future, the Statement of Earnings will show the amount of any extra Federal income tax withheld when an employee has authorized the withholding of such extra tax. All employees of your office should be advised of the foregoing. In the event you do not have a supply of the W-4 Forms as revised in July, 1960, these should be requisitioned in the usual manner from the Bureau.

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(E) FOREIGN LANGUAGE TRAINING PROGRAM -- It has come to my attention that the view is prevalent that age and length of service are a bar to consideration for Foreign Language training and that such training will adversely affect consideration for office of preference transfers or administrative advancement.

I wish to emphasize that neither age nor length of service constitutes an automatic bar to consideration for Foreign Language training. The primary factors which are given weight are (1) the need of the Bureau, which must be paramount and, (2) the interest, ability, aptitude and availability of individual Agents. Training in a foreign language definitely does not prevent an Agent being considered for a transfer to an office of preference. Language-trained Agents are listed for their indicated offices of preference in exactly the same fashion as other Agents and come up for consideration for such assignments in the normal manner. As regards foreign language ability precluding consideration for administrative advancement, I wish to state that this is simply not so. There are numerous Bureau executives at all levels, both at the Seat of Government and in the field, who have language ability and have used it on regular investigative assignments. It has not hindered their advancement. As a matter of fact, there are positions where foreign language ability is a mandatory requirement for administrative advancement, such as Legal Attaches. The main factors considered in connection with administrative advancement are the interest, ability and availability of the Agent.

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SAC LETTER NO. 62-34

(F) SEARCHES AND SEIZURES -- Federal courts have recently ruled adversely to the government in two Bureau cases involving questions of search and seizure. These decisions illustrate again the need for all investigative personnel to know and closely follow the rules pertaining to the crucial search function in criminal cases.

In U. S. v. Rutheiser, 203 F. Supp. 891 (1962), Agents went to the defendant's home at 8:30 p.m. and obtained what they considered to be a valid consent to search the home. The search disclosed stolen goods and the carton in which the goods had arrived, both of which were specifically pointed out to the Agents by the defendant during the search. The court ruled, however,

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that although the "... defendant did acquiesce to the search by the agents," such acquiescence was "... not that consent which constitutes an unequivocal, free and intelligent waiver of a fundamental right." In reaching this conclusion, the court agreed with the defendant's argument that "... the presence of the agents in his home at night created an atmosphere of coercion and duress."

Cases such as this one admittedly pose a difficult problem. The truck driver from whom the defendant allegedly received the stolen goods was in the Bureau office at the moment, and an immediate search of the defendant's premises seemed both logical and necessary. Delay of the search until daytime might have resulted in the defendant becoming apprised of the investigation and disposing of the contraband.

Although the Federal courts vary considerably in their receptivity to consent searches, and a different court might well have upheld the search here, consent searches should always be viewed as difficult to sustain. Duress is often implied from such circumstances as an abnormal hour of search, words of demand rather than request to search, or any show of force such as a large number of officers on the premises.

Before attempting a search by consent, consideration should be given always to the possibility of obtaining a search warrant. Searches by warrant are preferable to searches by consent, and particularly so when premises are involved.

In Mosco v. U. S., 301 F2d 180 (1962), four separate searches were made but the results of only two were allowed into evidence. These two were a consent search of a vehicle and a consent search of the person, both made by Bureau Agents. To the contrary, the results of a search of premises by an Agent and a local officer, and a vehicle search by a local officer alone, were not allowed into evidence.

As to the search of premises, the court found that an Agent and a local officer properly went into the apartment of one of the two defendants to arrest him on a bank robbery charge but, on finding the defendant not there, improperly searched the apartment for evidence some thirty minutes in advance of the defendant's arrest when he returned to the apartment. There being no search warrant and no consent,

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the search could be sustained only if made incidental to the arrest, and it did not meet the requirements for this type of search because it was made before the arrest rather than immediately subsequent thereto as required by the law.

The search of the same defendant's vehicle by a local officer was ruled out because it was made on no legal basis whatsoever. Moreover, defendant's later consent to search his vehicle, obtained after his arrest, did not cure the illegality of the search made previously.

The court said, "All searches, such as they were, were reasonable. They were not such as would shock the conscience of justice, nor were they contrary to one's sense of fair play." Nevertheless, two of the searches were held insufficient to meet Federal constitutional standards. The result was that the conviction of one of the two defendants was reversed and remanded for new trial on lawfully acquired evidence only.

Bring this information to the attention of all investigative personnel. Additional instruction on the legal points involved in both decisions cited here is available in Training Document #61 entitled, "The Federal Law on Search and Seizure."

(Security Letters on attached pages)

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(G) REPORT WRITING - SECURITY - THOROUGHNESS -- The Bureau has recently noted a number of instances in security matter reports wherein some anticipated or planned activity is reported but there is no follow-up statement in the report that the activity did, in fact, take place. This has occurred even though the period of the report has encompassed the date of the alleged activity. This is obviously an undesirable practice as it leaves the reader "up in the air" as to whether the activity did or did not take place. Also, such a situation could imply inadequate investigation and thus prove embarrassing because of the responsibility the Bureau has for dissemination to other agencies which rely on the Bureau for the full facts in given situations.

This matter should be brought to the attention of all Special Agents engaged in security work who should be reminded of the necessity for thoroughness in the preparation of reports so as to eliminate the undesirable tendency noted above.

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SAC LETTER NO. 62-34

(H) CHINESE REFUGEE SITUATION -- In accordance with the President's request, the Attorney General and, under his direction, the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) are formulating a program to bring to the United States 3,209 Chinese refugees in Hong Kong. It is anticipated that these refugees will be arriving in the near future at the rate of 25-50 per day. The Bureau does not intend to investigate all of these refugees who, incidentally, reportedly have resided in Hong Kong from 8-10 years. The field should promptly alert all logical informants, potential security informants, confidential sources and sources of information for indications that any of these refugees is engaged in activities inimical to interests of the United States.

Inasmuch as these Chinese refugees are entering the United States as immigrants, field offices would normally be alerted to their presence under the current program of "Chinese Aliens Entering the United States for Permanent Residence." However, before investigation is considered, the following minimum criteria should be applied:

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1. The refugees must have resided or visited Communist China within past        years.
2. At the time refugee last departed Communist China he was between        and        years of age.
3. Possesses a minimum of        years of formal education.
4. At time of entry into the United States was unaccompanied by

Within this framework only those cases are to be investigated where there is reasonable evidence to indicate the refugee may have been recruited by Chinese Communists for intelligence operations in the United States, possesses intelligence information of interest to Bureau or other Government agencies or possesses informant, source and/or double agent potential.

In addition, the afore-mentioned criteria are to be applied to all cases coming within the following three programs currently in operation with regard to Chinese security matters:

1. Chinese Aliens Entering the United States for Permanent Residence (Bufile        )
2. Chinese Entering the United States Claiming United States Citizenship (Bufile        )
3. Chinese Who Have Formerly Resided in Communist China Entering the United States on Student Visas (Bufile        )

Field, when reviewing data furnished by INS under program Number 1, will initiate investigation only in those cases which meet new criteria.

Under program Number 2, Washington Field will continue to review records of State Department but will furnish Bureau and field only those cases which meet new criteria.

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SAC LETTER NO. 62-34

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Legal Attache, Tokyo, when reviewing records at United States Consulate, Hong Kong, under program Number 3, will furnish Bureau with only those cases which meet new criteria.

As in the past, Bureau will conduct indices search regarding subjects and sponsors in those cases referred by Washington Field and Legal Attache, Tokyo, for investigation and appropriate field offices will be advised of results. Those cases initiated by field regarding "Chinese Aliens Entering the United States for Permanent Residence" will be handled as heretofore.

The foregoing instructions should not be construed as precluding investigations of those Chinese whose actions and/or background logically indicate inquiries are warranted although not falling within the new criteria.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

6/19/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-34

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-47

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

September 7, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) "A STUDY OF COMMUNISM" - AVAILABILITY -- The FBI Recreation Association will handle orders from Bureau personnel for my captioned new book on communism being published by Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., New York, New York, for release on October 1, 1962. While this volume will retail for \$3.95, it will be available to Bureau employees at the special price of \$2.50. Each office should determine the total number of books desired by employees and advise the Bureau by September 27, 1962, by routing slip marked "Attention: Crime Research Section." One check covering the entire order and made payable to the FBI Recreation Association should accompany each office's request. "Masters of Deceit" and "The FBI Story" will, of course, still be available at the usual prices.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

October 5, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

RE: SECURITY INDEX - CUBA

SAC letter Number 60-54 established criteria for inclusion of individuals on the Security Index based on their pro-Castro sympathies and for the tabbing as "pro-Cuban" of other individuals already on the Security Index. In recognition of the mounting tension between Cuba and the United States, additional standards for placing individuals on the Security Index based solely on their pro-Castro activities and sympathies have been established to complement the standards outlined in SAC letter 60-54.

Aliens of Cuban nationality and aliens holding Cuban citizenship should be considered for the Security Index when it is determined that one of these (1) is likely to foster, encourage, or promote the policies, programs, or objectives of the Cuban Government, or collaborate with the Cuban Government or (2) is likely to engage in or attempt to engage in acts of espionage, sabotage or other activities inimical or detrimental to the defense or public safety of the United States as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

Activities on a subject's part which should be considered in determining whether his name should be added to the Security Index under the above would include but should not be limited to (1) participation in organizations supporting the Castro regime, (2) participation in picket lines formed in support of the Cuban Government, (3) contacts with Cuban agents operating in this country on behalf of the Cuban Government or, (4) statements or activities on a subject's part establishing reasonable grounds to believe that his loyalty would lie with the Cuban Government in the event of armed conflict between the United States and Cuba.

*Reviewed by  
M. Kelly  
8/7/75*



There must be a showing of activities of the type described above subsequent to October 1, 1960, and this must be verified by investigation. In essence, these standards have been established to cover Cuban nationals who have definitely evidenced support of Castro or a communist regime in Cuba since October 1, 1960.

This move is being made to insure special consideration is given those potentially dangerous individuals who retain basic loyalties to the procommunist, pro-Soviet Bloc and anti-U. S. regime in Cuba but who have found it expedient not to engage in activities to an extent which would bring them within the previously proscribed standards.

Effective immediately no cases-involving pro-Castro allegations against aliens of Cuban nationality and aliens holding Cuban citizenship are to be closed without consideration being given to whether the subjects thereof should be placed on the Security Index in keeping with this SAC letter. A statement showing why they do not qualify should be included on a cover page of the closing report or in other closing communication if the appropriate FD-122 recommending inclusion of the individual on the Security Index is not submitted. A systematic review of all Internal Security - Cuba and Registration Act - Cuba cases closed since October 1, 1960, should be conducted to select other potentially dangerous individuals who fall within these new criteria. Your 105-0 files and any other appropriate control files (such as those containing INS name check forms G-135a showing pro-Castro allegations have been made against Cuban aliens arriving in the U. S.) should also be reviewed.

Special consideration is to be given those individuals previously recommended for the Security Index but whose participation in organizational activities on behalf of Castro was not sufficient to come within the previously established criteria. Concerning those individuals whose investigative files show they clearly fall within the newly established criteria, it will only be necessary to verify their present employments and residences, submit a report containing this data and any unreported pertinent derogatory information, and forward FD-122 with accompanying succinct summary justifying recommendations for inclusion on the Security Index. In border-line cases where there are no concrete indications the individuals have clearly and unmistakably renounced their adherence to the policies of the present Cuban regime, their sympathies should be established by appropriate investigation, informant checks and/or checks with other reliable individuals in a position to know the individuals' true sympathies.

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SAC LETTER NO. 62-55

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In order that special handling may be afforded "pro-Cuban" Security Index subjects in the event of a limited emergency, each office should at this time set up a new category of the Special Section of the Security Index designated "Cuban." Existing instructions applying to the handling of Special Section Security Index cards as set forth on pages 52 and 53, Section 87 D, Manual of Instructions, should be adhered to.

The new "Cuban" Special Section will include all Security Index cards containing the identification "CUB," indicating Cuban organization affiliation or nationalistic tendency. In the immediate future Bureau will forward to each interested office amended Security Index cards designated in the upper right-hand corner "CUB" for this Special Section.

SAC letter 60-54 (F) provided for "pro-Cuban" tabbing of individuals carried on the Security Index for reasons other than their Cuban organization affiliations or nationalistic tendencies. The Security Index cards on such subjects are not to be placed in the new "Cuban" Special Section. In order that they may be readily identified, however, these cards in the Alphabetical Section of the Security Index should be tabbed with a metal tab of a color different from that used to tab "DETCOM" subjects. In the immediate future Bureau will forward to each interested office a list of those subjects whose names should be so tabbed. For your information, cards on such subjects contain the capital letter "C" on the left side of the card at the beginning of the second line.

Upon receipt of the foregoing amended cards and lists, all offices are to immediately verify the residences and employments of those Security Index subjects placed thereon on the basis of their pro-Castro activities as well as those other Security Index subjects tabbed "pro-Cuban." FD-122 showing changes should be expedited. Be certain arrangements are made to assure you are advised of any subsequent changes in their residences and employments.

All offices except Miami and New York should complete this review and advise the Bureau by October 31, 1962, as follows: (1) Number of individuals being recommended for Security Index based on field office's evaluation that they positively fall within the newly established criteria; (2) Number of cases being opened or reopened to establish whether the individuals fit the new criteria; (3) Statement that residences and employments of all subjects placed on the Security Index based solely on their

10/5/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-55

- 3 -

pro-Castro activities and all Security Index subjects tabbed "pro-Cuban" have been verified or a statement as to the number of such individuals whose residences and employments have not been verified and when this will be accomplished. Miami and New York should advise the Bureau by November 15, 1962.

With regard to the "pro-Cuban" tabbing of current Security Index subjects, the following procedure is to be effected immediately. During the annual review of all Security Index cases special attention must be given to each case and a determination made as to whether those who have in any manner demonstrated strong sympathies for the present Cuban regime have backgrounds, employments or special aptitudes which would make them potential threats to engage in sabotage or other disruptive activities should there be hostilities with Cuba. For example, those with certain specialized military training, those employed at key facilities, and those who have received training in police work or the use of explosives would warrant special consideration. FD-122 with succinct summary should accompany the annual report in each case where "pro-Cuban" tabbing is believed warranted.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

10/5/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-55

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

October 16, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) HOUSEHOLD GOODS-COMMUTATION OF EXPENSES FOR TRANSPORTATION OF HOUSEHOLD GOODS AND PERSONAL EFFECTS -- The General Services Administration has revised the commuted rates for the transportation of household goods and personal effects. The new rates apply to any shipment which commenced on or after August 18, 1962. A copy of Circular Number 263 is attached. Additional copies of this circular will be forwarded to your office under separate cover.

All employees of your office who have occasion to submit vouchers claiming reimbursement for the cost of transportation and storage of household goods and personal effects should review the new rates to insure that vouchers are submitted correctly. Necessary manual changes will be forthcoming.

10/16/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-58

(B) COMMUNICATIONS - QUOTING BUREAU FILE NUMBERS -- You are again reminded that in addressing communications to the Seat of Government the Bureau file number, when available, should always be quoted. If the Bureau file number is not known and further correspondence between field office and Seat of Government is expected in the matter, Bureau file number should be requested by submitting FD-217 with the correspondence. By this relatively simple procedure the substantial cost of processing such mail at the Bureau is almost cut in half. Equally important is the increased speed with which the mail is handled with one hundred per cent accuracy if the number is quoted correctly. Not only should investigative employees be periodically reminded of this requirement, but also stenographers should be encouraged to request the dictator in every instance where it is known to furnish the Bureau file number for placement on communications addressed to the Bureau or to determine whether the dictator desires to request the Bureau file number by submitting FD-217.

10/16/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-58

(C) INTERVIEWS; CONFESSIONS; SIGNED STATEMENTS; WARNING OF RIGHTS -- A Federal judge in an eastern district recently inaugurated the practice of asking many probing questions concerning the voluntary nature of

guilty pleas entered in his court. Each defendant entering such a plea is asked to define "voluntary," and then asked if he was beaten, threatened, or given any promises by anyone in the U. S. Attorney's Office, or by the FBI or other law enforcement agency concerned.

It has been learned that the purpose of the new procedure is to make doubly sure that the defendant will not have a basis for subsequently filing a Writ of Habeas Corpus charging that his guilty plea was made involuntarily; also, that this new procedure has been discussed at a judicial conference and it may become the general practice in other Federal districts.

All investigative and supervisory employees, including Inspectors and their aides, must make certain that there is full compliance with long-standing Bureau instructions against the use of brutality, threats or promises; that any statement taken fully reflects such compliance; and that the personnel concerned are in a position to testify truthfully to compliance should a question arise in court. When allegations to the contrary are made in court they are to be rebutted as soon as possible with all proof available.

(Security Letters on attached page)

10/16/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-58

- 2 -

(D) SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION CHARACTERIZATION - NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO ABOLISH THE HOUSE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES COMMITTEE (NCAHUAC) -- SAC Letter 62-38 (A) dated July 11, 1962, advised that characterizations contained in the various issues of the "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications" published by the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HCUA) should be utilized when characterizing an organization listed therein. The December 1, 1961, issue of HCUA's "Guide," page 115, contains a characterization of the "National Committee to Abolish the Un-American Activities Committee (NCAUAC)."

In view of the change in the name of this organization by the adding of the word "House" and in order to be accurate in all respects in characterizing this organization, it should be characterized in the future in the following manner. The citation as it appears on page 115 of the December 1, 1961, "Guide" should be set forth in its entirety with the following added as a final paragraph: "A source has advised that the NCAUAC changed its name on March 3, 1962, to include the word "House" in its name, thereby becoming known as the National Committee to Abolish the House Un-American Activities Committee." The source for the quoted material is CG 6474-S who has furnished reliable information in the past.

10/16/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-58

(E) CUBAN ALIEN REFUGEES -- Attention is directed to SAC Letter Number 61-13 dated March 14, 1961, paragraph J. All offices should make certain that copies of Immigration and Naturalization Service reports pertaining to Cuban alien refugees are being carefully reviewed. Afford all pro-Castro allegations expeditious and continuous investigative attention. Your investigation of these cases should be guided by the instructions set forth in SAC Letter Number 62-55 dated October 5, 1962.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosure for (A)

10/16/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-58

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PERSONAL

NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 62-H

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

October 24, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RE: BUREAU CODES

A number of field offices have sent to the Bureau recently enciphered messages which could not be deciphered. This causes delay and unnecessary expenditure of employee time in attempting to decode such garbled messages.

The AFSAM-7 Manual of Operation and Routine Maintenance, Section II B., subsection 2.g., page 12, instructs that an enciphered message is to be completely check-deciphered prior to transmission, preferably by another operator and, if available, on a second machine using a different set of rotors. This check-decipherment is mandatory.

If this check-decipherment procedure were followed meticulously on all messages by each office, failures to encode properly would be detected prior to transmission, and the majority of garbles in messages would be eliminated.

Explanations will be requested by the Bureau for messages received which are undecipherable, and if this is due to failure to check-decipher, appropriate administrative action will be taken.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 62-J

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

October 29, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7

Amendment No. 1 to KAM-1A/TSEC, Repair and Maintenance Instructions for TSEC/KL-7 (Bureau's AFSAM 7 cipher equipment), being disseminated as follows: one to each office except Washington Field; one to Code Room, Seat of Government; seven to Bureau's Relocation Site; one to each Legal Attache office, except Bern and Manila.

Comply with Letter of Promulgation which appears on front cover. Page 3, entitled List of Effective Pages, through page 313, shall be inserted as in the case of other manuals and superseded pages removed. Revisions listed as Amendments and Instructions, pages III through VI, should then be handled. Check Manual for completeness and accuracy and enter appropriate information on Record of Amendments included therein.

Execute all copies of Flyleaf Receipts. One copy requires signature of SAC in two places. Employee who made changes will sign all copies, each twice. That bearing the SAC's signature should be placed in Manual.

The address label of the individual envelope containing Amendment No. 1, two Flyleaf Receipts and all residue including Letter of Promulgation, Amendments and Instructions, superseded pages and back cover must be returned immediately to Bureau, attention FBI Annex.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director





PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 62-I  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

October 25, 1962 WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7

One set of AFSAM 7 key lists for months of December, 1962, January and February, 1963, being forwarded separately to all divisions except Washington Field which will receive none; three copies being furnished Bureau's Emergency Relocation Site; and three copies Seat of Government Code Room.

Acknowledge receipt of key lists promptly by routing slip, indicating serial numbers which appear thereon; return in a sealed envelope to the Bureau, attention FBI Annex, the address label on individual tamperproof envelope containing keys even though torn while opening package; and destroy, by burning, each monthly sheet thirty days after last effective date thereof, advising Bureau promptly by routing slip, attention FBI Annex, this has been done.

It is essential address label mentioned above be returned in order to control security of shipment.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL

NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 62-K

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

October 30, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

RE: BUREAU CODES

The Bureau has two one-time cipher pad systems to serve as a "back-up" in the event both AFSAM 7 cipher machines become inoperative. Instructions for recourse to these systems are clearly set forth in Part II, Section 4, N, page 58, Manual of Rules and Regulations.

Detailed explanations of coding procedures involved in use of one-time cipher pads with the Seat of Government were furnished individual offices at the time each office received a set of pads. Similar instructions for operational use of Inter-Office pads appear in the first two pages of each Inter-Office pad and were supplied at the time these particular pads were distributed.

Thoroughly review instructions mentioned above and assure that employees who handle coding operations are completely familiar with all coding procedures and instructions pertinent thereto. If there are any questions whatever with regard to when or how the two "back-up" coding systems are to be used, immediately submit such questions to the Bureau, attention FBI Annex.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

October 26, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) WIRE AND RADIO COMMUNICATIONS-ADEQUACY OF TRAINED PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT -- In view of current international situation immediate attention should be given to the adequacy and availability of trained personnel and equipment to handle all phases of the Bureau's wire and radio communications.

Particularly, consideration should be given to:

(1) Availability of relief radio operators and code clerks. Code clerks should also be capable of handling interoffice cipher pad and one-time cipher pad messages. Prior Bureau approval of additional employees to be given code training required. Advise identities by teletype if necessary to insure adequate complement. Afford relief radio operators refresher practice if possible.

(2) Sufficient trained telephone and teletypewriter operators should be available for emergencies and to afford around-the-clock coverage. Train additional employees if necessary.

(3) Teletypewriter and telephone equipment capacity should be followed and immediate availability of additional equipment checked. Additional installations should not be made without prior Bureau authority.

Concerning the training of reserve and relief code clerks, teletypewriter and telephone operators, maximum utilization should be made of female personnel, bearing in mind the military demands that will be made upon male employees if the international situation worsens.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



November 20, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS - VISION - FBI FORM BOOK (FD-277 AND FD-300) -- Re SAC Letter 59-71, (L), dated November 24, 1959. Forms FD-277 and FD-300 have been revised effective immediately. Three copies of each of the revised forms are enclosed. Adequate supply being sent you separately. Place copy of each in the FBI Form Book. Henceforth, all offices must use FD-277 when transmitting to the Bureau physical examination reports containing medical examiner's notation that examinee should wear corrective glasses while driving a motor vehicle. FD-277 now contains a space for name of person who instructed employee he must wear corrective glasses when driving Bureau cars and date instruction given. Use of stamp containing such information not desired. FD-300 now informs medical examiners of Civil Service Commission's safe driving standard concerning distant vision.

11/20/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-66

(B) EXECUTIVE ORDER 10501 - SAFEGUARDING OFFICIAL INFORMATION IN THE INTERESTS OF THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES - FBI FORM BOOK -- Reference is made to SAC Letter 62-56 (D), dated October 9, 1962, concerning new regulations issued by the Attorney General in connection with Executive Order 10501. In order that there will be a record in personnel files that all new employees and present employees are aware of Section 107 of the new regulations on "Penalties for Violation" of Executive Order 10501, FD-291 concerning this subject has been revised to provide certification of this awareness by new employees in the Bureau's service, and an unnumbered form has been devised to provide for this for present employees.

A sufficient supply of the revised and unnumbered forms will be transmitted to you under separate cover. Upon receipt, have each present employee review and execute the unnumbered form and thereafter have each new employee execute the revised form FD-291 when he enters on duty. Your supply of the outdated FD-291 should be destroyed. The executed forms by present employees in your office should be submitted in one package to reach the Bureau, attention Personnel Section, no later than 30 days from the date of your receipt of the supply of forms. This should allow time for each employee to have an opportunity to review and execute a form.

Enclosed are three copies of FD-291, one copy of which should be placed in the FBI Form Book. Also enclosed is one copy of the unnumbered form for your information. The latter should not be placed in the FBI Form Book.

(C) THIRD AGENCY CONSIDERATION

11/20/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-66

(D) CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT BENEFITS -- Public Law 87-793 approved October 11, 1962, liberalized in several respects the retirement benefits granted by the Civil Service Retirement Act. The new benefits await implementation by Congressional appropriation of the necessary funds. This cannot occur until the 88th Congress convenes in January, 1963. Legislation will then be introduced looking toward appropriation of such funds.

The new benefits relate mainly to upward adjustment in amount of annuity and to increased survivor protection.

Provisions which would affect the amount of annuity include:

(1) The annuity of each retired employee and survivor annuitant receiving or eligible to receive an annuity on January 1, 1963, would be increased 5 per cent. Annuities commencing between January 2, and December 31, 1963, would be increased 4 per cent; those commencing during 1964, 3 per cent; those commencing during 1965, 2 per cent; and those commencing during 1966, 1 per cent.

(2) Beginning in January, 1964, yearly changes in the nation-wide cost of living will be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and whenever the cost of living rises at least 3 per cent, annuities will be further increased by a percentage matching the rise in the cost of living.

(3) The reduction in an employee's annuity to provide for a survivor annuity will be changed from  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent of the first \$2400, plus 10 per cent of the balance to  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent of the first \$3600, plus 10 per cent of the balance. This will apply, once Congress appropriates funds, to all retiring employees separated on or after October 11, 1962, with an annuity commencing after that time.

11/20/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-66

Provisions which increase survivor protection include:

(1) The survivor has been eligible for 50 per cent of the annuity of the employee but the new law changes this to 55 per cent. This applies to annuities based on separations occurring on or after October 11, 1962, but again must await appropriation of the necessary funds. Furthermore, instead of requiring that a retiring married employee must specifically designate his spouse to receive a survivor annuity, such annuity will be payable automatically unless employee at the time he retires specifies otherwise in writing. This particular change is now in effect and requires no appropriation by Congress.

(2) Survivor annuity payments to a child otherwise eligible for annuity can continue beyond the former limit of age 18 and up to age 21 if he is a student regularly pursuing full-time residence study in a high school, trade school, technical or vocational institute, junior college, college, university or comparable recognized institution. This will apply where the parent employee or annuitant dies on or after October 11, 1962, or where the death occurred before that date but the surviving student-child is not 18 until on or after that date. The annuity of a student-child ends when he marries, dies, ceases to be a student or becomes 21, whichever occurs first. This benefit likewise must await appropriation of the necessary funds by Congress.

11/20/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-66.

(E) FBI SUGGESTION PROGRAM -- The figures set out below are the totals of suggestions submitted and adopted in each field office for the first quarter (July, August, September) of Fiscal Year 1963:

<u>Office</u>	<u>Suggestions</u>	<u>Adopted</u>	<u>Not Adopted</u>	<u>Submissions</u>	
				<u>Agent</u>	<u>Clerk</u>
Albany	2	0	2	1	1
Albuquerque	4	0	4	1	3
Anchorage	2	1	1	0	2
Atlanta	3	0	3	2	1
Baltimore	1	0	1	1	0
Birmingham	3	1	2	3	0
Boston	2	0	2	0	2
Buffalo	0	0	0	0	0
Butte	3	0	3	0	3
Charlotte	1	0	1	1	0
*Chicago	3	0	2	3	0

11/20/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-66

<u>Office</u>	<u>Suggestions</u>	<u>Adopted</u>	<u>Not Adopted</u>	<u>Submissions</u>	
				<u>Agent</u>	<u>Clerk</u>
Cincinnati	5	0	5	2	3
Cleveland	0	0	0	0	0
Dallas	10	1	9	6	4
Denver	2	1	1	2	0
Detroit	2	1	1	1	1
El Paso	2	1	1	0	2
Honolulu	0	0	0	0	0
Houston	0	0	0	0	0
Indianapolis	1	0	1	0	1
Jacksonville	4	0	4	4	0
Kansas City	3	1	2	3	0
Knoxville	2	0	2	1	1
Las Vegas	1	0	1	1	0
Little Rock	0	0	0	0	0
Los Angeles	2	1	1	2	0
Louisville	2	0	2	0	2
Memphis	2	0	2	1	1
Miami	1	0	1	1	0
Milwaukee	5	1	4	3	2
Minneapolis	2	1	1	1	1
Mobile	6	1	5	3	3
Newark	6	1	5	3	3
New Haven	0	0	0	0	0
New Orleans	7	1	6	7	0
*New York City	16	2	13	9	7
Norfolk	4	1	3	4	0
Oklahoma City	0	0	0	0	0
Omaha	1	0	1	0	1
Philadelphia	2	0	2	1	1
Phoenix	0	0	0	0	0
Pittsburgh	0	0	0	0	0
Portland	1	0	1	1	0
Richmond	1	1	0	1	0
Saint Louis	0	0	0	0	0
Salt Lake City	0	0	0	0	0
San Antonio	1	0	1	0	1
San Diego	4	0	4	0	4
San Francisco	9	1	8	8	1
San Juan	4	0	4	2	2
Savannah	5	2	3	2	3
Seattle	5	0	5	4	1
Springfield	4	0	4	4	0
Tampa	2	0	2	1	1
Washington Field	4	2	2	2	2

11/20/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-66

<u>Office</u>	<u>Suggestions</u>	<u>Adopted</u>	<u>Not Adopted</u>	<u>Submissions</u>	
				<u>Agent</u>	<u>Clerk</u>
Bern	0	0	0	0	0
Bonn	0	0	0	0	0
London	0	0	0	0	0
Madrid	0	0	0	0	0
Manila	0	0	0	0	0
Mexico City	0	0	0	0	0
Ottawa	0	0	0	0	0
Paris	0	0	0	0	0
Rio de Janeiro	0	0	0	0	0
Rome	0	0	0	0	0
Tokyo	3	0	3	0	3
	<u>268</u>	<u>63</u>	<u>199</u>	<u>124</u>	<u>144</u>

\* - denotes offices having suggestions under consideration.

The foregoing totals disclose that during the first quarter of the current fiscal year 20 field offices and Legal Attache's offices submitted no suggestions. This fact is mentioned not to promote the submission of suggestions as a mere statistical achievement but to emphasize that we all share the mutual responsibility to insure the Bureau's operations are conducted as efficiently as possible. Therefore, any idea of any employee is valuable and vital and participation in the Suggestion Program is a logical means of bringing it to the Bureau's attention.

11/20/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-66

(F) ECONOMY - FISCAL YEAR 1963 -- An analysis at this time of the Bureau's financial condition projected through the end of the current fiscal year (1963) indicates many items of expense are being incurred at a rate that if continued would substantially exceed available funds. For example, (1) the Bureau is being required by the Bureau of the Budget to absorb an additional cost of about \$133,000 for postage rate increases to go into effect January 1, 1963, for which no additional funds will be made available; (2) higher costs of local, long distance, and teletype services; (3) higher travel costs; and (4) repairs and alterations to space. Your attention was called to the higher communications costs in item A of SAC Letter No. 62-45 dated August 28, 1962. Because of these higher costs, and in order to make sure no deficit will be incurred, the Bureau is making a corresponding reduction in the funds available for the purchase of equipment. This action means that only requests for absolutely essential supplies and equipment will be approved by the Bureau.



No requests for repairs or alterations to space should be made unless they are absolutely essential to the Bureau's proper and efficient operation. Requests submitted only on the basis that they are desirable will be turned down. In addition your full and complete cooperation is requested in keeping all other costs to an absolute minimum consistent with the proper performance of our work. With your full cooperation it is believed that the Bureau can avoid taking any more drastic steps.

11/20/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-66

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(G) TRADE EXPANSION ACT OF 1962 - PUBLIC LAW 87-794 - FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT -- Captioned law, signed October 11, 1962, provides for certain international trade agreements and for adjustment assistance to domestic industry, agriculture and labor when adversely affected by such agreements.

Section 319 of this law penalizes false statements for the purpose of obtaining financial assistance by companies which suffer economic dislocation caused by the Act with a fine of not more than \$5,000 and/or two years' imprisonment. Section 335 provides that false statements to obtain assistance on the part of workers claiming damage by the Act shall be penalized by a fine up to \$1,000 and/or imprisonment for one year.

In response to Bureau inquiry, the Department advised by letter dated November 1, 1962, that the Bureau has jurisdiction over reported violations of the penal provisions of the Act. Handle any reported offenses under the Fraud Against the Government classification.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures for (A) & (B)

11/20/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-66

- 7 -

(Field Office or Division) \_\_\_\_\_

(Date) \_\_\_\_\_

Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

In continuing my employment in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, I hereby agree that I will be governed by the following provisions.

1. That the strictly confidential character of any and all information secured by me or coming to my attention in connection, directly or indirectly, with my work as an employee of this Bureau, or the work of other employees of which I may become cognizant, is fully understood by me; and that neither during my tenure of service with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, nor at any time, will I violate this confidence nor will I divulge any information of any kind or character whatsoever that may become known to me to persons not officially entitled thereto, recognizing applicability to me of penalty provisions in case of any violation by me.
2. That information referred to in Item 1 above includes but is by no means limited to information in the interests of the defense of the United States marked "Top Secret," "Secret," or "Confidential," and that Department of Justice regulations provide specifically for penalty applicable to me for any violation of Executive Order 10501, the basic authority for safeguarding such information, as follows: "Any officer or employee who violates any provision of Executive Order No. 10501, as amended, or of these regulations shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action. Prompt and stringent administrative action shall be taken against any officer or employee determined to have been knowingly responsible for any release or disclosure of classified defense information or material except in the manner authorized by these regulations. Whenever a violation of criminal statutes may be involved in a deliberate unauthorized release or disclosure of classified defense information, criminal prosecution, in an appropriate case, shall also be instituted."

I further certify that the conditions specified herein are agreeable to me, and that I continue as an employee of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with a full knowledge of the conditions above set forth.

Very truly yours,

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Signature and Title of Position)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI

DATE:

FROM : SAC,

Attention: Personnel Section

SUBJECT:

- Remylet \_\_\_\_\_.
- ReBulet \_\_\_\_\_.

- Re physical examination \_\_\_\_\_.
- Dental work was completed on \_\_\_\_\_.
- Vision has been corrected to \_\_\_\_\_ Employee specifically instructed  
\_\_\_\_\_ by \_\_\_\_\_ that he can operate a Bureau car  
(date) (name of person giving instruction)  
only when wearing the necessary glasses.

- Results of  chest X ray  patch test  urinalysis  serology were negative.
- Enclosed physician's statement indicates he is qualified for strenuous physical exertion and use of firearms.
- Enclosed are  paid  unpaid medical bills.
- Attached are Bureau of Employees' Compensation forms \_\_\_\_\_

- Physical examination reports are enclosed.
- Employee is scheduled for physical examination on \_\_\_\_\_.
- Physical examination report has been reviewed and initialed.
- Employee returned to active duty \_\_\_\_\_.
- Employee's physical condition is \_\_\_\_\_.
- UACB he is being removed from limited duty.
- UACB he is being placed on limited duty.

Remarks:

**Attachment to Standard Form 88, Report of Medical Examination  
For Information and Guidance of Medical Examiner**

Name of Examinee \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type or print) Last First Middle

The following portions of the attached examination report form need not be completed:

2	14	68
3	17	69
4	62	72
9	65	76
11	67	

- 46. Is necessary unless facilities for affording same are not readily available.
- 48. Not required unless examinee is over 35 years of age or examination indicates such is desirable.
- 49. Is necessary unless facilities for affording same are not readily available.
- 71. Audiometer examinations should be afforded whenever possible for all Special Agent applicants and Special Agents. Applicants for the Special Agent position will not be accepted if the hearing loss exceeds a 15 decibel average in each ear in the conversational speech range (500, 1000, 2000 cycles).

**For All Examinees, Whether Clerical or Special Agent Applicants or Employees:**

*The medical examiner should answer the following question:*

Examinee  is  is not qualified for strenuous physical exertion.

**To be Answered in the Case of All Male Employees and Male Applicants:**

1. Does examinee have any defects restricting or prohibiting his participation in defensive tactics and dangerous assignments which might entail the practical use of firearms?

No  Yes If "yes" please specify defects. \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

2. Does examinee have any defects prohibiting safe operation of motor vehicles?

No  Yes If "yes" please specify defects. \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

3. For safe driving of motor vehicles, Civil Service Commission requires distant vision must test at least 20/40 in one eye and 20/100 in the other, corrected or uncorrected. Should examinee wear corrective glasses while operating a motor vehicle?  Yes  No

If recommendation is based on a factor other than above standard, indicate basis \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

**Desirable Weight Ranges for Males**

Height	Small Frame	Medium Frame	Large Frame
5' 4"	117 - 125	123 - 135	131 - 148
5' 5"	120 - 129	126 - 139	134 - 152
5' 6"	124 - 133	130 - 143	138 - 157
5' 7"	128 - 137	134 - 148	143 - 162
5' 8"	132 - 141	138 - 152	147 - 166
5' 9"	136 - 146	142 - 156	151 - 170
5' 10"	140 - 150	146 - 161	155 - 175
5' 11"	144 - 154	150 - 166	160 - 180
6'	148 - 158	154 - 171	164 - 185
6' 1"	152 - 163	158 - 176	169 - 190
6' 2"	156 - 167	163 - 181	174 - 195
6' 3"	160 - 171	168 - 186	178 - 200
6' 4"	169 - 180	178 - 196	188 - 210
6' 5"	174 - 185	182 - 202	192 - 216

3. Examinee's frame is  small       medium       large

4. Considering above weight table, the examinee's frame, and other individual physical characteristics, I consider his present weight  Satisfactory       Excessive       Deficient

5. Under proper medical supervision, examinee should  lose \_\_\_\_\_ pounds  
 gain \_\_\_\_\_ pounds

Remarks: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
 (Signature of Medical Examiner)

\_\_\_\_\_  
 (Date)

(Present address) \_\_\_\_\_

(Date) \_\_\_\_\_

Director  
 Federal Bureau of Investigation  
 United States Department of Justice  
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

In accepting an appointment to a position in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, I hereby agree that I will be governed by the following provisions:

1. That my retention in the Bureau will be contingent upon the performance of satisfactory services.
2. That the strictly confidential character of any and all information secured by me or coming to my attention in connection, directly or indirectly, with my work as an employee of this Bureau, or the work of other employees of which I may become cognizant, is fully understood by me; and that neither during my tenure of service with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, nor at any time, will I violate this confidence nor will I divulge any information of any kind or character whatsoever that may become known to me to persons not officially entitled thereto, recognizing applicability to me of penalty provisions in case of any violation by me.
3. That information referred to in Item 2 above includes but is by no means limited to information in the interests of the defense of the United States marked "Top Secret," "Secret," or "Confidential," and that Department of Justice regulations provide specifically for penalty applicable to me for any violation of Executive Order 10501, the basic authority for safeguarding such information, as follows: "Any officer or employee who violates any provision of Executive Order No. 10501, as amended, or of these regulations shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action. Prompt and stringent administrative action shall be taken against any officer or employee determined to have been knowingly responsible for any release or disclosure of classified defense information or material except in the manner authorized by these regulations. Whenever a violation of criminal statutes may be involved in a deliberate unauthorized release or disclosure of classified defense information, criminal prosecution, in an appropriate case, shall also be instituted."

I further certify that the conditions specified herein are agreeable to me, and that I am entering on duty as an employee of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with a full knowledge of the conditions above set forth.

Very truly yours,

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Signature and Title of Position)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 19 \_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Signature of Officer)



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

December 11, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO BAHAMAS DECEMBER 19 - 20, 1962 -- President Kennedy will make an official trip to the Bahamas December 19 - 20, 1962.

In connection with this trip, all offices should be alert for any data concerning possible threats to the personal safety of the President or members of his group. You should also be alert for information concerning anti-American demonstrations or any intelligence data of interest concerning this trip. Information regarding travel to the Bahamas of security suspects or of eccentrics up to the time President Kennedy's visit is terminated should be immediately furnished to the Bureau.

Sources and informants in a position to acquire the above-mentioned data should be alerted to the necessity for prompt reporting and the Bureau should be immediately advised if any such data is received. Communications in this matter should be submitted under the above caption.

12/11/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-70

(B) VOUCHERS - AIR LINE TRAVEL - NO-SHOW PENALTY -- Reference is made to Paragraph (B) of SAC Letter Number 62-41, dated July 31, 1962. The no-show penalty provision has been extended to January 31, 1963. However, carriers are now required to exempt a traveler from the payment of a penalty when he presents himself at the airport ticket office within thirty minutes after the scheduled departure time of his flight, and the delay was occasioned on account of late arrival of ground transportation, heavy traffic, accident, flat tire, difficulty in locating parking space, congestion in terminal and/or concourse area, or a faulty public address system. In such cases, the employee should obtain from the ticket agent a written confirmation of the fact that he arrived within the time limit under one or more of the foregoing conditions.

The above matter should be brought to the attention of all personnel of your office.



(C) VOUCHERS - GOVERNMENT TRANSPORTATION REQUESTS - OFFICIAL TRAVEL BY BUREAU EMPLOYEES - USE OF FIRST-CLASS ACCOMMODATIONS --

You have previously been advised of the need for the reduction of travel expenses. The Bureau of the Budget has now advised that the percentage of first-class air flights by employees of any agency should be less than fifty per cent of the authorized travel. A survey of the travel performed by Bureau personnel during October, 1962, indicates that approximately sixty-nine per cent of all air flights were first-class.

Accordingly, effective immediately, any employee of the Bureau traveling first-class by air must have prior approval from the Special Agent in Charge or Assistant Director unless no other air accommodations are available and there is not sufficient time to obtain the authority of the Special Agent in Charge or Assistant Director. In any instance where first-class air travel is used, a statement must accompany the voucher claiming reimbursement justifying the use of the first-class accommodations.

The Department of Justice has also advised that rail travel for distances of less than 250 miles must be by coach unless there is some reason this is not feasible. Effective immediately, justification must accompany the voucher reflecting any first-class rail transportation of less than 250 miles.

Appropriate manual changes will be forthcoming.

12/11/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-70

(D) FBIRA MATTER - FBIRA-SPONSORED INTEROFFICE FIREARMS COMPETITION - 1962 -- I am pleased to announce the results of the 1962 FBIRA-Sponsored Interoffice Firearms Competition, computed from Practical Pistol Course Scores fired by Agent personnel during the third outdoor firearms period. The Anchorage Office won the over-all competition with an average score of 97.69. This was the third win for the Anchorage Division, thereby giving them permanent possession of the "J. Edgar Hoover Firearms Trophy," as provided for in SAC Letter 60-26.

The 5,482 Agents participating had an over-all average of 91.24, surpassing last year's average of 90.66. The increase in the average is an indication of the interest and enthusiasm displayed by Agent personnel and is most gratifying.

12/11/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-70

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In addition to the over-all winner, "Honorable Mention" citations will be presented to the winning office in each of four categories, the offices being divided according to Agent complement. Those winners are as follows:

Group 1 - Chicago

Group 2 - Seattle

Group 3 - Portland

Group 4 - Albuquerque

The relative standing of each office, according to group, is as follows:

Over-all win - Anchorage - 97.69

<u>Group 1</u>		<u>Group 2</u>	
1. Chicago	94.07	1. Seattle	93.71
2. Newark	92.68	2. New Orleans	92.86
3. San Francisco	92.05	3. Cincinnati	92.58
4. Los Angeles	91.18	4. Indianapolis	92.37
5. Detroit	91.09	5. Pittsburgh	92.00
6. Miami	90.96	6. Charlotte	91.60
7. Seat of Government	90.92	7. Boston	91.20
8. New York	90.40	8. Kansas City	90.64
9. Washington Field	89.48	9. Cleveland	89.26
10. Philadelphia	88.87	10. Baltimore	89.09
<u>Group 3</u>			
1. Portland	94.53	13. Memphis	90.32
2. Jacksonville	93.28	14. Savannah	90.28
3. Minneapolis	92.52	15. Milwaukee	89.85
4. Phoenix	92.40	16. Buffalo	89.67
5. Springfield	92.39	17. Albany	89.35
6. New Haven	92.20	18. Oklahoma City	89.14
7. Houston	91.30	19. Louisville	89.08
8. Dallas	90.98	20. St. Louis	88.95
9. Denver	90.93	21. Richmond	88.56
10. Little Rock	90.86	22. Tampa	87.57
11. San Diego	90.60	23. San Antonio	87.22
12. Mobile	90.49		

12/11/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-70

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Group 4

1. Albuquerque	92.88	7. Las Vegas	91.56
2. Butte	92.45	8. Honolulu	91.46
3. Omaha	92.35	9. Birmingham	90.30
4. Knoxville	92.24	10. Atlanta	89.84
5. Salt Lake City	92.19	11. Norfolk	88.91
6. San Juan	91.62	12. El Paso	88.58

12/11/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-70

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(E) FEDERAL RESERVE ACT MATTERS - RESEARCH -- Enclosed for each office are two copies of a booklet entitled "Examination of Automation in National Banks" recently published by the Comptroller of the Currency, U. S. Treasury Department. This booklet while fairly technical provides information in layman's language concerning automatic data processing equipment, its various types of systems and machine functions as employed by National Banks. Because of the subject matter, it is felt the booklet will be of material assistance as background information to Special Agent Accountants in connection with their work in Federal Reserve Act cases. The booklet should be brought to the attention of all Special Agent Accountants and included in the library of each field office.

12/11/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-70

(F) FUGITIVES - HOLIDAY COVERAGE -- With the approaching year-end holiday season, you are reminded of the desirability of establishing appropriate coverage of relatives and close associates of fugitives so that you will be promptly alerted to any attempted contact at this time.

12/11/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-70

(G) SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT, 1948 - CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR MATTERS -- With increasing frequency members of the Nation of Islam (NOI) are requesting classification under the Selective Service Act, 1948, as conscientious objectors on the basis of their affiliation with and belief in the teachings of NOI. On the basis of FBI reports in these matters the Department prepares a summary, copies of which are furnished to a hearing officer and the registrant. Because of the method in which conscientious objector reports are handled and use made of them by the Department, they should contain nothing which would require classification under Executive Order 10501.

Conscientious objector reports on members and affiliates of the NOI should contain a current approved thumbnail sketch pertaining to the national organization of the NOI and/or Fruit of Islam (FOI) where applicable so the Department and the hearing officer may be apprised of the true character of these organizations. These two sketches, which are set forth in SAC Letter Number 62-38 (A) dated July 11, 1962, do not contain classified information under the provisions of Executive Order 10501 and their inclusion in a report is not a basis for classification.

12/11/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-70

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(H) HOODLUM COVERAGE IN THE GREATER MIAMI, FLORIDA, AREA DURING WINTER SEASON 1962 - 1963 - CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM -- The Miami Office has established plans and programs to afford coverage on out-of-town hoodlums and racketeers during the coming winter season of 1962-1963. These plans include utilization of informants, sources and strategically located highly confidential sources.

In an effort to assist the Miami Office in inaugurating immediate coverage on hoodlums and racketeers converging on the Miami area during the coming winter season, field offices are instructed to furnish the Miami Office complete details as to the itinerary and appropriate descriptive details including intended mode of travel on hoodlums and racketeers visiting the Miami area. As soon as this data is ascertained this information is to be forwarded by whatever appropriate expeditious communication is deemed necessary in each instance which will enable the Miami Office to have sufficient notice to provide coverage.

In notifying the Bureau and Miami Office of the intended travel of a hoodlum, each field office should also include information on the availability of any highly placed informants in a position to travel to this area to provide coverage on the hoodlums' activities. The Bureau will thereafter decide if the travel of a particular informant is warranted.

(Security Letter on attached page)

12/11/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-70

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(I) SECURITY INDEX -- Your attention is directed to Section 87D of the Manual of Instructions, page 78, in which is set forth a requirement that cover pages to reports relating to Security Index subjects must contain a statement as to whether or not the Security Index card in the case is tabbed DETCOM and a statement as to whether subject's activities do or do not warrant such tabbing.

Some instances have been noted recently in which no observations concerning this matter are contained in the cover pages.

The necessity of specifically commenting upon the DETCOM status of Security Index subjects in cover pages to reports should be reiterated at this time to all Agents engaged in security investigations. Destroy all outdated Forms FD-305.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures for (E)

12/11/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-70

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



December 26, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) BUREAU AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS - FISCAL YEAR 1962 --

Detailed statistics concerning accidents reported to the Bureau involving Bureau cars during fiscal year 1962 are set forth below. Only those accidents have been included wherein there was some tangible property damage to either Bureau car or third party's car or where there were personal injuries. This data should be called to the attention of all employees charged with the responsibility of operating or caring for the Bureau's automotive equipment.

OFFICE	NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS		1962 IN- CREASE OR DE- CREASE OVER 1961	EMPLOY- EES HELD RESPON- SIBLE 1962	REPAIR COSTS TO BUREAU 1962	TOTAL MILEAGE DRIVEN 1962	ACCIDENT RATE PER 100,000 MILES 1962
	1962	1961	1961	1962	1962	1962	1962
any	3	7	-4	-	\$ 75.00	447,294	.7
Albuquerque	2	4	-2	-	---	437,157	.5
Anchorage	3	2	/1	-	88.46	76,734	3.9
Atlanta	8	6	/2	2	---	816,045	1.0
Baltimore	10	14	-4	3	471.66	690,981	1.4
Birmingham	2	2	-	-	802.43	300,421	.7
Boston	14	3	/11	2	238.70	842,894	1.7
Buffalo	1	3	-2	-	---	356,178	.3
Butte	1	1	-	-	472.50	521,285	.2
Charlotte	3	4	-1	1	---	1,096,484	.3
Chicago	24	14	/10	2	1,492.22	1,392,367	1.7
Cincinnati	3	4	-1	2	\$ ---	717,986	.4
Cleveland	4	1	/3	-	480.73	648,803	.6
Dallas	3	6	-3	-	167.93	848,765	.4
Denver	4	6	-2	1	121.45	574,395	.7
Detroit	10	10	-	-	366.67	1,266,606	.8
El Paso	1	0	/1	-	---	181,667	.6
Honolulu	2	1	/1	-	---	59,986	3.3
Houston	2	1	/1	-	177.72	447,904	.4
Indianapolis	5	6	-1	-	---	727,710	.7
Jacksonville	3	1	/2	1	130.64	490,080	.6
Kansas City	7	5	/2	-	325.00	830,631	.8
Louisville	4	4	-	1	87.50	444,331	.9
Las Vegas	2	0	/2	-	---	267,406	.7

OFFICE	NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS		1962 IN- CREASE OR DE- CREASE OVER 1961	EMPLOY- EES HELD RESPON- SIBLE 1962	REPAIR COSTS TO BUREAU 1962	TOTAL MILEAGE DRIVEN 1962	ACCIDENT RATE PER 100,000 MILES 1962
	1962	1961					
Little Rock	7	3	/4	4	415.00	536,192	1.3
Los Angeles	18	20	-2	4	537.25	1,850,980	1.0
Louisville	2	8	-6	1	---	593,757	.3
Memphis	2	5	-3	-	---	592,931	.3
Miami	6	9	-3	2	---	885,260	.7
Milwaukee	2	6	-4	-	205.00	431,151	.5
Minneapolis	3	2	/1	1	85.00	773,745	.4
Mobile	0	1	-1	-	---	423,464	-
Newark	9	14	-5	2	121.45	1,271,457	.7
New Haven	2	6	-4	1	---	387,868	.5
New Orleans	8	8	-	1	241.40	797,103	1.0
New York	13	32	-19	1	326.00	1,552,726	.8
Norfolk	2	2	-	-	---	231,636	.9
Oklahoma City	8	3	/5	-	758.78	731,451	1.1
Omaha	1	2	-1	-	---	439,664	.2
Philadelphia	7	10	-3	2	42.50	702,692	1.0
Phoenix	2	9	-7	-	---	619,437	.3
Pittsburgh	7	5	/2	1	545.07	795,427	.9
Portland	3	4	-1	1	---	396,110	.8
Richmond	6	0	/6	-	\$ 80.64	584,008	1.0
St. Louis	4	2	/2	-	---	469,353	.9
Salt Lake City	2	5	-3	-	73.88	267,526	.7
San Antonio	3	4	-1	-	---	396,333	.8
San Diego	4	2	/2	-	162.23	532,603	.8
San Francisco	9	8	/1	2	---	1,563,377	.6
San Juan	3	2	/1	-	---	232,954	1.3
Savannah	2	3	-1	1	---	505,101	.4
Seattle	2	3	-1	-	---	669,227	.3
Springfield	5	3	/2	-	399.78	595,901	.8
Tampa	2	4	-2	-	205.42	453,444	.4
WFO	15	13	/2	5	702.05	776,188	1.9
SOG	6	4	/2	-	152.04	292,359	2.1
Quantico	0	2	-2	-	---	222,091	-
Legal Attaches	0	0	-	-	---	58,382	-
Totals	286	309	-23	44	\$10,552.10	36,116,008	.8

4/26/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-72

- 2 -



I am pleased to note the decrease in the over-all number of accidents during fiscal year 1962. The number of accidents was reduced from 309 in fiscal year 1961 to 286 for fiscal year 1962. A close analysis of this report reflects a favorable trend in several areas and I certainly hope this trend continues.

It should be noted that the principal cause of accidents was rear-end collisions which accounted for 65.9 per cent of all accidents in which Bureau employees were held responsible. Intersection collisions ranked second accounting for 22.7 per cent of those accidents in which Bureau employees were held responsible. A number of accidents which occurred in 1962 were the result of cars' striking parked vehicles, cars being sideswiped and drivers' pulling out from parked positions at the curb into moving traffic.

Last year instructions were issued that each employee must develop good defensive driving habits in order to keep the number of accidents at a minimum. These instructions should be reiterated at this time to endeavor to effect an even further reduction in accidents.

12/26/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-72

(B) INVESTIGATIVE MATTERS RECEIVED -- An examination of the Monthly Administrative Reports reflects there is a substantial decrease in the number of investigative matters being received, the cause of which must be immediately determined and necessary remedial action taken.

All offices showing a decrease in investigative matters received are requested to thoroughly review the situation so that the factors contributing to this decrease may be determined and steps taken to correct this undesirable trend which has occurred.

An examination of all sources from which cases are received should disclose any weaknesses in existence. It is desired that this study be completed within ten days of the receipt of this letter and that your findings, together with specific recommendations for corrective action taken by you, be submitted to the Bureau.

12/26/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-72

(C) FIELD CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO TECHNICAL MATTERS - TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT -- Henceforth, all correspondence concerning technical matters is to be reviewed by the senior sound-trained agent or technical supervisor prior to being approved by the Special Agent in Charge or other official acting for him. The purpose of this instruction is to insure that requests for technical equipment and other correspondence relating to technical matters are cleared through the individual in the office having the most current knowledge of equipment availability, equipment capability, technical procedures and technical policies. You should insure that this procedure is followed in your office.

12/26/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-72

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(D) SEIZURE OF MATERIAL UNDER INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF OBSCENE MATTER STATUTE -- The decision on November 5, 1962, by the Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, reversing the convictions of Arthur Abraham Peisner and Harry Morris Disman for violation of the Interstate Transportation of Obscene Matter Statute expresses views on probable cause which should be kept in mind during future investigations of this type.

In October, 1958, a reliable informant advised that Peisner would transport obscene material from Maryland to New York, probably over the week end of October 31, 1958. He had previously been linked with the manufacture and sale of obscene material. Bureau Agents on November 1, 1958, observed Peisner and Disman loading packages into a car at Peisner's Maryland residence. They were observed driving through Delaware and into New Jersey where they entered the New Jersey Turnpike. Bureau Agents alerted the New Jersey State Police to the possibility that Peisner and Disman were transporting obscene material, and the subjects were arrested by the State Police while on the turnpike. More than 1,500 obscene books were taken from the car. A Federal complaint was filed, and both subjects were convicted for violation of the Interstate Transportation of Obscene Matter Statute.

On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the convictions of both subjects. The search of the automobile without a warrant was not based on sufficient probable cause to believe that the books being transported were obscene. Once examined, the obscenity of the books was admitted, but the information in possession of the officers at the time the search of the automobile was initiated was insufficient to meet a strict standard of probable cause for vehicle search in obscene literature cases. The court concluded that as a minimal requirement for a search for and seizure of publications thought to be obscene it is essential that some qualified individual, aware of the proper test of obscenity as announced in the case of Roth v. United States, 354 US 476 (1957), should have made a determination prior to search and seizure that a publication meets that test. (The proper test of obscenity as announced in the Roth case is "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." The court held that the test is the effect "not upon any particular class, but upon all those whom it is likely to reach.")

A different conclusion was reached in the case of Weise v. United States, 251 F 2d 867 (1958), in which the facts were strikingly similar and the "minimal requirement" demanded by the court

12/26/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-72

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in the Peisner decision was not present. The Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, upheld the conviction in the Weise case, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, thus leaving the conviction standing.

The conflict in the decision in the Peisner case and that in the Weise case leaves in doubt the standard of probable cause which will be followed by the next court hearing a case of a similar nature. The decisions in the two cases have been set forth for the information and guidance of Agent personnel handling Interstate Transportation of Obscene Matter Investigations. It is to be noted that a warrant of arrest had been obtained in the Weise case but not in the Peisner case. You are again reminded of the existing Bureau rule that, wherever possible, a warrant of arrest should be obtained.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

12/26/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-72


- 6 -

1963

XEROXED

Reviewed by J. Dick  
8/11/75

Access Epstein  
8/13/75  
SFP



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-4

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

January 23, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

(A) CHARACTERIZATION OF KLAN-TYPE AND HATE-TYPE ORGANIZATIONS -- Set forth below are revised and new thumbnail sketches of klan-type and hate-type organizations which should be utilized in communications when necessary to document these organizations. These sketches supersede those previously furnished the field and presently being used. All sources furnishing information in connection with these thumbnail sketches are described as having furnished reliable information in the past.

Activities of individuals and groups must be specifically identified with the correct klan organization. Terms such as "the klan" or "a klansman" must not be used unless it is clearly indicated to which klan organization reference is being made. Care should be taken to use the correct name of a klan-type and hate-type organization in reporting information.

A thumbnail of an affiliate organization includes a statement showing affiliation with the parent organization. When such a thumbnail is used the thumbnail of the parent organization should also be set forth.

When submitting characterizations of klan-type or hate-type organizations instructions set forth in the Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part II, Section 4, Page 21, should be closely followed.

AMERICAN NAZI PARTY,  
ALSO KNOWN AS WORLD UNION OF FREE  
ENTERPRISE NATIONAL SOCIALISTS,  
GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL PARTY

A source advised on February 27, 1959, that George Lincoln Rockwell of Arlington, Virginia, had held an organizational meeting of the World Union of Free Enterprise National Socialists (WUFENS) at his residence on February 26, 1959.

Six persons were present and they, according to the source, comprised the beginning of an officer corps of the organization. Rockwell told those present that the WUFENS would be an international movement, but that the section of the organization in the United States would be known as the American Party of the WUFENS.

Rockwell, on March 26, 1959, furnished to Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a copy of the program of the WUFENS, stating that he expects to become the President of the United States through the organization's platform. The main tenets of the WUFENS, as reflected in the program, call for the migration of Negroes to Africa and the trial and execution of all Jews guilty of Communist and Zionist treason.

A second source advised on August 15, 1962, that the main activity of the organization in furtherance of these objectives, has consisted of picketings with anti-Jewish and anti-Negro placards; talks by Rockwell attacking Jews as traitors to the United States; attempts by Rockwell to form Nazi groups in various cities in the United States; and attempts to form a group of international sympathizers. Rockwell prints large amounts of Nazi literature at American Nazi Party Headquarters, 928 North Randolph Street, Arlington, Virginia.

On June 29, 1962, the State of Virginia revoked the charter of the American Nazi Party.

On September 20, 1962, the State Corporation Commission of Virginia issued a charter for a "George Lincoln Rockwell Party." The second source mentioned above advised on September 24, 1962, that Rockwell will continue to carry on his activities, using the name American Nazi Party, and he obtained the charter for the George Lincoln Rockwell Party merely to be able to do business as a corporation.

Sources:

1/23/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-4

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AMERICAN NAZI PARTY, ALSO KNOWN AS WORLD  
UNION OF FREE ENTERPRISE NATIONAL SOCIALISTS  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

A source advised on August 15, 1962, that the American Nazi Party (ANP), whose leader is George Lincoln Rockwell, maintains its headquarters at 928 North Randolph Street, Arlington, Virginia.

The main activity of the ANP in Washington, D. C., consists of picketing with placards which contain anti-Jewish and anti-Negro remarks. During some of the demonstrations, ANP literature is passed out.

Source:

AMERICAN NAZI PARTY, ALSO KNOWN AS WORLD  
UNION OF FREE ENTERPRISE NATIONAL SOCIALISTS  
CINCINNATI, OHIO

David G. Schreibeis, 7267 Berwood Drive, Madeira, Cincinnati 43, Ohio, advised Special Agents of the FBI on November 20, 1961, December 11, 1961, June 21, 1962, and August 27, 1962, that he is an associate member of the American Nazi Party and is the American Nazi Party Organizer in Cincinnati, Ohio.

He stated he has been an Associate American Nazi Party Member since April 18, 1961, and advised that he is one of the two associate members of the American Nazi Party in the Cincinnati, Ohio, area.

Schreibeis said there is no American Nazi Party activity in the Cincinnati, Ohio, area; also, that the Cincinnati Branch of the American Nazi Party is affiliated with the American Nazi Party parent organization located in Arlington, Virginia.

Source:

AMERICAN NAZI PARTY, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA,  
ALSO KNOWN AS AMERICAN NAZI PARTY,  
WESTERN DIVISION

A source has advised that the Los Angeles branch of the American Nazi Party (LAANP), which branch has also been known as the American Nazi Party, Western Division (ANPWD), came into existence as follows:

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In October, 1960, one Leonard Holstein was made a member of the American Nazi Party (ANP) by the national headquarters of that group as a result of his leading a picket line protesting the marriage of a Negro to a Caucasian. At that time Holstein told the Los Angeles Police Department he was in complete accord with the thinking of George Lincoln Rockwell, National ANP leader. He said he, Holstein, is trying to wake up the people to what is going on; that the Jewish-owned press and radio would not let the people know the truth.

On March 7, 1962, George Lincoln Rockwell advised a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that Holstein was one of his leaders in Los Angeles.

The source mentioned above advised that as of August 17, 1962, Holstein was the only leader of the LAANP.

Source:

### AMERICAN NATIONAL PARTY

On August 1, 1962, a source advised that the American National Party was formed in New York City on November 24, 1961, and is composed at present of Dan Burros, John Patler and Ralph Grandinetti, all former members of the American Nazi Party (ANP), who left the ANP because of policy disagreements with George Lincoln Rockwell, ANP leader.

The source further stated that the membership of the American National Party has gradually declined since its formation and is in danger of complete dissolution due to the lack of interest displayed by its present members. According to this source, there has been no real activity by the American National Party in recent months.

The above source stated that the original purpose behind the formation of the American National Party was to be openly anticommunist and attract other anti-communists who could be gradually converted to anti-Semites, thereby expressing the true sympathies of the American National Party.

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The source stated that the American National Party continues to maintain a "mail drop" at Post Office Box 191, Gracie Station, New York 28, New York, but has no actual headquarters.

Source:

HORACE SHERMAN MILLER  
ARYAN KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN  
P. O. BOX 5062, WACO, TEXAS

On March 29, 1955, a source advised that Horace Sherman Miller, 1401 North 13th Street, Waco, Texas, formerly was a member-at-large of the U. S. Klans of Georgia, but in approximately 1947, he was ousted from that organization by E. L. Edwards, Imperial Wizard.

Isador Fred, of Waco, Texas, on August 4, 1962, and Waco's Chief of Police Jesse Gunterman, on August 17, 1962, furnished the following information: Miller self-styled himself as "The Aryan Knight" and began distributing his writings under the caption "Aryan Knights of the Ku Klux Klan Religion" in approximately 1957. He is a prolific letter writer and since 1957, he has published and distributed his pamphlets entitled, "The Aryan Views-White Folk News." This publication contains reprints of articles which have appeared in newspapers and magazines and are anti-Catholic, anti-Semitic, anti-Masonic, anti-Negro, and pro-klan propoganda. He has distributed leaflets which set forth the tenets of the "Aryan Knights of the KKK religion," and which request contributions from the readers.

Sheriff C. C. Maxey, Waco, Texas, on August 10, 1962, informed that Miller is a disabled World War I veteran who receives retirement benefits from the Railway Retirement Board which he uses to defray the cost of publishing this propoganda. In recent months, the leaflets have contained articles and letters which are critical of the U. S. Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Kennedy Administration, and Miller has attacked efforts to integrate public schools and public facilities in the South. Recently, he denounced integration of the public schools, in the city of Waco. According to Maxey, Miller is a "crack pot" who has no following and does not appear capable of resorting to

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violence in his efforts to prevent integration of the races. He is a semi-invalid who uses an electric typewriter in preparing letters, leaflets, and other propoganda, and frequently advises law enforcement officers that he is anxious to assist his Government at all times.

Sources:

ASSOCIATION OF ARKANSAS KLANS  
OF THE KU KLUX KLAN (AAK)

A source advised on April 22, 1959, as follows: AAK was formed on April 21, 1959, at Pine Bluff, Arkansas, for the purpose of promoting white supremacy and segregation of the races but violence was disavowed. Leaders of AAK were previously members of the Original Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (OKKKK). George F. Edwardes, Grand Dragon of OKKKK for the State of Arkansas, was carried over as the Grand Dragon of the new organization, AAK. A source advised that on August 11, 1960, George F. Edwardes disavowed violence. Another source advised that on January 21, 1962, the new Grand Dragon Bill Williams disavowed violence. Goerge F. Edwardes is the Legal Counselor of the AAK. Another source stated the ritual used by OKKKK is taken from the "Kloran" of the Association of South Carolina Klans of the Ku Klux Klan (ASCK). Regarding the ASCK, the following is noted: A source advised on September 24, 1956, that the ASCK was organized in the Fall of 1955 and is patterned after the Association of Carolina Klans (ACK). The source stated the ASCK is a new organization and not a rebirth of the ACK, although all high-ranking officials of the ASCK had been members of the ACK. The announced purposes of this organization are to promote white supremacy and to combat integration of races; however, the use of violence is disavowed.

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A source advised on September 2, 1950, that the ACK was composed of groups formerly members of the Association of Georgia Klans (AGK), and although the ACK severed all connections with the AGK on November 14, 1949, the ideals, purposes and policies of the two organizations remained identical. The ACK became defunct after convictions and imprisonment of its highest official and other members in 1952.

The AGK has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Sources:

ASSOCIATION OF GEORGIA KLANS  
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN (AGK, KKKK)

A source advised on January 11, 1961, that the AGK, KKKK, was organized by Charles Homer Maddox in the Spring of 1960, with mailing address of Post Office Box 41, Bloomingdale, Georgia. This source stated that AGK, KKKK, is a new organization and is not affiliated in any way with the old Association of Georgia Klans which is defunct. It is patterned after the U. S. Klans, has the same general ritual and has the same titles for its Klavern officers. Most officers and members are former members of the U. S. Klans. The announced purposes of this organization are to promote white supremacy and to fight integration and communism by peaceful means, and it is opposed to any type of violence. This source said AGK, KKKK, is affiliated with the National Ku Klux Klan.

The same source advised on May 9, 1962, that this Klan group continues to operate with the same aims and purposes and is localized in the area of Bloomingdale and Savannah, Georgia. It continues to be affiliated with the National Ku Klux Klan.

Source:

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ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH CAROLINA KLANS  
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN (ASCK)

A source advised on September 24, 1956, that the Association of South Carolina Klans (ASCK) was organized in the Fall of 1955 and is patterned after the Association of Carolina Klans (ACK). This source said ASCK is a new organization and not a rebirth of ACK, although all high-ranking officials of ASCK had been members of ACK. The source stated announced purposes of this organization are to promote white supremacy and combat integration of the races; however, the use of violence is disavowed.

A second source advised on September 2, 1950, that ACK was composed of groups formerly members of the Association of Georgia Klans (AGK) and although ACK severed all connections with AGK on November 14, 1949, the ideals, purposes and policies of the two organizations remained identical. ACK became defunct after conviction and imprisonment of its highest official and other members in 1952.

A third source advised on April 16, 1962, that ASCK continues to operate for the purpose of promoting white supremacy and combating integration by peaceful means by public speaking and propaganda.

This third source said that ASCK, using the name Majority Citizens League of South Carolina, published a monthly newspaper, "Southland Standard," from August through December, 1961, and dropped it due to lack of financial support.

AGK has been designated by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Sources:

CHRISTIAN EDUCATIONAL ASSOCIATION

The Christian Educational Association of 530 Chestnut Street, Union, New Jersey, is the publisher of "Common Sense," a tabloid-size newspaper published twice monthly except during July and August. Current issues of this paper identify the editor as Conde McGinley and the publisher as the Christian Educational Association.

On December 17, 1954, the Committee on Un-American Activities of the United States House of Representatives published a "Preliminary Report on Neo-Fascist and Hate Groups" in which their growth and objectives are discussed at length. The report indicates that "Common Sense" has a circulation which fluctuates between 30,000 and 100,000 copies an issue. It describes "Common Sense" as a "hate sheet" vehicle which publishes "some of the most vitriolic hate propaganda ever to come to the attention of the Committee."

According to the report, "Common Sense" depicts Communism as Judaism and devotes its pages almost entirely to attacks on the Jewish and to a lesser extent, the Negro minorities in the United States. Sympathy for the former Nazi government in Germany is also shown in the paper.

CHRISTIAN KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN (CKKKK)

A source advised on December 17, 1959, that Post Office Box 45, Louisville, Kentucky, was rented by J. B. Stoner in July, 1959, for the CKKKK. The source stated that as of December 17, 1959, the Post Office Box was still being held by Stoner.

Another source advised on November 23, 1959, that J. B. Stoner stated that he started the CKKKK in Louisville, Kentucky, with people who were in bad financial condition; however, he felt that after the organization's activity became known, it would attract a higher class of individuals. He indicated at that time an interest in securing more members in the Louisville area.

The same source advised that in May, 1960, the first edition of the "Klan Bulletin" appeared. The source described the "Klan Bulletin" as the official publication of the CKKKK.

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The June issue of the "Klan Bulletin" disclosed the address of the CKKKK as Post Office Box 48, Atlanta, Georgia.

A third source advised on January 25, 1961, that the CKKKK was a functioning organization in Atlanta, Georgia, that meetings were held and literature distributed.

A fourth source advised on June 7, 1961, that the CKKKK was a paper organization and inactive. The source added Stoner collects some dues and uses this money for his personal benefit.

The same source advised on May 14, 1962, that the CKKKK was no longer functioning due to J. B. Stoner's being occupied as an attorney for racists in various southern cities.

Sources:

DIXIE KLANS, KNIGHTS OF THE  
KU KLUX KLAN, INC. (DK, KKKK)

Sources advised it was announced at a meeting of Klavern 1, U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., at Chattanooga, Tennessee, on September 17, 1957, that some former leaders of Klavern 1 and their close associates had been banished from U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., during the preceding week.

Sources advised those individuals who were banished formed a new klan organization known as Dixie Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., with headquarters in Masonic Hall, 2523 Glass Street, East Chattanooga, Tennessee. A general welfare charter was secured from the State of Tennessee on October 21, 1957, which charter lists some of the purposes of the organization as freedom of speech and association, rejection of forced integration,

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preservation of the Constitutions of the United States and of Tennessee, and preservation of the sovereignty of each state.

On April 26, 1962, source stated that the Dixie Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., has active klaverns in Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, and Virginia. This informant advised attempts were made to organize klaverns of this organization in Arkansas, Mississippi, Florida, South Carolina, and North Carolina, but the attempts at organization in these states have not been successful.

A source advised during the Fall of 1960 that a "den" of Klavern 1, DK, KKKK, Inc., Chattanooga, Tennessee, consisting of ten members and two alternates, including Jack William Brown, Imperial Wizard (National President) of DK, KKKK, Inc., Jack Leon Brown, Exalted Cyclops of Klavern 1, Chattanooga, Tennessee (the local chapter president), and others, all listed as members of Klavern 1, DK, KKKK, Inc., Chattanooga, Tennessee, during July, August, and September, 1960, were responsible for five bombings of residences of Hamilton County, Tennessee, during July and August, 1960. Some of these members and alternates of the "den" held closed meetings and discussed bombing and other acts of violence. These acts and meetings were reportedly closed and rank-and-file members of this organization unaware of such. All reported members and alternates of the "den" interviewed during another investigation denied knowledge of bombings or acts of violence, denied knowledge of the "den" of DK, KKKK, Inc., and the majority admitted membership in DK, KKKK, Inc.

Sources have reported Jack William Brown continually discusses commission of acts of violence, encourages such acts in relationship to integration, and boasts of having committed acts of violence. Information as to the "den" listed above and acts of violence boasted of by Brown have been unconfirmed.

Sources:

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DIXIE KLANS, KNIGHTS OF THE  
KU KLUX KLAN, INCORPORATED,  
GEORGIA

A source advised in May, 1962, the Dixie Klans has no state organization in Georgia but does have a few units located within the northern part of Georgia. The source stated that the units of Dixie Klans in Georgia are under the direct control and supervision of the headquarters of Dixie Klans located at 2523 Glass Street, East Chattanooga, Tennessee.

Sources:

DIXIE KLANS, KNIGHTS OF THE  
KU KLUX KLAN, INC.,  
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE

A source advised on May 16, 1962, that for about the past four years a small klavern of the Dixie Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., has been in existence in Memphis, Tennessee. This Klavern is affiliated with and has been chartered under the national or parent organization name, the national headquarters of which is located in Chattanooga, Tennessee.

The aims and purposes of this Klavern are primarily directed toward doing everything legally possible to maintain racial segregation in the South, particularly in the Memphis and Shelby County areas, and toward maintaining states rights as opposed to a concentrated Federal Government.

This Klavern as of 1961 had about thirty members, most of whom were inactive. Until the Fall of 1961, it held weekly meetings in Memphis, Tennessee, with an average attendance of six to eight persons.

Due to lack of interest on the part of the membership, no meetings have been held since the Fall of 1961; no new members have been recruited and no members are known to have paid any dues since 1961.

Source:

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DIXIE KLANS, KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN, INC.,  
VIRGINIA

On July 25, 1961, a source advised that Wilbur L. Schrum, Colonial Heights, Virginia, had received a charter from Dixie Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc. (DK, KKKK, Inc.), signed by Jack Brown, which designated Schrum as Grand Wizard of the State of Virginia of the DK, KKKK, Inc.

On December 6, 1961, a second source advised a klavern of DK, KKKK, Inc., with National Office in Tennessee, was organized in Colonial Heights, Virginia, around April, 1961, with Wilbur L. Schrum acting as its leader.

Records of the State Corporation Commission, Richmond, Virginia, showed an application for a Certificate of Authority to Transact Business in Virginia was filed by DK, KKKK, Inc., on April 4, 1962, by Jack W. Brown, President, 2523 Glass Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee, and a Certificate to Transact Business in Virginia was issued on April 6, 1962.

The application stated DK, KKKK, Inc., a nonprofit fraternal organization, was incorporated in the State of Tennessee in October of 1957, and the principal office is 2523 Glass Street, Chattanooga. W. L. Schrum, Sr., 613 Colonial Avenue, Colonial Heights, Virginia, described as an officer of the organization, was listed as the Registered Agent in Virginia.

Sources:

FEDERATED KU KLUX KLANS, INCORPORATED

A source advised on December 21, 1959, that Federated Ku Klux Klans, Incorporated, was organized in late 1959 originally in Alabama by William Hugh Morris who had headed a klan group of the same name in Alabama in the late 1940's or early 1950's.

Headquarters of the organization were located in Montgomery, Alabama. Morris claimed the organization was

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the successor to the original Ku Klux Klan, organized in 1866. The source advised that the aims and purposes of the organization included "pure Americanism," white supremacy and segregation of the races.

The same source advised in September, 1960, that Morris had moved from Alabama to Bremen, Georgia. This source reported in February, 1962, that Federated Ku Klux Klans, Incorporated, had gone out of existence in Alabama and that the members had affiliated with the United Klans of America, Incorporated, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.

A second source advised in May, 1962, that Federated Ku Klux Klans, Incorporated, which formerly had six or seven units in Georgia, had lost membership until only one unit remained.

A third source advised in November, 1962, that Federated Ku Klux Klans, Incorporated, had gone out of existence.

Sources:

FIGHTING AMERICAN NATIONALISTS  
(FAN)

On February 23, 1961, George Lincoln Rockwell, leader of the American Nazi Party (ANP), advised Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that the Fighting American Nationalists (FAN) was organized as an anti-communist organization in September, 1960. Rockwell said it is a separate and distinct group from ANP, but members of FAN are "frustrated Nazis" who do not like to wear the swastika or be associated with the principles of Adolf Hitler.

Rockwell stated individuals have expressed an interest in the FAN and since FAN is in consort with and guided by the ANP, these individuals soon realize the use of the swastika is the best method of getting recognition in their fight against communism. Soon these individuals will join the ANP, Rockwell said.

A source advised on February 17, 1961, that in talking to J. V. Kenneth Morgan, Deputy Commander, ANP,

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Morgan stated there is no legal connection between FAN and ANP but FAN was organized under the guidance of Rockwell and it is used as a front group dominated by the principles and objectives of the ANP and looks to George Lincoln Rockwell as its leader.

Source:

FIGHTING AMERICAN NATIONALISTS  
NEW YORK CITY

On May 8, 1962, Detective Tony Ulasewicz, Bureau of Special Services, New York City Police Department (NYCPD), advised that the Fighting American Nationalists (FAN) first made an appearance in New York City in October, 1960, when a small group picketed against John F. Kennedy, then a presidential candidate.

On July 12, 1962, a source advised that FAN, a front group of the American Nazi Party (ANP), formerly utilized P. O. Box 220, Murray Hill Station, New York 16, New York, as a mailing address, but since the latter part of June, 1962, has used P. O. Box 130, Highbridge Station, New York 52, New York, as a mailing address. The source stated that FAN, NYC, has no actual headquarters.

According to this source, FAN, NYC, was formed under the direction of George Lincoln Rockwell, leader of the ANP, Arlington, Virginia, and is composed of individuals who are in sympathy with the purposes of the ANP but who are reluctant to expose themselves publicly as ANP sympathizers. Although FAN, NYC, has no formal membership list, individuals who participate in FAN activities consider themselves FAN members.

The source further advised that Anthony Wells, a member of the ANP, who had been specifically designated by George Lincoln Rockwell as organizer of FAN, NYC, had appointed George Lincke, in the latter part of June, 1962, to the position of provisional leader of FAN, NYC.

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KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN (KKKK),  
also known as Southern Knights  
of the Ku Klux Klan (SKKKK),  
Southern-Northern Knights of the  
Ku Klux Klan (SNKKKK),  
Knights of the White Camellia (KOTWC),  
Knights of the White Camellia of the  
National Christian Church (KOTWC of the NCC)  
National Christian Church (NCC),  
Order of the Rattlesnake (OTR),  
Konsolidated Ku Klux Klans of the  
Invisible Empire

The August 23, 1949, issue of the Tampa, Florida, "Morning Tribune" newspaper contained an article concerning an interview with Bill Hendrix, Imperial Emperor of the SKKKK, relative to the formation of this new Klan. According to the article, Hendrix said the organization was an out-growth of the Klan set up in 1915 by William Joseph Simmons. Hendrix stated SKKKK was started under the Original Southern Klans, Incorporated, in June, 1948, a branch of which was formed in Tallahassee, Florida, in January, 1949.

Original Southern Klans, Incorporated, has been designated by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

On December 26, 1956, "The Klansman," described by Hendrix as the official publication of KKKK, ordered the above-named group to again become active in the fight against integration by all lawful means and to destroy Communism, Fascism, and Nazism.

On September 8, 1960, a source reported that all organizations named, with exception of Konsolidated Ku Klux Klans of the Invisible Empire, are merely other names of the KKKK which was still active at that time.

On June 23, 1961, this source advised that in June, 1961, Bill Hendrix commenced using the name Konsolidated Ku Klux Klans of the Invisible Empire for his Klan and that this is just another name for the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.

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Applications to join the Konsolidated Ku Klux Klans of the Invisible Empire state that it is a voluntary organization fighting for the freedom and rights of white Americans.

On May 17, 1962, this source advised that Bill Hendrix is still using the name Knights of the Ku Klux Klan as the name of his klan organization and the other names listed above are used whenever it suits him to use them.

Source:

KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN, INCORPORATED  
(KKKK, INC.)

Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., (KKKK, Inc.), was incorporated on December 7, 1959, in the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, on a petition signed by H. J. Jones, R. L. Bing, Sr., W. B. Parr, and J. T. Campbell.

A source advised on November 25, 1959, that at that time Jones and Bing were officials of the Jonesboro, Georgia, Unit of the U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc.

A second source stated in January, 1960, that Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., used the same ritual as the klan chartered in 1915 by William Joseph Simmons. The same source advised in 1960 that Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., had as its objectives the maintenance of white supremacy and segregation of the races.

The first source reported in May, 1962, that the organization is no longer in existence, having merged into United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, in July, 1961.

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NACIREMA, INCORPORATED,  
ALSO KNOWN AS WHITE CITIZENS

Records of the Superior Court of Cobb County, Georgia, show that Nacirema, Inc., was granted a charter on June 1, 1961, at Marietta, Georgia.

At a meeting of Nacirema, Inc., on December 5, 1961, William B. Crowe stated that Nacirema, Inc., is a secret organization for Americans who want to fight to uphold the principles of our Constitution. He said white Americans have only a little freedom remaining, and Nacirema, Inc., has been formed by men who have pledged themselves to "restore freedom to white Americans." Crowe did not openly state that Nacirema, Inc., had participated in acts of violence, but he gave the distinct impression that such had been the case.

A source advised on July 25, 1961, that the organization was composed almost entirely of present and former klansmen who joined Nacirema, Inc., to get "more action."

The same source advised in October, 1961, that two leaders of the organization conducted an explosives school at which instructions were given in the assembling and detonation of explosives and incendiary devices with the use of easy-to-obtain materials.

A second source advised in December, 1961, that leaders of Nacirema, Inc., frequently spoke of the necessity of violence to "restore freedom to white Americans." They never spoke of specific acts of violence but gave the definite impression that members of the organization had participated in acts of violence.

The same source advised in July, 1962, that the organization held its last meeting on May 30, 1962, and had gone out of existence due to surveillances and interviews by detectives of the Atlanta, Georgia, Police Department.

Sources:

NATIONAL KU KLUX KLAN  
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN  
(NKKK)

A source advised that on May 22, 1960, the National Grand Council of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan met at Atlanta, Georgia, to discuss consolidation of the klans

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unity of effort and activities, to establish a National Fund and a National Secretary and to design a new flag. The meeting was attended by representatives of the Federation of Ku Klux Klan, Alabama; Association of Arkansas Klans, Arkansas; Florida Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Florida; Southern Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Florida; Association of Georgia Klans, Georgia; Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, North Carolina; Association of South Carolina Klans, South Carolina; Dixie Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Tennessee; and Hyksos Klan, Texas.

This source advised that at a consolidation meeting at Atlanta, Georgia, September 2-5, 1960, at which the North Carolina and Texas Klans were not represented, it was resolved and passed that their name be changed to National Ku Klux Klan.

This source also advised that at a consolidation meeting at Savannah, Georgia, October 23, 1960, it was resolved and passed that in any future meetings of this group the name "Majority Citizens League" was to be used.

A second source advised that at a national klonklave meeting at Texarkana, Texas, on February 11-12, 1961, a motion was carried that there were to be at least six national meetings a year to be held any time from one week to twelve weeks after the last meeting. The time and meeting place were to be decided by the newly elected chairman. This second source also advised that at each meeting a new chairman and acting secretary were to be elected to serve at the next meeting. A national secretary had not been appointed.

A third source advised that at a national meeting on November 11-12, 1961, United Klans of America, Inc. (UK) was invited to meet with NKKKK and it was agreed they would meet together, but there was no talk of consolidation.

This third source further advised that as of the national meeting on May 5-6, 1962, no national fund, headquarters or secretary had been established and no plans had apparently been made to do so. A temporary chairman and acting secretary were to be appointed for each meeting. The name "Majority Citizens League" was not being used in connection with meetings.

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Sources :

NATIONAL STATES RIGHTS PARTY  
(NSRP)

On November 26, 1957, a source advised that the United White Party (UWP) was organized at a convention held in Knoxville, Tennessee, on November 10, 1957. An article in the November 26, 1957, issue of the "Greenville Piedmont," a newspaper of Greenville, South Carolina, reported "the recent formation of a new political party to be known as the United White Party." According to the article, the party was formed at a recently held meeting in Knoxville, Tennessee, at which many klansmen were represented. The UWP was reported as being opposed to all "race-mixing organizations and individuals."

The July, 1958, issue of "The Thunderbolt," self-described as the "official Racial Nationalist Organ of the National States Rights Party" (NSRP) reported that rank and file "States Righters" had merged with the UWP under "the banner of the National States Rights Party," with national offices at Post Office Box 261, Jeffersonville, Indiana.

In November, 1958, a source advised that the NSRP is composed of past members of klan-type organizations and notorious anti-Semites.

Issue Number 19, dated June, 1960, "The Thunderbolt," announced the address of the headquarters of the NSRP had been changed from Jeffersonville, Indiana, to Post Office Box 783, Birmingham, Alabama.

On June 17, 1960, a source advised that Edward R. Fields, the Information Director of the NSRP, is the individual who "runs the NSRP."

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"The Thunderbolt" continues to publish articles attacking Negroes and persons of the Jewish faith.

Sources:

NATIONAL STATE RIGHTS PARTY  
GEORGIA  
(NSRP)

Issue Number 35 dated October, 1961, of "The Thunderbolt," official organ of the NSRP, identified Reverend Henry G. White as State Chairman for Georgia of the NSRP with address of Post Office Box 604, Dalton, Georgia.

A source advised on October 14, 1961, that the NSRP group headed by Henry G. White at Dalton, Georgia, is the Georgia organization of the NSRP, which has its headquarters at Post Office Box 783, Birmingham, Alabama.

Sources:

NATIONAL STATE RIGHTS PARTY  
(LOUISIANA - MISSISSIPPI)  
(NSRP)

"The Thunderbolt," self-described "official white racial organ" of the National States Rights Party (NSRP), in Issue Number 27 dated March, 1961, published the name of the NSRP representative of Louisiana as Ray Leahart, 623 Jefferson Avenue, New Orleans, Louisiana, and the NSRP representative of Mississippi as Elmer G. Mabry, Route 1, Box 311C, Ocean Springs, Mississippi.

One source advised on August 9, 1961, that the Thunderbolts are the uniformed guard of the NSRP in New Orleans, but because of unfavorable publicity had changed their name to the Americanos Dedicados Nacionales (ADN) (National Dedicated Americans).

A second source reported on August 16, 1961, that the twelve members of the ADN are all members of the NSRP.

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The first source said on August 31, 1961, that the name of the ADN had been changed to the Blue Shirts of Louisiana (BSL) the aims of which are: (1) national Americanism; (2) preservation of all ethnic-cultural groups within the United States; (3) establishment of Corporative Councils including all workers, professions and employers, to institute economic justice for all people; (4) removal from the Government of all Communists and Social-Revolutionists regardless of race, creed, color or national origin; (5) establishment of local Blue Shirt units to defend the republic from Communists and Social-Revolutionists.

The same source said that Dr. Edward R. Fields was to attend a meeting of the NSRP in New Orleans, Louisiana, on September 26, 1961, but could not because of illness, and Roy E. Frankhouser, Jr., a national organizer of the NSRP, came instead.

A third source on September 26, 1961, reported that Frankhouser was assisted by Leahart in arranging this meeting, and it appeared that the local NSRP group is affiliated with the national organization of the NSRP.

Sources:

NATIONAL STATES RIGHTS PARTY  
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE  
(NSRP)

A source advised on August 14, 1962, that since early 1961, the National States Rights Party (NSRP), with National Headquarters in Birmingham, Alabama, has had a Memphis, Tennessee, representative. This representative has engaged in no organizational or recruiting activities on behalf of the NSRP.

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It is strictly a paper-type organization which has never had more than nine inactive members and as of August, 1962, was completely inactive. The Memphis Chapter has no officers, no bank account, no meeting place and conducts no meetings.

Source:

ORIGINAL KNIGHTS OF THE  
KU KLUX KLAN  
(OKKKK)

On December 12, 1957, a source advised that the U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, chartered its first klavern in Rylie, Texas, in November, 1957. Roy E. Davis, Sr., of Dallas, Texas, was the Grand Dragon for the State of Texas.

On October 5, 1958, a second source advised that in June of 1958, Roy E. Davis, Sr., Grand Dragon of the U. S. Klans for the State of Texas, broke away from that organization and formed the Original Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. However, on October 4, 1958, E. L. Edwards, Imperial Wizard, U. S. Klans, visited Dallas at which time most of the klansmen in the Dallas area rejoined the U. S. Klans, having become disgusted with Davis over his handling of klan funds. This source advised the Original Knights of the Ku Klux Klan was formed for the purpose of combating integration and preserving segregation, and that Davis had stated that this should be done through legal means only.

On August 15, 1960, the first source advised there is no known activity of the Original Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in the State of Texas. Roy E. Davis, Sr., however, does have a few scattered followers and spends most of his time mailing various proklan literature from his home, Davis being retired.

Sources:

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ORIGINAL KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN  
(ARKANSAS - LOUISIANA)  
(OKKKK)

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A source advised on November 7, 1960, that according to the Exalted Cyclops of the Texarkana, Arkansas, Klavern of the Original Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (OKKKK), a meeting was held in Texarkana, Arkansas, on November 5, 1960, and six men from Shreveport, Louisiana, joined the OKKKK and those six were to form a klavern in Shreveport.

The same source advised that on December 1, 1960, Dr. Jerry Bristol of Shreveport, Louisiana, was in Texarkana, Arkansas, and had a letter from the Imperial Grand Dragon of the OKKKK establishing Bristol as Grand Dragon in Texarkana and Shreveport, Louisiana.

On January 21, 1961, another source obtained from Bristol a current document bearing the seal which read: "Original Knights, Ku Klux Klan, USA, Imperial Seal, Gen. H. R. Forrest, 1866."

A third source advised on October 18, 1961, that the aims of the organization are the promotion of Americanism, white supremacy, and segregation.

Sources:

PALMETTO KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN,  
ALSO KNOWN AS GREENVILLE, SOUTH CAROLINA, KLAVERN NUMBER 460

On May 10, 1962, a source advised the Palmetto Knights of the Ku Klux Klan was first organized in 1956, at Greenville, South Carolina, as the Greenville, South Carolina, Klavern Number 460 of the Association of South Carolina Klans.

On July 21, 1957, a large group of the members of this Klavern were involved in the beating of a Negro male near Travelers Rest, South Carolina, for allegedly associating with a white woman, as a result of which eleven of its members were arrested and tried in State Court at Greenville, South Carolina, in January 1958. Four of its members were convicted and sentenced to terms on the local chain gang.

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Following the arrests in connection with the beating of the Negro, the Association of South Carolina Klans severed its association with this Klavern, and the Klavern, after unsuccessful efforts to affiliate with two other klan organizations, became independent, and at a public rally on April 19, 1959, adopted the name Palmetto Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.

This organization never established any written or clear-cut program or objective; however, the principal members have openly advocated during meetings their belief in white supremacy and segregation of the races, and have suggested use of violence in intimidating the Negro race to keep them from establishing any form of integration, including integration of the schools in the Greenville area, even to the extent of dynamiting schools which might possibly be considered for integration.

The organization has held no formal klavern meeting since the Spring of 1959, with the exception of the reorganizational meeting on April 19, 1959, and as of July, 1962, was inactive.

Source:

UNITED FLORIDA KU KLUX KLAN  
JACKSONVILLE  
(UFKKK)

A source advised on August 20, 1955, that a new organization known as Florida Ku Klux Klan (FKKK) had been formed at Macclenny, Florida, on August 14, 1955, by former members of the Association of Florida Ku Klux Klan (AFKKK).

The objectives of this group, according to a second source, are to oppose integration in the schools and to fight communism.

Regarding AFKKK, a third source advised that a former official of the Association of Georgia Klans (AGK) formed an organization on July 7, 1953, known as AFKKK. The "Morning Tribune," Tampa, Florida, newspaper, in its August 11, 1955, issue revealed AFKKK disbanded on that date.

A fourth source advised on October 25, 1956, that AFKKK operated under the same principles and bylaws as the AGK. The AGK has been designated by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

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A fifth source advised on February 17, 1958, that the FKKK was operating and maintaining the same objectives as set forth above.

The sixth source advised on June 28, 1961, that at a meeting held in Orlando, Florida, on June 25, 1961, the FKKK and the United Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., in Florida, consolidated and the new organization is known as the UFKKK.

On May 17, 1962, the sixth source advised that the UFKKK is still in existence in Florida and maintains the same objectives set forth above.

Sources:

UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.,  
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN (UNITED KLANS)

Records of Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, show that this Klan organization was granted a corporate charter on February 21, 1961, at Atlanta, Georgia, under the name United Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of America, Inc.

A source advised on February 27, 1961, that United Klans was formed as a result of a split in U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc. According to the source, the split resulted from a leadership dispute and United Klans has the same aims and objectives as the parent group. These are the promotion of Americanism, white supremacy and segregation of the races.

The first source and a second source advised in July, 1961, that United Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of America, Inc., merged with Alabama Knights, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. The merged organization established headquarters in Suite 401, The Alston Building, Tuscaloosa, Alabama. The organization is directed by Robert Shelton, Imperial Wizard, and is the dominant Klan group in the South with units in several southern states.

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On August 14, 1961, the second source advised that the organization formerly known as United Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of America, Inc., would be known in the future as United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. The second source said the name was changed by a resolution adopted at the National Klonvocation held July 8, 1961, at Indian Springs, Georgia.

Second source advised that at a meeting at Prattville, Alabama, on October 22, 1961, a majority of the Klaverns of the U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan merged with the United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.

Sources:

UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC., KNIGHTS  
OF THE KU KLUX KLAN, REALM OF GEORGIA  
(UNITED KLANS)

A source advised on May 16, 1962, that the State of Georgia organization of United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (United Klans) is called the Realm of Georgia. The Realm of Georgia has headquarters at 629 Peoples Street, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia.

The first source and a second source advised on May 16, 1962, that the Realm of Georgia is subordinate to the National Headquarters of United Klans in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, and receives its instructions and guidance from the National Headquarters which is headed by Imperial Wizard Robert Shelton.

Sources:

UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.,  
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN, LOUISIANA  
(UNITED KLANS)

In September, 1960, a source advised that Edgar Taylor of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, had communicated with an official of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in Georgia indicating he might be able to organize that group in Louisiana.

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A second source said that five individuals from the Baton Rouge-Denham Springs, Louisiana, area attended a Klan meeting in Demopolis, Alabama, on December 3, 1960, and a third source stated that after their return from Demopolis organizing of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan began in the Baton Rouge-Denham Springs area.

This source advised on February 20, 1961, that on December 5, 1960, he received a membership card in the organization in the Baton Rouge-Denham Springs area which states that the organization there is referred to as Klan 1, Realm of 1.

The first source advised on July 17, 1961, that in response to an application for charters to the United Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of America, Inc., Atlanta, Georgia, charters were issued for the Sidney L. Ballard Klavern (Klavern Number 1), Denham Springs, Louisiana, and for the Eldon L. Edwards Klavern (Klavern Number 1), Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

Sources:

UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.,  
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN (N. C.)  
(UNITED KLANS)

On May 16, 1962, a source advised that the United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in North Carolina, have two klaverns, one at Salisbury, North Carolina, and one at Monroe, North Carolina, which became affiliated with the national organization of the United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, in the Spring of 1961. The organization in North Carolina has the same aims and objectives as the parent group; that is, advocacy of segregation of the races and white supremacy.

Source:

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UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.,  
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN (S. C.)  
(UNITED KLANS)

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On May 14, 1962, a source advised that the United Klans of America, Inc., has a klavern at Spartanburg, South Carolina, which became affiliated with the national organization of the United Klans of America, Inc., headquarters in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, in the Spring of 1961. Bob Scoggins is the Grand Dragon of the United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in South Carolina, and the group in South Carolina has the same aims and objectives as the national group; that is, advocacy of segregation of the races and white supremacy.

Source:

UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.,  
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN, TENNESSEE  
(UNITED KLANS)

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On March 20, 1961, a source advised that a state meeting of the U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., was held at Harriman, Tennessee, on Sunday afternoon, March 19, 1961. George Compton, Grand Dragon, State of Tennessee, announced that the U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., was no longer in existence and Imperial Officer Wesley Morgan of Atlanta was present and announced the formation of a new organization, United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. The source stated that members present from the Maryville, Harriman, and Dayton, Tennessee, chapters of the U. S. Klans, KKKK, Inc., voted unanimously to affiliate with the United Klans of America, Inc., KKKK. The source advised that the Dayton, Tennessee, Klavern was not holding regular meetings and that only the Maryville and Harriman Klaverns were holding regular meetings.

On May 7, 1962, source stated that the Maryville and Harriman Klaverns continue to be the only chapters actively meeting.

Source:

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U. S. KLANS, KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN, INC.,  
ALSO KNOWN AS U. S. KLANS (USK)

A source advised on October 12, 1956, that Eldon Lee Edwards organized a new klan group in Atlanta, Georgia, in 1953. This organization received a corporate charter in Georgia in October, 1955, under the name U. S. Klans. The same source, and a second source, advised in May, 1960, that U. S. Klans has no direct affiliation with any previous klan group, but utilizes, with only minor changes, the klan Kloran or ritual written in about 1915 by William Joseph Simmons for use by the old Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (1915-1944).

These sources advised that the U. S. Klans has as its principal aims and objectives the promotion of Americanism, white supremacy and segregation of the races. On numerous occasions Edwards announced that these objectives would be attained by legal means and without violence.

The first source and a third source advised in February, 1961, that at that time a split occurred in U. S. Klans, which resulted in a great majority of the officers and members pulling out and forming a new klan group known as United Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of America, Inc.

These sources advised in May, 1962, that U. S. Klans is almost out of existence and only a few units remain.

Sources:

U. S. KLANS, KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN, INC.,  
ALSO KNOWN AS U. S. KLANS, REALM OF ALABAMA (USK)

A source advised that at a meeting in Prattville, Alabama, on October 22, 1961, the U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Realm of Alabama, affiliated with the parent group organized in Atlanta, Georgia, in 1953, and chartered in 1955, merged with the United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, with the exception of two or three Alabama klaverns.

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Source :

U. S. KLANS, KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN, INC.,  
ALSO KNOWN AS U. S. KLANS, REALM OF ARKANSAS (USK)

The "Arkansas Gazette," a Little Rock, Arkansas, daily newspaper, on June 5, 1959, reports that a charter and articles of incorporation for the U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., (USK), were filed with the Secretary of State, State of Arkansas, on June 4, 1959. The charter showed affiliation with the parent group, U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., which was incorporated October 24, 1955, at Atlanta, Georgia, with E. L. Edwards of Atlanta, Georgia, as president.

A source advised five members of the Little Rock, Arkansas, Klavern of USK, operating independently of the Klavern, were convicted for their participation in the 1959 Labor Day bombings at Little Rock, the Little Rock Klavern being the only one operating in the State of Arkansas. The same source advised in May, 1962, the Little Rock Klavern of USK had been relatively inactive during the last few years.

Source :

U. S. KLANS, KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN, INC.,  
ALSO KNOWN AS U. S. KLANS, FLORIDA (USK)

\* A source advised on November 7, 1956, that a number of members of the Florida Ku Klux Klan in Jacksonville, Florida, split away from that organization on November 6, 1956, and affiliated with the U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., which was headed by Eldon Lee Edwards of Atlanta, Georgia. The records of the office of the Secretary of State, Tallahassee, Florida, were reviewed on June 5, 1957, and revealed that the U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., was a Georgia nonprofit corporation and as such could not be chartered by the State of Florida. Under existing Florida laws, however, a permit to operate in Florida was issued this organization by the Secretary of State, Tallahassee, on October 29, 1956.

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A second source advised in May, 1962, that the U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., (Florida) has as its principal aims and objectives the promotion of white supremacy, segregation of the races and opposition to communism. According to the source, the organization advocates the attaining of these objectives without violence.

The second source and a third source advised in February, 1961, that at that time a split occurred in the U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., which resulted in the majority of the officers and members in Florida leaving the organization and affiliating with a new klan group.

The second source advised in May, 1962, that several units of the U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., (Florida) continue to operate in Florida and that these units closely follow the leadership of the Imperial Wizard and the parent or national organization in Georgia.

Sources:

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

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PERSONAL

No Number SAC Letter 63-A



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

January 30, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7

One set of AFSAM 7 key lists for months of March, April, and May, 1963, being forwarded separately to all divisions except Washington Field which will receive none; three copies being furnished Bureau's Emergency Relocation Site; and three copies Seat of Government Code Room.

Acknowledge receipt of key lists promptly by routing slip, indicating serial numbers which appear thereon; return in a sealed envelope to the Bureau, attention FBI Annex, the address label on individual tamperproofed envelope containing keys even though torn while opening package; and destroy, by burning, each monthly sheet thirty days after last effective date thereof, advising Bureau promptly by routing slip, attention FBI Annex, this has been done.

It is essential address label mentioned above be returned in order to control security of shipment.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-6

**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE**  
**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

January 29, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) TRAINING - FIREARMS - SAFETY -- In a recent firearms school being conducted by an FBI Field Office, an accident occurred which was caused by a participant's holstering a loaded weapon using one hand to hold the holster while forcing the revolver into the holster with the other hand. The safety strap caught in the trigger and caused the weapon to fire.

You will call this to the attention of all firearms experts in your office in order that additional emphasis can be placed on the safety rule prohibiting holstering a weapon using both hands. Where trainees are using holsters with safety straps, they should be cautioned to place the strap underneath the belt while engaging in quick-draw practice in order that it will not catch on the trigger while the revolver is being holstered.

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-6

(B) FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM - "TELEPHONE USERS GUIDE" - TELEPHONES AND TELETYPES -- As you have been previously advised, the Bureau does not intend to participate at this time in the Federal Telecommunications System, a nationwide, Government-wide communications network being set up by the General Services Administration. The Bureau has recently learned that the General Services Administration is distributing copies of a "Telephone Users Guide" for the Federal Telecommunications System which will go into effect February 15, 1963, in a number of cities where the Bureau has field offices. If copies of this guide are received by any field office they should be disregarded. Under no circumstances should Bureau personnel make any calls over the Federal Telecommunications System.

(C) CONTACTS WITH NEWS MEDIA - RE: BANK ROBBERY MATTERS -- In an all-out effort to combat the alarming increase in bank robberies, burglaries and larcenies, I desire immediate steps be taken to focus the full glare of publicity on this problem. Particular attention should be directed to tactfully obtaining full cooperation of all news outlets in your area not only in publicizing the crimes themselves, but also in affording equal coverage to the subsequent arrest and sentencing of guilty parties. All personnel should be instructed to stress the importance of such publicity in their normal contacts with representatives of mass communications media. Small town weekly and/or daily newspapers can be particularly helpful in this regard, since such crimes are usually of great news interest in rural areas. I feel that such publicity, especially that pertaining to the arrest and incarceration of the culprits, will serve as a definite deterrent to "amateurs" considering such crimes and convince them that the possibility of profit does not warrant the risk involved. One method to acquaint the public with this problem is through feature articles regarding successful investigations conducted by your respective offices in this field. Inquiries concerning guidance and assistance in obtaining material not in your possession should be submitted to the attention of the Crime Research Section.

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(D) CRIMINAL INFORMANTS -- While generally good, there are indications that criminal informant coverage can and should be improved. Reports show that in some areas within field office territory no new informants were developed during the 1962 calendar year. While in some instances coverage afforded by informants previously developed may provide the effective type of coverage needed, continuing increased responsibilities being borne by the Bureau require constant revitalization of criminal informant coverage.

Each Special Agent in Charge should immediately make a critical analysis of the criminal informant coverage and furnish the Bureau within fifteen days after receipt of this letter answers to the following: Does informant program provide coverage of all prevalent criminal activity throughout territory? Is sufficient attention being devoted to developing productive informant coverage in Resident Agency territories? Is coverage

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-6

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current and developing or is it becoming stagnant and nonproductive? Is sufficient effort being devoted to developing new informants and in further cultivating existing informants? Has proper consideration been given to the potential of monetary reward, where such may be necessary? Is full value being received for funds currently being expended? Where shortcomings are indicated, advise what steps are being taken to increase the effectiveness of your program.

In connection with the criminal informant program, you are also reminded that all informant accomplishments should be set out each month in a letter to the Bureau captioned "Monthly Progress Letter - Criminal Informant Matters," as set forth in Section 108-H1b, Manual of Instructions. All arrests and dollar value of merchandise recovered in Bureau, other Federal and local cases attributed to your informants should be reported each month.

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(E) LAW ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCES - 1963 - BANK ROBBERY AND INCIDENTAL CRIMES -- You were informed in SAC Letter 63-3 (G) that the topic "Bank Robbery and Incidental Crimes" would be featured in the 1963 Law Enforcement Conferences. You should hold sufficient conferences to cover your territory adequately and should choose sites readily accessible to all law enforcement agencies and banking-type institutions in your area. You are authorized to prepare friendly but businesslike circular letters of invitation to be forwarded to law enforcement and representatives of all types of financial institutions and companies coming within the purview of the Bank Robbery and related Statutes. Conferences should be limited to four-to-six hours, of the open forum type, and necessary speeches restricted to not over fifteen minutes. Qualified speakers from local law enforcement, the banking profession, and the United States Attorney's office may be scheduled as panelists and a free exchange of ideas and discussions of mutual problems should be encouraged. The names of panelists must be searched through your office indices and the Bureau advised of the results. Attendance of undesirables should be avoided and commercial product representatives should not be invited. Nothing should be done at these conferences which could be construed as an attempt by the Bureau to instigate legislation or endorse commercial protective devices. Adjacent offices should be kept informed of your conference plans. Border offices may invite nearby Canadian and Mexican police officials. Resident Agents may attend conferences held in their territories.

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Your conferences should be held between April 1 and June 1. The agenda of your proposed conferences, listing all speakers to be invited, as well as dates and sites, should be submitted to the Bureau UACB at least thirty days prior to the holding of your first conference. A national press release concerning these conferences will be made by the Bureau and the Attorney General shortly before April 1 and suggested press releases for local use will be provided in the near future. The Introduction in the April, 1963, Law Enforcement Bulletin will concern the bank robbery problem. The booklet "How Banks Can Help the FBI" and the decal for display in banking institutions showing that the FBI investigates bank robbery, burglary and larceny should be stressed during the conferences and their use encouraged. Advise Bureau by routing slip, Attention: Crime Records Division, by March 1 the number of copies of this booklet, the decal, Introductions to April, 1963, Law Enforcement Bulletin, and other materials you will require for your conferences. Bureau will not be able to prepare special exhibits or posters.

Refer to SAC Letter 61-16 (C) for proposed agenda; however, implementation and substitution of topics may be made in accordance with needs and interests in local territories.

Although your conferences should be closed to all but duly constituted law enforcement officers and those specifically invited to attend from the banking and related professions, you should plan each so that the last hour will be open to news media representatives and their attendance should be encouraged. A basic need in the drive to reduce crimes against banking institutions is the cooperation of various news media, especially with respect to their handling of news regarding such violations. Your conferences should be used to inform news media representatives, both executives and the reporters who gather and write crime and court news, of the problem and how they can help. This time should be arranged, if possible, so it will not conflict with news deadlines. It is suggested that you, a representative of the banking industry, and a spokesman for local law enforcement present a short summary of the various aspects of the conference during this last hour. All statements should, of course, present a united viewpoint and following the statements, the three representatives should make themselves available for questions by the news media. Where possible, it should be stressed to the news media that law enforcement and the banking industry seek the cooperation of the news media in stressing the importance of prominent presentation of news relating to the arrest and sentencing of bank robbers. Often the

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-6

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arrest and sentencing of a bank robber are not as interesting or newsworthy as the account of the crime itself. However, the prominent display of bank robbery stories without similar display of the accounts of arrest and sentencing of a robber might well lead others to attempt the crime with the mistaken feeling that it is a good way to get rich quickly. The recent general increase in crimes of this nature certainly demands the best efforts of all interested citizens to reduce these serious offenses.

Within a week after your last conference, advise Bureau of results of your conferences, giving the number of people in attendance, the number of different agencies represented (broken down according to law enforcement, banks, banking associations, Federal credit unions, insurance companies, surety companies, etc.), as well as dates and number of conferences completed. Provide specific statements of interest made by those in attendance, sampling of newspaper publicity received, and any suggestions heard for improvement of law enforcement conferences. Forward all correspondence, Attention: Training Division, Bufile 91-7953.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-6

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PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 63-B

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

February 27, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7

Four sets of KAR-402/TSEC rotors for use with Bureau's coding equipment are being furnished each office with the exception of Chicago and San Francisco which will receive six sets and Washington Field which will receive none; twelve sets being furnished Seat of Government Code Room; and fourteen sets Bureau's Emergency Relocation Site. These will become effective April 1, 1963, replacing the AFSAR-4545-2/TSEC rotors presently in use. You will note that new rotors consist of twelve rotors per set; however, only eight of these will be used for any one daily arrangement.

Upon receipt of rotors carefully inspect package for evidence of tampering. Notify Bureau immediately of any irregularity. Acknowledge receipt by routing slip, listing serial numbers of each set; return in a sealed envelope to the Bureau, attention FBI Annex, the address label on inner wrapping, even though torn in opening package; and make appropriate inventory adjustments by FD-222. Promptly check rotors by actual use in AFSAM 7 pursuant to AFSAM 7 Manual of Operation and Routine Maintenance, Section IV, A, and afford rotors secure storage with other AFSAM 7 material.


Rotors being furnished you are Type B as described in Section II, A, Manual of Operation and Routine Maintenance, and should be assembled as explained therein. Do not attempt to remove alphabet ring. Proper depression of notch ring and wide ring will disassemble rotor.

Retain AFSAR-4545-2/TSEC rotors presently in use until May 1, 1963, on which date they must be packaged securely and forwarded to Bureau, attention FBI Annex, by Railway Express, Protective Signature Service. Anchorage, Honolulu and San Juan should use Registered Mail, Return Receipt Requested.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL

NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 63-C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

March 6, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7

One set of AFSAM 7 key lists for months of April and May, 1963, being forwarded separately to all divisions except Washington Field which will receive none; three copies being furnished Bureau's Emergency Relocation Site; and three copies Seat of Government Code Room. Key lists being distributed at this time are for use with KAR-402/TSEC rotors.

Acknowledge receipt of key lists promptly by routing slip, indicating serial numbers which appear thereon; return in a sealed envelope to the Bureau, attention FBI Annex, the address label on individual tamperproofed envelope containing keys even though torn while opening package; and destroy, by burning, each monthly sheet thirty days after last effective date thereof, advising Bureau promptly by routing slip, attention FBI Annex, this has been done. Previously issued AFSAR-4545-2/TSEC key lists for April and May, 1963, should be destroyed by burning, advising Bureau promptly by routing slip, attention FBI Annex, this has been done.

It is essential the address label mentioned above be returned in order to control security of shipment.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

PERSONAL

NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 63-D

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

March 25, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

RE: TELEPHONES -  
SECURITY OF BUREAU TELEPHONE SERVICE

Telephone companies are rapidly extending the automation of telephone services. With this automation program they are increasing the number of unattended telephone exchanges. Some operating companies have found it economically necessary to incorporate facilities to permit operators to use a device, known as a "no test number" or a "busy verification test," to dial in and listen to the conversation on a busy telephone line. The number the operator must dial to override the busy signal is classified "SECRET" by the companies and is disseminated only on a "need-to-know" basis. This number, while classified "SECRET," may be inadvertently disclosed to an unauthorized person who may use it to monitor telephone conversations.

This "busy verification test" number, while limited to a relatively few isolated areas, is not restricted to local calls but can be extended to dialed long-distance calls. It is possible for a person, knowledgeable of the busy verification code number, to dial in on a busy telephone line in these isolated areas from any part of the United States and Canada, where direct distance dialing facilities are present, and to listen to the conversation on the busy line. The automatic accounting machines in the exchange will identify the telephone subscriber using the "secret number" in making the call as well as the number dialed but will report the call as being "non-billable."

The Bureau recognizes that the busy override feature is available in only a limited number of isolated areas; however, it is felt that, because of the potential security problem involved in any dial system, you should conduct a survey and advise Bureau of the number of exchanges which have the busy override feature. Your survey should be restricted to lines serving your office, resident agencies, any other official telephone lines and the home telephones of your supervisory and resident agent personnel who may handle official calls at their residences. In addition, you should indicate what steps you are taking to have those lines, which your survey indicates are available to the override feature, isolated from the override equipment. Further, you should outline what preventive measures you have effected to insure against the Bureau lines being subjected to this undesirable condition in the future.

All security checks of official lines shall, in the future, include inquiry concerning the busy override feature and, when applicable, verification that this feature no longer provides override onto Bureau lines.

Use of this technique constitutes a wire tap and thereby comes under all the legislative and administrative restrictions governing such matters.

There is attached, for the assistance of the Sound-trained personnel of your office, a technical discussion of the above-mentioned override device.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosure

3/25/63

NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 63-D

- 2 -

March 19, 1963

**SECURITY OF TELEPHONE SYSTEMS-  
BUSY LINE VERIFICATION**

Concurrent with the inauguration of dial telephone systems the telephone operating companies provided a means for an operator and/or test deskman to verify a busy line condition. Most of the operating companies follow the practice of having only one special trunk line per 10,000 subscribers for use in making busy line verification tests and they restrict the use of this line to supervisory personnel. It is not possible, with this special trunk feature, for unauthorized individuals to seize or override a busy telephone line as the special trunk line is restricted to the perimeter of a single central office or exchange building where it is accessible to only a limited number of employees. It is not, therefore, available to persons dialing from subscriber and/or unauthorized stations.

The rapid extension of automated telephone services and the increased reliability of dial switching equipment have encouraged the operating telephone companies to increase the number of unattended dial exchanges. These unattended exchanges seldom require attention and therefore are, for the most part, visited by authorized personnel only when there is a need to repair a reported trouble. Testing of switching equipment and verification of busy line conditions are performed from a centrally located test center and/or operator-attended exchange building. All equipment testing between the test center and the unattended exchange and the busy line verification at the unattended exchange is done over high-quality, revenue-producing trunk circuits that must be taken out of service for these purposes.

In order to produce maximum revenue with existing facilities some operating companies have devised a secret number system whereby operators and/or test deskmen may call an unattended exchange over regular subscriber trunking paths to make busy line verification tests. This procedure releases revenue-producing telephone lines that would otherwise be tied up for test purposes. The number used for this busy line verification is classified "SECRET" by the operating companies and is disseminated to employees only on a "need-to-know" basis.

An operator or test deskman making a busy verification test will first dial the exchange, then the secret number or numbers, followed by the station code (last four digits). If the line is busy the employee making the call will first get a busy signal then



the connector will "override the busy line" and connect the caller to the conversation in progress. The connection will be made to the called subscriber's line without alerting the subscriber. If there is a conversation in progress the operator can report a "busy line" condition; however, if there is no conversation on the line the operator will usually report that the "line is out of order" and so advise the trouble desk. The attendant at the trouble desk will then dispatch craftsmen to repair the trouble.

The busy verification number, while classified "SECRET," may inadvertently be disclosed to an unauthorized person who may use it to monitor telephone conversations. The use of the busy verification, although limited to a relatively few isolated areas, is not restricted to local calls. It is possible for a person, knowledgeable of the busy verification code number, to dial in on a busy telephone line from any part of the United States and Canada where direct distance dialing facilities are available without being charged for the call. The automatic accounting equipment assigned to the calling telephone will record the called number, calling number, date and time of the call and because of the initial busy-back signal from the called number will record the call as "non-billable."

Persons knowledgeable of the busy verification code number can, by dialing the exchange code, then the busy verification code followed by the station code, cut in on conversations without alerting the called subscriber. Persons using this technique from a distant point will first dial the area code followed by the same number sequence mentioned above. If the called telephone line is not busy at the time a dialed long-distance call is connected to the called number, the automatic machine accounting equipment will treat the call as a regularly dialed long-distance call. On the other hand, if the called line is busy a short busy signal will be sent back to the calling station and then the connector will override the busy condition without alerting the called subscriber.

In making checks of telephone lines in areas with this feature you should verify, by dialing in on the busy line from another station, that the Bureau line cannot be subjected to this undesirable override device.

Any technical questions which arise from the survey or unusual technical data developed as a result of the survey should be brought to the attention of the Electronics Section, FBI Laboratory.



SAC LETTER NO. 63-13

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

March 12, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

(A) FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY - SEVENTY-SECOND SESSION -- The Seventy-second Session of the FBI National Academy will begin on Monday, August 19, 1963, and will graduate on Wednesday, November 6, 1963. It is desired that you submit to the Bureau by April 1, 1963, the names of the candidates from your territory whom you desire to recommend to attend that Session. You should strictly comply with existing instructions previously given as to the procedures to be followed in nominating candidates to attend the Academy.

All candidates recommended for attendance at the Academy must be personally known to the Special Agent in Charge. The Special Agent in Charge must have conducted a formal interview with each candidate being recommended unless such candidate has been previously interviewed and favorably recommended by the former Special Agent in Charge within the preceding six months. It will not be necessary, however, for the present Special Agent in Charge to reinterview any candidates he, himself, interviewed even though more than six months have elapsed since the time of the first interview.

You may designate more than one candidate for the Seventy-second Session since there is a possibility that your first candidate may not be accepted or that two or more representatives will be accepted from your office. Unless you advise to the contrary, any candidate investigated as an alternate to the Seventy-first Session who is not invited to attend that Session, will be considered as the first choice of your office for the Seventy-second Session, provided of course his investigation was completely favorable. In your letter listing your candidates, you must specifically set forth the results of the reviews of your field office indices concerning the applicants and their law enforcement agencies.

The Bureau is desirous of accepting at the National Academy only those candidates who are outstanding both as to personal appearance and ability. The weight standards for National Academy applicants are the same as for our own personnel. Applicants must be within the desirable weight limits as set forth on form FD-300. If you have previously submitted a physical examination on any candidate which will be more than six months old as of April 1, 1963, a current physical examination form must be executed with the accompanying FD-300.

The fingerprints of National Academy applicants are to be submitted at the time the results of the formal interview are forwarded to the Bureau. You should make a notation on the fingerprint

card that the fingerprints are those of a National Academy applicant. The card should be forwarded to the Bureau, attention: Training Division.

I shall expect each Special Agent in Charge to give very close personal attention to the selection and recommendation of candidates for attendance at the National Academy.

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(B) *NAME AND TOWN OF RESIDENCE DELETED*

VIRGINIA -- The captioned individual is a prolific letter writer who has written to numerous prominent persons in various parts of the United States concerning her alleged fear that the present administration is conspiring to permit communist domination of the United States. She has indicated that some FBI Officials have participated in the conspiracy.

Efforts to locate *NAME AND TOWN OF RESIDENCE DELETED*

Virginia, to admonish her regarding these allegations have been unsuccessful to date and she is apparently constantly traveling because of her fear that her life is in danger due to her opposition to communism. One individual interviewed concerning her stated it is his impression she needs treatment for a mental disturbance. The Chief of Police in her area said she is considered to be a local "character" and mentally unstable, although to his knowledge she has never been in an institution.

In the event this person contacts your office, she should be admonished concerning her allegations regarding FBI personnel and, in the event her correspondence is referred to you by private individuals, you should furnish the Bureau and Richmond with copies of this material.

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(C) *DAILY REPORTS - NUMBER THREE REGISTERS - ADMINISTRATIVE - GENERAL* -- SAC Letter Number 62-19 dated March 27, 1962, instructed all investigative personnel, with certain exceptions, to submit Daily Reports on FD-28. The Special Agent in Charge, the Assistant Special Agent in Charge, and appropriate field supervisors were instructed to make adequate spot checks to insure against irregularities, improper entries, alterations, and any apparent inequitable overtime. It has come to the Bureau's attention these checks are not including comparisons with the Auto Record (FD-73) and the FM Radio Station Log (FD-283).

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Effective immediately, the Special Agent in Charge, the Assistant Special Agent in Charge, and appropriate field supervisors are instructed to insure these spot checks include comparisons of Daily Reports and Number 3 (Locator) Cards with the Auto Record and the Radio Log together with sufficient checks against investigative reports.

Previous Bureau instructions to destroy FM Radio Station Logs at the end of each month are hereby canceled. These Logs are to be retained by each field office from inspection to inspection and are to be destroyed only on instructions of the Inspector of each regularly scheduled inspection. Manual changes are forthcoming.

Furthermore, you are reminded that Daily Reports must be executed with meticulous accuracy insofar as concerns the Agent's accounting for his time. As a general rule, it should be possible for these to be executed currently as the Agent pursues his daily work. Exceptions to this might be warranted where the Agent must give precedence to a fast-moving case. In any event, however, the Bureau insists that whenever these reports are executed they must be completely reconcilable and consistent with all other records against which they might be checked. The Agent, as well as appropriate supervisory personnel, will be held accountable for any inaccuracies or irregularities.

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-13.

(D) PHOTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT - SUPPLIES -- Photographic paper known as Kodak Polycontrast type "F" will be made available on a limited basis for photographic enlargement work in the field. If you feel this paper could be used to the Bureau's advantage in your division, submit a specific request for the attention of the Administrative Division setting forth justification for its use and include information as to the technical knowledge of the employee or employees who will perform the work.

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-13

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(E) SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT - 1948 - DELINQUENT CITIZENS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES -- On February 18, 1963, the United States Supreme Court considered jointly Kennedy vs. Mendoza-Martinez and Rusk vs. Cort and handed down a written decision (5-4) declaring as unconstitutional those sections of the Nationality Act of 1940 and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 providing for the expatriation of citizens who leave or remain outside the United States to avoid military service in time of war or national emergency.

Francisco Mendoza-Martinez was born in California of Mexican extraction. In 1942 he fled to Mexico, a country that also considered him a national. He returned in 1946 and in 1947 he was convicted, sentenced and served one year and one day for violation of the Selective Service Act of 1940. Subsequently the U. S. Government determined his flight to Mexico to avoid military service in time of war effected his expatriation as of the date in 1944 that Section 401 (j) was added to the Nationality Act of 1940 (Public Law 431, 78th Congress) enacted as Section 801 (j), Title 8, U. S. Code. As a result of a deportation hearing he was ordered deported on September 11, 1953. A series of appeals culminated in the Supreme Court decision of February 18, 1963, which affirmed the ruling of U. S. District Court, Southern District of California, Northern Division; that Section 401 (j) was unconstitutional.

Joseph Henry Cort, a medical doctor, born December 27, 1927, at Boston, Massachusetts, registered for Selective Service May 25, 1951, and departed for England in June, 1951. He applied for political asylum in England claiming he faced loss of citizenship and prison if he returned to the United States. Political asylum in England denied, he then accepted asylum from Czechoslovakia where he continues to reside. Cort was indicted by Federal Grand Jury on December 17, 1954, for failure to report for induction in violation of Title 50 (App), 462 and 12 (a). Warrant issued December 18, 1954, is still outstanding. In February, 1960, State Department affirmed a previous administrative decision that Cort expatriated himself under provisions of Section 349 (a) (10), Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (Public Law 414, 82nd Congress), enacted as Section 1481 (a) (10), Title 8, U. S. Code. A series of appeals made by Cort culminated in the Supreme Court decision February 18, 1963, which affirmed the ruling of the U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia that this section is unconstitutional.

The Department is being requested to advise what effect the Supreme Court decision will have on the investigation and prosecution of Selective Service violations. Pending receipt of

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this advice, in future cases, where it is determined that a citizen has left the United States to avoid compliance with the Selective Service Act of 1948, the above rulings should be brought to the attention of the appropriate United States Attorney for his consideration in rendering a prosecutive opinion. Any problems that may arise should be brought to the attention of the Bureau.

(Security Letters on attached pages)

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(F) SECURITY INFORMANTS - DESTRUCTION OF CHANNELIZING MEMORANDA --  
If applicable in your office, henceforth copies of informant's reports designated for the 100 classification case files of informants may be purged therefrom under the following conditions: on a yearly basis after the reports are a year old; thus, reports in file for 1961 or prior thereto are eligible for destruction as of January 1, 1963, those of 1962 will be eligible for destruction as of January 1, 1964; and, a memorandum must be prepared and placed in the file listing each item destroyed and the location of the original information.

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-13.

(G) SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION CHARACTERIZATION - "LABOR TODAY" --  
Set forth below is a thumbnail sketch on "Labor Today" which can be used by the various field offices.

In January, 1962, a source advised that on January 13, 1962, *NAME DELETED* whom the source described as *POSITION IN CPUSA DELETED* Communist Party, USA, remarked that the Party-supported trade-union publication would be issued in the near future and would appear under the name "Labor Today."

On January 5, 1962, records in the Assumed Name Section of the County Clerk's Office, Wayne County, Detroit, Michigan, indicated that Certificate Number 145344, issued for conducting business under an assumed name, was issued to "Labor Today" (a bi-monthly publication) having a business address at 12065 Wyoming, Detroit 4, Michigan. A certificate was filed January 2, 1962, and the names of the persons listed as owning, conducting and transacting the business were:

*NAME DELETED*  
*ADDRESS* "  
Detroit, Michigan

*NAME DELETED*  
*ADDRESS* "  
Detroit, Michigan

A second source advised on December 15, 1961, that Charles Walters was then a member of the Michigan District Communist Party (MDCP) State Committee; this source advised on September 18, 1959, that *NAME DELETED* was then a member of the MDCP State Committee.

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A third source advised on September 21, 1961, that as of September 17, 1961, NAME DELETED was a member of the North-West Section Club of the MDCP.

The Founding Statement contained in the first issue of "Labor Today" (Spring, 1962) indicated that two additional issues would be forthcoming in 1962 and beginning in 1963 "Labor Today" would appear regularly as a "bi-monthly journal."

The masthead of "Labor Today" describes the publication as "An Independent Journal of Discussion." Its managing editor is NAME DELETED and business and editorial offices are located at 12065 Wyoming, Suite 5, Detroit 4, Michigan.

First Source SOURCE'S IDENTITY DELETED

Second Source is " "

Third Source " "

All sources utilized in the preparation of the characterization given above should be described as having furnished reliable information in the past. Careful consideration has been given to each source concealed and the source has been concealed only where necessary.

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-13

(H) SABOTAGE MATTERS - REQUESTS FOR PROSECUTIVE OPINIONS -- The Internal Security Division of the Department advised by letter dated March 4, 1963, "We believe that in the future it would be desirable to have sabotage matters handled in conformity with related internal security matters and, accordingly, we would appreciate your referring to this Division all future requests for opinions in sabotage cases as to whether the facts reflect a violation of the law or for a determination as to whether additional investigation is warranted."

In the future, sabotage cases are not to be discussed with or presented to United States Attorneys. All questions of law and jurisdiction and requests for prosecutive opinions are to be submitted to the Bureau for presentation to the Department. Appropriate Manual changes are being issued.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

3/12/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-13

Director

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-14

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

March 19, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

(A) FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY - 1964 SESSIONS -- The Seventy-third Session of the FBI National Academy will be held March 16 to June 3, 1964. The Seventy-fourth Session will be held August 10 to October 28, 1964. You will be advised at a later date when nominations for these Sessions should be submitted.

(B) - APPLICATION FOR PARDON AFTER COMPLETION OF SENTENCE INVESTIGATIONS (APACS) - IDENTIFICATION RECORDS - REPORT WRITING -- Effective immediately, it will no longer be necessary in APACS cases for the field office receiving a copy of the applicant's Identification Record to copy same into an investigative report. The Bureau will furnish two copies of the applicant's Identification Record with the investigative reports to the Pardon Attorney's Office when the investigation has been completed. One copy of the Identification Record will continue to be furnished to the field office conducting the initial interview with the applicant upon receipt of the flash notice at the Bureau. The Identification Record should be used for lead purposes.

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-14

(C) BUREAU APPLICANTS - MILITARY SERVICE RECORD CHECKS - REPORT WRITING -- For Veterans Preference Act purposes a veteran is an individual with active military duty between December 7, 1941, and July 1, 1955, inclusive; or one with service after the latter date who incurred a service-connected disability; or one who served in a campaign or expedition for which a service medal was authorized.

Some months ago a new medal was created, the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal, covering service in Lebanon (July 1 to November 1, 1958); Vietnam (July 1, 1958, to date to be announced); Quemoy and Matsu Islands (August 23, 1958, to date to be announced); Taiwan Straits (August 23, 1958, to January 1, 1959); Congo (July 14, 1960, to date to be announced); Laos (April 19, 1961, to date to be announced); and Berlin (August 14, 1961, to date to be announced). Also, the period for which the China Service Medal (Extended) is awarded was fixed at September 2, 1945, to April 1, 1957. The Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal may be awarded to members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard. The China Service Medal (Extended) may be awarded to members of the Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard.

The honorable discharge (DD 214) of an individual customarily lists any medals to which he may be entitled, and the Bureau is now requiring all appointees who have had military service to submit a copy of this form. However, it is possible for an individual to have had service qualifying him for the Armed Forces

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Expeditionary Medal or China Service Medal (Extended) and to have been discharged before the medal was created. His discharge, therefore, would not reflect his entitlement to the medal. To help resolve this problem, every report of a military service record check in a Bureau applicant case must henceforth contain information as to the individual's foreign duty, showing dates and places. This requirement will apply only to those whose military service was after July 1, 1955. The requirement will remain in effect until you are advised of its discontinuance.

Information showing service-connected disability or the possibility thereof should continue to be reported in the service record check report.

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-14

(D) INVESTIGATIVE JURISDICTION - CRIMINAL MATTERS -- The investigative jurisdiction of the FBI has been, for the most part, clearly defined by statute, Department directive or agreements with other Federal agencies. In order to properly discharge our investigative obligations, it is necessary that all investigative personnel remain constantly aware of the scope of our jurisdiction, being alert to recognize violations of law in which we have an investigative interest and where appropriate, initiating prompt, vigorous and aggressive investigative action.

Attempts have repeatedly been made by various agencies to modify our agreements and circumvent our basic jurisdiction to the extent that our effectiveness would be lessened. Such efforts should be opposed without compromise. Each employee must be alert to this situation so that corrective measures may be immediately initiated should such a condition arise.

You must insure that matters within our jurisdiction are aggressively and thoroughly investigated so that our presentations to the United States Attorneys and their assistants are factual, concise and complete.

It is imperative that all investigative personnel be again reminded the Bureau's record of leadership in the field

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-14

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of law enforcement can only be maintained by constant vigilance to insure matters within our jurisdiction are promptly referred by other agencies to us and cases investigated by the FBI are not referred for prosecution to local authorities for specious reasons.

Each instance wherein an attempt is made to encroach upon our investigative jurisdiction should be brought immediately to the Bureau's attention along with your comments as to action taken.

(Security Letter on attached page)

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-14

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(E) SECURITY MATTERS - LETTERHEAD MEMORANDA - APPENDIX -  
RELIABILITY OF SOURCES USED -- The Bureau has recently noted  
that many letterhead memoranda (LHM) which are submitted and  
include an Appendix, but not an informant evaluation memorandum,  
fail to account for the reliability of the sources used in the  
Appendix. All Agents engaged in handling matters of this type  
should be reminded of the necessity for accounting for the  
reliability of all sources used in LHM's just as they must be  
accounted for when used in investigative reports. A suggested  
way of complying, when an informant reliability memorandum does  
not accompany an LHM, is to include a statement in the main  
body of the LHM concerning the sources used in the Appendix,  
such as "All sources not identified in the Appendix have furnished  
reliable information in the past," provided, of course, this is  
applicable.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

3/19/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-14

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PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 63-E  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

March 27, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

RE: SECURITY INFORMANTS AND SOURCES -  
INCOME TAXES

A system has been worked out with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) which will enable informants and sources to pay their Federal income tax on monies received from the Bureau without jeopardizing their security. This plan will go into effect immediately in the San Francisco and Philadelphia Offices for a trial period of one year. Payments for services to certain security informants and sources will be subject to a twenty per cent withholding tax. No tax is to be withheld from payments made (1) to other than security informants and sources, (2) for reimbursement of expenses, (3) under the authority of the SAC or (4) to informants who have been able to report Bureau income on their Federal tax returns without jeopardizing their security or without challenge from IRS. In the latter instance, the Bureau must be advised as to the identity of each informant and the method used by him to report his Bureau income.

Proper records must be maintained of amounts withheld and such amounts must be placed in a special checking account. At the end of the tax year, the tax liability will be determined on money paid by the Bureau to those informants from whom tax has been withheld. Necessary adjustments will be worked out with the informants and the net amount withheld forwarded to the Bureau. This money will be turned over to a special representative of IRS without disclosure as to identities of informants, except for coded numbers. These numbers can later be used for identification purposes in the event it becomes necessary to substantiate income tax payments.

Other offices may now utilize the withholding system where it would be helpful; however, where it is not used, continue to instruct all informants to pay their taxes on income received from the Bureau by such method as may be proper and feasible.

Detailed instructions and exhibits are enclosed concerning the procedure to be followed in the accounting and control of money withheld.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (11)

March 27, 1963

WITHHOLDING OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX  
FROM PAYMENTS TO INFORMANTS AND SOURCES

INSTRUCTIONS AND PROCEDURES

Introduction:

A system has been worked out with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) which will enable informants and sources to pay their Federal income tax on monies received from the Bureau without jeopardizing their security. This will require the withholding of twenty per cent of any payments being made to such individuals for services rendered. Money so withheld will be immediately deposited to a special checking account, to be used for this purpose only, set up in the name of the SAC and ASAC. This account should, if possible, be in a different bank than that in which the regular office Confidential Fund (blue slip) or Double Agent (white slip) accounts are maintained. Any bank charges incidental to this special checking account are to be paid from the regular office Confidential Fund. Attached to these instructions are 10 Exhibits which are to be used as guides in setting up records for the maintenance and operations of the withholding accounts. Hereafter, any reference to informants refers to both informants and sources.

This plan will apply only to those informants or groups of informants authorized by the Bureau.

Accounting Instructions:

When a payment is to be made to an informant subject to this plan, the amount to be withheld for income tax purposes will be twenty per cent of the total for services. A check will be drawn on the regular office Confidential Fund to cover the total amount of the authorized payment. This check will be cashed and the amount for taxes immediately deposited in the special checking account set up for this purpose. A duplicate deposit slip is to be obtained for use in posting to the ledger accounts. Payment to the informant will then follow and the receipt to be executed by the informant for such payment should show not only the amount received as reimbursement for expenses and the authorized payment for services, but also the amount withheld for

Enclosures (10)

Federal income tax purposes (Exhibit 1). A Record of Income Tax Transactions (Exhibits 2 and 3) will be maintained on a calendar-year basis to record the informant's name, symbol number, period covered, and the amounts incidental to such transactions. Beginning with the first payment to an informant involving tax withholding, a new individual ledger sheet (Exhibits 4 and 5) must be set up. The amount of money withheld for income tax purposes should also be listed on the Blue Slip, Form FD 37, prepared with respect to the payment (Exhibit 6).

At the end of each month, entries in the Record of Income Tax Transactions and the individual informant's ledgers will be totaled and reconciled. A monthly report (Exhibit 7) is to be mailed to the Bureau in the same manner as the reports for the regular office Confidential Fund, no later than the 20th of the following month. All payments involving the tax account must be vouchered prior to the submission of this report.

In the event an informant subject to this plan is transferred to another field division, all records must be forwarded to the new field division, together with a check for the amount of income tax withheld.

#### Determining Informant's Tax Obligation:

At the end of the tax year, the contacting Agent will obtain from the informant his completed Federal income tax return based on his regular income, exclusive of money paid to him by the Bureau. The contacting Agent will not question the accuracy of the return except to point out obvious errors. The contacting Agent will furnish the informant's tax return to a qualified Special Agent Accountant who will prepare a separate return to include Bureau income. The accountant will compute the tax owed by informant on the combined earnings. The difference between the tax computed by the informant and that computed by the accountant will represent the amount of tax to be paid by the informant on money received from the Bureau. The accountant who prepared the return will sign on the line "Signature of Preparer Other Than the Taxpayer." The contacting Agent will have the informant sign the return prepared by the accountant as a certification that the informant has reviewed it and found it correct in every respect. The informant will file his original tax return with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The return prepared by the accountant, together with a Photostat of the informant's original return, will be maintained in the informant's subfile.



If the amount withheld from payments to the informant during the year exceeds the amount of tax for his Bureau income, the refund due the informant will be withdrawn from the special checking account and paid to him at the time he signs the return prepared by the accountant. A receipt (Exhibit 8) must be obtained from him. If the amount withheld during the year is not sufficient to cover the tax on Bureau income, the difference should be collected from the informant and a statement (Exhibit 9) obtained from him. Entries for any adjustments, either refunds or additional payments, must be made in both the informant's ledger (Exhibits 4 and 5) and the Record of Income Tax Transactions (Exhibit 2) for the calendar year involved.

#### Instructions to Informants:

The contacting Agent must fully explain the withholding procedure to any informant concerned. With regard to the informant's original tax return, the informant should clearly understand that (1) neither the contacting Agent nor the Special Agent Accountant is in any way certifying to its accuracy, (2) if his original tax return is questioned by IRS, it will be up to him to settle the matter with IRS, and he cannot plead that it has been examined and approved by an Agent of the FBI, since such statement is false and the informant would be uncovered.

#### Transmittal of Tax to Bureau:

After all adjustments have been made in the income tax withholding on payments to informants, a report of Federal Income Tax Deductions (Exhibit 10) will be prepared. The net amount of the tax indicated on the Record of Income Tax Transactions (Exhibit 2) will be withdrawn from the special checking account by means of a check made payable to the Chief Clerk, FBI. This report and check will be forwarded to the Bureau, together with receipts for refunds that have been made and statements of additional tax collected. The necessary entries showing the transmittal of the tax funds to the Bureau should be made in the Record of Income Tax Transactions (Exhibit 2). When received at the Bureau, the tax money will be turned over to a special representative of IRS with the amounts for each informant identified by a coded number; thus, the informant's connection with the FBI will be protected. However, the coded number can be used for identification purposes in the event it becomes necessary to substantiate the informant's income tax payment.



PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER NO. 63-F  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

April 29, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7

One set of AFSAM 7 key lists for months of June, July, and August, 1963, being forwarded separately to all divisions except Washington Field which will receive none; three copies being furnished Bureau's Emergency Relocation Site; and three copies Seat of Government Code Room.

Acknowledge receipt of key lists promptly by routing slip, indicating serial numbers which appear thereon; return in a sealed envelope to the Bureau, attention FBI Annex, the address label on individual tamperproofed envelope containing keys even though torn while opening package; and destroy, by burning, each monthly sheet thirty days after last effective date thereof, advising Bureau promptly by routing slip, attention FBI Annex, this has been done.

It is essential address label mentioned above be returned in order to control security of shipment.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 63-G  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

May 3, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7

Amendment No. 2 to KAM-1A/TSEC, Repair and Maintenance Instructions for TSEC/KL-7 (Bureau's AFSAM 7 cipher equipment), being disseminated as follows: one to each domestic and foreign office except Washington Field; one to Seat of Government Code Room; and seven to Bureau's Relocation Site.

Comply with Letter of Promulgation which appears on front cover. Page 3, entitled List of Effective Pages, through page 237 shall be inserted as in the case of other manuals and superseded pages removed. Revisions listed as Amendments and Instructions, pages III and IV, should then be handled. Check Manual for completeness and accuracy and enter appropriate information on Record of Amendments included therein.


Execute all copies of Flyleaf Receipts. One copy requires signature of SAC in two places. Employee who made changes will sign all copies, each twice. That bearing the SAC's signature should be placed in Manual.

The address label of the individual envelope containing Amendment No. 2, two Flyleaf Receipts and all residue including Letter of Promulgation, Amendments and Instructions, superseded pages and back cover of this Amendment must be returned immediately to Bureau, attention FBI Annex.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-27

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

June 11, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY'S TRIP TO ITALY, GERMANY AND IRELAND - JUNE, 1963 -- Commencing on or about June 20, 1963, President Kennedy will make an official visit to Germany, preceded by a short visit to Italy and followed by a visit to Ireland. Entire trip will last about one week, but the exact dates have not been announced.

In connection with this trip all offices should be alert for any data concerning possible threats to personal safety of the President or members of his group. You should also be alert for information concerning anti-American demonstrations or any intelligence data of interest concerning this trip. Information regarding travel to Italy, Germany and Ireland of security suspects or of potentially dangerous individuals up to the time the President's visit is terminated should be immediately furnished to the Bureau.

Sources and informants in a position to acquire the above-mentioned data should be alerted to the necessity for prompt reporting and the Bureau should be immediately advised if any such data is received.

Communications in this matter should be submitted under the above caption.

6/11/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-27

(B) INTERVIEWS -- It has been brought to our attention that interview rooms in some automobile agencies have been wired so that conversations carried on within them may be overheard. It has also been the practice in some instances to equip demonstrator models of automobiles with short-range transmitters so that conversations of potential customers may be overheard.

This information is being brought to your attention so that our Special Agents might be aware of the possibility of these practices and exercise proper caution in the event it becomes necessary to contact the personnel of automobile agencies in any official capacity.

(C) PERSONNEL MATTERS - LEAVE - TRAVEL TIME -- Effective immediately, an employee who drives his personally owned automobile in effecting travel on official transfer will be granted travel time, without charge to leave, equal to the actual driving time, provided he averages a minimum of 300 miles per day for the direct route distance. The travel time starts when he departs on transfer. To illustrate this policy, the following examples are furnished:

An employee departed Washington, D. C., on a Saturday at 8 a.m., driving his personally owned automobile en route to New Orleans, Louisiana, on official transfer, and arrived at 7 p.m. the following Monday. Since he traveled 1,103 miles and his daily average was within the 300-mile requirement, no annual leave would be charged. However, if during the travel period the employee decided to stop over in Knoxville, Tennessee, for two days and therefore did not report for work in New Orleans until Thursday morning, annual leave would be charged for two days (Tuesday and Wednesday).

If the employee performs indirect travel in effecting a transfer, travel time allowable will be determined by applying the 300-mile-a-day average over the direct route distance.

Excess time involving workdays will be a charge against annual leave. As an example of this situation, an employee who departed Washington, D. C., on a Saturday for New Orleans, traveled via Miami, Florida, and reported for duty in New Orleans at the beginning of the workday the following Friday. He would only be entitled to travel time through Monday. Therefore, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday would be charged to annual leave.

6/11/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-27

- 2 -

(D) VIOLATIONS OF THE CRIME ABOARD AIRCRAFT STATUTE -- Although violations of the Crime Aboard Aircraft Statute, Title 49, Section 1472, U. S. Code, are criminal violations specifically assigned to the FBI, there have been indications recently that some airlines are delaying referrals of these violations to the FBI. This has seriously hampered our investigative effectiveness by preventing the immediate interviews of crew members and passengers prior to dispersal, which is of vital importance, particularly when the violation occurs in the air.

To remedy this situation, within thirty days each office is to personally contact the responsible officer of every air carrier and major terminal in its division to re-emphasize the scope of this statute, Bureau jurisdiction and the necessity of utilizing procedures which will insure all violations are reported directly and immediately to the appropriate field office. The Bureau is to be advised upon completion of these contacts.

6/11/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-27

(E) VENUE OVER OFFENSES NOT COMMITTED IN ANY DISTRICT, (TITLE 18, SECTION 3238, UNITED STATES CODE) CRIMES WITHIN THE MARITIME AND TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES -- On May 23, 1963, Public Law 88-27 was passed amending Title 18, Section 3238, which section provides for venue over offenses not committed within any State or district, by providing the trial of all offenses begun or committed upon the high seas, or elsewhere out of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district, shall be in the district in which the offender, or any one of two or more joint offenders, is arrested or is first brought; but if such offender or offenders are not so arrested or brought into any district, an indictment or information may be filed in the district of the last known residence of the offender or of any one of two or more joint offenders, or if no such residence is known the indictment or information may be filed in the District of Columbia.

It is now possible to prosecute joint offenders who have violated Federal Law upon the high seas or elsewhere out of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district, in any district in which either of them is arrested or first brought. Also it is possible to secure an indictment or file an information against any of such joint offenders without waiting for him to be arrested or brought into a judicial district which would suspend the running of any applicable statute of limitations.

Appropriate manual changes are being prepared.

(Security Letter on attached page)

6/11/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-27

- 3 -

(F) INVESTIGATIONS OF "RIGHTIST OR EXTREMIST" GROUPS -- "Rightist or extremist" groups operating in the anticommunist field are being formed practically on a daily basis. I wish to re-emphasize the necessity for the field to be alert to, and advise the Bureau concerning, the formation and identities of such groups. The field should also be alert to the activities of such groups which come within the purview of Executive Order 10450 or are in violation of Federal statutes over which the Bureau has investigative jurisdiction. Investigations, where warranted, should be initiated and handled pursuant to Bureau policy relating to the specific substantive violation. You are reminded that anticommunism should not militate against checking on a group if it is engaged in unlawful activities in violation of Federal statutes over which the Bureau has investigative jurisdiction.

Investigations of groups in this field whose activities are not in violation of any statutes over which the Bureau has jurisdiction are not to be conducted without specific Bureau authority. A request for authority to investigate such a group should include the basis for your recommendations regarding investigation.

The above instructions should be called to the attention of all investigative personnel of your office.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

6/11/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-27

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-26

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

May 28, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) ECONOMY MATTERS - FISCAL YEAR 1964 - TELEPHONES -- Effective July 1, 1963, all calls from the Bureau Headquarters and Washington Field Office to field offices will be prepaid and sent by direct distance dialing. This action will enable the Bureau to reduce its cost here at the Seat of Government and to speed up the placing of such calls. This action will mean, of course, that the cost of such calls will not appear on your telephone bills and the costs will no longer be included in the figures you will report in the monthly economy reports for the cost of communications services. The Bureau will, however, in its accounting records charge the appropriate cost to the field divisions involved. This change in procedures will be taken into consideration when new base figures are furnished all field divisions for use during fiscal year 1964.



(B) CRIMINAL INFORMANTS SECURITY OF -- Security of informants must receive primary consideration both in the handling of the informants and the care given any correspondence relating thereto. By SAC letter number 62-27 dated May 8, 1962, you were reminded concerning possible attempts by the hoodlum element to conduct surveillances of Bureau Agents. Agents handling informants must continue to be constantly alert to this possibility. Avoid any patterns or habits which could unwittingly lead to detection by the hoodlum element.

Constant care must be exercised to avoid any disclosure to anyone which might permit identification of informants or even cast suspicion on them. Never relax your vigilance in protecting identities of informants. In this connection be certain that only authorized, experienced employees handle correspondence and memoranda regarding informants, and maintain criminal informant index under your personal supervision or that of Assistant Special Agent in Charge or criminal supervisor. (See Volume IV, Section 108 G 6 and 7, and 108 I 8, Manual of Instructions.)

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

5/28/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-26

- 2 -



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

June 25, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) PERFORMANCE RATINGS - 90-DAY WARNING OF UNSATISFACTORY ANNUAL RATINGS -- Annual performance ratings on noninvestigative personnel are due on September 30, 1963. Performance of such personnel should be appraised at this time to insure that 90-day written warnings (in form of special administrative performance ratings) are given to all those employees whose performances are considered to be unsatisfactory and to whom it is contemplated Unsatisfactory official annual performance ratings will be given. Insure that provisions of Section 5, Part I, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations are strictly adhered to.

6/25/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-30

(B) OFFICE SPACE - REPORT OF SPACE REQUIREMENTS TO GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION FOR FISCAL YEAR 1965 -- Reference is made to SAC Letter 59-45 dated July 21, 1959. Information regarding your space needs as set forth in referenced SAC Letter should be furnished to the Bureau, attention Administrative Division, no later than July 26, 1963.

Bureau of the Budget Bulletin Number 62-4 requires that all agencies justify and secure initial funding for general office space. Requests have been made by some offices for authority to contact the General Services Administration (GSA) for the purpose of securing space on a nonreimbursable basis. In line with the above Bureau of the Budget Bulletin, GSA will not honor such requests and the Bureau must reimburse GSA for the initial cost of such space if it is to be secured. Accordingly, the Bureau will not be able to secure new or additional space unless the cost can be defrayed through funds secured for this purpose in our budget. In view of the foregoing this survey must be detailed, accurate and comprehensive enough to insure that your future space needs are anticipated and the appropriate funding requested. Obviously, all requests for new or additional space must be accompanied by complete justification. You are also reminded that prior Bureau authority is necessary to contact GSA regarding the assignment of new or additional space in your division.

(C) RESEARCH ON ORGANIZED CRIME FOR FORD FOUNDATION -- It has recently come to the Bureau's attention that the Ford Foundation is sponsoring at least two research projects concerning organized crime. One of these is being directed by *NAME AND UNIVERSITY AFFILIATIONS AND POSITIONS DELETED*

*NAME DELETED* University. *NAME DELETED* contacted Bureau Headquarters concerning research on this topic in June, 1962, and was referred to statements which I have made as well as Uniform Crime Reports. He has an article entitled "An Overview of Organized Crime: Mores versus Morality" in the May, 1963, issue of "The Annals" of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. In this article he advocates legalizing various vices on which organized crime prospers so that law enforcement can concentrate more on combating organized crime in the labor or management fields. He proposes legalized gambling, prostitution, homosexual relations between consenting adults in private, the use of drugs under medical care and the reduction of liquor taxes.

In an interview on June 12, 1963, with *CITY DELETED* Chief of Police *NAMES DELETED* indicated his current research was on the extent of organized crime and the possible benefits of a national crime commission. He is known to have talked also to Chief of Police *NAME AND CITY DELETED*

Another project being financed by the Ford Foundation will be under the supervision of *NAME DELETED* former Managing Editor of "The Courier-Journal" of Louisville, Kentucky, who is anti-FBI. Research on this project will be conducted primarily by *NAME DELETED* a reporter for "The Courier-Journal" who has been friendly toward the Bureau and has done extensive writing for newspapers on organized crime.

All offices should be alert to the presence of these individuals or others identified as working with them, and pertinent information regarding their activities should be promptly furnished to the Bureau and interested offices. Should these individuals contact your office seeking assistance, they should be tactfully referred to Bureau Headquarters. Any inquiry concerning these research projects should be answered with "No comment," and the matter referred to Bureau Headquarters.

6/25/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-30

- 2 -

(D) INFORMANTS - GENERAL -- Henceforth, in executing Form FD-209, reflecting each contact with an informant, unless there has been a change in the type of information the informant is in a position to furnish, the word "Same" may be placed in the "Coverage" block. To obviate the necessity of reviewing previous FD-209s to ascertain this data, Forms FD-237 and FD-238, the respective Criminal and Security Informant Review Sheets, are being revised to include a "Coverage" block to facilitate the location of the necessary information. However, in estimating the capability of the informant, the "Rating" block on Form FD-209 should show the specific evaluation each time the form is executed, although abbreviations such as "G" for "Good" and "VG" for "Very Good" and so forth may be used.

6/25/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-30

- 3 -

(E) NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY ACT MATTERS -- The Fraud Section, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, in an attempt to induce more vigorous action by U. S. Attorneys as regards prosecution of violations of the National Bankruptcy Act (NBA) is closely reviewing all Bureau NBA reports with particular attention being given to those wherein the U. S. Attorney declines prosecution. In connection therewith the Department has adopted a form letter addressed to the U. S. Attorney and signed by Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, which states in part:

"It is our opinion that the declination as set forth in the said FBI report does not conform to the Bankruptcy Section of the United States Attorneys' Manual, Title II, page 61. This section requires that in declining prosecution in bankruptcy matters that cogent and reasonably detailed reasons for such declination together with specific reference to the facts of the case shall be reported to the Attorney General (1) by report to the FBI or (2) by letter addressed to the Criminal Division, Department of Justice."

In keeping with the foregoing, it is imperative that in NBA cases wherein the U. S. Attorney declines prosecution that his reasons for so doing are set forth in sufficient detail to permit adequate evaluation thereof by the Department.

6/25/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-30

(F) INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF GAMBLING DEVICES - DEPARTMENTAL OPINION CONCERNING GAMBLING WHEELS -- Based on an inquiry from the field as to whether gambling wheels (a device sometimes known as a wheel of fortune) are gambling devices falling within the purview of the Interstate Transportation of Gambling Devices Statute, the Department has furnished an opinion that such gambling wheels do fall within the purview of the 1962 amendments to this statute.

This type of gambling wheel contains a series of numbers, which numbers correspond to a board on which a sum of money is placed on a particular number by the participant or customer. After the wheel is spun and stops on a particular number, the corresponding number on the board determines the winner. The winner, in turn, receives money or merchandise.

6/25/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-30

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The Department advises the statute covers any mechanical device which is designed and manufactured for use in connection with gambling. Further, since the device is mechanical in nature it is apparently designed primarily for use in connection with gambling, and that by its operation a person who has paid the requisite consideration may become entitled to receive, as a result of the application of an element of chance, money or property.

In view of the Department's opinion, when complaints are received concerning gambling wheels, develop the facts and promptly contact the U. S. Attorney for his prosecutive opinion. At the same time promptly advise the Bureau of such investigations.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

6/25/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-30

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-35

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

July 19, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) DAILY REPORTS - TIME SPENT IN THE OFFICE - TIME SPENT ON DEVELOPING POTENTIAL CRIMINAL INFORMANTS - TIME SPENT ON DEVELOPING POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS -- Henceforth, daily reports will no longer be submitted by investigative personnel, special employees, radio personnel having special employee ratings, and clerks assigned to monitoring technical surveillances, assigned to headquarters city with the exception of those working outside of the divisional headquarters in excess of 24 hours, including absence in another division for the purpose of testifying. They will, of course, continue to be submitted by those personnel enumerated above who are assigned to resident agencies. Consequently, the Number Three (Locator Card) Register will be used by those investigative personnel now exempted from the submission of daily reports to indicate, in addition to those items presently entered thereon, their times of initial arrival and final departure and their daily tabulations of voluntary overtime and time in the office. Therefore, from now on, the Number Three Registers will be retained for a period of two years after which they will be destroyed on a monthly or other staggered basis if preferred.

In connection with the tabulation of time spent in the office, in addition to those activities presently excluded, it will no longer be necessary to include time spent therein on key interviews of subjects and witnesses, regularly scheduled conferences, and the review of accountancy-type books and records.

Further, it will no longer be necessary for agents to compute each day the total time spent on the development of potential criminal informants or potential security informants.

The elimination of these requirements in no way mitigates the necessity to insure that time in the office is kept at an absolute minimum and that agents are held accountable for any unjustifiable time so spent. With respect to the development of potential informants, both criminal and security, you are reminded that they are vital to success in the discharge of our investigative responsibilities and you must continue to stress the importance of these programs.

Appropriate manual changes incorporating the foregoing information are being prepared for issuance in the near future.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



**PERSONAL**  
**NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 63-H**  
**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE**  
**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

July 26, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

**RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7**

One set of AFSAM 7 key lists for months of September, October, and November, 1963, being forwarded separately to all domestic and foreign offices except Washington Field which will receive none; six copies being furnished Bureau's Emergency Relocation Site; and six copies Seat of Government Code Room.

Domestic offices should acknowledge receipt promptly by routing slip and foreign offices by deferred cable, indicating serial numbers which appear thereon; return in a sealed envelope to the Bureau, attention FBI Annex, the address label on individual tamper-proofed envelope containing keys even though torn while opening package; and destroy, by burning, each monthly sheet thirty days after last effective date thereof, advising the Bureau promptly, attention FBI Annex, this has been done.

It is essential the address label mentioned above be returned in order to control security of shipment.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director





PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-39

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

August 6, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

RE: SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION CHARACTERIZATIONS  
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Set forth below are up-to-date thumbnail sketches of organizations and publications, each of which is of use to various field offices. No attempt is made to include all sketches which have been furnished to the Bureau for approval; only those sketches which are believed to have field-wide application are set forth. The sketches appearing in SAC Letters 58-41(F), 58-81(K), 59-8(O), 59-43(M), 60-34(F), 60-54(G), 61-37(E), 61-47(G), 61-58(C), 62-38(A), 62-58(D) and 63-13(G) should no longer be used.

In the event an office needs to characterize an organization not mentioned in this letter, listed in the various issues of the "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications" published by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, or designated by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450, a request should be made of the office of origin to furnish the required characterization. In describing a local affiliate of a national organization, in addition to characterizing the local affiliate, it will be necessary to set forth separately the characterization of the parent organization.

The evaluation and identities of the sources should be handled in accordance with instructions set forth in Part I, Section 49B 2m (1)(d), page 65, of the FBI Handbook.

For the purpose of evaluation all sources utilized in the preparation of the sketches listed below should be described as having furnished reliable information in the past. In each sketch utilized below, the field office submitting the sketch has advised that careful consideration was given to each source concealed.

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT SENT TO  
NATIONAL ARCHIVES (NFKARCA)  
DATE 8/9/94 *del*

AMERICAN COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION

The April, 1963, issue of "ACA News," official publication of the American Communications Association (ACA), shows that the ACA is located at 18 John Street, New York, New York.

The "Report of the International Executive Board ACA, CIO" at the 5th National Convention, Chicago, Illinois, April 8 through 13, 1940, discloses that the ACA had its origin at the 3rd National Convention of the American Radio Telegraphists Association (ARTA) held in New York City in August, 1937. At this convention it was agreed to change the name of the union from ARTA to ACA. This change was ratified by the union members on March 10, 1938.

The "Directory of National and International Labor Unions in the United States, 1955," published by the United States Department of Labor, lists on page 4, unions expelled from the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) on charges of communist domination. ACA was listed as having been expelled on June 15, 1950.

COMMITTEE TO SECURE JUSTICE FOR ND

"Following the execution of atomic spies ND in June, 1953, the 'Communist campaign assumed a different emphasis. Its major effort centered upon ND the ND codefendant. The National Committee to Secure Justice in the ND - a communist front which has been conducting the campaign in the United States - was reconstituted as the National ND ND Committee at a conference in Chicago in October, 1953, and then as the National Committee to Secure Justice for ND in the ND ..."

("Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications" dated December 1, 1961, issued by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, page 116.)

In September, 1954, the name "National Committee to Secure Justice for ND" appeared on literature issued by the Committee. In March, 1955, the current name, "Committee to Secure Justice for ND," first appeared on literature issued by the Committee.

8/6/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-39

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The Address Telephone Directory for the Borough of Manhattan, New York City, as published by the New York Telephone Company on April 16, 1963, lists the "Committee to Secure Justice for <sup>W.D.</sup> as being located at 940 Broadway, New York, New York.

EMMA LAZARUS FEDERATION OF JEWISH WOMEN'S CLUBS

"The Jewish Fraternalist" dated October, 1947, self-identified as the official publication of the Jewish People's Fraternal Order (JPFO) of the International Workers Order (IWO), on page 6, contained an article which disclosed that the Emma Lazarus Division (ELD) of the JPFO was to hold its first national convention in New York City on November 15 and 16, 1947, after having been first established at a National Women's Conference called three years previously by the JPFO.

The "Morning Freiheit" on January 25, 1951, contained a report of the National Convention of the ELD of the JPFO which took place in New York City on January 20 and 21, 1951. At this convention it was noted that the ELD changed its name to Emma Lazarus Federation of Jewish Women's Clubs (ELF) and adopted a new constitution.

On April 25, 1963, a source advised that the ELF is one of several mass organizations comprising the Jewish cultural progressive movement. <sup>W.D.</sup> ELF Executive Director, who is a member of the New York State Communist Party (CP) Board and Committee, is the leading force in the organization, whose leadership is largely made up of communists.

The source stated that the ELF claims to be for peace and interested in protecting the rights of the foreign born. It is against the Ben Gurion Government of Israel, bomb testing, anti-Semitism, Negro discrimination, and the rearmament of West Germany.

The source related that the ELF renders support to and receives support from the "Morning Freiheit" and other Jewish progressive organizations.

The source also stated that the ELF is recognized by the CP, USA, as an important progressive national organization of women.

8/6/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-39

The address of the national office of the ELF is 160 Fifth Avenue, Room 911, New York City.

The IWO and JPF0 have been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

The "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications," revised and published as of December 1, 1961, to supersede Guide published on January 2, 1957, prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities, United States House of Representatives, Washington, D. C., contains the following concerning the "Morning Freiheit":

- "1. A 'Communist Yiddish daily' (Attorney General Francis Biddle, Congressional Record, September 24, 1942, p. 7686).
- "2. 'The Freiheit has been one of the rankest organs of Communist propaganda in this country for almost a quarter of a century.' (Special Committee on Un-American Activities House Report 1311 on the CIO Political Action Committee, March 29, 1944, p. 75)."

Sources: SD  
SD

### FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE

The April 6, 1960, edition of "The New York Times" newspaper contained a full-page advertisement captioned "What Is Really Happening In Cuba," placed by the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC). This advertisement announced the formation of the FPCC in New York City and declared the FPCC intended to promulgate "the truth about revolutionary Cuba" to neutralize the distorted American press.

"The New York Times" edition of January 11, 1961, reported that at a hearing conducted before the United States Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on January 10, 1961, SD identified himself and SD as organizers of the FPCC. He also testified he and Taber obtained funds from the Cuban Government which were applied toward the cost of the fore-mentioned advertisement.

8/6/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-39

-4-

On May 16, 1963, a source advised that during the first two years of the FPCC's existence there was a struggle between Communist Party (CP) and Socialist Workers Party (SWP) elements to exert their power within the FPCC and thereby influence FPCC policy. However, during the past year this source observed there has been a successful effort by FPCC leadership to minimize the role of these and other organizations in the FPCC so that today their influence is negligible.

On May 20, 1963, a second source advised that the National Headquarters of the FPCC is located in Room 329 at 799 Broadway, New York City. According to this source, the position of National Office Director was created in the Fall of 1962 and was filled by *ND* who now formulates FPCC policy. This source observed *ND* has followed a course of entertaining and accepting the cooperation of many other organizations including the CP and the SWP when he has felt it would be to his personal benefit as well as the FPCC's. However, *ND* has indicated to this source he has no intention of permitting FPCC policy to be determined by any other organization. *ND* feels the FPCC should advocate resumption of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States and support the right of Cubans to manage their revolution without interference from other nations, but not support the Cuban revolution per se.

The CP and the SWP have been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Sources: *SD* ;  
*SD*

#### FOUR CONTINENT BOOK CORPORATION

According to the records of the Foreign Agents Registration Section, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., the Four Continent Book Corporation, 156 Fifth Avenue, New York City, is registered under the provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 as amended. One of the foreign principals listed in this registration is the Mezhdunarodnaja Kniga (International Book), Moscow, Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.

#### FREEDOMWAYS ASSOCIATES, INCORPORATED

The records of the New York Secretary of State, Albany, New York, show that the certificate of incorporation of Freedomways Associates, Incorporated, was filed on March 2, 1961.

8/6/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-39

-5-

The Spring, 1963, issue of "Freedomways" is self-described as "A Quarterly Review of the Negro Freedom Movement" published by Freedomways Associates, Incorporated, 799 Broadway, New York City.

On May 24, 1961, a source advised that a report was given on "Freedomways" at a meeting of the National Board, Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), held on May 24, 1961. It was stated that the original plan called for the publication to be openly Marxist, but that it was later decided it would not be avowedly a Marxist publication. Editorials are in the hands of a mixed group of Marxists and non-Marxists. It was stated that the central purpose of "Freedomways" is to develop a theory and positive criticism of currents in the Negro movement, as well as to raise the level of understanding and discussion taking place in Negro life today and to project a socialist and pro-Soviet orientation.

On May 25, 1961, another source advised that "Freedomways" was set up for the CPUSA by <sup>ND</sup> a member of the National Committee of the CPUSA.

Sources: SD  
SD

JEWISH CULTURAL CLUBS AND SOCIETIES,  
also known as Jewish Program Service  
Committee

A source advised on April 27, 1954, that the former leaders, including <sup>ND</sup> Executive Secretary, of the Jewish People's Fraternal Order (JPFO), Jewish nationality section of the International Workers Order (IWO), had established a committee at 1133 Broadway, New York, New York. Through this committee they were organizing cultural clubs and societies based on JPFO lodges which had been dissolved on December 15, 1953, in the course of proceedings by the New York State authorities culminating in the liquidation of the IWO.

A second source advised on March 15, 1961, that a meeting of the National Groups Commission of the Communist Party, United States of America, was held on March 2, 1961, in New York City. <sup>ND</sup> was among those present and spoke of his experiences in maintaining the Jewish lodges after the dissolution of the IWO, which, to avoid prosecution, have no national name or organization.

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Sandler stated that these lodges "lived" as clubs and societies by maintaining their cultural, fraternal and civic activities, but which activities are less political than in the former lodges. New York gave leadership to the rest of the country since the New York lodges were the strongest and had the more politically developed comrades.

These clubs and societies still maintain a medical plan, funeral benefits and mutual aid funds. There are 132 clubs and societies nationally, 63 of which are located in New York City.

A third source furnished information in May, 1963, that the clubs and societies are located at 1133 Broadway, Room 1429, New York, New York, under the name of the Jewish Program Service Committee, but are more widely known as the Jewish Cultural Clubs and Societies.

The IWO and the JPFO have been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Sources: S.D.  
S.D.  
S.D.

### JEWISH MUSIC ALLIANCE

An undated pamphlet entitled "The Story of the Jewish Music Alliance" (JMA) sets forth the following on page 2:

"The Jewish Music Alliance was founded in 1925, in order to coordinate the activities of all the Jewish people's choruses, to organize new choral groups and orchestras, public music, train and develop conductors, and generally stimulate the promotion and distribution of Jewish folk and labor music in the United States."

A source advised on April 25, 1963, that the JMA is part of a number of organizations comprising the Jewish cultural progressive movement in which the Yiddisher Kultur Farband (YKUF) is the most prominent. All of these organizations are directed and led by Jewish functionaries of the Communist Party, United States of America.

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The JMA National Headquarters is located at Room 711, 1 Union Square, New York City.

The YKUF has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Sources: SF  
SD

### JULY 26TH MOVEMENT

The July 26th Movement is a revolutionary organization founded and led by Fidel Castro, the present Prime Minister of Cuba. It was dissolved during late 1962 when it was absorbed into the integrated revolutionary organization in Cuba, along with the Communist Party of Cuba, and the other principal political parties.

### LABOR TODAY

In January, 1962, a source advised that on January 13, 1962, ND whom the source described as POSITION DELETED of the Communist Party, USA, remarked that the Party-supported trade-union publication would be issued in the near future and would appear under the name "Labor Today."

On January 5, 1962, records in the Assumed Name Section of the County Clerk's Office, Wayne County, Detroit, Michigan, indicated that Certificate Number 145344, issued for conducting business under an assumed name, was issued to "Labor Today" (a bi-monthly publication) having a business address at 12065 Wyoming, Detroit 4, Michigan. A certificate was filed January 2, 1962, and the names of the persons listed as owning, conducting and transacting the business were:

ND  
ADDRESS DELETED(AD)  
Detroit, Michigan

ND  
AD  
Detroit, Michigan

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A second source advised on December 15, 1961, that  
N D was then a member of the Michigan District  
Communist Party (MDCP) State Committee. This source advised on  
September 18, 1959, that N D was then a member of  
the MDCP State Committee.

A third source advised on September 21, 1961, that  
as of September 17, 1961, N D was a member of the  
North-West Section Club of the MDCP.

The Founding Statement contained in the first issue  
of "Labor Today" (Spring, 1962), indicated that two additional  
issues would be forthcoming in 1962 and beginning in 1963,  
"Labor Today" would appear regularly as a "bi-monthly journal."

The masthead of "Labor Today" describes the  
publication as "An Independent Journal of Discussion." Its  
managing editor is N D and business and editorial  
offices are located at 12065 Wyoming, Suite 5, Detroit 4, Michigan.

Sources: SD  
SD  
SD

NATION OF ISLAM, formerly  
referred to as the Muslim  
Cult of Islam, also known  
as N D Temples of  
Islam  
FRUIT OF ISLAM  
MUSLIM GIRLS TRAINING

### Nation of Islam

In January, 1957, a source advised N D  
has described his organization on a nationwide basis as the  
"Nation of Islam" and "Muhammad's Temples of Islam."

On July 10, 1963, a second source advised  
N D is the national leader of the Nation of  
Islam (NOI); Muhammad's Temple of Islam No. 2,5335  
South Greenwood Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, is the national  
headquarters of the NOI; and in mid-1960, N D and other  
NOI officials, when referring to N D organization  
on a nationwide basis, commenced using either "Mosque" or  
"Temple" when mentioning one of "N D Temples of Islam."

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The NOI is an all-Negro organization which was originally organized in 1930 in Detroit, Michigan. ND claims to have been selected by Allah, the Supreme Being, to lead the so-called Negro race out of slavery in the wilderness of North America by establishing an independent black nation in the United States. Members following ND teachings and his interpretation of the "Koran" believe there is no such thing as a Negro; that the so-called Negroes are slaves of the white race, referred to as "white devils," in the United States; and that the white race, because of its exploitation of the so-called Negroes, must and will be destroyed in the approaching "War of Armageddon."

In the past, officials and members of the NOI, including ND have refused to register under the provisions of the Selective Service Acts and have declared that members owe no allegiance to the United States.

On May 5, 1958, the first source advised ND had, upon advice of legal counsel, tempered his personal statements and instructions to his ministers concerning the principles of his organization in order to avoid possible prosecution by the United States Government; however, he did not indicate any fundamental changes in the teachings of his organization.

On July 10, 1963, a third source advised ND had early in July, 1958, decided to de-emphasize the religious aspects of the teachings of Islam and to stress the economic benefits to be derived by those Negroes who joined the NOI. This policy change, according to ND would help him acquire additional followers and create more interest in his programs.

Sources: SD  
SD  
SD

### Fruit of Islam

On July 10, 1963, a source advised that the Fruit of Islam (FOI) is a group within the Nation of Islam (NOI) composed of male members of the NOI. The purpose of the FOI is to protect officials and property of the NOI, assure compliance of members with NOI teachings and to prepare for the "War of Armageddon." Members of the FOI are required to participate in military drill and are afforded the oppor-

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tunity to engage in judo training. The FOI is governed by a military system wherein the members are controlled by general orders similar to those issued by regular military organizations.

Source: SD

### Muslim Girls Training

On May 19, 1960, a source advised that the Muslim Girls Training (MGT) is a group within the Nation of Islam (NOI) and is composed of all female members of the NOI. The MGT is similar in structure to the Fruit of Islam (FOI), which is composed of male members of the NOI, in that the MGT has officers similar to military organizations to whom other female members are accountable. MGT members receive instructions in homemaking, hygiene, calisthenics, and other subjects such as Muslim history and the English language. There also exists a Junior MGT, which is composed of female members of the NOI who are between the ages of 15 and 19 and who are afforded military-type drill.

Since 1957, various officers and "sisters" of the MGT have, at meetings of the MGT, used the term MGT so that it also means General Civilization Class. General Civilization Class refers to classes conducted within the MGT.

The above refers to activities of the MGT at  
ND Temple of Islam No. 2, 5335 South Greenwood,  
Chicago, Illinois.

On July 10, 1963, another source advised that the MGT is a group within the NOI which is composed of all female members of the NOI. The MGT is similar in structure to the FOI, which is composed of male members of the NOI. In theory, the MGT exists in all Temples of the NOI and is patterned after the MGT at ND Temple of Islam No. 2, Chicago. General Civilization Class refers to the collective group of classes held within the MGT.

Sources: SD  
SD

NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO ABOLISH  
THE HOUSE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES  
COMMITTEE

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The "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications" issued December 1, 1961, by the Committee on Un-American Activities, U.S. House of Representatives, page 115, contains the following citation regarding the National Committee to Abolish the Un-American Activities Committee (NCAUAC).

"Cited as a 'new organization' set up in the Summer of 1960 to lead and direct the Communist Party's 'Operation Abolition' campaign. Seven of the national leaders of this group have been identified as Communists."

(Communists on Un-American Activities, House Report 1278 on the Truth About the Film "Operation Abolition," Part 1, October 3, 1961, p. 5.)

A source has advised that the NCAUAC changed its name on March 3, 1962, to include the word "House" in its name, thereby becoming known as the National Committee to Abolish the House Un-American Activities Committee (HCAHUAC). A national meeting of this organization was held in Chicago, Illinois, on April 27 and 28, 1963.  
Source. SD

PERMANENT STUDENT COMMITTEE FOR  
TRAVEL TO CUBA

"The Columbia Owl," a weekly student newspaper of Columbia University, New York City, December 13, 1962, issue, page 1, contained an article entitled "Students to Visit Cuba During Holidays." This article stated in part that the Ad Hoc Student Committee for Travel to Cuba was formed October 14, 1962, by a group of students from New York City universities, the University of Wisconsin, Oberlin College and the University of North Carolina, who stated that as students they would like a chance to see and evaluate the situation in Cuba for themselves and had received an offer of transportation and two weeks' stay in Cuba from the Federation of University Students in Havana, Cuba, as guests of the Federation. The committee accepted the offer and applied to the U. S. State Department for passport validation which was refused; however, over 50 students planned to defy the State Department ban and go to Cuba.

A source advised on December 6, 1962, that during December, 1962, it was learned that the Ad Hoc Student Committee for Travel to Cuba had recently been formed by the "Progressive Labor" group.

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"Progressive Labor," Volume II, Number 1, issue of January, 1963, page 11, in an article captioned "State Dept. Pulls Strings to Keep U. S. Students from Cuba" states that "For more information on the Cuban Trip contact the Ad Hoc Committee for Travel to Cuba, 42 St. Marks Place, New York 3, NY."

A second source advised on April 24, 1963, that a party sponsored by the Permanent Student Committee for Travel to Cuba was held on April 20, 1963, in New York City. At this party it was announced that the Ad Hoc Student Committee for Travel to Cuba is now known as Permanent Student Committee for Travel to Cuba.

The same source further advised that at this party it was announced that the committee had received a cable from the Federation of University Students in Havana inviting the students to spend the month of July, 1963, in Cuba and a new trip was planned whereby the students would leave New York City the last weekend of June, 1963, for Canada and travel by plane from Canada to Cuba.

Sources: SD  
SD

### PROGRESSIVE LABOR MOVEMENT

A source advised on January 15, 1962, that at a meeting of the <sup>ND</sup> faction in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on January 11, 1962, it was pointed out that this group was in touch with Communist Party (CP) and former CP members in various cities throughout the United States hoping to convene a National Conference in the Summer of 1962 for the purpose of establishing a National Marxist-Leninist organization.

"The Worker," an east coast communist newspaper, issue of January 7, 1962, page 10, column 3, reported the expulsion of <sup>ND</sup> former Labor Secretary of the New York State CP, from the CP.

A second source advised on July 2, 1962, that Progressive Labor groups held a conference in New York City, on July 1, 1962, where <sup>ND</sup> acted as chairman. He read a statement at this conference setting forth their intention to form a new Marxist-Leninist party in

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the United States. A source stated that a more formal organization was necessary, one which would provide a framework for all who wanted to join in a united effort to build an American vanguard. The functions of this new organization are to include consolidation of all existing forces around Progressive Labor and organizing additional forces, expand and improve political activities, win additional forces to an outlook of Marxism-Leninism and increase the open advocacy of socialism, develop a significant Marxist-Leninist program for the new party and organize a collective organization of leaders and members.

A third and fourth source advised in February, 1963, that this new Marxist-Leninist party has not yet been organized on a formal basis, but that Progressive Labor groups had been formed in several localities in line with proposals of A.D. The sources advised as of February, 1963, that the leaders of this group are referring to it as the Progressive Labor Movement.

Sources: SD  
SD  
SD  
SD

### PROGRESSIVE YOUTH ORGANIZING COMMITTEE

On February 9, 1961, a source advised that the Progressive Youth Organizing Committee (PYOC) was established at a national socialist-oriented youth conference held in Chicago, Illinois, December 30, 1960, through January 1, 1961. This conference was the result of a mandate issued by the National Executive Committee, Communist Party, USA, calling for a youth conference to establish an organizing committee whose objective would be to set up a national socialist-oriented youth organization. The conference scheduled a convention to be held within a year to found a new national socialist-oriented youth organization.

On June 18, 1962, a second source advised it was reported at the meeting of the National Council of the PYOC held in New York, New York, June 16 and 17, 1962, that although it had been planned to form a Marxist-oriented youth organization by the Fall of 1962, it would not be possible to form such an organization for the next few years.

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On May 7, 1963, a third source advised the PYOC has its headquarters at 80 Clinton Street, New York, New York.

Sources: SD  
SD  
SD

#### TASS NEWS AGENCY

The Tass News Agency is the official Soviet Government news-gathering organization with headquarters in Moscow, USSR, and branches throughout the world.

#### UNITED ELECTRICAL, RADIO AND MACHINE WORKERS OF AMERICA

The "UE Shop Steward Guide," United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE) Publication Number 212, Sixth Edition, 1952, discloses on pages 32-34, "UE - the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America was established in 1936 at a convention in Buffalo, New York. At that time the organization was called the United Electrical and Radio Workers of America. Shortly thereafter, a large group of American Federation of Labor machinists' locals joined the UE and the full name became the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE).

"The UE is known as an 'International Union' because companies of both the United States and Canada are under contract."

"100 Things You Should Know About Communism and Labor," prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities, United States House of Representatives, Washington, D. C., 1951, relates the following information. In 1944 the Committee on Un-American Activities found the "United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (CIO)" to be one of the unions which was described as having "communist leadership... strongly entrenched." The "United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America" was listed as one of the unions which was expelled from the Congress of Industrial Organizations in 1950 because of its communist domination.

The "Internal Security Annual Report for 1957, Report of the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate," on page 61, refers to UE as "one of the strongest communist controlled unions in America."

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The International Headquarters of UE is located at 11 East 51st Street, New York, New York, according to the April 22, 1963, edition of "UE News," official organ of UE.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

September 4, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

(A) VISITS BY CIVIL RIGHTS GROUPS TO FIELD OFFICES AND RESIDENT AGENCIES -- On August 29, 1963, a group of Negroes, identified as the "Freedom Now Movement," headed by Conrad J. Lynn, a New York attorney, called at my office. Previously the Bureau had learned that this group might possibly institute a "sit-in" demonstration.

The group, upon arrival at 9:10 a. m. , was courteously greeted and promptly ushered into my office. At that time, Mr. Lynn indicated that the Negro considered there was a lack of law enforcement on the part of the FBI, particularly with respect to prosecution of state and city police officials in civil rights cases. He, and other members of the group, talked about a number of cases, asserting that the FBI had not measured up to its responsibilities. William Worthy, a newspaperman who has been most critical of American foreign policy and who in 1962 was found guilty of traveling from Cuba to Miami, Florida, without a valid passport, was most sarcastic. He stated that he was disturbed that the FBI had not "prosecuted" anyone as a result of the "literally hundreds of bombings of Negro churches and homes throughout the country." Worthy added that it was only fair to let me know there was a rising tide of criticism against the FBI because of our failure to "prosecute." Worthy stated that while he was making no threat, he prophesied that FBI offices would be picketed in the future. He specifically mentioned the incident in which a demonstration was held at our Resident Agency at Danville, Virginia.

I told the group that I was happy to have the opportunity to answer their questions. I explained the FBI's jurisdiction and that we were an investigative and not a prosecutive agency. I emphasized that our investigations were penetrative in both the South and the North and that we constantly impress upon our Agents that they must be completely objective in all investigations, especially those involving civil rights. I told them that in many instances erroneous statements are made by extremists concerning the FBI's role in the civil rights field. I furnished facts regarding some specific cases they mentioned, and have since forwarded a letter to the leader of this group setting forth the facts in each case. As it turned out, the FBI had previously investigated each case the group brought up and the results of our investigations had been forwarded to the Department of Justice for consideration as to prosecution or further action.

The possibility exists that representatives of the "Freedom Now Movement" or other groups might call at our Field Offices or Resident Agencies. If they do, they are to be promptly and courteously received. The Special Agent

in Charge or the Senior Resident Agent, if available, is to conduct the interview. The group should be allowed to state the reason for its visit and its complaints heard. The Bureau's jurisdiction in the civil rights field should be thoroughly explained and questions in regard to the specific cases mentioned answered. If the interviewing Bureau official does not possess the facts on the cases, the group should be told that he will promptly check the matter and advise it of the true facts. Keep in mind the possibility of furnishing the group literature such as my recent article in the August, 1963, issue of "Yale Political" magazine concerning civil rights. At all times, the group should receive courteous attention and every effort made to assist its members in understanding the FBI's role in the civil rights field. The Bureau should be promptly advised of each such interview.

It is felt that by such an approach, not only can the Bureau forestall any "sit-ins" and unfavorable publicity, but do much to enable Negro leaders to understand the true role of the FBI in these investigations.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

September 17, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) BULKY EXHIBITS - SEMIANNUAL INVENTORY OF PROPERTY - SUBMISSION OF FD-192 -- In the past it has been the usual practice in handling FD-192 forms at the Bureau, when review discloses the case to be closed and no circumstances appear to exist for retention of the property listed, to so advise the field by letter instructing that action be taken for disposition.

In the future the following stamp will be utilized and a copy of the FD-192 so stamped will be returned to the field office for appropriate action.

"Noted case closed by report of SA \_\_\_\_\_  
dated \_\_\_\_\_ or letter dated \_\_\_\_\_.  
Consider whether disposition can now be made  
of evidence maintained by your office."

The employees of your office who handle these matters should be advised of this procedure.

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(B) TRAINING - POLICE - SEMINAR FOR POLICE TRAINING DIRECTORS -- One Field Division recently conducted a very successful three-day seminar for police training directors which evoked considerable interest and enthusiasm. Purpose of seminar was to bring together local law enforcement training directors for purpose of discussing teaching methods, techniques and training programs. Attendance was restricted to officers who handle training in their departments; the 30 men in attendance represented 28 law enforcement agencies. Although we coordinated the program and presented a substantial amount of the instruction, several competent, cooperative police training directors led discussions on topics which, logically, they could handle. Curriculum included such topics as The Police Training Library (Organization, Operation, Use), Basic-Recruit Training Programs, The Police Instructor (Selection, Training and Presentation Practices), Personnel Evaluation--Its Relation to Training, In-Service Training Programs, Evaluation of Training Programs Through Examination and Related Matters, Command Training Programs, Teaching Techniques, Teaching Methods, Visual Aids, Practical Problems as Form of Training, Specialized Training Programs, and Open Forum on Curriculum.

The above is called to your attention in line with Bureau's desire that you be apprised of successful innovations in the police training field. Similar training programs may be of assistance to local law enforcement in your area.

(C) FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM -- The open-season registration under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) will commence on 10-1-63 and must be completed by 10-15-63. Revised brochures on the various health benefits plans and on the "Open Season Instructions" will soon be made available to all divisions. Upon receipt, the Health Benefit Representative should give each employee a complete set of all applicable brochures. Extra copies of the brochures will be supplied for future distribution to new employees. Previous editions of all brochures will become obsolete on November 1, 1963, and should then be destroyed. Obtain supplements from the local Blue Cross-Blue Shield Office and add to the Service Health Benefit Plan Brochures prior to distribution. Copies of each of these brochures should be made a part of your defense plans for payroll (see page 5, Item (3) of Emergency Payroll Plan).

During this open season, eligible employees who previously elected not to enroll will be able to enroll and all employees enrolled in plans in the FEHBP may change from one health benefit plan to another, change options within the plan, or change from self only enrollment to self and family enrollment or the reverse. During this open season an SF-2809 should only be given to employees who desire to enroll or change their enrollment. Employees who enroll or change their enrollment due to open season should use 1 (One) under Item (2), Part D as the number of event which permits the enrollment or change. On changes in enrollment the old enrollment code number should be placed under Item (1), Part D. The Bureau will take the necessary action to cancel the old enrollment.

The effective date for open-season registration will be 11-10-63. This does not apply to new employees who register during this period or nonopen-season changes. The effective date for new employees and other nonopen-season changes will be the first day of the pay period following the pay period in which the form is submitted.

Employees enrolling in SAMBA due to open-season regulations are eligible for the minimum \$2,000 life insurance without evidence of insurability. Those applying for additional amounts of \$4,000 or \$9,000 must execute the Personal Health Statement. Those applying for Dependents Group Life Insurance must execute a health statement on spouse and each dependent child.

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You should personally ensure that this open-season registration period is brought to the attention of each employee in your office. The Health Benefit Representative should carefully review all forms for legibility, completeness, and accuracy prior to their submission to the Bureau to avoid unnecessary delay in the processing of the forms.

(Security Letter on attached page)

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(D) COMMUNIST PARTY, USA - MEMBERSHIP -- Information now being submitted pursuant to current Bureau instructions and included under "Membership" in the administrative section of the Cover Pages of your quarterly reports captioned "Communist Party, USA," which pertains to the latest available statistics concerning the total number of Communist Party members in the area covered by your field office, should now be augmented through the inclusion of the following items: (1) the total number of Negroes included in the overall numerical strength of the Communist Party, USA, in your territory; (2) the name and title of each Negro included in this total who maintains a national level position; (3) the name and title of each Negro included in this total who maintains a district level position above the status of "club chairman." Those individual members of the Communist Party, USA, who are now carried as unidentified but who are known to be members of the Negro race, should be included in your total figure. Auxiliary offices should include this breakdown in the data which they submit to the Bureau and office of origin. These instructions should be put into effect immediately and should be included in your quarterly reports covering the period ending September 30, 1963.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

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OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

TITLE 28--JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION  
CHAPTER I--DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

ORDER NO. 302-63

AMENDING THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY  
REGULATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
SO AS TO PRECLUDE DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES  
IN THE RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING OF  
DEPARTMENTAL PERSONNEL

By virtue of the authority vested in me by Executive Order No. 10590 of January 15, 1955, Part II of Executive Order No. 10925 of March 6, 1961, Section 161 of the Revised Statutes (5 U. S. C. 22), and Section 2 of Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1950, and in conformity with the regulations and instructions issued by the Civil Service Commission (5 C. F. R. 39.203(c) and 39.302(b); and F. P. M. Letters Nos. 330-2 and 410-5), Part 42 of Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations (relating to Equal Employment Opportunity in the Department of Justice) is hereby amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sections:

"§ 42.25 Selecting employees for training.

"(a) It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Department of Justice that there shall be no discrimination

because of race, creed, color, national origin, or sex in the selection of employees of this department for training.

"(b) The Administrative Assistant Attorney General, in carrying out his responsibilities under § 0. 81 of this title (relating to the selection and training of departmental personnel in non-Government facilities), shall take steps to assure full compliance with the policy expressed in paragraph (a) of this section throughout the department.

"(c) Any complaint by an employee alleging unfavorable or discriminatory action in violation of the policy expressed in paragraph (a) of this section shall be deemed a complaint within the meaning of § 42. 6, shall be filed as provided in § 42. 7, and shall be handled in accordance with the procedures prescribed by § 42. 8-42. 17."

" § 42. 30 Selecting non-Government facilities for training.

"(a) It is the policy of the Department of Justice that non-Government facilities that discriminate because of race, creed, color, or national origin in the admission, or in the subsequent treatment, of students shall not be selected or used by this department to train personnel of this department. In addition, non-Government facilities



in which restrictions would be imposed upon trainees because of race, creed, color, or national origin shall not be selected or used by this department for Government-type training.

"(b) The Administrative Assistant Attorney General shall take steps to assure full compliance with the policies expressed in paragraph (a) of this section throughout the department.

"(c) Whenever a non-Government facility is being considered by this department for selection as a training facility and this department lacks satisfactory evidence that such facility is operated without discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin, the facility shall be contacted and requested to provide the department with written assurances that it engages in no such discriminatory practices. If the facility declines to provide the requested assurances, or if the assurances it provides are deemed inadequate, there shall be no further consideration given to the selection of that facility. On the other hand, if the department has satisfactory reasons to know, either by its own experience or from the experience of others, that a facility does not engage in discriminatory practices, it shall be unnecessary to request written assurances.

"(d) Anyone possessing information indicating that a non-Government facility used by this department for training engages in discriminatory practices based upon race, creed, color, or national origin should submit such information to the Administrative Assistant Attorney General who shall investigate the matter and take such corrective steps as he may deem appropriate.

"(e) If training in process on the date of the issuance of this section is being conducted at a non-Government facility that does not qualify under paragraph (a) of this section, such training must be terminated at the conclusion of the current training unit."

"§42.35 Equal opportunity in recruitment.

"(a) The policy of the Department of Justice prohibits any arrangement with any private business, secretarial, trade, or similar private (non-public) school, or with any private employment agency or similar private referral or recruitment source that operates on a racially discriminatory or segregated basis.

"(b) Arrangements prohibited include arrangements for recruiting visits, formal or informal referrals of applicants or applications, participation in 'career days', and speeches by departmental representatives at such places.

"(c) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prohibit the transmittal of examination announcements and other publicity made available to the public generally to any school or recruitment source or to bar the acceptance of applications from students and former students of any school.

"(d) Whenever this department lacks sufficient evidence that a school or recruitment source, subject to paragraph (a) of this section, is operated without discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin, the school or source shall be contacted and requested to provide the department with written assurances that it engages in no such discriminatory practices. If the school or source declines to provide the requested assurances, or if the assurances it provides are deemed inadequate, any existing arrangement with that school or source shall be promptly cancelled and no new arrangement with that school or source shall be considered until the department is satisfied that the new arrangement would not be inconsistent with the policy expressed in paragraph (a). Whenever the department has satisfactory reasons for believing, either on the basis of its own experience or on

the basis of the experience of others, that a school or source does not engage in discriminatory practices, it shall be unnecessary to request written assurances."

Date: August 16, 1963

Robert F. Kennedy  
Attorney General



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

October 1, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) "ACCIDENT FACTS" - TRAFFIC PUBLICATION - TRAINING - POLICE -- Under separate cover you are being furnished a copy of the 1963 edition of the booklet "Accident Facts." The booklet is furnished for use in connection with traffic instruction which our traffic instructors provide in field police training schools. Since the pamphlet contains current information on traffic and safety matters, all traffic instructors should become conversant with its contents. The pamphlet should also be made available to other Agent personnel such as police instructors who would have an interest in the subject matter. The pamphlet is expendable and need not be included in your office inventory.

10/1/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-50

(B) MATNAP - BREKID - FILING SYSTEM - DESTRUCTION OF FILES BY AUXILIARY OFFICES -- To conserve filing space, all auxiliary offices are hereby authorized to destroy reports and letters in their files relating to the MATNAP and BREKID cases which are more than 20 years old, provided the offices of origin and offices of prosecution have copies of these reports and letters. Under no circumstances should any material of evidentiary value or any statements, memoranda, or other significant material be destroyed. Any office which has been an office of origin or an office of prosecution at any time in the BREKID case should retain all material in its possession. In the event it becomes necessary to later obtain information which is more than 20 years old, auxiliary offices should communicate with the office of origin, which should retain the complete files, or the Bureau.

10/1/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-50

(C) FILMS - "THE FBI" - TWENTY-SEVEN-MINUTE DOCUMENTARY FILM -- The Bureau, in cooperation with Warner Brothers Studios, has produced a twenty-seven-minute documentary film which is narrated by Jack Webb of "Dragnet" fame. The film is in color except for the middle portion which is in black and white in that historical news-reels were used. This is a pure documentary and covers the Laboratory, the Identification Division, communications, jurisdiction, historical aspects and the training of a Special Agent. Much of the filming is new, particularly in regard to the training of an Agent, and was taken by the First Camera Unit of the United States Marine Corps, which is stationed at Quantico, Virginia.

This film can be loaned to groups or used in connection with speaking engagements. The same rules that govern the distribution of "A Day with the FBI" would apply to the new film, "The FBI."

It is noted that the film is twenty-seven minutes in length; there is no objection to your lending it to local television stations for public service programs.

Warner Brothers has advised that they are shipping the Bureau the film the first part of October and we, in turn, will ship one copy to each field office. Upon receipt of the new film, you should destroy your copy of "A Day with the FBI."

10/1/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-50

(D) TRAINING - POLICE - POLICIES - RULES AND REGULATIONS -- By SAC Letter 62-17, dated March 13, 1962, you were furnished revised pages 19 and 20 of the pamphlet setting forth policies, rules and regulations regarding police training, bringing up to date copies of the pamphlet forwarded by SAC Letter 61-68, dated November 28, 1961. Enclosed are five copies of a revised version of this pamphlet; all copies now being retained in your office should be destroyed. Personnel in your division who have duties in connection with police training should be aware of the contents of this pamphlet.

(Security Letters on attached pages)

10/1/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-50

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(E) COMMUNIST PARTY, USA - NEGRO QUESTION - COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN RACIAL MATTERS -- The history of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), is replete with its attempts to exploit, influence and recruit the Negro. The March on Washington, August 28, 1963, was a striking example as Party leaders early put into motion efforts to accrue gains for the CPUSA from the March. The presence at the March of around 200 Party members, ranging from several national functionaries headed by CPUSA General Secretary Gus Hall to many rank-and-file members, is clear indication of the Party's favorite target (the Negro) today.

All indications are that the March was not the "end of the line" and that the Party will step up its efforts to exploit racial unrest and in every possible way claim credit for itself relating to any "gains" achieved by the Negro. A clear-cut indication of the Party's designs is revealed in secret information obtained from a most sensitive source that the Party plans to hold a highly secretive leadership meeting in November, 1963, which will deal primarily with the Negro situation. The Party has closely guarded plans for Gus Hall to undertake a "barnstorming" trip through key areas of the country to meet Party people and thus better prepare himself for the November meeting.

In order for the Bureau to cope with the Party's efforts and thus fulfill our responsibilities in the security field, it is necessary that we at once intensify our coverage of communist influence on the Negro. Fullest consideration should be given to the use of all possible investigative techniques in the investigation of the CPUSA, those communist fronts through which the Party channels its influence, and the many individual Party members and dupes. There is also an urgent need for imaginative and aggressive tactics to be utilized through our Counterintelligence Program for the purpose of attempting to neutralize or disrupt the Party's activities in the Negro field. Because of the Bureau's responsibility for timely dissemination of pertinent information to the Department and other interested agencies, it is more than ever necessary that all facets of this matter receive prompt handling.

Because of the Party's intensified efforts to render influence in racial matters, the Bureau is closing its subfile 100-3-75 relating to CPUSA - Negro Question. All information to be reported relating to the Negro question, as well as communist influence in racial matters, should be hereafter reported in Bureau file 100-3-116 relating to CPUSA, Negro Question - Communist Influence in Racial Matters. This instruction as to the administrative handling of this matter is effective immediately and should be followed in the

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-50

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preparation of the quarterly report concerning the CPUSA for the quarter ending September 30, 1963. The necessary Manual changes will follow.

The contents of this SAC Letter should be brought to the attention of all appropriate Agent personnel so that they will be fully alert to the urgency of this matter. The following offices should submit to the Bureau, by letter under above caption due 30 days from date of this SAC Letter, an analysis of their current coverage of communist activities in the Negro field plus details of their plans for intensifying such coverage: Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Los Angeles, Newark, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, San Francisco and Seattle. Also, those 16 offices which are participating in the Counter-intelligence Program on a continuing basis should include in their next monthly letters due at the Bureau by October 15, 1963, any plans they may have to neutralize or disrupt any Party activities in the Negro field. Such information should be set out under the category "Possible Counterintelligence Activity." After submission of the October letter, all offices will remain alert for future possible situations involving the Party and the Negro which have disruptive potential and submit them to the Bureau under the Counterintelligence Program caption.

10/1/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-50

(F) SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION CHARACTERIZATION - INTERNAL SECURITY - SAC Letter 63-39 dated August 6, 1963, provided a subversive organization characterization for the Progressive Labor Movement. Set forth below is an up-to-date characterization of this organization which replaces the one in SAC Letter 63-39. This thumbnail sketch also encompasses the Progressive Labor Party and the Movement's publication, "Progressive Labor," which are integral parts of the entire organization.

PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY;  
PROGRESSIVE LABOR MOVEMENT;  
"PROGRESSIVE LABOR"

A source advised on July 2, 1962, that Progressive Labor groups held a conference in New York City on July 1, 1962, where Milton Rosen acted as chairman. He read a statement at this conference setting forth their intention to form a new Marxist-Leninist Party in the United States. Rosen stated that a more formal organization was necessary, one which would provide a framework for

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-50

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all who wanted to join in a united effort to build an American vanguard. The functions of this new organization are to consolidate all existing forces around Progressive Labor and organize additional forces; expand and improve political activities; win additional forces to an outlook of Marxism-Leninism and increase the open advocacy of socialism; develop a significant Marxist-Leninist program for the new party; and organize a collective organization of leaders and members.

"The Worker," an east coast communist newspaper, issue of January 7, 1962, page 10, column 3, reported the expulsion of Milton Rosen, former labor secretary of the New York State Communist Party, from the Communist Party, USA.

A second and third source advised in February, 1963, that this new Marxist-Leninist Party had not yet been organized on a formal basis but that Progressive Labor groups had been formed in several localities in line with proposals of Milton Rosen. The sources advised as of February, 1963, that the leaders of this group were referring to it as the Progressive Labor Movement.

The "Amsterdam News," a daily New York City newspaper, dated July 27, 1963, page 22, set forth that the "Progressive Labor Party is a new political formation based on Progressive Labor Movement, a Socialist organization with groups in all parts of the United States. The organization publishes a monthly magazine called Progressive Labor."

The July-August, 1963, issue of Progressive Labor" set forth that it is published monthly by Progressive Labor Company, G.P.O. Box 808, Brooklyn 1, New York.

First Source

Second Source is

Third Source is

All sources utilized in the preparation of the characterization given above should be described as having furnished reliable

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-50

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information in the past. Careful consideration has been given to each source concealed and the source has been concealed only where necessary.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures for (D)

- J/1/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-50

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PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 63-I  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

October 23, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7

One set of AFSAM 7 key lists for months of December, 1963, January and February, 1964, being forwarded separately to all domestic and foreign offices except Washington Field which will receive none; six copies being furnished Bureau's Emergency Relocation Site; and six copies Seat of Government Code Room.

Domestic offices should acknowledge receipt promptly by routing slip and foreign offices by deferred (State Department priority "Routine") cable, indicating serial numbers which appear thereon; return in a sealed envelope to the Bureau, attention FBI Annex, the address label on individual tamper-proofed envelope containing keys even though torn while opening package; and destroy, by burning, each monthly sheet thirty days after last effective date thereof, advising the Bureau promptly, attention FBI Annex, this has been done.

It is essential the address label mentioned above be returned in order to control security of shipment.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-59  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

December 10, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) EMERGENCY MEDICAL IDENTIFICATION CARDS -- The American Medical Association has approved the use of a universal symbol to be used as a warning that any individual wearing or carrying it suffers from a physical disability or illness requiring special care such as, diabetes, epilepsy, allergy to certain drugs or medications, et cetera. The symbol may appear on an identification card or be affixed to a bracelet, pin, or similar ornamental device and consists of a hexagon on which has been superimposed a six-sided cross, "the Star of Life," on the upright arm of which is a staff with a serpent entwined about it, "the Staff of Aesculapius."

Although the American Medical Association is unable to state the extent of the use of the symbol, it has and will be given considerable publicity. A facsimile of the front and reverse side of a typical Emergency Medical Identification Card is enclosed.

12/10/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-59

(B) NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, D. C. - POLICE TRAINING -- Bureau has learned that a brochure has been forwarded to various law enforcement agencies announcing the National Administration Institute (NAI) will present, during 1964, a series of two-week training schools on police subjects for municipal, county, State and Federal law enforcement officers having arrest powers, and for foreign officials having law enforcement duties. This brochure gives no indication who will be connected with NAI; however, it was determined it is apparently a private undertaking by Neal M. Forney, a National Academy graduate no longer active in law enforcement, and has no connection with any law enforcement agency, organization or college. Forney plans to set up his Institute in Washington, D. C., but has indicated he will present instruction in other areas, if requested. Registration for the initial school closes 1/13/64; tuition for each school will be \$185.

You should make no comment at this time concerning this proposed police training organization, but you should be alert for information regarding Forney and NAI and advise the Bureau promptly. You are again reminded to insure that the police training program of your office is meeting the training needs of local law enforcement in your area.

(C) \*BANK ROBBERY MATTERS \*- It has been suggested that bait money used by banks should be made up of used Federal Reserve Notes emanating from Federal Reserve Districts far removed from the area in which the bait money is being used. It is felt this procedure would help our bank robbery investigations in that it would be easier for tellers in other banks to check bills received against lists of stolen bait money. Since each Federal Reserve Note contains a large letter on its face denoting the Federal Reserve District from which it came, and those from districts far removed from locality in question would be received in relatively small volumes, the money used in bait packages could be more easily detected.

Accordingly, this proposal is brought to your attention for discussion with appropriate officials of banking institutions within your territory during the normal course of business or in connection with field conferences.

12/10/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-59

(D) HOODLUM COVERAGE IN THE GREATER MIAMI, FLORIDA, AREA DURING WINTER SEASON 1963-1964 - CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM -- The Miami Office has been making plans to afford coverage of the activities of out-of-town hoodlums who may visit the Miami area during the coming winter season. These plans include the utilization of informants and sources in places frequented by racketeers and development of information to establish highly confidential investigative techniques.

To assist the Miami Office in the prompt establishment of effective coverage on hoodlums and racketeers proceeding to the Miami area, field offices are instructed to furnish to the Miami Office background information, including criminal records, physical descriptions and details of itineraries of such hoodlums. When information is received from highly sensitive sources or informants concerning the travel of any hoodlum, appropriate precautions should be set forth to enable the Miami Office to plan investigative steps which will not jeopardize these sources and informants. Information on travel plans should be forwarded expeditiously by appropriate communication to enable the Miami Office to have as much notice as possible to provide coverage on the activities of these individuals where facts have been developed indicating the desirability of such coverage. To make coverage more efficient and discreet, the information developed should include identity of associates the traveling hoodlums are expected to meet in the Miami area. All surveillances instituted must be discreet and based on information from which it can logically be inferred that there is a definite, useful objective to be achieved.

12/10/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-59

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All offices should furnish a brief outline to Miami of public source data identifying any of these individuals as racketeers or members of organized criminal groups, such as La Cosa Nostra, to be made available, if necessary, to local law enforcement officials.

It should be borne in mind that hoodlums from various parts of the country visiting the Miami area will be renewing associations, reminiscing about past experiences and discussing future plans. This recreation atmosphere should provide better opportunities for our informants and sources to obtain valuable information in accordance with the objectives of the Criminal Intelligence Program.

When notifying the Bureau and Miami Office of the intended travel of hoodlums, each field office should include information on the availability of any highly placed informants in a position to travel to Florida to provide coverage of hoodlum activities. The Bureau will thereafter decide if the travel of a particular informant is warranted.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosure for (A)

12/10/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-59

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-61

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

December 17, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) FBIRA MATTER - INTEROFFICE FIREARMS COMPETITION (PPC) 1963 -- I am pleased to announce the results of the 1963 FBIRA-Sponsored Interoffice Firearms Competition (PPC). The Tampa Division won the over-all competition with an average score, including handicap, of 101.36 per cent (92.48 plus 8.88). The "J. Edgar Hoover Practical Pistol Course Trophy" is being sent to Tampa where it will remain until the winner of the 1964 competition is determined. A plaque is also being forwarded to Tampa, which is to be permanently retained by this Division.

In addition to the over-all winner, plaques for permanent retention will be presented to the second and third place winners, Minneapolis (93.89 plus 6.71) and Seattle (94.43 plus 6.11) respectively.

Again this year Divisions were divided into groups according to agent complement and the office having the highest average, plus handicap, in each is being cited for "Honorable Mention." Excluding the first three place winners, the Divisions winning the citations are as follows:

Group 1 - Chicago

Group 2 - Cincinnati

Group 3 - Memphis

Group 4 - Anchorage

The relative standing of each office, according to group, is as follows:

*Reviewed by  
M. Talley 8/27/75*

Group 1

	<u>Net</u>	<u>Gross</u>
1. Chicago	93.64	99.76
2. Newark	92.98	98.96
3. Los Angeles	92.04	98.82
4. Miami	90.60	98.29
5. Washington	89.79	97.95
6. San Francisco	91.43	97.94
7. Detroit	91.03	97.57
8. Seat of Government	90.00	97.43
9. Philadelphia	89.29	97.36
10. New York	89.11	96.53

Group 2

	<u>Net</u>	<u>Gross</u>
1. Cincinnati	91.87	99.12
2. Atlanta	90.69	99.03
3. Boston	90.92	98.44
4. Charlotte	91.76	98.09
5. Dallas	91.20	97.92
6. Baltimore	89.87	97.91
7. New Orleans	91.57	97.66
8. Pittsburgh	90.92	97.37
9. Kansas City	89.50	96.35
10. Cleveland	87.70	95.50

Group 3

	<u>Net</u>	<u>Gross</u>
1. Memphis	91.82	99.54
2. San Juan	92.01	99.15
3. Las Vegas	92.90	98.96
4. Buffalo	90.87	98.19
5. Milwaukee	90.24	97.81
6. Springfield	91.36	97.72
7. Houston	89.40	97.66
8. Louisville	90.23	97.61
9. Oklahoma City	89.40	97.56
10. Jacksonville	91.94	97.37
11. St. Louis	89.56	97.21
12. New Haven	91.16	96.95
13. Denver	89.53	96.77
14. Phoenix	90.61	96.74
15. San Antonio	86.99	96.68
16. Indianapolis	90.44	96.63
17. Richmond	88.48	96.51
18. Savannah	88.26	95.65

Group 4

	<u>Net</u>	<u>Gross</u>
1. Anchorage	97.56	99.74
2. Norfolk	91.80	99.66
3. Omaha	92.78	99.45
4. Mobile	91.86	98.94
5. Portland	92.69	98.90
6. Albuquerque	93.30	98.52
7. Honolulu	91.76	98.37
8. Knoxville	92.56	98.32
9. San Diego	91.88	98.22
10. Little Rock	91.61	98.18
11. Birmingham	90.26	97.95
12. Albany	89.16	97.51
13. Salt Lake City	90.70	97.23
14. Butte	89.12	95.36
15. El Paso	87.44	94.97

The 5502 Agents participating in the 1963 competition surpasses last year's participation of 5482. The over-all average was 90.7 per cent which is an indication of the interest and enthusiasm displayed by Agent personnel and is most gratifying.

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-61

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(B) REPORT WRITING -- To avoid unnecessary dictation and typing, the attention of all investigative personnel should be directed to the general reporting rules set forth in the Handbook for FBI Agents. Particular emphasis should be placed on the provisions embodied in Part I, item 47, A, 10 and 11, on pages 32c and 32d of the Handbook as they relate to the use of inserts by auxiliary offices to report the results of investigations to an office of origin.

Good judgment should dictate the use of inserts wherever possible to report information ultimately destined for inclusion in a report. This will relieve the office preparing the report of the necessity of wholesale retyping of information to include it therein as is the case when the data is received from the auxiliary office in an airtel, letter, or similar communication.

12/17/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-61

(C) PERFORMANCE RATINGS - INVESTIGATIVE PERSONNEL -- The performance of all investigative personnel should be appraised at this time to insure that 90-day warnings (in the form of special administrative performance ratings) are given to all such employees whose performance is considered unsatisfactory and to whom it is contemplated an Unsatisfactory official annual performance rating will be given on March 31, 1964.

You should insure that all supervisory employees who will be preparing the ratings are completely familiar with the instructions in the Manual of Rules and Regulations and the contents of SAC Letter No. 61-28 (B) dated 5-23-61 and that these instructions are strictly adhered to.

12/17/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-61

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(D) PHOTOGRAPHS - INVESTIGATIVE AID -- It has been brought to our attention that the State of Montana has adopted the practice of requiring that a photograph of the driver be attached to the operator and chauffeur driving licenses issued by it. The licenses expire every two years and applicants are photographed at the time of initial application and each renewal. Montana thus joins several other states which have this requirement and, with the increasing trend toward uniformity in licensing procedures, it is anticipated that many more states will adopt this requirement in the future.

I need not elaborate on the value to our investigations of up-to-date photographs of subjects, suspects, et cetera, and you are reminded that all logical sources of obtaining them, such as that described above, should be exploited whenever possible.

(Security Letters on attached pages)

(E) VISIT OF GERMAN CHANCELLOR LUDWIG ERHARD TO UNITED STATES - DECEMBER, 1963 -- Chancellor Ludwig Erhard of Germany and party of 12 are scheduled to visit the United States as guests of President Johnson December 27-29, 1963. Present itinerary indicates that Chancellor Erhard's visit will be confined to the State of Texas. Erhard's party is expected to visit Houston or San Antonio, Texas, on December 27, 1963, and Austin, Fredericksburg, Johnson City, and the LBJ Ranch, Texas, on December 28-29, 1963. In connection with this visit all offices should be alert for any information concerning any activity which may adversely affect the United States. Sources and informants in a position to acquire pertinent data should be alerted to the necessity for prompt reporting. Information concerning threats, violence or hostile demonstrations against Erhard or his government should be immediately furnished to the Bureau, to appropriate local police, to local Secret Service representative and local Office of Security, United States Department of State, where available, and to San Antonio which will be considered office of origin. Notify Bureau of dissemination made.

Communications in this matter should be submitted under above caption.

12/17/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-61

(F) SECURITY INDEX -- In connection with all security investigations in the case of individual subjects, the essential question for determination is whether the subject's activities are such as to depict him to be a potential danger to the national security of the United States in time of an emergency. In the event such a determination is made, his name should be included in the Security Index.

The Security Index criteria have been found to afford practical and workable guidelines in arriving at a conclusion as to whether a subject represents a potential danger and are sufficiently elastic so that when applied with the necessary judgment, the complex questions which may arise in connection with these cases can be resolved.

Section 87D of the Manual of Instructions contains a number of specific factors that must be taken into consideration when arriving

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-61

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at a conclusion as to whether a particular subject meets the Security Index criteria and represents a potential threat to the national security.

For your assistance, the assistance of your investigative personnel engaged in security work, and for the assistance of your supervisory staff, the following specific factors, in addition to the ones presently enumerated in Section 87D of the Manual of Instructions, are set forth for consideration in arriving at a determination as to whether a security subject falls within the Security Index criteria, represents a potential danger in time of an emergency, and thus should be included in the Security Index.

- (1) Contacts with Sino-Soviet-bloc establishments (including Cuba) where purpose of contact cannot be determined or contact indicates communist sympathies.
- (2) Contacts with Sino-Soviet-bloc, Cuban or Yugoslav intelligence agents where purpose of contact cannot be determined or contact indicates communist sympathies.
- (3) Individuals who have defected, revoked or sought revocation of their United States citizenship in favor of a Sino-Soviet-bloc country, who have returned to the United States, and who have taken no positive steps to counteract such action.
- (4) Statements or activities on a subject's part establishing reasonable grounds to believe that his loyalty would lie with a Sino-Soviet-bloc country in the event of armed conflict between the United States and a Sino-Soviet-bloc country.
- (5) Training and/or participation in espionage, sabotage, or intelligence activities.
- (6) A history of emotional instability or irrational behavior on the part of an individual with a subversive background whose prior acts depict a propensity for violence and hatred against organized government.

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-61

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The above factors, including the various factors presently set forth in Section 87D of the Manual of Instructions, are not all-inclusive but are set forth for the purpose of providing a more detailed guideline and all must be considered in evaluating the facts developed during the course of the investigation.

In view of our responsibilities in the internal security field, most careful attention must be afforded this aspect of our operations and all security cases should be closely examined for the purpose of determining whether sufficient facts are available to depict the subject as a dangerous person whose activities warrant the inclusion of his name in the Security Index. When such a determination is made, appropriate recommendation to include his name in the Security Index should be made promptly.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

12/17/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-61

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1964

Reviewed by J. Dick  
8/21/75

Access Epstein  
8/3/75  
SPY



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 64-3  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

January 14, 1964

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

(A) EMERGENCY MEDICAL IDENTIFICATION CARDS - HEALTH AND IMMUNIZATION RECORD -- Re SAC Letter 63-59 of 12-10-63. Each division is being furnished a supply of "Health and Immunization Record" forms for distribution to employees desiring to use them. Employees should be informed of the availability of the forms which can be reduced to billfold size. As approved by the American Medical Association, the forms bear the universal symbol which may serve as a warning that the individual suffers from a physical disability or illness requiring special care, or is allergic to certain drugs, and the like. Employees using the form will be responsible for obtaining and recording the required data and should not expect the Bureau to do so. For example, blood type and factor could be obtained when donating blood. The form should also be made available to employees as they enter on duty. Should additional forms be needed, submit requests to Bureau.

1-14-64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-3

(B) FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY ASSOCIATES - RETRAINING SESSIONS -- Advise the Bureau, Attention: Training Division, by June 1, 1964, the dates and places of your 1964 retraining sessions for graduates of the FBI National Academy. If your retraining session will be held in advance of that date, Bureau should be advised at least thirty days in advance. You should make certain that emphasis is placed upon the training aspects so that the graduates in attendance may receive real benefit therefrom. The Bureau should be furnished with the detailed program to be followed and you should keep in mind that carefully planned annual retraining sessions are effective media whereby the graduates can be allied more closely to each other and to the Bureau in meeting our common problems.

Your attention is directed to Part II, Section 1 B, 13, page 12, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations concerning the attendance of Bureau personnel at FBI National Academy retraining sessions. These instructions must be closely followed.

(C) VISIT OF HER MAJESTY QUEEN FREDERIKA OF GREECE TO UNITED STATES, JANUARY, 1964 -- Her Majesty Queen Frederika of Greece, her daughter, Princess Irene, and a small entourage are scheduled to visit the United States between January 21 and February 7, 1964. Present itinerary indicates she will be in New York City January 21-26, 1964, and will be in Washington, D. C., January 26-30, 1964. From January 31, 1964, to February 7, 1964, her itinerary is not firm, but could include visits to Cape Kennedy, Florida; Boston, Massachusetts; and New York City. She is scheduled to leave the United States on February 7, 1964, from New York City by ship. Although Her Majesty will tour the United States in a private capacity, the Department of State will implement and request security protection and measures that are normally extended to a foreign head of state.

Department of State is concerned about her safety in view of the harassing and embarrassing actions taken against her during her two visits to England in 1963. Reportedly, demonstrations were made by the militant "Committee of 100" which is demanding the release of certain political prisoners in Greece. It was indicated these demonstrations were communist inspired and that similar demonstrations may be attempted during her visit to the United States. A second point of concern is that in connection with her contemplated visit to Barnard College, Columbia University, New York City, on January 22, 1964, there may be organized efforts to create embarrassing incidents since in October, 1963, an article appeared in the Columbia University newspaper alleging that Her Majesty was a Nazi sympathizer during World War II.

State Department has requested FBI and other appropriate Government agencies concerned to explore possible existence of any effort by the Communist Party, USA, communist front organizations or any dissident groups to create any incidents which could prove dangerous to the personal safety of Her Majesty or prove embarrassing to her and to the United States Government. Accordingly, all offices should immediately contact any informants and sources in a position to furnish information of this nature and forward to the Bureau in a form suitable for dissemination any pertinent data so developed.

Informants and sources in a position to acquire such data in the future should be alerted to the necessity for prompt reporting. Information concerning threats, violence or hostile demonstrations against Her Majesty, her entourage or her government should be immediately furnished to the Bureau, to appropriate local police, to appropriate local office of security,

1-14-64 ..

SAC LETTER NO. 64-3

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United States Department of State, where available, and to New York which will be considered office of origin. Notify Bureau of dissemination made.

Communications in this matter should be submitted under above caption.

1-14-64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-3

(D) HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW -- The January-February, 1964, issue of the above-captioned magazine contains my article entitled "The U. S. Businessman Faces the Soviet Spy." This article discusses in detail efforts by Soviet diplomats to make personal and friendly contact with American businessmen and how they hope to exploit these contacts to secure information of value to them. The article also sets forth suggestions on how citizens can help the FBI defeat these Soviet spy efforts.

This article should be considered as a possible investigative aid in espionage cases. In the past, the Bureau has received valuable information from individuals who had read my previous but shorter articles on this topic. Any such cases resulting from this article should promptly be called to the Bureau's attention; mark for the attention of Crime Records Division.

Three copies of the article are being furnished to each field office. The Bureau has limited supply of additional copies. If more copies are desired, they should be requested.

1-14-64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-3

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(E) RACIAL INFORMANTS -- New Manual of Instructions and FBI Handbook sections containing detailed instructions regarding the handling of racial informants and sources have been prepared. Classification 170 has been assigned. Upon receipt of these new sections, each field office will review all pending cases on racial informants and make necessary changes in files and indices to conform with the new classification number and instructions.

Effective upon receipt of the forthcoming manual changes; include in your monthly report of all expenditures from the confidential fund the total amount paid each month to racial informants and sources.

This separate category for payments to racial informants and sources will appear in the portion of your monthly report entitled "Summary of Payments to Informants and Sources" and should be shown in the same manner that you now show breakdown of information relative to criminal and security informants and sources.

The effectiveness of the Racial Informant Program is your personal responsibility and it will be incumbent upon you to implement the new instructions and to achieve positive results.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

1-14-64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-3

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 64-4

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

January 21, 1964

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) TRAINING - FIREARMS AND DEFENSIVE TACTICS - CALENDAR YEAR 1964 -- Attached are copies of the Field Firearms and Defensive Tactics Training Program for the 1964 calendar year which should be studied by instructors in your office to insure uniform training.

1/21/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-4

(B) TRAINING - AGENTS' ANNUAL TECHNICAL TRAINING - 1964 -- Enclosed for each office are five copies of captioned training program.

1/21/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-4.

(C) BUREAU MATERIAL TRANSMITTED BY AIRLINE PILOTS (AMERICAN AIRLINES) -- Reference is made to SAC Letter 63-11, part A, dated 3-5-63 indicating it was permissible to transmit FBI material in the custody of airline pilots provided the utilization of such service is limited to extreme emergency and the material is transmitted in an envelope bearing the postage indicia in order to comply with postal regulations.

An official of American Airlines has indicated that in responding to such requests they would render all cooperation possible but that, where time permits, our material, rather than being placed in the personal custody of their pilots, would be sent air express. Thereafter, responsible employees of American Airlines will take all steps necessary to insure prompt delivery at point of destination to a Special Agent of the FBI.

As previously indicated, this type of cooperative service should be utilized only in extreme emergency and in compliance with postal regulations requiring the use of envelopes bearing the postage indicia.

1/21/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-4

(D) TRAINING - POLICE - SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS ON AUTOMOBILE THEFT -- In view of the continuing problem of automobile theft, it is desired that you consider conducting specialized police schools on that topic. Such schools afford us an excellent opportunity to emphasize our

jurisdiction in such matters, and to highlight to the general public, through well-planned publicity, our interest and responsibilities in this field. The curriculum of the schools may include such topics as The Automobile Theft Problem (including most recent statistics), FBI Jurisdiction in ITSMV Cases, Modus Operandi of Auto Thieves, How to Spot a Stolen Car, and Processing Stolen Cars for Evidence. Also, a representative of the National Automobile Theft Bureau may be invited to participate in the schools, to explain how his Bureau may be of assistance. Each field division has films which are appropriate for use in such schools.

While these specialized schools are not to be solicited, you should bring them to the attention of law enforcement agencies in your division. Law enforcement organizations, such as Chiefs and Sheriffs Associations, may be interested in cooperating in arrangements for a series of these specialized schools.

(Security Letters on attached pages)

1/21/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-4

- 2 -

(E) ESPIONAGE INVESTIGATIONS -- Espionage violations in which there is no apparent participation by or with a foreign government can involve misuse, unauthorized disclosure, theft or photographing of material relating to the national defense (Title 18, Section 793, 795, 796, 797, 798, United States Code). These are carried under the Espionage - X character. In investigating these cases it is imperative that it be borne in mind that the illegal act may have been committed at the request or behest of a foreign agent although the person committing the violation was unaware of the foreign ramification. There are numerous instances in Bureau files in which an American citizen who was also an agent of a foreign principal requested another American who was unaware of this foreign connection to obtain information concerning the national defense either because of friendship or for financial gain. If the Espionage - X investigation discloses that an agent of a foreign principal is involved, it could very well mean that foreign ramifications are present which could increase the importance of the case as well as the degree of possible damage to the national defense. You should assure that Espionage - X cases receive thorough and complete investigative action and that it is resolved during these investigations whether there are any foreign ramifications.

1/21/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-4

(F) INTERNAL SECURITY - NATIONALISTIC TENDENCY -- Section 105B, Manual of Instructions, points out that one of the aims of our investigations in the Nationalistic Field is to develop information concerning conditions in foreign countries. This Section instructs that an effort should be made to obtain this type of information as it might have a bearing on the current or future policy of the United States toward such countries or might aid the intelligence agencies to engage more effectively in counterintelligence activities. Except in very rare and unusual instances information of this type is, of course, given wide dissemination by the Bureau immediately upon its receipt.

A glance at almost any current newspaper will establish the fact that revolutionary activity is rampant in foreign countries, particularly in the Caribbean and Latin-American areas. The concern of State Department and other Government agencies is obvious. Field offices have frequently received allegations of an apparently significant nature from a confidential informant or source and in most instances have promptly forwarded such information to the Bureau. It has been noted, however, that on occasions

1/21/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-4

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where time was deemed of the essence as, for example, where an invasion of a foreign country was allegedly imminent, the Bureau has been furnished a summary by teletype or by other expeditious means but the teletype failed to state whether the information should be classified and/or that details would follow immediately in form suitable for dissemination. In such instances these points should be covered in the original communication and full details should be expeditiously forwarded.

Too frequently allegations indicating a critical situation exists have been received from sources and forwarded to the Bureau without indicating whether the field is taking any action to corroborate or further develop the information. The field must recognize that the Government may go to considerable expense and effort as a result of receiving one of these allegations and the field must assume the responsibility, without prodding from the Bureau, of promptly checking these allegations out wherever possible. The original communication to the Bureau or the cover airtel where letterhead memorandum is used must spell out just what is being done by the field in this regard.

A large part of our information in these cases comes from exiled nationals of the countries involved. The field is reminded that such information may be colored by the individual prejudices and loyalties of such sources and that, therefore, their information cannot be accepted at face value. They must be pinned down to actual facts in their possession. In this connection the Bureau has noted an increasing laxity on the part of the field in this type of case to properly attribute information to sources. Where a source does not possess information as of his own knowledge the communication must not permit the inference that this is the case. It should be determined how and from whom the source obtained his information and, wherever possible, this data should be included in the memorandum or report prepared for dissemination.

You are instructed to bring the above matters to the attention of all Agents handling cases in the Nationalistic Tendency Field.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Enclosures for (A) & (B)

Director

1/21/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-4

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PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 64-A

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

January 24, 1964

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7

One set of AFSAM 7 key lists for months of March, April and May, 1964, being forwarded separately to all domestic and foreign offices except Washington Field which will receive none; six copies being furnished Bureau's Emergency Relocation Site; and six copies Seat of Government Code Room.

Domestic offices should acknowledge receipt promptly by routing slip and foreign offices by deferred (State Department priority "Routine") cable, indicating serial numbers which appear thereon; return in a sealed envelope to the Bureau, attention FBI Annex, the address label on individual tamperproofed envelope containing keys even though torn while opening package; and destroy, by burning, each monthly sheet thirty days after last effective date thereof, advising the Bureau promptly, attention FBI Annex, this has been done.

It is essential the address label mentioned above be returned in order to control security of shipment.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 64-5

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

January 28, 1964

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

(A) VOUCHER MATTERS -- The number of vouchers submitted to the Bureau requiring correction, suspension or return is increasing.

All employees preparing and submitting vouchers should be reminded of the necessity of strict adherence to the instructions set forth in Part II, Section 7, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

1-28-64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-5

(B) COMMUNICATIONS - UNAUTHORIZED USE OF GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION (GSA) FACILITIES - TELETYPES -- You are referred to SAC Letter 61-71, (B), dated December 19, 1961.

Recently, one Bureau field office made use of GSA teletypewriter facilities as an emergency measure, pending installation of additional TWX teletype facilities, to handle a large volume of outgoing teletypes. This use of GSA facilities was not authorized by the Bureau.

I want it thoroughly understood that no use is to be made of any type of GSA communications facilities under any circumstances without prior Bureau approval, even in emergency situations.

1-28-64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-5

(C) CASES CLOSED UPON AUTHORITY OF SAC - REPORT WRITING -- Effective immediately you are instructed to maintain a control file on all cases closed by memorandum upon the authority of the SAC. This file should contain a copy of the closing memorandum for each of the cases so closed. Copies of correspondence on cases closed upon authority of the U. S. Attorney for legal reasons should not be placed in this control file nor should copies of reports sent to the Bureau advising the case is being closed upon the authority of the SAC.

This control file should be maintained from one inspection to another. The Inspector will review the cases closed upon the authority of the SAC by memorandum to insure they have received appropriate attention. After completion of the inspection the office will be advised in the inspection letter when they can destroy the memoranda in the control file.



(D) FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION MATTERS -- Effective February 1, 1964, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) is tightening up on certain certifications relative to home improvement loans it insures under its Title I program. For example, all borrowers, makers and cosigners must henceforth sign the completion certificate and the borrower's authorization certificate. Application for credit forms have been revised to include an amplified certificate by the salesman and by any person other than the borrower who prepares the application. In addition, the completion certificate has been strengthened by requiring a certification by the dealer that he has paid all his bills in connection with the work done or that he will do so within sixty days.

FHA has also informed Title I lending institutions that they will be expected to inspect one out of each ten home improvement jobs performed by a dealer for at least six months after approving same. Thereafter, spot checks are to be made as frequently as necessary to assure fidelity of the dealer's performance.

The foregoing new regulations should provide more data as to identity of persons responsible for preparation of forms and should cause lending institutions to take an active part in processing loans they insure in behalf of the Government. Since old forms may continue to be used in these cases, you must be careful to differentiate between the varying language of the certificates thereon.

These new instructions provide a suitable opportunity for discussion of FHA Matters with lending institutions, which are usually the first to learn of indicated violations. Effective liaison with such sources will assist your office in getting criminal cases more promptly through simultaneous notification of the FBI as well as FHA in such investigations. Vigorous efforts should be made to arrange for such prompt referrals. As you have been previously instructed, all cases in this classification must continue to receive expeditious, vigorous and imaginative attention.

(Security Letter on attached page)

1-28-64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-5

- 2 -

(E) CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES -- Reference is made to SAC Letter 63-33 (E) dated July 9, 1963. Referenced SAC Letter instructed field to discontinue investigations under three programs relating to Chinese entering United States as citizens, permanent resident aliens and students. It has been decided these programs will be permanently discontinued and instructions relating to them in Manual of Instructions, Section 105F, pages 4f - 4h, will be deleted.

Suggestions from all offices are solicited for new methods and approaches to uncover and penetrate Chinese Communist intelligence activities in the United States. Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington Field Offices are instructed to furnish suggestions, comments and recommendations for fresh methods of approach to the problem of uncovering and penetrating Chinese Communist activities in the United States, it being noted these offices handle the bulk of Chinese security cases under investigation. Submit required data under the caption "Chinese Communist Intelligence Operations in the United States," Bureau file 65-53286. Designate copies of communication for other five offices. Buded March 15, 1964.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

1-28-64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-5

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

February 27, 1964

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) SURVEILLANCES - RADIO TRANSMISSIONS -- You have been reminded repeatedly of the possibility that FBI radio transmissions may be heard by unauthorized individuals and that FM radio transmissions must be discreet at all times. Standing instructions in this regard are set out in Paragraph 9, Chapter 4, Part II, FBI Handbook, and are reiterated here for emphasis:

"FM radio transmissions must be discreet and names of Agents, subjects, or specific locations involved in Bureau investigative activities must not be disclosed. Credential card numbers should be used where identity of Agents is necessary in station-to-car and car-to-station operation. Two-way car call signs should be used for identification in other operations although coded names or call signs may be used as necessary in surveillance-type operations."

During a recent sensitive surveillance in an extremely important criminal case FBI radio transmissions were monitored by the subject of the surveillance. Notes made by the interceptor of these transmissions have been introduced in court. These notes disclose that in many instances the Agents did not abide by the above instructions. First names and/or initials of surveillance Agents were used; the subject of the surveillance was mentioned by first or last name; and general as well as specific locations of surveillance cars were reported without any attempt to prevent disclosure. Uncalled for and unnecessary remarks, among other things, also were recorded by the subject of the surveillance. Needless to say, this interception and divulgence of our radio communications has resulted in considerable embarrassment.

It is desired that this situation be brought to the attention of all personnel and the instructions as set out above reiterated. In addition, you are to personally examine the manner in which your FM radio facilities are being utilized to insure that the operation of such facilities is in strict accordance with existing Bureau instructions.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO 64-20  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

April 7, 1964

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(A) INCOME TAX RETURNS - EXCLUSION OF SICK PAY - FBI FORM BOOK -- The recent revision by Congress of the Federal income tax law changes the regulations concerning the exclusion of sick pay from taxable income. Insofar as Bureau employees are concerned, pay received for all periods of absences for sick purposes beginning on or after January 1, 1964, will not be excludable unless an absence exceeds thirty calendar days. Then only the pay for the portion of the absence in excess of thirty calendar days can be excluded. The maximum allowable exclusion is still \$100 per week. Pay for any period of absence due to illness which began prior to January 1, 1964, can still be excluded under the former regulations, regardless of its duration. Form FD-307, Application for Sick Leave Statement, has been revised. Enclosed are three copies of such form, one copy of which should be placed in the FBI Form Book. All employees of your office should be advised of this change in regulations.

You should assure that employees having excludable sick pay for absence beginning prior to January 1, 1964, submit their application on the form now in your office. Any remaining copies of the form should then be destroyed and the necessary supply of the revised form ordered from the Bureau.

4/7/64

SAC LETTER NO 64-20

(B) FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM -- There will be a limited opportunity registration period between now and 6-30-64 for employees who were not enrolled on 3-17-64 to enroll in a health benefit plan and employees who on 3-17-64 were enrolled for self only to change to a family enrollment in the same plan or option. The effective date of enrollments or changes in enrollment due to this limited opportunity registration period will be the first day of the pay period following the pay period the Health Benefits Registration Form (SF 2809) is received. On these registrations "P L." should be placed under "Remarks" of the SF 2809.

The following changes in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act were made possible by Public Law 88-254 which was approved on 3-17-64. Effective 3-17-64 unmarried children up to age 21 (instead of age 19) and foster children are included under an employee's family enrollment in the

Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP). To be considered a foster child, the child must be living with the employee in a parent-child relationship and the employee must intend to rear the child indefinitely into adulthood as if he were his own. Coverage is automatic and all plans will honor claims for medical care received on or after 3-17-64. Employees who are enrolled in a group-practice or individual-practice plan should write the plan giving the name and date of birth of any eligible foster child and any child aged 19 to 21. Employees enrolled in any other plan need take no action unless their plan requests this information.

Effective 6-21-64 the family-female with nondependent husband-enrollment will be dropped and female employees will be eligible to enroll in the regular family plan and will receive the same Government contribution (\$3.12 per pay period) as male employees enrolled in the family plan. It will not be necessary for a female employee enrolled in the family plan to execute an SF 2809 to change her enrollment code number. The adjustment will be automatic and will first appear in the pay check dated 7-17-64. Under separate cover you will be sent notices concerning these changes to be attached to the SF 2809A's.

Employees aged 19 to 21, who enrolled for self only because upon attainment of age 19 they lost coverage under a parent's family enrollment under the FEHBP, should immediately execute an SF 2809 to cancel their enrollment because they are now covered under a parent's family enrollment until age 21. Before cancelling his enrollment the employee should ensure that his parent is still enrolled in a plan under the FEHBP. Upon attainment of age 21 these employees will again be eligible to enroll for self only since they will lose their coverage under the parent's enrollment in the FEHBP. The employees will not be notified when they or a member of their family loses coverage. It is the employees' responsibility to follow and make any changes which would affect their enrollment. Appropriate arrangements are being made by the SAMBA Office concerning employees with children aged 19 to 21 enrolled in the SAMBA Student Health Benefit Plan and who are affected by these changes.

An employee enrolled in a plan under the FEHBP who purchased a conversion contract for a child who is not yet 21 should get in touch with his plan to cancel the conversion contract. The child will have a new conversion right when he reaches age 21 or his coverage as a family member terminates by marriage.

4/7/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-20

- 2 -

Employees enrolling in SAMBA due to the limited opportunity registration period are eligible for the minimum \$2,000 life insurance without evidence of insurability. Those applying for the additional amounts of \$4,000 or \$9,000 must execute the Personal Health Statement. Those applying for Dependents Group Life Insurance must execute a health statement on spouse and each dependent child.

You should personally ensure that the changes in the law and this limited opportunity registration period are brought to the attention of each employee in your office. There will not be any brochures issued in connection with this registration period. The Health Benefits Representative should carefully review all forms prior to submission to the Bureau.

4/7/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-20

(C) REPORT WRITING -- A recent Federal decision underscores the wisdom of the Bureau's long-standing policy that information favorable to the defense must be reported as completely and accurately as that favorable to the prosecution.

In U. S. ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins, 326 F. 2d 135 (1964), the Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, held that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused violates due process of law and requires reversal of the conviction. In this case, two witnesses to a robbery saw the defendant in police custody after arrest and "positively stated to the police" that the defendant was not the robber. These witnesses were not called by the prosecution and did not appear at trial. Two other witnesses positively identified the defendant. Convicted, the defendant moved for a new trial, submitting an affidavit of assigned counsel that counsel did not learn of the existence of the two uncalled witnesses until after trial had ended. After defendant exhausted his state remedies without relief, he brought habeas corpus in Federal district court where it was held that the prosecution had a duty to disclose the existence of the two witnesses favorable to the defense, and that failure to do so violated due process of law. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

Although Wilkins was a state case, the result would have been the same had it been a Federal case. The due process clause in the Fifth Amendment, applicable to Federal officers, and that in the Fourteenth Amendment, applicable to state officers, are of identical meaning. Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401 (1945).

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SAC LETTER NO. 64-20

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The rule announced in Wilkins springs from Supreme Court decisions holding that due process is violated by (1) conviction obtained through use of knowingly false and perjured testimony, Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103 (1935), (2) failure to correct unsolicited false testimony for the prosecution after discovery of its falsity, Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264 (1959), and (3) suppression of evidence favorable to the accused upon request of the accused for that evidence, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963).

The Wilkins decision places upon the U. S. Attorney an affirmative duty to disclose to the defense at least the existence of potential witnesses and other evidence for the defense that are known to him. He cannot perform that duty, however, unless the reports are so complete and accurate that he is able to identify such witnesses and evidence therein.

The significance of Wilkins for this Bureau is that reports in all cases must be so complete that they will serve to identify potential witnesses for the defense, state their observations with sufficient precision to make the position which they take clear to the U. S. Attorney, and similarly identify any other evidence for the defense encountered during the investigation. This includes, as held in Brady, evidence which is "material either to guilt or to punishment."

Statements of witnesses in any way favorable to the defense must be reported on form FD-302 just as are those of witnesses for the prosecution. It may be held that the defense can call for those statements. 34 Federal Rules Decisions 88 (1964).

The reporting must be as clear and as free from equivocation or ambiguity as the information encountered by the Agent will permit. For example, if a witness to a bank robbery sees the defendant after arrest and states that the defendant is not the robber, a report that the witness "failed to identify" the robber would be defective; the quoted words would not correctly show the position taken by the witness and hence would not put the U. S. Attorney on notice that the witness is potentially one for the defense.

The cited decisions and these instructions are not to be interpreted as requiring the government to make an investigation for the defense. They go no further (for FBI purposes) than to require that if, while making the usual and proper investigation for the government, we come upon evidence

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SAC LETTER NO. 64-20

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of any kind seemingly favorable to the defendant, we must report the existence and nature of that evidence accurately and completely. This has long been the FBI rule, but current developments suggest that it should be reiterated.

These instructions must be brought to the attention of all investigative personnel immediately.

4/7/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-20

(D) LAW ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCES, 1964 - "THE FLEEING FELON" -- Law Enforcement Conferences in 1964 will concern fugitive investigations; they will be called "The Fleeing Felon" conferences. Subject matter will encompass assistance FBI can render to local law enforcement under the Fugitive Felon Act and through other cooperative functions, and principles involved in fugitive investigations. Schedule sufficient conferences to cover your territory adequately; wherever possible, utilize sites that are readily accessible to local law enforcement and others invited to your conferences. Conferences should be held between September 15 and November 1, 1964; adjoining offices should be advised of your conference plans; border offices may invite nearby Canadian and Mexican police officials. Conference agenda should be limited to four to six hours; should be of the open-forum type, with necessary talks restricted to 15 minutes; audience participation should be encouraged. Qualified speakers from local law enforcement, prosecutors, and related fields, may be used as panelists; names of contemplated panelists should be checked through your indices and the Bureau advised of the results. Attendance of undesirables should be avoided, and representatives of commercial concerns should not be invited.

You are authorized to prepare friendly but businesslike circular letters of invitation to be sent to police officials, sheriffs' departments, penal institutions, state correctional agencies, local and state prosecutors, and others in related fields who might refer unlawful flight matters to the Bureau.

You may desire to utilize police instructors in the planning of interesting and informative programs; however, you should preside at each conference personally. Potential curricula topics are:

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SAC LETTER NO. 64-20

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## National Crime Trends

- Crimes of violence against public
- Killers of law enforcement officers
- Ten Most Wanted Fugitives Program (importance of publicizing fugitives)

## What Local Authorities Can Do

- Detailed investigation of crime and processing of crime scene
- Conclusive identification of subject
  - Detailed description
  - Prior arrest numbers
  - Background information
- Sources of fingerprints; obtaining details of prior arrests
- Sources of photographs
- Sources of handwriting specimens
- Communication facilities; roadblocks, etc.

## What FBI Can Do

- Fugitive Felon Act
- FBI Identification Division assistance
- FBI Laboratory assistance
- Identification Orders; Wanted Flyers

## Investigative Procedures

- Personal history and background of fugitive, including preferences as to clothing, food, amusements, transportation, etc.
- Relatives, friends, associates of fugitive
- Use of informants and other sources of information
- Coverage of transportation facilities (air, rail, motor, water)
- Coverage of motels, hotels, rooming houses, etc.

## State Extradition Laws and Procedures

## Apprehension Techniques

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SAC LETTER NO. 64-20

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Implementation and/or substitution of topics may be made in accordance with needs and interests in various areas; Training Document #22, "Fugitives," should afford assistance.

Agenda of your proposed conferences, listing all speakers to be invited, as well as dates and sites, should be submitted to the Bureau on UACB basis at least 30 days prior to holding of your first conference. Advise Bureau by June 15 of tentative plans as to where and when your conferences will be held. A national press release will be made regarding these conferences; do not disclose subject matter or planning until after national press release; you will be provided with a copy of the national release and will be authorized to make appropriate releases locally.

Conferences should be closed to all but duly constituted law enforcement personnel and those in related fields who have a bona fide interest in fugitive matters. Designate a period, either immediately before or after each conference, to be open to news media representatives, during which you may explain the purposes and accomplishments of the conference; the interest of news media should be encouraged.

Material for distribution at your conferences, such as Law Enforcement Bulletin reprints, etc., should be ordered by routing slip from Crime Records Division as early as possible. Bureau will not be able to prepare special exhibits or posters; do not incur expenses for rental of space, etc., without prior Bureau authority.

Within a week following your last conference, advise Bureau of results of all conferences, giving the total number in attendance, number of agencies represented, dates and places where conferences were held, and total number of conferences completed. Summary letter should report specific statements of interest by those in attendance, as well as suggestions for improving future law enforcement conferences. Forward sampling of newspaper publicity, and any unusual publicity items noted. Correspondence should be directed to attention Training Division, under caption "Law Enforcement Conferences, 1964, "The Fleeing Felon," Bureau file (88-11941).

4/7/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-20

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(E) CASES CLOSED UPON AUTHORITY OF SAC - REPORT WRITING -- I wish to re-emphasize my concern over premature closing of unsolved cases. In order to insure the Bureau has fulfilled its responsibilities under the law, it is imperative that every step be taken to make certain that existing instructions are fully complied with.

It was necessary to require that no unsolved<sup>W</sup> bank robbery cases be closed upon authority of the Special Agent in Charge (SAC), and if present regulations are not strictly adhered to it will become necessary to remove all authority to close cases by the SAC. The importance of this matter should be clearly understood by all employees. As you are aware, the closing of cases upon SAC authority will be checked into in connection with inspections and any derelictions will be subject to appropriate administrative action.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures for (A)

4/7/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-20



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 64-21

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

April 14, 1964

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY - 1965 SESSIONS -- The Seventy-fifth Session of the FBI National Academy will be held March 15 to June 2, 1965. The Seventy-sixth Session will be held August 16 to November 3, 1965. You will be advised at a later date when nominations for these Sessions should be submitted.

4/14/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-21

(B) PERSONNEL - PROMOTIONAL POLICY REGARDING CLERICAL EMPLOYEES -- Effective immediately whenever a clerical employee is passed over for a promotional opportunity, he must be advised of the reason and a written record made of the fact that such action was taken. This rule applies to all cases irrespective of the number of employees being passed over. Appropriate manual changes will be submitted shortly.

In addition, you are reminded at this time of the long-standing policy requiring that all vacancies must be filled on the basis of merit and fitness and that under no circumstances should a recommendation leading to a promotion be made on the basis of seniority alone. Moreover, when an employee is being passed over for a promotional opportunity, detailed justification must be submitted and vague comments such as "not as well qualified" or "attitude not as good" are not considered acceptable. You should also make certain that the reasons given employees for being passed over are consistent with the reasons furnished to the Bureau. There can be absolutely no exceptions to the above regulations.

4/14/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-21

(C) FBIRA MATTER - INTEROFFICE FIREARMS COMPETITION (PPC) 1964 -- The Annual Interoffice Firearms Competition for 1964 will be held during the third outdoor firearms training. The "J. Edgar Hoover Practical Pistol Course Trophy" will be presented to the office having the highest average percentage score, plus handicap, of all Special Agents assigned to the office on July 1, 1964, not on limited duty.

The handicap scoring system explained in SAC Letter 63-25 will be used and handicaps will be based on the past four years of competition.

Field offices will be divided into groups according to Agent complement (Washington Headquarters being considered an office for this competition). The winning offices in each category will be cited for "honorable mention." The offices winning first, second and third place in the over-all competition will not be eligible to receive the "honorable mention" citations.

Competition rules, method of reporting scores and individual office handicaps are being forwarded separately.

4/14/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-21

(D) SEARCHES AND SEIZURES -- Two unanimous search and seizure decisions handed down by the Supreme Court on March 23, 1964, must be brought to the attention of all investigative personnel. Both are important and one makes a significant change in the law.

In Stoner v. California, police officers entered the subject's hotel room, by consent of the night clerk; after being advised by the clerk that the subject was out of the room as shown by his room key being in the mailbox. The officers searched the room and took several articles which were used as evidence at trial. The subject was arrested in another state two days later.

The conviction was reversed on the ground that the evidence taken from the hotel room was obtained by a search and seizure which was unreasonable because it was based on consent of the hotel clerk rather than consent of the subject. "No less than a tenant of a house, or the occupant of a room in a boarding house, a guest in a hotel room is entitled to constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures." The tenant has the possessory right in the room which he has rented, and that right is one "which only the petitioner (subject) could waive by word or deed, either directly or through an agent." There was in this case, as in most, no evidence to indicate that the tenant had authorized the clerk to consent to a search of the tenant's room.

The Stoner decision only reiterates the prevailing rule on this point.

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In Preston v. U. S., four police officers of a small city arrested three men in a parked car at 3:00 a. m. on vagrancy charges. The car was not searched at the time of arrest. It was driven by an officer to the station, from which it was towed to a garage. Soon after the subjects were booked at the station, some of the police officers went to the garage to search the car and found two loaded revolvers in the glove compartment. They were unable to open the trunk and returned to the station, where a detective told one of the officers to go back and try to get into the trunk. The officer did so, was able to enter the trunk through the back seat of the car, and in the trunk found various items adapted to the perpetration of a robbery. After the searches, one of the men confessed that he and two others intended to rob a bank nearby. At this point Bureau Agents were called in and the materials found in the car were turned over to them. It was contended by the defense that the use of these materials at trial violated the Fourth Amendment.

The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, stating that the search of the car was unreasonable and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible. The search of the car was unreasonable because it was made at a time and place different from that of the arrest and thus was "simply not incident to the arrest." Search of a vehicle or fixed premises incidental to arrest therein must be made contemporaneously with the arrest - following the arrest and at the same place. Searches of such places incidental to arrest are an exception to the basic rule that all such searches must be made by search warrant. Once the car in this case had been taken to the garage under police custody, the subjects could no longer use any weapons therein to attack the officers, nor destroy the evidence therein, nor hide the car from the police. The reason for granting an exception to the basic rule requiring searches by search warrant had disappeared.

The Government's brief before the Supreme Court in this case cited three earlier Federal decisions allowing search of a vehicle, incidental to arrest, at a time and place different from that of arrest where neither the time nor the distance was great. These decisions, although not mentioned in the opinion, must be taken as overruled.

An alternative method of searching the vehicle in situations like this is by consent. Consent searches, however, are only another exception to the basic rule that searches must be made by search warrant. The

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genuinely voluntary consent necessary to sustain a consent search often is difficult to prove, and particularly so in the case of a person under arrest and denying guilt.

The vehicle searched here was owned by one of the subjects and lawfully occupied by all three. This was not a stolen car case. A thief or other trespasser, having no legal right to occupy the vehicle or other place searched, has no rights which can be violated by search of the vehicle or place. It will be assumed that this rule continues for stolen vehicle cases since the court did not decide that issue in this case.

4/14/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-21

(E) "FBI CODE 98" - MOTION PICTURE -- Warner Brothers has released as a motion picture a show entitled "FBI Code 98." It was originally designed as a two-hour television spectacular, but due to its success abroad, it has been released as a motion picture here in this country. This motion picture deals with a hypothetical case wherein an attempt is made at sabotage in connection with a national defense situation. Accordingly, the number "98" is used in the title. This motion picture was made with the full cooperation of the Bureau and is now showing in New York City. For your information, it has received favorable reviews and it is felt employees will enjoy seeing this show.

4/14/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-21

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(F) FALSE ADVERTISING OR MISUSE OF NAME TO INDICATE FEDERAL AGENCY -- Section 19 of the Peace Corps Act was amended by the 88th Congress and approved by the President on December 13, 1963. The provisions of the amendment are set forth as follows:

Section 19 of the Peace Corps Act, as amended, which relates to the Peace Corps seal, is amended by striking out the short title and substituting therefor "Exclusive Right to Seal and Name", by inserting "(a)" before "The President may," and by adding a new subsection as follows:

"(b) (1) The use of the official seal or emblem and the use of the name 'Peace Corps' shall be restricted exclusively to designate programs authorized under this Act.

"(2) Whoever, whether an individual, partnership, corporation, or association, uses the seal for which provision is made in this section, or any sign, insignia, or symbol in colorable imitation thereof, or the words 'Peace Corps' or any combination of these or other words or characters in colorable imitation thereof, other than to designate programs authorized under this Act, shall be fined not more than \$500 or imprisoned not more than six months, or both. A violation of this subsection may be enjoined at the suit of the Attorney General, United States attorneys, or other persons duly authorized to represent the United States."

Upon receipt of complaints regarding violations of this newly adopted amendment, the field should immediately conduct appropriate investigation to develop full facts in order that timely presentation may be made to the appropriate U. S. Attorney in the district where the violation occurred to determine if the case has prosecutive merit. The character of such violations will be "False Advertising or Misuse of Name to Indicate Federal Agency" and the classification will be 43.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover


Director

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SAC LETTER NO. 64-21

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

April 1, 1964

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

PERSONAL

NO NUMBER SAC LETTER

64-B

RE: NAME

NAME is a member of the Communist Party in Chicago, Illinois. He has been trained in and is currently engaged in the electronics field in the Chicago area.

NAME OF OFFICIAL, Communist Party, USA, has instructed NAME to perfect an instrument which would locate listening devices and which can be used for the purpose of checking Party offices and residences of various Party leaders. NAME is working on such an instrument and has stated that at this stage his instrument probably will not locate listening devices unless the FBI has insecurely installed such devices. NAME is continuing to perfect his instrument and feels he is capable of developing an instrument which will be able to make a thorough security check of the various Party offices, meeting places and residences of Party leaders.

The Chicago Office should alert the Bureau and any interested offices when it is known that NAME will be traveling to another territory. This matter should be brought to the attention of appropriate investigative personnel and each office must be constantly alert for NAME'S activities in its area and take necessary steps to neutralize his effectiveness and protect our sensitive sources at all times.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

April 28, 1964

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) DIRECTOR S TESTIMONY ON JANUARY 29 1964. BEFORE THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS - FISCAL YEAR 1965 -- Copies of my testimony before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations on January 29, 1964, regarding the 1965 appropriation request of the FBI. will be sent to you office in the near future. These copies are to be made available to the personnel of your office who desire to review a copy. There will be one copy for every two employees in the supply furnished.

4/ 8/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-23

(B) **NAME AND ADDRESS** - INFORMATION CONCERNING -- **NAME** is currently engaged in a campaign of disseminating to FBI Offices, Federal agencies, members of Congress and other prominent individuals, communications apparently authored by her. These communications relate to the assassination of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy and are critical of the FBI. She reportedly is conducting her own investigation of the assassination which has included telephonic and personal interviews of principals connected with this investigation.

**NAME** has been previously interviewed and exhibited an insulting, argumentative and antagonistic attitude toward the FBI and its personnel. She recently contacted one of our Southwest offices by telephone and although identifying herself, endeavored to elicit information pertinent to the assassination by using the pretext of belonging to a ladies garden club. Two days later this office received a communication which in effect was a transcript of **NAME**'s telephone conversation with our Agent.

It would appear **NAME** is endeavoring to embarrass the FBI and may possibly telephone your office under pretext. You should be extremely circumspect in any dealings with her and be particularly alert to the possibility she may be recording your conversation. Any contacts with **NAME** or pertinent data developed relating to her should be promptly furnished to the Bureau marked for the attention of the Crime Records Division. Letters from **NAME** are not being acknowledged by the Bureau.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 64-24

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

May 5, 1964

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

(A) VOUCHERS - AMENDMENT TO STANDARDIZED GOVERNMENT TRAVEL REGULATIONS - PER DIEM ALLOWANCES -- Effective May 1, 1964, a per diem rate equal to one-half of the maximum rate prescribed for a particular area will be authorized for official travel of less than 24 hours when a night's lodging is not required. This change in the per diem rate is in accordance with an amendment to the Standardized Government Travel Regulations prescribed by the Bureau of the Budget. A copy of Bureau of the Budget Circular No. A-7, dated April 9, 1964, with Attachment A is enclosed. Travel vouchers having a per diem claim for travel of less than 24 hours computed at the maximum per diem rate for a particular area must be supported by a certification that an expense for a night's lodging was incurred. Employees who have an occasion to perform official travel should be advised of this change in per diem rates.

5/5/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-24

(B) SECURITY OF TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS - SECURITY INFORMANTS - CRIMINAL INFORMANTS - RACIAL INFORMANTS -- Recently a conversation relating to hoodlum activities between an informant in one city and his contacting Agent in another city was overheard by a telephone operator, who reported to a local hoodlum that she had listened to part of a telephone conversation between an unknown individual and a Special Agent of the FBI. The operator was instructed by the hoodlum to continue to be alert for any similar calls. The telephone call was made by a criminal informant, who used a code name, and his identity is not known to the underworld.

Instruct all informants to be most discreet and exercise caution in telephone calls to contacting Agents even in those instances when calls may be made to an unlisted number. Informants should always use their code names and avoid making collect calls, as such calls require handling by an operator who will know or can determine that the location being called is the FBI. All Agents should, likewise, be cautioned to make certain that they are careful in their conversations over the telephone, especially, on long distance calls to a field office.

Security of our informants and of our investigative operations requires that we be most circumspect in the use of all communications media, particularly the telephone, which is subject to monitoring by company employees.

(C) FEDERAL RESERVE ACT - RESEARCH MATTER -- Beginning July 1, 1964, for a duration of one year the Bureau is initiating a survey into each case wherein a conviction is obtained under the Federal Reserve Act. The purpose of this survey is to obtain data to be utilized in accounting training, newspaper articles and in the preparation of speeches.

Each office will be furnished under separate cover a supply of a form to be submitted at the time a conviction is reported in each Federal Reserve Act case. It is desired that this form be completed from the information developed during the investigation of the case.

Each office is to institute use of this form commencing with each conviction obtained in U. S. District Court on or after July 1, 1964, in matters of this nature.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosure for (A)

5/5/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-24

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PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 64-C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

May 20, 1964

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

**RE: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA - SECURITY MEASURES**

The Bureau has learned recently that Communist Party, USA, members are taking extra security precautions to determine whether or not any individual has entered their room or tampered with papers and material left in the room during the absence of such members. It is reasonable to assume that such precautions prevail in the residences and offices of Communist Party members and leaders.

This should be brought to the attention of all investigative personnel in the security field so as to preclude jeopardizing the future success of the Bureau's activities and operations. Every precaution must be taken so that during the course of contacting most sensitive sources, the same physical conditions exist subsequent to the contact as existed prior thereto.

Advise the Bureau promptly of any pertinent information received which relates to this matter.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

**PERSONAL**  
**NO NUMBER LETTER 64-D**  
**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE**  
**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

June 22, 1964

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

**RE: TRAINING - SOUND SCHOOL**

In accordance with the Bureau's continuing program of insuring that each field office has adequate technically trained personnel available, the Bureau desires that you submit the names of all Special Agents in your field division who are seriously interested in receiving sound school training. A technical background, such as that gained through formal education in science, engineering and technical subjects or through practical experience in telephony, radio communication and electronic repair, is most desirable, although not absolutely necessary. Lacking that, an Agent should possess considerable mechanical aptitude and some proficiency in one or more building trades such as woodworking, carpentry, masonry, electrical wiring, etc. A factual, detailed statement should be provided as to each Agent's technical background and/or mechanical aptitude and proficiency in order to permit a worthwhile evaluation of his capability.

As you are aware, each Sound-trained Agent is afforded specialized lock training. The Bureau will continue to afford this training at sound school. However, some offices may have need for lock-trained Agents over and above the Agents who will receive lock training at future sound schools. In addition to furnishing background information on all Agents interested in sound training, you are to assess the need for sound men in your field division projected as accurately as possible one year and three years from the date of this letter. You should likewise assess the projected need for any lock men needed over and above the number of sound men indicated above.

A reply, marked to the attention of the FBI Laboratory, should be submitted within forty-five days after the receipt of this letter.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 64-E  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

July 6, 1964

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

**RE: SECURITY INFORMANTS AND  
SOURCES - INCOME TAXES**

No Number SAC Letter 63-E dated March 27, 1963, contained full details and instructions for a withholding plan through which it was hoped security informants could satisfy their Federal income tax obligations arising from payments made to them for services without jeopardizing their security. The plan was tried on a limited basis and has proven to be sound and effective. As a result, it will be expanded to include all field divisions effective January 1, 1965. Under the plan, payments to certain security informants and sources for services rendered will be subject to a 20 per cent withholding tax.

There are four categories of circumstances in which taxes will not be withheld. Taxes are not to be withheld from payments made (1) to other than security informants and sources, (2) for reimbursement of expenses, (3) under SAC authority, or (4) to informants who have been able to report Bureau income on their Federal tax returns without jeopardizing their security or without challenge from the Internal Revenue Service.

To place the plan into effect, you should immediately review the personal situation of each security informant and source. Where circumstances warrant using the procedure, the matter should be discussed with each informant or source involved. It should be explained to each that the withholding procedure to be placed into effect January 1, 1965, is being adopted to afford a secure method of meeting Federal income tax obligations in regard to money received from the FBI for services. The Bureau must be advised by November 1, 1964; of the identity of each informant to be exempted from this program and the method to be used by each in reporting his Bureau income.

In operating the plan, you should be alert to streamline the procedures. For example, instructions call for a check to be drawn for the gross amount of an authorized payment. After it is cashed, the amount to be withheld for taxes is deducted and deposited in the special checking account; however, it is not necessary to make a deposit in connection with each such transaction. If it would simplify the matter, there would be no objection to making one deposit at the end of each day for the total amount of money withheld that day from payments to all informants.

In instances where the procedure is not used for certain informants or sources, you should continue to instruct them to satisfy their tax obligations on income received from the FBI by such methods as may be proper and feasible.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

7/6/64

NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 64-E

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



August 25, 1964

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to  
 File No.

(A) ARREST AND ARRAIGNMENT - CONFESSIONS - RIGHT TO COUNSEL -- SAC Letter 64-40 (E) advised you that effective immediately, and upon the advice of the Department of Justice, all investigative personnel are to warn arrested subjects of a right to free counsel. The warning required is more fully stated in referenced SAC Letter.

The new warning is not to be given to persons not under arrest and not charged with the crime, who are being interviewed as suspects only. To tell this latter type of person that he has a right to free counsel is subject to interpretation as a threat that he is about to be arrested or charged with a crime since otherwise he would not be appearing before a judge at all.

Bring these clarifying instructions to the attention of all investigative personnel immediately.

8/25/64  
 SAC LETTER NO. 64-43

(B) FBI SUGGESTION PROGRAM -- The following tabulations show the results of participation by the field in the FBI Suggestion Program during Fiscal Year 1964:

OFFICE	SUGGESTIONS	ADOPTED	SUBMISSIONS		1963	CHANGE
			AGENT	CLERK	TOTAL	
Albany	3	1	2	1	7	- 4
Albuquerque	11	2	4	7	16	- 5
Anchorage	9	3	1	8	2	+ 7
Atlanta	9	3	5	4	10	- 1
Baltimore	12	3	9	3	15	- 3
Birmingham	2	0	0	2	4	- 2
Boston	5	0	5	0	13	- 8
Buffalo	2	0	2	0	4	- 2
Butte	10	5	10	0	5	+ 5
Charlotte	28	11	16	12	24	+ 4
Chicago	14	4	10	4	23	- 9
Cincinnati	22	7	13	9	23	- 1
Cleveland	18	1	11	7	12	+ 6
Dallas	6	0	4	2	21	- 15

<u>OFFICE</u>	<u>SUGGESTIONS</u>	<u>ADOPTED</u>	<u>SUBMISSIONS</u>		<u>1963 TOTAL</u>	<u>CHANGE</u>
			<u>AGENT</u>	<u>CLERK</u>		
Denver	5	1	4	1	6	- 1
* Detroit	10	3	6	4	14	- 4
El Paso	16	4	7	9	6	+ 10
Honolulu	10	0	4	6	5	+ 5
Houston	5	1	3	2	4	+ 1
Indianapolis	4	0	3	1	3	+ 1
Jacksonville	5	0	4	1	9	- 4
Kansas City	16	2	11	5	8	+ 8
Knoxville	6	0	4	2	10	- 4
Las Vegas	2	0	0	2	5	- 3
Little Rock	6	3	1	5	2	+ 4
Los Angeles	16	7	15	1	24	- 8
Louisville	3	0	1	2	11	- 8
Memphis	6	2	4	2	4	+ 2
Miami	9	0	7	2	6	+ 3
Milwaukee	9	1	6	3	9	----
Minneapolis	6	2	6	0	12	- 6
Mobile	6	1	3	3	9	- 3
Newark	15	2	6	9	16	- 1
New Haven	7	2	3	4	12	- 5
* New Orleans	2	0	2	0	10	- 8
New York City	50	7	43	7	54	- 4
Norfolk	6	2	4	2	7	- 1
* Oklahoma City	17	1	13	4	14	+ 3
Omaha	2	1	0	2	3	- 1
Philadelphia	11	2	6	5	17	- 6
Phoenix	10	2	6	4	7	+ 3
Pittsburgh	8	1	6	2	7	+ 1
Portland	1	0	1	0	5	- 4
Richmond	6	1	6	0	8	- 2
Saint Louis	8	2	5	3	11	- 3
Salt Lake City	4	1	3	1	5	- 1
San Antonio	8	1	3	5	7	+ 1
San Diego	17	4	12	5	8	+ 9
San Francisco	31	2	24	7	31	----
San Juan	6	1	5	1	11	- 5

5/25/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-43

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OFFICE	SUGGESTIONS	ADOPTED	SUBMISSIONS		1963	CHANGE
			AGENT	CLERK	TOTAL	
Savannah	26	2	14	12	15	+11
Seattle	20	1	16	4	28	- 8
Springfield	23	1	13	10	24	- 1
Tampa	33	9	20	13	17	+16
Washington Field	26	9	21	5	33	- 7
Bern	3	2	1	2	3	----
Bonn	4	2	2	2	3	+ 1
London	1	0	1	0	3	- 2
Madrid	0	0	0	0	3	- 3
Manila	3	0	2	1	0	+ 3
Mexico City	8	2	3	5	9	- 1
Ottawa	2	1	2	0	3	- 1
Paris	5	2	3	2	6	- 1
Rio de Janeiro	0	0	0	0	0	----
Rome	12	3	9	3	0	+12
Tokyo	15	6	13	2	9	+ 6
TOTALS	<u>681</u>	<u>139</u>	<u>449</u>	<u>232</u>	<u>715</u>	<u>-34</u>

It should be noted that the Madrid Office ceased to function as of 12/18/63. The Jackson Office, which was created 7/10/64, is not shown in the foregoing list.

Offices whose designations are preceded by an asterisk still have suggestions pending resolution.

While the actual number of submissions declined slightly from the previous year, our percentage of adoption, which was 30.8%, improved substantially and exceeds the National adoption rate of 24-26%. The anticipated tangible savings of almost \$44,000 also surpassed last year's total.

I want to take this opportunity to thank all of our employees for the interest manifested by their participation in this vital program and to ask that this excellent spirit of cooperation continue to characterize our efforts during the present year.

8/25/64  
SAC LETTER NO. 64-43

(C) JUVENILES - DEFERRED/PROSECUTION SYSTEM - FINGERPRINTING -- A question has been raised by the field concerning the necessity or advisability of obtaining the fingerprints of a juvenile who is summoned to the office of the United

8/25/64  
SAC LETTER NO. 64-43

States Attorney to be handled under the Deferred Prosecution System, commonly known as the Brooklyn Plan, and who is not arrested at any stage of the proceedings against him.

The Department has advised that its policy is that if a juvenile is arrested his fingerprints are to be taken, but in any case where the juvenile is not arrested his fingerprints should not be obtained. Moreover, that "whenever possible" juveniles who are to be handled under the Brooklyn Plan should not be arrested. An arrest tends to defeat one of the prime purposes of the Plan, which is to avoid giving the juvenile the stigma of a criminal record.

You are to be guided by the above instructions. In the cases of juveniles not arrested, no attempt of any kind should be made to obtain the fingerprints of the juvenile, either by consent or otherwise.

8/25/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-43

(D) 'TESTIMONY OF AGENTS'-- A Federal trial judge has criticized severely a Special Agent of the FBI for having "volunteered" testimony that was irrelevant to the case being tried, and possibly so prejudicial to one defendant as to constitute grounds for mistrial.

In response to questions asked upon direct examination, the Agent testified to relevant statements made to him by a second defendant. At the conclusion of this testimony, the prosecutor asked, "Then what did Mr. \_\_\_\_\_ say?" After attempting to avoid answering this question, the Agent was directed by the judge to answer the question first and to offer any necessary explanation later. The Agent then testified to an additional remark made by one defendant which linked another defendant to a separate and distinct crime of state jurisdiction.

The correct answer to the prosecutor's question asked under the circumstances is "nothing about this matter," or other words having the same meaning. Such an answer truthfully admits that something else was said, but also puts the court on notice that in the judgment of the Agent the additional remarks have no relevancy to the issues at trial. If the judge doubts the Agent's judgment as to relevancy, he can dismiss the jury and direct the Agent to answer the question out of the jury's hearing. If the judge persists in directing the Agent to answer without dismissing the jury, as might conceivably occur, the responsibility for bringing improper testimony into the trial is that of the judge, not the Agent.

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SAC LETTER NO. 64-43

- 4 -

Doubts concerning relevancy can best be resolved by conferring with the prosecutor before trial. In any event, all investigative personnel in your office must be advised that whether through conferences with the prosecutor or exercise of the Agent's own judgment on the stand, it is expected that testimony will be confined to matters which are relevant.

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SAC LETTER NO. 64-43

(E) FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY - MEMBERSHIP IN FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY POSSIBLE CLUB -- As the result of a recent suggestion, a National Academy Possible Club will be initiated and a medal will be awarded to National Academy (NA) students and graduates in good standing who shoot a perfect score on the Practical Pistol Course (PPC) either on the ranges at Quantico or during regularly scheduled Bureau firearms sessions in the field under the same conditions as required of Special Agents.

Names of NA men who shoot perfect scores on a record run of the PPC will be placed on an FBINA Possible Club Plaque at the FBI Academy at Quantico. In each case, the Special Agent in Charge must submit a letter (original and three copies) to the Bureau marked for the attention of the FBINA Desk in the Training Division. This letter must specifically certify that the possible was shot during a regularly scheduled firearms session on a record run over the prescribed distances and within the prescribed time limits for the PPC. The letter must contain the names of the observer who witnessed the shooting of the target and the firearms instructor who was in charge of the firearms session and who must have personally scored the target.

All 50 hits in the K-5 area of the target must be clearly distinguishable. If there is any question as to the correct score on any target, it should be forwarded to the Bureau, Attention: Training Division, for final scoring.

A graduate who fired a possible while attending the NA will be awarded a medal only upon his specific request and subject to verification by existing Bureau records. The award will not be made retroactive for those who have fired possibles during a regularly scheduled FBI field office firearms session but will be placed into effect to include all firearms sessions subsequent to August 15, 1964. For membership in the Possible Club the perfect score must be fired with either a Bureau-issue-type revolver or a personally owned revolver with no more than a four-inch barrel.

8/25/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-43

- 5 -

(F) WORK-RELATED INJURIES - FISCAL YEAR 1964 -- Enclosed is a statistical compilation covering work-related injuries sustained in the field during fiscal year 1964. This report should be compared with the report furnished to you by SAC Letter 63-40. There was an increase of 23 injuries during fiscal year 1964. The injury rate throughout the Bureau for fiscal year 1964 was approximately 3.72 per cent. If your office exceeds this average rate of work-related injuries, you must immediately take any action necessary to reduce the number of work-related injuries. All employees should be advised of the necessity of our safety programs and instructed to use every safety precaution in the performance of their duties.

(Security Letter on attached page )

8/25/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-43

- 6 -

(G) COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE FBI -- Information developed by *THIRD AGENCY CONSIDERATION* classified "Secret/No Foreign Dissem," which reportedly originated with a communist leader in Panama having good knowledge of Communist Party security activities, reveals the Security Organization (SO) of the Communist Party of Panama has listed a number of United States Government entities in Panama as targets on which information is to be collected by the SO. The FBI is specifically mentioned as a target.

Although Bureau has no personnel assigned in Panama, all personnel should be most alert during investigations for any indications that Panamanian Communist Party or any other foreign subversive group is attempting to penetrate the FBI or other United States agency. Applicant investigations involving persons with Panamanian background should be most thoroughly investigated.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosure for (F)

8/25/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-43

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

September 29, 1964

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) THOROUGHNESS OF INVESTIGATIONS -- You are aware that the results of many phases of our investigations are given extremely wide dissemination at Seat of Government to all executive branches of the Government including the White House. The excellence or conversely the lack of excellence of our reports and memoranda reporting the results of our investigations is the standard by which we are judged.

I am gravely concerned over the gross derelictions exhibited by various offices in conducting and reporting investigations of extreme importance recently. In numerous instances the Bureau has received communications from recipients of our reports and memoranda which pointed out gaps in our investigations as well as other defects and shortcomings.

It is your responsibility to insure that our investigations are thorough, complete, and reported in an incisive manner. Our reports should be such that at no time will a situation arise where gaps or defects in our investigations can be called to our attention.

There must be an immediate improvement in this over-all situation. Any necessity to call the above-mentioned facts to your attention in the future will result in severe administrative action.

*Reviewed by  
M. Talley 8/27/25*



(B) ACCOMPLISHMENTS - PRESENTATION OF CASES TO UNITED STATES ATTORNEY -- Criminal investigations handled by the FBI are designed to obtain evidence for prosecution in Federal court and not in state or local courts. When Agents discuss cases with the U. S. Attorney (USA) or his assistant, it is expected that such will be done with sufficient aggressiveness to insure the Bureau's interests are protected.

While it is the prerogative of the USA and his staff to authorize prosecution, it is stressed that we do not have the manpower to investigate violations which are later prosecuted in other than Federal courts. During presentations of cases to USA's, it is expected that the amount of time and effort expended by Bureau personnel will be mentioned in its proper perspective. Consideration can then be given to this factor by the USA prior to deciding whether he will decline prosecution in favor of handling by local authorities. You should bear in mind that if a case is investigated by the FBI and prosecuted in local court additional Agent time and expense may well be lost if Bureau personnel are called on to testify in state court.

Effective immediately, whenever Federal prosecution is declined by a USA or his assistant in favor of prosecution by local authorities, and investigation has been conducted by Bureau personnel, the Bureau should be notified immediately by airtel or more expeditious means depending on the circumstances involved. This communication should contain a concise summary of the violation, the extent of the investigation conducted by your office, and the specific reason why the USA feels the matter should be handled in local court. You should also include your recommendations as to whether this matter should be taken up with departmental officials at the headquarters level.

This notification to the Bureau does not apply to cases involving juveniles or where the USA declines in favor of handling in local court prior to investigation being conducted by your office.

These instructions do not alter the requirement that the Bureau be immediately advised when USA's decline prosecution in criminal matters where military personnel are involved.

The above should be brought to the attention of all investigative personnel:

Appropriate manual changes follow..

(Security Letter on attached page)

9/29/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-48

- 2 -

(C) SECURITY INDEX - CHINA - CUBA -- Arrangements have been worked out with the Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for the special handling of Chinese and Cuban aliens on the Security Index (SI) in time of a limited emergency. As a result thereof, any information received through our sources in connection with our SI responsibilities indicating a change in residence and/or employment of a Chinese or Cuban alien on the SI would be of immediate interest to INS on a local level. INS headquarters and the Department have also expressed a desire to promptly receive information of this type in addition to that routinely furnished by reports and letterhead memoranda.

Form FD-366 has been devised and is currently being utilized in connection with our program to keep Secret Service promptly advised of changes of residence and/or employment of SI subjects. In view of the above, when submitting form FD-366 reporting changes concerning Chinese and Cuban aliens in the future, furnish one copy to INS as well as Secret Service locally. Also furnish four copies instead of the normal two copies to the Bureau for appropriate dissemination at the Seat of Government.

Bear in mind, however, in filling out the reference on the FD-366 that some memoranda have been expressly prepared for dissemination to Secret Service only, and have not been furnished to the Department or INS; therefore, the copy furnished INS locally and two of the copies furnished the Bureau should reference the last communication to INS.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

9/29/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-48

- 3 -



*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

**PERSONAL**  
**NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 64-F**  
**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE**  
**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

October 26, 1964

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

**RE: PREPARATION OF ABSTRACTS IN CONNECTION WITH  
CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS AND  
"JUNE" MATERIAL**

Detailed summaries of highly sensitive information set forth in communications in criminal intelligence investigations are not desirable on abstracts submitted with these communications. Accordingly, all Agents handling criminal intelligence investigations should be cautioned to avoid inclusion of unnecessary sensitive information on abstracts in such matters.

In cases where it is necessary to mark a communication or memorandum "June," the body of the accompanying abstract should contain no reference to any highly confidential techniques, and, further, the information contained in these abstracts should be carefully paraphrased so as not to reveal the presence or nature of the technique utilized. These regulations apply to both the field and the Seat of Government.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 64-52  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

October 27, 1964

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) HOUSEHOLD GOODS - COMMUTATION OF EXPENSES FOR TRANSPORTATION OF HOUSEHOLD GOODS AND PERSONAL EFFECTS -- The General Services Administration has prescribed two changes in the commuted rates for the transportation of household goods and personal effects. The first change, Circular Number 263, Revision Number 5, applies to shipments commencing August 25, 1964. The second change, Supplement Number 1, applies to shipments commencing October 2, 1964. Copies of the changes are enclosed and additional copies will be forwarded to your office under separate cover.

All employees of your office who have occasion to submit vouchers for the transportation and storage of household goods and personal effects should review the new rates to insure that vouchers are submitted correctly. Those employees who have previously submitted vouchers for transportation of household goods which commenced on August 25, 1964, should be advised that supplemental vouchers should be submitted to reach the Bureau no later than December 1, 1964.

10/27/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-52

(B) INTERVIEWS -- Current instructions as set forth in the Manual of Instructions, (Volume 1, Section 2, page 16) and the FBI Handbook (Part II, page 13a, Item 17) require interviews with witnesses, suspects and subjects, for the purpose of obtaining information, be conducted wherever possible in the daytime.

Time of interviews must be arranged with due regard to the rights of individuals to be free from unnecessary interference or inconvenience. Where circumstances indicate the availability of an individual for interview on the following day, the exercise of good judgment would indicate the undesirability of attempting to interview him at night or in the early morning hours.

You should insure that the supervisory and investigative staff of your office are aware of the importance of arranging interviews to avoid any basis for complaint as to the manner in which the FBI discharges its investigative responsibilities.

This reiterates instructions contained in SAC Letter 62-25 dated May 1, 1962.

(C) REPORT WRITING - SUBMISSION OF REPORTS -- Several instances have been noted during a recent field office inspection where there had been no submission of reports over an extended period of time in cases wherein thefts of high value from interstate shipment had occurred.

It is apparent that such cases cannot properly be supervised in the field or at the Seat of Government without prompt submission of investigative reports. Effective immediately, investigative reports must be submitted within 45 days in each and every instance where it is determined the loss by theft, fraud, embezzlement or robbery in those cases over which the Bureau has jurisdiction amounts to \$10,000 or more. This provision will apply specifically to those investigative matters handled under the current 90-day reporting rule, such as in Theft from Interstate Shipment, Theft of Government Property, and Crime on Government Reservation cases. Losses by theft or otherwise in these cases of less than \$10,000 will continue to be reported under the existing 90-day rule. There will be no change in the existing rule applicable to the submission of reports in the Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property classification since shortly after these matters initially are opened it is often determined they do not come within the investigative jurisdiction of the Bureau. The reporting rule applying to other categories of cases, such as Bank Robbery matters, Civil Rights cases, etc., remains as set forth in the Manual of Instructions.

I want it clearly understood that these cases must receive intelligent and close supervision and such delays as noted above will result in administrative action being taken.

10/27/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-52

(D) DEPARTMENTAL ORDER 324-64 - COURT TESTIMONY - DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION OR MATERIAL IN RESPONSE TO SUBPOENA, ORDER OR OTHER DEMAND -- Investigative personnel have long been familiar with Departmental Order 3229, superseded by 260-62, both of which prohibited employees of the Department of Justice from disclosing information or material in the files of the Department of Justice without permission of the Attorney General. Order 260-62 has now been superseded, effective October 10, 1964, on publication in the Federal Register that day, by Departmental Order 324-64.

10/27/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-52

The purpose of the new Order is to broaden the prohibition to cover not only information and material in files but, also, any other information or material acquired by the employee as a part of the performance of his official duties or because of his official status. The new Order reads as follows:

"Sec.

"16.1 Production or disclosure of official information or material in response to a subpoena, order, or other demand prohibited unless approved by the Attorney General.

"16.2 Procedure in the event of a demand for production or disclosure.

"16.3 Procedure in the event of an adverse ruling.

"16.1 Production or disclosure of official information or material in response to a subpoena, order, or other demand prohibited unless approved by the Attorney General.

"No officer or employee of the Department of Justice shall produce or disclose, in response to a subpoena, order, or other demand (hereinafter in this Part referred to as a 'demand') of a court or other authority any information or material contained in the files of the Department of Justice or any other information or material acquired as a part of the performance of his official duties or because of his official status, without the prior approval of the Attorney General. For the purposes of this Part, the term 'officer or employee of the Department of Justice' includes all officers and employees of the United States appointed by, or subject to the supervision, jurisdiction, or control of, the Attorney General of the United States, including United States Attorneys, United States Marshals, and members of the staffs of those officials.

"16.2 Procedure in the event of a demand for production or disclosure.

"(a) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, whenever a demand is made upon an officer or employee of the Department of Justice for the production or disclosure of information or

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SAC LETTER NO. 64-52

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material contained in the files of the Department of Justice or for the production or disclosure of any other information or material acquired as a part of the performance of his official duties or because of his official status, he shall immediately notify the Attorney General of such demand. If possible, the Attorney General shall be notified before the officer or employee concerned replies to, or appears before, the court or other authority.

"(2) The appropriate United States Attorney, or such other attorney as may be designated for the purpose, shall appear with the officer or employee upon whom the demand shall have been made, and inform the court or other authority (A) that § 16.1 of this Part prohibits the officer or employee from producing or disclosing the information or material demanded without the prior approval of the Attorney General, and (B) that the demand has been, or is being, as the case may be, referred for the prompt consideration of the Attorney General. The United States Attorney, or the attorney designated, shall provide the court or other authority with a copy of the regulations prescribed in this Part and shall respectfully request the court or other authority to stay the demand pending the receipt of instructions or directions from the Attorney General concerning the demand.

"(b) Whenever a demand of the type described in paragraph (a) of this section is made upon an officer or employee of the Department of Justice by a court or other authority while he is appearing before, or is otherwise in the presence of the court or other authority, the officer or employee, or the United States Attorney or other appropriate Government attorney, acting on behalf of the officer or employee, shall (1) immediately inform the court or other authority that § 16.1 of this Part prohibits the officer or employee from producing or disclosing the information or material demanded without the prior approval of the Attorney General, and (2) offer to refer the demand for the prompt consideration of the Attorney General. Unless the court or other authority withdraws the demand, the United States Attorney, or other appropriate Government attorney, shall provide the court or other authority with a copy of the regulations prescribed by this Part and shall respectfully request the court or other authority to stay the demand pending the receipt of instructions or directions from the Attorney General concerning the demand.

10/27/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-52

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"16.3 Procedure in the event of an adverse ruling.

"If the court or other authority declines to stay the effect of the demand in response to a request made in accordance with either § 16.2(a)(2) or § 16.2(b) pending the receipt of instructions or directions from the Attorney General, or if the court or other authority rules adversely on any claim of privilege that may be asserted in conformity with the provisions of this Part or with instructions or directions issued by the Attorney General pursuant thereto, the officer or employee upon whom the demand shall have been made shall, pursuant to the regulations prescribed in this Part, respectfully decline to produce or disclose the material or information demanded (United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 426).

"Order No. 260-62 is hereby superseded.

"The provisions of this order shall be effective when this order is filed for publication in the Federal Register.

"Nicholas deB. Katzenbach  
"Acting Attorney General"

All Bureau personnel whose duties might bring them into court or into any other situation in which official demands might be made upon them to produce information or material must be familiar with Departmental Order 324-64 in content and by official designation. Questions concerning the use of this Order by employees to refuse production should be taken up with the United States Attorney, with as much anticipation of the actual demand as possible.

10/27/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-52

(E) OPENING OF CASES -- During recent inspections it has been found necessary to instruct offices to close a number of cases which had been improperly opened, primarily in Bureau applicant, deserter, interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicle (ITSMV) and interstate transportation of stolen property (ITSP) matters. Inspectors have determined that Bureau applicant cases were being opened on persons of unknown qualifications who might be possibly interested in employment with the Bureau and were being contacted

10/27/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-52

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to ascertain their interest. Deserter cases were being opened as the result of inquiries concerning local absent without leave personnel wherein communications were being submitted to Bureau to determine if AWOL fugitive in possible deserter status. Of course, there is no objection to a case being opened if subject is found to be a deserter. ITSMV cases were being opened upon receipt of stolen car reports from local law enforcement agencies and the submission of FD-298 forms to Cincinnati for check with Cincinnati Confidential Source 309-C records as to possible ITSMV violation. At the time of initial contact no information was received indicating any ITSMV violation. ITSP cases were opened upon information received from Federal Reserve Banks and forwarded to other offices concerning checks which were possibly ITSP violations in the other offices.

In the above situations no actual investigation was conducted by the office in which the cases were opened. Generally, the cases were being obtained by one person on a volume basis and opened upon data which might possibly require investigation. They were subsequently closed administratively when it proved that no investigation was necessary. The reason stated for opening these cases was attributed to Part II, Section 3 E, Manual of Rules and Regulations, which provides that files are to be made up when one or more interviews are to be conducted. This provision, however, refers to investigative interviews and not to liaison contacts, receipt of inquiries or records checks from which information is procured which may or may not require investigation. This, of course, is to be distinguished from record checks made pursuant to actual investigative leads from other offices. Cases may be opened on this type of record check. Information received in the above categories should be more appropriately handled through control or zero files. The opening of cases in such matters results in an inflated case load and in addition creates unnecessary administrative work. I want to make it crystal clear that cases are to be opened only where one or more interviews of an investigative type are contemplated.

The above instructions are in no way intended to restrict your making inquiry of all logical sources to obtain cases having prosecutive potential.

10/27/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-52

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(F) DISSEMINATION OF CRIMINAL INFORMATION TO OTHER AGENCIES --  
Reference is made to SAC Letter Number 59-30, Section E, which specifically  
refers to reporting the total number of items disseminated in this program.

In this connection, it has come to the Bureau's attention in one  
instance that items of criminal information disseminated to a number of police  
agencies within one division were tabulated as one item for each of the receiving  
agencies rather than as a single item of dissemination for the office.

In view of this, it is felt that in order to assure uniformity in the  
handling of this phase of the program, the following procedure should be  
emphasized at this time:

An item which is circularized or furnished to numerous agencies  
should be counted as a single dissemination regardless of the number of agencies  
to which furnished. This includes Identification Orders, Apprehension Orders,  
Wanted Flyers, Check Circulars, and communications of a similar nature.

In addition, you are reminded again that this program should be  
closely followed in order to insure that all items, including those orally  
disseminated to other agencies, are properly recorded on a daily basis and  
that all personnel, including those with supervisory responsibilities, are  
encouraged to develop the fullest potential of this program.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures for (A)

10/27/64 .

SAC LETTER NO. 64-52

- 7 -

1961

Reviewed by *[Signature]*  
8/14/75

Reviewed by J. Dick  
8/11/75

*Access Epstein*  
8/13/75 SFT



PERSONAL  
NO. N<sup>o</sup> 3ER SAC LETTER 61-A  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

January 23, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7

One set of AFSAM 7 key lists for months of March, April and May, 1961, being forwarded separately to all divisions except Washington Field which will receive none; three copies being furnished Bureau's Emergency Relocation Site; and three copies Seat of Government Code Room.

Acknowledge receipt of key lists promptly by routing slip, indicating serial numbers which appear thereon; return address label of individual tamperproofed envelope containing keys even though torn when package opened; and destroy, by burning, each monthly sheet thirty days after last effective date thereof, advising Bureau promptly by routing slip, attention FBI Laboratory, this has been done.

It is essential address label mentioned above be returned in order to control security of shipment.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

183-10291

4-331 (Rev. 5-2-77)

62-116395-477

**BULKY ENCLOSURE**

**BIN #**

**ROOM 1-B970**


*Pt. 4*

**XEROX COPY OF COVER LETTER ENCLOSED**

FBI/DOJ

EXTRA SET  
OF  
SAC LETS  
1960-1968

PART II



PERSONAL ATTENTION

SAC LETTER NO. 64-3

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

January 14, 1964

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) EMERGENCY MEDICAL IDENTIFICATION CARDS - HEALTH AND IMMUNIZATION RECORD -- Re SAC Letter 63-59 of 12-10-63. Each division is being furnished a supply of "Health and Immunization Record" forms for distribution to employees desiring to use them. Employees should be informed of the availability of the forms which can be reduced to billfold size. As approved by the American Medical Association, the forms bear the universal symbol which may serve as a warning that the individual suffers from a physical disability or illness requiring special care, or is allergic to certain drugs, and the like. Employees using the form will be responsible for obtaining and recording the required data and should not expect the Bureau to do so. For example, blood type and factor could be obtained when donating blood. The form should also be made available to employees as they enter on duty. Should additional forms be needed, submit requests to Bureau.

1-14-64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-3

(B) FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY ASSOCIATES - RETRAINING SESSIONS -- Advise the Bureau, Attention: Training Division, by June 1, 1964, the dates and places of your 1964 retraining sessions for graduates of the FBI National Academy. If your retraining session will be held in advance of that date, Bureau should be advised at least thirty days in advance. You should make certain that emphasis is placed upon the training aspects so that the graduates in attendance may receive real benefit therefrom. The Bureau should be furnished with the detailed program to be followed and you should keep in mind that carefully planned annual retraining sessions are effective media whereby the graduates can be allied more closely to each other and to the Bureau in meeting our common problems.

Your attention is directed to Part II, Section 1 B, 13, page 12, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations concerning the attendance of Bureau personnel at FBI National Academy retraining sessions. These instructions must be closely followed.



183-10291

(C) VISIT OF HER MAJESTY QUEEN FREDERIKA OF GREECE TO UNITED STATES, JANUARY, 1964 -- Her Majesty Queen Frederika of Greece, her daughter, Princess Irene, and a small entourage are scheduled to visit the United States between January 21 and February 7, 1964. Present itinerary indicates she will be in New York City January 21-26, 1964, and will be in Washington, D. C., January 26-30, 1964. From January 31, 1964, to February 7, 1964, her itinerary is not firm, but could include visits to Cape Kennedy, Florida; Boston, Massachusetts; and New York City. She is scheduled to leave the United States on February 7, 1964, from New York City by ship. Although Her Majesty will tour the United States in a private capacity, the Department of State will implement and request security protection and measures that are normally extended to a foreign head of state.

Department of State is concerned about her safety in view of the harassing and embarrassing actions taken against her during her two visits to England in 1963. Reportedly, demonstrations were made by the militant "Committee of 100" which is demanding the release of certain political prisoners in Greece. It was indicated these demonstrations were communist inspired and that similar demonstrations may be attempted during her visit to the United States. A second point of concern is that in connection with her contemplated visit to Barnard College, Columbia University, New York City, on January 22, 1964, there may be organized efforts to create embarrassing incidents since in October, 1963, an article appeared in the Columbia University newspaper alleging that Her Majesty was a Nazi sympathizer during World War II.

State Department has requested FBI and other appropriate Government agencies concerned to explore possible existence of any effort by the Communist Party, USA, communist front organizations or any dissident groups to create any incidents which could prove dangerous to the personal safety of Her Majesty or prove embarrassing to her and to the United States Government. Accordingly, all offices should immediately contact any informants and sources in a position to furnish information of this nature and forward to the Bureau in a form suitable for dissemination any pertinent data so developed.

Informants and sources in a position to acquire such data in the future should be alerted to the necessity for prompt reporting. Information concerning threats, violence or hostile demonstrations against Her Majesty, her entourage or her government should be immediately furnished to the Bureau, to appropriate local police, to appropriate local office of security,

1-14-64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-3

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United States Department of State, where available, and to New York which will be considered office of origin. Notify Bureau of dissemination made.

Communications in this matter should be submitted under above caption.

1-14-64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-3

(D) HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW -- The January-February, 1964, issue of the above-captioned magazine contains my article entitled "The U. S. Businessman Faces the Soviet Spy." This article discusses in detail efforts by Soviet diplomats to make personal and friendly contact with American businessmen and how they hope to exploit these contacts to secure information of value to them. The article also sets forth suggestions on how citizens can help the FBI defeat these Soviet spy efforts.

This article should be considered as a possible investigative aid in espionage cases. In the past, the Bureau has received valuable information from individuals who had read my previous but shorter articles on this topic. Any such cases resulting from this article should promptly be called to the Bureau's attention; mark for the attention of Crime Records Division.

Three copies of the article are being furnished to each field office. The Bureau has limited supply of additional copies. If more copies are desired, they should be requested.

1-14-64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-3

- 3 -

(E) RACIAL INFORMANTS -- New Manual of Instructions and FBI Handbook sections containing detailed instructions regarding the handling of racial informants and sources have been prepared. Classification 170 has been assigned. Upon receipt of these new sections, each field office will review all pending cases on racial informants and make necessary changes in files and indices to conform with the new classification number and instructions.

Effective upon receipt of the forthcoming manual changes, include in your monthly report of all expenditures from the confidential fund the total amount paid each month to racial informants and sources.

This separate category for payments to racial informants and sources will appear in the portion of your monthly report entitled "Summary of Payments to Informants and Sources" and should be shown in the same manner that you now show breakdown of information relative to criminal and security informants and sources.

The effectiveness of the Racial Informant Program is your personal-responsibility and it will be incumbent upon you to implement the new instructions and to achieve positive results.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

1-14-64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-3

- 4 -



In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 64-4  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

January 21, 1964

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

(A) TRAINING - FIREARMS AND DEFENSIVE TACTICS - CALENDAR YEAR 1964 -- Attached are copies of the Field Firearms and Defensive Tactics Training Program for the 1964 calendar year which should be studied by instructors in your office to insure uniform training.

1/21/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-4

(B) TRAINING - AGENTS' ANNUAL TECHNICAL TRAINING - 1964 -- Enclosed for each office are five copies of captioned training program.

1/21/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-4

(C) BUREAU MATERIAL TRANSMITTED BY AIRLINE PILOTS (AMERICAN AIRLINES) -- Reference is made to SAC Letter 63-11, part A, dated 3-5-63 indicating it was permissible to transmit FBI material in the custody of airline pilots provided the utilization of such service is limited to extreme emergency and the material is transmitted in an envelope bearing the postage indicia in order to comply with postal regulations.

An official of American Airlines has indicated that in responding to such requests they would render all cooperation possible but that, where time permits, our material, rather than being placed in the personal custody of their pilots, would be sent air express. Thereafter, responsible employees of American Airlines will take all steps necessary to insure prompt delivery at point of destination to a Special Agent of the FBI.

As previously indicated, this type of cooperative service should be utilized only in extreme emergency and in compliance with postal regulations requiring the use of envelopes bearing the postage indicia.

1/21/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-4

(D) TRAINING - POLICE - SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS ON AUTOMOBILE THEFT -- In view of the continuing problem of automobile theft, it is desired that you consider conducting specialized police schools on that topic. Such schools afford us an excellent opportunity to emphasize our

jurisdiction in such matters, and to highlight to the general public, through well-planned publicity, our interest and responsibilities in this field. The curriculum of the schools may include such topics as The Automobile Theft Problem (including most recent statistics), FBI Jurisdiction in ITSMV Cases, Modus Operandi of Auto Thieves, How to Spot a Stolen Car, and Processing Stolen Cars for Evidence. Also, a representative of the National-Automobile Theft Bureau may be invited to participate in the schools, to explain how his Bureau may be of assistance. Each field division has films which are appropriate for use in such schools.

While these specialized schools are not to be solicited, you should bring them to the attention of law enforcement agencies in your division. Law enforcement organizations, such as Chiefs and Sheriffs Associations, may be interested in cooperating in arrangements for a series of these specialized schools.

(Security Letters on attached pages)

1/21/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-4

- 2 -

(E) ESPIONAGE INVESTIGATIONS -- Espionage violations in which there is no apparent participation by or with a foreign government can involve misuse, unauthorized disclosure, theft or photographing of material relating to the national defense (Title 18, Section 793, 795, 796, 797, 798, United States Code). These are carried under the Espionage - X character. In investigating these cases it is imperative that it be borne in mind that the illegal act may have been committed at the request or behest of a foreign agent although the person committing the violation was unaware of the foreign ramification. There are numerous instances in Bureau files in which an American citizen who was also an agent of a foreign principal requested another American who was unaware of this foreign connection to obtain information concerning the national defense either because of friendship or for financial gain. If the Espionage - X investigation discloses that an agent of a foreign principal is involved, it could very well mean that foreign ramifications are present which could increase the importance of the case as well as the degree of possible damage to the national defense. You should assure that Espionage - X cases receive thorough and complete investigative action and that it is resolved during these investigations whether there are any foreign ramifications.

1/21/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-4

(F) INTERNAL SECURITY - NATIONALISTIC TENDENCY -- Section 105B, Manual of Instructions, points out that one of the aims of our investigations in the Nationalistic Field is to develop information concerning conditions in foreign countries. This Section instructs that an effort should be made to obtain this type of information as it might have a bearing on the current or future policy of the United States toward such countries or might aid the intelligence agencies to engage more effectively in counterintelligence activities. Except in very rare and unusual instances information of this type is, of course, given wide dissemination by the Bureau immediately upon its receipt.

A glance at almost any current newspaper will establish the fact that revolutionary activity is rampant in foreign countries, particularly in the Caribbean and Latin-American areas. The concern of State Department and other Government agencies is obvious. Field offices have frequently received allegations of an apparently significant nature from a confidential informant or source and in most instances have promptly forwarded such information to the Bureau. It has been noted, however, that on occasions

1/21/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-4

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where time was deemed of the essence as, for example, where an invasion of a foreign country was allegedly imminent, the Bureau has been furnished a summary by teletype or by other expeditious means but the teletype failed to state whether the information should be classified and/or that details would follow immediately in form suitable for dissemination. In such instances these points should be covered in the original communication and full details should be expeditiously forwarded.

Too frequently allegations indicating a critical situation exists have been received from sources and forwarded to the Bureau without indicating whether the field is taking any action to corroborate or further develop the information. The field must recognize that the Government may go to considerable expense and effort as a result of receiving one of these allegations and the field must assume the responsibility, without prodding from the Bureau, of promptly checking these allegations out wherever possible. The original communication to the Bureau or the cover airtel where letterhead memorandum is used must spell out just what is being done by the field in this regard.

A large part of our information in these cases comes from exiled nationals of the countries involved. The field is reminded that such information may be colored by the individual prejudices and loyalties of such sources and that, therefore, their information cannot be accepted at face value. They must be pinned down to actual facts in their possession. In this connection the Bureau has noted an increasing laxity on the part of the field in this type of case to properly attribute information to sources. Where a source does not possess information as of his own knowledge the communication must not permit the inference that this is the case. It should be determined how and from whom the source obtained his information and, wherever possible, this data should be included in the memorandum or report prepared for dissemination.

You are instructed to bring the above matters to the attention of all Agents handling cases in the Nationalistic Tendency Field.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Enclosures for (A) & (B)


Director

1/21/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-4

- 4 -





PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 64-A  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

January 24, 1964

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7

One set of AFSAM 7 key lists for months of March, April and May, 1964, being forwarded separately to all domestic and foreign offices except Washington Field which will receive none; six copies being furnished Bureau's Emergency Relocation Site; and six copies Seat of Government Code Room.


Domestic offices should acknowledge receipt promptly by routing slip and foreign offices by deferred (State Department priority "Routine") cable, indicating serial numbers which appear thereon; return in a sealed envelope to the Bureau, attention FBI Annex, the address label on individual tamperproofed envelope containing keys even though torn while opening package; and destroy, by burning, each monthly sheet thirty days after last effective date thereof, advising the Bureau promptly, attention FBI Annex, this has been done.

It is essential the address label mentioned above be returned in order to control security of shipment.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 64-5

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

January 28, 1964

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) VOUCHER MATTERS -- The number of vouchers submitted to the Bureau requiring correction, suspension or return is increasing.

All employees preparing and submitting vouchers should be reminded of the necessity of strict adherence to the instructions set forth in Part II, Section 7, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

1-28-64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-5

(B) COMMUNICATIONS - UNAUTHORIZED USE OF GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION (GSA) FACILITIES - TELETYPES -- You are referred to SAC Letter 61-71, (B), dated December 19, 1961.

Recently, one Bureau field office made use of GSA teletypewriter facilities as an emergency measure, pending installation of additional TWX teletype facilities, to handle a large volume of outgoing teletypes. This use of GSA facilities was not authorized by the Bureau.

I want it thoroughly understood that no use is to be made of any type of GSA communications facilities under any circumstances without prior Bureau approval, even in emergency situations.

1-28-64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-5

(C) CASES CLOSED UPON AUTHORITY OF SAC - REPORT WRITING -- Effective immediately you are instructed to maintain a control file on all cases closed by memorandum upon the authority of the SAC. This file should contain a copy of the closing memorandum for each of the cases so closed. Copies of correspondence on cases closed upon authority of the U. S. Attorney for legal reasons should not be placed in this control file nor should copies of reports sent to the Bureau advising the case is being closed upon the authority of the SAC.

This control file should be maintained from one inspection to another. The Inspector will review the cases closed upon the authority of the SAC by memorandum to insure they have received appropriate attention. After completion of the inspection the office will be advised in the inspection letter when they can destroy the memoranda in the control file.

(D) FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION MATTERS -- Effective February 1, 1964, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) is tightening up on certain certifications relative to home improvement loans it insures under its Title I program. For example, all borrowers, makers and cosigners must henceforth sign the completion certificate and the borrower's authorization certificate. Application for credit forms have been revised to include an amplified certificate by the salesman and by any person other than the borrower who prepares the application. In addition, the completion certificate has been strengthened by requiring a certification by the dealer that he has paid all his bills in connection with the work done or that he will do so within sixty days.

FHA has also informed Title I lending institutions that they will be expected to inspect one out of each ten home improvement jobs performed by a dealer for at least six months after approving same. Thereafter, spot checks are to be made as frequently as necessary to assure fidelity of the dealer's performance.

The foregoing new regulations should provide more data as to identity of persons responsible for preparation of forms and should cause lending institutions to take an active part in processing loans they insure in behalf of the Government. Since old forms may continue to be used in these cases, you must be careful to differentiate between the varying language of the certificates thereon.

These new instructions provide a suitable opportunity for discussion of FHA Matters with lending institutions, which are usually the first to learn of indicated violations. Effective liaison with such sources will assist your office in getting criminal cases more promptly through simultaneous notification of the FBI as well as FHA in such investigations. Vigorous efforts should be made to arrange for such prompt referrals. As you have been previously instructed, all cases in this classification must continue to receive expeditious, vigorous and imaginative attention.

(Security Letter on attached page)

1-28-64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-5

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(E) CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES -- Reference is made to SAC Letter 63-33 (E) dated July 9, 1963. Referenced SAC Letter instructed field to discontinue investigations under three programs relating to Chinese entering United States as citizens, permanent resident aliens and students. It has been decided these programs will be permanently discontinued and instructions relating to them in Manual of Instructions, Section 105F, pages 4f - 4h, will be deleted.

Suggestions from all offices are solicited for new methods and approaches to uncover and penetrate Chinese Communist intelligence activities in the United States. Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington Field Offices are instructed to furnish suggestions, comments and recommendations for fresh methods of approach to the problem of uncovering and penetrating Chinese Communist activities in the United States, it being noted these offices handle the bulk of Chinese security cases under investigation. Submit required data under the caption "Chinese Communist Intelligence Operations in the United States," Bureau file 65-53286. Designate copies of communication for other five offices. Buded March 15, 1964.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover

Director

1-28-64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-5

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

February 27, 1964

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) SURVEILLANCES - RADIO TRANSMISSIONS -- You have been reminded repeatedly of the possibility that FBI radio transmissions may be heard by unauthorized individuals and that FM radio transmissions must be discreet at all times. Standing instructions in this regard are set out in Paragraph 9, Chapter 4, Part II, FBI Handbook, and are reiterated here for emphasis:

"FM radio transmissions must be discreet and names of Agents, subjects, or specific locations involved in Bureau investigative activities must not be disclosed. Credential card numbers should be used where identity of Agents is necessary in station-to-car and car-to-station operation. Two-way car call signs should be used for identification in other operations although coded names or call signs may be used as necessary in surveillance-type operations."

During a recent sensitive surveillance in an extremely important criminal case FBI radio transmissions were monitored by the subject of the surveillance. Notes made by the interceptor of these transmissions have been introduced in court. These notes disclose that in many instances the Agents did not abide by the above instructions. First names and/or initials of surveillance Agents were used; the subject of the surveillance was mentioned by first or last name; and general as well as specific locations of surveillance cars were reported without any attempt to prevent disclosure. Uncalled for and unnecessary remarks, among other things, also were recorded by the subject of the surveillance. Needless to say, this interception and divulgence of our radio communications has resulted in considerable embarrassment.

It is desired that this situation be brought to the attention of all personnel and the instructions as set out above reiterated. In addition, you are to personally examine the manner in which your FM radio facilities are being utilized to insure that the operation of such facilities is in strict accordance with existing Bureau instructions.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO 64-20  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

April 7, 1964

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

(A) INCOME TAX RETURNS - EXCLUSION OF SICK PAY - FBI FORM BOOK -- The recent revision by Congress of the Federal income tax law changes the regulations concerning the exclusion of sick pay from taxable income. ~~Insofar as Bureau employees are concerned,~~ pay received for all periods of absences for sick purposes beginning on or after January 1, 1964, will not be excludable unless an absence exceeds thirty calendar days. Then only the pay for the portion of the absence in excess of thirty calendar days can be excluded. The maximum allowable exclusion is still \$100 per week. Pay for any period of absence due to illness which began prior to January 1, 1964, can still be excluded under the former regulations, regardless of its duration. Form FD-307, Application for Sick Leave Statement, has been revised. Enclosed are three copies of such form, one copy of which should be placed in the FBI Form Book. All employees of your office should be advised of this change in regulations.

You should assure that employees having excludable sick pay for absence beginning prior to January 1, 1964, submit their application on the form now in your office. Any remaining copies of the form should then be destroyed and the necessary supply of the revised form ordered from the Bureau.

4/7/64

SAC LETTER NO 64-20

(B) FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM -- There will be a limited opportunity registration period between now and 6-30-64 for employees who were not enrolled on 3-17-64 to enroll in a health benefit plan and employees who on 3-17-64 were enrolled for self only to change to a family enrollment in the same plan or option. The effective date of enrollments or changes in enrollment due to this limited opportunity registration period will be the first day of the pay period following the pay period the Health Benefits Registration Form (SF 2809) is received. On these registrations "P L." should be placed under "Remarks" of the SF 2809.

The following changes in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act were made possible by Public Law 88-254 which was approved on 3-17-64. Effective 3-17-64 unmarried children up to age 21 (instead of age 19) and foster children are included under an employee's family enrollment in the

Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP). To be considered a foster child, the child must be living with the employee in a parent-child relationship and the employee must intend to rear the child indefinitely to adulthood as if he were his own. Coverage is automatic and all plans will honor claims for medical care received on or after 3-17-64. Employees who are enrolled in a group-practice or individual-practice plan should write the plan giving the name and date of birth of any eligible foster child and any child aged 19 to 21. Employees enrolled in any other plan need take no action unless their plan requests this information.

Effective 6-21-64 the family-female with nondependent husband-enrollment will be dropped and female employees will be eligible to enroll in the regular family plan and will receive the same Government contribution (\$3.12 per pay period) as male employees enrolled in the family plan. It will not be necessary for a female employee enrolled in the family plan to execute an SF 2809 to change her enrollment code number. The adjustment will be automatic and will first appear in the pay check dated 7-17-64. Under separate cover you will be sent notices concerning these changes to be attached to the SF 2809A's.

Employees aged 19 to 21, who enrolled for self only because upon attainment of age 19 they lost coverage under a parent's family enrollment under the FEHBP, should immediately execute an SF 2809 to cancel their enrollment because they are now covered under a parent's family enrollment until age 21. Before cancelling his enrollment the employee should ensure that his parent is still enrolled in a plan under the FEHBP. Upon attainment of age 21 these employees will again be eligible to enroll for self only since they will lose their coverage under the parent's enrollment in the FEHBP. The employees will not be notified when they or a member of their family loses coverage. It is the employees' responsibility to follow and make any changes which would affect their enrollment. Appropriate arrangements are being made by the SAMBA Office concerning employees with children aged 19 to 21 enrolled in the SAMBA Student Health Benefit Plan and who are affected by these changes.

An employee enrolled in a plan under the FEHBP who purchased a conversion contract for a child who is not yet 21 should get in touch with his plan to cancel the conversion contract. The child will have a new conversion right when he reaches age 21 or his coverage as a family member terminates by marriage.

4/7/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-20

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Employees enrolling in SAMBA due to the limited opportunity registration period are eligible for the minimum \$2,000 life insurance without evidence of insurability. Those applying for the additional amounts of \$4,000 or \$9,000 must execute the Personal Health Statement. Those applying for Dependents Group Life Insurance must execute a health statement on spouse and each dependent child.

You should personally ensure that the changes in the law and this limited opportunity registration period are brought to the attention of each employee in your office. There will not be any brochures issued in connection with this registration period. The Health Benefits Representative should carefully review all forms prior to submission to the Bureau.

4/7/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-20

(C) REPORT WRITING -- A recent Federal decision underscores the wisdom of the Bureau's long-standing policy that information favorable to the defense must be reported as completely and accurately as that favorable to the prosecution.

In U. S. ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins, 326 F. 2d 135 (1964), the Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, held that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused violates due process of law and requires reversal of the conviction. In this case, two witnesses to a robbery saw the defendant in police custody after arrest and "positively stated to the police" that the defendant was not the robber. These witnesses were not called by the prosecution and did not appear at trial. Two other witnesses positively identified the defendant. Convicted, the defendant moved for a new trial, submitting an affidavit of assigned counsel that counsel did not learn of the existence of the two uncalled witnesses until after trial had ended. After defendant exhausted his state remedies without relief, he brought habeas corpus in Federal district court where it was held that the prosecution had a duty to disclose the existence of the two witnesses favorable to the defense, and that failure to do so violated due process of law. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

Although Wilkins was a state case, the result would have been the same had it been a Federal case. The due process clause in the Fifth Amendment, applicable to Federal officers, and that in the Fourteenth Amendment, applicable to state officers, are of identical meaning. Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401 (1945).

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SAC LETTER NO. 64-20

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The rule announced in Wilkins springs from Supreme Court decisions holding that due process is violated by (1) conviction obtained through use of knowingly false and perjured testimony, Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103 (1935), (2) failure to correct unsolicited false testimony for the prosecution after discovery of its falsity, Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264 (1959), and (3) suppression of evidence favorable to the accused upon request of the accused for that evidence, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963).

The Wilkins decision places upon the U. S. Attorney an affirmative duty to disclose to the defense at least the existence of potential witnesses and other evidence for the defense that are known to him. He cannot perform that duty, however, unless the reports are so complete and accurate that he is able to identify such witnesses and evidence therein.

The significance of Wilkins for this Bureau is that reports in all cases must be so complete that they will serve to identify potential witnesses for the defense, state their observations with sufficient precision to make the position which they take clear to the U. S. Attorney, and similarly identify any other evidence for the defense encountered during the investigation. This includes, as held in Brady, evidence which is "material either to guilt or to punishment."

Statements of witnesses in any way favorable to the defense must be reported on form FD-302 just as are those of witnesses for the prosecution. It may be held that the defense can call for those statements. 34 Federal Rules Decisions 88 (1964).

The reporting must be as clear and as free from equivocation or ambiguity as the information encountered by the Agent will permit. For example, if a witness to a bank robbery sees the defendant after arrest and states that the defendant is not the robber, a report that the witness "failed to identify" the robber would be defective; the quoted words would not correctly show the position taken by the witness and hence would not put the U. S. Attorney on notice that the witness is potentially one for the defense.

The cited decisions and these instructions are not to be interpreted as requiring the government to make an investigation for the defense. They go no further (for FBI purposes) than to require that if, while making the usual and proper investigation for the government, we come upon evidence

4/7/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-20

- 4 -

of any kind seemingly favorable to the defendant, we must report the existence and nature of that evidence accurately and completely. This has long been the FBI rule, but current developments suggest that it should be reiterated.

These instructions must be brought to the attention of all investigative personnel immediately.

4/7/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-20

(D) LAW ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCES, 1964 - "THE FLEEING FELON" -- Law Enforcement Conferences in 1964 will concern fugitive investigations; they will be called "The Fleeing Felon" conferences. Subject matter will encompass assistance FBI can render to local law enforcement under the Fugitive Felon Act and through other cooperative functions, and principles involved in fugitive investigations. Schedule sufficient conferences to cover your territory adequately; wherever possible, utilize sites that are readily accessible to local law enforcement and others invited to your conferences. Conferences should be held between September 15 and November 1, 1964; adjoining offices should be advised of your conference plans; border offices may invite nearby Canadian and Mexican police officials. Conference agenda should be limited to four to six hours; should be of the open-forum type, with necessary talks restricted to 15 minutes; audience participation should be encouraged. Qualified speakers from local law enforcement, prosecutors, and related fields, may be used as panelists; names of contemplated panelists should be checked through your indices and the Bureau advised of the results. Attendance of undesirables should be avoided, and representatives of commercial concerns should not be invited.

You are authorized to prepare friendly but businesslike circular letters of invitation to be sent to police officials, sheriffs' departments, penal institutions, state correctional agencies, local and state prosecutors, and others in related fields who might refer unlawful flight matters to the Bureau.

You may desire to utilize police instructors in the planning of interesting and informative programs; however, you should preside at each conference personally. Potential curricula topics are:

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SAC LETTER NO. 64-20

## National Crime Trends

Crimes of violence against public  
Killers of law enforcement officers  
Ten Most Wanted Fugitives Program (importance of  
publicizing fugitives)

---

## What Local Authorities Can Do

Detailed investigation of crime and processing of  
crime scene  
Conclusive identification of subject  
Detailed description  
Prior arrest numbers  
Background information  
Sources of fingerprints; obtaining details of prior arrests  
Sources of photographs  
Sources of handwriting specimens  
Communication facilities; roadblocks, etc.

## What FBI Can Do

Fugitive Felon Act  
FBI Identification Division assistance  
FBI Laboratory assistance  
Identification Orders; Wanted Flyers

## Investigative Procedures

Personal history and background of fugitive, including  
preferences as to clothing, food, amusements, trans-  
portation, etc.  
Relatives, friends, associates of fugitive  
Use of informants and other sources of information  
Coverage of transportation facilities (air, rail, motor,  
water)  
Coverage of motels, hotels, rooming houses, etc.

## State Extradition Laws and Procedures

## Apprehension Techniques

4/7/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-20

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Implementation and/or substitution of topics may be made in accordance with needs and interests in various areas; Training Document #22, "Fugitives," should afford assistance.

Agenda of your proposed conferences, listing all speakers to be invited, as well as dates and sites, should be submitted to the Bureau on UACB basis at least 30 days prior to holding of your first conference. Advise Bureau by June 15 of tentative plans as to where and when your conferences will be held. A national press release will be made regarding these conferences; do not disclose subject matter or planning until after national press release; you will be provided with a copy of the national release and will be authorized to make appropriate releases locally.

Conferences should be closed to all but duly constituted law enforcement personnel and those in related fields who have a bona fide interest in fugitive matters. Designate a period, either immediately before or after each conference, to be open to news media representatives, during which you may explain the purposes and accomplishments of the conference; the interest of news media should be encouraged.

Material for distribution at your conferences, such as Law Enforcement Bulletin reprints, etc., should be ordered by routing slip from Crime Records Division as early as possible. Bureau will not be able to prepare special exhibits or posters; do not incur expenses for rental of space, etc., without prior Bureau authority.

Within a week following your last conference, advise Bureau of results of all conferences, giving the total number in attendance, number of agencies represented, dates and places where conferences were held, and total number of conferences completed. Summary letter should report specific statements of interest by those in attendance, as well as suggestions for improving future law enforcement conferences. Forward sampling of newspaper publicity, and any unusual publicity items noted. Correspondence should be directed to attention Training Division, under caption "Law Enforcement Conferences, 1964, "The Fleeing Felon," Bureau file (88-11941).

4/7/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-20

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(E) CASES CLOSED UPON AUTHORITY OF SAC - REPORT WRITING -- I wish to re-emphasize my concern over premature closing of unsolved cases. In order to insure the Bureau has fulfilled its responsibilities under the law, it is imperative that every step be taken to make certain that existing instructions are fully complied with.

It was necessary to require that no unsolved bank robbery cases be closed upon authority of the Special Agent in Charge (SAC), and if present regulations are not strictly adhered to it will become necessary to remove all authority to close cases by the SAC. The importance of this matter should be clearly understood by all employees. As you are aware, the closing of cases upon SAC authority will be checked into in connection with inspections and any derelictions will be subject to appropriate administrative action.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures for (A)

4/7/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-20



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

SAC LETTER NO. 64-21

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

April 14, 1964

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY - 1965 SESSIONS -- The Seventy-fifth Session of the FBI National Academy will be held March 15 to June 2, 1965. The Seventy-sixth Session will be held August 16 to November 3, 1965. You will be advised at a later date when nominations for these Sessions should be submitted.

4/14/64  
SAC LETTER NO. 64-21

(B) PERSONNEL - PROMOTIONAL POLICY REGARDING CLERICAL EMPLOYEES -- Effective immediately whenever a clerical employee is passed over for a promotional opportunity, he must be advised of the reason and a written record made of the fact that such action was taken. This rule applies to all cases irrespective of the number of employees being passed over. Appropriate manual changes will be submitted shortly.

In addition, you are reminded at this time of the long-standing policy requiring that all vacancies must be filled on the basis of merit and fitness and that under no circumstances should a recommendation leading to a promotion be made on the basis of seniority alone. Moreover, when an employee is being passed over for a promotional opportunity, detailed justification must be submitted and vague comments such as "not as well qualified" or "attitude not as good" are not considered acceptable. You should also make certain that the reasons given employees for being passed over are consistent with the reasons furnished to the Bureau. There can be absolutely no exceptions to the above regulations.

4/14/64  
SAC LETTER NO. 64-21

(C) FBIRA MATTER - INTEROFFICE FIREARMS COMPETITION (PPC) 1964 -- The Annual Interoffice Firearms Competition for 1964 will be held during the third outdoor firearms training. The "J. Edgar Hoover Practical Pistol Course Trophy" will be presented to the office having the highest average percentage score, plus handicap, of all Special Agents assigned to the office on July 1, 1964, not on limited duty.

The handicap scoring system explained in SAC Letter 63-25 will be used and handicaps will be based on the past four years of competition.

Field offices will be divided into groups according to Agent complement (Washington Headquarters being considered an office for this competition). The winning offices in each category will be cited for "honorable mention." The offices winning first, second and third place in the over-all competition will not be eligible to receive the "honorable mention" citations.

Competition rules, method of reporting scores and individual office handicaps are being forwarded separately.

4/14/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-21

(D) SEARCHES AND SEIZURES -- Two unanimous search and seizure decisions handed down by the Supreme Court on March 23, 1964, must be brought to the attention of all investigative personnel. Both are important and one makes a significant change in the law.

In Stoner v. California, police officers entered the subject's hotel room, by consent of the night clerk; after being advised by the clerk that the subject was out of the room as shown by his room key being in the mailbox. The officers searched the room and took several articles which were used as evidence at trial. The subject was arrested in another state two days later.

The conviction was reversed on the ground that the evidence taken from the hotel room was obtained by a search and seizure which was unreasonable because it was based on consent of the hotel clerk rather than consent of the subject. "No less than a tenant of a house, or the occupant of a room in a boarding house, a guest in a hotel room is entitled to constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures." The tenant has the possessory right in the room which he has rented, and that right is one "which only the petitioner (subject) could waive by word or deed, either directly or through an agent." There was in this case, as in most, no evidence to indicate that the tenant had authorized the clerk to consent to a search of the tenant's room.

The Stoner decision only reiterates the prevailing rule on this point.

4/14/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-21

In Preston v. U. S., four police officers of a small city arrested three men in a parked car at 3:00 a. m. on vagrancy charges. The car was not searched at the time of arrest. It was driven by an officer to the station, from which it was towed to a garage. Soon after the subjects were booked at the station, some of the police officers went to the garage to search the car and found two loaded revolvers in the glove compartment. They were unable to open the trunk and returned to the station, where a detective told one of the officers to go back and try to get into the trunk. The officer did so, was able to enter the trunk through the back seat of the car, and in the trunk found various items adapted to the perpetration of a robbery. After the searches, one of the men confessed that he and two others intended to rob a bank nearby. At this point Bureau Agents were called in and the materials found in the car were turned over to them. It was contended by the defense that the use of these materials at trial violated the Fourth Amendment.

The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, stating that the search of the car was unreasonable and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible. The search of the car was unreasonable because it was made at a time and place different from that of the arrest and thus was "simply not incident to the arrest." Search of a vehicle or fixed premises incidental to arrest therein must be made contemporaneously with the arrest - following the arrest and at the same place. Searches of such places incidental to arrest are an exception to the basic rule that all such searches must be made by search warrant. Once the car in this case had been taken to the garage under police custody, the subjects could no longer use any weapons therein to attack the officers, nor destroy the evidence therein, nor hide the car from the police. The reason for granting an exception to the basic rule requiring searches by search warrant had disappeared.

The Government's brief before the Supreme Court in this case cited three earlier Federal decisions allowing search of a vehicle, incidental to arrest, at a time and place different from that of arrest where neither the time nor the distance was great. These decisions, although not mentioned in the opinion, must be taken as overruled.

An alternative method of searching the vehicle in situations like this is by consent. Consent searches, however, are only another exception to the basic rule that searches must be made by search warrant. The

4/14/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-21

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genuinely voluntary consent necessary to sustain a consent search often is difficult to prove, and particularly so in the case of a person under arrest and denying guilt.

The vehicle searched here was owned by one of the subjects and lawfully occupied by all three. This was not a stolen-car case. A thief or other trespasser, having no legal right to occupy the vehicle or other place searched, has no rights which can be violated by search of the vehicle or place. It will be assumed that this rule continues for stolen vehicle cases since the court did not decide that issue in this case.

4/14/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-21

(E) "FBI CODE 98" - MOTION PICTURE -- Warner Brothers has released as a motion picture a show entitled "FBI Code 98." It was originally designed as a two-hour television spectacular, but due to its success abroad, it has been released as a motion picture here in this country. This motion picture deals with a hypothetical case wherein an attempt is made at sabotage in connection with a national defense situation. Accordingly, the number "98" is used in the title. This motion picture was made with the full cooperation of the Bureau and is now showing in New York City. For your information, it has received favorable reviews and it is felt employees will enjoy seeing this show.

4/14/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-21

(F) FALSE ADVERTISING OR MISUSE OF NAME TO INDICATE FEDERAL AGENCY -- Section 19 of the Peace Corps Act was amended by the 88th Congress and approved by the President on December 13, 1963. The provisions of the amendment are set forth as follows:

Section 19 of the Peace Corps Act, as amended, which relates to the Peace Corps seal, is amended by striking out the short title and substituting therefor "Exclusive Right to Seal and Name", by inserting "(a)" before "The President may," and by adding a new subsection as follows:

"(b) (1) The use of the official seal or emblem and the use of the name 'Peace Corps' shall be restricted exclusively to designate programs authorized under this Act.

"(2) Whoever, whether an individual, partnership, corporation, or association, uses the seal for which provision is made in this section, or any sign, insignia, or symbol in colorable imitation thereof, or the words 'Peace Corps' or any combination of these or other words or characters in colorable imitation thereof, other than to designate programs authorized under this Act, shall be fined not more than \$500 or imprisoned not more than six months, or both. A violation of this subsection may be enjoined at the suit of the Attorney General, United States attorneys, or other persons duly authorized to represent the United States."

Upon receipt of complaints regarding violations of this newly adopted amendment, the field should immediately conduct appropriate investigation to develop full facts in order that timely presentation may be made to the appropriate U. S. Attorney in the district where the violation occurred to determine if the case has prosecutive merit. The character of such violations will be "False Advertising or Misuse of Name to Indicate Federal Agency" and the classification will be 43.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

4/14/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-21

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

April 1, 1964

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

PERSONAL

NO NUMBER SAC LETTER

64-B

RE: NAME

NAME is a member of the Communist Party in Chicago, Illinois. He has been trained in and is currently engaged in the electronics field in the Chicago area.

NAME OF OFFICIAL, Communist Party, USA, as instructed NAME to perfect an instrument which would locate listening devices and which can be used for the purpose of checking Party offices and residences of various Party leaders. NAME is working on such an instrument and has stated that at this stage his instrument probably will not locate listening devices unless the FBI has insecurely installed such devices. NAME is continuing to perfect his instrument and feels he is capable of developing an instrument which will be able to make a thorough security check of the various Party offices, meeting places and residences of Party leaders.

The Chicago Office should alert the Bureau and any interested offices when it is known that NAME will be traveling to another territory. This matter should be brought to the attention of appropriate investigative personnel and each office must be constantly alert for NAME'S activities in its area and take necessary steps to neutralize his effectiveness and protect our sensitive sources at all times.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

April 28, 1964

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) DIRECTOR'S TESTIMONY ON JANUARY 29 1964, BEFORE THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS - FISCAL YEAR 1965 -- Copies of my testimony before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations on January 29, 1964, regarding the 1965 appropriation request of the FBI, will be sent to your office in the near future. These copies are to be made available to the personnel of your office who desire to review a copy. There will be one copy for every two employees in the supply furnished.

4, 8/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-23

(B) **NAME AND ADDRESS** - INFORMATION CONCERNING -- **NAME** is currently engaged in a campaign of disseminating to FBI Offices, Federal agencies, members of Congress and other prominent individuals, communications apparently authored by her. These communications relate to the assassination of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy and are critical of the FBI. She reportedly is conducting her own investigation of the assassination which has included telephonic and personal interviews of principals connected with this investigation.

**NAME** has been previously interviewed and exhibited an insulting, argumentative and antagonistic attitude toward the FBI and its personnel. She recently contacted one of our Southwest offices by telephone and although identifying herself, endeavored to elicit information pertinent to the assassination by using the pretext of belonging to a ladies garden club. Two days later this office received a communication which in effect was a transcript of **NAME**'s telephone conversation with our Agent.

It would appear **NAME** is endeavoring to embarrass the FBI and may possibly telephone your office under pretext. You should be extremely circumspect in any dealings with her and be particularly alert to the possibility she may be recording your conversation. Any contacts with **NAME** or pertinent data developed relating to her should be promptly furnished to the Bureau marked for the attention of the Crime Records Division. Letters from **NAME** are not being acknowledged by the Bureau.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

ORIGINAL FILED IN CASE NO.  
NATIONAL ARCHIVES (REGISTRATION)  
DATE 8/5/94



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 64-24  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

May 5, 1964

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to

File No.

(A) VOUCHERS - AMENDMENT TO STANDARDIZED GOVERNMENT TRAVEL REGULATIONS - PER DIEM ALLOWANCES -- Effective May 1, 1964, a per diem rate equal to one-half of the maximum rate prescribed for a particular area will be authorized for official travel of less than 24 hours when a night's lodging is not required. This change in the per diem rate is in accordance with an amendment to the Standardized Government Travel Regulations prescribed by the Bureau of the Budget. A copy of Bureau of the Budget Circular No. A-7, dated April 9, 1964, with Attachment A is enclosed. Travel vouchers having a per diem claim for travel of less than 24 hours computed at the maximum per diem rate for a particular area must be supported by a certification that an expense for a night's lodging was incurred. Employees who have an occasion to perform official travel should be advised of this change in per diem rates.

5/5/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-24

(B) SECURITY OF TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS - SECURITY INFORMANTS - CRIMINAL INFORMANTS - RACIAL INFORMANTS -- Recently a conversation relating to hoodlum activities between an informant in one city and his contacting Agent in another city was overheard by a telephone operator, who reported to a local hoodlum that she had listened to part of a telephone conversation between an unknown individual and a Special Agent of the FBI. The operator was instructed by the hoodlum to continue to be alert for any similar calls. The telephone call was made by a criminal informant, who used a code name, and his identity is not known to the underworld.

Instruct all informants to be most discreet and exercise caution in telephone calls to contacting Agents even in those instances when calls may be made to an unlisted number. Informants should always use their code names and avoid making collect calls, as such calls require handling by an operator who will know or can determine that the location being called is the FBI. All Agents should, likewise, be cautioned to make certain that they are careful in their conversations over the telephone, especially, on long distance calls to a field office.

Security of our informants and of our investigative operations requires that we be most circumspect in the use of all communications media, particularly the telephone, which is subject to monitoring by company employees.

(C) FEDERAL RESERVE ACT - RESEARCH MATTER -- Beginning July 1, 1964, for a duration of one year the Bureau is initiating a survey into each case wherein a conviction is obtained under the Federal Reserve Act. The purpose of this survey is to obtain data to be utilized in accounting training, newspaper articles and in the preparation of speeches.

U  
Each office will be furnished under separate cover a supply of a form to be submitted at the time a conviction is reported in each Federal Reserve Act case. It is desired that this form be completed from the information developed during the investigation of the case.

Each office is to institute use of this form commencing with each conviction obtained in U. S. District Court on or after July 1, 1964, in matters of this nature.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover


Director

Enclosure for (A)

5/5/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-24

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PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 64-C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

May 20, 1964

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

**RE: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA - SECURITY MEASURES**

The Bureau has learned recently that Communist Party, USA, members are taking extra security precautions to determine whether or not any individual has entered their room or tampered with papers and material left in the room during the absence of such members. It is reasonable to assume that such precautions prevail in the residences and offices of Communist Party members and leaders.

This should be brought to the attention of all investigative personnel in the security field so as to preclude jeopardizing the future success of the Bureau's activities and operations. Every precaution must be taken so that during the course of contacting most sensitive sources, the same physical conditions exist subsequent to the contact as existed prior thereto.

Advise the Bureau promptly of any pertinent information received which relates to this matter.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

**PERSONAL**  
**NO NUMBER LETTER 64-D**  
**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE**  
**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

June 22, 1964

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

**RE: TRAINING - SOUND SCHOOL**

In accordance with the Bureau's continuing program of insuring that each field office has adequate technically trained personnel available, the Bureau desires that you submit the names of all Special Agents in your field division who are seriously interested in receiving sound school training. A technical background, such as that gained through formal education in science, engineering and technical subjects or through practical experience in telephony, radio communication and electronic repair, is most desirable, although not absolutely necessary. Lacking that, an Agent should possess considerable mechanical aptitude and some proficiency in one or more building trades such as woodworking, carpentry, masonry, electrical wiring, etc. A factual, detailed statement should be provided as to each Agent's technical background and/or mechanical aptitude and proficiency in order to permit a worthwhile evaluation of his capability.

As you are aware, each Sound-trained Agent is afforded specialized lock training. The Bureau will continue to afford this training at sound school. However, some offices may have need for lock-trained Agents over and above the Agents who will receive lock training at future sound schools. In addition to furnishing background information on all Agents interested in sound training, you are to assess the need for sound men in your field division projected as accurately as possible one year and three years from the date of this letter. You should likewise assess the projected need for any lock men needed over and above the number of sound men indicated above.

A reply, marked to the attention of the FBI Laboratory, should be submitted within forty-five days after the receipt of this letter.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director





In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

**PERSONAL**  
**NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 64-E**  
**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE**  
**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

July 6, 1964

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

**RE: SECURITY INFORMANTS AND  
SOURCES - INCOME TAXES**

No Number SAC Letter 63-E dated March 27, 1963, contained full details and instructions for a withholding plan through which it was hoped security informants could satisfy their Federal income tax obligations arising from payments made to them for services without jeopardizing their security. The plan was tried on a limited basis and has proven to be sound and effective. As a result, it will be expanded to include all field divisions effective January 1, 1965. Under the plan, payments to certain security informants and sources for services rendered will be subject to a 20 per cent withholding tax.

There are four categories of circumstances in which taxes will not be withheld. Taxes are not to be withheld from payments made (1) to other than security informants and sources, (2) for reimbursement of expenses, (3) under SAC authority, or (4) to informants who have been able to report Bureau income on their Federal tax returns without jeopardizing their security or without challenge from the Internal Revenue Service.

To place the plan into effect, you should immediately review the personal situation of each security informant and source. Where circumstances warrant using the procedure, the matter should be discussed with each informant or source involved. It should be explained to each that the withholding procedure to be placed into effect January 1, 1965, is being adopted to afford a secure method of meeting Federal income tax obligations in regard to money received from the FBI for services. The Bureau must be advised by November 1, 1964, of the identity of each informant to be exempted from this program and the method to be used by each in reporting his Bureau income.

In operating the plan, you should be alert to streamline the procedures. For example, instructions call for a check to be drawn for the gross amount of an authorized payment. After it is cashed, the amount to be withheld for taxes is deducted and deposited in the special checking account; however, it is not necessary to make a deposit in connection with each such transaction. If it would simplify the matter, there would be no objection to making one deposit at the end of each day for the total amount of money withheld that day from payments to all informants.

In instances where the procedure is not used for certain informants or sources, you should continue to instruct them to satisfy their tax obligations on income received from the FBI by such methods as may be proper and feasible.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover


Director

7/6/64

NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 64-E

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

July 30, 1964

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

**RE: SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION CHARACTERIZATIONS  
INTERNAL SECURITY - C**

Set forth below are up-to-date thumbnail sketches of organizations and publications, each of which is of use to various field offices. No attempt is made to include all sketches which have been furnished to the Bureau for approval; only those sketches which are believed to have field-wide application are set forth.

In the event an office needs to characterize an organization not mentioned in this letter, listed in the various issues of the "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications" published by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, or designated by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450, a request should be made of the office of origin to furnish the required characterization. In describing a local affiliate of a national organization, in addition to characterizing the local affiliate, it will be necessary to set forth separately the characterization of the parent organization.

The evaluation and identities of the sources should be handled in accordance with instructions set forth in Part I, Section 49B 2m (1)(d), page 65, of the FBI Handbook.

For the purpose of evaluation all sources utilized in the preparation of the sketches listed below should be described as having furnished reliable information in the past. In each sketch utilized below, the field office submitting the sketch has advised that careful consideration was given to each source concealed.

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT SENT TO  
NATIONAL ARCHIVES (NIFARCA)  
DATE 8/5/94

✓  
AMERICAN COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION

The April, 1964, issue of the "ACA News," official publication of the American Communications Association (ACA), shows that the ACA is located at 18 John Street, New York, New York.

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The "Report of the International Executive Board ACA, CIO" at the 5th National Convention, Chicago, Illinois, April 8 through 13, 1940, discloses that the ACA had its origin at the 3rd National Convention of the American Radio Telegraphists Association (ARTA) held in New York City, in August, 1937. At this convention, it was agreed to change the name of the union from ARTA to ACA. This change was ratified by the union members on March 10, 1938.

The "Directory of National and International Labor Unions in the United States, 1955," published by the United States Department of Labor, lists on page 4, unions expelled from the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) on charges of communist domination. ACA was listed as having been expelled on June 15, 1950.

y AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR MARXIST STUDIES

A source advised on April 9, 1963, that on April 7, 1963, at a meeting of the District Committee of the Communist Party, United States of America (CP, USA), of New England, held in Boston, Massachusetts, Herbert Aptheker stated he was developing an organization called American Institute for Marxist Studies (AIMS), which would eventually legalize the CP. He stated AIMS would publish literature on history, science, physics, archeology and other subjects which would be put out quarterly with various supplements.

A second source advised in December, 1959, that Herbert Aptheker was elected to the National Committee, CP, USA, at the 17th National Convention of the CP, USA, held in December, 1959.

A third source advised on June 7, 1963, that on June 3, 1963, Herbert Aptheker spoke at the CP, USA, New York District Board meeting concerning AIMS. Aptheker

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stated that AIMS would unite and strengthen the CP although the CP would not be connected with it. He stated AIMS was being formed to operate within the scope of the McCarran and Smith Acts and would legally bring Marxist material and opinions to the attention of American scholars and the general public.

A fourth source advised on May 15, 1964, that as of that date AIMS was located on the fifth floor west at 20 East 30th Street, New York, New York.

Sources: \_\_\_\_\_

COMMITTEE TO SECURE JUSTICE FOR MORTON SOBELL

"Following the execution of atomic spies Ethel and Julius Rosenberg in June, 1953, the 'Communist campaign assumed a different emphasis. Its major effort centered upon Morton Sobell,' the Rosenbergs' codefendant. The National Committee to Secure Justice in the Rosenberg Case - a communist front which had been conducting the campaign in the United States - was reconstituted as the National Rosenberg-Sobell Committee at a conference in Chicago in October, 1953, and 'then as the National Committee to Secure Justice for Morton Sobell in the Rosenberg Case?..."

("Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications" dated December 1, 1961, issued by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, page 116.)

In September, 1954, the name "National Committee to Secure Justice for Morton Sobell" appeared on literature issued by the Committee. In March, 1955, the current name, "Committee to Secure Justice for Morton Sobell," first appeared on literature issued by the Committee.

The Address Telephone Directory for the Borough of Manhattan, New York City, as published by the New York Telephone Company on April 20, 1964, lists the "Committee to Secure Justice for Morton Sobell" (CSJMS) as being located at 940 Broadway, New York, New York.

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CROSS WORLD BOOKS AND PERIODICALS, INCORPORATED,  
also known as Midwest Book House, Midwest Book  
Store

Records of the Foreign Agents Registration Section (FARS), Justice Department, Washington, D. C., disclose statements were filed by Rose Rose for the Cross World Books and Periodicals (CWBP) as agent for Mezhdunarodnaja Kniga (MK) (International Book), Moscow, USSR, from May, 1959, until she sold the business in October, 1960. The address of the CWBP was given as 333 South Wacker Drive, Chicago, and the purpose of the business was given as importing Russian books and periodicals for profit.

In January, 1961, a source advised the CWBP would be the propaganda center Rose was unable to establish and would become a reality through new owners.

A second source in May, 1944, advised that Rose was then a member of the Rogers Park Professional Branch, Communist Party (CP), Chicago.

The new CWBP groups, with Alexander Svenchansky, President; Gregory Lotsman, CWBP Manager; and others, filed registration statement number 1457 on June 19, 1961, with the FARS as agent for foreign principal MK to distribute and sell "Russian language books, recordings, periodicals, film strip, and visual aid..." and act as subscription agents for Soviet periodicals and newspapers. The CWBP was incorporated in Illinois on January 3, 1961.

On September 3, 1963, the CWBP filed a supplemental registration for the six-month period ending June 19, 1963, indicating no change in its status.

Svenchansky was linked with a Soviet espionage ring in testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on November 2, 1953, by Harry Gold, confessed atomic spy.

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On December 21, 1953, a third source said Lotsman was in the CP for a short period in the mid-1940's and was suspected by the CP as being disloyal as of December 21, 1953. Source knew nothing else concerning him or his recent activities.

Sources:

FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE

The April 6, 1960, edition of "The New York Times" newspaper contained a full-page advertisement captioned "What Is Really Happening In Cuba," placed by the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC). This advertisement announced the formation of the FPCC in New York City and declared the FPCC intended to promulgate "the truth about revolutionary Cuba" to neutralize the distorted American press.

"The New York Times" edition of January 11, 1961, reported that at a hearing conducted before the United States Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on January 10, 1961, Dr. Charles A. Santos-Buch identified himself and Robert Taber as organizers of the FPCC. He also testified he and Taber obtained funds from the Cuban Government which were applied toward the cost of the aforementioned advertisement.

On May 16, 1963, a source advised that during the first two years of the FPCC's existence there was a struggle between Communist Party (CP) and Socialist Workers Party (SWP) elements to exert their power within the FPCC and thereby influence FPCC policy. This source added that during the past year there had been a successful effort by FPCC leadership to minimize the role of these and other organizations in the FPCC so that their influence as of May, 1963, was negligible.

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

On May 20, 1963, a second source advised that Vincent "Ted" Lee, FPCC National Office Director, was then formulating FPCC policy and had indicated that he had no

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FOUR CONTINENT BOOK CORPORATION

According to the records of the Foreign Agents Registration Section, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., the Four Continent Book Corporation, 156 5th Avenue, New York City, is registered under the provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 as amended. One of the foreign principals listed in this registration is the Mezhdunarodnaja Kniga (International Book), Moscow, Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.

FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

In the November 4, 1963, issue of "The Militant," a weekly newspaper of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), the Fourth International (FI) was described as the world organization of revolutionary socialists founded by Leon Trotsky. It was set forth that the major sectors of the FI were reunited in the Summer of 1963 after a long split and are represented by the United Secretariat of the FI.

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

FREEDOMWAYS ASSOCIATES, INCORPORATED

The records of the New York Secretary of State, Albany, New York, show that the certificate of incorporation of Freedomways Associates, Incorporated, was filed on March 2, 1961.

The Spring, 1964, issue of "Freedomways" is self-described as "A Quarterly Review of the Negro Freedom Movement" published by Freedomways Associates, Incorporated, 799 Broadway, New York City.

On May 24, 1961, a source advised that a report was given on "Freedomways" at a meeting of the National Board, Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), held on May 24, 1961. It was stated that the original plan called for the publication to be openly Marxist, but that it was later decided it would not be avowedly a Marxist publication. Editorials are in the

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hands of a mixed group of Marxists and non-Marxists. It was stated that the central purpose of "Freedomways" is to develop a theory and positive criticism of currents in the Negro movement, as well as to raise the level of understanding and discussion taking place in Negro life today and to project a socialist and pro-Soviet orientation.

On May 25, 1961, another source advised that "Freedomways" was set up for the CPUSA by James Jackson, a member of the National Committee of the CPUSA.

Sources:

#### FRUIT OF ISLAM

On May 8, 1964, a source advised that the Fruit of Islam (FOI) is a group within the Nation of Islam (NOI) composed of male members of the NOI. The purpose of the FOI is to protect officials and property of the NOI, assure compliance of members with NOI teachings and to prepare for the "War of Armageddon." Members of the FOI are required to participate in military drill and are afforded the opportunity to engage in judo training. The FOI is governed by a military system wherein the members are controlled by general orders similar to those issued by regular military organizations.

Source:

(The thumbnail sketch of the NOI must be utilized when using the above sketch.)

#### "INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST REVIEW"

The November 27, 1961, issue of "The Militant," a weekly newspaper of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), described the "International Socialist Review" as "a magazine reflecting the viewpoint of the SWP."

The Spring, 1964, issue of "International Socialist Review" described the magazine as a quarterly publication located at 116 University Place, New York City.

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

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LABOR TODAY

In January, 1962, a source advised that on January 13, 1962, Gus Hall, whom the source described as General Secretary of the Communist Party, USA, remarked that the Party-supported trade-union publication would be issued in the near future and would appear under the name "Labor Today."

On January 5, 1962, records in the Assumed Name Section of the County Clerk's Office, Wayne County, Detroit, Michigan, indicated that Certificate Number 145344, issued for conducting business under an assumed name, was issued to "Labor Today" (a bimonthly publication) having a business address at 12065 Wyoming, Detroit 4, Michigan. A certificate was filed January 2, 1962, and the names of the persons listed as owning, conducting and transacting the business were:

Charles H. Walters  
9309 Memorial  
Detroit, Michigan

Eve Neidelman  
19972 Marlowe  
Detroit, Michigan

A second source advised on December 15, 1961, that Charles Walters was then a member of the Michigan District Communist Party (MDCP) State Committee. This source advised on September 18, 1959, that Eve Neidelman was then a member of the MDCP State Committee.

A third source advised on September 21, 1961, that as of September 17, 1961, Eve Neidelman was a member of the North-West Section Club of the MDCP.

The Founding Statement contained in the first issue of "Labor Today" (Spring, 1962) indicated that two additional issues would be forthcoming in 1962 and beginning in 1963, "Labor Today" would appear regularly as a "bi-monthly journal."

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The masthead of bimonthly "Labor Today," Volume 3, No. 1, February - March, 1964, issue, describes the publication as "An Independent Journal of Discussion." Its managing editor is Charles H. Walters and business and editorial offices are located at 12065 Wyoming, Suite 5, Detroit 4, Michigan.

Sources:

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MONROE DEFENSE COMMITTEE

A source advised on February 16, 1962, that Gerald Quinn, a member of the Workers World Party (WWP) from New York, was sent to Cleveland, Ohio, in October, 1961, by the Monroe Defense Committee (MDC) of New York to organize an MDC in Cleveland, and that Quinn, with the aid of Ted and Frances Dostal, members of WWP, and Willie Mae Mallory, organized an MDC in Cleveland with headquarters at 1289 East 115th Street.

On March 3, 1964, this source related that the purpose of the MDC in Cleveland was to aid in the support of Willie Mae Mallory in her fight against extradition to Monroe, North Carolina. Following her extradition in January, 1964, headquarters of MDC was moved from Cleveland to Monroe, North Carolina.

A second source advised March 12, 1964, that the purpose of MDC is to obtain support and funds to aid in the continued defense of Willie Mae Mallory, Richard Crowder and Harold Reape who were convicted in Superior Court, Monroe, North Carolina, February 27, 1964, on charges of kidnaping Mr. and Mrs. G. Bruce Stegall in Monroe on August 27, 1961, following a race riot in that city.

This source stated on May 21, 1964, that headquarters of MDC is located at 605 Brown Street, Monroe, North Carolina, with Clarence Seniors as chairman.

A third source in September, 1963, identified Clarence Seniors as a member of WWP.

Sources:

(The thumbnail sketch of the WWP must be utilized when using the above sketch.)

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MUSLIM GIRLS TRAINING

On May 19, 1960, a source advised that the Muslim Girls Training (MGT) is a group within the Nation of Islam (NOI) and is composed of all female members of the NOI. The MGT is similar in structure to the Fruit of Islam (FOI), which is composed of male members of the NOI, in that the MGT has officers similar to military organizations to whom other female members are accountable. MGT members receive instructions in homemaking, hygiene, calisthenics and other subjects such as Muslim history and the English language. There also exists a Junior MGT which is composed of female members of the NOI who are between the ages of 15 and 19 and who are afforded military-type drill.

Since 1957 various officers and "sisters" of the MGT have at meetings of the MGT used the term MGT so that it also means General Civilization Class. General Civilization Class refers to classes conducted within the MGT.

The above refers to activities of the MGT at Muhammad's Temple of Islam No. 2, 5335 South Greenwood, Chicago, Illinois.

On May 7, 1964, another source advised that the MGT is a group within the NOI which is composed of all female members of the NOI. The MGT is similar in structure to the FOI which is composed of male members of the NOI. In theory, the MGT exists in all Temples of the NOI and is patterned after the MGT at Muhammad's Temple of Islam No. 2, Chicago. General Civilization Class refers to the collective group of classes held within the MGT.

Sources:

(The thumbnail sketches of the NOI and FOI must be utilized when using the above sketch.)

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**NATION OF ISLAM, formerly  
referred to as the Muslim  
Cult of Islam, also known as  
Muhammad's Temples of Islam**

In January, 1957, a source advised Elijah Muhammad has described his organization on a nationwide basis as the "Nation of Islam," (NOI) and "Muhammad's Temples of Islam."

On May 8, 1964, a second source advised Elijah Muhammad is the national leader of the NOI; Muhammad's Temple of Islam No. 2, 5335 South Greenwood Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, is the national headquarters of the NOI; and in mid-1960, Muhammad and other NOI officials, when referring to Muhammad's organization on a nationwide basis, commenced using either "Mosque" or "Temple" when mentioning one of "Muhammad's Temples of Islam."

The NOI is an all-Negro organization which was originally organized in 1930 in Detroit, Michigan. Muhammad claims to have been selected by Allah, the Supreme Being, to lead the so-called Negro race out of slavery in the wilderness of North America by establishing an independent black nation in the United States. Members following Muhammad's teachings and his interpretation of the "Koran" believe there is no such thing as a Negro; that the so-called Negroes are slaves of the white race, referred to as "white devils," in the United States; and that the white race, because of its exploitation of the so-called Negroes, must and will be destroyed in the approaching "War of Armageddon."

In the past, officials and members of the NOI, including Muhammad, have refused to register under the provisions of the Selective Service Acts and have declared that members owe no allegiance to the United States.

On May 5, 1958, the first source advised Muhammad had, upon advice of legal counsel, tempered his personal statements and instructions to his ministers concerning the principles of his organization in order to avoid possible prosecution by the United States Government; however, he did not indicate any fundamental changes in the teachings of his organization.

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On May 7, 1964, a third source advised Muhammad had, early in July, 1958, decided to de-emphasize the religious aspects of the teachings of Islam and to stress the economic benefits to be derived by those Negroes who joined the NOI. This policy change, according to Muhammad, would help him acquire additional followers and create more interest in his programs.

Sources:

#### NEWS AND LETTERS COMMITTEES

A source on August 1, 1958, stated that as a result of the split in the Johnson-Forest Group (JFG) which occurred in 1955, two factions emerged, the Johnson Faction and the Forest Faction. According to the source, the Johnson Faction was composed of the followers of C.L.R. James, also known as James Johnson, and the Forest Faction was composed of the followers of Rae Dwyer, also known as Freddie Forest. The cofounders of the JFG were C.L.R. James, known as Johnson, who was deported from the United States as an undesirable alien in 1953, and Rae Dwyer known as Forest.

The JFG has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

On March 3, 1964, another source advised that the Forest Faction of the JFG is publicly known as the News and Letters Committees (NLC). The national headquarters of the NLC is located at 8751 Grand River, Detroit, Michigan.

According to the second source and a third source, the Detroit Local of the NLC carries out the instructions and policies issued by the National Headquarters of the NLC.

Sources:

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**PROGRESSIVE LABOR MOVEMENT, also  
known as Progressive Labor Party  
"PROGRESSIVE LABOR"**

A source advised on July 2, 1962, that Progressive Labor groups held a conference in New York City on July 1, 1962, where Milton Rosen acted as chairman. He read a statement at this conference setting forth their intention to form a new Marxist-Leninist party in the United States. Rosen stated that a more formal organization was necessary, one which would provide a framework for all who wanted to join in a united effort to build an American vanguard. The forces of this new organization are to consolidate all existing forces around Progressive Labor and organize additional forces, expand and improve political activities, win additional forces to an outlook of Marxism-Leninism and increase the open advocacy of socialism, develop a significant Marxist-Leninist program for the new party, and organize a collective organization of leaders and members.

"The Worker," an east coast communist newspaper, issue of January 7, 1962, page ten, column three, reported the expulsion of Milton Rosen, former Labor Secretary of the New York State Communist Party, United States of America.

A second and third source advised in February, 1963, that this new Marxist-Leninist party had not yet been organized on a formal basis, but that Progressive Labor groups had been formed in several localities in line with the proposals of Milton Rosen. The sources advised as of February, 1963, that the leaders of this group were referring to it as the Progressive Labor Movement.

A fourth source advised on March 15, 1964, that the Progressive Labor Movement follows, supports and is politically orientated toward the Communist Party line of Red China rather than that of the Soviet Union.

A fifth source advised on March 28, 1964, that at a Progressive Labor Movement meeting held in New York City on that date, it was announced that the Progressive

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Labor Movement would try to hold a national convention in New York City in September, 1964, to organize the Progressive Labor Movement on a more formal basis into a Progressive Labor Party.

The fifth source also advised that the Progressive Labor Movement publishes a monthly magazine called "Progressive Labor" and also a quarterly theoretical publication called the "Marxist-Leninist Quarterly." The source also advised that starting June 1, 1964, the Progressive Labor Movement would start publishing a weekly newspaper in New York City.

The March, 1964, issue of "Progressive Labor" sets forth that it is published monthly by the Progressive Labor Company, General Post Office Box 808, Brooklyn 1, New York.

Sources:

RUSSIAN-AMERICAN CULTURAL  
EDUCATIONAL COMMITTEE

A source advised on July 11, 1961, that from its inception in June, 1955, until May, 1960, the Russian-American Cultural Educational Committee (RACEC) operated as a fund raising organization of the Russian Club of the Communist Party (CP) of Illinois. In May, 1960, the Russian Club, CP of Illinois, was enlarged to include Ukrainians and Poles and this united club became a unit of the Nationalities Section, CP of Illinois. During that period the RACEC served as a fund raising organization for the Russian element of the Polish-Ukrainian-Russian Club of the Nationalities Section, CP of Illinois.

In December, 1961, it was decided that the Russians, Ukrainians and Poles would again be separated into individual clubs within the Nationalities Section, CP of Illinois.

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As of May 12, 1964, the source advised that the RACEC was composed of members of the Russian Club, CP of Illinois, and functioning as a fund raising organization for that club.

Meetings of the RACEC are held irregularly, as the occasion demands, and are held at the residences of its various members. In the event of a fund raising affair open to the public, arrangements are made for a hall in which to hold the affair.

Source:

SOVFOTO

According to the records of the Foreign Agents Registration Section, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., the Sovfoto Agency, 24 West 45th Street, New York, New York, is registered with the Department of Justice as agent for Mezhdunarodnaja Kniga (International Book), USSR, for the sale of Soviet books, articles, stories and plays for publication in the United States and Canada. Sovfoto is also registered agent for Tass (the telegraphic agency of the USSR) for the sale of Soviet newspapers and photographs and for fourteen other foreign principals. Other names also used by Sovfoto are Eastfoto Agency, East Music Agency and AM-RUS Literary and Music Agency.

TASS NEWS AGENCY

The Tass News Agency is the official Soviet Government news-gathering organization with headquarters in Moscow, USSR, and branches throughout the world.

"THE MILITANT"

"The Militant" is a weekly newspaper of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP).

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

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UNITED ELECTRICAL, RADIO AND MACHINE WORKERS OF AMERICA

The "UE Shop Steward Guide," United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE) Publication Number 212, Sixth Edition, 1952, discloses on pages 32-34, "UE - the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America" was established in 1936 at a convention in Buffalo, New York. At that time the organization was called the United Electrical and Radio Workers of America. Shortly thereafter a large group of American Federation of Labor machinists' locals joined the UE and the full name became the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE).

"The UE is known as an 'International Union' because companies of both the United States and Canada are under contract."

"100 Things You Should Know About Communism and Labor," prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities, United States House of Representatives, Washington, D. C., 1951, relates the following information. In 1944, the Committee on Un-American Activities found the "United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (CIO)" to be one of the unions which was described as having "Communist leadership... strongly entrenched." The "United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America" was listed as one of the unions which was expelled from the Congress of Industrial Organizations in 1950 because of its communist domination.

The "Internal Security Annual Report for 1957, Report of the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate," on page 61 refers to UE as "one of the strongest Communist controlled unions in America."

The International Headquarters of UE is located at 11 East 51st Street, New York, New York, according to the April 20, 1964, edition of "UE News," official organ of UE.

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W.E.B. DU BOIS CLUBS OF AMERICA

A source has advised that on October 26-27, 1963, a conference of members of the Communist Party (CP), including national functionaries, met in Chicago, Illinois, for the purpose of setting in motion forces for the establishment of a new national Marxist-oriented youth organization which would hunt for the most peaceful transition to socialism. The delegates to this meeting were cautioned against the germ of anti-Soviet and anti-CP ideologies. These delegates were also told that it would be reasonable to assume that the young socialists attracted into this new organization would eventually pass into the CP itself.

A second conference of over 20 persons met in Chicago on December 28-29, 1963, for the purpose of initiating a "call" to the new youth organization and planning for a founding convention to be held in June, 1964.

A second source has advised that the founding convention for the new youth organization was held from June 19-21, 1964, at 150 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California, at which time the name W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America was adopted. Approximately 500 delegates from throughout the United States attended this convention. The aims of this organization, as set forth in the preamble to the constitution, are: "It is our belief that this nation can best solve its problems in an atmosphere of peaceful coexistence, complete disarmament and true freedom for all peoples of the world, and that these solutions will be reached mainly through the united efforts of all democratic elements in our country, composed essentially of the working people allied in the unity of Negroes and other minorities with whites. We further fully recognize that the greatest threat to American democracy comes from the racist and right wing forces in coalition with the most reactionary sections of the economic power structure, using the tool of anti-communism to divide and destroy the unified struggle of the working people. As young people in the forces struggling for democracy, we shall actively strive to defeat these reactionary and neo-fascist elements and to achieve

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complete freedom and democracy for all Americans, thus enabling each individual to freely choose and build the society he would wish to live in. Through these struggles we feel the American people will realize the viability of the socialist alternatives."

The constitution further states that this new organization shall be a membership organization open to individuals, or if five or more people so desire a chapter can be formed which shall in turn be guided by the policies and principles of the parent organization.

The second source has also advised that at the founding convention it was voted that the organization should be temporarily headquartered in San Francisco, California, although no specific physical location was decided upon. This same source advised on June 29, 1964, that the temporary headquarters of this organization is 1007 McAllister Street, San Francisco, which is the headquarters of the W.E.B. DuBois Club of San Francisco.

Both sources have advised that at the founding convention two officers were elected:

Philip Chapin Davis - President  
Carl Ellenger Bloice - Publications Chairman

A third source has advised that on October 26, 1962, Philip Davis attended a CP recruiting class held at 1579 Scenic Avenue, Berkeley, California.

A fourth source has advised that Carl Bloice, reporter for the "People's World" newspaper, was, on April 3, 1964, elected to the newly organized San Francisco County Committee of the CP.

The "People's World" is a west coast communist newspaper published weekly in San Francisco, California.

Sources:

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"WORKERS WORLD"

On May 13, 1964, a source advised that the "Workers World" is the official newspaper of the Workers World Party, published twice monthly, with editorial offices located at 46 West 21st Street, New York, New York.

Source:

(The thumbnail sketch of the Workers World Party must be utilized when using the above sketch.)

WORKERS WORLD PARTY

On April 17, 1959, a source advised that on February 12, 1959, a Socialist Workers Party (SWP) minority group, under the leadership of National Committee member Sam Ballan, split from the SWP.

The source stated that this minority group, referred to as the Marcyites, after many years of program and policy differences on varied issues concerning tactics and interpretation of political events, split from the SWP on the grounds that the Party was liquidating itself by departing from the Marxist precepts of Leon Trotsky and retreating from the fight for the world socialist revolution. The final issue which ultimately forced the split was the minority's opposition to the SWP regroupment policy which involved cooperation with the Communist Party (CP) periphery individuals characterized by the minority as petty-bourgeois.

The minority program, according to the source, advocated unconditional defense of the Soviet Union and has as its goal the building of a revolutionary party with a complete proletarian orientation for the purpose of overthrowing capitalism in the United States and throughout the world.

On May 12, 1960, the source advised that this minority group had chosen the name Workers World Party.

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On April 27, 1964, a second source advised that the Workers World Party, which maintains headquarters at 46 West 21st Street, New York, New York, supports the People's Republic of China in its ideological dispute with the Soviet Union.

The SWP and the CP have been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Sources:

### "YOUNG SOCIALIST"

The "Young Socialist" (YS) is a monthly publication self-described in the April-May, 1964, issue of this newspaper as the official organ of the Young Socialist Alliance.

The YS maintains the mailing address of Post Office Box 471, Cooper Station, New York, New York, 10003.

(The thumbnail sketch of the Young Socialist Alliance must be utilized when using the above sketch.)

### YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE

The May, 1960, issue of the "Young Socialist" (YS), page 1, column 3, disclosed that during April 15-17, 1960, a national organization entitled "The Young Socialist Alliance" (YSA) was established at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This issue stated that this organization was formed by the nationwide supporter clubs of the publication YS.

The above issue, page 6, set forth the Founding Declaration of YSA. This declaration stated that the YSA recognizes the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) as the only existing political leadership on class struggle principles, and that the supporters of the YS have come into basic political solidarity with the SWP on the principles of revolutionary socialism.

A source advised on May 6, 1964, that the original YSA was an organization formed during October, 1957, in New York City by youth of various left socialist tendencies, particularly members and followers of the SWP. The leaders of this group were the guiding forces in the establishment of the national organization.

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The source further advised on May 6, 1964, that the YSA is dominated and controlled on a national basis by the SWP through having SWP members comprise exclusively the National Executive Committee (NEC) and through an official SWP representative at all YSA NEC meetings. The YSA, in reality, is the youth and training section of the SWP and the main source of new SWP members.

The headquarters of the YSA are located in Room 631, 41 Union Square West, New York City.

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The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Source:

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

7/30/64

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 64-43

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

August 25, 1964

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

Reply, Please Refer to  
No.

A) ARREST AND ARRAIGNMENT - CONFESSIONS - RIGHT TO COUNSEL -- SAC  
letter 64-40 (E) advised you that effective immediately, and upon the advice of  
the Department of Justice, all investigative personnel are to warn arrested subjects  
of a right to free counsel. The warning required is more fully stated in referenced  
SAC Letter.

The new warning is not to be given to persons not under arrest and not  
charged with the crime, who are being interviewed as suspects only. To tell this  
latter type of person that he has a right to free counsel is subject to interpretation  
as a threat that he is about to be arrested or charged with a crime since otherwise  
he would not be appearing before a judge at all.

Bring these clarifying instructions to the attention of all investigative  
personnel immediately.

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SAC LETTER NO. 64-43

(B) FBI SUGGESTION PROGRAM -- The following tabulations show the results  
of participation by the field in the FBI Suggestion Program during Fiscal Year 1964:

OFFICE	SUGGESTIONS	ADOPTED	SUBMISSIONS		1963 TOTAL	CHANGE
			AGENT	CLERK		
Albany	3	1	2	1	7	- 4
Albuquerque	11	2	4	7	16	- 5
Anchorage	9	3	1	8	2	+ 7
Atlanta	9	3	5	4	10	- 1
Baltimore	12	3	9	3	15	- 3
Birmingham	2	0	0	2	4	- 2
Boston	5	0	5	0	13	- 8
Buffalo	2	0	2	0	4	- 2
Butte	10	5	10	0	5	+ 5
Charlotte	28	11	16	12	24	+ 4
Chicago	14	4	10	4	23	- 9
Cincinnati	22	7	13	9	23	- 1
Cleveland	18	1	11	7	12	+ 6
Dallas	6	0	4	2	21	- 15





OFFICE	SUGGESTIONS	ADOPTED	SUBMISSIONS		1963 TOTAL	CHANGE
			AGENT	CLERK		
Savannah	26	2	14	12	15	+11
Seattle	20	1	16	4	28	- 8
Springfield	23	1	13	10	24	- 1
Tampa	33	9	20	13	17	+16
Washington Field	26	9	21	5	33	- 7
<hr/>						
Bern	3	2	1	2	3	----
Bonn	4	2	2	2	3	+ 1
London	1	0	1	0	3	- 2
Madrid	0	0	0	0	3	- 3
Manila	3	0	2	1	0	+ 3
Mexico City	8	2	3	5	9	- 1
Ottawa	2	1	2	0	3	- 1
Paris	5	2	3	2	6	- 1
Rio de Janeiro	0	0	0	0	0	----
Rome	12	3	9	3	0	+12
Tokyo	15	6	13	2	9	+ 6
TOTALS	<u>681</u>	<u>139</u>	<u>449</u>	<u>232</u>	<u>715</u>	<u>-34</u>

It should be noted that the Madrid Office ceased to function as of 12/18/63. The Jackson Office, which was created 7/10/64, is not shown in the foregoing list.

Offices whose designations are preceded by an asterisk still have suggestions pending resolution.

While the actual number of submissions declined slightly from the previous year, our percentage of adoption, which was 30.8%, improved substantially and exceeds the National adoption rate of 24-26%. The anticipated tangible savings of almost \$44,000 also surpassed last year's total.

I want to take this opportunity to thank all of our employees for the interest manifested by their participation in this vital program and to ask that this excellent spirit of cooperation continue to characterize our efforts during the present year.

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SAC LETTER NO. 64-43

(C) JUVENILES - DEFERRED/PROSECUTION SYSTEM - FINGERPRINTING -- A question has been raised by the field concerning the necessity or advisability of obtaining the fingerprints of a juvenile who is summoned to the office of the United

8/25/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-43

States Attorney to be handled under the Deferred Prosecution System, commonly known as the Brooklyn Plan, and who is not arrested at any stage of the proceedings against him.

The Department has advised that its policy is that if a juvenile is arrested his fingerprints are to be taken, but in any case where the juvenile is not arrested his fingerprints should not be obtained. Moreover, that "whenever possible" juveniles who are to be handled under the Brooklyn Plan should not be arrested. An arrest tends to defeat one of the prime purposes of the Plan, which is to avoid giving the juvenile the stigma of a criminal record.

You are to be guided by the above instructions. In the cases of juveniles not arrested, no attempt of any kind should be made to obtain the fingerprints of the juvenile, either by consent or otherwise.

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(D) TESTIMONY OF AGENTS-- A Federal trial judge has criticized severely a Special Agent of the FBI for having "volunteered" testimony that was irrelevant to the case being tried, and possibly so prejudicial to one defendant as to constitute grounds for mistrial.

In response to questions asked upon direct examination, the Agent testified to relevant statements made to him by a second defendant. At the conclusion of this testimony, the prosecutor asked, "Then what did Mr. \_\_\_\_\_ say?" After attempting to avoid answering this question, the Agent was directed by the judge to answer the question first and to offer any necessary explanation later. The Agent then testified to an additional remark made by one defendant which linked another defendant to a separate and distinct crime of state jurisdiction.

The correct answer to the prosecutor's question asked under the circumstances is "nothing about this matter," or other words having the same meaning. Such an answer truthfully admits that something else was said, but also puts the court on notice that in the judgment of the Agent the additional remarks have no relevancy to the issues at trial. If the judge doubts the Agent's judgment as to relevancy, he can dismiss the jury and direct the Agent to answer the question out of the jury's hearing. If the judge persists in directing the Agent to answer without dismissing the jury, as might conceivably occur, the responsibility for bringing improper testimony into the trial is that of the judge, not the Agent.

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Doubts concerning relevancy can best be resolved by conferring with the prosecutor before trial. In any event, all investigative personnel in your office must be advised that whether through conferences with the prosecutor or exercise of the Agent's own judgment on the stand, it is expected that testimony will be confined to matters which are relevant.

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SAC LETTER NO. 64-43

(E) FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY - MEMBERSHIP IN FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY POSSIBLE CLUB -- As the result of a recent suggestion, a National Academy Possible Club will be initiated and a medal will be awarded to National Academy (NA) students and graduates in good standing who shoot a perfect score on the Practical Pistol Course (PPC) either on the ranges at Quantico or during regularly scheduled Bureau firearms sessions in the field under the same conditions as required of Special Agents.

Names of NA men who shoot perfect scores on a record run of the PPC will be placed on an FBINA Possible Club Plaque at the FBI Academy at Quantico. In each case, the Special Agent in Charge must submit a letter (original and three copies) to the Bureau marked for the attention of the FBINA Desk in the Training Division. This letter must specifically certify that the possible was shot during a regularly scheduled firearms session on a record run over the prescribed distances and within the prescribed time limits for the PPC. The letter must contain the names of the observer who witnessed the shooting of the target and the firearms instructor who was in charge of the firearms session and who must have personally scored the target.

All 50 hits in the K-5 area of the target must be clearly distinguishable. If there is any question as to the correct score on any target, it should be forwarded to the Bureau, Attention: Training Division, for final scoring.

A graduate who fired a possible while attending the NA will be awarded a medal only upon his specific request and subject to verification by existing Bureau records. The award will not be made retroactive for those who have fired possibles during a regularly scheduled FBI field office firearms session but will be placed into effect to include all firearms sessions subsequent to August 15, 1964. For membership in the Possible Club the perfect score must be fired with either a Bureau-issue-type revolver or a personally owned revolver with no more than a four-inch barrel.

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SAC LETTER NO. 64-43

(F) WORK-RELATED INJURIES - FISCAL YEAR 1964 -- Enclosed is a statistical compilation covering work-related injuries sustained in the field during fiscal year 1964. This report should be compared with the report furnished to you by SAC Letter 63-40. There was an increase of 23 injuries during fiscal year 1964. The injury rate throughout the Bureau for fiscal year 1964 was approximately 3.72 per cent. If your office exceeds this average rate of work-related injuries, you must immediately take any action necessary to reduce the number of work-related injuries. All employees should be advised of the necessity of our safety programs and instructed to use every safety precaution in the performance of their duties.

(Security Letter on attached page )

8/25/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-43

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(G) COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE FBI -- Information developed by *THIRD AGENCY CONSIDERATION* classified "Secret/No Foreign Dissem," which reportedly originated with a communist leader in Panama having good knowledge of Communist Party security activities, reveals the Security Organization (SO) of the Communist Party of Panama has listed a number of United States Government entities in Panama as targets on which information is to be collected by the SO. The FBI is specifically mentioned as a target.

Although Bureau has no personnel assigned in Panama, all personnel should be most alert during investigations for any indications that Panamanian Communist Party or any other foreign subversive group is attempting to penetrate the FBI or other United States agency. Applicant investigations involving persons with Panamanian background should be most thoroughly investigated.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosure for (F)

8/25/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-43

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

September 29, 1964

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(A) THOROUGHNESS OF INVESTIGATIONS -- You are aware that the results of many phases of our investigations are given extremely wide dissemination at Seat of Government to all executive branches of the Government including the White House. The excellence or conversely the lack of excellence of our reports and memoranda reporting the results of our investigations is the standard by which we are judged.

I am gravely concerned over the gross derelictions exhibited by various offices in conducting and reporting investigations of extreme importance recently. In numerous instances the Bureau has received communications from recipients of our reports and memoranda which pointed out gaps in our investigations as well as other defects and shortcomings.

It is your responsibility to insure that our investigations are thorough, complete, and reported in an incisive manner. Our reports should be such that at no time will a situation arise where gaps or defects in our investigations can be called to our attention.

There must be an immediate improvement in this over-all situation. Any necessity to call the above-mentioned facts to your attention in the future will result in severe administrative action.

*Reviewed by  
M. Talley 8/2/25*

**(B) ACCOMPLISHMENTS - PRESENTATION OF CASES TO UNITED STATES ATTORNEY** -- Criminal investigations handled by the FBI are designed to obtain evidence for prosecution in Federal court and not in state or local courts. When Agents discuss cases with the U. S. Attorney (USA) or his assistant, it is expected that such will be done with sufficient aggressiveness to insure the Bureau's interests are protected.

While it is the prerogative of the USA and his staff to authorize prosecution, it is stressed that we do not have the manpower to investigate violations which are later prosecuted in other than Federal courts. During presentations of cases to USA's, it is expected that the amount of time and effort expended by Bureau personnel will be mentioned in its proper perspective. Consideration can then be given to this factor by the USA prior to deciding whether he will decline prosecution in favor of handling by local authorities. You should bear in mind that if a case is investigated by the FBI and prosecuted in local court additional Agent time and expense may well be lost if Bureau personnel are called on to testify in state court.

Effective immediately, whenever Federal prosecution is declined by a USA or his assistant in favor of prosecution by local authorities, and investigation has been conducted by Bureau personnel, the Bureau should be notified immediately by airtel or more expeditious means depending on the circumstances involved. This communication should contain a concise summary of the violation, the extent of the investigation conducted by your office, and the specific reason why the USA feels the matter should be handled in local court. You should also include your recommendations as to whether this matter should be taken up with departmental officials at the headquarters level.

This notification to the Bureau does not apply to cases involving juveniles or where the USA declines in favor of handling in local court prior to investigation being conducted by your office.

These instructions do not alter the requirement that the Bureau be immediately advised when USA's decline prosecution in criminal matters where military personnel are involved.

The above should be brought to the attention of all investigative personnel:

Appropriate manual changes follow..

(Security Letter on attached page)

9/29/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-48

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(C) SECURITY INDEX - CHINA - CUBA -- Arrangements have been worked out with the Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for the special handling of Chinese and Cuban aliens on the Security Index (SI) in time of a limited emergency. As a result thereof, any information received through our sources in connection with our SI responsibilities indicating a change in residence and/or employment of a Chinese or Cuban alien on the SI would be of immediate interest to INS on a local level.

INS headquarters and the Department have also expressed a desire to promptly receive information of this type in addition to that routinely furnished by reports and letterhead memoranda.

Form FD-366 has been devised and is currently being utilized in connection with our program to keep Secret Service promptly advised of changes of residence and/or employment of SI subjects. In view of the above, when submitting form FD-366 reporting changes concerning Chinese and Cuban aliens in the future, furnish one copy to INS as well as Secret Service locally. Also furnish four copies instead of the normal two copies to the Bureau for appropriate dissemination at the Seat of Government.

Bear in mind, however, in filling out the reference on the FD-366 that some memoranda have been expressly prepared for dissemination to Secret Service only, and have not been furnished to the Department or INS; therefore, the copy furnished INS locally and two of the copies furnished the Bureau should reference the last communication to INS.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

9/29/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-48

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In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

PERSONAL

NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 64-F  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

October 26, 1964

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

RE: PREPARATION OF ABSTRACTS IN CONNECTION WITH  
CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS AND  
"JUNE" MATERIAL

Detailed summaries of highly sensitive information set forth in communications in criminal intelligence investigations are not desirable on abstracts submitted with these communications. Accordingly, all Agents handling criminal intelligence investigations should be cautioned to avoid inclusion of unnecessary sensitive information on abstracts in such matters.

In cases where it is necessary to mark a communication or memorandum "June," the body of the accompanying abstract should contain no reference to any highly confidential techniques, and, further, the information contained in these abstracts should be carefully paraphrased so as not to reveal the presence or nature of the technique utilized. These regulations apply to both the field and the Seat of Government.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



SAC LETTER NO. 64-52  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

October 27, 1964

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) HOUSEHOLD GOODS - COMMUTATION OF EXPENSES FOR TRANSPORTATION OF HOUSEHOLD GOODS AND PERSONAL EFFECTS -- The General Services Administration has prescribed two changes in the commuted rates for the transportation of household goods and personal effects. The first change, Circular Number 263, Revision Number 5, applies to shipments commencing August 25, 1964. The second change, Supplement Number 1, applies to shipments commencing October 2, 1964. Copies of the changes are enclosed and additional copies will be forwarded to your office under separate cover.

All employees of your office who have occasion to submit vouchers for the transportation and storage of household goods and personal effects should review the new rates to insure that vouchers are submitted correctly. Those employees who have previously submitted vouchers for transportation of household goods which commenced on August 25, 1964, should be advised that supplemental vouchers should be submitted to reach the Bureau no later than December 1, 1964.

10/27/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-52

(B) INTERVIEWS -- Current instructions as set forth in the Manual of Instructions, (Volume 1, Section 2, page 16) and the FBI Handbook (Part II, page 13a, Item 17) require interviews with witnesses, suspects and subjects, for the purpose of obtaining information, be conducted wherever possible in the daytime.

Time of interviews must be arranged with due regard to the rights of individuals to be free from unnecessary interference or inconvenience. Where circumstances indicate the availability of an individual for interview on the following day, the exercise of good judgment would indicate the undesirability of attempting to interview him at night or in the early morning hours.

You should insure that the supervisory and investigative staff of your office are aware of the importance of arranging interviews to avoid any basis for complaint as to the manner in which the FBI discharges its investigative responsibilities.

This reiterates instructions contained in SAC Letter 62-25 dated May 1, 1962.

(C) REPORT WRITING - SUBMISSION OF REPORTS -- Several instances have been noted during a recent field office inspection where there had been no submission of reports over an extended period of time in cases wherein thefts of high value from interstate shipment had occurred.

It is apparent that such cases cannot properly be supervised in the field or at the Seat of Government without prompt submission of investigative reports. Effective immediately, investigative reports must be submitted within 45 days in each and every instance where it is determined the loss by theft, fraud, embezzlement or robbery in those cases over which the Bureau has jurisdiction amounts to \$10,000 or more. This provision will apply specifically to those investigative matters handled under the current 90-day reporting rule, such as in Theft from Interstate Shipment, Theft of Government Property, and Crime on Government Reservation cases. Losses by theft or otherwise in these cases of less than \$10,000 will continue to be reported under the existing 90-day rule. There will be no change in the existing rule applicable to the submission of reports in the Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property classification since shortly after these matters initially are opened it is often determined they do not come within the investigative jurisdiction of the Bureau. The reporting rule applying to other categories of cases, such as Bank Robbery matters, Civil Rights cases, etc., remains as set forth in the Manual of Instructions.

I want it clearly understood that these cases must receive intelligent and close supervision and such delays as noted above will result in administrative action being taken.

10/27/64  
SAC LETTER NO. 64-52

(D) DEPARTMENTAL ORDER 324-64 - COURT TESTIMONY - DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION OR MATERIAL IN RESPONSE TO SUBPOENA, ORDER OR OTHER DEMAND -- Investigative personnel have long been familiar with Departmental Order 3229, superseded by 260-62, both of which prohibited employees of the Department of Justice from disclosing information or material in the files of the Department of Justice without permission of the Attorney General. Order 260-62 has now been superseded, effective October 10, 1964, on publication in the Federal Register that day, by Departmental Order 324-64.

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The purpose of the new Order is to broaden the prohibition to cover not only information and material in files but, also, any other information or material acquired by the employee as a part of the performance of his official duties or because of his official status. The new Order reads as follows:

"Sec.

"16.1 Production or disclosure of official information or material in response to a subpoena, order, or other demand prohibited unless approved by the Attorney General.

"16.2 Procedure in the event of a demand for production or disclosure.

"16.3 Procedure in the event of an adverse ruling.

"16.1 Production or disclosure of official information or material in response to a subpoena, order, or other demand prohibited unless approved by the Attorney General.

"No officer or employee of the Department of Justice shall produce or disclose, in response to a subpoena, order, or other demand (hereinafter in this Part referred to as a 'demand') of a court or other authority any information or material contained in the files of the Department of Justice or any other information or material acquired as a part of the performance of his official duties or because of his official status, without the prior approval of the Attorney General. For the purposes of this Part, the term 'officer or employee of the Department of Justice' includes all officers and employees of the United States appointed by, or subject to the supervision, jurisdiction, or control of, the Attorney General of the United States, including United States Attorneys, United States Marshals, and members of the staffs of those officials.

"16.2 Procedure in the event of a demand for production or disclosure.

"(a) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, whenever a demand is made upon an officer or employee of the Department of Justice for the production or disclosure of information or

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material contained in the files of the Department of Justice or for the production or disclosure of any other information or material acquired as a part of the performance of his official duties or because of his official status, he shall immediately notify the Attorney General of such demand. If possible, the Attorney General shall be notified before the officer or employee concerned replies to, or appears before, the court or other authority.

"(2) The appropriate United States Attorney, or such other attorney as may be designated for the purpose, shall appear with the officer or employee upon whom the demand shall have been made, and inform the court or other authority (A) that § 16.1 of this Part prohibits the officer or employee from producing or disclosing the information or material demanded without the prior approval of the Attorney General, and (B) that the demand has been, or is being, as the case may be, referred for the prompt consideration of the Attorney General. The United States Attorney, or the attorney designated, shall provide the court or other authority with a copy of the regulations prescribed in this Part and shall respectfully request the court or other authority to stay the demand pending the receipt of instructions or directions from the Attorney General concerning the demand.

"(b) Whenever a demand of the type described in paragraph (a) of this section is made upon an officer or employee of the Department of Justice by a court or other authority while he is appearing before, or is otherwise in the presence of the court or other authority, the officer or employee, or the United States Attorney or other appropriate Government attorney, acting on behalf of the officer or employee, shall (1) immediately inform the court or other authority that § 16.1 of this Part prohibits the officer or employee from producing or disclosing the information or material demanded without the prior approval of the Attorney General, and (2) offer to refer the demand for the prompt consideration of the Attorney General. Unless the court or other authority withdraws the demand, the United States Attorney, or other appropriate Government attorney, shall provide the court or other authority with a copy of the regulations prescribed by this Part and shall respectfully request the court or other authority to stay the demand pending the receipt of instructions or directions from the Attorney General concerning the demand.

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**"16.3 Procedure in the event of an adverse ruling.**

"If the court or other authority declines to stay the effect of the demand in response to a request made in accordance with either § 16.2(a)(2) or § 16.2(b) pending the receipt of instructions or directions from the Attorney General, or if the court or other authority rules adversely on any claim of privilege that may be asserted in conformity with the provisions of this Part or with instructions or directions issued by the Attorney General pursuant thereto, the officer or employee upon whom the demand shall have been made shall, pursuant to the regulations prescribed in this Part, respectfully decline to produce or disclose the material or information demanded (United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 426).

"Order No. 260-62 is hereby superseded.

"The provisions of this order shall be effective when this order is filed for publication in the Federal Register.

"Nicholas deB. Katzenbach  
"Acting Attorney General"

All Bureau personnel whose duties might bring them into court or into any other situation in which official demands might be made upon them to produce information or material must be familiar with Departmental Order 324-64 in content and by official designation. Questions concerning the use of this Order by employees to refuse production should be taken up with the United States Attorney, with as much anticipation of the actual demand as possible.

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(E) OPENING OF CASES -- During recent inspections it has been found necessary to instruct offices to close a number of cases which had been improperly opened, primarily in Bureau applicant, deserter, interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicle (ITSMV) and interstate transportation of stolen property (ITSP) matters. Inspectors have determined that Bureau applicant cases were being opened on persons of unknown qualifications who might be possibly interested in employment with the Bureau and were being contacted

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to ascertain their interest. Deserter cases were being opened as the result of inquiries concerning local absent without leave personnel wherein communications were being submitted to Bureau to determine if AWOL fugitive in possible deserter status. Of course, there is no objection to a case being opened if subject is found to be a deserter. ITSMV cases were being opened upon receipt of stolen car reports from local law enforcement agencies and the submission of FD-298 forms to Cincinnati for check with Cincinnati Confidential Source 309-C records as to possible ITSMV violation. At the time of initial contact no information was received indicating any ITSMV violation. ITSP cases were opened upon information received from Federal Reserve Banks and forwarded to other offices concerning checks which were possibly ITSP violations in the other offices.

In the above situations no actual investigation was conducted by the office in which the cases were opened. Generally, the cases were being obtained by one person on a volume basis and opened upon data which might possibly require investigation. They were subsequently closed administratively when it proved that no investigation was necessary. The reason stated for opening these cases was attributed to Part II, Section 3 E, Manual of Rules and Regulations, which provides that files are to be made up when one or more interviews are to be conducted. This provision, however, refers to investigative interviews and not to liaison contacts, receipt of inquiries or records checks from which information is procured which may or may not require investigation. This, of course, is to be distinguished from record checks made pursuant to actual investigative leads from other offices. Cases may be opened on this type of record check. Information received in the above categories should be more appropriately handled through control or zero files. The opening of cases in such matters results in an inflated case load and in addition creates unnecessary administrative work. I want to make it crystal clear that cases are to be opened only where one or more interviews of an investigative type are contemplated.

The above instructions are in no way intended to restrict your making inquiry of all logical sources to obtain cases having prosecutive potential.

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(F) DISSEMINATION OF CRIMINAL INFORMATION TO OTHER AGENCIES --  
Reference is made to SAC Letter Number 59-30, Section E, which specifically  
refers to reporting the total number of items disseminated in this program.

~~In this connection, it has come to the Bureau's attention in one~~  
instance that items of criminal information disseminated to a number of police  
agencies within one division were tabulated as one item for each of the receiving  
agencies rather than as a single item of dissemination for the office.

In view of this, it is felt that in order to assure uniformity in the  
handling of this phase of the program, the following procedure should be  
emphasized at this time:

An item which is circularized or furnished to numerous agencies  
should be counted as a single dissemination regardless of the number of agencies  
to which furnished. This includes Identification Orders, Apprehension Orders,  
Wanted-Flyers, Check Circulars, and communications of a similar nature.

In addition, you are reminded again that this program should be  
closely followed in order to insure that all items, including those orally  
disseminated to other agencies, are properly recorded on a daily basis and—  
that all personnel, including those with supervisory responsibilities, are  
encouraged to develop the fullest potential of this program.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures for (A)

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**PERSONAL**  
**NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 64-6**  
**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE**  
**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

November 25, 1964

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

**RE: SECURITY INFORMANTS AND SOURCES -  
INCOME TAXES**


No Number SAC Letter 64-E dated July 6, 1964, advised that effective January 1, 1965, all field divisions must utilize the Bureau Federal income tax withholding plan for payments to security informants and sources. In order to place the plan in effect, you were to discuss the matter with each informant and source where circumstances warranted using the procedure and advise the Bureau by November 1, 1964, of the identity of each exempted informant and the method used by each such individual in reporting his Bureau income.

Communications being received from the field indicate that the plan is being utilized for many informants but, at the same time, there are a great many instances where the informant has not had any difficulty in reporting his Bureau income in the past and, therefore, these informants are being exempted by the field from the withholding plan. The procedure was devised by the Bureau to afford informants a method of reporting Bureau income in a secure manner and should be utilized wherever necessary to prevent any embarrassing situations in the future such as those which occur when an informant finds it necessary to disclose his receipt of income from the FBI in response to inquiries from Internal Revenue Service or it is later found that taxes have not been paid on Bureau income. There should be no further instances of this type and you are reminded that if situations do arise in the future where it is learned informants are not reporting Bureau income and they have not used the withholding procedure, administrative action will be considered by the Bureau in each such case.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-38

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

August 2, 1960

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) BUREAU ATTENDANCE AT JUDICIAL CONFERENCES -- A Special Agent in Charge recently attended the Ninth Circuit Conference of Federal District Court Judges as a guest of one of the attending jurists. He was thereby in an excellent position to renew valuable contacts and cultivate new ones with leading judicial authorities. He was also able to immediately know what events were transpiring relative to matters affecting the Bureau's interests and responsibilities and could tactfully insure that the Bureau's position on certain key matters was thoroughly understood by those conferees in a position to help safeguard the Bureau's best interests. I desire that each Special Agent in Charge be alert to the opportunities presented by attendance at such gatherings and particularly explore, in a discreet manner, potentialities of attendance at Federal Circuit Court conferences throughout the country. Should the opportunity arise for a Bureau representative to attend such conferences and it would appear to the Bureau's advantage to do so, a request should be submitted to the Bureau for approval of attendance at such a meeting.

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(B) FEDERAL PERSONNEL SURVEY - THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION -- The Bureau is in receipt of information concerning a survey being conducted by The Brookings Institution to ascertain the attitudes of the American people toward the Federal service and Federal employment. The survey has been endorsed by the Civil Service Commission and it will involve interviews with individuals not employed by the Federal Government, as well as interviews of about 1200 employees selected from the nationwide Federal work force. The Federal employees are to be interviewed by representatives of National Analysts, Inc., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, a marketing research organization, on behalf of The Brookings Institution.

In the event any of your employees are contacted relative to the survey, the Bureau should be immediately advised and no employees should participate in the survey unless prior Bureau authority to do so is received in each case.

(C) PROPERTY - SALE OF GOVERNMENT - FORMS -- General Services Administration (GSA) has revised the forms to be used for sale of Government property. The use of the revised forms is effective on September 1, 1960, and shall be used for all sales of Government personal property. Present supply of forms SF-114 and SF-114A on hand at that time should be destroyed.

The revised forms consist of:

SF-114, March 1960 - Invitation Title Page  
SF-114A, March 1960 - Bid and Award Page  
SF-114B, March 1960 - Item Bid Page  
SF-114C, March 1960 Edition - General Sale Terms  
and Conditions

It will be necessary to use one of each to make a bid form and the number of pages will be "4" (assuming that only one page is required for itemization of articles for sale). Five copies of each form should be forwarded to the Bureau as in the past.

In view of the amount received for items usually sold by the Bureau bid deposits will not be required and SF-114 should be so marked.

The forms will be available from GSA Stores Depots and should be ordered from that Agency when needed. They can be obtained with SF-114A printed on the reverse of SF-114, Item Number 7530-634-4061, and SF-114C on the reverse of SF-114B, Item Number 7530-753-4689, at a cost of 25 cents per hundred.

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(D) FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN INTRODUCTIONS -- A Bureau official recently visited a number of editors of small newspapers in the southern part of the country, and, in discussing the FBI, he learned that they are deeply interested in obtaining copies each month of my Introduction in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. These editors pointed out that the Introductions provide them with excellent material on various issues of the day from which they can prepare either news items or editorials. To provide editors of the smaller newspapers, as well as small radio and television stations, with copies of these Introductions, of course, is an excellent means of presenting to the public the problems of

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law enforcement, juvenile delinquency, sex offenders, the menace of communism, and other dangers besetting our society, and can be of outstanding benefit to the FBI and law enforcement in general.

Each month a minimum of 25 copies of these Introductions is sent to each field office; some field offices have requested a larger number. The purpose of furnishing Introductions to field offices is so that they may be disseminated to the smaller, so-called "grass root" newspapers, both daily and weekly, as well as small radio and television stations, which do not receive the full advantages of national news dissemination outlets. Each field office should immediately review the manner in which it is using these Introductions for the purpose of establishing greater distribution, either on a personal basis or by mail, to newspaper, radio and television contacts. Columnists frequently ignore or may not have access to wire service material, and these Introductions should be made available to such writers since they are constantly on the lookout for material for their columns.

It is felt that most field offices can find use for more than 25 copies of these Introductions, and it is expected that each field office after reviewing this program will develop additional needs for the Introductions.

(Security Letter on attached page)

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(E) DOMINICAN INTELLIGENCE AGENTS IN THE UNITED STATES - INTERNAL SECURITY - DOMINICAN REPUBLIC -- Information has been received from an individual who has been in contact with Dominican Military Intelligence Service (SIM) agents that these agents are known to carry miniature lethal weapons on their persons. Reportedly, one of their several weapons is a derringer-type pistol with an over and under barrel about the size of a charm, similar to the charms on a woman's charm bracelet. The top barrel fires a pellet which the above individual claimed could kill an individual if it hits him in a vital spot. The bottom barrel of the above pistol fires a miniature tear gas pellet. Another weapon utilized by SIM agents is a belt buckle fitted to fire two .32 short cartridges. SIM agents also frequently carry switchblade-type knives which are fitted to fire two .32 short cartridges, one from each end of the knife.

In view of the above information, extreme caution should be exercised in interviews and contacts of individuals who are allegedly connected with SIM.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

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PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 60-I  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

August 17, 1960

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RE: BUREAU CODES

Effective with messages encoded on the AFSAM 7 rotor settings for September 1, 1960, each message rotor alignment shall be encoded twice. For example: Assuming that the indicator rotor alignment (taken from the key list) is KYBTA and the random group (message rotor alignment) is EOCPD, the AFSAM 7 rotors would be set on KYBTA, the machine set for encoding, and EOCPDEOCPD typed on the keyboard. Note that no space is typed between the first and second EOCPD. This will produce two five-letter code groups which will become groups two and three of the encoded message. If additional message rotor alignments are required for a message over 350 groups in length, each shall be encoded in the same manner, that is, twice.

In decoding messages encoded in this manner, groups two and three are both decoded to obtain the repeated message rotor alignment and the actual decoding of the message will begin with group four. If the decode of groups two and three are not identical, as they should be, try first one and then the other to decode the message. If neither group two nor group three will decode the message, try various combinations of the two before sending a service message to obtain a clarification or recoding of the message.

This procedure, applicable to both domestic and foreign offices, is being adopted to eliminate as far as possible decoding difficulties resulting from transmission garbles in the encoded message rotor alignments.

Immediately advise each employee authorized to use the AFSAM 7 equipment of these instructions and make sure each employee concerned thoroughly understands and demonstrates his understanding of this procedure prior to September 1, 1960.

The AFSAM 7 Manual of Operation and Routine Maintenance is being revised to incorporate this procedure. Pending receipt of the manual revisions, keep this letter with the AFSAM 7 manual. Upon receipt of the manual revisions incorporating the encoding procedure explained in this letter, you should personally destroy this letter by burning and advise the Bureau that this has been done by routing slip, attention Cryptanalysis-Translation Section.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-43

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

September 13, 1960

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No. -

(A) AUTOMOBILES - PROPERTY -- Attention has been directed to a recent theft of a certain employee's personally owned automobile containing in the trunk a number of current license plates issued for Bureau vehicles. The license plates in question had been maintained in the trunk of the automobile for a period of months, indicating that no proper check had been made by the Special Agent in Charge to assure the proper handling of such items of property.

Accordingly, a positive check should be made every thirty days to account for all current license plates issued to each office. All Special Agents in Charge should give this matter their personal attention to assure that an appropriate tickler is established and that the required inspections are made regularly to preclude the recurrence of a situation of this type.

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(B) FLU VACCINE PROGRAM (1960-1961) -- Medical sources have advocated flu shots this year and the Bureau is again instituting this program with inoculations on a cost-free basis to all employees who desire to participate. All Special Agents in Charge and Legal Attaches must insure that every employee is informed of the desirability of participating voluntarily in this program. Employees should be encouraged to have such shots in an effort to reduce absenteeism and conserve sick leave, particularly during the flu season. Although only approximately 52 per cent of employees participated during the previous year, a study made by the Bureau reflected beneficial results were obtained, particularly in those areas where flu was most prevalent. Every effort should be made by each supervisor for personal contacts with his subordinate employees to encourage greater participation than demonstrated in the previous year.

Use the same waiver forms as we used last year (adult 3-343 and minor 3-343a). Each participant must execute a waiver. Submit requests to Bureau for these forms. Washington Field Office inoculations will be handled by the Bureau. Polyvalent vaccine will be used again. Order this from the Bureau which will have the supplier direct the amount ordered to your office. The Imprest Fund may be used to pay services of a physician to administer the



vaccine provided his services do not exceed \$50.00 for one day. If doctor charges in excess of this amount, submit item to Bureau in accordance with existing instructions. For complete effectiveness, polyvalent vaccine requires two separate shots spaced two to four weeks apart but be guided by your doctor's opinion and insure he is aware of the type of vaccine used.

The Bureau desires that this program be commenced approximately October 7, 1960.

When you have completed giving the two shots to your personnel, submit a report to the Bureau showing total personnel, the number inoculated, and cost of program, which will include cost of serum, syringes, and doctors' fees. Retain waivers for six months. These may be destroyed thereafter.

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(C) VISIT-OF KING AND QUEEN OF DENMARK TO THE UNITED STATES  
OCTOBER 4 - OCTOBER 17, 1960 -- On October 4, 1960, King Frederik IX and Queen Ingrid of Denmark are scheduled to arrive in Los Angeles, California, for a tour of the United States. The tentative schedule of Their Majesties is as follows: arrival in Los Angeles, California, October 4, departing October 6 for San Francisco, California; depart San Francisco October 8 for Chicago, Illinois; depart Chicago, October 11 for Washington, D. C., where they will be State guests of President Eisenhower; depart for New York City, October 14; on October 16 Their Majesties will fly to Albany, New York, for a luncheon with New York Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller, returning to New York City that day; depart New York City, October 17 for return to Copenhagen, Denmark.

In connection with this visit, all offices should be alert for any data indicating anti-Danish demonstrations which may be instigated by the Communist Party or nationality groups in the U. S.; any data indicating a threat to Their Majesties and party; and any other data which may be of intelligence significance to the U. S. Sources and informants in a position to acquire the above-mentioned data should be alerted to the necessity of prompt reporting. Any data regarding threats, possible violence or demonstrations should be promptly disseminated to the local police and to the appropriate representative of the State Department if one is accompanying the group. The Bureau should be immediately advised if any such data is received and of any action taken.

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(D) 67TH SESSION - FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY -- The 67th Session of the FBI National Academy will begin on Monday, March 20, 1961, and will graduate on Wednesday, June 7, 1961. It is desired that you submit to the Bureau by October 17, 1960, the names of the candidates from your territory whom you desire to recommend to attend that session. Your attention is called to instructions previously given as to the procedures to be followed in nominating candidates to attend the Academy, and it is desired that you strictly comply with existing instructions.

All candidates recommended for attendance at the Academy must be personally known to the SAC. The SAC must have conducted a formal interview with each candidate being recommended unless such candidate has been previously interviewed and favorably recommended by the former SAC within the preceding six months. It will not be necessary, however, for the present SAC to reinterview any candidates he, himself, interviewed even though more than six months have elapsed since the time of the first interview.

You may designate more than one candidate for the 67th Session since there is a possibility that your first candidate may not be accepted or that two or more representatives will be accepted from your office. In your letter listing your candidates, you must specifically set forth the results of the reviews of your field office indices concerning the applicants and their law enforcement agencies.

I want to emphasize the fact that the Bureau is desirous of accepting at the National Academy only those candidates who are outstanding both as to personal appearance and ability. The weight standards for National Academy applicants are the same as for our own personnel. Applicants must be within the desirable weight limits as set forth on form FD-300.

You are again reminded that the fingerprints of National Academy applicants are to be submitted at the time the results of the formal interview are forwarded to the Bureau. You should make a notation on the fingerprint card that the fingerprints are those of a National Academy applicant. The card should be forwarded to the Bureau, attention: Training and Inspection Division.

I shall expect each SAC to give very close personal attention to the selection of candidates for attendance at the National Academy.

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(E) ILLUSTRATED BROCHURE - COOPERATIVE FUNCTIONS - EXHIBITS SECTION -- An illustrated brochure entitled "Visual Presentations" is in the process of being prepared in the Bureau's Exhibits Section. It is expected that copies of this brochure will be made available to you within the next three weeks. All copies should be placed in your office library and signed out to investigative personnel as needed.

A study of this brochure will clearly indicate the way in which visual aids have helped to bring cases of national importance to satisfactory conclusion. The Bureau considers visual aids as valuable investigative tools with which each Special Agent should be thoroughly familiar.

All investigative employees should be required to read this material so that they may be cognizant of the help that the Exhibits Section can render in the thorough investigation of involved cases and draw upon this help immediately when such action is justified.

This brochure should not be made available to individuals or groups outside the Bureau without prior Bureau approval, since it contains information concerning investigative and prosecutive techniques.

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(F) PERSONNEL - RESTORATION RIGHTS FOLLOWING MILITARY SERVICE -- Public Law 86-632 amended certain restoration to duty provisions of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, effective September 12, 1960. The only rights affected are those of employees who are members of the Reserve or National Guard and resign in order to report for an initial period of active military duty for training. If the military duty is for three months or more the employee must apply for restoration to his job within 31 days after release from such duty instead of within 60 days as has previously been the case. If during his military service he is hospitalized incident to such service, he must apply within 31 days after discharge from the hospital or within one year following the date he should have been separated from the military service, whichever is earlier.

In cases where the initial period of active military duty for training is less than three months, employees must apply for restoration within 31 days after their release from military service.

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Restoration rights of employees who are drafted or otherwise enter the military service than from the Reserve or National Guard are not in any way changed.

The Civil Service Commission plans to issue changes in its instructions to implement Public Law 86-632, and at that time appropriate revisions will be prepared for the Manual of Rules and Regulations, and in form FD-183 (Re-employment Rights Following Military Service). Meanwhile, in interviewing employees who leave for military service and are affected by the changes above described, you should see that they are advised correctly concerning their rights and warned that form FD-183 is not accurate in one paragraph, namely paragraph (3) under the description of how to claim re-employment rights.

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(G) BUREAU APPLICANTS - SPECIAL AGENT -- This is to reiterate previous instructions concerning the personal appearance of Special Agent applicants. Some of the recent Special Agent trainees have failed to meet the Bureau's personal appearance qualifications and particularly have created poor first impressions. This is undesirable as first impressions are very important in our work. It is therefore imperative that you carefully evaluate all Special Agent applicants to insure that they are not only outstanding men academically but also physically and from a personal appearance standpoint, and only those who are outstanding in appearance as well as in the other qualifications should be recommended.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-41

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

August 23, 1960

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) APPLICANT MATTERS -- Reference is made to SAC Letter 59-25 (F) concerning cooperation with the public and news media. Recently a local television personality interviewed a clerical employee applicant concerning her reaction to being accepted as an FBI employee. The program was planned with Bureau cooperation and was taped for showing the day the employee reported for duty. During the interview she was extremely enthusiastic about her contemplated Bureau employment and acquitted herself well. Viewer response was excellent. This type of program can do much to familiarize the public with the Bureau's employment opportunities and a well-planned interview with an accepted applicant or new employee can materially assist in applicant recruiting. You should consider this technique where feasible. Bureau should be advised of identity of proposed interviewee and projected interview should be cleared through Crime Records Division.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-44  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

September 20, 1960

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) PERSONNEL - HEALTH EDUCATION PAMPHLETS -- The American Cancer Society, Incorporated, has a revised health education pamphlet entitled, "The Hopeful Side of Cancer," which may be procured free of charge from the local division of the Society in many cities.

The Bureau will furnish supplies of the pamphlet on request if it is not obtainable in your area. You may wish to make this pamphlet available to all employees or those desiring information on this subject. This worthwhile health education pamphlet is a part of the American Cancer Society's effort to save lives through its educational program.

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(B) "ACCIDENT FACTS" - TRAFFIC PUBLICATION - TRAINING - POLICE -- Under separate cover you are being furnished with a copy of the 1960 edition of the booklet "Accident Facts." This booklet contains current facts and statistics on traffic and safety matters. It is furnished primarily for use by our traffic instructors who provide traffic instruction in field police training schools. In view of the wealth of current information on safety matters in the pamphlet, it is incumbent on all traffic instructors to familiarize themselves with the contents of the pamphlet and make it available to the Agent personnel, such as police instructors, who would have an interest in it. The pamphlet is expendable and need not be included on your office inventory.

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(C) MOTOR VEHICLE RECORDS - MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS - INDEXING -- Volume I, Section 9, pages 40 through 51, of the Manual of Instructions sets out information concerning the location and types of motor vehicle records maintained in the various states. Since automobiles now bear a vehicle identification number as the primary means of identification and registration, most states have already or are in the process of converting their indices to the vehicle identification number. Section 9 of the Manual of Instructions should be revised to show which states maintain records by the vehicle identification number. The column now captioned "Serial Number" will be changed to "Vehicle Identification Number." Advise the Bureau, Attention Training and Inspection Division, whether a "Yes" or a "No" should appear for your state or the states covered by your office in the proposed column captioned "Vehicle Identification Number." In

making this check, also verify the remaining information set forth for your state or states and advise Bureau of any changes necessary. Follow the format in the manual in setting out your changes (use new heading of "Vehicle Identification Number" instead of "Serial Number"). In some instances the information set out in the National Automobile Theft Bureau booklet concerning these records differs from that appearing in the Manual of Instructions; therefore, make certain the information set forth in our manual is up to date.

In connection with indexing, index cards should be prepared for the vehicle identification number, when necessary or pertinent, in the same manner as index cards are prepared for motor and serial numbers.

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(D) TRANSPORTATION OF HOUSEHOLD GOODS - AMENDED REGULATIONS -- There is set forth below an amendment to Sections 12 and 17 of Executive Order Number 9805, as amended. This amendment was issued by the Bureau of the Budget and applies to the transportation and storage of household goods and personal effects shipped on or after August 23, 1960.

When employees without immediate families own household goods and personal effects in excess of 2,500 pounds net weight as a result of their former status as part of a larger household, the total amount up to the maximum of 7,000 pounds net weight may be allowed at the agency head's discretion when he determines that an unusual hardship would result if the employees were to be held to the 2,500 pound limit.

All vouchers, submitted by employees of your office, which involve this regulation are to be forwarded to the Bureau by cover letter setting forth complete justification for the claim, together with your personal recommendation concerning payment.

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(E) SAC CONTACTS - DISCREET BACKGROUND INQUIRIES -- Re SAC letters 54-54, 59-10, 60-21 and 60-42.

Recently, on his own initiative, an SAC conducted a brief background inquiry concerning an individual being

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proposed as an SAC contact. The inquiry came to the attention of the pertinent individual who is a newspaper editor. Obviously, such inept and indiscreet handling could prove most embarrassing to the Bureau. I cannot emphasize too strongly the need to be most discreet in making all inquiries into the background of proposed SAC contacts or other individuals. I will not tolerate a recurrence of an incident such as this.

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(F) PHYSICAL EXAMINATION MATTERS - WEIGHT STANDARDS -- Effective immediately you are instructed that when investigative personnel are weighed they must also have their height measured without shoes. You must insure that this procedure is meticulously followed at your Government examining facility or at any other place Special Agents are weighed. These instructions are to be followed without fail and any deviations will result in severe administrative action.

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(G) BUREAU APPLICANTS - SPECIAL AGENT -- I am gravely concerned over the caliber of some of the new agents appointed to our recent training schools insofar as their appearance and personality are concerned. I want it clearly understood that our New Agents' Training Schools are not to be considered as rehabilitation centers for applicants whose defects are readily apparent and should have been readily apparent to interviewing officials who recommended them for employment. These men should have all the necessary requisites before coming to Washington and should not have to be molded after reporting to the New Agents' Training School. It should be constantly borne in mind when interviewing agent applicants that first impressions are lasting impressions. A great many people have but one contact with the FBI and if this contact is with an agent whose over-all appearance and personality do not measure up to the high caliber expected by the American public, it is obvious what that individual's lasting impression of this Bureau will be. I feel that some officials are recommending men merely because they have a law degree, with no consideration whatsoever as to whether applicant could represent the Bureau in an outstanding manner.

Over the years I have constantly stressed the fact that no work is more important than properly interviewing and evaluating applicants seeking the position of Special Agent, which is necessary in order to maintain the high reputation of this Bureau. I am not interested in applicants who appear to be average, and I insist that every Special Agent applicant favorably recommended be outstanding. This applies not only to his education but to the first impression created by applicant. In the future, specific comments should be set out regarding the first impression created by applicant, as well as specific comments concerning his dress, hair style, gestures, and demeanor as they pertain to his over-all appearance and impression. If applicant does not have the qualities necessary, he should be recommended unfavorably and I can assure you that severe administrative action will be taken against any interviewing official recommending any man found to be lacking in the necessary qualities.

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(H) NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY ACT MATTERS -- Effective September 2, 1960, Public Law 86-701 amended paragraph six, Section 152, Title 18, U. S. Code, to read as follows:

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"Whoever, either individually or as an agent or officer of any person or corporation, in contemplation of a bankruptcy proceeding by or against him or any other person or corporation, or with intent to defeat the bankruptcy law, knowingly and fraudulently transfers or conceals any of his property or the property of such other person or corporation: or."

This new amendment strengthens the provisions of the Criminal Code relating to the concealment of assets by individuals and broadens the scope of the Bureau's jurisdiction in bankruptcy matters as it now makes it an offense for an individual as well as an agent or officer of a person or corporation to transfer or conceal any property in contemplation of bankruptcy. You should insure that appropriate liaison is established with sources of cases to be certain that violations coming within the purview of the new amendment are promptly reported to your office for investigative attention.

Appropriate manual changes are being prepared.

(Security Letter on attached page)

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(I) PLANT INFORMANTS -- Under our Plant Informant Program, the security officers must be contacted in those plants engaged in classified contracts with the Armed Forces. The Bureau has furnished the field the data received from Army and Air Force concerning these contracts and Navy has furnished this information to the offices covering Naval District Headquarters.

The Department of Defense has now devised a form entitled "DD Form 254, Security Requirements Check List (Classification Specifications)," which will be put in use about October 1, 1960. While this form contains a quantity of information solely of value to the Department of Defense, it does completely identify the facility holding the classified contract, the contract number, the military agency holding the contract, the military agency assigned security responsibility and other details of the contract which should be of assistance to you under the Plant Informant Program. A separate form will be filled out on each individual contract.

Upon receipt of these forms from the Department of Defense, one copy of the form will be furnished by routing slip to the appropriate field office marked "for appropriate action." You should then afford each of these plants appropriate attention under the Plant Informant Program.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



September 27, 1960

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) ECONOMY MATTERS - FISCAL YEAR 1961 - COMMUNICATIONS - FBI FORM BOOK -- Effective with the reports to be submitted for the month of October, 1960, on Forms FD-274 and FD-274a (Resident Agencies), concerning the cost of communications, such costs should be segregated to show (1) fixed and other charges (switchboards and related equipment, telephone instruments, radio station and other tie lines, teletype lines and equipment, postage costs, etc.), (2) message costs (local and long distance), and (3) total costs. These figures should be tabulated as shown below:

<u>Total</u>	Per cent Decrease (-) Increase (+)
October, 1960	
Fixed and Other Charges	
Average Per Agent	
Message Costs	
Average Per Agent	
Total Costs	
Average Per Agent	

It is felt that the segregation of these expenses as indicated will enable both the Field and the Bureau to better understand the reasons for increases or decreases in these costs. Three copies of revised Forms FD-274 and FD-274a are enclosed. One copy of each should be placed in the FBI Form Book. A supply of the revised forms is being forwarded under separate cover. In preparing the report for the month of October, 1960, on the revised Form FD-274 the same base figures now in use will be shown. For the months of July, August, and September, only the figures on "total costs" will be shown. For the month of October, 1960, and all subsequent months, the figures should be furnished in the breakdown indicated above. Increases or decreases can only be shown for the "total costs" for the time being until experience factors for the other items can be developed.

In compiling costs of communications, payment for rental of post office boxes, postage and postage meter rental are to be included as a part of "fixed and other charges." This will be true regardless of whether payment is made to the vendor through the submission of a voucher to the Bureau, by payment through the Imprest Fund, or by an Agent who subsequently reclaims the expense through the submission of an expense voucher (SF-1012). Expenses

incurred by an Agent for telephone calls while on an investigative assignment and reclaimed from the Imprest Fund or by the submission of an expense voucher (SF-1012) should not be included as communications expense but should be included as a part of travel expenses.

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(B) FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION ACT AND SAFETY -- On September 13, 1960, captioned Act was amended by Public Law 86-767, which liberalizes benefits available to Government employees for work-related injuries and diseases. The main features provide a 10 per cent cost-of-living increase for employees totally disabled between 1951 - 1958; a 20 per cent increase for such cases arising between 1946 - 1951, and 30 per cent increase for employees totally disabled prior to January 1, 1946. The amendment also provides a more liberal formula for computing survivors' benefits. It raises minimum amount of compensation for total disability from \$112.50 to \$180.00 per month. It provides that burial allowances be increased from \$400.00 to \$800.00. In the past, medical, hospital, and other work-related injury and disease expenses were paid by the Bureau of Employees' Compensation (BEC). Effective December 1, 1960, the new law now requires that each agency absorb such costs. It is imperative that each Special Agent in Charge and other supervisory personnel be made aware of this so that extra effort will be expended to keep accidents of all kinds at a minimum. All employees during the course of their official duties should be alert to any accident hazards or accident potentials so that corrective action can be taken from a preventive aspect. A safety-conscious attitude should be developed on the part of all personnel and be maintained by periodic discussions at conferences so that we can be proud of our safety record and accomplishments.

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(C) AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ANTICOMMUNIST RESOLUTIONS -- On August 30, 1960, the Special Committee on Communist Tactics, Strategy and Objectives of the American Bar Association (ABA) submitted its annual report (#55) to the House of Delegates of the ABA which included certain resolutions designed to combat communism. Resolution No. 1 recommended that the American Bar Association recommend to state and local bar associations that they establish committees to conduct a program to provide addresses and literature to school assemblies and civic organizations to

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explain the nature, objectives and tactics of communism, and its dangers to our rights and freedoms, and to contrast affirmatively the basic fundamentals of communism with the liberties under the Constitution of the United States.

Other resolutions designed to implement the first indicate that soon printed copies of the ABA's anticommunist proposals ~~may be distributed to ABA members, state and local bar associations, libraries, and civic organizations across the country.~~ Inquiries can be expected from these sources. You should keep in mind that the Bureau is not participating in this program, though you may of course respond to requests for information on communism by making available copies of my articles and speeches on communism.

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(D) SEARCHES AND SEIZURES -- SAC Letter 59-20 (I) advised you that in *Hanna v. U. S.*, 260 F2d 723 (1958), the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia circuit held that evidence seized illegally by State and local officers would no longer be admissible in the Federal courts of that circuit. In *Elkins v. U. S.*, 364 U. S. 206 (1960), and *Rios v. U. S.*, 364 U. S. 253 (1960), the Supreme Court has extended this rule to the courts of all Federal circuits.

It should be clearly understood that this new Federal rule neither requires nor permits a Federal investigating officer to arbitrarily reject relevant evidence on the ground that it was seized illegally by State or local officers. The legality of a seizure is a question to be decided by the appropriate Federal court, not by the investigating officer. Moreover, in deciding the question "...a Federal court must make an independent inquiry, whether or not there has been such an inquiry by a State court, and irrespective of how any such inquiry may have turned out. The test is one of Federal law, neither enlarged by what one state may have countenanced, nor diminished by what another may have colorably suppressed." *Elkins v. U. S. supra.* Under this formula it is possible for a Federal court to decide that an item was legally seized and that it is admissible in evidence even after courts of the state whose officers seized it have held the seizure illegal under the law of that state. Obviously, Federal officers investigating a Federal violation will not arbitrarily reject relevant evidence which can be obtained from State or local officers even though it appears to have been seized

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illegally or a determination to that effect has actually been made by the State courts. In each such case the existence and nature of the relevant evidence, together with available information on how it was obtained by the State or local officers, must promptly be called to the attention of the U. S. Attorney for his decision on whether an attempt will be made to use it ~~on the ground that, by Federal standards, it was legally seized.~~

Another important factor is that even such evidence as has been seized illegally by Federal standards may yet be put to certain uses in the Federal courts. These uses are discussed in SAC Letter 59-20 (I).

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(E) PROPOSALS FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL CRIME COMMISSION -- There continue to be efforts on the part of numerous individuals in law enforcement as well as legislative fields to foster the formation of a National Crime Commission or some similar organized Federal task force to serve as a clearinghouse which would enable Federal, state and local law enforcement units to maintain contact with each other on organized crime matters.

The various proposals for the setting up of such an organization which have been advocated during the past several years have been carefully analyzed by the Bureau. As a result, it has been found that the need for such an organization has not been established and the possibility of it operating in a successful manner cannot be envisioned on the basis of plans suggested to date.

Observations regarding the Bureau's belief that the centralization of police power in a state or Federal agency was both unnecessary and unwise appeared in the Law Enforcement Bulletins of December 1, 1952, and January 1, 1953.

There are set forth below specific arguments against the formation of such an organization and these are being furnished to you for guidance in the event inquiries in this regard should be directed to you. These are arguments which have been made available to people who are opposed to this commission and are being made available to the Field at this time. They may be used to refute arguments of those favoring a National Crime Commission. At no time should a Special Agent in Charge endeavor to foster these ideas unless it is necessary to refute claims to the contrary.

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You should be alert to keep the Bureau informed of the identity of any prominent police or other public officials who may take a stand, publicly or otherwise, with regard to this question.

The following are a number of objections to the formation of a National Crime Commission or similar type of clearinghouse.

1. Human and legal rights demand that false, derogatory information which might injure reputation or character not be published orally or in writing either by officials or others. There is no insurance that information circulated by an organization of this type would be accurate unless it is supported by records such as indictments, convictions and sentences. It is doubtful that any group but a regularly constituted, functioning law enforcement agency could handle dissemination of criminal intelligence-type information in such a manner that it would be viewed in proper perspective and not lend itself to misuse.
2. No one should have the governmental authority to characterize an individual as a racketeer or gangster. If the law is violated it should be enforced and the violator brought before the bar of justice. If the law is not violated, who should have such great authority as to engage in official name calling, establish black lists or engage in acts of attainder which even our Congress has no authority to do? Such would be persecution, not prosecution.
3. The dissemination of criminal intelligence information by a so-called Federal clearinghouse or National Crime Commission would possibly lead to some local arrests on the basis of a Federal dossier without evidence. Such arrests would be violations of the civil rights of the accused.
4. This would be a start toward a centralization of police powers in a Federal agency. The local peace officer and those whom he serves would be deprived of their right to fully supervise law enforcement in their own community.
5. The proposed agency would be a step in creating a national police agency which would first resort to reporting failures of a local agency to act on information which it furnished. This it might do to show its service to the local police and for purposes of self-perpetuation. The next short step might be one of supervision. This might be the first step in a national control of law enforcement or a nationalization of police.

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6. Even if there is some widespread operation of a particular racketeer or group of racketeers, strict enforcement of local laws will dry up the source of revenue and interest of these racketeers. Thus the criminal overlord will receive no profit from law violators elsewhere if the local law is enforced. What is needed is not more clearinghouses or Government bureaus with more Federal taxes, but a will to enforce the law vigorously by police, prosecutors and the courts.

7. Such an agency is the dream of wishful thinkers who prefer to believe that there is a "void" and a magic formula to overcome it. By creation of such an agency the wishful thinkers escape from the hard realism that there must be continuous day-by-day hard work with no letup by local police agencies and local prosecutors in order to have effective law enforcement.

8. A National Crime Commission or Federal clearinghouse of information would constitute an unnecessary and costly superstructure imposed on existing establishments which are already functioning effectively in the field of law enforcement under well-established practices, procedures and laws. It would involve an unnecessary duplication of functions and would permit an agency to inject itself into the operation of other agencies, both local and Federal, with resulting disruption, confusion and harassment.

9. Rather than the existence of a so-called "void," as some claim exists, law enforcement agencies are now furnishing available information in proper instances to other agencies, both Federal and local. The FBI alone furnishes several thousand items of criminal information to law enforcement agencies throughout the country each month. This is exclusive of services performed by the Identification Division and FBI Laboratory. The FBI, as in the case of all other agencies, receives similar cooperation and assistance. This information is exchanged among regular law enforcement officers with an understanding of its nature and therefore its proper application to the objectives of law enforcement.

10. Proposals to centralize law enforcement authority can be quite unrealistic; they tend to assume that either the state or Federal government can and should do for each community what the people of that city or county will not do for themselves. This is a somewhat naive view of the problems involved in enforcing the law, a view based on the fallacious assumption that in "the government" there exists some magic method by

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which all good things can be accomplished, regardless of the will and the responsibility of the people. This is not the case. If the majority of the communities in a state are unable to enforce a law, either directly as a result of widespread disobedience or indirectly from public apathy, we have no reason to believe that some higher authority will be more successful. Experience during the prohibition era is strong evidence bearing on this point.

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(F) COOPERATION WITH THE PUBLIC AND NEWS MEDIA - FEATURE ARTICLES -- Re SAC Letters 59-25 (F) and 60-2 (B).

One office has been most successful in having friendly newspapers publish features on various phases of FBI operations in holiday editions by contacting the newspapers two or three weeks prior to the holiday. Newspapers generally operate with a limited staff on holidays and have difficulty filling editions. As a result editors are most receptive to such offers of cooperation. With the approach of the holiday season I desire that you give this matter appropriate attention

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(G) STREAMLINING COMMITTEES - FIELD OFFICES -- Re SAC Letters 58-69 (E) and 59-53 (I).

All employees should be made aware of the fact that suggestions are encouraged as a means of improving Bureau efficiency and economy. I want each employee to understand that he should send any suggestion he makes directly to me so that I can insure that each suggestion receives appropriate attention. Likewise, suggestions originating with streamlining committees must be sent directly to me without consideration or recommendation by the committees. Should the need for the opinion of the streamlining committee arise following receipt of a suggestion at the Bureau, it will be returned to the field division whence it emanated and such opinion solicited.

These instructions should not be construed as eliminating the necessity for streamlining committees which must still seek ways and means of improving operations and procedures. However, the statistics required by SAC Letter 59-53 for offices having streamlining committees need no longer be submitted.

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(H) ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE - FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT --  
Public Law 86-695, approved 9/2/60, amends captioned Statute  
(Sections 51-54, Title 41, USC), violations of which are handled  
by the Bureau under the FAG classification. This Statute penalizes  
payments of fees, gifts or gratuities by subcontractors to prime  
contractors or higher tier contractors holding U. S. Government  
contracts for purposes of securing awards or orders. Formerly  
the Statute applied to cost-plus-a-fixed fee or cost reimbursable  
contracts. As amended it now applies to negotiated contracts  
regardless of their nature. Negotiated contracts are defined  
as those made without formal advertising.

The foregoing change should be mentioned in your  
regular liaison contacts with military installations, large  
industrial plants handling Government work, and other potential  
sources of cases of this type.

(Security Letter on attached page)

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(I) COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF DOMINICAN EXILE GROUPS - INTERNAL SECURITY - DOMINICAN REPUBLIC -- Unsettled political conditions in the Dominican Republic point to the inevitable fall of the Trujillo regime. One of the biggest problems facing any new Dominican Government will be to prevent communist exiles from returning to the Dominican Republic and gaining some measure of control in the Dominican Government. As the Dominican political situation continues to deteriorate, there is a good possibility that communist Dominican exiles in Cuba, Venezuela, and Mexico will attempt to gain control of Dominican exile groups in the United States, looking forward to key roles these groups may play in any new Dominican Government.

All offices should be alert to the above problem in their coverage of Dominican activities. It is essential that there be an active collection of data of this type in the course of investigations of Dominican and communist matters. All offices should also be alert to any attempts by the Communist Party, USA, to agitate on behalf of communist Dominican exiles for key roles in any new Dominican Government. Data obtained should be submitted to the Bureau under the above caption.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover


Director

Enclosures for (A)

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-54

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

November 22, 1960

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) ARREST FINGERPRINT CARDS - FEDERAL EMPLOYEES - IDENTIFICATION MATTERS -- All law enforcement agencies have been requested to note the name of the employing agency and position occupied on arrest fingerprint cards submitted on Federal employees. The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin for May, 1950, and a letter to all fingerprint contributors dated July 26, 1950, requested this data.

Recent developments have further emphasized the desirability of this practice. All Agents in their regular contacts with police departments should stress the need of including this information on arrest fingerprint cards submitted on Federal employees, and in addition, stress the need for pinpointing any arrest involving sex deviation. Arrest charges for "disorderly conduct" and similar nonspecific offenses should carry an additional notation if the arrest involved sex deviation.

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SAC LETTER NO. 60-54

(B) SPEECH MATTERS -- I wish at this time to again remind each Special Agent in Charge, Assistant Special Agent in Charge and other approved Bureau speakers of the utmost importance of the Bureau's speech program and the continued necessity of affording this program constant and careful attention. Well-presented Bureau speeches provide an outstanding opportunity to regularly keep before key segments of the public the Bureau's tremendous responsibilities and accomplishments. You should be continually on the alert for opportunities to promote the Bureau's best interests before representative groups. In furthering this program, the Bureau welcomes suggestions and observations which might increase the receptiveness and success of public appearances by Bureau representatives. I desire at this time that any techniques, suggestions, proposals or observations which you feel might prove beneficial to the Bureau speakers in other offices be brought to my attention. Following review and correlation at the Bureau, those which appear to represent general application will be subsequently made available to the field. All replies should be marked to the attention of the Crime Research Section and should be submitted within 30 days of the receipt of this letter.

*Received by  
Mr. Tully 8/27/75*

(C) TRAINING - POLICE - FINGERPRINT SCHOOLS -- Recently it has been indicated that there is a strong demand for FBI Fingerprint Schools in the field. At present, ten field divisions do not have a qualified fingerprint instructor.

The Bureau realizes that ~~it may not be desirable to have a~~ fingerprint instructor in each division as the needs of the division may be adequately and economically handled by instructors from nearby divisions. A number of field divisions are not conducting more than one fingerprint school a year. Although we do not solicit police schools, each SAC should evaluate his divisional needs and advise the Bureau, attention Training and Inspection Division, within thirty days whether he considers additional police instructors qualified in fingerprint training are necessary or desirable. Any SAC who deems additional fingerprint instructors necessary for his division should prepare adequate justification and should advise as to the manner in which the needs of his division have been previously handled.

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SAC LETTER NO. 60-54

(D) BUREAU AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS - FISCAL YEAR 1960 -- In the past Bureau automobile accident statistics have been furnished to you on a calendar year basis. Hereafter these statistics will be furnished on a fiscal year basis. Detailed statistics concerning accidents reported to Bureau involving Bureau cars during fiscal year 1960 are set forth below. Only those accidents have been included wherein there was some tangible property damage to either the Bureau car or third party's car or where there has been personal injury. This data should be called to the attention of all employees charged with the responsibility of operating and caring for the Bureau's automotive equipment.

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OFFICE	NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS		1960 IN- CREASE OR DE- CREASE OVER 1959	EMPLOY- EES HELD RESPON- SIBLE 1960	REPAIR COSTS TO BUREAU 1960	TOTAL MILEAGE DRIVEN 1960	ACCIDENT RATE PER 100,000 MILES 1960
	1960	1959	1959	1960	1960	1960	1960
Albany	4	2	/2	-	\$ 93.65	400,668	1.0
Albuquerque	3	1	/2	-	23.50	475,073	.6
Anchorage	1	1	-	-	-- --	65,682	1.5
Atlanta	3	6	-3	1	-- --	674,412	.4
Baltimore	3	7	-4	-	-- --	770,695	.4
Birmingham	1	-	/1	1	-- --	279,704	.4
Boston	8	8	-	2	245.00	837,287	1.0
Buffalo	2	5	-3	-	-- --	298,694	.7
Butte	1	4	-3	-	-- --	541,589	.2
Charlotte	5	9	-4	-	-- --	1,115,244	.4
Chicago	19	22	-3	4	95.00	1,328,341	1.4
Cincinnati	12	6	/6	5	133.88	645,695	1.9
Cleveland	3	5	-2	-	-- --	606,261	.5
Dallas	3	5	-2	-	\$ -- --	743,489	.4
Denver	2	5	-3	-	-- --	736,029	.3
Detroit	8	6	/2	1	590.00	1,163,076	.7
El Paso	-	-	-	-	-- --	178,004	-
Honolulu	-	-	-	-	-- --	37,275	-
Houston	4	4	-	-	-- --	403,399	1.0
Indianapolis	5	7	-2	-	-- --	751,371	.7
Jacksonville	7	-	/7	4	57.22	403,298	1.7
Kansas City	6	11	-5	1	-- --	748,119	.8
Knoxville	1	-	/1	-	-- --	635,826	.2
Little Rock	2	5	-3	-	-- --	523,200	.4
Los Angeles	22	20	/2	7	182.85	1,888,767	1.2
Louisville	4	4	-	2	116.50	636,767	.6
Memphis	3	6	-3	2	-- --	514,636	.6
Miami	8	7	/1	3	935.64	902,026	.9
Milwaukee	2	8	-6	-	-- --	497,377	.4
Minneapolis	4	3	/1	-	145.00	711,816	.6
Mobile	3	-	/3	1	-- --	278,446	1.1
Newark	11	19	-8	1	226.60	1,121,670	1.0
New Haven	2	2	-	-	98.29	347,419	.6
New Orleans	8	10	-2	1	96.39	660,532	1.2
New York	30	35	-5	1	255.00	1,685,989	1.8
Norfolk	1	3	-2	-	-- --	215,147	.5
Oklahoma City	1	3	-2	-	29.00	561,601	.2
Omaha	-	1	-1	-	-- --	474,684	-
Philadelphia	6	14	-8	2	-- --	687,840	.9
Phoenix	4	2	/2	1	81.05	576,301	.7
Pittsburgh	5	6	-1	-	510.56	723,341	.7
Portland	5	2	/3	2	-- --	346,582	1.4
Richmond	3	2	/1	1	-- --	588,913	.5
St. Louis	3	4	-1	-	\$ -- --	432,565	.7
Salt Lake City	4	5	-1	1	761.17	453,623	.9
San Antonio	6	1	/5	3	23.00	405,639	1.5
San Diego	5	2	/3	-	-- --	463,877	1.1
San Francisco	12	14	-2	1	42.00	1,584,225	.8
San Juan	1	3	-2	-	-- --	187,079	.5
Savannah	2	5	-3	-	-- --	489,440	.4
Seattle	10	6	/4	3	112.51	723,750	1.4
Springfield	5	1	/4	1	-- --	579,461	.9
Tampa	-	Office Opened 6-1-60	-	-	-- --	29,772	-
WFO	14	18	-4	1	-- --	825,708	1.7
SOG	3	5	-2	2	-- --	291,897	1.0
	290	330	-40	56	\$4,853.81	34,249,321	.8



Largest percentage of accidents in which Bureau employees were held responsible were rear-end (53.6%) and intersection (14.3%) collisions. Bureau employees must exercise greater care and alertness in the operation of Bureau vehicles in order to materially reduce the number of such avoidable accidents. In 1960 there were several accidents which were due to Bureau employees! running into stationary objects which is completely inexcusable.

I was pleased to note that there was a substantial decline in the number of accidents in fiscal year 1960 over fiscal year 1959. There was also a marked decrease of ten in the number of accidents in which our employees were responsible. Some offices effected a rather material decrease in the number of accidents which is most creditable; however, other offices had substantial increases in the number of accidents which would indicate that it is possible not enough emphasis is being placed on this program.

The absolute necessity for strong emphasis on careful driving cannot be overstressed. Although during the past several years there has been a substantial decrease in the number of accidents and in the number of accidents in which our employees were responsible, each Special Agent in Charge must continue to take a very special interest in this matter in order to effect a further reduction in the number of accidents. You should particularly stress the necessity for reducing the number of rear-end and intersection collisions. There is no reason why employees should not at all times maintain cars operated by them under sufficient control to avoid colliding with cars in front of them. Furthermore, there generally is no excuse for an employee to be involved in an intersection collision. Reasonable alertness in approaching and crossing an intersection would certainly avert a major percentage of these accidents.

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SAC LETTER NO. 60-54

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(E) THEFT FROM INTERSTATE SHIPMENT (TFIS) MATTERS -- With the approach of the holiday season, interstate and foreign shipments of valuable merchandise will increase immeasurably. Thefts and hijackings of such shipments may be expected to increase proportionately.

Each office must be prepared to cope effectively with these thefts. Appropriate coverage should be arranged by alerting established informants and sources, increasing efforts to develop new informants, and effecting liaison with shippers, common carriers and local law enforcement agencies to insure the prompt referral of these cases to the FBI.

As thefts occur they must be afforded immediate, thorough and continuous investigative activity.

(Security Letters on attached pages)

11/22/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-54

- 5 -

(F) SECURITY INDEX - CUBA -- The possibility of a break in relations between the United States and Cuba or a limited emergency growing out of the Cuban situation requires that we plan now to meet any responsibilities arising from such an eventuality.

The Bureau desires to tabulate as "pro-Cuban" all individuals now on, and subsequently added to, the Security Index whose activities and sympathies have been such that they warrant special consideration in the event of a limited emergency involving Cuba and the U. S. This tabulation will include not only Cubans but also non-Cubans who have been engaged in substantial activities in furtherance of the aims and purposes of the Cuban Government, in support of pro-Castro groups or organizations or in furtherance of the communist or subversive infiltration of pro-Castro groups.

This tabulation will be effected at the Bureau based on recommendations from the field. With regard to individuals now on the Security Index who should be so tabbed, Form FD-122 should be submitted promptly with the notation "Pro-Cuban" typed directly opposite the words "Miscellaneous (specify)" in the space provided on the form. Attached to the Form FD-122 should be an additional page containing a concise summary of facts which prompt the recommendation for this tabbing. These instructions in no way affect the character of cases under which subjects are currently being investigated.

Careful consideration should be given at this time to recommending for inclusion in the Security Index those individuals who are not now on the Security Index but who, in the light of the clear and present identification of the Cuban Government as procommunist, pro-Soviet Bloc and anti-United States, would be deemed dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the U. S. in the event of an emergency involving Cuba and the U. S.

In considering whether the facts clearly and unmistakably depict a subject as a dangerous individual who could be expected to commit acts inimical to the national defense and public safety in such an eventuality, there should be a substantial showing of data within the following standards:

(a) An individual has served as a leader or officer or has substantially participated in the activities of a pro-Castro organization and has engaged in activities which have included either the preparation or distribution of pro-Cuban

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SAC LETTER NO. 60-54

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or anti-U. S. propaganda; the active collection of funds for any agency or representative of the Cuban Government or for a pro-Castro group, which funds are not intended for the relief of human suffering or other charitable purposes; active participation in acts of violence against anti-Castro individuals or groups or against the United States; or the active collection of intelligence data regarding the national defense of the United States or which would serve the purposes of the Cuban Government as opposed to the interests of the United States, where there are reasonable grounds to believe that such data is to be or has been conveyed to any agency or representative of the Cuban Government.

(b) An individual, whether he has participated in organizational activity or not, has engaged in one or more activities specified in (a) above and it has been clearly established, by overt acts or statements or other evidence, that there are reasonable grounds to believe the loyalty of the individual would lie with the Cuban Government in the event of armed conflict between the Cuban Government and the United States.

(c) In connection with all individuals recommended for addition to the Security Index in consideration of these standards there must be a clear showing, by overt acts or statements or other evidence, that there has been a continuing sympathy for the aims and objectives of the Cuban Government since October 1, 1960. This is absolutely essential in view of the rising tide of disillusion with and defection from the Cuban Government.

When recommending additional subjects for the Security Index in consideration of the above factors sound judgment must be exercised in order to assure the weight of evidence justifies inclusion. The facts which form the basis for recommendation for inclusion must be established through reliable informants, sources or individuals or by physical evidence and must be concisely set forth in the succinct summary of facts appearing on the required additional page or pages attached to the Form FD-122. Since the courses of action which might be followed in the event of a limited emergency would, in all probability, be different for aliens as distinguished from U. S. citizens it is imperative that the citizenship status of these individuals be clearly established. The same procedure for tabbing these individuals as "Pro-Cuban" should be followed as set out hereinbefore.

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SAC LETTER NO. 60-54

Each field office should institute an immediate review to identify those subjects who should be recommended for the Security Index on this basis. The submission of recommendations in this regard should be implemented immediately and must receive continuous and preferred attention. You are reminded that existing instructions require that a summary report containing all pertinent information must be in the possession of the Bureau when a subject is recommended for the Security Index.

When an individual is included on the Security Index and tabbed "Pro-Cuban" under this procedure, it is the continuing responsibility of the office of origin to recommend immediate removal of this tabbing or removal from the Security Index itself where specific information is received or acquired indicating such action is warranted.

11/22/60  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-54

(G) SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION CHARACTERIZATIONS -- Reference is made to SAC Letter No. 60-34 (F) dated July 12, 1960, characterizing the Four Continent Book Corporation. The following thumbnail sketch should be utilized effective immediately regarding the Four Continent Book Corporation:

According to the records of the Foreign Agents Registration Section, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., the Four Continent Book Corporation, 156 Fifth Avenue, New York City, is registered under the provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended. One of the foreign principals listed in this registration is the Mezhdunarodnaja Kniga (International Book), Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

11/22/60  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-54

(H) COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF DOMINICAN EXILE GROUPS - INTERNAL SECURITY - DOMINICAN REPUBLIC -- Re SAC Letter 60-45 dated September 27, 1960. *Third AGENCY CONSIDERATION*

11/22/60  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-54

In view of above, all offices must be most alert to develop and collect data indicating plans and activities of the communists with regard to the Dominican situation. In addition, it is felt that there is a definite need at this time for a co-ordinated compilation of data, now in individual case files, which will give a clear and complete picture of the over-all extent of communist infiltration of Dominican exile groups.

Accordingly, New York, Miami, San Juan, Washington Field Office, and Legal Attache, Mexico (offices which handle most of our Dominican investigations) are instructed to prepare reports suitable for dissemination under the above caption and such reports are to contain a complete and comprehensive survey of the extent of communist infiltration among these exile groups. Reports should not only show the extent of communist infiltration within each group but reports should also contain a separate section whereby subversive information concerning individuals themselves is set forth separately under the names of the individuals involved. Plan format of reports carefully, utilizing appropriate headings for sake of clarity wherever possible. Preparation of reports will necessitate thorough file review of closed as well as pending cases, possibly supplemented by current contacts with established sources wherever necessary.

In order to avoid duplication of the compilation of this data, confine reporting to data from cases of which particular office is office of origin. If pertinent data is discovered during file reviews which would not fall within this guide, the office discovering such information should include it in its report in order to make certain that all pertinent information is reported. Remember the main purpose of this survey is to make available within this control file the complete current situation regarding communist infiltration into Dominican groups and to maintain such control file on a current basis.

Deadline for initial report is 45 days and supplemental reports should be submitted at 45-day intervals. New York is designated as office of origin.

Although report writing phase of this survey at this time is confined to above-mentioned offices, all offices should be alert to problem here, especially in view of our far-reaching informant coverage in the communist field. Data secured should be submitted promptly to Bureau under above caption.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

11/22/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-54

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PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 60-J  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

October 20, 1960

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7

One set of AFSAM 7 key lists for months of December, 1960, January and February, 1961, being forwarded separately to all divisions except Washington Field which will receive none; three copies being furnished Bureau's Emergency Relocation Site; and three copies Seat of Government Code Room.

Acknowledge receipt of key lists promptly by routing slip, indicating serial numbers which appear thereon; return address label of individual tamperproofed envelope containing keys even though torn when package opened; and destroy, by burning, each monthly sheet thirty days after last effective date thereof, advising Bureau promptly by routing slip, attention FBI Laboratory, this has been done.

It is essential address label mentioned above be returned in order to control security of shipment.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

November 1, 1960

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) LEAVE MATTERS -- Any employee who can be spared should be granted leave over the Christmas-New Year's holidays with preference being given those who have not had a vacation during the year for leave over one or both of the holidays. Special attention should also be given the requests of new employees. Employees who have been with us less than ninety days, and thus cannot take annual leave, may be granted up to four workdays of leave without pay (LWOP) if they can be spared. Employees who have been here 90 days or longer will not be allowed to take any LWOP; however, they may take any available annual leave, consistent with the first sentence above. In scheduling leave or LWOP, you must bear in mind the condition of the work; annual leave or LWOP should not be granted if to do so will increase the work delinquency.

A holiday is charged as LWOP when it intervenes in a period of LWOP; thus if an employee is on LWOP December 23 through December 28, 1960, four days of LWOP must be charged for this absence although only three are workdays. If the employee is absent only on December 23, 1960, returning to work December 27, 1960, only one day will be charged as LWOP. All LWOP granted under the four-workday rule is to be reported on the Time and Attendance Card and no special communication should be submitted to the Bureau.

The 1960 leave year ends January 7, 1961. Employees having a maximum accumulation of thirty or more days should understand that leave earned in the current leave year but unused at the close of the leave year is forfeited. Likewise, if more leave than earned during the leave year is used during the leave year, their maximum accumulation is lowered. Your leave schedule should be so arranged as to permit employees to take annual leave they request and which they would otherwise lose. The Bureau's concurrence must be secured when it is proposed to deny an employee's request with the result he will forfeit leave.

11/1/60  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-51

(B) TRAINING - INSTRUCTION - POLICE INSTRUCTORS -- A series of recent incidents have come to the attention of the Bureau in which approved police instructors have requested removal from police instruction duties on the basis of personal preference.



alone. One such instructor requested that he be removed as a general police instructor and only utilized in fingerprint instruction because he felt more comfortable teaching the latter subject.

The Bureau has gone to considerable expense to train police instructors and does not intend to relieve an Agent of such assignments merely because he prefers some other type of work. This is consistent with the Bureau's long-standing policy that Agents are not permitted to choose their assignments.

Of course, it is essential that police instruction be of the highest caliber in order to maintain the Bureau's pre-eminence in this field. If you feel that an instructor should no longer be utilized because of a deterioration in his performance, conflicting investigative assignments, or any other reason which would serve the Bureau's best interests, you should immediately submit your recommendation with full justification. You should not recommend his removal based solely on his personal preference.

The Inspection Staff has been instructed to be alert for any deficiencies in police schools, including an evaluation of Agents' capabilities and performance.

11/1/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-51

(C) LEAVE FOR VOTING -- In view of the forthcoming election on November 8, 1960, this is to remind you of the policy with respect to leave for voting as set out in SAC Letter #58-33 dated 5-27-58 and in the Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part I, Section 4, under Official Leave. All employees should be aware of this policy.

11/1/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-51

(D) JUVENILE DELINQUENCY MATTERS -- I have long felt that the term "juvenile delinquency" is inaccurate and inadequate when used to describe serious crimes, as contrasted to juvenile pranks, committed by young people. Henceforth, in speeches, statements, correspondence, etc., on this topic you should refer to serious crimes committed by young people as "youthful criminality," and refrain from using the term "juvenile delinquency" in this respect.

11/1/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-51

(E) TELETYPE MESSAGES -- Teletype Operators' Manual contains detailed and precise instructions, Section 3, page 11, regarding Bureau Headquarters-New York Field Office leased (private line) teletype circuit, including (1) how the circuit is used to effect savings in teletype toll costs, (2) correct message transmission headings for messages to be relayed through Washington via the leased circuit to the New York Office, and (3) instructions to post the operating hours of referenced circuit on your teletype machine.

These instructions are not being observed closely. Messages are being sent to Bureau Headquarters for relay to New York on weekends and at other times when the leased circuit is not in operation. Improper and inadequate transmission headings are being used on the relay messages. Messages are being teletyped directly to the New York Office in instances where the relay procedure should be used.

In the interest of communications efficiency and economy see to it that the instructions and procedures in the teletype Operators' Manual are observed meticulously in your office. This letter does not apply to the Washington Field Office or to the Anchorage, Honolulu or San Juan Offices.

11/1/60  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-51

(F) INTERVIEWS - REPORT WRITING -- A recent incident occurred wherein a Special Agent, while being questioned by a Federal Judge during his testimony in court, was unable to recall whether or not he had advised the defendant during an interview two years before of his right not to make a statement and the fact that any statement he made could be used against him in court.

The Manual of Instructions, Volume 1, Section 2B, 2 (c and d) and the FBI Handbook, Part 2, Chapter 2, 2A, (2), (3), and (4) provide certain requirements in conducting interviews with suspects or subjects. In the future when following these provisions, the fact that a suspect or subject has been appropriately advised should be included in the document reporting the results of the interview with that suspect or subject. Manual changes are forthcoming.

11/1/60  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-51

(G) SPECIAL INQUIRIES FOR WHITE HOUSE, CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES -- Effective November 9, 1960, a new classification is being assigned to the captioned character of case. As of that date the classification will be 161. Submit original only of reports to Bureau.

It is anticipated that a large number of requests for such investigations will be received from the new Administration after the election. Those requests will concern, in many instances, persons of wide prominence in many different fields. A deadline of fifteen days is set by the Bureau; however, in some instances, the White House will request such immediate action that the investigation will have to be completed more expeditiously. The general instructions pertaining to applicant investigations, as set forth in Section 19 of the Manual of Instructions, are to be strictly adhered to in the conduct of these investigations.

The Bureau wishes to stress the importance of this type of case. Frequently the persons under investigation are being considered for high, responsible Government positions and the investigation must be thorough and complete in every detail, covering the entire adult life of the appointee. These cases must be assigned immediately, afforded continuous attention, and the Bureau deadline must be met without fail.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

11/1/60  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-51

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PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 60-K  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

December 13, 1960

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) SOUND SCHOOL TRAINING -- The Bureau desires that you submit the names of all Special Agents in your field division who are seriously interested in receiving sound school training. A technical background, such as that gained through formal education in science, engineering and technical subjects or through practical experience in telephony, radio communication and electronic repair, is most desirable, although not absolutely necessary. Lacking that, an Agent should possess considerable mechanical aptitude and proficiency. A factual, detailed statement should be provided as to each Agent's technical background or mechanical proficiency in order to permit a worthwhile evaluation of his capability.


Due to the fact that sound installations involve confidential techniques, the Agent selected should not be one widely known to police officers, hoodlums and security subjects, since his being recognized during his work might seriously jeopardize the security of an installation. Experience in the past has shown that maximum utilization of this specialized training and of the technical equipment supplied each office is realized only when the Sound-Trained Agent is assigned to headquarters city.

A reply, marked to the attention of the FBI Laboratory, should be submitted within thirty days after the receipt of this letter.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-56

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

December 6, 1960

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to

File No.

(A) FBI SUGGESTION PROGRAM - STATUS REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1961 --  
From the beginning of fiscal year 1961 to October 31, 237 suggestions had been received by the Suggestion Desk for an average of 59 per month as compared with an average of 65 per month for the same period during fiscal year 1960. As is readily apparent, this is evidence of a decline in the number of suggestions submitted. To date, the 36.1% of our employees who are assigned to the Seat of Government have submitted 58.2% of the suggestions; whereas field employees, 63.9% of the total, have submitted only 41.8% of the suggestions.

I wish to emphasize that increased attention must be given to encouraging employees to contribute to this important program. However, we do not desire to increase quantity at the expense of quality in suggestions designed to improve our procedures.

The Inspection Staff has been instructed to scrutinize carefully the handling of the Suggestion Program during its inspection of each division to insure that the division head is affording this matter his close attention.

(Security Letter on attached pages)

(B) SECURITY INFORMANTS -- A series of five two-day conferences in the field on the developing and handling of security informants was recently completed. These conferences were held in the Chicago, Los Angeles, New Orleans, Philadelphia and New York Offices, with 107 selected Special Agents from all offices except Anchorage, Honolulu and San Juan participating. The results of these conferences are set forth herein containing changes in procedure effective immediately. These changes were recommended by the conferences.

USE OF CURRENT INFORMANT TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL HIGH-LEVEL  
COVERAGE IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY (CP) USA

SOURCES AND SENSITIVE METHOD DELETED

LONG-RANGE PROGRAM TO DEVELOP HIGH-LEVEL INFORMANT COVERAGE

SENSITIVE METHODS DELETED

12/6/60  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-56

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# SENSITIVE METHODS DELETED

## YOUTH PROGRAM OF THE CPUSA

At the 17th National Convention of the CPUSA held in New York City December 12-14, 1959, the CPUSA set up a program which was designed to produce a communist youth organization in the United States. The Party implemented this program by naming Daniel Mortimer Rubin as National Secretary for Youth, and Rubin has been touring a large part of the United States in order to complete the organization of a communist youth group. This organization will encompass all classes of young people, including college students. The Party hopes that in addition to other groups it will eventually have communist youth groups on college campuses.

All offices were alerted to this program by letter of June 21, 1960, entitled "CPUSA, Youth Matters, Internal Security - C" and to the necessity to have complete coverage of CP activity in youth matters. The Party is expected shortly to establish this youth organization, and we must be ready for this eventuality. If you have not already done so, alert

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SAC LETTER NO. 60-56

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established informants so we will be advised immediately of the location of any youth groups set up anywhere in the country. Consideration should be given to making contacts with cooperative officials of institutions of learning so that we may become aware of the emergence on campuses of groups dominated by the CP. In addition, through a review of campus publications information may be elicited concerning the formation of communist youth groups on campuses. The Party is keenly aware of the need to develop an effective program among youth, and you should be alert to develop and maintain the necessary informant coverage of this activity.

#### TOPLEV PROGRAM

Through this program of contacting METHOD communists as potential informants it has been possible to obtain the services of many excellent informants. By contacting carefully selected subjects and utilizing new specific approaches, additional informants can be developed which would insure continuation of METHOD coverage of the CPUSA. By separate communication all 14 Toplev offices are being instructed to conduct an analysis of subjects previously approached and select individuals for reinterview at this time by utilizing specific new approaches.

#### COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

Any office where there is any degree of concentration of communists (although not a regular participant in the Program) should consider the possible application of counterintelligence techniques specifically aimed at causing disruption or disillusionment inside Party circles. Bureau approval must be obtained before any action can be taken. All proposals must be carefully evaluated prior to submission so it can clearly be stated that the action recommended will not embarrass the Bureau or jeopardize informants, sources of information or special investigative techniques. Communications in this regard should be captioned "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C," Bureau file 100-3-104.

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CONTROL - INTERVIEW OF FORMER INFORMANTS BY SAC

Strict control over informants is absolutely necessary to prevent embarrassment to the Bureau and jeopardizing our informant program. In order to minimize situations which could arise after discontinuance of informants, whenever the contacting Agent feels a discontinued informant could cause embarrassment to the Bureau arrangements should be made to have the former informant come to the field office where he will be personally met by the SAC. At that time he should be impressed with the fact that his services were appreciated and were of considerable assistance to the national defense of the country, and he will be reminded that he signed an agreement when he was active as an informant to maintain his relation with the Bureau on a confidential basis. The SAC will stress the necessity for the informant to maintain this confidence. This procedure should be placed in effect immediately.

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, UNDERGROUND OPERATIONS

CP leaders have discussed the possibility of the Party going underground in the event the forthcoming Supreme Court decision on the Internal Security Act of 1950 requires the CPUSA to register with the Attorney General. Party leaders feel the decision may be against the Party and it will have to go underground. Betty Gannett, member of the National Committee and educational director of the New York State CP, has been instructed to formulate a plan which could be used to establish an underground apparatus. All offices were advised by letter of November 2, 1960, to be alert for all activities of the Party throughout the country in this connection and efforts should be concentrated on developing sources and informants among individuals on the fringe of communist activity as such persons were used to great advantage by the Party when it went underground in the 1950s. Efforts should be made to obtain the actual blueprint which the Party will follow if it goes underground. Current informants should be alert for any discussion of this matter in the Party and be ready to place themselves in positions whereby they can provide information regarding the development of any underground activity.

MONOGRAPHS AND "THROWAWAYS"

The Agents who attended all five conferences were unanimous in their statements that the material being sent

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to the field in the form of monographs and "throwaways" was of considerable assistance to them in the informant development program. The value of research material should be kept in mind at all times in making contacts with potential informants and in handling informant problems which are constantly arising.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

12/6/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-56

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-59

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

December 27, 1960

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) TRAINING - AGENTS' ANNUAL TECHNICAL CONFERENCES - 1961 --  
Enclosed for each office are five copies of captioned training  
program.

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SAC LETTER NO. 60-59

(B) ACCOMPLISHMENTS -- It may reasonably be anticipated that  
changes in personnel of the Offices of the United States Attorneys  
due to recent election results will take place during the early  
months of 1961. It will therefore be incumbent upon each field  
division to remain continually alert in order to insure that  
during this transitory period no prosecutive delays result thereby  
adversely affecting the Bureau's accomplishments.

If a situation should arise whereby you encounter lack  
of prosecutive initiative on the part of certain United States  
Attorneys or their assistants or unwarranted delays in prosecution  
due to these anticipated changes, the Bureau should be immediately  
advised.

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SAC LETTER NO. 60-59

(C) YOUNG AMERICAN MEDAL AWARDS -- Reference is made to SAC  
Letter 59-2 (D) dated January 13, 1959. Final selections for the  
Young American Medal Awards for Bravery and for Service have been  
made for the calendar year 1959. There were only 26 nominations  
for the bravery award and only 10 for the service award for 1959.

You have previously been furnished complete background  
information on these awards. I do not believe that the small  
number of qualified nominees for these awards is truly representative  
of the accomplishments of the youth of our country. You should be  
alert for any outstanding acts by youth in your respective ter-  
ritories which would be worthy for nomination for either award.  
Your attention is called to the requirements of these awards,  
especially the service award, as set out in the FBI Law Enforcement  
Bulletin issue of January, 1957. Frequently in the past, an  
individual who has performed an outstanding service to his community  
did not receive favorable consideration from the Young American  
Medal Awards Committee because of insufficient supporting documents  
submitted with the nomination. In your next conference with the  
governor or executive official in your territory, you should personally  
bring this matter to his attention.

(D) PERFORMANCE RATINGS - 90-DAY WARNING OF UNSATISFACTORY ANNUAL RATINGS -- Annual performance ratings on investigative personnel are due on March 31, 1961. Performance of all investigative personnel should be appraised at this time to insure that 90-day written warnings (in form of special administrative performance ratings) are given to all such employees whose performances are considered unsatisfactory and to whom it is contemplated ~~Unsatisfactory official annual performance ratings~~ will be given. The warning performance ratings must contain detailed specific information regarding the deficiencies of the employee and, according to regulations, the following information is required and must be set forth in the rating for the benefit of the employee:

1. How performance is deficient;
2. What should be done to correct the deficiencies;
3. That current level of performance must be maintained with respect to other aspects on which performance is adequate; and
4. That unless those aspects which are deficient are improved within 90 days an official rating of "Unsatisfactory" will be given.

Unsatisfactory annual performance ratings may not be given unless employee has been given a 90-day warning. Therefore, such a rating must be deferred until 90 days have elapsed since the submission of the warning. Provisions of Section 5, Part I, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations should be carefully reviewed to insure that all requirements are complied with.

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SAC LETTER NO. 60-59

(E) FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN -- To continue the high degree of excellence of the material in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin for the edification of law enforcement officers, it is necessary that each field office constantly be on the alert for new and unusual ideas, techniques and procedures of value to the field of law enforcement. As in the past, each field office is instructed to submit three suggestions for potential Bulletin articles in 1961 for each individual state within its territory. These suggestions should be made in accordance with provisions of SAC Letter No. 53-63 (A), dated September 8, 1953, and should reach the Bureau, attention Crime Records Division, no later than February 20, 1961. You should select items having widespread value to police agencies which give good geographical coverage

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to your area and which are representative of the various types of police organizations in your territory. It is imperative that the most qualified authors be suggested who have not been invited to contribute to the Bulletin in recent years.

The Bureau is particularly anxious to acquire articles by very prominent people--so-called "name" authors--who can provide enlightening material relative to the many ramifications of the law enforcement profession. Particular consideration should be given to categories such as firearms training programs; training for court appearances and testifying; construction and use of special kits, such as investigative, traffic, latent fingerprinting, etc.; techniques in investigating homicide, safebreaking, burglary, shoplifting, robbery, auto theft, fraudulent checks, etc.; methods of interviewing, conducting crime scene searches, patrolling; functions of "bunco" squads and detective bureaus; growth of police agencies in areas experiencing rapid expansion or annexation; modern and novel traffic and public relations programs; police participation in crime prevention and youthful criminality matters; and matters relating to the control of sex deviates, child molesters and rapists and unique reference systems, files and techniques used in connection with investigations involving such crimes. The foregoing categories are suggestions, of course, and your contributions should not be restricted by this list which is merely a guide.

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SAC LETTER NO. 60-59

(F) PERSONNEL - CONDUCT AND ACTIVITIES OF EMPLOYEES -- A number of instances have been noted recently of Bureau employees becoming involved in personal misconduct and other difficulties in connection with their visiting and patronizing taverns and bars. It is particularly disturbing to note that some of the undesirable occurrences in drinking establishments have involved experienced Special Agents who have certainly set bad examples for the newer Bureau employees.

All these occurrences are inexcusable and these observations should be brought to the attention of all employees with the warning that they will be held to strict accountability for any incidents reflecting immoderation or lack of good judgment in personal conduct.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover


Director

Enclosures for (A)

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SAC LETTER NO. 60-59

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PERSONAL  
NO. N<sup>o</sup> 3ER SAC LETTER 61-A

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

January 23, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7

One set of AFSAM 7 key lists for months of March, April and May, 1961, being forwarded separately to all divisions except Washington Field which will receive none; three copies being furnished Bureau's Emergency Relocation Site; and three copies Seat of Government Code Room.

Acknowledge receipt of key lists promptly by routing slip, indicating serial numbers which appear thereon; return address label of individual tamperproofed envelope containing keys even though torn when package opened; and destroy, by burning, each monthly sheet thirty days after last effective date thereof, advising Bureau promptly by routing slip, attention FBI Laboratory, this has been done.

It is essential address label mentioned above be returned in order to control security of shipment.

Very truly yours,  
John Edgar Hoover  
Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-5

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

January 31, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) FIRST-CLASS MAIL -- When first-class mail is packaged in brown envelopes or parcels (packages or boxes) and is not sent air mail or special delivery, it should be labeled "FIRST-CLASS MAIL" immediately above the address with a rubber stamp having one-quarter inch or larger letters or with labels obtainable from your local post office. This labeling should be done to avoid mail transit and delivery delays sometimes resulting from postal employees assuming such mail envelopes and parcels are third-class mail dispatches..

1/31/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-5

(B) MAILING LIST - FIELD OFFICE LISTS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS - Your attention is directed to Part II, Section 6 (G), of the Manual of Rules and Regulations: You are reminded that changes in your field office list are to be reported to the Bureau as they occur. They should be submitted in duplicate. Form for submission of changes should remain the same except that the page number on which the name appeared in the list originally submitted should be shown. Appropriate manual changes being prepared.

1/31/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-5

(C) FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY -- It is desired that you make the usual arrangements for the holding of state or regional Retraining Sessions for graduates of the FBI National Academy in your territory. Carefully prepared programs of training should be drawn up in order to insure that the graduates attending the Retraining Sessions will receive interesting, valuable and timely instructions. Emphasis should be placed on the training aspects of these Sessions.

The dates and places of your 1961 Retraining Sessions, together with the detailed programs to be followed, should be submitted to the Bureau by June 1, 1961, or thirty days in advance of your Retraining Session, whichever is earlier.

Your attention is directed to SAC Letter 58-75 (C) concerning the attendance of Bureau personnel at FBI National Academy Retraining Sessions. These instructions must be closely followed.

(D) FBI'S ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1960 FISCAL YEAR -- Paragraph (C) of SAC Letter 60-49 dated October 18, 1960, advised that three copies of the FBI's Annual Report for the 1960 Fiscal Year were being sent each field office, and that the Bureau's Annual Report should not be distributed to outsiders until the Attorney General had released the Department's Annual Report.

The printed Annual Report of the Department of Justice for the 1960 Fiscal Year has now been made available to the public. Accordingly, you may distribute the Bureau's Annual Report to press contacts and other individuals who may have a special interest in the data contained therein. For your use in this regard, several additional copies of the FBI's Annual Report are being sent each field office.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

1/31/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-5

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-8  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

February 21, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) PERSONNEL MATTERS - CONTRIBUTIONS AND FLOWER FUNDS -- My attention was recently called to a complaint concerning excessive collections from our employees for gifts. Henceforth, there will be no collections for birthdays, showers, baby and wedding gifts, transfers, resignations, and the like. Your attention is directed to SAC Letter 60-24 dated 5-10-60 setting forth instructions regarding the proper use of the flower fund. Contributions to the flower fund from employees should be strictly voluntary and held to an absolute minimum.

2/21/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-8

(B) CRIME POSTER -- My Introduction in the March issue of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin pertains to the alarming rise in crime and calls upon the American public to lend assistance to law enforcement. The Introduction makes specific reference to a poster on crime which is designed to enlist the aid of the public and which is being introduced on the inside back cover of the March Bulletin. This black-and-white poster is available in an 8- by 10 1/2-inch size in large quantities to your office and to other law enforcement agencies, civic and service organizations, parent-teacher groups, etc.

A minimum of 100 copies is being sent under separate cover to each field office for the purpose of obtaining wide dissemination of this poster, and you should make every effort to see that the public in your territory is aware of its existence and has the opportunity to effectively use it. The public may obtain copies by writing to FBI Headquarters in Washington, D. C.

In order to control the release of this poster in line with our commitments to wire services, you may release this poster immediately upon receiving the copies of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin Introduction which are sent to your office each month.

(c) VOUCHERS -- FORMS -- TRAVEL VOUCHER, SF 1012; REVISED ISSUE -  
SUPPLIES -- Standard Form (SF) 1012, 1012a, b, and c, travel  
voucher forms, have been revised and requisitions for these are  
being filled with the revised issue. The revised issue is  
substantially different from the old form and, therefore, in  
requesting a supply from the Bureau, you should insure that  
your initial order includes SF 1012, 1012a, b, and c. You  
should continue to use the old form until your supply is  
exhausted.

For your guidance in the preparation of the new SF 1012,  
a sample voucher is enclosed.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-8

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(D) SPECIAL INQUIRIES FOR WHITE HOUSE, CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES -- In the future, you should not conduct neighborhood investigation on individuals being considered for positions of Cabinet rank. Further, neighborhood investigation should not be made on any other prominent persons without Bureau approval. In other investigations concerning persons not falling within these two categories, the field should be alert to any information which would indicate the possibility that a neighborhood investigation would be inadvisable, in which event the Bureau should be notified immediately prior to any neighborhood investigation.

In those cases in which no neighborhood investigation is being conducted, should information be developed which indicates the advisability of making a neighborhood investigation, you should immediately furnish pertinent facts to the Bureau for its consideration.

The Bureau expects that these instructions will be strictly adhered to.

(Security Letter on attached pages)

2/21/61

SAC LETTER 61-8

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(E) STREAMLINING PROCEDURES - CHANNELIZING MEMORANDA -- Numerous channelizing memoranda, particularly in large offices operating a large number of live informants, are presenting an increasingly critical space problem and demands for extra file cabinets.

In June, 1960, the Chicago and San Francisco Offices were authorized to destroy channelizing memoranda following submission of reports in security cases on an experimental basis to determine the feasibility of adopting this practice throughout the field.

Based upon the favorable results obtained in these offices, particularly in savings in file space and streamlining of case files, the Bureau is authorizing the destruction of these channelizing memoranda following submission of reports in both individual and organizational security cases.

In devising procedures for the handling of this matter you should be guided by the following:

(1) The current procedure with regard to filing the original informant report, the filing of the master channelizing memoranda in the informant file and the serializing of channelizing memoranda in the substantive case files will be continued as at present.

(2) The Agent, at the time he dictates the report, will prepare a memorandum listing the channelizing memoranda to be destroyed by serial or serial scope and requesting the Chief Clerk's Office to destroy. The memorandum should indicate that pertinent information contained in the serials to be destroyed was incorporated in the report. It will not be necessary to set forth in this destruction memorandum the file and serial number of original informant reports or master channelizing memoranda as this information will be listed in the cover pages to the report. In the case of multiple volumes, the destruction memorandum should be prepared by the Agent in sufficient numbers so that one copy will appear in each volume of the multiple volume file being stripped.

(3) Prior to destruction, the Agent's recommendations with respect thereto are to be reviewed and approved by the Supervisor at the time he reviews and approves the report.

(4) Following destruction of the channelizing memoranda the Chief Clerk will so note on the memorandum. Thereafter, the memorandum will be filed in the case file as a permanent record of the serials destroyed.

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(5) Technical and microphone surveillance channelizing memoranda may be destroyed without the necessity of identifying in the cover pages of the report the exact location in the office files of the original information. The use of an asterisk identifies the source and the original information can be readily located.

The channelizing memorandum should not be destroyed in the following instances:

(1) When the original information is not contained elsewhere in your office.

(2) Do not destroy serial one of a file regardless of its nature.

(3) Do not destroy any serial containing indexing. It would appear that if indexing was necessary to channelizing memoranda, such indexing would only be done in the main case file as set forth in the title of the communication.

(4) Do not destroy serial showing "action" information. For example, opening, closing, posting, or instructions given by a Supervisor to an Agent concerning the case.

The destruction of these channelizing memoranda should be subject to close supervisory control by you to insure that all pertinent information contained in these memoranda is reported in the investigative report.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosure for (C)

2/21/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-8

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-10  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

March 1, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM -- I desire to insure that each office is fulfilling its obligations under this program and to be certain we have that type of coverage of the criminal underworld comparable to that which we achieved in our investigations of the Communist Party. To this end, the techniques which have proved so invaluable in the Internal Security field must be carefully considered and adapted wherever feasible to our criminal intelligence operations. Present policy regarding tesurs must be adhered to.

We must continue all-out efforts in our investigation of specific hoodlum subjects; however, it is imperative that you understand the necessity for maintaining on the criminal underworld intelligence coverage as effective and productive as has been established in other major intelligence operations. The personnel of each office concerned with criminal intelligence matters must be thoroughly briefed and indoctrinated so that they understand the Bureau's aims and the importance of obtaining true intelligence information on the underworld.

You should carefully evaluate this situation in the above perspective and follow through with a planned program to develop high-level live informants as well as sources who can produce significant information as to underworld activities.

It cannot be stressed too strongly that this matter is to receive your personal attention and that having understood the Bureau's objective, effective and vigorous action is to be exerted to accomplish the aims outlined.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC I TER NO. 61-12  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

March 7, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) LABORATORY MATTERS - PHOTOGRAPHY OF EVIDENCE -- The FBI Laboratory has noted a growing tendency of investigative personnel to use the FINGERPRINT CAMERA to photograph document, heel print, and similar evidence. Because of the small field ( $2\frac{1}{4}$  by  $3\frac{1}{4}$ ) covered by this camera, it is often impossible to record the entire area that must be photographed on one negative, making it necessary to record the evidence by sections on several separate negatives. In some instances even individual signatures or heel impressions have been reproduced in this manner. Such photography unnecessarily complicates examinations in the Laboratory and may hinder or limit the use of such evidence in a court of law.

Every field division has available Speed Graphic cameras equipped for document photography which can be adjusted to include an entire document or other evidence in one negative. To properly record evidence photographically, the Speed Graphic camera should be used whenever the area to be photographed is greater than  $2\frac{1}{4}$  by  $3\frac{1}{4}$ .

This matter should be brought to the attention of all investigative personnel, and it is expected that in the future documentary and similar evidence will not be recorded photographically by sections merely because it is more convenient to use the Fingerprint Camera. Of course, where large numbers of documents are to be photographed, the field should continue to use one of the 35 mm or other camera units designed for document photography.

(B) FUGITIVES - WOMEN IN CRIME -- The issue of "The American Weekly," which will be distributed throughout the United States on the weekend of March 11-12, 1961, will contain an article concerning five current female fugitives. The subjects featured will be:

Ruth Paige Bogli, origin Boston  
Dale Colvin, I. O. #3445, origin Little Rock  
Janett Carroll Crusenberry, I. O. #3076, origin Chicago  
Mary Catherine Lawson, Check Circular 26, origin New Orleans  
Ellen Yolenda Samuels, I. O. #3335, origin Denver

"The American Weekly" has a coast-to-coast circulation of approximately 17,500,000. Accordingly, it may be anticipated that a large number of leads will be received as a result of this article. Each office should insure that sufficient investigative personnel is available on March 11-12 to give immediate attention to all leads which are received. Be certain to advise the Bureau (Attention: Crime Records Division) of any positive results attained through the publication of this article in "The American Weekly" magazine.

(Security Letters on attached page)

3/7/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-12

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(C) ANTI-TRUJILLO ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES - INTERNAL SECURITY - DOMINICAN REPUBLIC -- Information has been received from a confidential informant that many young anti-Trujillo Dominicans and followers of the 30th of March Battalion, an anti-Trujillo Dominican exile group, are purchasing weapons in various places in New York City. According to the informant, the young anti-Trujillo Dominicans are making purchases of weapons singly and in diverse establishments in New York City so as not to attract attention.

In view of the above information, agent personnel should exercise caution in interviews and contacts with young anti-Trujillo Dominicans and followers of the 30th of March Battalion.

3/7/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-12

(D) REPORT WRITING - SECURITY CASES. -- It has been noted that on occasions some field offices fail to include in security reports information previously submitted for dissemination by letterhead memoranda. Apparently this omission is made on the theory that to include it in a subsequent report would be repetitious and an unnecessary expenditure of time. Page 33, Part I, FBI Handbook, indicates the results of investigations in security cases should generally be submitted in reports, and page 31, Part I, FBI Handbook, defines a report as a written document containing the results of an investigation as of a certain date. According to this definition, a report should be complete in itself and should contain all pertinent and material information obtained since the submission of a previous report or since the inception of an investigation.

This is being called to your attention so that in the future there will be no misunderstanding and all field offices will, when submitting reports in security cases, include succinctly all pertinent and material information previously submitted for dissemination in letterhead memoranda. You are also cautioned that letterhead memoranda containing information which will later be placed in reports should only be submitted when it is believed expeditious dissemination of the particular information must be made and time is of the essence.

These instructions are intended to amplify and not to change in any way present rules relating to report writing.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

3/7/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-12



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-13  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

March 14, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) BUREAU AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS -- There has been an increase of twenty-five accidents involving Bureau cars during the first seven months of fiscal year 1961 as compared with a like period in fiscal year 1960. Although the adverse weather conditions throughout the country during the past several months undoubtedly had a bearing on the increase, this upward trend is most undesirable and must be reversed. You should place increased emphasis on safe driving practices and insure that all Bureau drivers exercise the highest degree of caution in the operation of the Bureau's automotive equipment.

During the past two or three months there have been a number of reported brake failures on Bureau cars which contributed to accidents. Employees responsible for the operation, inspection and maintenance of Bureau cars must be constantly alert for any advance warning of possible brake failure and when such warning is noted the vehicle should be removed from service, thoroughly inspected and corrective action taken to insure the vehicle is in safe operating condition. Further, during the regular monthly inspection of Bureau cars increased emphasis should be placed on the inspection of the brakes.

A large metropolitan police department reported they had experienced a number of brake failures particularly while cars equipped with automatic transmissions were being used on high-speed chases and fast-moving surveillances. Inspection of the cars disclosed no mechanical defects; however, they discovered that some of their officers were "riding the brake pedal" with their left foot. This caused overheating of the brakes and resulted in temporary brake failure. You should caution all Bureau drivers against such a faulty driving habit.

3/14/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-13

(B) SPEECH MATTERS -- When declining invitations for field representatives to discuss the subject of communism, the utmost discretion and good judgment must be exercised at all times to preclude conveying the wrong impression as to why only headquarters representatives discuss this topic. You should tactfully point out that because of the complexity and nationwide scope of the communist threat, and the fact that a

specialized knowledge is necessary to thoroughly portray the latest fluctuations of this conspiracy from a national standpoint, it has been the Bureau's policy to restrict such speeches to those made by specialists in this field assigned to Bureau headquarters.

Bureau speakers must also meticulously refrain from discussing the subject of organized crime while handling speech commitments. The Bureau's long-standing policy of not commenting upon pending investigative matters can be pointed out in declining to discuss or answer questions on this topic. Published data, such as the Uniform Crime Reports, can, of course, be cited.

3/14/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-13

(C) FOREIGN LANGUAGE TRAINING PROGRAM -- The Bureau requires at the present time additional candidates interested in Foreign Language Training. Please review Section (B), SAC Letter No. 60-12, dated 2/23/60, and canvass your office for volunteers. Do not confine your survey to the languages mentioned in the last paragraph of that SAC Letter. It would be helpful if the Agents did not restrict themselves to the study of any one language but were available for an assignment which best suited the needs of the service. Please let the Bureau have the results thirty days from the date of this letter. Include your personal recommendation in each case. Mark your reply for the attention of the FBI Laboratory.

3/14/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-13

(D) FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM -- The Bureau has been advised that in the near future the Civil Service Commission (CSC) will begin an evaluation of the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program. The objectives of this evaluation will be to insure effective administration of the program and to ascertain what improvements may be made in the Act, regulations, procedures and health benefits plans. The evaluation will include visits by CSC regional representatives to various Government field establishments. During these visits, CSC representatives plan on conducting oral interviews and having a representative number of employees fill out questionnaires for the purpose of determining the adequacy and effective operation of this program.

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CSC has advised that regional representatives have been instructed not to interview FBI employees. Also, the questionnaires are to be administered by Bureau personnel to our employees who should not identify themselves on the questionnaire. You should assure that these instructions are followed.

Immediately canvass SAMBA members and advise the Bureau within thirty days of any suggested changes in the SAMBA plan for future consideration at the expiration of the contract period. If contacted by the CSC, you should also review the questionnaires executed by our employees for any additional suggestions and advise the Bureau.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-13

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(E) ANTITRUST -- The Attorney General recently stated that the Antitrust Division should emphasize criminal Antitrust cases and in connection therewith should utilize the services of the FBI to a greater extent and institute criminal prosecutions where possible.

~~It can be expected that this will result in an increase~~ in the number of criminal Antitrust matters referred to the Bureau for investigation and may result in more requests by Antitrust attorneys to confer with Agents concerning these investigations. At this time it is not expected that there will be any changes in any current policies and procedures for handling Antitrust matters. We should continue to participate in such conferences and if travel of Agents is required, such will be authorized when justification exists.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-13

(F) CRIMINAL INFORMANTS - TOP HOODLUM COVERAGE - CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM -- SAC letters 57-70 dated December 13, 1957, 58-64 dated October 14, 1958, and 59-48 dated August 4, 1959, pointed out the urgent need for informants who can give direct information relative to Top Hoodlums on a continuing basis, and the need for constant re-evaluation of our informant coverage in order that the Bureau will be fully abreast of hoodlum activities. Informants of this type should be developed not only to obtain new cases for prosecution but for utilization on a long range basis in order to provide continuous intelligence information concerning organized crime. Through well-placed informants we must infiltrate organized crime groups to the same degree that we have been able to penetrate the Communist Party and other subversive organizations. Our coverage in this field must be just as extensive and effective as that achieved in security matters. Our responsibilities in these areas cannot be over-emphasized.

Today the press, television, and radio along with the express interests of the Administration keep this phase of criminal activity in a position of prominence in the public eye. Certainly we cannot relax even momentarily our efforts in combating the criminal underworld including the prosecution of Top Hoodlums. The foundation from which we forge our attack must be kept strong and fresh with a full flow of information from well-placed informants.

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All Agents in conducting investigation of criminal matters should be constantly alert for the development of new informants and new potential informants who may be in a position to assist us.

You should at this time re-examine this category of your criminal informant coverage to insure ample notice of new developments, ~~full exploitation of possible Federal violations~~ on the part of Top Hoodlums and their associates, and complete intelligence coverage in the field of organized crime. Such coverage must be carefully scrutinized from a geographical standpoint as well as on the basis of concentration of population to make certain that no phase of criminal activity is overlooked. After you have analyzed your present coverage, you should immediately concentrate on any areas which may need strengthening.

By way of an affirmative and positive approach, you should direct your action against hoodlums under investigation in your office, concentrating on their acquaintances, associates, and henchmen with a view to developing them as criminal informants. From footholds thus gained, the pattern of penetration should be broadened by the addition of new informants.

The responsibility for maintaining a comprehensive and effective criminal informant coverage of the hoodlum element rests with you, and must receive your careful consideration and personal attention on a continuing basis.

You should advise the Bureau within fifteen days of this letter (1) the results of the analysis and re-evaluation of your informant coverage in Top Hoodlum matters, (2) areas requiring improvement, (3) steps taken toward improving informant coverage in these areas, and (4) future plans for enlargement of your criminal informant program with relation to coverage of Top Hoodlums.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-13

(G) EXTORTION MATTERS -- The Bureau desires to reiterate instructions which pertain to the submission of extortion letters to the Laboratory for examination. Present instructions are that extortion letters are to be promptly forwarded to the

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Bureau airmail registered or regular mail registered, whichever is the faster means of communication.

Failure to comply with these instructions creates the possibility of criticism being directed toward the Bureau since prompt examination of such evidence may effect an early solution. This matter should be closely followed so that these instructions are strictly adhered to.

(Security Letters on attached pages)

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-13

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(H) COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE UNITED STATES PEACE CORPS - INTERNAL SECURITY - C -- Your attention is called to the United States Peace Corps which has been established by the President for the purpose of training young people and sending them abroad to project the image of our democratic way of life in foreign lands.

~~We have received information to the effect that Philip Bart, National Organizational Secretary, Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), has stated that it would be wise to have some Communist Party youth get into the newly formed Peace Corps at its inception. You can understand what this would mean to the project and to our country should the CPUSA succeed in infiltrating the Peace Corps and using it for communist purposes.~~

In order that the Bureau may fulfill its responsibilities in the security field, it is necessary that you determine just what the communists are doing in this area in order that we may keep the appropriate departments of the Executive Branch of the Government promptly advised regarding any communist penetration into the Peace Corps. Information obtained in this regard should be submitted under instant caption.

In the event a communist infiltration type of investigation is warranted, you should be guided by instructions contained in Section 87E of the Manual of Instructions and submit your recommendations to the Bureau.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-13

(I) AFRICAN ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES - INTERNAL SECURITY - AFRICA -- Recent disturbances and demonstrations at the United Nations, New York City, and in various United States cities, protesting the "murder" of Patrice Lumumba, deposed Premier of the Republic of Congo, are clear evidence of the capacity of subversive and nationalist elements in the United States to stir up agitation among African nationalists, American Negroes and others in the United States whose sympathy with the spread of nationalism in Africa does not always take into account the underlying motivation behind such agitation. The possibility that diplomatic representatives in the United States of Soviet-bloc nations and of nations sympathetic to the Soviet bloc could have a behind-the-scenes part in such agitation must not be overlooked.

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In April of 1960 the New York Office exercised excellent initiative in recognizing that a pattern of activities in the United States favoring African nationalism was emerging and in instituting a semiannual reporting procedure to present an over-all picture of such developments. Several field offices were drawn into this reporting procedure; however, the recent demonstrations in the United States indicate the desirability of an alertness on the part of all field offices to activities of this type taking place in the various Bureau field office territories. In this connection, therefore, the Bureau desires to utilize this file to collect a concise and factual over-all picture from all field offices of just what pattern is developing in the activities of African nationals in the United States and in the activities of individuals and groups here who seek to exploit the issue of African nationalism. It must be borne in mind that the increasing influx of African students, who are attending educational institutions throughout the United States, requires we be most alert not only to agitational and organizational activities of the students themselves, but also to the problem of uncovering pressures brought to bear on them and/or efforts to organize them by nationalists or subversive elements or by representatives of other nations.

In view of current developments in captioned matter, reports should be submitted by each office on January 15, April 15, July 15 and October 15 of each year until further notice. Eight copies of reports should be furnished to the Bureau. After reports are submitted which will afford an over-all picture of the situation confronting each office negative reports should not be submitted but a letter should be submitted indicating there is no change in the existing picture.

This file should be utilized as a control file to present a concise picture of the problem. It is not designed as a catchall for reporting individual case activity. Any data warranting investigation of organizations, groups or individuals should be handled in separate case files and only that data pertinent to showing the over-all picture should be repeated in this file. Information concerning racist activities in the United States which are unrelated to African nationalist activities should not be included in reports in this case.

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Reports in this matter should utilize logical headings and subheadings in order to enable an organized presentation. The Bureau file number is 105-87964. The New York Office is the office of origin.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-13

(J) ~~CUBAN ALIEN REFUGEE REPORTS~~ --- Bureau has arranged for Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) offices locally to furnish copies of reports pertaining to Cuban alien refugees in the United States to Bureau offices at field level. These reports generally contain brief identifying data concerning the alien including his whereabouts at the time he was interviewed by INS. They are normally submitted on INS Form I-161. While active investigation of these individuals is not desired in the absence of allegations indicating they are procommunist, pro-Soviet, anti-American, pro-Castro or are engaged in activities which would bring them within our investigative jurisdiction, they represent an excellent potential from whom intelligence information can be obtained and sources of information developed.

Offices receiving these reports should carefully review them with the thought in mind of interviewing the alien refugees on a selective basis for the purpose of developing intelligence data and assessing their potential as informants or sources in Cuban matters. It is realized that many refugees may not have information; however, you should bear in mind that if there is an indication a refugee was involved in counterrevolutionary activities he probably has information concerning such activities in Cuba. If refugee was Cuban official, it would be logical to expect he would have information concerning communist and Soviet orientation of Castro officials. Likewise, if he was in public relations field he could be expected to have data dealing with Cuban propaganda activity. Prior to conducting such interviews, review your office indices and if the data received from INS or the data located in your files indicates that a check of Bureau files would be desirable prior to the interview, then an expedite check of Bureau files should be requested. Sufficient background data should be furnished to facilitate this check. Your interviews should be designed to determine the full scope of each refugee's knowledge and this should be clearly shown in reporting the results of the interviews. This will enable the Bureau and any other field office having a direct interest in the data to request additional information on specific points where desirable.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-13

Pertinent concrete information elicited from the refugees would be of interest not only to the Bureau but also to other Government agencies. For this reason you should submit the results of such interviews under an appropriate caption in a form suitable for dissemination, submitting nine copies to the Bureau. Where warranted, appropriate investigations should be instituted on the basis of data obtained from these refugees. There is no need to obtain Bureau permission for these interviews unless some unusual circumstance exists. Advise the Bureau of the results of all interviews conducted.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

3/14/61

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-18

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

April 4, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) FBI SUGGESTION PROGRAM -- In connection with the Bureau's Suggestion Program, it has been noted that a number of suggestions have been received which, although they appear meritorious on the surface, actually would create more paper work or other administrative burden than they would relieve if adopted. This is not meant to discourage creative thought on the part of our employees, but should be borne in mind when considering the merits of each proposal.

In addition, where savings of a tangible nature are anticipated through the adoption of a suggestion, a statement indicating, as far as possible, the amount to be realized in savings should be set forth in the suggestion or accompanying comments. This is necessary so that the suggestor may receive due consideration for recognition under the Incentive Awards Program if his suggestion is adopted. In the past, it has been necessary on occasions for the Suggestions Desk to go back to the Division where the suggestion originated and have this point covered. This causes delay in processing the suggestion and unnecessary communications.

4/4/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-18

(B) 1962 SESSIONS - FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY -- The Sixty-ninth Session of the FBI National Academy will begin on Monday, March 19, 1962, and will graduate on Wednesday, June 6, 1962. The Seventieth Session will begin on Monday, August 13, 1962, and will graduate on Wednesday, October 31, 1962. You will be instructed at a later date as to when you should submit the names of candidates for these two sessions.

4/4/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-18

(C) PROTECTIVE CUSTODY -- During the recent retrial of a Bureau case, a Government witness on cross-examination refused to reveal her current address because she feared for her own safety and that of her child. When Court was adjourned for the day the Judge ordered the FBI to take the witness into protective custody until she completed her testimony.

The protection of a witness is clearly within the function of the United States Marshal's Office. The arbitrary action of the Judge in this case is a most undesirable precedent and may be seized upon by other Judges in the future to involve us in a situation outside our primary duties.

In the event of a similar request in the future, you should advise the United States Attorney to point out to the Court the function of the United States Marshal with respect to the protection of witnesses.

4/4/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-18

(D) LAW ENFORCEMENT INTELLIGENCE UNIT -- This organization is comprised of representatives of law enforcement organizations located for the most part in the Far West and particularly in California. However, recent additions in its membership included representatives from police agencies as far eastward as Ohio and Florida. These members exchange data on hoodlums, gangsters and organized crime. Collection and dissemination of information are handled through the California State Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation at Sacramento.

The Bureau has taken no part in the activities of the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU) since it was organized in 1956.

This organization is holding an annual meeting at Reno, Nevada, on April 13 - 14, 1961. The existence of the organization is being called to your attention in order that you will be acquainted with its operations in the event any information concerning it should be referred to your office. In the event you learn of any new agencies being accepted as members of LEIU or of any other information of interest concerning the organization, the Bureau should be advised. You should take no action with respect to the activities of this organization and no comment should be made with respect to the merits of LEIU.

4/4/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-18

(E) REPORTING CHINESE NAMES AND USE OF CHINESE TELEGRAPHIC CODE (CTC) NUMBER - REPORT WRITING - INDEXING -- In those instances where a Chinese name is reported in a communication,

4/4/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-18

either in the title or text, you should insure that the Chinese Telegraphic Code number, if available, is included. The first time the name appears in either the title or the body of a communication, the Mandarin, Cantonese or other available dialectal spelling should be given followed by the code numbers. The code number should appear in sequence in such a manner that there will be no question as to which name it attaches where the names of several persons are listed.

The title should, of course, include the name as it is actually used by the person himself. Index cards on Chinese names should include the CTC number when it is available. The CTC number is a valuable factor for identification or elimination purposes but it should not be relied upon to the exclusion of other information. Instances have occurred where two persons have the same number or where two numbers are ascribed to the same individual.

(Security Letter on attached page)

4/4/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-18

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(F): NATIONALITY GROUP COVERAGE - CUBA -- On February 13, 1961,  
THIRD AGENCY CONSIDERATION

Each field office should assure that all pertinent data relating to such individuals is referred on a continuing basis to the appropriate local office of INS in order that action by INS looking toward possible exclusion, deportation, expatriation or denaturalization may be properly considered.

You will note that INS investigative action in these matters requires specific clearance with the FBI. In view of INS objectives and in view of the tense Cuban situation clearance should be granted upon request unless INS investigation of a particular individual would definitely interfere with a pending investigation or jeopardize your own interests in an individual. When clearance for INS investigation is not granted the Bureau should be advised promptly by airtel under the caption of the individual case of the denial and the reasons therefor. Any pending action which prompts the denial should be expedited in order that clearance can be granted INS as soon as practical. When granting clearance for INS investigative action be certain that arrangements are effected whereby you will be advised by INS of pertinent data developed and of any proceedings instituted regarding subjects of interest to your office.

THIRD AGENCY CONSIDERATION

You will recognize, however, that some local offices of INS; in order to implement their instructions, may request data regarding the July 26th Movement and other organizations supporting the Castro cause. Pertinent data should be supplied.

Any problems experienced by field offices in connection with INS activities in this regard should be brought to the attention of the Bureau promptly.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

4/4/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-18

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-19  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

April 5, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) NONDISCRIMINATION - GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT POLICY - GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS -- By Executive Order 10925 dated March 6, 1961, the President abolished the President's Committee on Government Employment Policy and the Government Contracts Committee and in lieu thereof established the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity. The President reaffirmed the policy that there be no discrimination against any employee or applicant for employment in the Federal Government or with contractors doing business with the Government and delegated to the new committee the authority to implement this policy. A copy of the Executive Order is enclosed.

As regards rules for effectuating the policy and provisions of Executive Order 10925 throughout the Department, the Attorney General by Departmental Order 239-61 dated March 17, 1961, reaffirmed regulations in this regard prescribed by the Departmental Order 105-55 dated November 21, 1955. He specified that all references in that Order to the President's Committee on Government Employment Policy shall be deemed to be references to the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity. This instruction by the Attorney General means there is no substantive change in provisions for complying with the nondiscrimination program. Manual revisions are being prepared.

At this time I want to strongly remind you of the prime importance of insuring that each applicant for any Bureau position is given consideration based entirely on his merit and fitness and without regard for his race, color, religion, or national origin. In view of the ever-increasing challenges facing the Bureau and our country, it is absolutely imperative that we make the best use of the human resources available so as to assure that our responsibilities are discharged in the best possible manner. This requires alertness and application at every level of our recruitment program, from contact with possible applicants through interview and investigation, to insure that the best qualified are eventually extended appointments.

You should emphasize this to all personnel who have occasion to participate in handling Bureau applicant matters. I shall continue to expect you to implement this policy and to make certain that the best qualified applicants for Bureau positions anywhere in the service are referred to the Bureau for appropriate consideration.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

Enclosure



## Executive Order 10925

### ESTABLISHING THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

WHEREAS discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin is contrary to the Constitutional principles and policies of the United States; and

WHEREAS it is the plain and positive obligation of the United States Government to promote and ensure equal opportunity for all qualified persons, without regard to race, creed, color, or national origin, employed or seeking employment with the Federal Government and on government contracts; and

WHEREAS it is the policy of the executive branch of the Government to encourage by positive measures equal opportunity for all qualified persons within the Government; and

WHEREAS it is in the general interest and welfare of the United States to promote its economy, security, and national defense through the most efficient and effective utilization of all available manpower; and

WHEREAS a review and analysis of existing Executive orders, practices, and government agency procedures relating to government employment and compliance with existing non-discrimination contract provisions reveal an urgent need for expansion and strengthening of efforts to promote full equality of employment opportunity; and

WHEREAS a single governmental committee should be charged with responsibility for accomplishing these objectives:

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

#### PART I—ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

SECTION 101. There is hereby established the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity.

Sec. 102. The Committee shall be composed as follows:

(a) The Vice President of the United States, who is hereby designated Chairman of the Committee and who shall preside at meetings of the Committee.

(b) The Secretary of Labor, who is hereby designated Vice Chairman of the Committee and who shall act as Chairman in the absence of the Chairman. The Vice Chairman shall have general supervision and direction of the work of the Committee and of the execution and implementation of the policies and purposes of this order.

(c) The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Secretary of Com-

merce, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Administrator of General Services, the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Each such member may designate an alternate to represent him in his absence.

(d) Such other members as the President may from time to time appoint.

(e) An Executive Vice Chairman, designated by the President, who shall be *ex officio* a member of the Committee. The Executive Vice Chairman shall assist the Chairman, the Vice Chairman and the Committee. Between meetings of the Committee he shall be primarily responsible for carrying out the functions of the Committee and may act for the Committee pursuant to its rules, delegations, and other directives. Final action in individual cases or classes of cases may be taken and final orders may be entered on behalf of the Committee by the Executive Vice Chairman when the Committee so authorizes.

Sec. 103. The Committee shall meet upon the call of the Chairman and at such other times as may be provided by its rules and regulations. It shall (a) consider and adopt rules and regulations to govern its proceedings; (b) provide generally for the procedures and policies to implement this order; (c) consider reports as to progress under this order; (d) consider and act, where necessary or appropriate, upon matters which may be presented to it by any of its members; and (e) make such reports to the President as he may require or the Committee shall deem appropriate. Such reports shall be made at least once annually and shall include specific references to the actions taken and results achieved by each department and agency. The Chairman may appoint sub-committees to make special studies on a continuing basis.

#### PART II—NONDISCRIMINATION IN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT

SECTION 201. The President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity established by this order is directed immediately to scrutinize and study employment practices of the Government of the United States, and to consider and recommend additional affirmative steps which should be taken by executive departments and agencies to realize more fully the national policy of nondiscrimination within the executive branch of the Government.

Sec. 202. All executive departments and agencies are directed to initiate forthwith studies of current government employment practices within their responsibility. The studies shall be in such form as the Committee may prescribe and shall include statistics on current employment patterns; a review of cur-

rent procedures; and the recommendation of positive measures for the elimination of any discrimination, direct or indirect, which now exists. Reports and recommendations shall be submitted to the Executive Vice Chairman of the Committee no later than sixty days from the effective date of this order, and the Committee, after considering such reports and recommendations, shall report to the President on the current situation and recommend positive measures to accomplish the objectives of this order.

Sec. 203. The policy—expressed in Executive Order No. 10590 of January 18, 1955 (20 F.R. 409), with respect to the exclusion and prohibition of discrimination against any employee or applicant for employment in the Federal Government because of race, color, religion, or national origin is hereby reaffirmed.

Sec. 204. The President's Committee on Government Employment Policy, established by Executive Order No. 10590 of January 18, 1955 (20 F.R. 409), as amended by Executive Order No. 10722 of August 5, 1957 (22 F.R. 6287), is hereby abolished, and the powers, functions, and duties of that Committee are hereby transferred to, and henceforth shall be vested in, and exercised by, the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity in addition to the powers conferred by this order.

#### PART III—OBLIGATIONS OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS AND SUBCONTRACTORS

##### SUBPART A—CONTRACTORS' AGREEMENTS

SECTION 301. Except in contracts exempted in accordance with section 303 of this order, all government contracting agencies shall include in every government contract hereafter entered into the following provisions:

"In connection with the performance of work under this contract, the contractor agrees as follows:

"(1) The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, creed, color, or national origin. The contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin. Such action shall include, but not be limited to, the following: employment, upgrading, demotion or transfer; recruitment or recruitment advertising; layoff or termination; rates of pay or other forms of compensation; and selection for training, including apprenticeship. The contractor agrees to post in conspicuous places, available to employees and applicants for employment, notices to be provided by the contracting officer setting forth the provisions of this non-discrimination clause.

"(2) The contractor will, in all solicitations or advertisements for employees placed by or on behalf of the contractor,

state that all qualified applicants receive consideration for employment without regard to race, creed, color, or national origin.

"(3) The contractor will send to each labor union or representative of workers with which he has a collective bargaining agreement or other contract or understanding, a notice, to be provided by the agency contracting officer, advising the said labor union or workers' representative of the contractor's commitments under this section, and shall post copies of the notice in conspicuous places available to employees and applicants for employment.

"(4) The contractor will comply with all provisions of Executive Order No. 10925 of March 6, 1961, and of the rules, regulations, and relevant orders of the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity created thereby.

"(5) The contractor will furnish all information and reports required by Executive Order No. 10925 of March 6, 1961, and by the rules, regulations, and orders of the said Committee, or pursuant thereto, and will permit access to his books, records, and accounts by the contracting agency and the Committee for purposes of investigation to ascertain compliance with such rules, regulations, and orders.

"(6) In the event of the contractor's non-compliance with the nondiscrimination clauses of this contract or with any of the said rules, regulations, or orders, this contract may be cancelled in whole or in part and the contractor may be declared ineligible for further government contracts in accordance with procedures authorized in Executive Order No. 10925 of March 6, 1961, and such other sanctions may be imposed and remedies invoked as provided in the said Executive order or by rule, regulation, or order of the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, or as otherwise provided by law.

"(7) The contractor will include the provisions of the foregoing paragraphs (1) through (6) in every subcontract or purchase order unless exempted by rules, regulations, or orders of the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity issued pursuant to section 303 of Executive Order No. 10925 of March 6, 1961, so that such provisions will be binding upon each subcontractor or vendor. The contractor will take such action with respect to any subcontract or purchase order as the contracting agency may direct as a means of enforcing such provisions, including sanctions for non-compliance: *Provided, however,* that in the event the contractor becomes involved in, or is threatened with, litigation with a subcontractor or vendor as a result of such direction by the contracting agency, the contractor may request the United States to enter into such litigation to protect the interests of the United States."

Sec. 302. (a) Each contractor having a contract containing the provisions prescribed in section 301 shall file, and shall cause each of its subcontractors to file, Compliance Reports with the contracting agency, which will be subject to review by the Committee upon its request.

Compliance Reports shall be filed within such times and shall contain such information as to the practices, policies, programs, and employment statistics of the contractor and each subcontractor, and shall be in such form, as the Committee may prescribe.

(b) Bidders or prospective contractors or subcontractors may be required to state whether they have participated in any previous contract subject to the provisions of this order, and in that event to submit, on behalf of themselves and their proposed subcontractors, Compliance Reports prior to or as an initial part of their bid or negotiation of a contract.

(c) Whenever the contractor or subcontractor has a collective bargaining agreement or other contract or understanding with a labor union or other representative of workers, the Compliance Report shall include such information as to the labor union's or other representative's practices and policies affecting compliance as the Committee may prescribe: *Provided,* that to the extent such information is within the exclusive possession of a labor union or other workers' representative and the labor union or representative shall refuse to furnish such information to the contractor, the contractor shall so certify to the contracting agency as part of its Compliance Report and shall set forth what efforts he has made to obtain such information.

(d) The Committee may direct that any bidder or prospective contractor or subcontractor shall submit, as part of his Compliance Report, a statement in writing, signed by an authorized officer or agent of any labor union or other workers' representative with which the bidder or prospective contractor deals, together with supporting information, to the effect that the said labor union's or representative's practices and policies do not discriminate on the grounds of race, color, creed, or national origin, and that the labor union or representative either will affirmatively cooperate, within the limits of his legal and contractual authority, in the implementation of the policy and provisions of this order or that it consents and agrees that recruitment, employment, and the terms and conditions of employment under the proposed contract shall be in accordance with the purposes and provisions of the order. In the event that the union or representative shall refuse to execute such a statement, the Compliance Report shall so certify and set forth what efforts have been made to secure such a statement.

Sec. 303. The Committee may, when it deems that special circumstances in the national interest so require, exempt a contracting agency from the requirement of including the provisions of section 301 of this order in any specific contract, subcontract, or purchase order. The Committee may, by rule or regulation, also exempt certain classes of contracts, subcontracts, or purchase orders (a) where work is to be or has been performed outside the United States and no recruitment of workers within the limits of the United States is involved;

for standard commercial supplies or raw materials; or (c) involving less than specified amounts of money or specified numbers of workers.

#### SUBPART B—LABOR UNIONS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF WORKERS

Sec. 304. The Committee shall use its best efforts, directly and through contracting agencies, contractors, state and local officials and public and private agencies, and all other available instrumentalities, to cause any labor union, recruiting agency or other representative of workers who is or may be engaged in work under government contracts to cooperate with, and to comply in the implementation of, the purposes of this order.

Sec. 305. The Committee may, to effectuate the purposes of section 304 of this order, hold hearings, public or private, with respect to the practices and policies of any such labor organization. It shall from time to time submit special reports to the President concerning discriminatory practices and policies of any such labor organization, and may recommend remedial action if, in its judgment, such action is necessary or appropriate. It may also notify any Federal, state, or local agency of its conclusions and recommendations with respect to any such labor organization which in its judgment has failed to cooperate with the Committee, contracting agencies, contractors, or subcontractors in carrying out the purposes of this order.

#### SUBPART C—POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AND OF CONTRACTING AGENCIES

Sec. 306. The Committee shall adopt such rules and regulations and issue such orders as it deems necessary and appropriate to achieve the purposes of this order, including the purposes of Part II hereof relating to discrimination in government employment.

Sec. 307. Each contracting agency shall be primarily responsible for obtaining compliance with the rules, regulations, and orders of the Committee with respect to contracts entered into by such agency or its contractors, or affecting its own employment practices. All contracting agencies shall comply with the Committee's rules in discharging their primary responsibility for securing compliance with the provisions of contracts and otherwise with the terms of this Executive order and of the rules, regulations, and orders of the Committee pursuant hereto. They are directed to cooperate with the Committee, and to furnish the Committee such information and assistance as it may require in the performance of its functions under this order. They are further directed to appoint or designate, from among the agency's personnel, compliance officers. It shall be the duty of such officers to seek compliance with the objectives of this order by conference, conciliatory mediation, or persuasion.

Sec. 308. The Committee is authorized to delegate to any officer, agency, or employee in the executive branch of the

Government any function of the Committee under this order, except the authority to promulgate rules and regulations of a general nature.

SEC. 309. (a) The Committee may itself investigate the employment practices of any government contractor or subcontractor, or initiate such investigation by the appropriate contracting agency or through the Secretary of Labor, to determine whether or not the contractual provisions specified in section 301 of this order have been violated. Such investigation shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures established by the Committee, and the investigating agency shall report to the Committee any action taken or recommended.

(b) The Committee may receive and cause to be investigated complaints by employees or prospective employees of a government contractor or subcontractor which allege discrimination contrary to the contractual provisions specified in section 301 of this Order. The appropriate contracting agency or the Secretary of Labor, as the case may be, shall report to the Committee what action has been taken or is recommended with regard to such complaints.

SEC. 310. (a) The Committee, or any agency or officer of the United States designated by rule, regulation, or order of the Committee, may hold such hearings, public or private, as the Committee may deem advisable for compliance, enforcement, or educational purposes.

(b) The Committee may hold, or cause to be held, hearings in accordance with subsection (a) of this section prior to imposing, ordering, or recommending the imposition of penalties and sanctions under this order, except that no order for debarment of any contractor from further government contracts shall be made without a hearing.

SEC. 311. The Committee shall encourage the furtherance of an educational program by employer, labor, civic, educational, religious, and other non-governmental groups in order to eliminate or reduce the basic causes of discrimination in employment on the ground of race, creed, color, or national origin.

#### SUBPART D—SANCTIONS AND PENALTIES

SEC. 312. In accordance with such rules, regulations or orders as the Committee may issue or adopt, the Committee or the appropriate contracting agency may:

(a) Publish, or cause to be published, the names of contractors or unions which it has concluded have complied or have failed to comply with the provisions of this order or of the rules, regulations, and orders of the Committee.

(b) Recommend to the Department of Justice that, in cases where there is substantial or material violation or the threat of substantial or material violation of the contractual provisions set forth in section 301 of this order, appropriate proceedings be brought to enforce those provisions, including the enjoining, within the limitations of applicable law, of organizations, individ-

uals or groups who prevent directly or indirectly, or seek to prevent directly or indirectly, compliance with the aforesaid provisions.

(c) Recommend to the Department of Justice that criminal proceedings be brought for the furnishing of false information to any contracting agency or to the Committee as the case may be.

(d) Terminate, or cause to be terminated, any contract, or any portion or portions thereof, for failure of the contractor or subcontractor to comply with the nondiscrimination provisions of the contract. Contracts may be terminated absolutely or continuance of contracts may be conditioned upon a program for future compliance approved by the contracting agency.

(e) Provide that any contracting agency shall refrain from entering into further contracts, or extensions or other modifications of existing contracts, with any non-complying contractor, until such contractor has satisfied the Committee that he has established and will carry out personnel and employment policies in compliance with the provisions of this order.

(f) Under rules and regulations prescribed by the committee, each contracting agency shall make reasonable efforts within a reasonable time limitation to secure compliance with the contract provisions of this order by methods of conference, conciliation, mediation, and persuasion before proceedings shall be instituted under paragraph (b) of this section, or before a contract shall be terminated in whole or in part under paragraph (d) of this section for failure of a contractor or subcontractor to comply with the contract provisions of this order.

SEC. 313. Any contracting agency taking any action authorized by this section, whether on its own motion, or as directed by the Committee, or under the Committee's rules and regulations, shall promptly notify the Committee of such action or reasons for not acting. Where the Committee itself makes a determination under this section, it shall promptly notify the appropriate contracting agency of the action recommended. The agency shall take such action and shall report the results thereof to the Committee within such time as the Committee shall provide.

SEC. 314. If the Committee shall so direct, contracting agencies shall not enter into contracts with any bidder or prospective contractor unless the bidder or prospective contractor has satisfactorily complied with the provisions of this order or submits a program for compliance acceptable to the Committee or, if the Committee so authorizes, to the contracting agency.

SEC. 315. Whenever a contracting agency terminates a contract, or whenever a contractor has been debarred from further government contracts, because of noncompliance with the contractor provisions with regard to non-discrimination, the Committee, or the contracting agency involved, shall promptly notify the Comptroller General of the United States.

#### SUBPART E—CERTIFICATES OF MERIT

SEC. 316. The Committee may provide for issuance of a United States Government Certificate of Merit to employers or employee organizations which are or may hereafter be engaged in work under government contracts, if the Committee is satisfied that the personnel and employment practices of the employer, or that the personnel, training, apprenticeship, membership, grievance and representation, upgrading and other practices and policies of the employee organization, conform to the purposes and provisions of this order.

SEC. 317. Any Certificate of Merit may at any time be suspended or revoked by the Committee if the holder thereof, in the judgment of the Committee, has failed to comply with the provisions of this order.

SEC. 318. The Committee may provide for the exemption of any employer or employee organization from any requirement for furnishing information as to compliance if such employer or employee organization has been awarded a Certificate of Merit which has not been suspended or revoked.

#### PART IV—MISCELLANEOUS

SECTION 401. Each contracting agency (except the Department of Justice) shall defray such necessary expenses of the Committee as may be authorized by law, including section 214 of the Act of May 3, 1945, 59 Stat. 134 (31 U.S.C. 691): *Provided*, that no agency shall supply more than fifty per cent of the funds necessary to carry out the purposes of this order. The Department of Labor shall provide necessary space and facilities for the Committee. In the case of the Department of Justice, the contribution shall be limited to furnishing legal services.

SEC. 402. This order shall become effective thirty days after its execution. The General Services Administration shall take appropriate action to revise the standard Government contract forms to accord with the provisions of this order and of the rules and regulations of the Committee.

SEC. 403. Executive Order No. 10479 of August 13, 1953 (18 F.R. 4899), together with Executive Orders Nos. 10482 of August 15, 1953 (18 F.R. 4944), and 10733 of October 10, 1957 (22 F.R. 8135), amending that order, and Executive Order No. 10557 of September 3, 1954 (19 F.R. 5655), are hereby revoked, and the Government Contract Committee established by Executive Order No. 10479 is abolished. All records and property of or in the custody of the said Committee are hereby transferred to the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, which shall wind up the outstanding affairs of the Government Contract Committee.


JOHN F. KENNEDY

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
March 6, 1961.

[F.R. Doc. 61-2093; Filed, Mar. 7, 1961;  
10:06 a.m.]

JFK - FPCC

This is listed as  
PBI/JFK front piece,  
but has it been  
copied and  
forwarded?  
NO stamps.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC I TFR NO. 61-24

April 27, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) NATIONALITY GROUP COVERAGE -- The increasing anti-United States attitudes and demonstrations stemming from the Cuban situation and "cold war" tensions are cause for concern and must be taken fully into account in connection with our investigative efforts.

There has been recent evidence of hostility and intelligence on the part of pro-Castro Cubans during attempted interviews by Special Agents. The Bureau has also received data indicating that the Communist Party of Mexico planned violent action against Special Agents of the FBI and Americans in Mexico. Subsequent data indicated the Communist Party of Mexico planned to prepare black lists of Americans in Mexico, to identify Special Agents of the FBI and agents of the Central Intelligence Agency and place them under surveillance, and to seize Americans and hold them as hostages in the event of war with Russia. Plans were made to conduct surveillances of members of the Communist Party of Mexico suspected of being informants. A war of nerves was contemplated involving planned damage to property and sabotage with wide-scale sabotage efforts planned in the event of war, including the organization, arming and training of militia from farm and labor elements to be used to defend Cuba if necessary.

This hostility and the grave steps contemplated undoubtedly were touched off as a part of an emotional reaction to the invasion of Cuba by anti-Castro elements. They are, however, clear evidence of what we should be prepared to contend with now and in the event anti-United States tensions increase. The planned actions of the Communist Party of Mexico demonstrate forcefully the capacity of a subversive organization to react militantly to an emergency situation. The activities of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in the United States reveal clearly the capacity of a nationality group organization to mobilize its efforts in such a situation so as to arrange demonstrations and influence public opinion.

Each Special Agent in Charge should assure that investigations and interviews related to nationality group activity are conducted with due caution and careful consideration of the safety of personnel handling this work. Care should be taken not to provoke hostility. Border offices should be particularly cautious in view of the militant hostility and reported plans of the Communist Party of Mexico.

The existing situation is such that all field offices must be most alert to the possibility of demonstrations by nationality groups which could lead to incidents involving

violence. Advise local police of such demonstrations at once and immediately advise Bureau under caption of particular matter indicating such action has been taken. The same instructions are applicable when data is received that individuals involved in nationality group situations may be illegally carrying arms.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

4/27/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-24

2

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

May 23, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) BOOKLET ENTITLED "HOW SERVICE STATIONS CAN HELP LAW ENFORCEMENT" -- Captioned booklet has been prepared by the Bureau for distribution to service station operators and other interested individuals throughout the country. Two thousand copies are being forwarded to each office, under separate cover, together with a copy of the press release which will be made from the Department on May 28. Those divisions having headquarters offices of major gasoline distributors should immediately contact the appropriate officials of these companies and call the booklet to their attention, pointing out that the booklet is available in quantity for distribution to their retail outlets. All offices should identify retail associations of gasoline dealers within their divisions and contact the appropriate officers to call the availability of the booklet to their attention. The June, 1961, issue of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin will include an item concerning the booklet. The Bureau will welcome the interest of other law enforcement agencies in distributing the publication.

5/23/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-28

(B) PERFORMANCE RATINGS -- A review of the annual performance ratings recently submitted clearly indicates that rating and reviewing officials have not completely familiarized themselves with instructions set out in the Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part I, Section 5, pertaining to performance ratings. Furthermore, in evaluating employee performance many rating and reviewing officials have failed to give due consideration to such important matters as disciplinary action, limited duty, voluntary overtime and the weight program. It was obvious some ratings had been written without sufficient preparation and care and had not been thoroughly reviewed before being transmitted to the Bureau. This resulted in needless delay in processing the ratings, as well as in unnecessary correspondence. Responsibility for the proper evaluation of employee performance and the accuracy of performance ratings rests with the rating and reviewing officials and hereafter they will be held strictly accountable for every error, deviation from instructions and failure to properly evaluate the employee's performance.

The following are some of the items which have been the source of considerable correspondence and are being set forth for your future guidance.

(1) Failure to give due consideration to administrative action taken against an employee during the rating period. Certainly an employee who has been the recipient of several letters of censure or has been the subject of more severe administrative action during the rating period is not entitled to an adjective rating of Excellent.

(2) Failure to give due consideration to the physical condition of an employee. It should be obvious that a Special Agent who has been on limited duty during the greater portion of the rating period is not entitled to a satisfactory rating in physical fitness nor is he entitled to more than a Satisfactory adjective rating since he cannot perform all of the duties required of a Special Agent and his assignments must be controlled. It is the personal responsibility of the rating and reviewing officials to insure that employees with physical limitations are properly rated.

(3) Some rating and reviewing officials have not given due consideration to the employee's efforts to comply with the Bureau's weight standards and to equitably share the work load. It is difficult for the Bureau to understand how an employee who has not complied with the weight standards or whose overtime has been consistently below the office average can be rated excellent or outstanding in attitude.

(4) There have been a number of instances in which ratings afforded employee on the rating guide and check list and/or the narrative comments have not supported the adjective rating afforded the employee. In some instances the ratings on the rating guide and check list have been inconsistent with the narrative comments. The fact that an employee is rated excellent or outstanding on the majority of the items on the rating guide and check list does not automatically entitle him to an Excellent adjective rating. It should be obvious that although all of the items on the rating guide and check list are important, some of the items, such as attitude, judgment, initiative, accuracy, industry, productivity, knowledge of duties, investigative ability, development of informants and sources of information and reporting ability, are of particular importance in evaluating employee performance and must be carefully considered in arriving at the adjective rating.

(5) There have been a number of instances in which the ratings on the subelements on such items as investigative ability, reporting ability, executive ability and ability on raids

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and dangerous assignments did not support the over-all rating on the particular element. If an employee is to be rated excellent on any one of these elements he must be rated excellent or outstanding on the majority of the subelements or the narrative comments must clearly reflect the reason why the employee is considered excellent in the particular item. If an employee is to be rated outstanding on one of these elements he must be rated outstanding on each of the subelements in which he is rated.

(6) In some instances the narrative comments were not complete or the information submitted was misleading. In this regard the Manual of Rules and Regulations specifically sets out information which must be included and questions which must be answered. Rating officials who have followed the format and answered the questions outlined in the Manual have experienced little difficulty in the preparation of performance ratings; however, those who erroneously assume a complete knowledge of the regulations invariably submit incomplete and inaccurate ratings. Particular attention must be given to the specific comments required on police instructors; sound men, resident agents, accountants, language ability, disciplinary action and administrative advancement to insure that complete and accurate information is set out. In regard to disciplinary action it is imperative that the rating official set out each item of administrative action, including the date of the action and the reason for it, and specifically note the items on the rating guide and check list which have been affected by the action.

(7) If an employee is a relief supervisor and has been used in this capacity during the rating period he should be rated on item 21, executive ability, and if he has not been used in this capacity during the rating period the narrative comments should so indicate.

(8) In those cases in which there has been a deterioration in the employee's performance or serious deficiencies are noted it is the responsibility of the rating and reviewing officials to submit a cover memorandum with the rating setting out recommendations for appropriate action.

(9) It is imperative that ratings be prepared in sufficient time to reach the Bureau by the due date which is reflected in the Manual of Rules and Regulations and that a rating be submitted on each employee when due. Performance

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ratings are a most important aspect of the administrative operations of the Bureau and it is essential that they be promptly submitted so that various personnel actions can be handled as expeditiously as possible.

I shall expect you to take immediate steps to insure that all performance ratings, whether administrative or official annuals, on all employees are properly prepared in accordance with instructions set out in the Manual of Rules and Regulations and that every aspect of an employee's performance is placed in its proper perspective in evaluating and rating the employee. Rating and reviewing officials will be held personally responsible for the accuracy and completeness of the performance ratings and the proper evaluation of the employee's performance.

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(C) IDENTIFICATION MATTERS - FINGERPRINTING SUBJECTS OF FBI CASES -- A number of field offices have written in concerning the new "Prisoner Record and Reporting System" placed in operation February 26, 1961, for U. S. Marshals and Bureau of Prisons institutions. As a result of this system, two marshals have asked FBI to either fingerprint each Federal prisoner twice or route fingerprints through marshal headquarters in the arresting area whenever subject is released by a U. S. Commissioner or Federal judge before marshal has opportunity to take custody.

I am strongly opposed to duplicate fingerprinting and also delays which would occur if arrest fingerprints taken by FBI cleared through marshal before being received by Identification Division. These objections were voiced to Executive Office for U. S. Marshals which agreed to our stand. It was pointed out that Special Agents of the FBI do fingerprint incidental to an arrest whenever the person apprehended is released on bond or otherwise, or it appears that he will be released before being placed in custody of a marshal. We should insure that this is done in each instance. Indicate on the reverse side of the fingerprint card three copies of reply for marshal in district of apprehension. This conforms with procedure already in effect whereby all U. S. Marshal fingerprint cards are answered in triplicate. Show city and state where correspondence is to be sent. Upon receipt, marshal will retain one copy of record and will deliver one

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copy to U. S. Attorney and to U. S. Probation Officer. Fingerprinting incidental to an arrest includes the situation where a Federal prisoner incarcerated in an area where there is no deputy marshal is released at a hearing or arraignment before marshal can obtain his fingerprints.

Executive Office for U. S. Marshals also has agreed to have all marshals discontinue forwarding to Identification Division disposition of arrest data in FBI cases. Requirement that office of prosecution is responsible for furnishing such data on Form R-84 remains unchanged.

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(D) FBIRA MATTER - INTEROFFICE FIREARMS COMPETITION (PPC), 1961 -- In connection with the Annual Interoffice Firearms Competition, I have approved holding the competition for 1961 during the third outdoor firearms training period. The trophy, won by the Anchorage Office in 1960, will be presented to the office with the highest average percentage score of all Special Agents assigned to the office on July 1, 1961, not on limited duty.

I want each Special Agent in Charge to again actively support this competition. The rules and method of reporting the scores and averages will be forwarded to your office in the near future by the President of the FBIRA.

(Security Letters on attached pages)

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(E) NATIONALITY GROUP COVERAGE - CUBA -- The failure of the recent invasion attempt by Cuban rebel forces has accentuated the problem of investigating anti-Castro and pro-Castro groups and individuals in the United States. In addition to discharging our security and criminal responsibilities we are faced with the necessity of acquiring and providing other agencies informative and valid intelligence data relative to the objectives and activities of both factions as well as data regarding key personalities. Key field offices handling Cuban matters have been instructed previously to give continuous and preferred attention to all phases of Cuban activity.

In order to discharge these investigative and intelligence responsibilities with maximum effectiveness it is essential that particular attention be afforded the development on a broadly expanded basis of sources and informants in a position to provide knowledgeable data regarding pro-Castro and anti-Castro activities. The need for broadened coverage in the anti-Castro field by the FBI is quite evident when it is recognized there is as yet no firm indication of the extent of guidance and direction, if any, which will be afforded anti-Castro activity in the United States by other agencies of the U. S. Government. Any pertinent developments in this regard will be brought promptly to your attention in order to assure proper coordination. Advise Bureau promptly in event any such data is received at a local level.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-28

(F) SOVIET-BLOC ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS - (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND DISRUPTION) -- Your attention is directed to SAC Letter 60-34(E) and SAC Letter 60-36(H) which furnished instructions for handling a counterintelligence program against the Soviet-bloc intelligence services aimed at neutralizing or disrupting their activities.

During a conference held at the Bureau May 8 and 9, 1961, attended by representatives of 18 field offices which handle the bulk of the Bureau's security work, it was noted that this program of harassment and disruption has been successful and the conference concluded that it should be continued and, if possible, expanded in the future. It was noted particularly that the Soviet-bloc intelligence services are very sensitive to adverse publicity and it was considered desirable to foster such publicity wherever possible in the future. You should, therefore, continue to furnish to the

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Bureau data regarding Soviet-bloc activities in those instances where you believe some effective counterintelligence action can be taken. It is suggested that agents handling individual cases be alerted to this possibility and that each case individually be considered for such action particularly in those instances where Soviet-bloc officials travel throughout the United States on reconnaissance trips, to make public appearances before various groups, or to attend conventions, scientific exhibitions, et cetera. ~~However, no action should be taken without Bureau approval unless previously authorized.~~

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(G) SECURITY INDEX -- It has been suggested that in the case of Security Index (SI) subjects the labor union affiliation, if any, be shown on the SI cards.

This matter was discussed at a recent Internal Security - Espionage Conference held at the Bureau and attended by representatives of 16 field offices. It was the opinion of the Conference that the listing of such information on the SI cards would materially facilitate any future surveys that need be conducted in connection with infiltration of subversives into labor unions.

This matter should be handled as the cases are opened for semiannual verification of residences and employments. If it is determined that a subject is affiliated as either a member or officer of a labor union, that information should be set out on Form FD-122 under the heading, "Employment" and submitted to the Bureau in order that such may be added to the SI cards.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-29  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

May 29, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) DIRECTOR'S TESTIMONY ON MARCH 6, 1961, BEFORE THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS - FISCAL YEAR 1962 -- Copies of my testimony before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations on March 6, 1961, regarding the 1962 appropriation request of the FBI, will be sent to your office in the near future. These copies are to be made available to the personnel of your office who desire to review a copy. There will be about one copy for every two employees in the supply furnished.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-29

(B) POISON CONTROL CENTERS -- A "Directory of Poison Control Centers" dated April, 1961, issued by the U. S. Public Health Service is being forwarded to you separately. Retain this pamphlet for ready reference purposes in the event you need immediate advice concerning antidotes to counteract ingestion of poisons pending arrival of a physician. The directory lists facilities available throughout the U. S. Make certain employees in your office are aware of the existence of this pamphlet.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-29

(C) RAIDS - ARM BANDS FOR USE IN - SUPPLIES -- Immediately check to make certain your office has an adequate supply of the standard arm band to be utilized in raids as provided for in the Bureau's manuals. You should insure a supply sufficient to provide fifty per cent of your Agent personnel with them. Should your supply not equal that minimum, immediately requisition same.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-29

(D) TRAINING - MOTION-PICTURE FILMS -- The Bureau is considering producing four new training films in color. In order to insure that the proposed films serve the best interests of the Bureau in the field of training for our own personnel as well as for law enforcement in general, each Special Agent in Charge and Seat of Government division should submit suggestions concerning a topic for these films. Your consideration should be based on what films we presently have available for use, whether you believe these films are dated and should be replaced and also what you feel the

actual need is at the present time for training films. The ideal topic for the new training films should be one that would be conducive to use by the Bureau in training its own personnel as well as in field police training. Your comments and suggestions should be sent, attention Training and Inspection Division, within thirty days.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-29

(E) BORDER STOPS - SUBJECTS DEPARTING U. S. -- Due to heavy volume of traffic at most crossing points along Mexican and Canadian borders, requests to border offices to place stops should be made only on a highly selective basis. Any exit stop placed with border officials must be placed with respective immigration or custom officials of the Mexican or Canadian Government. At the heavily traveled border crossing points, particularly on the Mexican border, very little control is exercised by these officials and Americans frequently are not stopped. Mexican Tourist Cards are required only for individuals bound for the interior of Mexico. Requests for exit stops should be limited to important cases where direct liaison with foreign officials or surveillance by Bureau Agents is justified. In making requests, border offices should be furnished with approximate time and place of crossing, full description of subject, including photograph, and vehicle.

(Security Letter on attached pages)

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JFK



(F) CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES -- The Castro regime has received a tremendous boost as a result of its defeat of the anti-Castro forces during the recent invasion of Cuba. Castro's prestige has risen not only among his followers in this country but also throughout many of the Central and South American countries. His followers in the United States have benefited prestigewise from his victory and as a result we have had a resurgence of pro-Castro activities, particularly involving the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. We can expect this activity to increase, particularly in the intelligence and propaganda fields.

One of the major problems in our Cuban work is that of intelligence activities. Heretofore Cuban intelligence activities in this country have been aimed primarily at the various anti-Castro groups. The continued drift of Cuba into the Soviet orbit and the continued dependence of the Cuban Government upon Russia and its satellite countries for economic and military assistance could conceivably result in the undertaking by Cuban intelligence of activities against the United States itself. We must be prepared to meet any such threat.

Perhaps the most effective means of fighting this Cuban intelligence problem is through good source, informant and double agent coverage. Since the break in United States - Cuban relations in January, 1961, we have been hampered to some degree by our loss of special coverage on Cuban diplomatic establishments in Miami, New York and Washington, D. C. Other sources have compensated for this loss to some degree; however, we cannot fulfill our obligations unless there is a continuing effort to develop new sources, informants and double agents who can keep us abreast of developments in the Cuban intelligence field.

One phase of this coverage which warrants special mention is that of double agents. There is a definite need for improvement in this type coverage and the Bureau expects key offices involved in Cuban work to lead the way in the development and utilization of double agents. The Bureau believes that the present time would be ideal to infiltrate double agents into the pro-Castro ranks. Individuals utilized could use approach that although they have been anti-Castro in the past they are now disenchanted with the leaders of the various anti-Castro groups; they do not agree with the United States role in the recent invasion of Cuba by anti-Castro forces; and they now feel that Castro's policies are best for Cuba. One special segment of present anti-Castro individuals who might be utilized along these lines are those who have recently returned from

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anti-Castro training camps abroad. These individuals might have a special appeal to the pro-Castro forces since many of these individuals are ostensibly disheartened by the recent unsuccessful invasion of Cuba.

The problem of Cuban intelligence activities can be solved only if the field offices involved afford these cases vigorous investigative attention and have coverage which will supply needed data. The Bureau expects that field offices involved in Cuban work will keep on top of this situation not only that we may discharge our own investigative responsibilities but also that we may develop intelligence data of special interest to other Government agencies.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

June 6, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) TRAINING - POLICE TRAINING FILMS -- Recently, there have been several errors by the field in connection with handling of police training films. Since Bureau receives so many requests for the use of our films, it is necessary that we frequently change the instructions in regard to forwarding them; accordingly, it is imperative that Bureau instructions be accurately followed so that no office is deprived of the use of films.

In some instances field offices have requested that films be sent direct to law enforcement officers, and those individuals have returned the films to Bureau after use even though Bureau had instructed that the films be forwarded elsewhere. When you request that films be sent direct to a law enforcement officer, you should instruct the officer to either return the film to your office or contact your office before forwarding it. If you cannot rely upon the officer to do so, you should not request that films be sent direct to him.

You should make certain that all employees in your division responsible for handling films realize the necessity of prompt, accurate forwarding of films. Appropriate administrative action will be taken in those instances in which Bureau instructions are not followed.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-31

(B) INTERNATIONAL SERVICES OF INFORMATION FOUNDATION, INC. (ISI) -- The ISI, which has its headquarters in Baltimore, Maryland, and an office in Elizabeth, New Jersey, was organized in 1946. It is headed by Ulius Louis Amoss, a former colonel in the Air Force. A number of other former officers in various branches of the Armed Forces of the United States are listed as officers in ISI, and, according to one official, former military officers are used to solicit contributions to finance the organization's activities. These individuals reportedly are paid a 25 per cent commission on all funds they collect.

ISI is a private intelligence agency which publishes a pamphlet entitled INFORM for distribution to its subscribers. Data appearing in the pamphlet appears to be a rehash of old information which has been given a sensational slant. Amoss formerly was connected with the Office of Strategic Services and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the latter group has described him as a "flop and fabricator." A limited investigation on both ISI

and Amoss has been conducted but no information indicating an espionage or Registration Act violation was developed.

Should any representatives of ISI contact your office, you should accept any information volunteered, but under no circumstances should they be afforded any assistance. No comment regarding ISI or Amoss should be made to persons outside the FBI without specific Bureau approval. Inquiries should be answered in accordance with instructions contained in Section B of SAC letter No. 61-20.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-31

(C) AUTOMOBILES - SEMI-ANNUAL MOTOR VEHICLE REPORT - FORMS FD-111 AND FD-111A -- In connection with the preparation of the above forms, a number of errors are being made. Therefore, the following items are being brought to your attention:

1. Only the original of these forms is to be submitted to the Bureau. They are to be prepared in typewritten form.
2. On cars transferred to or from an office, only the data concerning mileage, operating and maintenance costs incurred by your office during the period cars were in your possession should be reported by you.
3. Gallons of gasoline and mileage should be reported in whole figures only.
4. The purchase, installation and maintenance cost of special equipment is to be included in the proper column on Form FD-111.
5. The amount shown in the "Subtotal" column under "Direct Maintenance and Repair" should include only the cost shown in the columns captioned "Commercial," "Government," and "Due to Accident Damage."
6. Reports are late in reaching the Bureau. You are reminded that Forms FD-111 and FD-111a are to reach the Bureau no later than July 15 and January 15.

You are to give closer attention to the preparation of future reports to insure their accuracy.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-31

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(D) TRAINING - POLICE-PUBLIC RELATIONS SCHOOLS -- Your attention is directed to SAC letter 61-27, (A), captioned "Training - Police Administrative Schools," in which the Bureau's interest in command-level schools was set forth. To further aid the Field in furnishing command-level schools to local law enforcement agencies, there is attached a curriculum used by one of the Field Divisions in giving a command-level school on Police-Public Relations. The Bureau has ~~noted an increasing interest in this particular subject by local~~ law enforcement agencies, and such curriculum on Police-Public Relations may meet the need for this timely subject by most local law enforcement agencies.

It is requested that you furnish the Bureau any suggested topics suitable for command-level schools. It should be noted that if the command-level schools program is to be successful, it will be necessary to vary the central topic from year to year to eliminate repetition and maintain the interest of local law enforcement officers for this type of school. All suggestions pertaining to topics for command-level schools should be sent, Attention: Training and Inspection Division.

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(E) INTERVIEWS - EXCESSIVE LENGTH -- In spite of repeated instruction on the subject, it is necessary at this time to again call attention to the provisions of Part I, Section 9 D, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations prohibiting prolonged interviews of employees who are involved in allegations of misconduct or improper performance of duty. Such interviews must be conducted efficiently and concluded without undue delay so that the interviewees will have no cause for complaint about the length of time they are questioned. All Bureau officials will be expected to insure that this rule is carefully observed at all times.

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(F) INTERVIEWS WITH SUBJECTS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS - INCOME TAX MATTERS -- In interviewing subjects of criminal investigations where the possibility exists the subject may have evaded payment of income taxes or there is an apparent irregularity relating to the payment of income taxes, consideration should be given to inquiring of the subject as to whether he filed an income tax return for the pertinent period and where it was filed. Such an inquiry should not be made, of course, where there is a possibility that it will prejudice our case. In the event any information of interest to the Internal Revenue Service, Treasury Department, is obtained as the result of such an inquiry, it should, of course, be promptly referred to the local office of the Internal Revenue Service, and to the Bureau in form suitable for dissemination.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-31

(G) COMMITTEE FOR NONVIOLENT ACTION - SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT OF 1948 -- Recently the Committee for Nonviolent Action (CNVA) circulated copies of a leaflet captioned "THIS IS THE SAN FRANCISCO-TO-MOSCOW WALK FOR PEACE." The leaflet contained a statement of "proposed action" and urged recipients to consider "Not serving in the armed forces and not registering for the draft."

The contents of the leaflet were taken up with the Department and the Department's reply stated:

"It is our view that the publication and/or distribution of copies of the leaflet might, under some circumstances, be in violation of 50 U.S.C. App. 462. However, we do not believe that investigation of this matter would be warranted unless it becomes apparent that the organization is making a concerted effort to persuade particular registrants, or those required to register under the Universal Military Training and Service Act, to evade military service. We would appreciate being advised of any information of that nature that may come to your attention."

In view of the Department's opinion if information is received indicating the organization is making a concerted effort to persuade registrants, or those required to register to evade military service, furnish the information to the Bureau in report form.

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When information is received from a United States Attorney's Office or from a local board that a registrant is in violation of the Selective Service Act of 1948, as a result of the propaganda issued by the CNVA, conduct full investigation in accordance with existing Bureau instructions concerning a delinquent registrant. Each such registrant should be thoroughly interviewed to identify other registrants who may be in violation of the act, persons who distributed the leaflet, and the actual author or authors of the leaflet. Upon completion present the delinquent registrant violation to the appropriate United States Attorney for his prosecutive opinion. When submitting the closing report include in the synopsis specific data showing registrant became delinquent as a result of following the advice of the CNVA.

When information is received that a nonregistrant is counseling, aiding, or abetting a violation of the Selective Service Act of 1948 in furtherance of the activities of the CNVA interview complainant thoroughly and submit a closing report to the Bureau for referral to the Department. These reports on nonregistrants should contain a dual caption as: John Doe - Committee for Nonviolent Action. The character will be Selective Service Act of 1948.

Five copies of reports on registrants as well as nonregistrants should be submitted to the Bureau and one copy of each closing report should be submitted to the New York Office since the headquarters of CNVA are located in New York City.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-31

(H) CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM - DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION -- In view of the position which has been taken by the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice restricting the dissemination of reports submitted under the Criminal Intelligence Program to the Department, your attention is being directed to existing instructions concerning the prompt dissemination of information of interest to other governmental agencies.

Even though reports in the Criminal Intelligence Program are disseminated only to the Department, there has been no change in the instructions as to dissemination contained in part 2, section 5 of the Manual of Rules and Regulations. Dissemination to other governmental agencies required under this manual section must be handled on a timely basis and you should insure that all agents conducting investigations under the Criminal Intelligence Program

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are thoroughly familiar with this section of the manual. If any instances should arise where you consider dissemination inadvisable, the Bureau should be promptly advised.

As you are aware, the Department of Justice has sought the cooperation of other investigative agencies of the Federal government in furtherance of the Attorney General's attack on organized crime. As a result, other agencies, particularly the Internal Revenue Service, will be investigating notorious hoodlums and racketeers who are also being investigated under our Criminal Intelligence Program. You will already have disseminated to Internal Revenue Service information received indicating a possible tax violation on the part of these subjects. If Internal Revenue Service or another Federal investigative agency seeks further information from you, there is no objection to your disseminating such information under the provisions of the manual section previously referred to provided, of course, such dissemination will in no way interfere with the Bureau's interests. Where time is of the essence or where the information to be disseminated is relatively simple, there is no objection to this dissemination being made orally. A proper record should be made in your file covering such dissemination. If, however, the material is voluminous, an appropriate dissemination memorandum should be prepared in keeping with existing instructions and copies of such memoranda should be supplied to the Bureau.

You will, of course, recognize that as your investigation progresses additional information which should be disseminated may be developed. It would also appear that as you are advised by Internal Revenue Service or another Federal investigative agency as to developments in its investigation of a subject, information in your file not previously disseminated may become sufficiently pertinent to warrant further dissemination by you.

The Bureau is cooperating wholeheartedly with the Attorney General's drive on organized crime and to this end desires each Special Agent in Charge to insure that all information which should be disseminated to another Federal investigative agency is promptly forwarded to that agency in line with the manual instructions previously cited.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-31

(1) CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM -- RESULTS OF CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCES AT THE SEAT OF GOVERNMENT -- It was the consensus of those in attendance that recent Criminal Intelligence Conferences

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held at the Seat of Government (SOG) provided an extremely valuable exchange of ideas and a sounding board to resolve mutual problems. Agents attending these conferences exhibited an excellent knowledge of their subject matter, which enabled informative and stimulating discussion of the activities of the organized hoodlum element in this country. The free exchange of ideas and investigative techniques gained through experience in criminal intelligence matters proved beneficial to all in attendance.

The following were some of the major areas covered in these discussions:

### PROPOSED LEGISLATION

Keen interest was evidenced in some of the provisions of proposed legislation which would enable the Bureau to carry current investigations to a logical prosecutive conclusion. It was emphasized that the Bureau must now lay necessary groundwork in contemplation of the passage of proposed legislation in order that we will be in a position to move swiftly and efficiently when our responsibilities in this field are extended through a broadening of our jurisdiction.

Proposed legislation to combat organized crime and racketeering, now before Congress, comprises generally eight proposals which will either create new legislation or extend current legislation over which the Bureau has investigative jurisdiction.

Proposed legislation covering interstate and foreign travel in support of racketeering enterprises would prohibit travel in interstate or foreign commerce for the purpose of distributing the proceeds of any unlawful activity; committing any crime of violence to further any unlawful activity; or otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on of any unlawful activity. The term unlawful activity is defined as any enterprise involving gambling, liquor, narcotics, or prostitution offenses or extortion or bribery in violation of Federal or state laws.

A proposed amendment to the Obstruction of Justice statute would broaden this statute to make it a violation for any individual by force, threats, or injury to endeavor to intimidate any person who had furnished information to, or from whom information had been sought, by any investigative agency.

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of the United States. It would also make it a violation to wilfully furnish false and misleading information to any investigative agency of the government.

Proposed legislation covering the interstate use of wire communications for wagering would make it unlawful to lease, furnish, or maintain any wire communication facility with the intent that it be used for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest or to knowingly use such facility for any such purpose.

Proposed legislation covering the interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia would make it unlawful to transport interstate any record, ticket, certificate, bill, slip, token, paper, writing, or other paraphernalia designed for use in bookmaking or wagering pools with respect to a sporting event or any numbers, policy, bolita, or similar illegal games.

A proposal compelling testimony in certain labor racketeering cases would compel a witness to testify and afford him immunity against self-incrimination regarding matters on which he is compelled to testify in connection with the Hobbs Act (interference with interstate commerce by extortion or robbery) and Section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act (bribes by employers to union representatives).

Proposed amendments to the Fugitive Felon Act would broaden this statute to include all crimes punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year under the laws of the place from which the fugitive flees.

A proposed amendment to the Johnson-Preston Act, covering Interstate Transportation of Gambling Devices, would enlarge the description of gambling devices to include any machine or mechanical device designed primarily for use in connection with gambling. This proposal would also enlarge the category of persons to whom registration and filing provisions apply; it would grant immunity in specific instances to individuals involved in order to secure their testimony, and would extend the act to include transportation in foreign commerce.

It is emphasized that the above provisions are strictly in a proposal stage. However, a general knowledge of the contents of these proposals should be of value in shaping your investigative approach in this program.

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## BROADENING OUR INTELLIGENCE BASIS

It was concluded at these conferences that we must extend our intelligence coverage through the various echelons in the organized underworld to complement highly concentrated coverage we have attained and are perfecting on the top leaders of organized crime in this country. Our investigations have identified the top ~~men to date as falling generally in older age groups.~~ When these leaders are removed by prosecution, death, or normal underworld attrition, it will be necessary to be aware of the makeup of the younger element who will replace them. Our position, both from an intelligence standpoint and in consideration of future prosecution, will be greatly enhanced if we obtain this broader coverage of hoodlum groups at various levels.

In view of the possibility of our jurisdiction being extended to cover interstate gambling operations, it is also important that we develop a well-rounded picture of the integral functions of major gambling operations which would be of interest under the Interstate Gambling Activities classification. This will require that all offices are fully aware of the makeup, operational detail, and control of large scale gambling operations within their areas making use of interstate wire communication facilities for gambling purposes. As previously pointed out, these investigations will be aimed primarily at the top gamblers and hoodlums in control of such operations, and we cannot under any circumstances conduct investigation of a legitimate news service or other completely legitimate communications firm.

Other special groups which should be designated for special attention are labor racketeers who are influencing or controlling labor unions, either directly or through intermediaries, and hoodlums who specialize in the domination of racket activities on the United States water fronts.

## INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

It was generally agreed that the most productive and valuable coverage achieved to date in the Criminal Intelligence Program has been through the establishment of highly confidential sources in key locations. Such sources have provided insight into the organized hoodlum element which was unavailable through other means. From results obtained to date, there can be no question that such sources are invaluable and that our efforts should be concentrated on the establishment of additional comparable sources in order to afford a more complete picture of the inner workings and relationships of various hoodlum groups.

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Experience has shown that the most complete and intelligible information is obtained from a combination of highly confidential sources and live informants. Each operates as an invaluable adjunct to the other, as demonstrated by some of the best criminal intelligence operations we have in existence in various cities to date. Fragmentary information obtained from a highly confidential source, when interpreted and further identified through well-placed live informants, has become meaningful and extremely significant in our tracing of hoodlum activities. Conversely, isolated bits of information initially furnished by live informants, when fully exploited through the establishment of a highly confidential source, have proven extremely valuable in filling in our picture of underworld activities.

For these reasons, the importance of both of these types of sources cannot be overemphasized, and every effort should be made to improve our coverage in both areas.

With regard to the development of new live informants, you should be constantly alert and ready to fully exploit any opportunity offered to develop as informants highly placed members of the organized hoodlum element. It is recognized that the development of such an individual may result in unusual conditions or requests being presented by the potential informant. Such situations should be evaluated in proportion to the individual's potential value in this program, and the possibility of developing a live source on an upper level of the organized hoodlum element should not be dismissed arbitrarily.

COORDINATION OF INFORMATION OFFERING PROSECUTIVE POTENTIAL  
AND DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION

Among topics of primary importance discussed at these conferences was the goal whereby our criminal intelligence investigations will reach their culmination in successful prosecution of the leaders of organized crime. It is of paramount importance to understand that our current investigations must be coordinated and reported in such a way to provide the Department with necessary bases for prosecution. All information developed which may offer potential violations of statutes covered by other agencies should be promptly disseminated in keeping with existing instructions. Additionally, we must insure that our investigations are intelligently planned and sufficiently thorough that we will develop any possible violation of Federal law over which this Bureau has investigative jurisdiction. We must also be prepared to take full advantage of any new legislation which would provide the Bureau with extended jurisdiction to effectively combat the organized hoodlum element.

6/6/61

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## HOODLUM ACCOUNTS IN SWISS BANKS

The problem of tracing hoodlum funds was discussed and it was determined that information has been developed in a number of offices that top hoodlums are using numbered accounts in Swiss banks to maintain concealed cash reserves. Extreme difficulty has been experienced in developing full information concerning such accounts because of Swiss laws guaranteeing the secrecy of these accounts. In such instances, where it appears that a subject is dealing with foreign banking institutions, investigation should be conducted at correspondent banks in this country to determine if records of pertinent transactions may be available at the correspondent bank.

## THUMBNAIL SKETCHES

Discussion concerning the availability of a ready reference on hoodlums under investigation made it apparent that there is a need to maintain in each office a brief sketch on all hoodlum subjects under investigation throughout the Bureau. This investigative aid would list an up-to-date description, aliases, criminal associates, and other descriptive data, together with a brief documentation of the hoodlum. This sketch would be valuable in coordinating hoodlum investigation between field offices and in the preparation of reports. You will be advised in the near future of the mechanics of maintaining this Bureau-wide list of hoodlums under investigation.

It was also concluded during these discussions that all investigations of the organized hoodlum element will be referred to under the caption "Criminal Intelligence Program" and that the use of the caption "Top Hoodlum Program" in communications on these matters should be discontinued.

-----

This series of conferences demonstrated that our Criminal Intelligence Program has to date developed excellent coverage of the upper level organized criminal element in specific areas, and that this desired coverage must be extended throughout the country. This must be done to insure that the Bureau has a continuing broad and comprehensive picture of the activities of the organized hoodlum element in the United States.

6/6/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-31

- II -

With the extension of this required coverage, you must organize your investigations to insure that you are fully exploiting your intelligence information for prosecutive potential. You must be mindful at all times that this program must ultimately result in the prosecution of key underworld figures, and you must employ every means at your disposal to bring about the early stages of this goal at the earliest possible date.

(Security Letter on attached pages)

6/6/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-31

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(J) REPORT WRITING -- STREAMLINING - SECURITY REPORTS -- The possibility of streamlining periodic reports in Security Index (SI) cases without losing accuracy or essential data was discussed at an Internal Security - Espionage Conference held at the Bureau on May 8-9, 1961, and attended by representatives of 16 field offices. As a result of recommendations submitted at this Conference, the Bureau is authorizing the utilization of a narrative-type statement setting forth the activities of a subject over a specified period of time as reported by informants. This particular report is susceptible to use primarily in those cases of extensive activity in subversive organizations.

For your utilization in discussing this matter with Agents engaged in security work, there is attached a sample report that should be utilized as a guideline for submission of reports in SI cases.

The type reporting described above and in the attached sample is not to be utilized in Smith Act of 1940 cases or Internal Security Act of 1950 cases with the exception of key facility cases.

This change in reporting procedure in no way relieves you of the responsibility of reporting in detail specific items of pertinence, such as information tending to establish a subject's knowledge of the basic aims and purposes of the subversive organization with which affiliated or information tending to establish that a subject holds revolutionary and/or anarchist beliefs.

The narrative statements must be statements of facts and not conclusions.

You will continue to use inserts, for example Form FD-302, recording the results of an interview, in accordance with current practices.

The location of the original informants' reports and/or channelizing memoranda from which the information reported is obtained will be shown on the cover pages of the report by file number and serial scope.

6/6/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-31

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Although the attached sample of the report does not include the Form FD-305 as part of the cover pages to the report, you should continue to use Form FD-305 in SI cases in accordance with current instructions.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures for (D) & (J)

6/6/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-31

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S A M P L E

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE <b>CHICAGO</b>	OFFICE OF ORIGIN <b>CHICAGO</b>	DATE <b>4/26/60</b>	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD <b>4/5-22/60</b>
TITLE OF CASE  <b>HAROLD P. PARKER, aka Harold Parker, Roy Brown, Ray Follett, Roy Follett</b>		REPORT MADE BY  <b>IDENTITY DELETED</b>	TYPED BY
		CHARACTER OF CASE  <b>SM - SWP</b>	

REFERENCE: Report of IDENTITY DELETED dated 4/8/59, at Chicago.

-C-

INFORMANTS

<u>IDENTITY OF SOURCES</u>	<u>Location</u>
DELETED	A) 134-259-922 thru 1109
	A) 134-1339-2 thru 25
	A) 134-236-462 thru 526

APPROVED  COPIES MADE:  <b>4 - Bureau (100-369005) (RM)</b> <b>3 - Chicago (100-19416)</b>	SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE  DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW <table border="1" style="width: 100%; height: 100px;"> <tr><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> </table>																														
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Date	To	By	Initials	Remarks																											

COVER PAGE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy to:

Report of: ~~IDENTITY DELETED~~  
Date: April 26, 1960

Office: CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

File Office File #: 100-19416

Bureau File #: 100-369005

Title: HAROLD P. PARKER

Character: SECURITY MATTER - SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY

Synopsis: HAROLD P. PARKER was a member of the Chicago Socialist Workers Party (SWP) Branch during 1957 and 1958; since 2/59, PARKER has been actively engaged in SWP activities at Chicago, in a leadership capacity, and has regularly attended Chicago SWP Branch affairs; during the pertinent period, PARKER has contributed money to the SWP, sold "The Militant," spoken as an SWP representative, served as the Chicago SWP Branch Acting Organizer, Financial Secretary, Fund Drive Director, and on the Local Executive Committee of this Branch.

- C -

CONFIDENTIAL

S A M P L E

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CG 100-19416

IDENTITY OF SOURCES  
DELETED

A) 134-147-163 thru 281

A) 134-98-677 thru 740

65-645 - 65-90

A) 134-951-100 thru 119

DOCUMENTATION OF ORGANIZATIONS

Source

Organization

IDENTITY OF  
SOURCES DELETED

Militant Labor Forum

Young Socialist

Young Socialist Alliance

Young Socialist Alliance,  
Chicago

-B-  
COVER PAGE

CG 100-19416

DETAILS: AT CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

I. BACKGROUND

A. Employment

HAROLD PARKER continues to be employed as a chemist at the Stepan Chemical Company, 3250 South Kedzie Avenue, Chicago.

IDENTITY OF SOURCE  
AND SPECIAL AGENT  
RECEIVING INFORMATION  
DELETED

B. Residence

HAROLD PARKER continues to reside at 8035 South Kostner Avenue, Chicago.

(CG T-1, 4/20/60)

C. Identification Record

The records of the Bureau of Records and Communications, Chicago Police Department, were reviewed and revealed no information identifiable with HAROLD PARKER, subsequent to March 11, 1959.

(Investigative Clerk (IC)  
IDENTITY DELETED  
4/12/60)

D. Credit Record

A check was made at the Chicago Credit Bureau, Incorporated, and revealed no information pertaining to HAROLD PARKER, subsequent to March 4, 1957.

IDENTITY DELETED 4/6/60)

**II. CONNECTIONS WITH THE  
SOCIALIST WORKERS  
PARTY (SWP)**

**A. History of Activities in, Attendance at  
Meetings of, and Positions Held in the SWP**

Unless otherwise indicated, all SWP affairs mentioned in this report were held in Chicago.

HAROLD PARKER uses the name RAY or ROY FOLLETT in connection with SWP activities and is a member of the Chicago Branch Socialist Workers Party (CBSWP) and has actively engaged in CBSWP activities on a regular basis during the period from February, 1959, to April, 1960. PARKER attended 50 SWP scheduled activities including meetings, forums, socials, Local Executive Committee (LEC) meetings, conventions and conferences. During this time, PARKER served as Chicago Branch Local Executive Committee (CBLEC) member, Chicago Branch Financial Secretary, Chicago Branch National Fund Drive Director, and acting Chicago Branch Organizer. PARKER was recommended for National Committee (NC) SWP. During the past year PARKER served as an SWP speaker, panelist, and writer, a panelist and chairman of Militant Labor Forums, a characterization of which appears as an appendix hereto, and also active in the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) for the purpose of pushing for action within the organization and not for reforming or changing the NAACP on SWP instructions. PARKER pledged \$100.00 to SWP National Fund Drives on three separate occasions during 1959-60 and pledged \$20.00 to SWP Special National Fund Drive. During 1959-60 PARKER was in contact with FARRELL DOBBS and attended SWP meeting at which TOM KERRY talked on democratic centralism and its functions in the SWP.

CG T-1

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

FARRELL DOBBS and TOM KERRY were described in the April 5, 1961, edition of the "Militant," a weekly newspaper of the SWP, as National Secretary and National Committee Member, respectively, of the SWP.

CG 100-19416

HAROLD PARKER was a member of the CBSWP from 1957 through 1960 and actively participated in SWP affairs on a regular basis during 1959 and 1960. In addition to verifying PARKER'S positions in the SWP, reported his attendance at 20 scheduled SWP activities during 1959-60. PARKER was introduced at a Militant Labor Forum panel discussion on December 10, 1960, entitled "Is There a Road to Peace or is There Peace?" as an SWP member writer for the "Militant."

PARKER was in attendance at a December 16, 1959, CBSWP meeting at which FARRELL DOBBS gave a 1960 election campaign report stating that the 1960 election campaign would be the most aggressive political propaganda campaign that the Party has ever attempted, the reason being the changing attitude of the workers, i.e. they are becoming more aggressive and receptive to radical ideas. DOBBS said that at the present time some of the workers are so aggressive that the labor leaders are forced to go along with working class ideas.

CG T-2

HAROLD PARKER was a member of the CBSWP during 1959-60 and actively participated in SWP activities on a regular basis. Verified PARKER'S SWP positions and activities at 36 scheduled SWP activities.

CG T-3

HAROLD PARKER was a member of the CBSWP during 1959-60 and actively participated in SWP activities on a regular basis. Verified PARKER'S SWP positions and activities at 40 scheduled SWP activities.

CG T-4

HAROLD PARKER was a member of the CBSWP during 1959-60 and actively participated in SWP activities on a regular basis. Active participant in 27 scheduled SWP activities. PARKER stated that the SWP wanted him to become a member of the National Committee of the SWP but because of family complications he was unable to accept. He stated, however, that if it became a choice between his family and the National Committee, he would want to be a National Committee member. PARKER attended CBSWP Semiannual Conference in June, 1960, and was elected to the CBLEC.

CG 100-19416

the governing body and policy-making group of the CBSWP. During January, 1960, PARKER was selling the "Militant" at various steel mills in the Chicago area.

At a meeting of the Chicago CBSWP on December 2, 1959, and following the Branch financial report by PARKER, MARJORIE SWABECK, described by source as a member of the CBSWP, gave the educational concerning the "PERMANENT REVOLUTION." She stated that there was nothing permanent about a revolution, however, the conditions for a revolution are permanent. She added that these conditions must be taken advantage of and worked at by the working class, adding that the Theory of the Permanent Revolution serves as a guide for future actions.

CG T-5

PARKER was in attendance at a Militant Labor Forum held April 2, 1959, at which EDITH FOX reported on a recent trip to Washington, D. C., as a delegate to the Unemployment Conference. FOX stated that the working class in America should build a labor party and immediate steps should be taken against unemployment.

CG T-6

EDITH FOX was in 1959 a member of the SWP, Detroit, Michigan.

CG T-1

HAROLD PARKER was a member of the CBSWP during 1960. Reported in attendance at five SWP meetings during 1960.

CG T-7

CG 100-19416

B. Activities in the Young Socialist Alliance

PARKER was present at 12 meetings of the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) in Chicago during the year 1960. He was present as an observer and did not actively participate in the affairs thereof.

CG T-3

Characterizations of the YSA and the YSA, Chicago, appear as appendices hereto.

PARKER'S name was in possession of the YSA, Chicago, during October, 1959.

CG T-4



MILITANT LABOR FORUM

On April 20, 1960, a source advised that the "Militant Labor Forum" is a paper organization set up by the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) in Chicago, Illinois, for SWP members and sympathizers. Open meetings are held, under the auspices of this Forum, on an irregular basis and are geared to the activities that the SWP is pursuing at a particular time, e.g., unemployment, election campaigns, etc.

The leaders of the various committees, set up within the Chicago SWP Branch, are in charge of the "Militant Labor Forum" and schedule meetings under the name of the Forum in order to conceal the SWP sponsorship of same. The meetings of the Forum are generally held at Chicago SWP Headquarters, although the Forum also sponsors other affairs, such as meetings, socials, and picnics, held at other locations.

The SWP has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order #10450.

APPENDIX

"YOUNG SOCIALIST"

The "Young Socialist" (YS) is a monthly publication, self-described in the May, 1960, issue as the newspaper of the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA).

The YS maintains headquarters at 45 East 7th Street, New York City, and the mailing address is PO Box 471, Cooper Station, New York 3, New York.

APPENDIX

- 8 -

THE YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE

The May, 1960, issue of the "Young Socialist" (YS), page one, column three, disclosed that during May 15-17, 1960, a national organization entitled the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) was established at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This issue stated that this organization was formed by the nationwide Supporter Clubs of the publication YS.

The above issue, page six, set forth the Founding Declaration of the YSA. This declaration stated that the YSA recognizes the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) as the only existing political party capable of providing the working class with political leadership on class struggle principles and that the supporters of the YS have come into basic political solidarity with the SWP on the principles of revolutionary Socialism.

A confidential source advised on May 11, 1960, that the original YSA was an organization formed during October, 1957, in New York City, by youth of various left Socialist tendencies, particularly members and followers of the SWP. The leaders of this group were the guiding forces in the establishment of the national organization.

The source further advised that the YSA is dominated and controlled in its leadership and ranks by members of the SWP. The source added that the SWP considers the YSA as the leading force in the radical youth field and its current and future hope in regard to recruits and the promulgation of the SWP movement throughout the United States.

The headquarters of the YSA are located at 45 East 7th Street, New York City.

The YS is a monthly publication, self-described in the May, 1960, issue as the newspaper of the YSA.

The SWP has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order #10450.

APPENDIX

CG 100-19416

YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE - CHICAGO,  
aka Young Socialist Supporters,  
University Young Socialists

A source advised in late November, 1959, that the Young Socialist Alliance - Chicago (YSA - C) had its origin in a series of informal discussions held in Chicago prior to June, 1959, among individuals who were close to the Socialist Workers Party (SWP).

This group in June, 1959, obtained recognition from the "Young Socialist" Editorial Board of New York as the official Young Socialist Supporters (YSS) group in the Chicago area.

In September, 1959, the YSS group in Chicago formally adopted the name "Young Socialist Alliance - Chicago" in accordance with the 1959 National Young Socialist Supporters Youth Plenum directive, which directive was designed to give a sense of national unity to the various clubs.

The YSA - C as of November, 1959, proclaimed itself to be a city-wide revolutionary youth organization designed to build Socialism in America and aimed toward youth on college campuses in the Chicago area and as being independent of all adult groupings.

A second source advised in April, 1960, that at the second National Conference of Young Socialist Supporters Club (YSSC) held April 15-17, 1960, at which the Chicago group was represented, a new national socialist youth organization, known as the Young Socialist Alliance, was formed with the Chicago group being an affiliate.

According to a third source in May, 1960, the YSA - C, also known as the University Young Socialists (UYS) and the YSS, was considered the youth group of the Chicago Branch SWP and affiliated with the national organization of the YSA in New York. YSA officers as of May, 1960, were current members or sympathizers of the Chicago SWP.

The SWP has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order #10450.

APPENDIX

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CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Chicago, Illinois  
April 26, 1960

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No. 100-19416

Title: HAROLD P. PARKER

Character: SECURITY MATTER - SOCIALIST WORKERS  
PARTY

Reference is made to the report of Special Agent Ralph D. Harmon dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

CG T-6 is a municipal agency engaged in collecting security information in the Chicago area.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.



JUNE  
PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 61-C  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

June 19, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RE: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA  
PROSECUTIONS UNDER THE  
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

On June 5, 1961, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the registration provision of the Internal Security Act of 1950 and ordered the Communist Party, USA, to register with the Attorney General as a communist-action organization. In view of the definite possibility of prosecutive action against the Party and against selected Party officers and members should they fail to register as ordered, the Bureau desires to reiterate and enlarge upon instructions previously issued in No Number SAC Letter J dated October 19, 1951, captioned "Communist Party - USA (Brief), Prosecution of Communist Party Functionaries under the Smith Act."

Since it is a cardinal rule of evidence that conversations between a subject and his attorney are in the nature of privileged communications, technical and microphone surveillances in operation on Communist Party functionaries arrested for violation of the Smith Act of 1940 were discontinued immediately following such arrests. Notwithstanding this fact, the possibility was recognized that occasions might arise when conversations between subjects and their attorneys, or between the attorneys themselves, might be intercepted by technical or microphone surveillances which continued in operation on unrelated individuals and/or organizations.

Accordingly, the field was instructed in referenced No Number SAC Letter J that should such conversations occur, they were to be completely disregarded by the employees assigned to technical and microphone surveillance coverage. Such conversations were not to be monitored and no record whatever was to be made of their occurrence.

While it is true that the Department has not as yet furnished the identities of those Party officers or members who will be prosecuted should they fail to register, the Supreme Court decision is being widely discussed in Party circles and it is possible that Party leaders and/or members may be in communication with attorneys regarding defense plans and strategy on the possibility an indictment might be returned against the Party as an organization or against themselves as individuals. Therefore, the instructions set out in No Number SAC Letter J are being reiterated and emphasized

as applying to possible prosecutions under the Internal Security Act of 1950 and are to be placed into immediate effect. The question of the discontinuance of specified technical and microphone surveillances will be faced when the necessity for such action occurs.

In addition, the possibility also exists that confidential informants, particularly those operating on a high level in the Party, may be present when defense plans are being discussed by Party attorneys. The first time an informant attempts to report information of this nature, he should be advised that the Bureau does not desire to receive such information and the informant should not, in the future, attempt to report it.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

6/19/61

NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 61-C

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-33  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

June 20, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) TRAINING -- POLICE TRAINING FILMS -- Since the films "Arrest" and "Margin of Victory" are old and outmoded, Bureau desires that they no longer be used. Commitments already made for the use of these films should be handled; however, no further commitments should be made.

Those offices having permanent retention copies of these films should destroy them after present commitments for their use are handled.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-33

(B) SUPPLIES - LABELS -- The Bureau has decided to stock perforated labels (three inches by one inch in size) which come in rolls of 1000 complete with appropriate dispenser. These will be made available for use by the field in addressing envelopes, wanted flyers, identification orders and similar communications particularly where no Addressograph plates are available. In order that enough labels may be stocked to anticipate the needs of the field, you should advise the Bureau of the amount of labels needed for a three months' supply. Replies should be directed to the attention of the Property Management Unit, Administrative Division, by July 1, 1961.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-33

(C) TELETYPES - ENCODED TELETYPE MESSAGES -- Since teletypes are transmitted through telephone company facilities data contained therein, which in many instances includes information developed and received from confidential techniques and sources, is accessible to a limited number of communication company employees. There has been a tendency by some field offices to submit plain text rather than encoded teletypes in instances involving the Criminal Intelligence Program and other type cases where the Bureau's operations and investigations could be seriously hampered or impaired if the teletypes were intercepted by unauthorized persons. You should immediately instruct responsible personnel in your office that teletype messages of this type should be encoded and remind them of current rules and regulations involving matters of this type as set out in the Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part II, Section 4G, 4b. This will be closely followed at the Bureau.



(D) CONFIDENTIAL VOUCHERS - SECURITY INFORMANTS - CRIMINAL INFORMANTS -- In the audit of confidential vouchers it has been noted that a substantial number contain errors which either require a suspension or the return of the voucher to the field office for correction. In order to keep to a minimum the number of errors in confidential vouchers, the following items are set forth for your guidance:

#### RECEIPTS

1. Receipts for payments to informants should be obtained in all instances if possible. In the event a receipt cannot be obtained for a particular payment, complete circumstances should be set forth on the blue slip at the time reimbursement is claimed.
2. Receipts reflecting payment to informant should clearly reflect the date of payment, purpose, that is, whether for services or expenses or both and the amount for each. The period covered should be shown when the informant is paid on a period basis and the name of the Special Agent from whom the money was received. The receipt must be signed by the informant receiving the money and should not be witnessed by another Agent.
3. If necessary to make corrections on the receipts, such corrections must be initialed by the informant and not the Agent.

#### BLUE SLIPS

1. Each blue slip prepared in connection with payments to informants should reflect date of payment, Bureau case title, date of the authorization under which the payment was made, period covered and purpose of payment.
2. The first blue slips submitted in connection with a payment to an informant who has previously been used by another field division should reflect the identity of the other field division when known.
3. Vouchers and blue slips in the name of either the SAC or the ASAC must be signed by him personally. The name appearing on the voucher and the name appearing on the blue slip must always be in agreement. The

6/20/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-33

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signature of the payee on the voucher must be in agreement with the typed name of the payee as reflected on the face of the voucher.

The above should be called to the attention of all employees of your office who have occasion to make payments to confidential informants or sources as well as those employees who handle the preparation of confidential vouchers.

As you are aware, upon request the Bureau must make available to the Federal courts receipts covering payments to informants who are used as witnesses. In view of this, it is imperative that receipts be submitted in good order. Unless immediate adherence to the Bureau's regulations concerning the preparation and execution of receipts is effected, it will be necessary to take administrative action against those employees who do not comply with these instructions.

6/20/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-33

(E) OFFICE SOCIAL ACTIVITIES -- I wish to emphasize the personal responsibility incumbent upon each division head to see that any outside social or recreational function sponsored by a divisional office is not attended by persons who may potentially cause embarrassment through their attendance at such functions. Each division head should be alert to see that no undesirable persons are invited to such functions and that they be held at respectable, reputable locations.

6/20/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-33

- 3 -

(F) KIDNAPPING AND MAJOR CASE SQUAD INVESTIGATIONS -- In order to more adequately utilize the experience of those Special Agents filling key positions on kidnapping squads, the Bureau requested that several of these Agents prepare memoranda setting forth the duties involved in their special assignment. A total of ten memoranda was prepared and used in recent specialized schools held at the Seat of Government. The Agents attending these schools were most enthusiastic over these memoranda. It is, therefore, believed that these ten memoranda dealing with the specialized duties of key personnel on a kidnapping or major case squad will be of value to the entire field. There are enclosed ten memoranda captioned as follows: "Duties of #1 Man," "Report Writing," "Preparation of Ransom List," "Liaison at Victim's Home," "Technical Installations in Victim's Home," "Laboratory Expert on the Major Case Squad," "Equipment," "Setting up Chief Clerk's Office on Special Assignment Cases," "Law Enforcement Liaison," and "Liaison with the Telephone Company."

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures for (F)

6/20/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-33

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**KIDNAPING AND MAJOR CASES  
DUTIES OF #1 MAN**

The #1 Man is the immediate assistant to the Inspector or person in charge of the case and serves in the capacity of executive officer, taking whatever action is necessary to implement the instructions of the Inspector.

In the absence of the Inspector or official in charge, the #1 Man is to supervise and be in charge of the entire investigation. To carry out this responsibility there must be a close working arrangement between the Inspector and the #1 Man so that both are fully informed at all times.

Generally the Inspector should see everything coming in on the case, including memos, letters and other communications, while outgoing communications can usually be handled by the #1 Man. Of course, any outgoing communication of importance or unusual significance would be brought to the Inspector's attention. In addition, the #1 Man reviews all incoming material prior to the assignment of leads and preparation of lead cards so that he has a complete knowledge of all the facts in the case and the action being taken to develop further information.

Among the various duties performed by the #1 Man are the following:

1. Receive official telephone calls pertaining to the case.
2. Consult with Agents and key personnel on matters not of sufficient importance to be brought to the immediate attention of the Inspector in charge.
3. Plan and supervise the investigation.
4. Assign leads.
5. Assign duties to the Night Supervisor.
6. Keep current notations during the day on all major developments and have them available for the Inspector in charge or Bureau official.
7. Supervise matters assigned to him by the Inspector.
8. Keep informed of all developments and keep Inspector in charge current of all developments.

Usually the #1 Man would have the following personnel and operations under his direct supervision:

1. Report supervisor
2. Lead supervisor
3. Night supervisor
4. Personnel officer
5. Equipment supervisor

6. Sound man and/or radio technician
7. Laboratory supervisor
8. Identification supervisor
9. Reception Agent, if one is used
10. ~~Research officer~~
11. Clerical employees
12. Reports and outgoing communications
13. Files
14. Indexing
15. Bulky exhibit files
16. Reference index
17. Running memorandum
18. Daily summary

The space arrangement should be such that the #1 Man is located immediately adjacent to the Inspector. The report supervisor and lead supervisor should be located immediately adjacent to the #1 Man. A stenographer should be located nearby so that important matters can be placed on record immediately.

Immediately upon reporting at the office handling a major case, the #1 Man should confer with the Inspector and then follow up to see that the various administrative assignments are made to provide for

the proper handling of the case. In this regard it probably will be necessary for the #1 Man to confer with the personnel in key positions to insure they understand their duties and to clarify any particular problems or procedures. Thereafter, the #1 Man should immediately review all pertinent developments in the case so he will have complete information concerning the developments to date and be in a position to carry out his responsibilities.

## REPORT WRITING

The work of a report writer on a special assignment falls into three general categories:

1. Assembling and preparing reports on the case.
2. Preparation of a daily teletype summary to the Bureau.
3. Other special projects assigned by the Inspector or Agent in charge of the case.

### I. REPORT WRITING

Generally speaking, reporting investigation conducted by a special squad follows the reporting procedures set forth in the Manual for other cases. However, there are certain suggestions which can be followed which will facilitate the report writing.

1. Do not wait to write long reports on a variety of subjects. It makes for better reports and is easier for reference purposes to limit each report to one phase of the investigation or even a part of one phase. For instance, the first report in a kidnaping case might well cover the predication and initial investigation, another report cover the investigation at the crime scene, another on the background of the victim and family, another on miscellaneous suspects and other reports on various phases of the investigation as they develop. It is probable that near the end of the investigation, as the case begins to come to a close, reports will be written covering a variety of subjects.



2. Even though it may seem unnecessary at the beginning, a table of content for each report will prove helpful. The more that the table of contents is set out in detail, the more helpful it will be.

3. Because of the manner in which leads are assigned, it is unnecessary and actually of no use to set out leads in reports written while the case is being handled by the special squad. A short statement that leads are not being set out but are being assigned and handled as developed should appear in the administrative section of each report.

4. Dissemination of copies of reports to other offices will depend on the circumstances of each case. If the case appears to have nation-wide ramifications, it would be well to send one copy of each report containing the basic facts to each office so that it will not be necessary to repeat this information as later leads are set out by teletype or airtel. In some cases, this dissemination can be limited to offices in the general area of the country surrounding the office of origin. In any event, it is not necessary to provide widespread dissemination of later reports dealing with specific projects as the investigation progresses. Copies of these reports can be limited to offices which are known to have an interest in that particular phase of the investigation.

5. Leads for other offices will usually be set out by telephone, teletype, airtel or letter. While other offices should be expected to advise the results of their investigation by a similar communication, they should also be instructed to report the results of their investigation in regular report form. It would be a mistake to allow auxiliary offices to RUC investigation by letter or airtel since the office of origin would soon become bogged down in paper work.

6. The office of origin should have additional copies of each report run off for working copies. These can be bound in file covers by the clerks and made readily available to agents on the squad without the necessity of having to charge out a file each time it is necessary to refer to a report. They will also be available for squad members to read in their spare time, if any, in order to familiarize themselves with the case. These working copies should be accounted for and destroyed when the special terminates. The number of working copies prepared will depend on the size of the special squad. Four copies have been found to be sufficient for a squad of from twenty-five to thirty-five men.

7. Usually considerable work will have been performed by the office of origin before the special squad arrives. In order that reporting will be uniform and prepared properly, the report writer should prepare a memo of reporting instructions to be

distributed to all agents and stenos immediately upon his arrival. These instructions should be discussed verbally at the first available conference of agents and should also be discussed verbally with stenographers in order that any misunderstandings can be clarified. These instructions should include the following items:

~~a. Interviews and other investigation conducted~~  
which can reasonably be expected to be used as testimony should be reported on an FD-302. In many cases, there has developed a tendency to use an FD-302 in situations where there is only a possibility of the information being used as testimony. This clutters up the report with a series of disjointed short items. Exercise judgment in the use of an FD-302 and do not use it indiscriminately.

b. Investigation conducted which does not go on an FD-302 should be reported on a narrative type insert. It is well to begin the insert with a short explanatory statement as to the basis for the investigation conducted. For instance: "John Jones, 312 Main Street, Los Angeles, California, was interviewed by SA Thomas Smith, inasmuch as Jones' name had been found on a piece of paper in possession of subject's wife." This not only makes the report clearer but is also of assistance to the report writer in preparation of the report.

c. Each narrative type insert should be limited to one subject matter, since as mentioned above, reports will usually be written about one phase of the investigation and each

report will be broken down into logical sections. The insert should be dictated in a form suitable to go into a report without change or deletion. Do not include administrative matters, etc.

d. All FD-302s and narrative inserts should be prepared on stencils. The steno should be instructed to make two proof sheets since it is sometimes necessary in complicated matters to hand one proof sheet to an agent for assistance in covering leads suggested by the insert. White proof sheets are easier to read than yellow sheets.

e. A 3 x 5 card should be attached to each FD-302 or insert which has on it the particular project or phase of the investigation to which it applies. This assists the report writer in segregating the stencils into appropriate sections of the report.

f. Each agent should dictate any leads suggested by the insert or FD-302 he is submitting. These should be narrative type lead cards in triplicate with a short statement similar to an abstract, showing the predication for the lead. See memo on setting up Chief Clerk's Office for example of this type of lead.

g. Each agent should indicate to the steno all names, license numbers, serial numbers or any other data which should be indexed and instruct the steno to prepare index cards in duplicate.

8. Complaints received, suggestions, administrative matters and other similar data which cannot go into a report verbatim should be dictated in memorandum form. The number of copies will depend upon the way the case is set up administratively,

bearing in mind that in many cases a copy of the memorandum will be necessary for a subfile. Therefore, a minimum of original and two copies.

9. As FD-302s, inserts and memoranda are typed they should be delivered to the Inspector in charge or SAC immediately.

He and the number one man will read them and pass them on to the lead supervisor who will remove and handle the lead cards. The Inspector in charge or the lead supervisor will mark memoranda for routing and they will go to the Chief Clerk for serializing and routing. Stencil FD-302s and narrative type inserts go from the lead supervisor to the report writer. The report writer should then segregate them as to subject matter and use in the preparation of the report. It will be recalled that there will be a duplicate set of index cards attached to each stencil. Undoubtedly there will be considerable information in the stencils which should be in the special indices in order to be of use. In order to solve this problem, the report writer will remove one set of index cards and turn them over to the Chief Clerk. These will be "red flashed" by making a small red pencil mark where the serial number would ordinarily appear. This index card will then be filed in the special indices. An agent seeing a "red flash" index card with no serial number will then know that the material indexed is on a stencil in possession of the report writer and can refer to it there. When a report is prepared, the appropriate "red flash"

index cards are marked with the serial and page number. The other set of index cards which had been attached to the stencil is similarly marked and placed in the regular office indices at that time. In other words, in the interval between when a stencil is prepared and when it finally is incorporated into a report, there is an index card in the special indices with the special red marking so that all data submitted by the Agents is indexed at all times with no time lapse.

## II. DAILY TELETYPE SUMMARY

A teletype should be sent to the Bureau each night summarizing developments which have occurred during the day. This is necessary even though the Bureau might have been informed by telephone of developments. This procedure should be followed until the Bureau instructs to the contrary. The report writer should make notes during the day of developments which should be included in this teletype and each night should confer with the Inspector in charge prior to preparing the summary.

## III. SPECIAL PROJECTS

The report writer is responsible for various "paper work" projects and research which become necessary in a case and which are usually assigned by the Inspector in charge. Examples of such projects which have been necessary in some cases are as follows:

1. Memorandum to all Agents outlining certain phases of the case with which they should be acquainted such as description of property in possession of the victim, explanation of the basis

for various investigative projects being conducted and similar memoranda.

2. Communications to all offices or selected offices outlining investigative projects desired and the basis for them.

3. Special research and file review projects desired by the Inspector in charge. As an example, in one case an analysis was made of the financial status of subject at the time of the crime based on past earnings and expenses. In another case a chart was prepared of the whereabouts of all subjects for the pertinent period of one week for assistance in interviews and checking their stories.

4. When the subject is identified, plans should be made for the preparation of a prosecutive summary report. It will assist in the preparation of the report if the report writer keeps a rough draft compilation of evidence developed and the names of potential witnesses so that when the time comes for the preparation of the report much of the data will be available in outline form. Summary reports are often required with a minimum of notice and this procedure will assist in expediting the preparation.

SUBMITTED BY SA CHARLES G. CAMPBELL,  
San Francisco

PREPARATION OF RANSOM LIST

IN KIDNAPING CASES

INTRODUCTION

May it be stated here that this treatise is not intended to be all inclusive but to be considered as a supplement to well-established procedures currently outlined in the Manual of Instructions.



## OBTAINING FUNDS NEEDED

With the apparent ever-increasing amount of ransom money being demanded which is usually in currency of small denominations and in consideration of the limited time element presented under the twenty-four hour presumptive clause, and further, in consideration that the Subject may make a payoff request within a very few days after the abduction, it has become increasingly clear that obtaining funds in the quantity and type needed for the best interest of the investigation is a major problem of paramount importance.

Consistent with suitable banking arrangements available and/or desirable to the victim's family and the Bureau case and depending on the amount and type of currency needed, an early conference with a member of the family and/or their banking representative should be held to determine identities of persons who are responsible on the family side for preparation of the ransom money and whether the proper type of currency is readily available in amounts needed.

If not, immediate steps should be taken to obtain such money; it being sometimes necessary to obtain funds from other Federal Reserve Districts. Here, working directly with a Federal Reserve Bank can be very advantageous. If it is necessary to sort a large volume of currency to insure that all bills are of particular denomination of the ransom money or of the same type and series, much more currency than the amount specified in the ransom demand will be needed.

For instance, in a recent case three million dollars in bills of ten and twenty dollar denominations were assembled and sorted to obtain therefrom the necessary five hundred thousand dollar ransom. Here, the expert staff of currency sorters employed in a Federal Reserve Bank were not only extremely helpful but necessary and in a situation of this kind are of inestimable value.

Such a conference as indicated above will often be valuable in conveying to the family and its bankers an appreciation of the investigation and evidentiary problems arising in these cases and avoids such instances as recently occurred where a family banking representative thought that just to fill a suitcase with currency of the denomination and total amount demanded would be all that is necessary.

It was found in one recent case where the ransom demanded was five hundred thousand dollars in ten and twenty dollar bills that the local bank, although quite a sizable institution, could not supply these funds, let alone in bills of the same Federal Reserve District as is sometimes desirable. Neither could the local Federal Reserve Bank of this district supply the necessary funds of the type needed.

Calls to other Federal Reserve Banks determined they had no such amounts on hand of the same series or type.

Finally, to assemble the required amounts in ten and twenty dollar denominations, the local Federal Reserve Bank had to obtain funds

from another unit of the Federal Reserve System totaling some one and one-half million dollars which, when combined with a like amount on hand, provided the sorting staff with sufficient currency to make up the ransom amount in bills of the desired type.

Here, the cooperation between Federal Reserve Banks enabled the delivery by plane of the requested amount from a city some seven hundred miles distant in a matter of approximately four and one-half hours.

#### PHOTOGRAPHING THE RANSOM MONEY

It is believed experience has shown that automatic feed Recordak equipment of a type having an odometer counter and which will handle paper of the texture of used currency, is most satisfactory for photographing the ransom currency. The counter provides a check of the number of bills photographed in a given package and will provide an alert if there is an inaccurate count.

It is considered absolutely necessary that, as soon as it is determined, the preparation of a ransom and a ransom list may be or is necessary, steps be taken through the nearest Recordak representative to make one or more of these machines available for installation at a suitable scene of operations, preferably away from either the Bureau Field Office or any temporary Bureau headquarters set up on the case. A suitable location may be found in the vault or other isolated section of the

bank through which the ransom money is being prepared. In this connection and in the interest of security and secrecy, a Federal Reserve Bank, if one is in the vicinity, may offer the best advantages from several standpoints, namely:

1) If a large sum must be assembled of a certain kind of currency, it would probably not be on hand at any one private banking institution and may have to be obtained through the Federal Reserve Bank.

2) Banking connections of prominent families are usually known to many bank employees and may be known to the press. These individuals may exhibit an interest in the ransom money preparation which could possibly be detrimental to the investigation and which could probably be avoided if a Federal Reserve Bank is used.

3) In all probability considerable night work will be necessary for several dozen persons. They can be assembled at a Federal Reserve Bank without arousing the curiosity of outsiders more effectively than at a private bank, particularly where it is known the family has its banking interests.

The mere obtaining and installation of the proper type of recording equipment does not insure a successful photographic operation. The mechanical adjustments on the machine, particularly the feeding mechanism where used currency is the subject material, is very critical.

The Recordak representative should effect these adjustments, photograph a trial number of bills which should be processed immediately to insure proper operation.

In this connection and in the actual operation of photographing the ransom money, attention is invited to instructions set forth in the Manual of Instructions concerning the obtaining of a clearance from the United States Secret Service before photographing money.

The Recordak representative should also provide training and instructions to the individuals who will operate the equipment on the loading, changing and removal of film reels. These photographers or operators should be banking employees working under the guidance of Bureau agents.

Exposed film should be identified as follows:

- 1) Before photographing each package of one hundred bills, a photo of a 3 x 5 card should be taken on which is clearly shown the name of the bank employee, photographer, date and identity of the case.
- 2) Each reel of film sent to the FBI Laboratory, whether developed or merely exposed, should be handled by Agents as evidence. If the film is only exposed this should be plainly indicated on the package containing this particular reel to avoid accidental exposure because there may not be another opportunity to photograph this portion of the money again.

It is suggested that if facilities are at all available for developing the Recordak film locally that exposed film be immediately processed for the following reasons:

- 1) Will insure that photographing equipment is functioning properly during the operation.
- 2) That operators are efficient.
- 3) Will provide immediate opportunity for scanning results in a viewer for partially or completely superimposed bills, which when photographed were in such position as to obscure portions of or all of the identifying currency serial numbers. Further, it will also indicate instances where for some reason or other, the bill happened to be photographed face down, thereby obscuring identifying characteristics.
- 4) Where superimposition is discovered it permits rephotography of that group of one hundred bills which should be done rather than trying to photograph only the bills involved.

Photographing of the face of the ransom currency should begin at the earliest possible time and not delayed for the handlisting of the bills. In fact, a bundle of one hundred bills can be photographed in seconds, thus permitting the hand listing to begin virtually simultaneously.

It should be borne in mind that, in the event of an early, unexpected or premature demand for the ransom payoff is made, that the photographic record of the money would be better than none or even better than a partial handwritten list.

~~If photography is the only record available and it is done~~  
with the insertion on the film of proper identifying cards with each package of one hundred bills such film could be used for identifying the ransom money at a later time and conceivably as evidence in court.

#### HAND LISTING OF BILLS

In addition to the instructions set forth in the Manual the following is offered:

A lined tablet sheet of approximately legal size and having thirty-three or more lined spaces is suitable for preparing the handwritten list of bills and is usually readily available in most banking institutions or at local stationery stores.

The top margin of this sheet can be used for identifying data and by drawing two vertical lines down through the lined spaces, the sheet can be divided into three columns, each with thirty-three lined spaces for recording bill serial numbers. This gives spaces for ninety-nine bills of the one hundred bill package.

At the head or top of the third column the vertical line dividing columns two and three should be extended upward a distance of a lined space and then to the right to the edge of the page. This will be the space on which the serial number of the sixty-seventh bill of the package will be entered thereby keeping the bills listed in the order making up the package.

The reason this is suggested is that it provides an instantaneous visual check to insure that:

- 1) The particular package has one hundred bills in it and:
- 2) That all one hundred have been handlisted. In a recent

case where currency was shipped from an auxiliary bank and some thirty thousand bills prepared, some of the currency had a musty odor and was somewhat damp to the touch. Apparently it had been stored in a damp place.

Some of this money was not usable because the Recordak machine would not handle it properly in this condition.

In photographing that portion of the money which could be used and apparently due to some dampness, two of the bills were superimposed so perfectly that only the upper one was photographed and the bank employee doing the photography did not check the odometer count or possibly did not have it properly reset so that the fact that only ninety-nine bills were photographed in that package came to his attention.



When this package of bills was handlisted the bills were apparently still together since the page on which the package was listed contained only ninety-nine serial numbers. This was not immediately noted and when the lists and films were sent to the Bureau for the preparation of the ransom list it was discovered one bill was missing.

Since the ransom was not paid in this case, the money was returned to the bank several months later and meanwhile apparently dried out.

The package having the handlisting of only ninety-nine bills was examined and found to actually contain one hundred bills.

If the pages for the handwritten list had had one extra space as above described or some other simple method of assuring a proper count had been used it is believed this missing bill would have been found and listed due to the simple visual check made possible by the system outlined.

If a sheet is used having more than thirty-four lined spaces it is suggested the same easy check can be effected by drawing a line horizontally across the first and second columns thirty-three spaces down and then a line across the third column thirty-four spaces down.

## MISCELLANEOUS

If possible, the photographing and handlisting of the various packages of currency should follow the same sequence to aid the data processing section of the Bureau in locating errors or questionable entries.

This may not be one hundred per cent possible because instances will occur when it will be necessary to re-run a package of bills through the Recordak machine some time after they were originally photographed and after other packages had been exposed.

For instance, when proof viewing, if this is possible, some superimposed currency may be noted necessitating that particular package of bills be photographed again. As of possible aid to the data processing section in reconciling possible errors and discrepancies, the following is suggested:

The 3 x 5 card bearing the identifying data as to file number, date, name of photographing bank employee, etc., will be photographed at the beginning of each "bundle" of ten packages of currency and also photographed again before each package of bills are photographed.

This card could have, say in the left lower corner, the Roman numeral I followed by a small Arabic numeral 1 and photographed prior to the running of the first package of one hundred bills. For the second package of one hundred bills the Arabic figure 2 would be added after the Arabic numeral 1 and this same procedure followed on up through the tenth package of bills.

The card would then be placed on the face of package one which would be the top package of a bundle of ten packages which would then be assigned for handlisting.

The ten packages of this bundle could then be identified on the particular sheet on which these particular bills are handlisted by merely entering the package number on the sheet.

For the second bundle of ten packages the Roman numeral II would be used and the Arabic system 1 through 10 repeated.

This system could also be repeated for each denomination of bills processed.

Care should be taken that the 3 x 5 cards are not included with the ransom money when it is finally assembled. Cards should be removed at the time the handlisting operation occurs and not replaced on the bundles. A simple control system should be set up to insure that all cards are retrieved before the ransom money is packaged.

In a recent case where time was limited and in order to be certain the photography was being properly handled, exposed film was processed immediately after exposure by the local Recordak agency. Since there was the possibility all handwritten lists would not be completed before a pay-off demand came, in which case it was conceivable the film might be the only evidentiary record of the money, the film was escorted through the Recordak processing laboratory by the bank employee who did the photography and who could appear as a competent witness if need be.

It is suggested that after the photography and preparation of the handwritten list has been in progress for say, three hours, a check be made to determine the amount of work accomplished which would then

give an estimate of approximately when completion of the ransom money processing could be expected. This check could be made repeatedly throughout the operation insofar as is considered necessary and would serve as a barometer by which it could be told whether or not more employees and machines are needed. It also will provide information which can be furnished the Bureau as to about when it could expect to receive the films and handwritten lists.

TECHNICAL INSTALLATIONS  
IN VICTIM'S HOME

The victim's residence was served by a private telephone line which traveled underground from the road to the residence, entering the residence in a crawl space located underneath the bedroom areas of the house. There were four extension telephones, one in victim's wife's bedroom, one in the bedroom occupied by victim's two daughters, one in the kitchen and one in the basement recreation room.

Prior to the Bureau's officially entering the investigation on February 10, 1960, two deputies from the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office had been assigned to the victim's residence by the Jefferson County Sheriff. These deputies had connected a recorder to the telephone extension located in the basement recreation room by taping the microphone of the recorder to the ear piece of the telephone handset. Arrangements had been made with the person designated to answer the telephone to pick up the handset of the upstairs extension at the end of the third ring, at which time one of the deputies would turn the recorder on and lift the receiver of the recreation room extension telephone.

The sound-trained Agent went to victim's residence on the evening of February 10, 1960. A 1948 Ford panel truck was used to take this Agent and the equipment to victim's residence. The following was the equipment taken:

1. Western Electric 500 C/D telephone instrument with Audio Development Co. transformer #114A.

2. Two Magnecord PT 6 amplifiers and four Transport units.
3. Two Magnecord transfer switches.
4. One Magnecord voice-operated relay.
5. FM radio dispatcher unit.
6. ~~Lineman's test set.~~
7. Supply of magnetic recording tape.
8. 100 foot spool of two-conductor wire.
9. Tool box with flashlight, tools, tape and miscellaneous items.
10. Mile Ray light.

Due to the layout of victim's residence and due to the fact that victim's wife and four children had friends coming to the residence to visit them, the kidnap telephone installation was made in the basement recreation room in place of the extension telephone located there. This area of the house was the only place Agents could remain out of sight of visitors visiting members of victim's family. Making the installation in this room made it necessary for the person designated to answer the telephone, one of the victim's brothers or the brother of victim's wife, to come down to the basement recreation room to answer the telephone when it rang. The other three extension telephones were disconnected in the terminal block located in the crawl space under the house. This was done to prevent anyone from picking up the handset of one of the telephone extensions located on the main floor of the house while a telephone call was being received on the kidnap telephone installation, thus causing a disturbance on the line.

Following discussion with victim's wife regarding the plans for the family during the time the victim was missing, victim's wife made arrangements for the children to live elsewhere and she discouraged most of her friends from making visits to her residence. This provided more security for the Agents and the recording equipment at victim's residence. The kidnap telephone instrument was then moved to victim's wife's bedroom where one Agent remained on duty at all times, along with the person designated to answer the telephone.

The victim's wife's bedroom, in which the kidnap telephone installation was made, was located about 90 feet away from the recreation area at the far end of the house. It was connected to the Magnecord recording equipment in the recreation room and this was accomplished by running a two-conductor wire from the "Bridge In" of the Magnecord amplifier in the recreation room through the furnace room and through the crawl space under the house to victim's wife's bedroom. The wire was routed into the room through the hole in the floor used by the Telephone Company in the original installation of the telephone extension located in this room and was connected to the transformer attached to the Western Electric 500 telephone instrument. A connection was made from the ground terminal of the transformer to a nearby electrical outlet box. A lineman's test set was connected to the red and green terminals of the telephone connecting block along with the kidnap telephone instrument. The switch on the lineman's test set was taped to prevent it from being switched from the monitor position which would have permitted the feeding of extraneous noises on the line. This test set was used

by the Agent on duty in this room to listen in on the calls while they were being received and permitted him to give the proper prearranged signals to the person receiving the call.

A Magnecord amplifier and two Transport units with a transfer switch and a voice-operated relay were used in this recording of the telephone calls. Another Magnecord amplifier and two Transport units were set up next to the ones being used for the recording and a connection made from the "Bridge In" of the Magnecord amplifier in use to the "Bridge In" of the Magnecord amplifier maintained as a stand-by. In the event a failure had occurred in the Magnecord amplifier while a call was being recorded, the recording operation could have been continued by switching the motor-control switch of the Magnecord Transport unit set up as a stand-by to the "forward position."

A direct, private, unlisted and nonpublished line had been installed which permitted Agents at victim's residence to communicate directly with Headquarters Office. The instrument at victim's residence was located in the basement recreation room and the instrument at Headquarters Office was located on the desk of the Special Agent in Charge of the Special. When the handset of either of these instruments was removed from the cradle, the other instrument would ring. This arrangement permitted rapid, direct communication between victim's residence and the Headquarters Office. The instrument at victim's residence was located near the recording equipment and the SAC of the Special could listen in on a telephone



call at victim's residence while it was being recorded by holding the handset of the telephone instrument, connected to the direct line, near the speaker of the Magnecord amplifier.

When a telephone call was received at victim's residence the SAC of the Special or the person designated to remain in charge in his absence was notified by use of the direct line to have the Telephone Company continue the tracing of the call or to discontinue the tracing operation, depending upon the identity of the caller.

Locating the recording equipment in the basement recreation room away from the main living area provided security for the recording operation and for the Agent operating the equipment when visitors came to victim's residence. At the same time, the Agent operating the equipment could provide security for the ransom package containing the \$500,000 which had been placed in a basement storeroom near the recreation room.

An FM radio dispatcher unit was set up in the basement recreation room for the purpose of communicating with Headquarters Office or with Bureau automobiles, should the occasion arise. This unit was also utilized to test the concealed radio units in the automobile that was to be used by a person handling the ransom package. Radio installations had been made in this car and this car was stored in victim's residence garage and the radio equipment was tested every 24 hours by the sound-trained Agent on duty at victim's residence.

## LABORATORY EXPERT ON THE MAJOR CASE SQUAD

The Laboratory expert's primary function on a Major Case Squad is that of technical advisor and consultant to the Inspector in Charge of the squad and the #1 Man on the one side, and the investigating agents on the other. It is his duty to assist in resolving any problems relating to physical evidence collected during the course of the investigation. The basic responsibilities of a Laboratory expert on a Major Case Squad are as follows:

1. Be available to answer any questions arising with regard to proper handling of physical evidence.
2. Supervise packing and shipment of physical evidence to the Laboratory for examination.
3. Conduct preliminary examination of physical evidence with the purpose of eliminating useless requests of the Laboratory and furnish the investigating agents with the results of preliminary examinations for investigative guidance.
4. Dictate inserts on Laboratory matters.
5. Dictate leads arising as a result of collection and/or examination of physical evidence.
6. Periodically, review the subsection of the case file entitled "Laboratory Matters" in order to be certain that all leads which may have arisen from Laboratory examinations have been dictated

and are being covered by the investigating agents. In this connection, it is also the responsibility of the Laboratory expert to see that the subsection of the case file entitled "Laboratory Matters" is up to date and current at all times.

7. Organizing and supervising projects arising as the result of location of physical evidence. For example, furnishing technical instruction to an investigating agent to assist him in obtaining handwriting and typewriting specimens and in eliminating typewriters obviously different from that used in preparing a questioned ransom letter in a kidnaping case.
8. Preparing or supervising preparation of exhibits, charts, memoranda, et cetera, which can be used by the investigating agents in the search for significant handwriting, typewriting, et cetera.
9. Conferring with the Inspector in Charge and #1 Man of the Major Case Squad regarding all Laboratory matters in order that they may have the benefit of any suggestions for projects or other investigations which should be conducted or considered based on Laboratory findings or collection of physical evidence. For example, the Laboratory expert may, through his technical knowledge and experience, be in a position to suggest a certain line of

*inquiry which may not be readily apparent to the Inspector in Charge or #1 Man.*

- 10. Provide all necessary technical assistance in connection with crime scene searches such as co-ordinating the collection, preservation and identification of all physical evidence. It is also his responsibility to see that the necessary graphs, charts and photographs are prepared at the crime scene.*
- 11. Work in close cooperation with the official photographer on the Major Case Squad to see that reproduction facilities, such as cameras, Auto-stating equipment, Photostating equipment and dark room are available and are in readiness for any photographic or copying work which may be necessary.*
- 12. In connection with kidnaping cases, to handle all extortion and crank letters which may be directed to the victim and see that they are properly identified, photocopied and forwarded to the Laboratory for examination.*
- 13. Perform any other duties which are requested by Inspector in Charge and #1 Man in so far as primary responsibilities permit. The Inspector in Charge of the Major Case Squad should attempt to avoid nontechnical assignments to the*

Laboratory man which will make him unavailable to properly perform his duties pertaining to the Laboratory aspects of the case.

As can be seen from the list of responsibilities of the Laboratory expert set forth above, any Laboratory man assigned to a Major Case Squad should be well-rounded in all phases of the laboratory's work in order that he can properly handle his responsibilities. When a Laboratory man is assigned to a Major Case Squad and prior to his departure from the Laboratory in Washington, he should confer with the various section and unit chiefs of the Laboratory at the Bureau regarding any technical activity which he may encounter in the field. He should also carefully check the list of equipment and supplies which will be necessary for him to take with him on his assignment to the field. No set list of materials can be arbitrarily drawn up; such a list depends entirely on the case in question, the availability of facilities in the field, and the availability of technical equipment in the field.

Upon arrival in the field on a Major Case Squad, the Laboratory expert should, if possible, arrange for suitable working space, so arranged that his technical equipment is readily available and working conditions are such that a minimum of distraction is present.

The above observations are set forth for the guidance not only of the Laboratory expert assigned to a Major Case Squad but also for the guidance of the Inspector in Charge of the Major Case Squad and the #1 Man.

EQUIPMENT

At the inception of COORNAP, an inventory was made of all supplies available in the Denver Office. Efforts were made to immediately correct obvious omissions. The following items were received from other offices or the Bureau:

Shoulder pack transmitters and receivers

MX Unit - transmitter and receiver

Decoy package

Concealed automobile transmitter

Of particular importance among the items assigned to the Denver Office were the Handie Talkies, the twenty-five watt transmitter and receiver and Motorola pocket receivers and transmitters.

In addition to the above, the Bureau forwarded the infrared viewer, together with infrared lenses for mile ray lamp and floodlight.

Additionally, the small items which it was felt might be necessary in the event of a pay off or concurrent investigation were assembled in one suitcase, as follows:

Flashlight

Large rolls of two types of twine

Paper clips

Rubber bands

Pencils

Fingerprint dusting kit with spare camel's hair brush

Scotch tape

Two pair of rubber gloves

Tweezers

Rulers

Spray lacquer

Cellophane envelopes

Plain envelopes

Portable fingerprint kit

Writing tablets

Evidence tags

Spare batteries

Compasses

Magnifying glass

Plaster of Paris

Because of the mountainous and unoccupied area in which the kidnaping occurred and in which it was felt that if the victim were murdered a body might be buried, shovels, an ax and a pick were also obtained. A heavy hammer and stakes were obtained in anticipation of the necessity of roping off an area for a crime-scene search.

All of the equipment which it was anticipated might be used in the investigation was maintained separately from the regular office equipment so that it could be immediately issued without searching through cabinets or other receptacles before issuing. Each item of equipment was charged to the Agent to whom issued by the equipment supervisor or a designated alternate. A separate charge-out book was maintained.

As kidnaping in COORNAP occurred in February, at the beginning of extremely inclement weather, it was felt that clothing for outdoor surveillance of pay off should be obtained. Contact was made with one of the sporting goods stores and the following items were obtained on a loan basis:

Three parkas

Three pair of men's down underpants

Three hand warmers

One can of fluid for hand warmers

One pair of khaki pants

Contact was also made with one of the large department stores and the following items which were not available at the sporting goods store, were obtained:

Three pair of insulated boots

Three pair of quilted, insulated underwear

Six pair of wool and cotton socks

Three pair of knit wool gloves



Two pair of heavy work pants

Three hoods for face covering

The hand warmers were felt necessary because it was felt that Agents' hands should be warm and facile in the event of an emergency.

In addition, the department store made available the top half of a male mannequin as it was felt that the male mannequin could be dressed in clothing and possibly placed on the front or back seat of an automobile in the event of a pay off or other activity at night.

All of these items were obtained on a loan basis, and at the time it was determined that no pay off would be made the articles of clothing were returned without charge to these stores.

Arrangements were made with the managers of these two stores, and with the managers of hardware, radio and electrical stores, to permit twenty-four hour contact in the event an emergency arose. It was found that the operators of these stores were cognizant of the Coors' investigation but were not told in any instance that the FBI was actually working on this case. They neither asked for nor were given an explanation for the requests. The individuals operating these stores were all known to the Agents of the Denver FBI as reliable persons, and no record of their names was found in the indices. Even though it was probably assumed by them that this request was made as the result

of the disappearance of Adolph Coors, III, no mention was made of this case in contacting them as publicity had appeared to the effect that the family of the victim had requested all law enforcement agencies to cease investigation.

As Agents were on twenty-four hour duty at the office for a considerable period of time and thereafter worked extraordinarily long hours, it was considered necessary to have food and coffee available at the office. A coffee percolator was obtained on a loan basis from one of the coffee suppliers. Arrangements were made for the delivery of food to the office by a restaurant as the building in which the Denver FBI Office is located is locked after regular office hours; and, additionally, local newspapers had reporters posted at the building on a twenty-four hour basis. As a consequence, it was necessary for Agents, particularly those coming in on special, to come to and leave the office space by a circuitous route in an effort to avoid being seen by these reporters. These Agents were able to obtain food and return with it to the office. In larger towns the problem of obtaining food on a twenty-four hour basis is not acute. In a smaller town where twenty-four hour restaurant service is not available, it would probably be necessary to lay in a larger stock of food for night consumption or make arrangements with a restaurant owner to have food available on a twenty-four hour basis.

The problem of darkroom facilities did not arise in the Denver Office during the actual investigation of COORNAP while the special was on, but subsequently when it was necessary to prepare a summary report containing numerous blown up photographs, it was determined that the darkroom facilities of the Denver Office were inadequate. Because this work can be done at night or on weekends, a request was made of the Denver Police Department for the use of their darkroom. This darkroom was made available and adequately handled the large number of photographs which had to be prepared. The possibility of utilizing police darkrooms should be considered, particularly if headquarters are being set up for an office other than the FBI headquarters city.

Agents designated by the Bureau to come to Denver on special in COORNAP from the Salt Lake City, Albuquerque and Butte Offices, brought with them five automobiles which operated on the same radio frequency as the Denver Office. It was necessary in order that these automobiles not be conspicuous that Colorado license plates be obtained. In addition to obtaining these license plates, it was necessary to obtain current brake and light stickers which are placed on windshields of automobiles in Colorado. These items were necessary, of course, to conform with Colorado law and so that the cars would not be conspicuous. This should be remembered in the event of specials in cities such as Kansas City where tax stickers are placed in the windshield of automobiles.

It was felt necessary to designate one of the automobiles of the Coors family as the automobile which would probably be used for a pay off. The automobile which it was thought could be most easily duplicated was so designated. This was a 1958 Impala owned by Bill Coors, brother to the victim. Contact was made with numerous car dealers in the Denver area but none had in his possession an automobile identical to the car owned by Bill Coors. A Police Captain in a suburban town, who was known to be a used-car salesman on the side, was contacted and he located an automobile similar in appearance. It was necessary to have this car partially repainted to achieve a two-tone effect and to place a radio aerial on the right front fender. Additionally, it was necessary to remove one dealer's metal identification plate from this car and replace it with a plate identical to that appearing on Bill Coors' car.

As the possibility existed that the pay off would necessitate a loose surveillance, would occur in the mountainous farm or cattle-raising area of Colorado or in metropolitan Denver, different arrangements had to be made. A taxicab was rented and a taxicab driver's hat was obtained. Arrangements were made for immediate delivery from one of the truck rental firms of a cattle truck or farm truck in the event one was necessary. The taxicab and the Chevrolet Impala, rented to duplicate Bill Coors' car, were both stored at a garage near the office where they could be obtained on a moment's notice.

Arrangements were also made that if necessary a truck of one of the local public utilities would be available for use in the event a stationary surveillance in the city area was necessary.

The automobile of Bill Coors was equipped with the concealed automobile transmitter (CAT). This unit was located under the front seat beneath the seat springs. It was activated by means of the speaker switch of the regular car radio at the lower center of the dash. The microphone was concealed under the speaker grill at the center of the dash. The broadcast receiver of the regular car radio was disabled by removal of a fuse. The antenna of the CAT unit was connected to the exhaust pipe at the left rear of the car and additional antenna was spread under the car body.

In both Bill Coors' car and in the car which simulated it, Handie Talkies were also placed under the front seat and connected by coaxial cable to the regular automobile antenna. This antenna was then regulated to the proper length to handle the Handie Talkie. The speaker of the Handie Talkie was concealed under the seat but was immediately available, and the switch controlling this Handie Talkie was placed in such a position that it could be easily reached by the driver.

It was felt necessary to have a car simulating Bill Coors' car as it was not known if he and his automobile would be immediately available on a twenty-four hour basis. The simulated car, of course, was always kept available.

As it was not known if Adolph Coors, III, would be returned alive or would be killed by his kidnaper, the identities of competent physicians were determined in Denver and the surrounding counties. These individuals can usually be determined either through personal contact of the Agents in the office or through contact with the various local law enforcement agencies. The same is true of autopsy surgeons who are usually known to local law enforcement officers or coroners. It should also be borne in mind that it possibly may be necessary to obtain the identities of coroners in areas considered pertinent to the investigation. In the COORNAP case these men were contacted early in the investigation and their cooperation solicited. It was found that each was cooperative and indicated that he would not notify the papers or other publicity media, realizing the necessity of a thorough crime-scene search before the public invaded the area.

Timetables of the various public transportation facilities were obtained, but arrangements were also made with ranking officials at various airlines in Denver to bump passengers in the event that was necessary in the handling of COORNAP.

Joseph Corbett had told friends that he hunted in the Golden Gate Canyon area northwest of Golden, Colorado. Inasmuch as a yellow Mercury was earlier reported as pertinent in this investigation and prior to its discovery burned on a dump in New Jersey, investigation was conducted in Colorado in an effort to locate this car. As the car was reported a bright yellow in color, use was made of a slow flying airplane to search the Golden Gate area, and also the area contiguous to victim's home and the bridge from which he disappeared. Consideration was given to use of a helicopter. This type of machine was not used, however because of danger in the high rugged mountain area where up drafts and down drafts might have easily wrecked the plane. The aircraft was obtained through the services of a Colonel with the U. S. Air Force who was also the liaison man with the Civil Air Patrol.

As it was felt that Corbett might demand payment of ransom in the mountainous area with which he was reported familiar, contact was made with stables for the rental of horses. In addition, it was felt that guides might be necessary and contact was made with State Game Wardens, U. S. Forestry Service Rangers and particularly with some of the old-time prospectors and wood cutters in the mountainous area. These men were constantly available for assistance.

In COORNAP demand was made for \$500,000 ransom. The only communication received did not specify the type of container the money should be placed in. A footlocker, measuring 31" by

16 3/4" by 12 1/2", was found to hold the demanded ransom in mixed bills. A footlocker of this sort, not metal, was obtained from a local manufacturer. A hole was cut in the center of the bottom of the footlocker so that the switch of the ransom decoy package would fit within this hole. ~~The switch was built up so that it would protrude beyond the side of the footlocker.~~ A cloth similar to the cover used on the footlocker was obtained from the manufacturer and substituted for the cloth torn when the hole was cut in the bottom of the footlocker. This cloth was placed on the footlocker loosely so that it would not activate the switch. The footlocker was then packed with seventy pounds of newspaper which was the approximate weight of the bills. The ransom decoy package was placed in the footlocker so that it would be in an off position when the footlocker was resting on its bottom. In order to obtain additional transmitting range, a loop antenna was placed around the inside of the trunk lid. This was made of two turns of Belden indoor aerial wire; a condenser was connected in series with the loop to tune it. This condenser was mounted at the center of the back edge of the lid of the footlocker in place of a rivet which was removed. The condenser could then be tuned by a small screwdriver from either the outside or inside of the trunk. The loop antenna was connected by a low impedance line to a coupling loop 2" in diameter and consisting of two turns. Lining paper matching the interior of the trunk was obtained from the manufacturer and used to cover the antenna and connecting wires



As twenty-five Agents were sent to the Denver Office on special, it was necessary to obtain maps for these Agents in order to facilitate their becoming acquainted with the area. This required obtaining regular State maps which are obtainable through service stations, and also maps of the City of Denver and surrounding suburbs. Before the discovery of the skeleton remains of Adolph Coors, III, a detailed search was made of the mountainous area where the Laboratory stated samples of soil found under the car destroyed by Corbett, originated. A contact was made with the Geological Survey for quadrangle maps of the entire mountain area, and the maps were obtained and supplied to the Agents making this search. These maps were coordinated with county maps obtainable through the State Highway Department. A team of four Agents was assigned to each quadrangle map area which covered approximately seventy miles. These Agents were instructed to travel every road in the quadrangle and talk to all residents, and to search all mines, buildings, caves or other places where a body might be concealed.

Nine stenographers and clerks were sent to the Denver Office on this special. It was necessary to obtain office equipment for these employees. This equipment was obtained primarily from the General Services Administration on a loan or rental basis.

At the time the skeleton remains of Adolph Coors, III, were found it was necessary that a detailed crime-scene search be conducted. This search covered a large area in rugged mountainous terrain. A regular crime search line was established with one man acting as anchor on each end of the line. In order to keep both Agents anchoring the line in contact with the office, the men anchoring the line each carried a Motorola pocket receiver and transmitter. With these items they were able to maintain contact with a two-way automobile stationed in the vicinity, which in turn was able to contact the office approximately thirty miles away.

The equipment man should maintain close contact with all personnel on the special, particularly the Special Agent in Charge. All requests for any equipment should be channeled through the equipment supervisor as he may have the equipment available in the office or have made arrangements for it to be available at some supplier. It is suggested that the equipment supervisor be an Agent assigned to the local office because of contacts already available.

## LIAISON AT VICTIM'S HOME IN KIDNAPING CASES

### PREFACE

The comments contained herein are based on one actual experience of being in a kidnaped victim's residence. Accordingly, it is to be recognized there are many different circumstances, conditions, problems and types of people that will differ in each individual case. It is to be noted that the material in the manual on this topic covers most any situation. The following is offered as Agents' experiences of having been in the COORS' residence for some seventeen days beginning February 11, 1960, three days after ADOLPH COORS, III was kidnaped.

On February 9, 1960, the following note was received  
by MARY COORS, the wife of victim:

"Mrs. Coors:

"Your husband has been kidnaped. His car is by Turkey Creek.

"Call the police or F. B. I.: he dies.

"Cooperate: he lives.

"Ransom: \$200,000 in tens and \$300,000 in twenties.

"There will be no negotiating.

"Bills: used / non-consecutive / unrecorded / unmarked.

"Warning: we will know if you call the police or record the  
serial numbers.

"Directions: Place money & this letter & envelope in  
one suitcase or bag.

"Have two men with a car ready to make the delivery.

"When all set, advertise a tractor for sale in Denver  
Post section 69. Sign ad King Ranch, Fort Lupton.

"Wait at NA 9-4455 for instructions after ad appears.

"Deliver immediately after receiving call.

Any delay will be regarded as a stall to set up  
a stake-out.

"Understand this: Adolph's life is in your hands. We have no desire  
to commit murder. All we want is that money. If you follow the  
instructions, he will be released unharmed within 48 hours after the  
money is received."

The ad was placed in an issue of the Denver Post which  
was first available to the public on the night of February 13, 1960.

## PREPARING TO GO INTO VICTIM'S HOME

In preparation for going into the victim's home, it is essential that all information available relative to the entire case, as known as of that time, be obtained as well as background of family and conditions in the residence.

Some consideration should be given to wearing apparel.

The following are a few of the items which were found to be useful:

Washable, quick dry underwear

Quick dry shirts

Respectable pair of lounging shoes with soles that will not make excessive noise when walking around the house

Adequate sleeping garments

Personal toilet items.

The following equipment was used and found to be desirable:

Stationery and writing supplies

Typewriter

Dictaphone

Camera

Sidearms and shotgun

Complete kit for taking fingerprints

Technical equipment necessary to handle the specific

situation should be selected by Agent making  
the installation.

It was found that two recordings of each telephone  
conversation was essential, indicating additional recording units  
would be necessary.

Sufficient attachments for the private phone line to  
the Field Office enabling each Agent in the residence to  
simultaneously enter into conferences with the Person in Charge  
of the case.

Monitoring instrument to be attached directly to  
the phone on which incoming calls are to be received at the residence.

Arrangements should be made to discreetly enter  
the home of the victim.

PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED AT VICTIM'S HOME

On arrival at the COORS' residence, on February 11, 1960, local law enforcement officers had departed and a log was established which would continue to reflect activities there during the stay of the Agents. First contact at the residence was made with JAMES GRANT, a lawyer and the brother of MARY COORS, victim's wife. He advised that a number of family friends were visiting and that the four COORS' children and some of their friends were in the house. Other friends were expected to arrive. During the initial conversation with GRANT, it was noted that numerous phone calls were being received from family friends. MARY COORS joined the latter part of the conversation with GRANT and it was explained to them that it was necessary now to have more privacy in the residence. It was agreed the guests would be excused.

Shortly thereafter, the guests left. The Agents were shown through the residence for the purpose of familiarizing them with it. For a detailed description of the house, blueprints were obtained and are probably still available in the Denver Office.



Briefly the house may be described as located in a rather remote mountain side location, outside of a suburban community of Denver, known as Morrison, Colorado. The residence is not in direct view of any other habitation, but is situated in the foothills in such a manner that it could be watched from numerous locations in higher surrounding terrain. The house itself is large with four bedrooms on the main floor. Three of the bedrooms in line. Adjacent to the main entrance there is a stairwell down to a daylight basement of considerable proportions. The bedroom on the extreme end of the line of bedrooms is a large room with private bath and dressing room. It was normally occupied by Mr. and Mrs. COORS. The two bedrooms in line, separated by a bath and adjoining the master bedroom, were occupied by the two COORS' girls and the other one by the two COORS' boys. The fourth bedroom on the first level was separated from these and normally unoccupied. The remaining space upstairs composed of a large living room, dining room, kitchen and utility room. The basement, occupying less space than the first floor, consisted of a furnace room, large recreation room that was furnished with complete kitchen facilities in one corner and normal recreation room furniture. The basement also had a combination bedroom - office and a bathroom. Adjoining the bedroom - office, is

a room completely enclosed in cement with the exception of one door from the office, and originally designed as a bomb shelter. It contained a deep freeze and a few personal items in storage.

The garage is located to the side of and directly attached to the house near the front entrance. It is accessible from a door between the end of the garage and the inside of the house. The doors are electrically controlled. These controls are on the inside of the garage located directly adjacent to the door entering the house. The garage contained space for three automobiles and storage area.

The normal phone service used by the COORS' family consisted of a private line with extensions in the bedroom used by Mr. and Mrs. COORS, one in the kitchen and the third extension in the recreation area downstairs.

During the tour through the house, MARY and JIM brought up the question as what should be done about the friends of MARY COORS expected to arrive within the next few minutes, most of those coming were bringing food and et cetera. It was suggested that if they could be reached by telephone, they be requested not to appear. This MARY COORS did.

The four children, ranging in ages of 10 to 18, presented a problem in the residence, in that they were making and

receiving numerous phone calls, and using the entire residence without being able to understand any imposed restrictions. For security reasons and the general peace of mind of all, it was decided by MARY COORS and JIM GRANT that if the children's grandparents,

~~Mr. and Mrs. COORS, SR., were willing, the four children should~~ stay at their residence. This was arranged and the COORS' children remained at the grandparents' residence until the Agents departed the victim's home.

In regard to the numerous phone calls that were being received by MARY COORS, it became obvious that something ~~would have to be done to avoid possible interference with the~~ kidnapers' call. Also each time the phone rang, it completely interrupted the entire household until the identity of the caller was known. In this connection, MARY COORS telephonically contacted two or three of her friends instructing them to call other people who would be most likely to contact her telephonically, requesting them to refrain until further notice. In addition, she asked JOE and BILL COORS, brothers-in-law, to contact their immediate family with the same request.

The servant arrangement consisted of two maids, one appearing primarily as a house cleaner, and the other as a laundry servant. Neither lived in and the arrival of both entailed

an automobile trip to the bus stop by MARY COORS. It was decided that one full-time maid living in would be more adaptable to the situation for purposes of security and convenience. MARY COORS selected the maid to be kept, that selection being based on long time acquaintanceship and her ability as a servant and cook.

This reduction of the household members and visitors left MARY COORS, JIM GRANT and THELMA HOFFMAN, the maid. In addition, on a schedule of 24 hours each, JOE and BILL COORS were to alternate being in the residence.

The first evening it was noted that MARY COORS was becoming increasingly nervous, sometimes almost hysterical.

The following day, with JIM GRANT'S assistance, MARY COORS invited a friend as a permanent house guest.

All of the above arrangements, with the exception of having MARY COORS invite her friend in to stay, were undertaken and accomplished on the first afternoon the Agents arrived. During this same period of time, a considerable number of requests were made of MARY COORS for specific bits of information or things she was to do. Some would be forgotten by her. It was the Agents' experience in the residence with all members of the family, that it was more desirable to make one specific request or resolve one problem at a time rather than a number of them.

The schedule of service people who should call at the residence was established so that there would be no Agent personnel in sight when they arrived. MARY COORS' doctor was identified and places where he would be available at all times established. This was for the primary purpose of being able to locate him should she require his attention.

Living quarters for the three Agents was established in the daylight basement. Inasmuch as two Agents were scheduled to be awake at all times, the one bed in the office with adjoining bath was sufficient. One end of the recreation room, out of sight of the stairwell and windows, was used for installation of private line and recording equipment.

It was felt it was necessary to reduce the number of telephone extensions to avoid any individual answering the phone except the one selected to receive the kidnaper's call. Due to the physical layout of the house, the extension in the recreation room was left in service as it was available only to the Agents. As the person answering the phone, should the kidnaper call, would be one of the family, the extension in the master bedroom was designated for this purpose. With MARY COORS' consent, this room was converted into an office for the purpose of receiving phone calls and most generally was occupied by one Agent and the member of the family

who was expecting to receive the call at the time. This separation turned out satisfactorily in that it left the recreation room private for the Agents' use with the technical equipment, dictating, use of the private line and other general official activities, eliminating the necessity of anyone but Agents to be there. The phone extension in the kitchen was disconnected. The other three bedrooms upstairs were used by MARY COORS and her friend, JIM GRANT and the COORS' brother in the residence, and the maid.

PLANS TO RECEIVE KIDNAPER'S CALL

MARY COORS was anxious to receive the phone call but it was felt by the Agents present that she would be the least capable of carrying on a conversation with the kidnaper.

JIM GRANT, age 42, Harvard Law graduate and practicing attorney in New York, left the impression with the Agents that he was the most desirable individual to receive an incoming call from the kidnaper.

JOE COORS and BILL COORS, who alternated at the residence, were to relieve JIM GRANT during the time he was to sleep. GRANT was actually around and available to answer the phone from 10:00 A. M. until 2:00 A. M. During the rest of the 24-hour cycle, either JOE or BILL COORS was present for this purpose. In giving instructions to the persons that were to answer the phone, it was not necessary to include questions that would determine whether or not the victim was alive, inasmuch as the family had agreed that they wanted to pay the ransom money irrespective of whether they had proof that he was alive. It was desirable to retain the caller on the phone as long as possible to afford the possibility of tracing the phone call.

Several questions were formulated, the answers of which would determine if it was the kidnaper calling, were typed and left by the

phone that was to be used for incoming calls. In addition, on the same desk attached to the phone was a monitoring instrument giving an Agent across the desk a chance to hear both sides of any telephone conversation coming into the residence. This was in addition to monitoring and recording equipment in the recreation room. This instrument was designed so the Agent could only listen and was unable to talk in it or have any other room noises interfere. To facilitate the Agent having control over this conversation without unduly interrupting a member of the family receiving the call, a prompting board was improvised. On this board, which was a door from the basement, was large printed phrases, as prompters, to help the person taking the call to prolong the conversation and to obtain pertinent information from the kidnaper. Some of these phrases were:

SLOW DOWN

READY TO PAY

WILLING TO PAY

REPEAT THAT

PERSONAL ITEMS

ROADS ARE BAD - SNOW

HOW DO I KNOW YOU ARE THE KIDNAPER



M GRANT had a tendency to static-repeat phrases made to the person he was talking to. He was encouraged and so were JOE and BILL COORS on all conversations to static-repeat the phone conversation.

There was never any intention that all these phrases should be used in any one conversation. A baton type pointer was available for the Agent to point to particular phrases which would be applicable at that point in the conversation. Also on the desk to facilitate the person carrying on the conversation was a copy of the ransom note, typed questions, and a memo scratch pad and a crayon was available to write reminders to the individual accepting the call.

Mock practices were conducted with all three individuals who were expected to possibly take the call. In addition, prior to the series of family calls being eliminated, the element of repeating, slow down and other phrases on the board were used without interfering with personal calls coming in.

## INTERVIEWS OF MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY

Members of the family in the residence were repeatedly and almost constantly interviewed in a conversational manner. These interviews covered all subject matters pertinent to the case. The close association for many hours within each 24-hour period made it possible to handle interviews and problems in strictly a conversational manner. This arrangement seemed ideal in that it was possible to stay abreast of the family's thinking. At the same time, it was imperative that each Agent in the residence be consistent with each other and advise the Person in Charge in order that all problems could be handled in an acceptable manner without contradiction.

It was felt necessary to note the answer to questions propounded to members of the family by each Agent to avoid repeating the same question to the same member of the family unnecessarily.

In eliminating personal items the victim could have had on his person at the time of his abduction, a complete inventory was made of his personal effects in the residence including clothing, as well as those personal items in his office.

Hair specimens were obtained from victim's personal brush and comb.

With MARY COORS' permission, all records and papers in the residence were reviewed.

Members of the family were photographed and fingerprinted.

The following items and information were obtained and developed in the course of interviews of members of the family:

Photo of victim

Wearing apparel at time of abduction

Hair specimens of victim

Personal items in possession at time of abduction

Identity of retailer that could identify personal items in his possession at time of abduction

Identity of doctors and hospitals relative to medical history of victim

Dental history

Financial status of victim and wife

Identity of friends and associates of victim and family

Identity of servants and service people

Friends of family

Activity of victim and family immediately prior to the kidnaping

Identity of possible suspects

Identities of banks, investment houses, stockbrokers, etc.

Education of victim

**Background and membership in organizations maintaining permanent records**

**Hobbies, recreation, social activities of victim**

**Family history of all members of family, immediate relatives and victim**

**Background of all servants**

**Normal activity and daily itinerary of family.**

## HANDLING OF RANSOM MONEY AT RESIDENCE

On the evening of February 12, the prepared ransom money in the amount of \$500,000 was delivered to the residence by bank officials. It arrived in a sealed canvas bag and was accepted at the residence by BILL COORS. It was placed in the bomb shelter room previously described. This room had been selected because it was not accessible from the outside of the house and the one inside door could be locked. In this room was placed two footlockers, one of which was to be used to deliver the money in. These two lockers had been marked for future identification prior to arrival in the residence. One of them contained a radio sounding device, the other had no equipment. Also in this room was placed the original ransom note and an exact facsimile. The money was left in the sealed canvas bag. Depending on the circumstances and instructions immediately prior to delivery, it was to be placed in one of the footlockers with one of the notes. The door of this room was locked at all times after the above articles were placed therein. The key on a string was worn around the neck of the member of the family who was on duty to receive the call from the kidnaper. The foreseeable things to be done immediately after receiving a call from the kidnaper were divided among the Agents in the residence. The additional preparation of the money and placing it into the automobile in the garage

was to be handled by one Agent and the COORS' brother on duty at the time. The money was never delivered. It was accepted by bank officials in the residence for return to the bank. It was in the original sealed bag, avoiding the necessity of recounting the money.

It should be pointed out that the Person in Charge was constantly advised by private telephone line of all arrangements and activity described. This was done on a continuing basis.

The Person in Charge kept Agents in the residence informed in detail as to his general thinking, and problems which could occur involving the family. These telephone conferences on things that might happen in the future made it possible for the Agents in the residence to answer questions and make decisions with the family. He in turn was advised of each question asked by the family and the answer given. Through this manner, the Agents and Person in Charge were consistent with the family in all matters.

The technical equipment making it possible for all Agents at the residence to simultaneously carry on a conversation with the Person in Charge eliminated the necessity of paraphrasing his instructions and ideas and added to their ability to act in harmony.

The individual Agents in the victim's home also kept each other advised of all conversations with and questions asked and answers given to members of the family.

MISCELLANEOUS QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED  
IN THE VICTIM'S RESIDENCE

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Due to the arrival some days after the kidnaping, many of the necessary things had been done in connection with the residence assignment. Those items are mentioned in the manual and are not being repeated here.

Agents, prior to entering the residence, in a conference with the Person in Charge reached the conclusion that there was a strong likelihood the victim was not alive.

On entering the residence, they felt that it was imperative to receive as clear and detailed telephone call from the kidnaper as possible. It was also felt necessary to associate with the family in a manner that would result in them taking no action that would interfere with the investigation of the case.

The family were continually reassured that the answers to their questions and problems were given them by the Agents present, with the full knowledge and consideration of the Person in Charge. It was pointed out that the Person in Charge had much experience in kidnaping cases, and in turn, on their behalf, was consulting with FBI officials in Washington, D. C., including Mr. HOOVER himself.

In one instance, the family inquired as to the necessity of the detailed coverage of the expected telephone call from the kidnaper.

In this instance, as well as every other opportunity, it was pointed out to the family that the safe return of the victim was the first and primary object of the FBI. That the necessity for complete coverage of the phone call was first to make sure that clear instructions were obtained from the kidnaper in order that they could be complied with, resulting in the release of the victim. That, secondly, the coverage might assist in leading to the identification and apprehension of the individual responsible for the kidnaping.

The Agents in the residence were frank at all times in answering the various questions and problems and tried to avoid leaving any impression of mystery and evasiveness in their actions and conduct.

JIM GRANT, after some time had elapsed and no contact from the kidnaper had been received, asked the question, are you actually going to pay the money to the kidnaper when it is recognized the victim is dead? It was pointed out to him that was a decision to be made by the family and they had already reached the decision that the money would be paid whether or not he was alive.

Getting necessary items in and out of the house was handled by BILL and JOE COORS, in that they exchanged shifts daily, this presented no problem.



Permission to intercept and open all mail addressed to the COORS' residence had previously been obtained and this was handled at the Post Office. It placed no particular responsibility on the Agents in the residence. However, contents of the extortion letters intercepted at the Post Office were relayed over the direct line to the Agents in the residence and were made known to the family for their decision as to complying with them. No particular problem was encountered in having them reach a decision. When practical, these notes were presented in the A. M. in that MARY COORS could respond more logically then than later in the day.

The identity of several individuals were furnished by members of the family as suspects. Particularly BILL COORS would pursue the results and inquire in connection to these suspects very persistently. Although few of the suspects from the very beginning had any logical basis, it left a better impression with the family when they could be advised rather promptly that that individual had been eliminated as a suspect and why. Bearing in mind that at this stage of the case, a very limited investigation was being conducted, it is believed where logical, these suspects reported by the family should be eliminated.

After the children had moved to the grandparents' residence, they continued to be some bother to MARY COORS in making requests of her for permission to go various places such as

school, skiing and visiting friends.

There were Agents stationed at the grandparents' residence and after advising them of the children's bother to their mother, they were able to eliminate it.

News Releases: The two COORS' brothers and

Mr. COORS, SR., as a matter of business policy and custom, had lunch each day in the COORS, SR. residence located and adjoining their place of business. At that time, they would discuss problems and have a mutual agreement as to the solution. That custom continued over in regard to this case. The major decisions that were reached in this case concerning the family were reached at a conference of the COORS' family, including MARY COORS and JIM GRANT, with the Person in Charge being present. These conferences were held in COORS, SR. residence, usually shortly after the lunch hour. In regard to press releases, the COORS' family, in connection with their business, had a press representative. The handling of the press releases were cleared through him and he in turn would clear with the Person in Charge prior to any release being made in connection with this case. On one occasion later in the stay of the Agents in the residence, MARY COORS wanted to make a final appeal through the press for the kidnaper to contact her. The fact that she was thinking of this release was known to the Agents in the residence a day or so ahead and finally she presented to them a copy of her proposed release. At the suggestion of the Person in Charge, some changes were made by MARY COORS and it was handled as stated above.

The family had decided that BILL or JOE COORS, under no circumstances, would personally deliver the ransom money. JIM GRANT had volunteered to help in any way he could, including delivering the ransom money. The Person in Charge of the investigation had decided that JIM GRANT and one of the Agents in the residence would jointly deliver the ransom money. In the event the ransom money was to be delivered, one Agent, as previously described, was to handle the final packaging of the ransom money. One Agent immediately on the conclusion of the call was to transcribe verbatim the phone call for the use of the Person in Charge. The third Agent was to furnish verbally this information to and receive the final instructions from the Person in Charge.

CECIL KENDRICK was the friend that MARY COORS selected to have stay with her and who did stay with her for the first week. On arriving at the COORS' residence, which was the next day after the Agents arrived, she was cautioned about security features, but was given a free rein to console and help MARY COORS in any way she thought best. However, she was cautioned as to the possibility that the victim might not be alive and to bear this in mind in offering MARY any assurance on this point. CECIL KENDRICK had to leave the residence for personal reasons and another friend, JAN PHIPPS, took her place in the residence and she was given similar instructions.

The possibility that the kidnaper might not recontact the family was recognized from the outset by the Person in Charge.

Actually the kidnaper did not recontact the family. This resulted in one of the principal problems for the Agents in the residence. The problem being to assist the family in deciding on a date they would no longer wait for a call and all out active investigation could begin.

This problem was not actually broached by the Agents in the first instances. During the last several days of their stay in the residence, on different occasions, individual members of the family would open this subject. The problem would then be discussed with that member in a specific and frank manner. The actual date was decided on in a family conference at the COORS, SR. residence, the Person in Charge being present.

Having a bearing on this problem, was one of the most frequent questions asked by individual members of the family from the outset. Is "AD" alive? The answer would consist of enumerating the factual circumstances. From the beginning, their conclusions would be that he probably was not alive, yet this same question would be put to an Agent a short time later. Never was there any encouragement that he was alive given to the family.

Another question: When will he (the kidnaper) call? Here again, no encouragement was ever extended to the family. The point was made that if "AD" was dead resulting in the kidnaper losing

his security, there might never be a call.

It is believed the frank approach to these questions, as well as all others, from the outset, materially assisted in having some influence with the family and their thinking in resolving their problem of terminating the wait for a contact by the kidnaper.

SETTING UP CHIEF CLERK'S OFFICE ON  
SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT CASES

When a major case has occurred and the investigation is to be handled as a "special," of course, the SAC of the office involved and the Bureau have discussed the matter as to the number of Special Agent personnel necessary. In addition, discussion is had as to the number of extra stenographers and at least four clerical employees should be borne in mind as being necessary to handle the "paper work" in connection with the handling of a "special."

The field office in which the major crime has occurred has already opened a case, for example, a kidnaping, and undoubtedly the first serial appearing therein will be a memorandum of some Special Agent reflecting that he received a call from someone advising that a particular individual has been kidnaped or disappeared.

Probably the next serial, or Serial #2, will be a copy of a teletype to the Bureau or a memorandum reflecting a telephone call with the Bureau.

Subsequent serials will reflect, as a rule, memoranda of different Agents as to what they have done or information they have received.

In connection with the handling of a "special," arrangements should first be made to obtain some particular section of the office which will be away from other Agents of

the office an away from the public so that the inspector or man in charge of the "special" can have his group in one space. The temporary Chief Clerk's Office (CCO) should, of course, be allocated a corner or section of that area, and the office in question should already make arrangements to have brought in a number of extra file cabinets and other office supplies which are used in the operation of a CCO.

Generally in the regular CCO, files contain a number of serials; for example, one file or volume may possibly contain 75 to 100 serials. However, in connection with a "special," it has been found that if each volume contains only 25 serials, this helps a great deal; that is, Volume No. 1 should have Serials 1 to 25, Volume No. 2 should have Serials 26 to 50, and so forth. The reason for breaking down these volumes containing only 25 serials is that as the case progresses Agents will have to refer to references and previous serials and if several Agents have to look in one volume which would contain a hundred serials, it would involve a loss of time, and so forth, whereas smaller volumes will be more readily available.

In addition to starting these volumes containing only 25 serials, sub-files should immediately be opened in order to channel into that sub-file an extra copy of a memorandum, airtel or teletype.

For example, as soon as a "special" is started, there will be a number of communications referring to Agents, stenographer and clerical employees leaving their headquarters city

for the office where the "special" is being handled. Instead of having all of these communications put in the regular investigative file, this type of communication should be placed in a sub-file which can be given a number, for example, Sub-file A, and it can be entitled "Personnel Matters." With this sub-file in existence, any subsequent correspondence relating to personnel should be placed in that file and no copies be placed in the regular investigative file. Then, if the person in charge of the "special" or his assistants need any information regarding personnel, the same is readily available in one volume.

At about the same time the Bureau will probably issue instructions that a weekly communication should be forwarded to the Bureau setting forth cost data, and a sub-file should be opened for that phase. In other words, the Bureau will issue instructions to the office where the "special" is being handled to notify all offices to submit weekly communications relative to the extra cost involved. All of these communications should be placed in that particular sub-file and no copies should be placed in the main investigative file. For example, this section can be called Sub-file B and it can be entitled "Cost Data."

As soon as the newspapers start publishing their articles, there will be many newspaper articles and a sub-file should be opened which, for example, can be Sub-file C entitled "Newspaper Clippings." A copy of every newspaper item should be placed in this sub-file and, of course, an extra copy be



forwarded to the Bureau daily. In addition, these newspaper clippings should be reviewed for possible leads and all pertinent names appearing therein should be indexed. These newspaper clippings will, of course, be properly mounted, serialized and initialed before being placed in this sub-file.

The Bureau will generally issue instructions to submit a daily teletype summary, and it has been found advisable to place the regular copies in the regular investigative file; but an extra copy should be placed in a sub-file, for example, Sub-file D, entitled "Daily Summaries." By having an extra copy in this sub-file, one can readily refer to that file which will contain a day-by-day summary of the activities that have been described to the Bureau.

Of course, another sub-file should be opened which should contain instructions relative to the logs that are maintained at the commencement of the "special" in order that all such information will be readily available in one sub-file. It is also advisable to open a sub-file to contain an extra copy of "Narrative Memoranda."

Inasmuch as the telephone company will be contacted immediately and interviews will be had with various telephone officials, all of which will be recorded in memorandum form, it is deemed advisable to open a sub-file, which can be entitled "Confidential Telephone File," and all copies of memoranda submitted regarding the installation of telephones, contacts with the phone company, and so forth, should be

placed in this file and no copies at all be placed in the investigative file. Again, if one desires to know what has been done in connection with the telephone situation, this one sub-file is readily available and should contain all pertinent data.

As a rule, neighboring offices will be instructed by teletype or telephone calls to ship in to the interested office extra equipment that might be needed and in order to have this information available and in one file, a sub-file should be opened, which probably can be entitled "Equipment," and copies of all communications, and so forth, can be placed in this file so that the property man or Agent in charge of the property can readily have available and in one file all information relative to equipment that has been shipped in, rented or obtained from other sources.

If the major crime receives publicity, as it undoubtedly will, there will be many communications prepared relative to contacts with the press, TV or radio stations, and it has been found advisable to open a sub-file, which can be entitled "Press Services," and in this file a copy of the memoranda should be placed, whereas the original and other copies will be in the investigative file. Again, if any question comes up regarding the press, and so forth, a copy of every communication is in this one sub-file, which will be readily available.

A similar sub-file should be opened which can be entitled "Western Union." This sub-file should reflect results of contact with Western Union officials and, again, all copies of such communications should be placed in this sub-file.

In connection with a kidnaping case, the question of circularizing arises, and it has been found advisable to open a sub-file, which can be entitled "Ransom Circularization," and in this file should be placed an extra copy of each communication relating to this phase of the investigation. Of course, the original and other copies are in the investigative file, but, again, by having an extra copy in the sub-file, the person handling that particular phase will have at his fingertips copies of all communications relating to that matter.

When the unknown subject is identified and, for example, a wanted flyer or identification order is prepared, it has been found that the office supervisor in the case will on a number of occasions instruct other offices to circularize, for example, bus depots, barber shops, and so forth. When this is done, the other offices will send a letter or communication advising that the particular circularization has been done, and it has been found of an assistance to have a sub-file opened entitled, for example, "Wanted Flyer Circularization," and an extra copy of that communication is designated for that sub-file.

At the start of a kidnaping case, of course, written authority will be obtained from the victim's family or close

friends relative to checking mail at the Post Office, and it has been found advisable to open a sub-file, which can be entitled "Post Office File," and place therein all communications or memoranda relating to this phase of the investigation and do not place copies in the regular investigative file. If the person in charge, or someone else, desires to know what the situation is relative to the inquiry made or set up at the Post Office, this file will have all information in it.

It has also been found advisable to open a sub-file which will contain a copy of all memoranda or other communications which more or less contain "policy matters" or instructions given by the Bureau to the person handling the special assignment or contain suggestions, and so forth. The originals, of course, which would be memoranda, teletypes or airtels, would be placed in the investigative file, but a copy should be placed in this sub-file so that the same will be readily available to the person in charge or his assistants if any information is desired as to Bureau policy or instructions.

In addition, of course, an exhibit and 1-A files are opened and maintained similar to that in the regular field division office.

It has also been found advisable to open another file and to entitle it "Informants." As time goes on, all

offices, especially the office handling the "special," will be asked to contact all criminal informants, potential criminal informants, and other sources, and the office in question will probably submit an extra copy of FD-209

reflecting a contact with an informant, and instead of putting that in the investigative file, it should be designated for the sub-file. Likewise, other offices will from time to time send an airtel or letter reflecting results of their informants and, again, all copies should be placed in this sub-file.

At the commencement of each "special," as a rule, inquiries are conducted regarding transportation facilities and, as a result, much information, pamphlets, and so forth, will be obtained relative to airplane, train, bus, and other means of transportation, and it has been found advisable to place all copies of such information in a sub-file, which can be entitled "Transportation," so that the Special Agent handling that particular phase will have readily available in one file all such data.

Many green sheets, of course, will be prepared containing bulky exhibits and other pieces of evidence, and a sub-file should be opened containing an extra copy of those so that they will be readily available at any time.

As the case progresses, undoubtedly criminal records will be obtained from the Identification Division of the Bureau, and it has been found that instead of placing them in the investigative file that a sub-file should be opened and all criminal records be placed in this sub-file and, of course, indexed to that sub-file. Here again, one will have in a particular volume, or volumes, nothing but identification records which will be more readily available than having to go through the investigative file for them.

In connection with a kidnaping, the victim's family or relatives will undoubtedly receive a number of letters from "nuts," "crackpots," and from respectable people, and it has been found advisable that instead of placing these in the regular investigative file that a sub-file should be opened and they should be placed therein and, of course, indexed and serialized so that one, again, will have in one volume all such letters that have been received.

In connection with a kidnaping, one probably will receive at least one or more letters, and it has been found advisable to open a sub-file which will contain either photostatic copies or photographic copies of such letters which are known to come from the kidnaper. The purpose of this sub-file is so that Agents in connection with their

investigation can readily read and observe the type of communication that was sent and, of course, this file will have photographic copies and not the original.

As a rule in connection with a kidnaping case, there will be a large number of other extortion letters which are received and, of course, when it is readily known that such type of letters do not come from the kidnaper, separate Extortion (9) cases should be opened and handled by the personnel in the office and not by the men on the special assignment. However, in order to keep a record as to such letters, and so forth, it has been found advisable to open a sub-file and to see to it that an extra copy of the main communication to the Bureau is placed in this file.

For example, in connection with a kidnaping case, the first crackpot letter that is received can be given number "1," the next number "2," and so forth, then, as these new "9" cases are opened and a letter is sent to the Bureau in that "9" case, an extra copy should be designated for the sub-file and one can thereafter pick up this sub-file and readily observe just what other extortion letters have been received.

As the case progresses, one will receive many FBI Laboratory reports, and it has been found that instead of placing these in the regular investigative file that a sub-file should be opened and all copies should be filed in that sub-file after being serialized, indexed, and so forth,

so that one will have in one sub-file every FBI Laboratory report that has been submitted.

A similar sub-file can be opened up which should contain Latent Fingerprint Section communications.

~~Of course, a photograph file is also opened and~~  
maintained similar to that of the exhibit file.

The opening of the main investigative file and these sub-files, of course, is to conform with Bureau instructions relative to the operations of a CCO, and the items appearing in these sub-files, of course, are serialized, stamped, initialed, and so forth, and are indexed.

~~The main purpose in having such sub-files referred~~  
to above is so that during the early stages of the investigation of the major case, one can readily "put his finger" on certain communications or correspondence that the person in charge or his assistants may want to quickly or readily refer to.

Each major case may present different problems and in some types of cases one may want to open additional sub-files which again should contain only a copy of the communications or memorandum. For example, in almost every kidnaping case much investigation will be conducted relative to identifying the type of paper, and it has been found that in addition to filing the original and copy of the communication or memorandum in the main investigative file that



an extra copy be designated for a sub-file which can be entitled "Ransom Paper Project." The Agents handling that particular phase of the investigation will readily have available in one sub-file copies of all communications relating to that phase. The same would apply to possibly identifying a typewriter if a typewriter was used in the preparation of the ransom letter or letters.

After the regular investigative file and whatever sub-files that are needed are opened, the problem arises as to seeing to it that the information appearing in these files can be readily found and located when needed.

By this time, some clerical employee will have been designated as the Chief Clerk of the "special," or, as in some cases, a regular Chief Clerk will be brought in to the office where the "special" is being handled and at that time indices will have to be set up and organized.

The regular index in the ordinary CCO is broken down alphabetically by the name of the person or firm and then there will be indices for motor numbers of automobiles, guns, and a few other items; however, in connection with a "special," the Chief Clerk or one of the other clerks who will handle that phase should be instructed to immediately set up a number of other type of guide cards. For example, index cards will, of course, be filed alphabetically;

automobiles will be indexed and filed by motor number. The same should apply for guns, typewriters, and other items. In other words, special guide cards should be placed therein, for example, "Guns," "Typewriters."

~~As the case goes along, one may want other breakdowns~~ and guide cards can be placed therein. For example, guide cards can be made for the words "Bodies," "Bloody Cars," "Evidence," "Phone Numbers," and numerous other items.

In connection with the indices maintained in a "special," one should see to it that such items are marked for indexing and are indexed because as the case progresses many times an individual will recall some incident relating to a bloody car or a telephone number or to something else but cannot recall the name of the person involved; however, by having such breakdowns in the indices, one can readily refer to them and find the communication in question.

In addition, instead of making one index card, two index cards should be made. For example, Serial #1 will probably contain a memorandum of a Special Agent to the SAC reflecting that a Mr. JOHN SMITH, for example, of say Jones and Company, phoned and stated that his nephew, JOHN BLACK, was believed kidnaped and that JOHN BLACK is the president of Black Corporation. In

connection with this particular memorandum, which would be Serial #1 probably, one would readily see that the individual marking such communication for indexing will underline all four of the above names and duplicate index cards should be made with a little identifying data on each card, and the copy of these index cards will be filed in the "speical" indices while the original will subsequently be forwarded to the main CCO in that particualr field division for filing in their main and permanent indices.

The CCO of the field division, not the temporary special CCO, when they receive the above original four cards, should receive instructions that they are to search those cards, and if there are any references, they should be placed on the Indices Search Slip, FD-160, and returned to the "special squad" so that they can be assigned out and such references reviewed to determine whether or not any of the information may be of interest or value to the regular office or to the "special squad."

The regular CCO should also be instructed that after they have once received the index card, for example, on JOHN BLACK, and the clerk notes that there already has been a card filed referring to the "special case," they need not send back any additional Indices Search Slips, but only when they receive an index card bearing

a new name which has not been indexed to the "special case."

Say for example, the first memorandum, or Serial #1, made reference to the person phoning in stating that he had heard there was a "body" found in a certain lake and that he did not know whether that body might belong to the victim or not. The person marking communications for indexing would, of course, underline the word "body" in blue so that the clerks in the temporary CCO handling the "special" would then know that Serial #1 should be indexed under the caption of "Body." This procedure should likewise be followed for any similar breakdowns as mentioned above.

In addition, the CCO in charge of the "special squad" should obtain a file box,  $4\frac{1}{2}$  x  $5\frac{1}{2}$  x 10", in which 3"x5" cards can be filed. In this box there should be prepared guide cards for each of the field offices and they should be filed in alphabetical order, including guide cards for legal attaches, as well as a separate guide card for the Bureau and a separate guide card for the office in which the "special" is being handled: for example, Volume I which contains Serial #1, mentioned heretofore, which is a memorandum of a Special Agent in that office prepared for his SAC. The 3"x5" index card behind the office, for example, Denver, where the special

is being handled, should have typed in the center of the 3"x5" card, on top, "Denver."

On the first line on this card should be placed a little resume as to that particular serial. For example:

"S.1 SA BROWN memo 6/1/60, SAC re JOHN SMITH

phoning re disappearance of JOHN BLACK.

For example, Serial #2, in Volume I, would probably be the office teletype to the Bureau or would be a memorandum reflecting a phone call to the Bureau, and the guide card marked "Bureau" will have an index card and similar information will be placed on that card for Serial #2.

As the volumes containing the investigative file are made and each contains 25 serials, one of the clerical employees should be designated to see to it that this particular index box, with cards, is maintained up-to-date and as quickly as possible. The purpose of this particular box of cards is to show what communication has been sent to or received from a particular office or to the Bureau. For example, the Bureau guide card will later on have a number of cards and one can, by readily looking at these cards, get a resume or idea as to the gist of those communications referred to, and if the person in charge or one of his assistants asks for a particular piece of correspondence, by checking this special indices one can

readily find the same.

It is to be noted that separate index cards are not made for each serial. For example, behind the guide card marked "Bureau" will be at first only one index card and on that index card will be typed a resume of the contents of the communications, say, for example, for ten different serials, and that card, of course, is marked in the upper right-hand corner "1." When that card is filled, card "2" is placed behind it, card "3," and so forth.

To reiterate, the person in charge asks for a communication received from the Miami Office three weeks previously and one can go to this index box, look behind "Miami," look up and down the few cards that are there, and can readily locate the communication he is interested in.

In this box the section for the office where this "special" is being worked out of will, of course, have numerous cards and it has been found on many occasions to be of assistance to refer to that guide card, say, for example, "Denver," when looking for some communications, especially when the name of the person is not recalled, and by glancing up and down these cards one will quickly and readily find the communication desired. One clerical employee can generally be kept busy merely handling this phase of the project, as such employee, as new volumes are made, will take a volume and take this index box with the

cards and add such information on the necessary cards. To further explain it, for example, the New York Office sends a communication in to the Denver Office reflecting an interview with THOMAS JONES. This communication, after being serialized, is noted by the clerk who will add the serial number onto the index card of the New York Office showing that serial number so and so relates to interview with THOMAS JONES.

Going back to the special indices which are being maintained, it was mentioned before that the original card will go to the front office or to theCCO in that division while the copy will be retained in the special indices.

The special indices, of course, should be informative and should not merely contain the name of an individual, an automobile, an address, or something like that, and the serial number to which it relates.

For example, the inspector's assistant or No. 1 man, or whatever title he has, who handles the mail consisting of teletypes, reports, airtels and memoranda, generally should mark for indexing, by underlining in blue pencil, what items in that communication he believes should be indexed. Of course, at first, preference should be given to over-indexing, and by that is meant that in a particular communication almost every name, whether of

an individual or a firm, should be indexed. On many occasions telephone numbers of suspects or underworld characters should be marked for indexing, as well as possibly their addresses. In the meantime, of course, the special indices will have guide cards for such telephone numbers, addresses, and so forth. In addition, if the communication makes reference to a body or to some other item, that should be marked for indexing.

In other words, when that piece of correspondence leaves the desk of the inspector's assistant, No. 1 man, or whatever he is called, it is underlined in blue and, of course, is marked with other notations as to a copy being designated for a certain Agent or a lead slip, to be made, and so forth, and these items will be mentioned later.

If a capable clerical employee is obtained, such employee can be given instructions as to how to maintain the informative index, and after such employee gets the "knack," that employee can handle this phase of the work, thereby saving the services of a Special Agent who would otherwise have to dictate the same to a stenographer.

Such clerical employee in the temporary CCO of the "special," when he gets that communication, will, if there has been no previous index card made, make two index cards for the name of the suspect. The original, as mentioned before, will go to the regular CCO in that division; however, on these two cards the clerk will type a brief narrative,



for example, that Serial 25 reflects the suspect THOMAS WHITE was interviewed by the New York Office on a certain date and established an alibi. If the communication made reference to a body being found in a lake, the clerk would automatically know that under the guide card for "Bodies" there would be an index card and on that index card he would put a sentence or two reflecting what that communication said regarding the body referred to therein.

In other words, a clerical employee properly instructed can maintain this special indices which has been set up for the "special squad." In addition, if these clerical employees are instructed properly, they will be always on the alert for typing in names, addresses, telephone numbers, and other items as such information is being recorded on such cards.

For example, the indices may have a card for a certain individual being an ex-convict and as being a possible suspect. A week or two later another communication comes to that clerk's attention wherein references is made to a similar name of an individual who might have had a suspicious car in his possession. As those two names are matched up, an alert clerical employee will call it to the attention of someone who can determine what further action can be taken.

The person in charge of the clerical employees, who can be referred to as the temporary Chief Clerk, will, of course, see that the communications, memoranda, and so forth are serialized

and disseminated into the proper files or sub-files and so forth, and will also see that the operation of the temporary CCO is being handled in accordance with Bureau instructions for a regular CCO.

A fourth clerical employee will always find other similar duties and, as mentioned before, if at least four clerical employees are assigned at the start, one can, as a rule, keep up with the indexing, serializing and recording, as this is an important phase of the Bureau's work, and if there are not enough clerical employees, these matters get behind and one will never get caught up.

Bulky exhibits, of course, should be filed and retained in accordance with existing Bureau instructions, and in some cases it is advisable to obtain a large metal cabinet into which can be placed items and evidence which is obtained in connection with the "special." This locked cabinet should, of course, be located in the temporary CCO so that such items are available to the Agents on the "special" rather than having to go into the special room generally maintained by the office in question.

In connection with "special" assignments, it is well to immediately notify all offices to furnish at least three copies of all reports, teletypes, airtels, memoranda, and so forth, in order that an extra copy may be available for the sub-files if occasion arises.

SETTING UP OF LEAD BOXES ON  
SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT CASES

In connection with a special assignment in a field division, ~~the official in charge of the special assignment~~ will generally designate a Special Agent to handle the leads.

The first thing that should be done is to obtain about eight wooden or metal index card boxes,  $4\frac{1}{2} \times 5\frac{1}{2} \times 10$ ", which will contain 3"x5" index cards. The first box to be set up should be a box containing guide cards and these guide cards should contain the typewritten name of each Agent who is going to work on the "special."

On a special assignment a number of Special Agents will be brought in from other offices and, as a rule, a certain number of Special Agents from the local office in which the crime was committed will be assigned to work under the inspector in charge or other Bureau official. At first, one generally is not acquainted with all personnel and it is a good idea to prepare these guide cards by color, possibly type the name of the Agents in on special assignment on a card which will have a white background and say, for example, the Agents assigned to the local office will have a green background tab. The person handling the leads will then readily know as to what Agents are local Agents and as to what Agents are visiting, which will greatly assist him at the commencement of the case.

In addition, at the end of the guide cards should be set up guides for the Resident Agents who from time to time will be covering leads in connection with this "special." This box, of course, containing these guide cards, should be marked "Agents."

Another similar box should be set up containing guide cards for the Bureau and all offices. These guide cards should be filed alphabetically, with the Bureau guide card at the front.

As it will be noted, the above two index boxes relate to Special Agents and to offices, and into these two boxes will be placed the lead cards, to be described hereinafter, which are prepared for a Special Agent covering a lead or for a particular office which has been requested to cover a lead. In addition to these two boxes, sometimes the individual handling this phase of the investigation might desire to have two similar extra boxes made; that is, one for the Special Agents and one for the Bureau and field offices, in order that a copy of the lead slip, after the lead has been covered, can be placed behind the Agent's name or behind the office; however, maintaining these two boxes involves extra work and sometimes is not essential.

The two or three extra lead card boxes should then have placed therein guide cards under

various headings, which will be explained in more detail hereinafter.

After the inspector or Bureau official handling the case looks over each piece of correspondence, such as teletypes, airtels, letters, memoranda, or reports, he will generally make some notations thereon as to "leads," or other comments as to what he believes should be done or not done and after he initials it, it is routed on to the Special Agent assigned to reviewing same to make up leads.

For example, an airtel will come in from an eastern office stating that someone there reported JOHN BROWN as being a suspect inasmuch as JOHN BROWN is an ex-convict and lives in the same city where the crime occurred. On this communication, for example, an airtel, a notation is made, such as: "Make suspect lead card." The communication is then marked for indexing with blue pencil and such pertinent information will be underlined, such as the suspect's name, possibly his address or telephone number, license number of his car, if given, and motor number of car, if given. If it is known to whom the lead is going to be assigned, the second copy should then contain the name of the Agent who will get the lead and a notation is made thereon: "Lead slip to follow." If there is any question as to the handling of that lead, and so forth, there will be written opposite

the name of the Agent a notation to see the particular Special Agent assigning that lead.

The original of this communication, which will contain possibly comments or notations of the inspector or Bureau official handling the case, as well as the blue markings, and so forth, should always be retained in the investigative file and the second copy should be charged out to the Agent who is to handle the lead. The third copy, of course, can likewise be retained in the investigative file unless some reason exists that the third copy should be placed in one of the sub-files previously discussed, and if so, a notation is made on the original and copy of the effect that a copy has been designated for a particular sub-file.

The communications, memoranda, and so forth, after being properly marked for indexing, and so forth, will then be picked up by the Chief Clerk handling the special assignment and that party will serialize these communications into volumes containing only 25 serials apiece. As mentioned heretofore, these volumes will then be taken by the other clerical employees and index cards will be prepared, as related previously.

The Special Agent or individual handling the leads will also several times a day take these particular volumes and dictate lead cards.

For example, an Agent will pick up Volume V,

"S. BROWN has copy above reflecting Mrs. MABEL WHITE, 1000 Peach Street, City, phoned on a certain date and believed above should be considered ~~as suspect inasmuch as he is ex-convict~~ and lives in vicinity where victim worked or lived. Check office and special case indices. Ascertain whereabouts pertinent date. Show photo, compare prints, handle as regular suspect."

After the stenographer types this lead, consisting of three copies, it is advisable to blockstamp either the front or back of it and place the Agent's name to whom the lead is assigned on all three copies. If one knows that a certain Agent is to get the lead, he can dictate that to the stenographer at the same time and she can type the Agent's name and date on the lead in addition to the blockstamp.

When this lead is dictated, a notation is then made on the original communication that this lead was dictated and one can merely write the word "done" with his initials and date after the notation: "Make suspect lead slip."

When these leads are returned by the stenographer, the original, of course, should be placed in the lead box for "Agents" behind the name of the Agent in question.

The second copy of this same lead is then routed to the Agent who is to handle the lead or investigation.

One will still have a third copy of this lead and, as mentioned above, there will be extra lead card boxes and inasmuch as this lead relates to a particular suspect, an index tab card should be made on which will appear the name of this suspect and that is filed in the lead box alphabetically and the third copy of the lead slip will be placed behind that.

In other words, if an inquiry is made as to who was handling a certain suspect, one can go to this box and look under the name of the person - suspect, and there will be a copy of that lead slip in that section reflecting the name of the Agent to whom assigned.

In some major cases one may have many, many suspects who have to be investigated and checked out and there will be a number of these tab cards with the name of the suspect appearing thereon.

As each "special" case develops, one may want to have different projects or breakdowns. For example, one may want to have a breakdown entitled "Crime Scene."

In regard to the crime scene investigation, possibly ten Agents may be assigned to it or in that area and as these leads are made, the original, as mentioned above, is placed behind the Agent's name, the second copy



is given to the Agent, and the third copy goes behind the section entitled "Crime Scene." By picking up these leads behind the section "Crime Scene," one may readily note or observe what Agents have assignments that relate to that particular matter.

For example, one may desire to set up a subsection entitled "Hats," inasmuch as a hat may have been found at the scene of the crime. Although one Agent may possibly be assigned to handle and coordinate the hat project, still there might be a hundred leads made for individuals to be checked out who bought or owned similar hats. One can see that as these leads are made up and assigned to say twenty Agents, the original lead slip is behind the Agent's name, the second copy goes to him, and the third copy would go behind the subsection "Hats."

Each special assignment case presents its own problems as to what subheadings have to be placed into these lead box sections and the following are a few:

- Victim's home affairs
- Victim's business affairs
- Victim's route men
- Typewriter project
- Paper project
- Dodge project
- Bloody car project

Body project

Hideout project

Terrain search project

By having these leads set forth above, one can look into the one box for Agents and readily account for, and observe, each lead that is assigned to that particular Agent or what project he is handling or working on.

Each Special Agent working on the squad, of course, will have the second copy of the lead slip and at any time he can be called to the desk and have his leads compared and checked with the ones appearing behind his name.

The third copy, as mentioned above, will be in the various boxes under the various projects.

If possible, it is best to line up the suspects and projects in alphabetical order; that is, the first sub-card could be for a suspect named JOHN ABBOTT, the next sub-card in back of him could be MIKE BLACK, the third sub-card would be "Crime Scene." In other words, these sections of the index boxes should be placed alphabetically if possible.

By having the above type of setup, one can readily find or know who is working on certain projects or who is handling certain suspects.

When an Agent handles a lead, say, for example, on a certain suspect, and he dictates, it is well to have

instructions issued to have the Agent's lead card, which is the second copy, marked by him that it is either covered or done and have him place his initials in the blockstamp and give it to the stenographer so it will accompany the memorandum or stencil or communication that he has prepared, and when it comes back over the desk, that lead slip is then noted. If it is marked "done" or "covered," the original lead slip behind the Agent's name in the Agents' lead box should then be removed.

If one has the extra box, described above, containing the guide cards for Agents' names, this original can then be placed in that box, which can be referred to as a "closed" box, behind the Agent's name. If this box is maintained, it gives a ready reference as to all leads that have been assigned to an Agent while working on the "special;" however, as a rule, it does not serve any other purpose and sometimes is not used.

With the original lead slip being filed in the box referred to above, one should then go to the other lead box, under the name of the suspect, which will contain the third copy of the lead slip. That lead slip can then be destroyed and it should be replaced with the second copy of the lead slip containing the Agent's initials and notation that the lead was done.

Say, for example, one wants to note or obtain a brief resume as to what was developed at the crime scene area, one can refer to the index box and look at all of

the lead slips behind "Crime Scene," and if and when that investigation is done, all of those lead slips should be marked "done" or "covered" and have the Agent's initials thereon, and by looking at this group of lead slips, one will get a brief resume as to whom was talked to in that area or what evidence was found, and so forth. Once in a while one will ask as to what was the name of a certain person interviewed down near the crime scene, and by glancing through these closed lead slips, one can possibly come up with the name as it will probably appear on one of the leads.

As mentioned previously, one will also have a lead box containing leads for other offices, which lead box should have guide cards filed alphabetically. Instructions will have to be given to the stenographers first that whenever they prepare a teletype, airtel, or letter, they should prepare an original and one copy of a lead slip for that office, which lead slip is prepared in a similar manner to that prepared for leads to Agents; however, in the upper left-hand corner instead of having the name of the city or village, there should appear the name of the office which will be covering the lead and not the name of a particular city in a field division.

Say, for example, an Agent handling TOM BROWN - Suspect, has information which has to be checked out and

verified by nother office. He will dictate an airtel setting forth his information and specific lead. The stenographer, after being instructed, will automatically prepare this lead slip with a little resume of the information appearing thereon, and as that airtel comes over the desk, and after being signed, the copies with the lead slip will be routed on to the CCO handling the special assignment; however, it is advisable to make a notation in the lower left-hand corner, on the top of the copies, for example, "NYC lead made." The lead slip is not detached but goes along with the copies of the correspondence, and in the CCO handling the special project, after that communication is serialized, the serial number is placed on these two lead slips, in pencil, and then the lead is sent back to the desk and, of course, the original of the lead will be placed behind the tab, for example, "New York," and the second copy of the lead will be placed behind the tab for that particular suspect in the lead box. The Agent handling this suspect or dictating the airtel does not need a copy of this lead for the reason that he should be aware as to what he is doing and has done regarding that suspect. He also knows that at any time he can come to the desk and look in the index lead box and look behind the name of his

suspect and he will see copies of the various leads that have been made in connection with that suspect and will give him a bird's-eye view as to what leads are outstanding in other offices regarding his suspect.

By having this office lead box, one can keep tab on other offices to see that they are covering all leads they have been instructed to handle, and if such leads are delinquent, their attention can be called to same by routing slip or other communication.

When a particular office covers a lead and their communication comes over the desk, the original lead slip behind the name of that office is then pulled and it is advisable to make a notation thereon, for example, "Done NYC airtel (certain date)." Inasmuch as that lead makes reference to a certain suspect, the guide card for the name of the suspect should be referred to and the original lead slip can be placed behind that guide card reflecting the investigation was done.

As mentioned above, the remaining copy, instead of being destroyed, can be placed in the "closed" box for all offices, which will give one a picture of what leads other offices have covered.

As will be noted from the above lead cards and boxes, if someone is later on interested in re-checking back on a particular project or suspect,

he can look in the lead boxes, under the name of the suspect, to determine what leads have been set out and, of course, they will contain the serial number which he probably wants, or else he can go to the regular indices which are maintained in the CCO for the "special squad" and check those indices, which will give a resume as to the different communications.

Especially at the start of the investigation, many leads will be made, some of which may not need to be covered later and many leads will be unassigned. An index box or two will have to be obtained and proper breakdowns or subheadings placed therein, for example, "Suspects," "Dodge Car Project," "Typewriter Project," and so forth. The leads, as they are typed, consisting of three copies, and which are unassigned, will then be placed behind the respective subheadings, such as "Typewriter Project," "Hat Project," and so forth. As investigation progresses, one can then look in these lead boxes and see what leads should be assigned as they are filed behind the various subheadings.

As one knows, in a special assignment case more important leads have to be handled at first, but some types of leads cannot be handled until certain phases of other investigations have been completed, and if there are special leads like this, they should be placed in a separate subheading, properly marked and identified, to be given special attention later on when an active or open investigation is made.

In regard to lead cards or slips being retained for a minimum of thirty days and thereafter being destroyed at the discretion of the officer in charge of the investigation, it is believed well to retain all such lead slips until the case has actually been disposed of and closed, as oftentimes reference is made to inquiries that were made many months previously.



**LAW ENFORCEMENT LIAISON**  
**MAJOR CASE AND KIDNAPING TRAINING**

In any major case, including kidnaping, close liaison would be established with law enforcement agencies in the area where the crime was committed. This liaison should include closest possible relationship with state, county and city police, to insure that any information coming to the attention of these agencies is obtained without delay.

To effect this coverage the inspector or official in charge of the investigation will immediately assign Special Agents, probably on a twenty-four hour a day basis, to the headquarters of the city police department, the state police headquarters; and in a case which occurs in a rural county, to the appropriate county sheriff's office.

Initial arrangements should be made through the head of the respective department. Ideally, some officer in each police agency will be assigned to handle the case for his department. At the time of the initial contact, the Agent should explain the necessity of his being immediately advised of all information possibly related to the case. The Agent should request that instructions be issued that information received should be immediately brought to the Bureau Agent's attention. It should be specifically requested that all communications, such as telephone calls and letters, be referred to a particular officer's office and that all individuals calling in person at the department be sent to that office so that the Agent will be able to immediately obtain and furnish the information to the Number 1 Man on the case.

It should be pointed out that the information desired should include any reports pertaining to suspicious persons who could have committed the offense. The officers should be requested to furnish the identity of any individual and any information in their records concerning individuals in their jurisdiction who have come to their attention and who might be considered suspects. They should also be requested to furnish information concerning missing persons or the disappearance of persons from the area under suspicious circumstances, particularly when these occurred at the time of the crime.

The officers should be alerted as to the items which might be pertinent to the case and should be requested to be on the lookout for and to furnish any information concerning abandoned automobiles, as well as reports as to the location of clothing, guns, typewriters, jewelry or other items found, which might be connected with the case. The officers should be requested to immediately advise of any reports received of automobiles containing bloodstains or of any unanswered suspicious reports pertaining to bloodstains anywhere.

The officers should be requested to report murders and suicides, and it should be pointed out that advice is particularly desired if a report is received of a finding of a body that is possibly the victim. Arrangements should be made to instruct all patrolmen, investigators and dispatchers so that if a report of the finding of a body is received, the member receiving this initial information should see to it that nothing is done to disturb the area, and also insure the area is closely guarded and not disturbed.

The police should be asked to preserve the crime scene until Bureau Agents arrive and make a thorough crime-scene search. In cases of sheriff's offices or other rural police, it may be well to point out the advisability of having available about 500 feet of rope for possible use in protecting the area where the body is found.

There will be other special projects that the Agents will be required to handle at the local law enforcement offices, which might include:

(1) Examination of stolen car and stolen license reports and a check to see if any of these stolen automobiles or licenses could have been used in the crime. Particular attention should be given to cars stolen before the crime and not yet located.

(2) A check may be required of Auto Theft Bureau records for suspicious automobiles of a particular make or description similar to automobiles observed in the vicinity of the crime scene.

(3) A check of identification records of the various departments would be required on all suspects developed during the investigation of the various projects.

Under an ideal situation when the Bureau enters a major case, the law enforcement body in whose area the offense occurred would state they were taking no action independent of that being taken by the Bureau, that they would turn all information over to the Bureau and would render all possible assistance to the FBI.

In the Coors kidnaping case, however, the sheriff in whose county the offense occurred, even though his department was conducting little or no active investigation, furnished stories to the press, radio and television on a daily basis, claiming to be making inquiries and to be investigating clues. The sheriff himself was soon determined to be thoroughly unreliable and uncooperative. On the other hand, his undersheriff, NA, and Captain of Investigations, both competent and reliable officers, were completely cooperative. Liaison was set up with the undersheriff and Captain of Investigations, and no contact was had with the sheriff on official matters.

The Agent should furnish no information concerning the case to local officers other than such information as is necessary to carry out a specific inquiry. In other words, information should be furnished only on a "need-know" basis. Any inquiry by the local officers as to the status of the investigation could be answered by replying that the case is still under active investigation, but that any pertinent developments of interest to local authorities will be made known to them.

It should be borne in mind that local law enforcement officers and other local officials will possibly not afford proper secrecy to information pertaining to major cases which have publicity appeal due to the interest of these officers and officials in politics and in receiving publicity. Experience has shown that each department has its chain of command in such a way that subordinate officers must advise their superiors of significant information. Then too, in a major case agreements

will exist between the various agencies as to action to be taken. For instance, if a body of a victim is located in a particular county, the coroner will immediately advise the sheriff and the District Attorney. These local officials most likely will immediately advise the press media.

From the above, it is apparent that all possible arrangements must be made to protect the crime scene and as thorough an investigation conducted of the area as possible prior to the arrival of the coroner, Sheriff and District Attorney, as the entry of these individuals into the case will preclude any further possibility of investigating without being hampered by press and curiosity seekers.

When a major case such as a kidnaping occurs, members of the press will be stationed on a twenty-four hour a day basis at the headquarters offices of the law enforcement agencies in the area. Any Bureau Agent stationed at these headquarters must take every precaution to be sure that no remark or action on his part provides a story prejudicial to the best interests of the case.

Kidnapings, of course, are ordinarily cases of national interest, therefore every local politician may desire to get into the picture in order to enhance his political future. For instance, the Sheriff and District Attorney of the county in which the kidnaping occurred will undoubtedly attempt to drain every possible iota of publicity out of the kidnaping without any consideration as to whether or not their seeking of publicity interferes

with the conduct and investigation of the case. For example, a kidnaping may occur in one county and the remains of the victim may be found in a second county. In such a case it becomes necessary to have arrangements in both counties to handle any situation which might arise.

In the Coors case, the District Attorney and the Sheriff of  
the county in which the kidnaping occurred, as well as the county in which the remains of the victim were found, were all publicity seekers. Under the laws of the State of Colorado, when any human remains are discovered the coroner of the county must be notified immediately. In COORNAP, a man who was firing a pistol in the county discovered the clothes of the victim and immediately reported his finding to the Denver Office. This, of course, presented the problem as to whether or not the coroner of the county in which the clothes were found should be notified. If so, it would be incumbent on the coroner to immediately notify the District Attorney of his county. This problem was resolved by maintaining absolute silence and taking twenty-six Agents into the wooded area and making a thorough search for skeletal remains. This silence was maintained for three days. Meanwhile, such bones as were found were submitted to a pathologist who agreed to maintain absolute silence and at the end of three days advised the Denver Office that some of the bones which had been found were of human origin. Upon this discovery it was believed it was absolutely essential the coroner in whose county the remains had been found should be notified. It was explained to the coroner that a search of the area which surrounded a dump resulted in the location of numerous bones and that it was not until

after examination by the pathologist, whose report had just been received, that definite knowledge existed that human skeletal remains had been found.

This, of course, caused considerable consternation and angered the Sheriff, District Attorney and coroner in the county in which the remains were found. The Sheriff publicly announced he felt this was a most uncooperative attitude on the part of the FBI. The District Attorney came to the Denver Office and demanded all evidence in this case be turned over to him, threatening the SAC with grand jury action, subpoenas and various other types of threats; however, the evidence was not turned over to him. At a later date he was given a list of the evidence which had been obtained by the Bureau. The Sheriff of the county in which the evidence was found finally, after his first outburst, had nothing further to say in the matter; however, the Sheriff of the county in which the kidnaping occurred made a considerable amount of news by flying out to Seattle to pick up the subject of the case who was returned to Denver by Bureau Agents. This Sheriff then took his grievance to the press and finally ended up by stating his office was no longer open to Agents of the Bureau.

This matter is being included in this write-up since it is very pertinent to anticipate in advance exactly how law enforcement officers and agencies are to be handled in the event they become obstreperous. It is also to be noted the District Attorney in both counties mentioned above, were candidates for re-election and as a consequence tried to use this case to enhance their chances for re-election; however, because of the

Bureau maintaining its silence and no-comment attitude in connection with the case and because of the loud ravings of these individuals, both were defeated for re-election.

In conclusion, it should again be pointed out that the primary purpose of establishing an Agent at headquarters of police departments or other law enforcement agencies at the time of a kidnaping or other major case is to insure that any information received by these departments is immediately routed to the FBI.



## LIALON WITH THE TELEPHONE COMPANY

The immediate problem in setting up a tracing operation is to determine the bounds within which it will be necessary to operate. In the Coors case, the Special Agent in Charge of the Special Squad determined at the outset that no interruption of service or noise on the Coors' telephone line could be evident to any person telephoning the residence. The life of the Victim was in the balance. How do you go about setting up a tracing operation under these conditions? Here is how it was done in Denver:

### CONFERENCE WITH TELEPHONE COMPANY OFFICIALS

Original contact was made with the Chief Special Agent of the Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. (M S T & T Co.) on the day the Bureau entered the case. This individual had a wide knowledge of telephone procedures and was acquainted with key technical and managerial personnel of the company. These people are the essential ingredients for a successful tracing operation.

The Chief Special Agent called a meeting of key personnel to map out a workable tracing arrangement. In attendance were.

1. Chief Special Agent
  2. Supervising Service Foreman of the toll equipment section.
- This foreman in Denver is responsible for supervision of all toll equipment including the Direct Distance Dialing (DDD) equipment. His is a very technical type of position and his knowledge of long distance circuits and procedures is almost unlimited. The equipment under his supervision is valued at

\$15,000,000. His long distance equipment accounts for a great portion of telephone company revenue.

3. Plant Superintendent having responsibility for the area in which the Coors residence telephone was served.
4. Supervising Service Foreman of the telephone exchange from which the Coors residence was served.
5. District Traffic Superintendent who is responsible for all Denver long distance operations.
6. Two sound trained FBI Special Agents.

The meeting was held at one of the local telephone exchanges in the office of the Plant Superintendent. This was done to avert the possibility of press notice. Our requirements for coverage of the Coors residence telephone were discussed in detail. Ways and means of securing such coverage were left to the individuals most familiar with each operation. None of the individuals were able to state specifically at the meeting just exactly how the complete operation would be undertaken but all left the meeting with a firm idea of the problems involved and immediately began to develop a workable system of tracing the calls.

COORS RESIDENCE, NATIONAL 9-4455, MORRISON, COLORADO

The Coors residence was served from the Morrison, Colorado, telephone exchange. Morrison is a suburb some fourteen miles from Denver. The telephone exchange at Morrison is normally unattended except during daylight hours. The equipment in use at this exchange is known as "step-by-step" equipment. This means simply, each time a digit of the telephone number is dialed, the switching equipment "steps"

for each dial pulse until the connection is made.

A direct call to the Coors residence telephone could be made from any other telephone in the Morrison exchange (NAtional 9) by dialing the number. The NAtional 9 area consisted of the small town of Morrison, several smaller mountain communities and twenty-eight ~~isolated public telephone pay stations throughout this mountainous area.~~

It became necessary at this point to establish twenty-four hour a day coverage at the local exchange so that supervisory telephone company personnel could visually trace all local telephone calls to the residence. The entire telephone exchange building was blacked out so that no one would be aware that any activity was in progress within the building.

Long distance calls to Morrison, (and this included those from Denver) were routed over thirteen long distance operator trunks and through Direct Distance Dialing equipment at the toll section of the Denver telephone building.

It was necessary that a means be found so that the supervisor on duty at the exchange could be alerted of all calls going to the Coors residence telephone. This was accomplished by placing a "ringer" across the Coors telephone line. The "ringer" is merely a telephone bell which rings in an identical manner to that of the bell on the telephone at the Coors residence. It has no effect on the telephone circuit.

When the "ringer" rang, the supervisor on duty could determine in a matter of seconds whether the call to the Coors residence was coming from a local NAtional 9 telephone or whether it was an incoming call by long distance.

If the call was being made from a local number within his own exchange, he could visually trace the call within a matter of seconds and determine from what local area telephone the call was being made.

If the call was coming by long distance from Denver, he could immediately determine on which of the thirteen trunks from Denver the call was coming in on.

This is the only tracing he could do.

Local calls were simple to trace. All equipment in the exchange was contained in one small room.

Long distance calls were a different matter. The Morrison supervisor needed to immediately notify the toll section at Denver so that tracing operations from that point could be started.

CENTRAL CONTROL POINT

The tracing operation was controlled from the office of the Supervising Service Foreman of the toll section at the Denver main telephone building. This office and associated equipment occupy an entire floor of the main telephone building. Doors to this space can be opened only by authorized personnel through use of a coded dialing system. It is a key facility.

The office was equipped with two toll tandem lines as well as four local telephone lines. Denver had not converted to Direct Distance Dialing (DDD) at the time the Coors case began, but the toll tandem lines could do the same thing as DDD, only better. It might be well to furnish a brief summary of DDD as this is necessary to explain how the toll tandem operates and a toll tandem line is the key to the successful operation of a tracing system such as was used.

With DDD, to call the FBI in San Francisco from Denver, it is first necessary to dial 112. This serves to actuate the DDD equipment. Then it is necessary to dial 415, which places the call into the San Francisco main toll center equipment. Then it is necessary to dial Londike 2-2155, the actual number of the San Francisco office.

As soon as this operation is completed, an operator comes on the line to secure the number from which you are calling. This is for billing purposes. As soon as she has done this, the call is put through without any further action on the part of the calling party. (This is known as a CAMA operation, Customer Automatic Message Accounting.)

Some cities have a completely automatic system in which all data necessary for billing purposes is punched on a tape and no operator breaks in to secure the number of the calling party. (This is known as AMA operation, Automatic Message Accounting.)

The toll tandem cuts out one whole operation of DDD. To call our San Francisco number, it is only necessary to pick up the tandem, dial the area code of 415, plus the number of the San Francisco Office. No operator comes on the line to secure the number as no toll charge is necessary. It's almost like making a local call, except for the extra three digits. The toll tandem line is used almost exclusively by supervisory toll personnel to talk to other supervisory toll personnel in distant cities, much as the ordinary individual dials local calls. This is truly an investigative aid, but to the telephone company it is merely a means to secure instant communication to any city in the United States. Only three toll tandem lines were available in the telephone building, two in the toll tandem supervisor's office.

and the other in the office of the President of M S T & T Co.

From the toll tandem office, the central control point of the tracing operation, (except for local Morrison, Colorado, calls within the NAtional 9 exchange), it became necessary to devise a system of rapid communication between Denver and Morrison as all calls to Morrison could appear at several different places in the main Denver telephone building.

Let us consider this communications problem:

When the Morrison exchange supervisor located a call coming to the Coors residence on one of the thirteen long distance trunks from Denver, quick action had to be taken at the Denver exchange to locate the particular call while the calling party was still on the line, otherwise no trace could be made of the call.

The only available means of communication from Denver to Morrison was by way of one of the thirteen long distance lines, but this wasn't fast enough. It meant lifting up a phone at Denver or Morrison and calling the other by long distance. Only two phones were available at the Morrison exchange and during the time a call was being received at the Coors residence, the supervisor was much too busy trying to trace the call to stop and get on the telephone.

The answer was the installation of a continuously operating telephone circuit between the Denver toll office and the Morrison exchange through use of one of the thirteen long distance lines.

At the Morrison exchange, a telephone handset was mounted in the center of the equipment room.

At the Denver toll office, a speaker telephone set was installed.

A speaker telephone is the type used by many executives to free their hands when making telephone calls. It consists of a small speaker and a built-in microphone so that the user of such a set can talk in a normal tone of voice and anyone in the room can hear the incoming conversation over the speaker. No handset is used.

Thus, when a call came to the Coors residence over long distance equipment from Denver, the supervisor on duty at Morrison immediately determined on which of the thirteen long distance trunks the call was coming from and shouted the number of the trunk into the speaker phone system to alert the supervisor on duty at Denver.

The supervisor at the Denver toll office then had to take prompt action to trace the call. His problem was magnified somewhat because each long distance call to the Coors residence could originate in one of three ways and there was no way of telling which way was in use until checks were made at various equipment centers within the telephone building. It was a matter similar to locating a fire in a building when you don't know on which floor the fire is burning.

Originating points were as follows:

1. Through a Denver long distance operator. (Two floors of equipment and operators and an overload long distance exchange located at an east Denver exchange some five miles away.)
2. Through terminal grade trunks from a number of cities in Colorado, Wyoming and New Mexico. (Located on one floor.)
3. Through Direct Distance Dialing equipment.

(Located adjacent to the toll tandem office.)

Each had its own separate problems of tracing and each will now be covered in some detail:

A. LONG DISTANCE OPERATOR CALLS

Telephone company craft employees were kept on duty twenty-four hours a day in the equipment room at Denver where the thirteen trunks from Morrison, Colorado, originated. When a trace alert arrived from Morrison to the toll tandem office, the craft employee was notified by loud speaker to visually determine where a particular call was coming from. For example, if he was notified that a call was coming in on Trunk 7, the craft employee went to Trunk 7 where he could determine whether the call was coming from a Denver long distance operator or from a long distance operator in some distant city. He would immediately relay this information back to the toll tandem supervisor's office.

If the call originated from a Denver long distance operator, the toll supervisor would call the three Denver Chief Operators, each responsible for a unit of long distance operators. Each Chief Operator would then unobtrusively walk down a line of long distance operators and pick up all their long distance toll tickets, locate the one directed to the Coors residence and notify the toll supervisor where the call was coming from as the originating telephone number appears on the toll ticket.

It might be noted at this point that the picking up of toll tickets by the Chief Operator is a normal procedure but the timing in a tracing operation is most important. Any lag would result in searching through a greater number of toll tickets.

The Chief Operators were briefed as to what they were doing but the many long distance operators were unaware that a tracing



operation was in progress.

One small loophole existed in this system but it could not be avoided other than by direct tracing of each call and this could not be done in this case. Why? To make a direct trace, it is necessary to "hold-up" or "slug" each circuit involved in the call, starting at the called party and following it back to the originating point. ~~This would~~ very likely alert the calling party because of the clicks which would be heard on the line every time a "slug" was inserted into the switching mechanism. It would mean having telephone company employees on duty twenty-four hours a day at each telephone exchange in the city of Denver and surrounding suburban areas. Each employee would have to be able to communicate instantly with each other employee. A direct trace can be made only from one exchange to the next and a call may go through many exchanges. A "slug" must be inserted at each exchange before you can go on to the next exchange. This takes time and manpower of such magnitude that it is not feasible for any extended period of time. The call can be traced only while the actual call is taking place. As soon as the calling party hangs up, the trace is lost except to the points where the call has been "slugged."

The loophole mentioned was this: the calling party merely had to give the long distance operator an incorrect number for the one from which the call was actually being placed, but this in itself is a risk for the calling party. An alert long distance operator can detect that a wrong number is being given and will refuse to place the call under such circumstances. She might not check a call coming from AComa 2-1234 if the calling party said he was calling from AComa 2-1235,

but if the calling party was calling from BELmont 3-1234 and he said he was calling from AComa 2-1234, he would not get away with it. Even in the first example, the operator, if suspicious, could re-dial the number AComa 2-1234 and if this line did not show a busy signal, the ruse would not work. Even in the first example where a wrong number was given, we would still have the city the call came from if long distance and at least the approximate area if a local call. During the operation of the tracing system, no incorrect numbers were noted and all were traceable.

If the call originated from a distant city long distance operator, the supervisor used the facilities of the toll tandem in his office. He dialed the distant city Chief Operator, briefly explained his problem, giving no more information than was necessary, and asked the Chief Operator to collect all pending toll tickets and locate the one directed to NAtional 9-4455 at Morrison, Colorado. — This is not an unusual procedure and the toll supervisor has a job of such responsibility that a Chief Operator will not ordinarily question his orders. In the few instances where a Chief Operator in a distant city hesitated, the Denver toll supervisor was prepared to call his counterpart toll supervisor in the distant city. Usually, the mere statement that he was prepared to make such a call or that he would call the Chief Special Agent or a Traffic Superintendent (the Chief Operator's boss) was enough to resolve the hesitation. The cardinal principle here involved, is that a toll tandem supervisor knows his way around, knows telephone company parlance and operating procedure. If he can't get the job done one way, he knows who to

contact to get the job done. As a result, no failures were involved in obtaining the pertinent toll ticket in a minimum of time.

### B. CALLS THROUGH TERMINAL GRADE TRUNKS

A terminal grade trunk is one by which a long distance operator in a distant city can dial a number in the same manner as a long distance operator located in Denver. Thus, for example, a long distance operator in Cheyenne, Wyoming, could plug into a Denver terminal grade trunk and place a call to Morrison, Colorado, in the same manner as a Denver long distance operator. It is just an extension off the Denver long distance board, although it covers a lot of miles. This did not create much of a problem as the craft employee soon recognized that a terminal grade trunk was being used and he notified the toll tandem supervisor who then placed a call to the Chief Operator in the distant city and the same procedure was followed as outlined above.

### C. DIRECT DISTANCE DIALING (DDD) EQUIPMENT

When the Coors case occurred, Denver was not equipped to handle DDD calls but all the equipment for this method of dialing was installed in the toll office and the system of tracing calls which went through this equipment was developed by the Supervising Service Foreman of the toll section and several of his toll supervisors. As will be recalled, the Supervising Service Foreman of the toll section attended the original meeting of telephone company officials.

He returned to his office late in the afternoon, held over several of his toll supervisors, and they all went to work on the problem.

By 3:00 A.M., the system was completed, tested and placed into operation. The ingenuity of this operation cannot be over-emphasized

as it eventually saved countless hours of manpower and alerted toll personnel in Denver that a call was proceeding to the Coors residence even before the Coors telephone rang.

Tracing became an instantaneous operation.

The technical aspects of this system are much too extensive for review at this point, but in layman's language the following took place:

The DDD equipment in Denver is described as a 4A Crossbar System. The crossbar switching system was developed by Western Electric and the Bell Telephone laboratories after years of research, but even when it was being installed a few years ago, it was obsolete because of newer advancements in the electronic field.

Each crossbar office is equipped with a machine known as a Trouble Recorder. This machine helps the crossbar system to locate all mechanical and electrical malfunctions in the entire system.

If a trouble condition develops in one particular circuit, the crossbar system tries to route the call through another circuit, and in most instances succeeds.

As soon as any malfunction occurs, the trouble recorder ejects a punched card and an alarm bell rings. A trained craft employee needs only to glance at the punched card to determine that a particular circuit is not functioning properly and immediately proceed to make the necessary repairs.

Any large toll office prides itself in keeping the crossbar equipment operating in a most efficient manner. In fact, each trouble card ejected cuts down their "Index" which to them is what statistics are to the Bureau.

The tracing system developed used the trouble recorder machine to trace the incoming calls. Every time a call went to the Coors residence or to eight other adjacent numbers, a trouble card was ejected. This card would show the routing of the incoming call and a tracing operating could be started even before the Coors telephone rang.

The card was ejected because a trouble condition "trap" showing a continuity failure was placed on the first attempt to ring the Coors telephone. This is known as a "first trial failure."

But remember, when a failure occurs, the crossbar system doesn't give up but makes a second trial attempting to place the call by a different circuit. The "trap" was so set up that on the second trial, the call to the Coors residence was completed. The important thing was that the essential routing instructions for a tracing operation were punched into the trouble recorder card which had been ejected on the first trial.

The time lapse between "trials" is not great. It takes from 500 to 750 milliseconds to make the second trial so there is no observable delay in the call. Note, however, that from the crossbar equipment the incoming call to the Coors residence had to go through the step-by-step equipment at Morrison, Colorado. Since it takes a call approximately ten seconds to go through the step-by-step equipment, we got a ten second running start on the tracing operation.

As to actual procedure, as soon as the trouble card dropped in the crossbar equipment room, a craft employee determined the routing instructions from which he could determine from what distant city the call was being originated. He called the toll tandem supervisor by inter-com. The supervisor placed a call to the Chief

Operator of the distant city and asked her to pick up the pertinent toll ticket. On almost all occasions, the calling number was known before we knew whether the call was worthy of tracing or not.

As time went on, the trouble cards being dropped for our operation began to cut into the "Index" of the toll section to such an extent that permission was granted by officials of the company to discount all the cards caused by our tracing activities.

As a matter of evidentiary nature, each trouble card was filed away for future reference. Craft employees marked each card with the time, date and their initials as well as the routing information.

A log was maintained in the toll tandem supervisor's office by the toll supervisors, marking down the date, time, routing information, results of the trace and the fact that a discontinuance of the trace was received.

These logs and cards assumed some importance later in the Coors case when the SAC noted that a call had been received from Atlantic City during the early stages of the tracing operation at a time prior to the discovery of Corbett's car near Atlantic City. Through quick checking of the logs and cards, it was determined that this call had been placed by a college friend of Mrs. Coors.

#### MODIFICATIONS MADE IN THE TRACING SYSTEM AS TIME PROGRESSED

As time went on, officials of the telephone company became somewhat alarmed at the added expense to them of continuing the tracing operation.

Toll supervisors were on duty twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Under ordinary conditions, these supervisors were not on

duty during weekends, except when major trouble occurred or when extensive reworking of the system was required. Additionally, these supervisors are usually out inspecting equipment and directing the work of the craft employees in the equipment room. Since one of the supervisors had to remain in the toll tandem supervisor's office at all times to handle the tracing operation, it cut down on his normal supervisory duties.

To alleviate this situation, a Special Agent of the telephone company was assigned to handle the tracing operation during the day. If any particular problem arose, one of the toll supervisors was not too far away.

A sound trained FBI agent was on duty from 4:00 P.M. until the next morning. After familiarizing himself with the operation he was able to handle the tracing operation during the occasional absences of the toll supervisor. Week-end duty was handled on a voluntary basis by the individual toll supervisors and all volunteered. Since they were paid on a yearly salary basis, no overtime or premium pay was involved insofar as the telephone company was concerned.

The big problem arose in justifying the use of a craft employee in the equipment room twenty-four hours a day. His sole duty was to determine on which Denver-Morrison trunk a particular call was on. He could do nothing else. His entire salary had no return to the telephone company. Further, as a craft employee, he was entitled to premium pay for working nights, special shifts and on weekends.

With the success of the tracing operation through use of the trouble recorder system, a way was found to eliminate the craft employee. Recall that all calls through the crossbar system were

automatically traced through use of the trouble recorder card. Craft employees were on duty twenty-four hours a day at the trouble recorder, irrespective of our operation.

If all calls could somehow be routed through the crossbar system, the craft employee making checks on the long distance operator calls and ~~the terminal grade operator call, could be eliminated. This was done.~~

Each long distance operator in Denver had access to the thirteen trunks to Morrison, Colorado by which she could dial a NATIONAL 9 number by plugging into an unused Morrison circuit and dialing the number involved. This she did as a creature of habit when she had a call going to Morrison.

She could just as easily plug into a crossbar circuit and place her call through the crossbar system. So, the District Traffic Superintendent authorized the "blacking out" of all these Morrison operator trunk outlets. This became a matter of disabling each of these operating circuits at each long distance operator position by removing the sleeve from each circuit and placing plugs in the associated holes on the long distance board. Each long distance operator was then instructed to place her Morrison calls through the crossbar circuits.

This left the terminal grade trunks of which there were 170 scattered throughout the Rocky Mountain area. The terminal grade trunks were the property of the long lines department of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company and were a revenue making proposition for A T & T Co., but not necessarily for Mountain States. The terminal grade trunks would be made inoperative anyway as soon as Mountain States changed over to DDD on April 23, 1960. The district Traffic Superintendent authorized the "turning down," or placing out of service,



all the terminal grade trunks. This took a few days to accomplish, but the end result was that all calls to Morrison, and coincidentally to the Coors residence, were all routed through the crossbar system where an automatic trace was available.

From that time on, the tracing system could be kept up indefinitely without a great monetary loss to the telephone company and it was so continued until March 14, 1960.

#### COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE SAC OF THE SPECIAL

When the Special Squad was being organized, it became evident that the telephone facilities of the Denver Office would be taxed to the utmost.

The criminal squad room of the Denver Office was vacated for the Special Squad. The SAC's office was placed in the adjacent criminal supervisor's office.

A call was placed to the M S T & T Co. Denver-Metropolitan equipment supervisor, a long time contact of the Denver Office. He immediately proceeded to the Denver Office with a crew of installers to design an expanded telephone system for the office.

The criminal supervisor's office had a two button telephone set with two incoming lines. Each of these lines was brought out to another two button telephone set so that the ASAC of the Special could listen to each call if necessary.

An additional telephone with a direct outside unlisted number was installed so the SAC could make direct outside calls without going through the office switchboard. Another telephone was installed for the SAC's secretary.

A way had to be found to arrange instantaneous telephone communication with the Coors residence. This is where the Denver-Metropolitan Equipment supervisor's knowledge of telephone circuitry came to the fore.

Thirteen telephone circuits existed from Denver to Morrison. One of these circuits was being used full time for the Inter-com system between the Morrison telephone exchange and the Denver toll office. None of the other lines could be released for our use as they were all needed for long distance traffic.

To call the Coors residence from the Denver FBI Office it was necessary to dial the operator, as on a regular long distance call and delays occurred on every call.

The equipment supervisor recalled that a wealthy Denver manufacturer had a summer home in the mountains, served by a leased long distance line from Denver through which his mountain mansion could be dialed directly from Denver.

The line was not in use during the winter months but because of the owner's stature in the community, the line was never used for any other purpose. The equipment supervisor promptly "borrowed" this line and had it looped into the Morrison exchange thereby giving us the direct long distance line from Denver to Morrison via the mountain mansion.

Then our equipment supervisor borrowed a technique which is not used very frequently in telephone installations. It resembles the old hand-cranked country telephone set in a sense except you don't need the hand crank. He installed a "ring-down" phone in the SAC's

office and a companion "ring-down" phone in the Coors residence at Morrison.

To communicate, all that was necessary was to lift up either phone and the one on the other end of the line rang.

To complete the communications picture, there were four incoming lines to the toll tandem supervisor's office, all dialable from Denver.

So, we can now follow the action as it took place every time an incoming call arrived at the Coors residence in Morrison:

As soon as the phone rang, the Special Agent on duty at the Coors residence was alerted to listen to his Magnecorder and record the incoming conversation. If he could determine that the call was legitimate and not worthy of tracing, he would lift up his "ring-down" phone and advise the SAC the trace was not necessary. The SAC would then dial one of the numbers of the toll tandem office and advise the agent or the telephone company employee on duty that it was not necessary to trace the particular call in progress.

To prevent any delay in case all the lines to the toll tandem office were busy (and this happened on occasion) a dispatcher radio unit was installed in the toll tandem office so that the tracing operation could be discontinued by calling on the Denver FM radio system using suitable pretext language.

This dispatcher unit was also used to communicate with Bureau radio cars during the period of time when a number of pay telephone locations were being covered in the Denver area.

A dispatcher unit was also installed at the Coors residence at Morrison in the event of a breakdown of telephone circuits.

SPECIALIZED COVERAGE:

PAY STATIONS IN THE NATIONAL 9 AREA

Early in the case it was obvious that a call could be placed to the Coors residence from any one of a number of pay telephones located in the National 9 exchange without going through an operator.

By checking telephone company records, it was found that twenty-eight pay telephones existed in the National 9 exchange. Many were located outside and some in very isolated places. These ranged, according to telephone company records, from such places as:

"Inside booth at Tabor Bar, Main Street, Morrison, Colorado";

"Outside booth, inter-Canyon Fire Department, mounted on telephone pole number 649, about three miles above Tiny Town at Fender Junction, where you turn off to Phillipsburg, Colorado";

"Outside booth, M S T & T Co. ball park, Morrison Road, east edge of town about where you cross to go to Soda Lake, on Pole number 9-26."

A team of Agents visually observed each of these locations through use of a telephone company truck and all locations were pinpointed on a map in the Denver Office.

In addition, supervisors at the Morrison exchange marked each of these telephone terminals for quick reference in the event that a call was received from one of the booths.

MULTIPLE PAY STATIONS IN DENVER AREA

Recognizing that a call might be made from a crowded area in Denver through a pay telephone, a survey was made of all locations in

Denver where three or more pay stations existed. This was accomplished through review of telephone company records.

Seventeen locations were found where multiple pay stations existed. For instance, the Denver Union Station had a total of twenty-eight pay stations located in three different banks of booths.

Stapleton Air Field, the main Denver airport, had twenty-three pay telephones located in four different banks of booths.

#### DENVER TOLL TICKET SURVEY

Since the subject of the case might place a call to the Coors residence to give instructions for a payoff, and then place a long distance call to the location where the victim was being held, all toll tickets on long distance calls made from Denver, Colorado and some suburban areas were photographed through use of a Recordak machine set up in the main telephone company building.

Two agents were busy handling this operation as approximately 600,000 toll tickets were photographed from February 13, 1960 through March 1, 1960.

Toll tickets were picked up on a regular basis and processed through the Recordak machine so that no delay would occur in transferring the toll tickets to the telephone company's accounting center in Denver where the tickets are sorted for billing purposes.

It is well to note here that unless the toll tickets are photographed immediately before the accounting breakdown is made, the tickets are sent to all parts of the country for billing purposes and they are effectively lost forever insofar as obtaining data which might later be of interest to the investigation.

## CRANK CALLS

Several crank calls were made to the Coors residence during the tracing operation period. We were successful in tracing these calls. The Chief Special Agent's Office was particularly helpful in these instances in furnishing us with long distance toll tickets placed by the persons who made the crank calls.

Crank calls were made to the Victim's father's home in Golden, Colorado, where the Coors Brewery is located. These calls were usually of short duration.

In one instance, the caller stated he would call later the same evening. The telephone company Chief Special Agent, a supervising service foreman and an FBI Agent attempted to make a direct trace when the incoming call came in. The call was traced back to a telephone exchange in West Denver, but the call was of such short duration that it "fell-off" before the trace could be completed. We did know that the call was coming from a pay telephone in West Denver on a particular street and with sufficient manpower on the street, the caller probably could have been identified.

How do you say thanks to all the telephone company employees, many of whom gave up their week ends to assist in covering this essential operation?

While the sound trained agent working with telephone company personnel is able to verbally express the appreciation of the whole office and of the Bureau, letters of appreciation from the Director are most effective.

Anyone visiting the Denver toll tandem office today will notice

a framed letter from the Director, addressed personally to the Supervising Service Foreman commending him and individually mentioning the names of each foreman under his supervision who so ably assisted the Bureau.

A visit to the office of the Chief Special Agent will reveal a framed photograph of the Director addressed to him personally.

The above two are examples of ways in which the Bureau's gratitude was expressed. Other such letters were directed to key personnel of M S T & T Co., including the President. You can be assured that these expressions of gratitude are treasured long after the remembrance of sacrificed week ends have faded away.

The question now arises, if a similar situation arose today, could the same job be done with DDD equipment?

According to our now firmly established sources, it can be done, but each future case will have its own individual problems. The answer can be given by the telephone company personnel involved when the specific problem is advanced.

The best advice that can be given is to locate the proper key personnel, particularly those responsible for the operation of the toll tandem office, set out the problem involved and let them arrive at the proper method of handling the particular case.



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-34

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

June 21, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) CRIMINAL INFORMANTS-CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM -- SAC Letters 57-70 dated December 13, 1957, 58-64 dated October 14, 1958, 59-48 dated August 4, 1959, and 61-13 dated March 14, 1961, pointed out the urgent need for criminal informants who can give direct information relative to individuals under investigation in connection with the Criminal Intelligence Program.

An analysis of available information developed to date concerning the structure of organized crime in this country reveals a decided need for the further clarification and expansion of facts now known concerning the identity of the leaders of the organized hoodlum element, and the manner in which this element functions. To successfully complete our intelligence picture of the controlling forces which make organized crime operative, it is now urgently necessary to develop particularly qualified, live sources within the upper echelon of the organized hoodlum element who will be capable of furnishing the quality information required.

The most significant information developed to date indicating organization among the nation's hoodlum leaders has been obtained from highly confidential sources in Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia concerning the existence of a "commission" of top leaders of the organized hoodlum element exerting a controlling influence on racket activities in this country. Additional information concerning the "commission" has also been developed recently from a highly confidential source in Newark. The Chicago and New York sources have discussed the "commission" as being composed variously of six, nine, and twelve members. The Chicago source accounts for a nine- or twelve-man commission by discussing increases in "commission" membership resulting in expansion of this group to either nine or twelve men. Both the Chicago and New York sources list as members Vito Genovese, Thomas Luchese, Joseph Profaci, Carlo Gambino and Joseph Bonanno. The Chicago source indicates Samuel Giancana is a member, with the New York source furnishing information that there is a "commission" member from Chicago without naming him. Genovese, Luchese, Profaci and Gambino are all Top Hoodlums from the New York area. Giancana is a Chicago Top Hoodlum; Bonanno is a Phoenix Top Hoodlum residing in Tucson, and formerly from Brooklyn, New York.

In addition, the Chicago source names hoodlums believed identical with Joseph Zerilli, Detroit Top Hoodlum; John La Rocca, Pittsburgh Top Hoodlum; Raymond Patriarca, Boston Top Hoodlum; and Steve Magaddino, Buffalo Top Hoodlum as "commission" members. The Chicago source suggests that Joseph Ida, Newark Top Hoodlum who has



returned to Sicily, was a "commission" member representing the Philadelphia area. The Philadelphia source identifies Angelo Bruno, Philadelphia Top Hoodlum, as the current representative of the "commission" in that area. This source also discusses Bruno traveling to New York to receive instructions from the "commission." Information recently received from a highly confidential source in Newark indicates that Gerardo Catena, Newark Top Hoodlum, has been placed on the "commission" in the recent past.

The New York source identifies Carlo Gambino as the current chairman of the "commission," indicating that he is occupying this position in place of Vito Genovese, while Genovese is in prison. The Chicago source previously indicated that Genovese appeared to occupy the top position prior to his incarceration. The New York and Chicago sources have mentioned Albert Anastasia, deceased New York hoodlum, as a former "commission" member, and the New York source has identified Frank Costello, New York Top Hoodlum currently in Federal Prison, as a former "commission" member prior to his loss of favor as an underworld power.

Both the Chicago and New York sources have used the term "avugat" to denote a "commission" member; "avugat" is a shortened version of the full Italian word "avvocato" which, literally translated, means "attorney."

Enlarging upon the "commission's" power and influence regarding organized criminal activities throughout the country, the New York source explained that there were two hoodlum leaders, referred to as the "boss" and the "underboss," in each major population area throughout the country and in Canada, who are responsible to the "commission" for activities in their respective areas. In explaining this progression of authority, the source cited as an example the mob leadership in the Philadelphia area in years past. In the period referred to, Joseph Ida was identified as the "boss," and Marco Reginelli, deceased hoodlum leader, as the "underboss," with these local leaders answerable to Albert Anastasia, a "commission" member at that time. Other examples of "bosses" identified by this source were Santo Trafficante in Florida and Joseph Civello in Texas. Trafficante is a Tampa Top Hoodlum and Civello, a Dallas Top Hoodlum. According to this source these local leaders, the "bosses" and "underbosses," operate to a degree on their own, making their own decisions in underworld matters involving activities in their own areas. However, they are ultimately answerable to the "commission" in case of problems or disputes, with the "commission" functioning as an arbitration board.

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In areas of great population or importance there appears to be additional second and third echelon leaders corresponding to the positions of "boss" and "underboss" in other areas. For example, the New York source has identified at least six New York hoodlum subordinates of Joseph Profaci, a "commission" member, as his "capirigime." This Italian word literally translated means "heads of the regime," and is used to denote mob bosses working on a level below a "commission" member, or "avugat." The New York source has also identified several well-known New York hoodlums as "capirigime" working under Vito Genovese, another "commission" member.

The Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia sources strongly suggest that the "commission" either appoints, or at least has final approval over the appointment of local "bosses" and "underbosses." The Chicago source discussed Vito Genovese traveling about the country in connection with a number of "promotions" within the organization, and mentioned frequent changes of the "boss" in Philadelphia during a comparatively short period. The Philadelphia source furnished corresponding information concerning a change in leadership in that area occasioned by the "commission."

This information, made possible through the establishment of these sources, has been invaluable in providing insight into the top echelon of organized crime in this country. However, as pointed out above, there is an urgent need for amplifying information which will reveal full details concerning the operations of these inter-related organized criminal groups throughout the nation.

Our urgent need for new live sources strategically placed in the upper echelons of organized crime is brought into clear focus by the fact that no information regarding the "commission" has been reported by any live criminal source to date. This, of course, suggests a problem of some delicacy in seeking information from live informants, since we must avoid the danger of informants "playing back" information they may obtain through questions asked them.

#### TOP ECHELON INFORMANT PROGRAM

To insure that the Bureau meets its responsibilities in connection with the Criminal Intelligence Program, it is mandatory that the development of quality criminal informants be emphasized and the existing program be implemented and greatly expanded.

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You are again reminded that the penetration and infiltration of organized criminal activity is a prime objective of the Bureau, and to accomplish this it is necessary to give a renewed impetus to the development of quality criminal informants.

We have learned through our experience in conducting investigations in connection with the Criminal Intelligence Program that the best source we could possibly obtain would be a criminal informant who is highly placed in organized crime.

The Bureau is therefore inaugurating the following program in an effort to develop criminal informants of the type mentioned above.

Effective immediately the following offices must designate a squad of Special Agents to work exclusively on the development of criminal informants who are in a position to furnish valuable information regarding cases currently under investigation in connection with this program, and to furnish quality criminal intelligence information: Chicago, Detroit, Kansas City, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Miami, Newark, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and San Francisco.

The selection of Agent personnel to participate in this program is of vital importance. The Agents selected must have demonstrated in the past their ability in this field and should be mature, aggressive, resourceful, and possess the necessary knowledge of criminal activities in your area to intelligently accomplish the objectives.

In addition to the above qualities an enthusiastic approach to this program is a basic essential which must be evidenced by all Agents whom you designate to participate.

To insure the success of this program, it is necessary to utilize Special Agents with the will and desire to employ new approaches and means to secure the Bureau's goals.

It is your personal responsibility to select the Special Agents to participate in the program and to advise the Bureau within one week of their names.

#### SELECTION OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS

Your selection of potential criminal informants in connection with this program should be based upon a combination

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of a particular hoodlum's qualification by virtue of his position in the organized hoodlum element, and upon circumstances indicating his possible vulnerability to development. A few examples of the type hoodlum who should be considered for development are:

Chicago

Louis Kanne  
Henry Susk

Detroit

Richard Zalmanowski  
John J. White

Kansas City

Alex Presta  
Phillip Simone

Las Vegas

George Gordon  
Eugene Richard Warner  
Lou Ledderer

Los Angeles

John Battaglia  
Alfonso Rocco Pizzichino

Miami

JFK Act 6 (4)

Newark

Pasquale Masi  
Salvatore Paci

New York

Mike Scandifia  
Max Courtney

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Philadelphia

Felix DeTulio  
Antonio Pollina

Pittsburgh

Arthur G. Nelson  
Frank Valente

San Francisco

Aladena T. Fratianno

These are cited only as examples of the types of individuals who would be in a position to furnish the information required. You are undoubtedly aware of other hoodlums, who for various reasons may be susceptible to an approach.

The eleven offices participating in this program should submit to the Bureau within one week the identities of hoodlums you have selected for concentrated attention. Each office, with the exception of the New York Office, should submit a minimum of five names; the New York Office is to submit a minimum of ten names.

SUGGESTED APPROACHES

To properly develop informants of this caliber, varied approaches can and should be utilized, dependent upon the individual under development. The following methods are being set forth as possible guidelines.

Background Investigation

A penetrative investigation of each individual selected as a target for development as an informant should be conducted prior to any approach of the individual.

In many instances this information will be available to your office as a result of previous investigations. Do not overlook possibilities of obtaining additional information from your criminal informants and sources.

Through these investigations you should determine background, marital status, girl friends, hobbies, personalities,

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relatives, financial affairs, criminal record, current criminal activities, et cetera of each individual selected for development.

Be alert to the possibility of utilizing as informants, individuals currently incarcerated who were formerly associates of Top Hoodlums. The offer of assistance to these individuals' families could induce their cooperation.

A review of all these facts should assist materially in planning the development period.

### Payments

The Bureau will authorize substantial remuneration for informants who can provide information concerning hoodlums who have national stature. Payments in this instance will be made for quality criminal intelligence information and you will not be restricted in making payments to just those instances which involve a substantive violation over which the Bureau has jurisdiction.

It is apparent that hope for financial reward will not be a motivating force which would induce most selected targets for development to cooperate; however, under certain circumstances this could be a most effective means and should not be overlooked.

### Compromising Situations

It is imperative that full exploitation be made of circumstances which place a potential informant in a position where it would be advantageous to him to furnish information to the Bureau.

#### a. Prosecution

Awareness of an individual under development that he is liable to either Federal or State prosecution could be a compelling reason for such an individual to cooperate with the Bureau.

#### b. Deportation

Fear of deportation is a fact that could motivate many of the selected targets for development to be susceptible to development as informants. This may well be one of the effective approaches which could be used against older top echelon hoodlums.

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c. Personal Reasons

These will vary with the individual under development. Some examples could be: concern over the criminal activity and possible prosecution of children, wife, girl-friends, et cetera. Fear of pressure being exerted from associates or rivals in organized criminal activity.

Confidential Basis

It should be made crystal clear to the individuals under development in connection with this program that any information furnished by them will be handled on a strictly confidential basis. You should insure that no dissemination is made of information obtained from such sources unless the informant can be fully protected. In the implementation of this program, the Bureau's objective of penetration and infiltration of the top echelon of organized criminal activities and the continuous flow of quality criminal intelligence information should be constantly kept in mind.

This program presents a definite new challenge to the field which to be met calls for new and untried methods and situations may arise which will be evaluated by the Bureau based upon the realization of the need for unusual and extreme methods. The offices participating in this program must of necessity display the initiative and ingenuity to provide the impetus to realize the Bureau's objective.

Every office is being advised of this program since in the future it may be appropriate to expand it to include additional offices.

All offices instructed to designate a squad of Special Agents to participate in this program should advise the Bureau within thirty days of the progress made.

The Bureau will analyze the preliminary information obtained and within a three months' period, a conference at either Seat of Government or in the field will be held to evaluate the progress made and to redirect the program as a result of the experience gained to date.

These special assignments will not eliminate the responsibilities of all Special Agents to fully participate in the criminal informant program.

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This program has, as its primary purpose, the development of quality criminal intelligence informants. The two most important components of this program are the selection of individuals for development as informants and the designation of the Special Agents who will participate.

I cannot stress too strongly the urgent necessity of each Special Agent in Charge providing the personal leadership which will insure the success of this program.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

6/21/61

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

July 11, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) INCENTIVE AWARDS - FBI FORM BOOK -- The Civil Service Commission has revised the Incentive Awards Program regulations as they relate primarily to awards for suggestions or contributions where tangible savings are involved. ~~The table for determining the amount of~~ such awards has been changed to (1) increase the minimum award from \$10 to \$15, (2) provide for \$50 minimum tangible benefit to qualify for an award and (3) increase the amount of award where more substantial savings are realized. The changes have little effect on awards involving intangible benefits resulting from employee contributions and performances other than to increase the minimum award from \$10 to \$15. Minimum awards will not be granted for intangible benefits unless the employee's contribution compares favorably with minimum awards granted where tangible benefits are involved.

Suggestions which deal with maintenance or repair, items of supply which could be procured through simple requisition, or offer no specific means to improve operations cannot be considered suggestions within the limits of the program. Similarly, ideas to improve working conditions which could and should have been corrected in the normal course of work and proposals which are trivial in nature or which would cost more to process than any saving they could achieve, will not be evaluated under the suggestion program but will be returned to the appropriate supervisor for oral acknowledgment.

The foregoing which became effective July 1, 1961, should be brought to the attention of all employees. Form FD-255 is being revised and upon receipt of a supply of the revised form which will be forwarded under separate cover one copy should be placed in the FBI Form Book and you should destroy all copies of this form not bearing the current revision date. You may continue to submit recommendations on an old FD-255 form until you receive a supply of the revised form.

7/11/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-37

(B) AUTOMOBILES - 1961 - PLYMOUTHS - TRUNK LIGHT -- The Bureau has recently learned of the following technique being used by car thieves to gain entry to the trunk of the 1961 Plymouth:

Remove the two screws which hold the light (over the license plate) in place; push the bulb aside, and insert a screwdriver and remove the lock retainer clip. Once the retainer clip is removed the cylinder can be removed and the trunk opened.

The Chrysler Company has advised that the screws holding this assembly should be the "one-way" type; that is, they can be tightened but not loosened. A rivet can also be used for this purpose. Any vehicle not having "one-way" screws will be so equipped by an authorized Plymouth dealer at no cost. Insure that all 1961 Plymouths in your division are protected against entry in the above manner.

7/11/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-37

(C) INTERVIEWS - CONFESSIONS AND SIGNED STATEMENTS -- At the request of the Criminal Division and the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice, a new rule will be followed, effective immediately, in giving defendants or prospective defendants and witnesses copies of confessions and signed statements which they have previously furnished to the Bureau. The rule will be, as stated by the Department, that:

"...subsequent to the formal referral of a matter to the United States Attorney, any such request, whether made by the prospective defendant or his counsel, should be referred to the interested United States Attorney. He can then determine, after consultation with the Criminal Division, if deemed necessary, the potential adverse impact upon the criminal proceeding should there be an untimely release or inspection of the statements in question."

For the purposes of this rule, a case will be considered as formally referred to the United States Attorney when facts are presented to him and he indicates the likelihood of ultimate prosecution.

Requests made prior to formal referral for copies of signed statements and confessions will be honored as in the past. If a defendant, prospective defendant or witness, interviewed after formal referral, offers to give a signed statement or confession only upon condition that a copy will be given to him, the statement or confession should be taken and a copy furnished unless the United States Attorney can readily be reached for an opinion and advises to the contrary.

7/11/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-37

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The rule for defendants and prospective defendants will be applied to witnesses also, owing to the fact that witnesses sometimes become defendants and vice versa.

In the event of an inquiry from the United States Attorney concerning this new policy, you should advise him that it was put into effect at the request of the Department.

7/11/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-37

(D) FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY -- In view of the extremely heavy demand for attendance at the National Academy, the size of each class will be increased to 80 men, effective with the August, 1961, class. The standards for attendance at the Academy are not to be lowered in any fashion to fill a class.

Although there have already been nominated for the August class a sufficient number of candidates to make up a class of 80 men, it will be permissible for you to make recommendations to the Bureau for additional representatives at the August Session. These will be given consideration if the size of the class permits.

(Security Letter on attached pages)

7/11/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-37

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(E) SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION CHARACTERIZATIONS - INTERNAL SECURITY - C  
Set forth below are up-to-date thumbnail sketches of organizations and publications, each of which is of use to various field offices. You are instructed that the sketches set forth in SAC Letters 58-41 (F), 58-81 (K), 59-8 (C), 59-43 (M), and 60-34 (F) should no longer be used. In the event an office needs to characterize an organization not mentioned in this letter, listed in the various issues of the "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications" published by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, or designated by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450, a request should be made of the office of origin to furnish the required characterization. You are instructed that in describing a local affiliate of a national organization, in addition to characterizing the local affiliate, it will be necessary to set forth separately the characterization of the parent organization.

The evaluation and identities of the sources should be handled in accordance with instructions set forth in Part I, Section 49B 2m (1) (d), page 64, of the FBI Handbook.

For the purpose of evaluation all sources utilized in the preparation of the sketches listed below should be described as having furnished reliable information in the past.

In each sketch utilized below, the field office submitting the sketch has advised that careful consideration was given to each source concealed.

"A TENY" ("THE FACT")

A source advised on May 2, 1961, that "A Teny" ("The Fact") is a Hungarian-language newspaper which closely follows the Communist Party line and has done so since at least the late 1940's. This newspaper is published monthly in Los Angeles, California.

Source: DELETED

COMMITTEE TO SECURE JUSTICE FOR MORTON SOBELL

"Following the execution of atomic spies Ethel and Julius Rosenberg in June, 1953, the Communist campaign assumed a different emphasis. Its major effort centered upon Morton Sobell, the Rosenbergs' codefendant. The National Committee to Secure Justice in the Rosenberg case - a Communist front which had been conducting the campaign in the United States - was reconstituted as the National Rosenberg-Sobell Committee at a conference in Chicago in October, 1953, and then as the National Committee to Secure Justice for Morton Sobell in the Rosenberg case'...."

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("Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications" dated January 2, 1957, issued by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, page 60.)

In September, 1954, the name "National Committee to Secure Justice for Morton Sobell" appeared on literature issued by the Committee. In March, 1955, the current name, "Committee to Secure Justice for Morton Sobell," first appeared on literature issued by the Committee.

The 1960-61 Borough of Manhattan telephone directory lists the "Committee to Secure Justice for Morton Sobell" as being located at 940 Broadway, New York, New York.

#### FOUR CONTINENT BOOK CORPORATION

According to the records of the Foreign Agents Registration Section, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., the Four Continent Book Corporation, 156 Fifth Avenue, New York City, is registered under the provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended. One of the foreign principals listed in this registration is the Mezhdunarodnaja Kniga (International Book), Mošcow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

#### JULY 26TH MOVEMENT OF NEW YORK

The July 26th Movement is a revolutionary organization founded and led by Fidel Castro, now Prime Minister of Cuba.

NATION OF ISLAM, formerly referred to as the  
Muslim Cult of Islam, also known as Muhammad's  
Temples of Islam  
FRUIT OF ISLAM  
MUSLIM GIRLS TRAINING

#### Nation of Islam

In January, 1957, a source advised Elijah Muhammad has described his organization on a nationwide basis as the "Nation of Islam" and "Muhammad's Temples of Islam."

On May 5, 1961, a second source advised: Elijah Muhammad is the national leader of the Nation of Islam (NOI). Muhammad's Temple of Islam No. 2, 5335 South Greenwood Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, is the national headquarters of the NOI. In mid 1960 Muhammad and other NOI officials, when referring to Muhammad's organization on a nationwide basis, commenced using either "Mosque" or "Temple" when mentioning one of "Muhammad's Temples of Islam."

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The NOI is an all-Negro organization which was originally organized in 1930 in Detroit, Michigan. Muhammad claims to have been selected by Allah, the Supreme Being, to lead the so-called Negro race out of slavery in the wilderness of North America by establishing an independent black nation in the United States. Members following Muhammad's teaching and his interpretation of the "Koran" believe there is no such thing as a Negro; that the so-called Negroes are slaves of the white race, referred to as "white devils," in the United States; and that the white race, because of its exploitation of the so-called Negroes, must and will be destroyed in the approaching "War of Armageddon."

In the past, officials and members of the NOI, including Muhammad, have refused to register under the provisions of the Selective Service Acts and have declared that members owe no allegiance to the United States.

On May 5, 1958, the first source advised Muhammad had, upon advice of legal counsel, tempered his personal statements and instructions to his ministers concerning the principles of his organization in order to avoid possible prosecution by the United States Government, however, he did not indicate any fundamental changes in the teachings of his organization.

On May 17, 1961, a third source advised: Muhammad had, early in July, 1958, decided to de-emphasize the religious aspects of the teachings of Islam and to stress the economic benefits to be derived by those Negroes who joined the NOI. This policy change, according to Muhammad, would help him acquire additional followers and create more interest in his programs.

Sources: DELETED  
DELETED  
DELETED

#### Fruit of Islam

On May 5, 1961, a source advised that the Fruit of Islam (FOI) is a group within the Nation of Islam (NOI) composed of male members of the NOI. The purpose of the FOI is to protect officials and property of the NOI, assure compliance of members with NOI teachings and to prepare for the "War of Armageddon." Members of the FOI are required to participate in military drill and are afforded the opportunity to engage in judo training.

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The FOI is governed by a military system wherein the members are controlled by general orders similar to those issued by regular military organizations.

Source: DELETED

Muslim Girls Training

On May 19, 1960, a source advised that the Muslim Girls Training (MGT) is a group within the Nation of Islam (NOI) and is composed of all female members of the NOI. The MGT is similar in structure to the Fruit of Islam (FOI), which is composed of male members of the NOI, in that the MGT has officers similar to military organizations to whom other female members are accountable. MGT members receive instructions in homemaking, hygiene, calisthenics, and other subjects such as Muslim history and the English language. There also exists a Junior MGT, which is composed of female members of the NOI who are between the ages of 15 and 19 and who are afforded military-type drill.

Since 1957, various officers and "sisters" of the MGT have, at meetings of the MGT, used the term MGT so that it also means General Civilization Class. General Civilization Class refers to classes conducted within the MGT.

The above refers to activities of the MGT at Muhammad's Temple of Islam No. 2, 5335 South Greenwood, Chicago, Illinois.

On May 17, 1961, another source advised that the MGT is a group within the NOI which is composed of all female members of the NOI. The MGT is similar in structure to the FOI, which is composed of male members of the NOI. In theory, the MGT exists in all Temples of the NOI and is patterned after the MGT at Muhammad's Temple of Islam No. 2, Chicago. General Civilization Class refers to the collective group of classes held within the MGT.

Sources: DELETED  
DELETED

NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO ABOLISH  
THE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES COMMITTEE

On May 3, 1961, a source advised that the National Committee to Abolish the Un-American Activities Committee was organized in August, 1960, at Los Angeles, California, to stimulate and utilize all efforts of interested individuals and organizations in a national campaign to promote public education leading

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to political action to abolish the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HCUA). The National Committee to Abolish the Un-American Activities Committee will not duplicate the work of other Civil Liberties organizations, which include the abolition of the HCUA as a part of their program, but will encourage the coordination and consolidation of all their efforts for abolition, and will promote new efforts in those Congressional Districts where education and political action for abolition have not been initiated.

Frank Wilkinson is the Field Representative of the National Committee to Abolish the Un-American Activities Committee. According to the source, Wilkinson periodically confers with Dorothy Healey, Chairman, Southern California District Communist Party, and is in close touch with other leading communist functionaries in the Los Angeles area.

Another source on September 17, 1952, advised that Frank Wilkinson was a Communist Party member as of September, 1952.

Sources: DELETED

#### POLITICAL AFFAIRS

In "The Worker," an east coast communist weekly newspaper, issue of March 5, 1961, the editor of "Political Affairs" identified the latter publication as an organ of the National Committee of the Communist Party, USA, published monthly.

#### PROGRESSIVE YOUTH ORGANIZING COMMITTEE

On February 9, 1961, a source advised that the Progressive Youth Organizing Committee (PYOC) was established at a national socialist-oriented youth conference held in Chicago, Illinois, December 30, 1960, through January 1, 1961. This conference was the result of a mandate issued by the National Executive Committee, Communist Party, USA, calling for a youth conference to establish an organizing committee whose objective would be to set up a national socialist-oriented youth organization. The conference scheduled a convention to be held within a year to found a new national socialist-oriented youth organization. The PYOC has its office in Room 638, 80 East 11th Street, New York, New York.

Source: DELETED

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RUSSKY GOLOS PUBLISHING CORPORATION

A source advised on April 27, 1961, that "Russky Golos" is a Russian language newspaper which has consistently followed the Communist Party (CP) line and supports the same issues as he CPUSA. It is published by the Russky Golos Publishing Corporation at 130 East 16th Street, New York City. ~~It was in-~~corporated in the State of New York on January 11, 1917.

The source said that "Russky Golos" was formerly the organ of the "Russian Section" of the International Workers Order (IWO). Since the dissolution of the IWO by the New York Courts in 1954, the "Russian Section" is no longer known as such, but has been organized into Russian Cultural and Aid Society groups which continue to support "Russky Golos" financially and look on "Russky Golos" as the organ of these groups.

The CPUSA and the IWO have been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Source: ~~DELETED~~

TASS NEWS AGENCY

Tass News Agency is an official Soviet Government news gathering organization, with headquarters in Moscow, Russia, and branches throughout the world.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover

Director

7/11/61

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

July 18, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) TRAINING - FILMS -- Since the films "The FBI," "The FBI Front" and "You Can't Get Away with It" are old and outmoded, Bureau desires that they no longer be used for police training purposes, or in connection with speeches.

Commitments already made for the use of these films should be handled; however, no further commitments should be made. Those offices having permanent retention copies of any of these films should destroy them after present commitments are handled.

7/18/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-38

(B) FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM -- The "open season" enrollment period between the first and sixteenth inclusive of October, 1961, will provide an opportunity for all eligible employees to change plans, if they so desire. Also, during this period an employee who previously elected not to enroll may register to enroll, provided he is otherwise eligible.

The Bureau has been advised by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) that training sessions will be conducted by their regional offices starting on or about August 15, 1961, for the various Government field establishments in preparation for the "open season." This training will cover "open season" regulations, plans and procedures; changes in Health Benefits plans and other items of interest to agency representatives with Health Benefits responsibilities. You should assure that your representative or representatives responsible for the supervision of this program in your office are in attendance in order to be properly prepared for the forthcoming "open season." If not previously advised, it is suggested that you contact the appropriate CSC regional office in order to be apprised of the date and location of the training conference.

Subscriber kits for maintaining records of medical expenses required for claiming supplemental benefits are being made available by Blue Cross-Blue Shield for employees who are enrolled in the Service Benefit Plan. These kits can be obtained from the local Blue Cross-Blue Shield office and should be furnished to employees presently enrolled in this plan. A supply of these kits should be maintained for distribution to new enrollees. Similar kits have been made available to SAMBA members.

(C) TELEPHONES - SECURITY OF FBI TELEPHONE LINES -- Individuals having background as telephone men and electricians could be a good source of information to individuals or organizations engaged in subversive, criminal or racial activities if these individuals or organizations choose to use their training and background in an attempt to monitor FBI telephone facilities. Therefore, you are instructed to immediately review the security procedures involving telephone lines used by your office to insure that maximum security is maintained.

There is a present requirement that field office telephone lines be checked quarterly and resident agency lines annually. These security checks should not be performed on such a highly regular basis that a pattern is established as to the time they are conducted. As you are aware, these checks are a precautionary measure and cannot guarantee absolute security of office and resident agency lines. Since these checks guarantee security only at the time they are performed, personnel should be most circumspect as to the nature of their conversation over outside telephone lines.

It is noted that a security check of telephone lines requires a review of confidential telephone company records and physical observation of the Bureau telephone lines located with the telephone company central office (a space accessible only to telephone company employees), and it is necessary to have the cooperation of the telephone company officials and craftsmen. Careful consideration, therefore, should be given to the attitude and background, particularly regarding security, racial and criminal matters, of local telephone company employees contacted in that these individuals are also in a position to assist any person or group interested in tapping telephones.

7/18/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-38

(D) LAW ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCES - 1961 BANK ROBBERY AND INCIDENTAL CRIMES -- SAC Letter 61-26 (C) advised that it might be necessary to include data concerning any legislation which might become law prior to September 1, 1961, in the programs of Law Enforcement Conferences scheduled for 1961. This legislation is still pending and is being closely followed. You will be immediately advised in the event any of the legislation passes so that you may include discussions of it in your conference programs.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-38

To aid you in the preparation of 1961 conferences, there will be an article in the August issue of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin concerning bank robberies. Reprints of this article along with others from past Law Enforcement Bulletins and a selection of booklets will be furnished each office for distribution at these conferences. A national press release concerning the conferences will be made prior to September 1, 1961. ~~Suggested press release will be furnished~~ each office well enough in advance for local use.

Each Division should promptly furnish the Bureau by routing slip to the attention of Crime Research Section, the total attendance expected, and sufficient material for distribution at the conferences will be furnished by the Bureau. In addition, at the completion of your conferences you should advise the Training and Inspection Division the names of the chief executives of local law enforcement agencies attending your conferences. Names of other prominent persons in attendance should be included on this list.

Upon completion of the conference, furnish the Bureau, attention Training and Inspection Division, comments of participants, and any suggestions or criticisms which would be of assistance in planning future conferences of this type.

7/18/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-38

(E) USE OF IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE INTERPRETERS --  
In an effort to improve existing interpreting facilities available to the field, the Bureau has discussed with Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) headquarters the number and type of interpreters used by INS and whether or not its interpreters could periodically be used by the Bureau. INS has available throughout the field, principally in larger cities, a small staff of interpreters who are full-time employees of INS. Additionally, each local INS office maintains a roster of private individuals who can be used by INS on a contract basis in emergency situations. The latter individuals are paid when necessary on an hourly basis. No investigation of the latter group is conducted although, in some instances, INS makes a national agency check if repeated use of a particular individual is contemplated. INS has no objection to the Bureau's use of either its employees or the nonemployee type, pointing out that, where employees are involved, arrangements could be worked out on a local level and, in the nonemployee type, the INS local office will provide the

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-38

identities of specific individuals capable of handling interpreting work and the Bureau could make its own arrangements regarding the use of these individuals. To implement its offer of assistance in this regard, INS is sending appropriate instructions to each INS field office.

As initially indicated, INS interpreting assistance, as well as that available locally through other intelligence agencies of the Government, previously approved, is to be used only when Bureau personnel qualified to handle interpreting work or already established Bureau sources utilized as interpreters are not available or the expense of securing one from another Bureau field division cannot be justified by the routine nature of the particular interview involved. Further, you are aware that outside interpreting assistance is sought and utilized only in routine, nonsensitive, exploratory interviews and, in these instances, if unresolved questions develop or the individual being interviewed begins to produce sensitive data, the preliminary interview should be gracefully terminated and steps taken to conduct a reinterview with qualified Bureau interpreting personnel.

In substance, therefore, if a need arises in your office for an interpreter in a routine, nonsensitive investigative matter and no previously established interpreting source is readily available, you may consult the nearest local office of INS and determine if the desired interpreting assistance can be provided. If the individual recommended by INS is not an employee, his name should be checked through field office indices, through local informants and established sources, credit and criminal checks made and Bureau indices checked. If financial reimbursement to this individual will be required, Bureau approval must be obtained. Once you have established a satisfactory relationship with an individual interpreter in this category, no further contact with INS concerning his use is necessary.

In order that the Bureau might assess the potential value of this step, each office should maintain statistical data showing the number of times INS employee-interpreters are utilized by your office, the language involved, the number of hours they expend on behalf of the Bureau, the number of interviews they participate in and any unusual or exceptional services performed. No statistical data is necessary concerning the nonemployee type. A letter containing requested statistical data covering the last six months of 1961 should be submitted to the Bureau by January 15, 1962. A second letter covering the first six months of 1962 should be submitted by July 15, 1962.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

7/18/61

SAC LETTER NO 61-38

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-39  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

July 25, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) COMMUNICATIONS - MESSAGE PRIORITIES - ENCODED MESSAGES -- Discretion, common sense and good judgment should be used in assigning the priority "Urgent" to teletype and radio messages. Assigning an "Urgent" priority to a message which does not require immediate action serves only to delay the handling of messages which are actually of an urgent and important nature and require immediate action.

The sending of a nonurgent matter in encoded form with an "Urgent" priority is a serious mistake in judgment, especially if it is sent when skeleton shifts are on duty after regular hours or on weekends. Encoded communications cannot be read, evaluated, or their real urgency determined until they are actually decoded. The receipt at any office of a nonurgent communication in encoded form bearing an "Urgent" priority may delay the decoding and delivery to officials and supervisors of an urgent and important communication received at the same time.

Lengthy encoded communications should not be sent to the Bureau or to a field office on Friday concerning matters requiring no action until the following Monday. Matters of this nature should be transmitted by airtel, using airmail and special delivery where appropriate.

7/25/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-39

(B) ILLUSTRATED BROCHURE ("VISUAL PRESENTATIONS") - COOPERATIVE FUNCTIONS OF EXHIBITS SECTION -- Re SAC Letter Number 60-43 (E), September 13, 1960.

Requests for visual aids have moderately increased as a result of the dissemination of captioned brochure; however, requests for investigative and prosecutive aids are not widely distributed, indicating a need for all field divisions to be continually alert to the value of utilizing the specialized services available through the Exhibits Section. For example, approximately fifteen divisions regularly request the preparation of artists' conceptions of unknown subjects, charts and diagrams for antitrust and price-fixing investigations, scale drawings for use in Federal Tort Claims Act cases, three-dimensional scale models in criminal prosecutions, et cetera.

A copy of this brochure is now being made available to each United States Attorney in attendance at the United States Attorneys' Conferences in Washington, D. C. It is to be noted that the requirement of obtaining prior Bureau approval for discussing possible services of the Exhibits Section with ~~United States Attorneys~~ has been removed from all brochures (last paragraph, page III) furnished to the United States Attorneys. Requests for the preparation of demonstrative evidence should be brought to the Bureau's attention whenever the United States Attorney is of the opinion that visual aids are required in the prosecution of those cases wherein the FBI has primary investigative jurisdiction.

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In the interest of assisting law enforcement agencies to fully realize the advantages of utilizing visual aids in connection with investigative and prosecutive matters, it is desired that your office will, when the occasion arises, exhibit the brochure and discuss with police officials the extent to which the Bureau has developed the use of trial exhibits in bringing cases of national importance to satisfactory conclusions. Due to the limited staff of specialized technicians maintained to prepare trial exhibits in Federal violations, the services of the Bureau's Exhibits Section cannot be honored in cases where the FBI is without jurisdiction.

In the event police officials indicate an interest in obtaining a copy of this brochure, the Bureau should be advised of your recommendation.

7/25/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-39

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(C) FUGITIVE PROGRESS LETTER -- Furnish Bureau by tenth of month number of probation violator cases obtained as result of Bureau's expanded jurisdiction in such matters. Furnish results to date within one week of receipt of this letter. Thereafter incorporate under above caption along with other data presently submitted in one letter with following subheadings:

- (1) Unlawful flight complaints filed
- (2) Identity of replacements for Ten Most Wanted Fugitives Program
- (3) Fugitive deadlines missed
- (4) Probation violator cases obtained as to:
  - a. Cases wherein Bureau had original jurisdiction, and
  - b. Cases obtained under expanded jurisdiction

Submit original and one copy. No abstract is required.

(Security Letters on attached pages)

7/25/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-39

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(D) REPORT WRITING - STREAMLINING - SECURITY REPORTS -- Reference is made to SAC Letter Number 61-31 (J) dated June 6, 1961.

Referenced SAC Letter authorized the utilization of narrative-type statements in security reports. It was pointed out that this particular type reporting was susceptible to use primarily in cases of extensive activity in subversive organizations.

A review of reports submitted subsequent to referenced SAC Letter reveals that attempts are being made to utilize narrative-type reporting in cases in which little subversive activity has occurred. In such instances the reports must be detailed in order to present as complete a picture as possible of the subject's activities in order that a proper determination may be made with respect to his Security Index status.

Instances have been noted of attempts to weave into one narrative statement information received from more than one source. This practice is contrary to the instructions contained in referenced SAC Letter.

In reporting that a subject has attended meetings of a particular organization during a certain period of time, the number of meetings must be specified.

When reporting a subject's attendance at a specific affair, set forth not only the date of the activity but the date the information was received. Likewise, in utilizing a narrative statement to report a subject's activities, you must specify the period of time covered. Following identification of the source to which the information in the narrative statement is attributed, specify inclusive dates of the informant reports; for example, T-1 (July 1, 1960, to June 15, 1961).

I want to again stress the necessity for reporting in detail all information tending to establish a person's knowledge of the basic aims and purposes of the subversive organization with which affiliated, as well as all information tending to establish that a subject holds revolutionary and/or anarchist beliefs.

7/25/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-39

(E) EAST GERMAN INTELLIGENCE -- A recent defection of an East German Intelligence Service (EGIS) staff officer who was assigned to the Hauptverwaltung Aufklaerung (HVA) has furnished insight

7/25/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-39

concerning present and prospective EGIS activities in the United States. The defector was assigned to the section of HVA which is concerned with operations against continental United States and South America.

According to this source's knowledge, HVA has agents inside the continental United States. A number of agents residing in South America and targeted against United States installations there have thus far been identified by him. to the source's knowledge, HVA agents are presently located in the United States, he is providing information on a number of who are targets for HVA recruitment or have already been recruited by the HVA. All of these recruited agents are presently residing. The source did furnish the names of individuals of interest to HVA who are currently residing. These individuals are currently the subjects of investigation by

Prior to his open defection, this source furnished information that an effort was being made by the EGIS to recruit who reside in the United States. Fulfillment of this would be accomplished by (a) METHODS

### THIRD AGENCY CONSIDERATION

7/25/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-39

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In view of the above and the EGIS plan concerning immigrants to the United States, all offices are instructed to give close attention to investigations concerning immigrants who formerly resided in \_\_\_\_\_ Instructions concerning these investigations ~~as set forth in Section 105.E of the Manual of Instructions~~ should be given close adherence.

Regarding EGIS interest in visitors from the United States to East and West Germany, for some time the Bureau has had available information concerning ~~DATA IDENTIFYING TECHNIQUE DELETED~~ individuals in the United States and East and West Germany as provided by the \_\_\_\_\_ ~~IDENTITY OF SOURCE DELETED~~

Much of the information received is of a business or personal nature and is furnished to the field office covering the individual's residence for information. In the future, offices receiving information from this source should give particular attention to indications of recent or future travel to East and West Germany. In the event of indicated travel, a discreet investigation should be conducted to obtain background data and information concerning the individual's employment and activities. The results of such inquiries should be furnished to the Bureau. If the investigation indicates the subject to be a likely prospect for EGIS recruitment, the results should be accompanied by your recommendation for or against interview of the individual subject. While interviews will not normally be considered of individuals prior to travel to East Germany, in exceptional cases where unusual informant potential might exist, these also should be submitted for consideration.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover

Director

7/25/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-39

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PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 61-D

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

July 24, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7

One set of AFSAM 7 key lists for months of September, October and November, 1961, being forwarded separately to all divisions except Washington Field which will receive none; three copies being furnished Bureau's Emergency Relocation Site; and three copies Seat of Government Code Room.

Acknowledge receipt of key lists promptly by routing slip, indicating serial numbers which appear thereon; return address label of individual tamperproofed envelope containing keys even though torn when package opened; and destroy, by burning, each monthly sheet thirty days after last effective date thereof, advising Bureau promptly by routing slip, attention FBI Laboratory, this has been done.

It is essential address label mentioned above be returned in order to control security of shipment.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-42

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

August 8, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) FBI SUGGESTION PROGRAM -- A decline in the number of suggestions submitted under the FBI Suggestion Program was experienced during fiscal year 1961 when 700 suggestions were submitted in comparison to 1870 during fiscal year 1960. Of the latter total 910 were submitted to the Suggestions Desk, while 960 were handled by the various employees' streamlining committees. SAC Letter 60-45 (G) dated 9/27/60 instructed that all suggestions were to be submitted directly to me without consideration or recommendation by streamlining committees. However, even limiting consideration to the 910 suggestions handled by the Suggestions Desk in fiscal year 1960, there was still a decrease of 210 suggestions in fiscal year 1961. In addition the percentage of adoptions decreased from 35.66% to 31.4% and awards and estimated savings from \$900 to \$641 and \$78,888.73 to \$22,284.67 respectively.

Following is a comparison of submissions by each field office and legal attache office for fiscal years 1960 and 1961 respectively:

<u>Office</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>Increase or Decrease</u>
Albany	12	11	- 1
Albuquerque	16	10	- 6
Anchorage	1	7	+ 6
Atlanta	11	5	- 6
Baltimore	21	1	-20
Birmingham	2	5	+ 3
Boston	9	10	+ 1
Buffalo	2	1	- 1
Butte	1	0	- 1
Charlotte	7	7	
Chicago	9	13	+ 4
Cincinnati	43	16	-27
Cleveland	2	3	+ 1
Dallas	15	3	-12
Denver	2	5	+ 3
Detroit	7	9	+ 2
El Paso	9	3	- 6
Honolulu	4	5	+ 1
Houston	0	1	+ 1
Indianapolis	7	3	- 4
Jacksonville	8	4	- 4
Kansas City	8	7	- 1
Knoxville	2	5	+ 3
Little Rock	7	11	+ 4

<u>Office</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>Increase or Decrease</u>
Los Angeles	17	13	- 4
Louisville	4	3	- 1
Memphis	3	2	- 1
Miami	5	5	
Milwaukee	3	4	+ 1
Minneapolis	3	6	+ 3
Mobile	9	9	
Newark	22	12	-10
New Haven	8	2	- 6
New Orleans	11	2	- 9
New York City	29	18	-11
Norfolk	2	2	
Oklahoma City	1	1	
Omaha	8	1	- 7
Philadelphia	11	5	- 6
Phoenix	12	8	- 4
Pittsburgh	7	9	+ 2
Portland	4	6	+ 2
Richmond	5	4	- 1
Saint Louis	3	7	+ 4
Salt Lake City	5	3	- 2
San Antonio	1	3	+ 2
San Diego	4	6	+ 2
San Francisco	17	14	- 3
San Juan	3	6	+ 3
Savannah	23	9	-14
Seattle	23	19	- 4
Springfield	12	2	-10
Tampa	0	8	+ 8
Washington Field Office	13	17	+ 4
Las Vegas		0	

<u>Legat Offices</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>Increase or Decrease</u>
Bonn	0	0	
Havana	1		- 1
London	2	1	- 1
Madrid	1	0	- 1
Mexico City	0	0	

8/8/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-42

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<u>Legat Offices</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>Increase or Decrease</u>
Ottawa	0	0	
Paris	0	1	+ 1
Rio de Janeiro	0	0	
Rome	0	0	
Tokyo	2	7	+ 5

The foregoing figures are paradoxical. The degree of participation in the Suggestion Program is a good indication of the interest of each office in the improvement of the Bureau's operations. With the expansion of our work and the new challenges we face almost daily, it is inconceivable that the tempo of suggestions should decline. The fact that thirty offices fell appreciably behind last year's figures is, in the absence of sound reasons to the contrary, an apparent indictment of the personal leadership afforded by SACs, ASACs, and supervisory personnel to this vital program.

Fresh ideas calculated to promote greater economy and efficiency in all our operations should be the concern of every member of our organization and it is the particular responsibility of those in supervisory capacities to encourage and spur the submission of worthwhile ideas. The aim and purpose of our efforts should not be to generate suggestions for the sake of numerical increase in submissions but to make certain that the Bureau receives the benefit of substantial, qualitative, constructive ideas designed to insure that our resources are used to the best possible advantage. To this end, the Bureau is at all times interested in receiving any suggestions concerning ways to stimulate the Suggestion Program.

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(B) LEGAL ATTACHE OPERATIONS -- MANILA, PHILIPPINES -- Effective August 13, 1961, the Bureau is establishing a Legal Attache Office in Manila, Philippines. The areas which Legal Attache, Manila, will cover, together with areas covered by the other foreign offices, are set out alphabetically below. The Bureau desires to re-emphasize that domestic field offices should exploit our foreign offices to the fullest extent possible in connection with requested coverage by foreign offices of leads developed in the course of domestic investigation. In addition to specific leads, all field offices should remain alert for information of general interest to our foreign offices. The Legal Attaches have advised that there has been a lack of

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-42

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such information, particularly in the criminal field, and this information is of great value to the Legal Attaches as "trading material" with their sources abroad.

Countries Covered

Offices Covering

Algeria	Paris
Argentina	Rio de Janeiro
Austria	Bonn
Balearic Islands	Madrid
Belgium	Paris
Brazil	Rio de Janeiro
Canada	Ottawa, and border offices under certain circumstances
Canary Islands	Madrid
Costa Rica	Mexico City
Denmark	London
El Salvador	Mexico City
England	London
Formosa	Tokyo
France	Paris
Germany	Bonn
Gibraltar	Madrid
Greece	Rome
Guatemala	Mexico City
Honduras	Mexico City
Hong Kong	Tokyo
International Zone of Tangier	Madrid
Italy	Rome
Japan	Tokyo
Luxembourg	Paris
Mexico	Mexico City
Monaco	Paris
Morocco	Madrid
Netherlands	Bonn
Nicaragua	Mexico City
Northern Ireland	London
Norway	London
Okinawa	Tokyo
Philippines	Manila
Portugal	Madrid
Republic of Ireland	London
Scotland	London
Singapore	Manila
South Korea	Tokyo

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- 4 -



Spain  
Sweden  
Switzerland  
Thailand  
Turkey  
Uruguay  
Wales

Madrid  
London  
Paris  
Manila  
Rome  
Rio de Janeiro  
London

For further information on the functions and responsibilities of the Legal Attaches and the proper manner of setting forth leads to be covered by Legal Attache Offices, you should refer to Section 102, E, of the Manual of Instructions.

(Security Letter on attached page)

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-42

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(c) TRAVEL CONTROLS - CUBA -- Section 87D, page 33, Manual of Instructions, details the procedure to be followed concerning foreign travel by subjects of current or past security investigations and certain other individuals with subversive backgrounds. A volume of data concerning travel to Cuba by U. S. citizens and resident aliens of the United States not previously of security interest to us is being received at the Bureau. Current regulations, in effect since January 19, 1961, require that U. S. citizens possess valid passports specifically endorsed to authorize travel to Cuba before departing for that country. Resident aliens must have authorization from Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) before performing such travel. Section 1185, Title 8, U. S. Code, and Part 53, Title 22, Code of Federal Regulations, are applicable and Section 1185 provides penalties of not more than \$5,000 fine or more than five years' imprisonment, or both, when illegal travel is performed by U. S. citizens. INS has authority to deny re-entry to resident aliens who did not have specific authority to leave the United States for Cuba.

Existing instructions in Section 87D, Manual of Instructions, still apply in cases where travelers to Cuba fall within the specified categories. In cases not covered by provisions therein the field should, upon receipt of information indicating unauthorized travel to Cuba has occurred, conduct sufficient investigation to positively identify the individual involved, review indices, attempt to determine reason for travel through available sources, and furnish Bureau memoranda suitable for dissemination under individual captions containing the results thereof. Copies of the memoranda should be furnished INS locally in cases involving resident aliens and naturalized citizens. All offices should remain alert for information concerning violations but no investigation in addition to that outlined above is desired without specific Bureau instructions.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-42

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-47  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

September 5, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY APPLICANTS - PUBLICITY -- In connection with appointments of local police officers to the FBI National Academy, it is customary for me to address a letter to the head of the police agency of each applicant who is to be invited. At the same time, you are authorized to release pertinent facts concerning such appointments to the press. In order to obtain wider press coverage of such appointments, you should consider the advisability of personally congratulating officers invited to the FBI National Academy and arranging for the taking of appropriate photographs. It would then be possible for these photographs and pertinent data concerning the applicant and the FBI National Academy to be released to interested news outlets in your area. This procedure can best be followed when the invited officers are from areas close to your headquarters city. In those cases where the officers reside in outlying areas, the suggested procedure would be inadvisable.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-47

(B) AUTOMOBILES - 1960-1961 PLYMOUTH CARS-PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE -- The contract garage in one of the Bureau offices recommends repacking the rear wheel bearings in Chrysler-product cars at 10,000 mile intervals, although the Plymouth Service Manual reflects this is not necessary. This service was performed on two Bureau vehicles as a preventive-maintenance measure. Subsequent contact with the Chrysler Motor Company reflects their engineers do not feel this service necessary or warranted and they do not recommend. Under no circumstances should the rear wheels be repacked as a maintenance procedure without prior Bureau approval.

(C) FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY - SIXTY-NINTH SESSION -- The 69th Session of the FBI National Academy will begin on Monday, March 19, 1962, and will graduate on Wednesday, June 6, 1962. It is desired that you submit to the Bureau by October 13, 1961, the names of the candidates from your territory whom you desire to recommend to attend that session. Your attention is called to instructions previously given as to the procedures to be followed in nominating candidates to attend the Academy, and it is desired that you strictly comply with existing instructions.

All candidates recommended for attendance at the Academy must be personally known to the SAC. The SAC must have conducted a formal interview with each candidate being recommended unless such

candidate has been previously interviewed and favorably recommended by the former SAC within the preceding six months. It will not be necessary, however, for the present SAC to reinterview any candidates he, himself, interviewed even though more than six months have elapsed since the time of the first interview.

You may designate more than one candidate for the 69th Session since there is a possibility that your first candidate may not be accepted or that two or more representatives will be accepted from your office. In your letter listing your candidates, you must specifically set forth the results of the reviews of your field office indices concerning the applicants and their law enforcement agencies.

I want to emphasize the fact that the Bureau is desirous of accepting at the National Academy only those candidates who are outstanding both as to personal appearance and ability. The weight standards for National Academy applicants are the same as for our own personnel. Applicants must be within the desirable weight limits as set forth on form FD-300.

You are again reminded that the fingerprints of National Academy applicants are to be submitted at the time the results of the formal interview are forwarded to the Bureau. You should make a notation on the fingerprint card that the fingerprints are those of a National Academy applicant. The card should be forwarded to the Bureau, Attention: Training and Inspection Division.

I shall expect each SAC to give very close personal attention to the selection of candidates for attendance at the National Academy.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-47

(D) PERSONNEL - REFRESHMENTS DURING PERIODS OF OFFICIAL DUTY -- SAC Letter 58-55 (B) dated September 18, 1958, sets forth instructions concerning the use of refreshments during periods of official duty. The spirit and letter of the regulations as dictated by good judgment prohibit employees from partaking of refreshments, including such items as food, coffee, soft drinks, milk, orange juice or the like at any time they are signed in on the register as being on regular official duty. This applies to Agent and clerical personnel.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-47

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I find it necessary at this time to reiterate that food and drinks are to be partaken of only during official rest periods, lunch periods and at Bureau-authorized parties occasioned by the anniversary or retirement of a Bureau employee. Anniversary parties are not to include birthday parties or gatherings incidental to transfers, and parties marking anniversaries in the Bureau should include those on the occasion of which a Service Award Key is presented, such as the twentieth, twenty-fifth, thirtieth, and thirty-fifth. Such parties are to be held only during the last hour of the working day.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-47

(E) ERROR IN CALENDAR - THANKSGIVING -- The General Services Administration calendars issued to Bureau personnel show Thanksgiving as being November 30, 1961. This is erroneous, Thanksgiving being November 23, 1961. Employees should be appropriately notified.

9/5/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-47

(F) LEAVE - COMPENSATORY - RECORDING AND CHARGING -- Effective with the pay period commencing September 17, 1961, compensatory leave earned in lieu of payment for authorized overtime must be recorded and charged in multiples of 15 minutes. No compensatory leave is to be recorded before regular working hours unless at least 15 minutes is worked; the same rule will apply to time worked after regular working hours. If work of 15 minutes or more is performed both before and after regular working hours, it may be combined. However, the total claimed must be in multiples of 15 minutes.

This does not change present regulations that compensatory leave cannot be earned by Wage Board employees or Agents receiving Fringe Benefit payments. No compensatory leave may be claimed by any employee for voluntary overtime, travel overtime or in lieu of holiday pay.

(Security Letters on attached pages)

9/5/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-47 - 3 -

(G) CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTIES -- SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION CHARACTERIZATION -- The following subversive organization characterization should be utilized effective immediately in characterizing the Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties. The sources utilized in the characterization are all described as having furnished reliable information in the past and the New York Office has advised that careful consideration was given to each source concealed.

CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTIES

A source advised on June 11, 1961, that a meeting of the National Executive Committee (NEC), Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), was held on June 10, 1961, at Communist Party headquarters, 23 West 26th Street, New York, New York. According to the source, the main topic of discussion at this meeting was the Communist Party's plans in regard to combating the June 5, 1961, decision of the United States Supreme Court, requiring the Communist Party to register with the Attorney General of the United States as a communist-action organization pursuant to the provisions of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, and the Court's decision of the same date upholding the April 21, 1955, conviction of Junius Scales under the Smith Act provision covering membership in the Communist Party. This source further advised that during this discussion a special Communist Party defense committee was formed and it was decided that this committee would have an office, which would be managed by Miriam Friedlander who according to the source is a member of the CPUSA National Committee.

Another source advised on June 14, 1961, that at a meeting of the CPUSA National Board and invited guests held on that date at Communist Party headquarters, New York City, it was announced that the Communist Party defense committee would have an office at 22 East 17th Street, New York, New York, under the name of the Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties (CCFCL).

A third source advised on July 20, 1961, that at a meeting of the Communist Party defense committee held on that date at Communist Party headquarters, New York City, the purpose and scope of the CCFCL was discussed. It was stated that this committee has been set up to serve as a national coordinator and service center for every effort being made by whatever source to repeal the McCarran and Smith Acts. In addition it has been set up to reverse the Supreme Court's decision of June 5, 1961, or secure an indefinite stay of any enforcement of the law by the Department of Justice.

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It is to engage in generating a popular defense movement to mobilize legal assistance of any organization or individual whose "democratic rights are infringed upon by these laws." This committee wants to encourage the creation of local organizations or groups to work in support of any one of the above-stated objectives. The committee will also serve as an exchange center of material and provide speakers for any local organization.

Source: DELETED  
DELETED  
DELETED

9/5/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-47

(H) CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES -- The Manual of Instructions, Section 105 E, sets forth current Bureau instructions regarding investigations of Chinese entering U. S. as citizens or permanent resident aliens who were 17 years of age or older at the time they departed Communist China.

Arrangements are now in effect whereby we can cover a third group, namely, those who enter the U. S. on student visas. The control file for this program is "Chinese Who Have Formerly Resided in Communist China Entering U. S. on Student Visas, IS - CH," Bureau file

### THIRD AGENCY CONSIDERATION

Legal Attache furnishes this information to the Bureau and the visa recipient's name is checked through Bureau indices and results furnished to appropriate Bureau field division covering visa recipient's destination, together with two copies of Legal Attache, Tokyo, letter which includes appropriate instructions regarding investigation.

It is important to keep in mind the objectives of Bureau programs regarding individuals who have formerly resided in Communist China. Purposes of our investigations are to identify Chinese Communist Intelligence agents, obtain intelligence information of interest to Bureau and other Government agencies, develop informants and double agents, and acquaint reputable Chinese with Bureau's responsibilities and jurisdiction with regard to the internal security of the United States, thus effecting a broad over-all coverage

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-47

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consisting of individuals ready and willing to assist the Bureau in matters pertaining to Chinese Communist regime.

Recently, information was received from a confidential source abroad of a new Chinese Communist method to surreptitiously infiltrate target areas. This operation is called "Detouring Tactics" and consists of sending espionage agents by indirect routes to their ultimate destinations. ~~Such agents reportedly~~ leave Communist China at Hong Kong, British Crown Colony, and proceed to transit areas such as Singapore, Malaya, Burma and Indonesia. The intelligence agents are under instructions to find employment in Hong Kong as teachers in order to establish a reputation for respectability prior to continuing to various transit areas en route to their ultimate destination.

It is incumbent upon all personnel engaged in security investigations to be fully aware of the grave responsibility of the Bureau in the area of Chinese security matters. SAC Letters 58-72 (L) and 58-81 (J) advised the Chinese Communists had approved a decision to expand intelligence operations particularly in the U. S. Although we have received no indication to date of any organized Chinese Communist Intelligence activity in the U. S., we must assume that Chinese Communists are actively pursuing their intention of eventually carrying out organized intelligence activities in this country. The importance of developing sufficient informant and source coverage in order that such activity will be promptly brought to our attention is obvious.

In all probability, the greatest handicap to Chinese Communist Intelligence activities in the U. S. is the absence of a legal establishment in U. S. or adjacent areas. We must assume that the Chinese Communists recognize this handicap and are endeavoring to overcome the inherent difficulties resulting from this situation. Obviously, if the Chinese Communists can establish a diplomatic post in the U. S. such as a delegation to the UN, they will then be in a position to initiate intelligence operations. However, we must not overlook possibility that Chinese Communists, failing to establish diplomatic establishment in the U. S., may work through establishments set up in the future in Latin America or possibly even Canada. It is, therefore, vitally important that the investigations we are currently conducting in the Chinese security field be pursued with enthusiasm, imagination and a determination to accomplish Bureau objectives.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

3/5/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-47

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

September 26, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) REDESIGNATION OF NAMES OF U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE UNITS -- Pursuant to orders issued by the Department of the Army, effective July 25, 1961, all U. S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps Groups and Counter Intelligence Corps Detachments were designated respectively as ~~Intelligence Corps Groups~~ and ~~Intelligence Corps Detachments~~. Also, those Army intelligence units previously known as Military Intelligence Groups are now to be known as Intelligence Corps Groups. Pursuant to these orders, the designation Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) will no longer be used by the Army.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-55

(B) REPORT WRITING - FD-302 DUPLICATING MASTERS -- It has been suggested that, in those instances in which the Form FD-302 is prepared on a duplicating master with report page numbers thereon, the stenographer place two asterisks at the top of the master (not to appear in the body of the finished product) as an indication to the clerk who runs off the copies to prepare one copy without the report page numbers thereon. This would apply to the FD-302 form itself and any subsequent pages of each FD-302. It is suggested that this procedure be applied by those field offices which find this to be a problem, since it involves little time or effort on the part of the stenographer or clerk.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-55

(C) PERSONNEL MATTERS - FIELD ELIGIBILITY LIST -- Effective immediately, the current employment of those applicants being considered for a field office eligibility list should not be verified during the initial investigation. It is realized that quite frequently such applicants are amenable to verification of their employment, knowing there are no existing vacancies in that office at the time they apply. Nevertheless, to insure that dismissal action will not be taken by the present employer as a result of an inquiry by the Bureau, the foregoing instructions must be rigidly adhered to. Upon Bureau approval to fill a clerical need in your office, this phase of the investigation should be done in connection with the applicant whom you choose from your eligibility list. The contents of this SAC Letter should be immediately brought to the attention of all personnel engaged in the handling of applicant matters. Appropriate manual changes will be furnished subsequently.

(D) CONFIDENTIAL FUND - IMPREST FUND -- During the course of a recent inspection of a Bureau field division, it was noted that an Agent had received funds from the Confidential Fund of the office to be used in paying for confidential services rendered to the Bureau; however, contact with the payee was not made promptly and the Agent did not return the funds to the office account for a period in excess of 45 days. During the audit of the Imprest Fund, it was noted that an Agent had received funds from the Imprest Fund cashier for miscellaneous office purchases and that after five and one-half months had elapsed, no receipts reflecting purchases had been furnished by the Agent. These two incidents indicate poor judgment on the part of the Agent in not promptly handling these transactions.

Undue delays in handling matters involving the Confidential Fund and Imprest Fund will not be tolerated. It is the responsibility of every Bureau employee to carry out his assignments with promptness and in accordance with existing regulations and it is your responsibility to see that all employees comply with these instructions.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-55

(E) TRAINING - LAW ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCES - DEMONSTRATIONS OF POLYGRAPH AND COMPOSITE PICTURE IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS -- It was recently brought to the attention of the Bureau that an SAC intended to present demonstrations on a Composite Picture Identification System and on the Polygraph by non-Bureau personnel at a scheduled FBI Law Enforcement Conference on Bank Robbery and Incidental Crimes. The Bureau has carefully evaluated Composite Picture Identification Systems and has neither endorsed nor adopted any such system for identification purposes in unknown subject cases. A demonstration of such a Composite Picture Identification System at a Bureau-sponsored conference might serve as a tacit endorsement and is therefore undesirable. By SAC Letters 60-43 (E) dated 9/13/60 and 61-39 (B) dated 7/25/61, you were advised of the services of the Exhibits Section at the Seat of Government. It was clearly set forth that you should utilize artists' conceptions which could be prepared by the Exhibits Section. You were also advised that there were illustrated brochures describing the services of this section available for distribution to United States Attorneys and police officials. You should be completely familiar with these SAC letters and fully utilize these facilities.

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SAC LETTER NO. 61-55

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By Bureau letter to all offices captioned POLYGRAPH RESEARCH dated 12/9/60, the field was fully apprised of instructions concerning the use of the Polygraph. To reiterate previously furnished instructions, in no instance does the Bureau desire to have a demonstration of the Polygraph and Polygraph Techniques before any FBI-sponsored conference or training school attended by persons other than Agent personnel of the FBI. These instructions apply regardless of whether the demonstration is to be given by Bureau personnel or an employee of a local law enforcement agency.

9/26/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-55

3

(F) DISSEMINATION OF CRIMINAL MATTERS TO THE U. S. ARMY --  
Effective immediately information concerning criminal matters  
of interest to the Army is to be disseminated to the  
appropriate Provost Marshal rather than G-2. This does not  
affect the dissemination of information concerning espionage,  
sabotage, subversive and related matters to the appropriate  
G-2. There is attached a listing of major command Provost  
Marshals and the territory covered by their respective offices  
which you are to utilize in dissemination of pertinent infor-  
mation to the Provost Marshal.

(Security Letter on attached page)

9/26/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-55

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(G) RESERVE INDEX - FORM FD-154 -- When annually verifying information on individuals included on Section A of the Reserve Index, Form FD-154 (Verification of Information on Security Index Card) may be used. The form is readily adapted by the simple expedient of striking through the words "Security Index" in the title and paragraph one of the form and inserting the words "Reserve Index" in their place. The letter "a" should be added to the words FD-122 to denote the proper form to be submitted to the Bureau in these cases.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosure for (F)

9/26/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-55

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MAJOR COMMAND PROVOST MARSHALS  
AND  
THEIR AREAS OF JURISDICTION

Territorial Jurisdiction:

MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON:

Office of the Provost Marshal  
Military District of Washington  
United States Army  
Washington 25, D. C.

District of Columbia, the  
counties of Arlington, Fairfax,  
King George, Prince William,  
Stafford, Westmoreland, and  
the city of Alexandria in the  
State of Virginia; and the  
counties of Calvert, Charles,  
Montgomery, Prince Georges,  
and Saint Marys in the  
State of Maryland.

FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY:

Office of the Provost Marshal  
First United States Army  
Governors Island  
New York 4, New York

Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts,  
New Hampshire, New Jersey,  
New York, Rhode Island, and  
Vermont.

SECOND UNITED STATES ARMY:

Office of the Provost Marshal  
Second United States Army  
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland

Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland,  
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia,  
and West Virginia (less  
territory listed under Military  
District of Washington, and  
Fort Campbell, Kentucky).

THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY:

Office of the Provost Marshal  
Third United States Army  
Fort McPherson, Georgia

Alabama, Florida, Georgia,  
Mississippi, North Carolina,  
South Carolina, and Tennessee  
(plus Fort Campbell, Kentucky).

FOURTH UNITED STATES ARMY:

Office of the Provost Marshal  
Fourth United States Army  
Fort Sam Houston, Texas

Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico,  
Oklahoma, and Texas.

Territorial Jurisdiction:

FIFTH UNITED STATES ARMY:

Office of the Provost Marshal  
Fifth United States Army  
1660 East Hyde Park Boulevard  
Chicago 15, Illinois

Colorado, Indiana, Illinois,  
Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota,  
Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota,  
South Dakota, Wisconsin, and  
Wyoming.

SIXTH UNITED STATES ARMY:

Office of the Provost Marshal  
Sixth United States Army  
Presidio of San Francisco,  
California

Arizona, California, Idaho,  
Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah,  
and Washington.

UNITED STATES ARMY, ALASKA:

Office of the Provost Marshal  
United States Army, Alaska  
APO 949, Seattle, Washington  
(Fort Richardson, Alaska)

State of Alaska.

UNITED STATES ARMY, HAWAII:


Office of the Provost Marshal  
United States Army, Hawaii  
APO 957, San Francisco,  
California  
(Schofield Barracks, Hawaii)

State of Hawaii.

UNITED STATES ARMY, CARIBBEAN:

Office of the Provost Marshal  
United States Army, Caribbean  
Fort Amador, Canal Zone

Canal Zone and Puerto Rico.



PERSONAL ATTENTION

SAC LETTER NO. 61-56

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

October 3, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION - WORK-RELATED INJURIES (FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1961) -- Attached is a tabulation concerning work-related injuries caused by accidents which occurred during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1961. Insure that every possible step is taken to prevent accidents from occurring. Try to improve our safety record. Where you observe a preponderance of accidents occurring in any particular category, concentrate your efforts on such category and adopt safety measures to insure these accidents will be reduced in the future. You will be furnished with similar statistics at the end of this current fiscal year so you can measure your progress. Bear in mind that every work-related injury which results in medical or other expense must be absorbed from the Bureau's appropriated funds.

10/3/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-56

(B) BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA - COOPERATION WITH -- The Boy Scouts, under its Explorer Scouts program, has started a nationwide plan to provide specific training for various Scout groups interested in particular professions or industries. Various industries and professional organizations are being called on to sponsor Scout groups, and in one instance, a Field Office has been requested to serve as a sponsor of a group interested in law enforcement work.

While the Bureau is in accord with the aims of this program, it is felt it would be improper and unwise for the FBI to officially sponsor any Boy Scout group. Should you be approached regarding this program, you may offer full cooperation in the nature of providing lectures, showing movies or slides, and conducting the group on a tour of your office. Should an employee of your office be requested to serve as a counselor of such a group, he may do so; however, such activities must be confined to nonworking hours.



(C) CRIMINAL INFORMANT PROGRAM -- I have noted during the last six months that the number of potential criminal informants (PCIs) has decreased approximately eight per cent over the preceding six-month period. I have also noted that during this same period the number of Agent days being used in the development of informants has decreased over five per cent. These are unhealthy conditions. Rise in crime, new legislation, and added emphasis on organized crime make it necessary that our criminal informant coverage be increased proportionally. An insufficient number of individuals under development as potential criminal informants can only result in the future deterioration of our criminal informant coverage.

It is incumbent on every Agent engaged in criminal investigations to actively participate in this program. Individuals should be selected for development who have the potential as quality informants. Every consideration should be given to the development of gamblers, bookmakers, and individuals who have definite ties with the criminal underworld. While these individuals are more difficult to cultivate as informants, the results in the long run will be much greater. Individuals under development should be contacted frequently and when they agree to cooperate should be given definite assignments.

You should advise the Bureau within 10 days of the receipt of this letter what action you are taking to improve the criminal informant program in your office.

(Security Letter on attached page)

10/3/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-56

- 2 -

(D) SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION CHARACTERIZATION - "THE WORKER" --  
Re SAC Letter 58-5 (I), January 28, 1958, which instructed that  
"The Worker" was to be characterized as an east coast communist  
weekly newspaper.

Inasmuch as "The Worker," commencing with its midweek  
edition of September 26, 1961, is now being issued twice weekly,  
~~the following is being adopted as the thumbnail sketch for~~  
this publication.

"'The Worker' is an east coast communist newspaper."

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosure for (A)

10/3/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-56

- 3 -



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

October 24, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) OVERTIME -- I have noted with concern the increased amount of overtime being performed by some field investigative personnel and I firmly believe the overtime could be materially reduced if field supervisory personnel would see to it that such overtime as is necessary in the type of work handled by the Bureau is equitably shared by all agents.


It has been noted that in some offices the daily overtime of some agents exceeds three hours per day, whereas other agents in the same offices render a much less average overtime. If all agents were required to share the work load, the average would drop accordingly.

I want all overtime reduced to an absolute minimum, consistent with our responsibilities. At the same time, I feel very strongly that such overtime as is necessary should be shared equitably by all investigative personnel.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

October 26, 1961 WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7

One set of AFSAM 7 key lists for months of December, 1961, January and February, 1962, being forwarded separately to all divisions except Washington Field which will receive none; three copies being furnished Bureau's Emergency Relocation Site; and three copies Seat of Government Code Room.


Acknowledge receipt of key lists promptly by routing slip, indicating serial numbers which appear thereon; return address label of individual tamperproofed envelope containing keys even though torn when package opened; and destroy, by burning, each monthly sheet thirty days after last effective date thereof, advising Bureau promptly by routing slip, attention FBI Laboratory, this has been done.

It is essential address label mentioned above be returned in order to control security of shipment.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



JUNE  
PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 61-F

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

November 7, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RE: RADIO FREQUENCY MICROPHONE-  
TELEPHONE DEVICE (RFMT)

No Number SAC Letter V, Series 1952, dated July 14, 1952, advised that the FBI Laboratory developed an instrument which imposes a radio frequency on a telephone line and converts the telephone instrument into a microphone without entering the premises where the telephone is located. You were instructed to admonish your Security Supervisors and Sound-Trained Agents that this technique has been classified "Top Secret" and that it should not be discussed with other than Agent personnel in these two categories.

The device has recently been reclassified as "Secret." It will, therefore, not be necessary to continue the former practice of keeping this device in the personal custody of an Agent at all times when it is not stored in an approved field office space. Henceforth, when the device is not operated under the personal custody or supervision of an Agent, it may be placed in a steel cabinet which cabinet is equipped with a steel lockbar and a changeable three-number, manipulation-proof, combination dial-type padlock. The cabinet must be bolted or otherwise securely affixed to the floor of a closet or equally secluded space. The closet or secluded space must not have a window or other similar opening and must be equipped with a door that can be securely locked with a cylinder-type lock having no less than five pins with all the keys to the lock being under the exclusive control of Bureau personnel. The closet or secluded space must be in an apartment or area under the exclusive control of the Bureau and arranged so that equipment servicing can be performed at any time during the day or night without jeopardizing the security of the installation. The doors to the closet and all doors and windows in the controlled space must be equipped with a fail-safe type alarm device that will alert monitoring personnel to unauthorized entry.

This technique will operate successfully only under certain conditions. It will be necessary that a detailed survey of the telephone company subscriber equipment and telephone cable facilities serving the subscriber be made in each instance prior to installation of the equipment. This survey should be forwarded to the Bureau, attention FBI Laboratory, for review. If an installation appears feasible, a specially trained technician from the Laboratory or from key points in the field will be sent to make the installation.

Use of this equipment will be approved only on a most selective basis. It will be necessary, therefore, for all requests to use the device to be supported by adequate information reflecting the essential need to obtain this coverage and the reasons why such coverage is not feasible by other means. All communications concerning ~~this equipment should be captioned~~ "RFMT" and transmitted as "JUNE" material.

The use of RFMT in the unattended manner described above will permit running it into a central plant for monitoring. It is recognized that the monitoring of this and other types of microphone surveillances at a central point will result in a saving of man power to the extent that it will release any men who are otherwise on equipment guard duty when the subject is inactive. However, in general, this saving will be at the cost of some loss of intelligence because of the loss of intelligibility inherent in running the wires over a longer distance. There is, of course, no saving in man power during periods when the subject is active as there is no method which will reliably signal the presence of a conversation in the microphone target area and it is, therefore, imperative that the individual microphone surveillances be separately manned during the periods when the subjects are active. This is in contrast with the case of telephone surveillances where there are technical differences which permit us to have a signalling device to reliably indicate the presence of conversations so that monitoring personnel can restrict their attention to those lines which are active and thus can be reduced to a minimum consistent with the volume of traffic.

I will hold each SAC personally responsible for the security of RFMT equipment assigned his office and for adequately covering each microphone and telephone surveillance operating within the field office territory.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 61-F  
11/7/61

- 2 -



In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

JUNE  
PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 61-G  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

November 29, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RE: TECHNICAL AND MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCES -  
CHANNELIZING MEMORANDA

No Number SAC Letter dated December 22, 1949, established the "June" procedure for handling information obtained through these techniques. The Special Agent to whom the case is assigned, after reviewing the log, dictates necessary excerpts from the log in paraphrased form for inclusion in future reports. For purposes of uniformity, this dictation should take the form of channelizing memoranda which should be disseminated to the appropriate files. In accordance with SAC Letter No. 61-8 dated February 21, 1961, these memoranda may be destroyed following submission of reports containing the information in both individual and organizational security cases.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

December 19, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE COURT JUDGES -- The Committee on Law Enforcement for The National Council of Juvenile Court Judges currently is communicating with law enforcement officials throughout the country seeking their views on the juvenile problem. One SAC already has received an inquiry from a member of the Committee in his territory and it may be assumed that similar inquiries will be made of other SAC's. Liaison has been established with The National Council of Juvenile Court Judges, and there has been frequent contact with Judge James P. Gossett of Gooding, Idaho, Chairman of the Committee on Law Enforcement, regarding the work of this Committee. Should you receive any inquiry from a member of this Committee, you should advise the individual that our views already have been furnished to the Committee Chairman. Copies of any communications you receive relating to this matter should be sent to the Bureau, Attention: Crime Records under the caption "The National Council of Juvenile Court Judges."

12/19/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-71

(B) TELECOMMUNICATIONS SURVEY BY GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION (GSA) - TELEPHONES AND TELETYPES -- The Bureau does not intend to utilize local GSA communications facilities and will not give further consideration to the Bureau's possible participation in the Federal Telecommunications System until such time as that system has been completely implemented and definite information can be obtained regarding the type of service and priorities which are actually available at that time and specific cost data can be furnished to the Bureau to permit a determination as to whether economies can be effected. In view of this, the Bureau does not desire to participate in the local surveys being conducted by GSA at present since such surveys require considerable employee time on the part of our telephone operators and have a tendency to interfere with day-to-day operations.

If any requests are received from GSA or local telephone companies for permission to conduct such surveys or to furnish any other information concerning our communications system, you should tactfully advise them the Bureau does not wish to participate in the surveys and decline to furnish the information.



The Bureau's position has been cleared with GSA authorities in Washington, who have advised that their field installations will be instructed by them not to request the FBI to participate. If you receive any additional requests for information in connection with this program, you should immediately advise the Bureau. You should not discuss with other agencies the fact that the FBI is not participating in these surveys.

12/19/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-71

(C) FIREARMS - CARRIED ABOARD AIRCRAFT -- As an answer to the recent hijackings of aircraft by the use of firearms carried on board those aircraft by passengers, Congress passed Public Law 87-197 which prohibits unauthorized persons from carrying weapons aboard aircraft.

Advice has been received from the Department that this statute does not apply to Department of Justice personnel authorized to carry weapons. In this connection, the Attorney General has issued the following instructions:

"1) All Department of Justice personnel who are authorized to carry arms and who have them on their person while travelling by air should present proper credentials to the ticket agent or flight attendant when boarding the aircraft, unless to identify themselves would, in their judgment, compromise the success of their mission.

"2) When it is not feasible to inform the carrier that they are carrying weapons, Department of Justice personnel must act with the utmost discretion to avoid giving cause for alarm to air carrier personnel or their fellow passengers."

Each SAC will be held personally responsible for insuring that these instructions of the Attorney General are immediately brought to the personal attention of all Special Agents and insuring complete understanding of these instructions and full compliance with them.

12/19/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-71

(D) SOUTHERN ASSOCIATION OF INVESTIGATIVE AGENTS -- By SAC Letter 61-68(c) you were advised of the formation of the Southern Association of Intelligence Agents. The name has since been changed to the Southern Association of Investigative Agents.

12/19/61

SA LETTER NO. 61-71

(.) PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM ON STRENGTHENING OF COORDINATION OF GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE WASHINGTON -- In a memorandum for heads of departments and agencies dated November 10, 1961, the President stated that as an integral part of present steps to increase the effectiveness and economy of Federal agencies he wants coordination of Government activities outside Washington, D. C., significantly strengthened. As a first step in bringing Federal officials outside Washington closer together the President has directed the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission to arrange for establishment of a Board of Federal Executives in each of the Commission's ten administrative regions, the headquarters cities of such being Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Chicago, St. Louis, Dallas, Denver, San Francisco, and Seattle.

The purpose of the Boards will be to make possible closer and stronger coordination of activities across departmental and agency lines and to implement opportunities to pool experience and resources and to accomplish savings. The areas of interest involved are management and budgetary procedures, personnel policies, recruitment, office space use, procurement activities, public information duties, natural resources development, protection of equal rights, urban development activities, manpower utilization, etc. Each Board will establish liaison with State and local Government officials in its region.

You may be invited to attend conferences by the Board in your region and if so, it will be satisfactory for you to attend but only as an observer, advising the Bureau thereafter as to what transpired. Should you receive any request to actively participate in this program or for anything that would commit the Bureau to a course of action, such should be promptly brought to the attention of the Bureau for consideration.

12/19/61

SAC LETTER NO. 61-71

(F) CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM - DISSEMINATION OF REPORTS TO UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS -- Effective immediately copies of all reports in Interstate Transmission of Wagering Information, Interstate Transportation of Wagering Paraphernalia and Interstate Transportation in Aid of Racketeering investigations and related investigations under the Criminal Intelligence Program (Anti-Racketeering and Interstate Gambling Activities) will be furnished to the appropriate United States Attorney.

All pending cases in these categories will be immediately reviewed and copies of all reports prepared to date will be submitted to the appropriate United States Attorney. No reports submitted prior to September, 1960, are to be disseminated since these were not prepared in form suitable for dissemination.

In view of the wider dissemination of these reports, it is essential that meticulous care be afforded to their preparation in order to afford informants and highly confidential sources maximum protection and to prevent the possibility of exposure.

In Interstate Transmission of Wagering Information, Interstate Transportation of Wagering Paraphernalia and Interstate Transportation in Aid of Racketeering matters, the Criminal Division of the Department will retain authority to authorize prosecution, in accordance with existing policies.

You should insure that instructions set forth herein are given close personal attention and the requirements complied with as expeditiously as possible.

12/19/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-71

(G) CRIME ABOARD AIRCRAFT - SPECIAL CIVIL AIR REGULATION NO. SR-448A -- Attention is directed to Subsection (1) of Section 1472, Title 49, (Federal Aviation Act of 1958 as amended) which deals with carrying weapons aboard aircraft and specifically prohibits carrying a concealed, deadly or dangerous weapon on or about the person aboard an aircraft being operated by an air carrier. This Section further prohibits an attempt to commit such an act. The Statute excepts from this prohibition "law enforcement officials of any municipal or state government, or the Federal Government, who are authorized or required to carry arms, and....such other persons as may be so authorized under regulations issued by the (Federal Aviation Agency) Administrator."

12/19/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-71

In accordance with the authority granted by the Statute, the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) has issued Special Civil Air Regulation No. SR-448A, which in part states as follows:

"Except for employees or officials of municipal, State, or Federal Governments who are authorized or required to carry arms, and except for those crewmembers and such other persons as may be authorized by an air carrier, no person, while aboard an aircraft being operated by an air carrier in air transportation, shall carry on or about his person a deadly or dangerous weapon, either concealed or unconcealed."

In effect, the FAA has granted the air carrier the right to determine who shall be permitted to carry concealed weapons aboard aircraft. Whereas SR-448A is considerably broader than Subsection (1), Section 1472, Title 49, since it covers unconcealed weapons, the Statute limits violations within FBI jurisdiction to concealed, deadly or dangerous weapons.

In view of the provisions of Special Civil Air Regulation No. SR-448A, you should insure in conducting investigations under this Statute that the air carrier has not granted authority for the individual in question to carry weapons aboard aircraft.

12/19/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-71

(H) "TROPIC OF CANCER" - INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF OBSCENE MATTER -- For your information, law enforcement agencies in many parts of the country have initiated steps to remove from circulation in their respective jurisdictions the book "Tropic of Cancer" by Henry Miller. Several field offices have inquired of the Bureau as to this book being a suitable vehicle for prosecution under the Interstate Transportation of Obscene Matter Statute.

This is to advise that after having carefully reviewed this book the Department has concluded that Federal prosecution would not be warranted. You should be guided accordingly.

(Security Letter on attached page)

12/19/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-71

- 5 -

(I) FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE -- Richard Gibson, national leader of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC), pro-Castro group with headquarters at New York City and with chapters in approximately 20 cities throughout the United States, recently advised a New York source that the FPCC leadership was concerned about FBI interviews of its members. Gibson further commented that the FPCC plans to make a legal issue on the next occasion when an FPCC member is contacted at his place of employment by the FBI. In view of the foregoing, specific Bureau authority should be secured prior to interviews of FPCC members at their places of employment. These instructions, however, are in no way intended to discourage field from recommending interviews of FPCC members, where warranted. In the event it is not feasible to conduct such interviews away from the individual's place of employment, the Bureau should be furnished full details in this regard when submitting recommendations for interview.


Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

12/19/61  
SAC LETTER NO. 61-71

- 6 -



PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 62-A

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

January 8, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

RE: BUREAU CODES - AFSAM 7

Four sets of AFSAM - 4545 - 2/TSEC rotors for use with Bureau's coding equipment are being furnished each office with the exception of San Francisco which receives six sets and Washington Field which receives none; twelve sets being furnished Code Room and fourteen sets Seat of Government Relocation Site. These will become effective March 1, 1962, replacing the KAR-110 rotors presently in use. Appropriate key lists being distributed separately.

Upon receipt of rotors carefully inspect package for evidence of tampering. Notify Bureau immediately of any irregularity. Acknowledge receipt by routing slip, listing serial numbers of each set; return to Bureau in a sealed envelope marked for the attention of the FBI Laboratory the address label on inner wrapping, even though torn in opening, and make appropriate inventory adjustments by FD-222. Promptly check rotors by actual use in AFSAM 7 pursuant to AFSAM 7 Manual of Operation and Routine Maintenance, Section IV, A, and afford rotors secure storage with other AFSAM 7 material.

Rotors being furnished you are Type A as described in Section II, A, of Manual of Operation and Routine Maintenance and should be assembled as described therein. During assembly of Type A rotors, particular attention should be given to insuring that the metal retaining rings are properly seated on the rotor cores with the release tabs facing outward.

Retain KAR - 110 rotors presently in use until April 2, 1962, on which date they should be packaged securely and forwarded to Bureau, attention FBI Laboratory, by Railway Express, Protective Signature Service. Anchorage, Honolulu and San Juan use Registered Airmail, Return Receipt Requested.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-12

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

February 14, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.


(A) DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES PREPARED LOCALLY BY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES -- The various local military intelligence agencies throughout the country issue and disseminate domestic intelligence summaries on a regular periodic basis which contain a review of security matters within the military area where prepared. These summaries are compiled from research and analysis of domestic intelligence information received from various sources including data which was disseminated to these agencies by our various offices located in the region covered by these military groups. In order to insure that our information is being used properly and to make certain that any data set forth in these summaries which could cause potential embarrassment to the Bureau is called to the Bureau's attention, it is essential that these summaries be promptly reviewed by the appropriate offices upon publication. In making the review, particular attention should be paid to information involving matters of nationwide newspaper controversy and that which is of such a highly important nature that it is possible its improper use could prove embarrassing to the Bureau. Any such information noted should be promptly called to the Bureau's attention under the caption of the subject matter involved, together with observations and recommendations as to what steps have been or should be taken to correct the situation. The above-mentioned summaries are not to be confused with military briefing or training documents prepared solely for use within the various military intelligence agencies.

Each Special Agent in Charge must advise the Bureau by February 27, 1962, the following information: (1) the arrangements he has made to obtain copies of all the above-described intelligence summaries issued by the local military intelligence agencies covering the region in which his office is located; (2) the administrative procedures set up to insure prompt review of these summaries upon receipt in order that the Bureau may be immediately advised if they contain information which might be detrimental to our best interests; and (3) the title of each summary which will be received, together with the identity of the issuing military agency and the frequency of publication of each.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



SAC LETTER NO. 62-11  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

February 13, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) TRAINING - POLICE - PHOTOGRAPHY INSTRUCTORS -- It has recently been noted that due to the limited number of instructors qualified to furnish photography training at police schools, a number of requests for this type of training have been declined. Certainly training in photography is vital to modern, efficient police work. ~~The Bureau will consider affording specialized training to qualify police instructors to furnish police schools on photography if there are sufficient interest in and need for this training by local law enforcement agencies.~~

You should immediately advise the Bureau if there are such interest and need by local law enforcement agencies in your division for photography training. If such need exists, you should recommend how many police instructors would be necessary to adequately handle police training on photography for your division. Do not make recommendations for any specific individual at this time for specialized training in photography. In the event that such specialized training is provided at the Seat of Government, you will be advised of the qualifications for attendance at this school and will be requested to furnish recommendations for an agent meeting these qualifications to attend this specialized school.

2/13/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-11

(B) SPEECH MATTERS - RECORDED STATEMENT "OPERATIONS OF THE FBI" -- The Bureau has just prepared and taped a 14-minute, 23-second statement on the "Operations of the FBI." The narration for this tape is by the same person who prepared the two previous messages on communism. This tape is being reproduced in quantity at the Bureau and copies will be made available to all offices in the near future.

It is believed this tape should have many valuable uses throughout the field. It can be used in conjunction with regularly scheduled appearances of Bureau speakers and can also be furnished to reliable groups requesting Bureau speakers when such speakers are not available because of other commitments.

You should also consider using it in high schools throughout your territory where it should serve as an exceedingly satisfactory medium to acquaint these young people with our operations.



In the event you should wish to make the tape available to any of your contacts in the radio field, you should feel free to do so.

You should advise the Bureau on a periodic basis of the distribution made of this tape. An estimation of the number of persons who have heard it and any comments as to their response should also be furnished. This information and any inquiries concerning this tape should be marked for the attention of the Crime Research Section.

2/13/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-11

(C) GOVERNMENT BILLS OF LADING - EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY CLAUSE -- The provisions presently included on the back of the U. S. Government bills of lading forms as condition 9 are based on Executive Order 10557, 19 F. R. 5655, which has been revoked by Executive Order 10925.

Pursuant to Executive Order 10925 it will be necessary, when using U. S. Government bills of lading forms, to incorporate a reference to section 301 of Executive Order 10925 as an integral part of bills of lading contracts. Accordingly, before any Government bill of lading is issued for use there shall be placed thereon a typewritten, rubber stamp, or other similar impression containing the following words:

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY  
Condition 9 hereof is revised as follows:  
The contract clauses in Sec. 301 of  
Executive Order 10925 (26 F. R. 1977)  
are incorporated herein, but carriers are  
exempted from paragraphs 3-7 thereof  
unless otherwise specifically ordered  
(26 F. R. 6586, Sec. 60-1.3(b)(4)).

A rubber stamp, if necessary, may be purchased locally from the Imprest Fund.

2/13/62

(D) FBI SUGGESTION PROGRAM -- The following figures are the totals of suggestions submitted and adopted in each field office for the first half (July through December) of Fiscal Year 1962:

	<u>Suggestions</u>	<u>Adopted</u>	<u>Not</u> <u>Adopted</u>	<u>Agent</u> <u>Submissions</u>	<u>Clerk</u> <u>Submissions</u>
Albany	3	0	3	2	1
Albuquerque	19	2	17	7	12
Anchorage	1	0	1	1	0
Atlanta	3	1	2	2	1
Baltimore	10	3	7	5	5
Birmingham	1	0	1	0	1
Boston	3	1	2	3	0
Buffalo	0	0	0	0	0
Butte	1	1	0	1	0
Charlotte	6	2	4	1	5
* Chicago	7	0	6	4	3
Cincinnati	8	0	8	6	2
Cleveland	1	0	1	1	0
Dallas	10	1	9	7	3
Denver	2	0	2	1	1
Detroit	5	0	5	2	3
El Paso	1	0	1	1	0
Honolulu	0	0	0	0	0
Houston	5	1	4	4	1
Indianapolis	2	0	2	0	2
Jacksonville	2	1	1	0	2
Kansas City	2	0	2	2	0
Knoxville	4	0	4	3	1
Las Vegas	2	0	2	2	0
Little Rock	0	0	0	0	0
Los Angeles	12	2	10	8	4
Louisville	4	0	4	3	1
Memphis	5	0	5	3	2
Miami	4	0	4	2	2
Milwaukee	8	1	7	6	2
Minneapolis	3	0	3	3	0
Mobile	4	0	4	4	0
Newark	6	3	3	5	1
New Haven	5	1	4	5	0
New Orleans	3	1	2	1	2

2/13/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-11

- 3 -

	<u>Suggestions</u>	<u>Adopted</u>	<u>Not Adopted</u>	<u>Agent Submissions</u>	<u>Clerk Submissions</u>
New York	13	2	11	10	3
Norfolk	5	3	2	1	4
Oklahoma City	1	0	1	0	1
Omaha	0	0	0	0	0
Philadelphia	13	2	11	4	9
Phoenix	2	0	2	2	0
Pittsburgh	1	0	1	0	1
Portland	4	0	4	3	1
Richmond	2	0	2	2	0
Saint Louis	2	0	2	1	1
Salt Lake City	1	0	1	1	0
San Antonio	3	0	3	0	3
San Diego	9	4	5	6	3
San Francisco	14	6	8	12	2
San Juan	4	0	4	4	0
Savannah	7	1	6	3	4
Seattle	7	2	5	4	3
Springfield	7	1	6	1	6
Tampa	8	0	8	5	3
Washington Field	13	5	8	8	5
<b>* TOTALS</b>	<b>268</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>220</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>106</b>
Bonn	1	0	1	1	0
London	2	2	0	1	1
Madrid	0	0	0	0	0
Manila	1	0	1	1	0
Mexico City	1	1	0	0	1
Ottawa	2	0	2	0	2
Paris	0	0	0	0	0
Rio de Janeiro	0	0	0	0	0
Rome	0	0	0	0	0
Tokyo	3	2	1	2	1
<b>** Bern</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>* Aggregate</b>	<b>278</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>225</b>	<b>167</b>	<b>111</b>

\* Chicago has one suggestion under 60-day survey

\*\* Bern began operations on 10/10/61

2/13/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-11

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As evidenced by the foregoing totals, some offices have made little or no contribution to the Suggestion Program. It is imperative to reconcile such a showing with the fact that the Bureau's operations are constantly expanding. Faced with these increasing responsibilities, it is imperative that we permit no waste of our manpower and resources but seek incessantly for ways to streamline our work in order to concentrate our efforts and energies most efficaciously. This can only be accomplished if we are given the benefit of every constructive suggestion of each of our employees. Passive or perfunctory attention to the Bureau's needs cannot be condoned. The Suggestion Program is undoubtedly one of the most effective vehicles for insuring that the Bureau may take advantage of beneficial ideas and I expect each office to pursue this program vigorously.

7/11/62  
LETTER NO. 62-11

17) TRAINING - NEW AGENTS' - FOURTEEN-WEEK CURRICULUM -- The new agents' training has been extended from thirteen weeks to fourteen weeks with the class which entered on duty January 15, 1962. Attached is for your information the curriculum for the fourteen weeks' training afforded the new agents. This curriculum is being furnished to you to inform you of the areas where additional emphasis is being placed such as report writing, Bureau communications and practical work on volume categories of cases. A review of this curriculum may be of benefit in correlating the training that you afford the new agent in his first office assignment. You may also find this curriculum of value in discussing the Bureau's training with Special Agent applicants.

Any suggestions that you or other personnel may have for the betterment of the new agents' curriculum should be submitted to the Bureau, attention Training and Inspection Division.

7/11/62  
LETTER NO. 62-11

18) ARRESTS - SEARCHES OF INDIVIDUALS TAKEN INTO CUSTODY -- I would like to reiterate existing instructions that all persons taken into custody by Bureau Agents must be afforded thorough and complete searches. This search must include not only a search of wearing apparel but a search of the body in an effort to locate any evidence of criminal activity or any material which may be secreted for the purpose of self-destruction.

7/13/62  
LETTER NO. 62-11

The necessity for a most thorough search cannot be overemphasized and all personnel must be on guard at every minute in order to assure that material is not retained by prisoners that could be used for self-destruction. Extra care must be taken in situations where prisoners after being searched are given back their clothing rather than being provided with special prisoner garb.

2/13/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-11

G) ACHIEVEMENTS -- I have been deeply concerned that some recent occurrences in the field, though isolated, may have created a false and misleading impression as to our operations which, if not corrected, could possibly impair our high standards of efficiency and effectiveness.

At this time it is well to remember that no other investigative organization in this country enjoys a record of achievement and excellence which is comparable to that of the Bureau. Ours is a hard-earned record based on the solid accomplishments the Bureau has placed in the record books in the fields of criminal, security and intelligence activities. This paramount position is the product of work and sacrifice, patience and perseverance, imagination and practicality combined in substantial measure with unremitting thoroughness and dedication to fairness and accuracy.

Our high aims and aspirations place heavy responsibilities on each of us to constantly strive through improvement of our day-to-day operations to further strengthen and preserve our position.

Each one of us must be sure that our conduct in discharging our responsibilities meets the high standards of excellence which have long been our aim and to that end we must in all respects be guided by the dictates of sound discretion and good judgment.

2/13/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-11

- 6 -

(H) BUREAU APPLICANTS - CLERKS - SUMMER EMPLOYEES -- The following policy has been adopted regarding summer employment of clerical employees at the Seat of Government and the field this year: Only those applicants will be considered who were summer employees during the Summer of 1961 and whose work records were completely satisfactory, who fulfilled their agreements to work at least ninety days or their entire vacation period, and who agree to work during the Summer of 1962 for a minimum of ninety days or their entire vacation period. All applications for summer employment should clearly indicate that applicant is interested only in employment during the summer months and such information and their agreement to work the stated time should be clearly reflected on the formal interview sheet.

The field will not be authorized to hire any more than ten per cent of its regular clerical staff for summer employment and then only after complete justification is furnished. As summer employment will necessarily affect the clerk-agent ratio in the field, the employment of summer applicants will be considered in connection with any field requests for regular clerical employees during the same period.

2/13/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-11

(I) STATUS OF INCARCERATED NOTORIOUS CRIMINALS -- There are currently incarcerated in Federal penal institutions a number of notorious criminals, sentenced as a result of prosecution, in whom the Bureau has had an interest. By reason of their criminal conduct, the identity of these notorious criminals is well known to the general public and any action concerning their application for pardon or release results in considerable nationwide publicity.

Accordingly, those offices having Federal penal institutions located within their territory must insure that through established liaison with penal officials the Bureau will be advised of any change in status concerning incarcerated notorious criminals. The Bureau should be advised of any contemplated action such as proposed or actual parole, release from confinement or transfer from one institution to another.

(Security Letters on attached pages)

2/13/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-11

(J) INTERNATIONAL SERVICES OF INFORMATION FOUNDATION, INC.  
(ISI) -- Reference SAC Letter No. 61-31 (B) dated June 6, 1961, which included background data relating to the ISI and which pointed out that Ulius Louis Amoss was its head. For your information Amoss died on November 9, 1961, and his widow, Mary Veronica Amoss, now serves as President and Secretary of the Board of Trustees of the ISI. She also succeeded Amoss as editor of the ISI publication "Inform."

The contents of "Inform" in the past have been limited to international intelligence data; however, it has been reported that consideration is being given to the possibility of instituting a program dealing with domestic intelligence information. Be alert for any data corroborating this report and submit such information promptly to Bureau.

As mentioned in the afore-mentioned SAC Letter, in the event an ISI representative contacts your office, you should accept any information volunteered but under no circumstances should he be afforded any assistance. No information pertaining to this organization should be furnished to persons outside the FBI without specific Bureau approval.

2/13/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-11

(K) COMMUNIST FRONT ORGANIZATIONS - INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950 - PREPARATION OF PROSECUTIVE SUMMARY REPORTS - REPORT WRITING -- As a result of the recent action by the U. S. Supreme Court against the Communist Party, USA, pursuant to the Internal Security Act of 1950, the Department has commenced reviewing cases concerning communist front organizations for presentation to the Subversive Activities Control Board under the Act. Certain offices have been instructed to submit prosecutive summary reports on organizations in which the Department has expressed an interest. It is expected more requests will be forthcoming in the near future. Review of the summary reports submitted to date indicates a need for reiterating and amplifying current instructions in report-writing procedures.

Prosecutive and supplemental prosecutive summary reports should follow the format contained in SAC Letter 114 (A), Series 1951, dated November 30, 1951. Instructions contained in the Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part II, pages 26 through 27, and the FBI Handbook, Part I, pages 71-72a, should be scrupulously followed, where applicable.

2/13/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-11

- 8 -

The words "Prosecutive Summary" or "Supplemental Prosecutive Summary" should appear on the FD-204 in the same manner these words appear on the FD-272. Informants, concealed by T symbols, and exhibits referred to in the summary reports should have the same T symbols and exhibit numbers assigned to them in all summary reports prepared in a particular case. Manual and Handbook changes are forthcoming.

2/13/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-11

(L) FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE -- Attention is directed to SAC Letter Number 61-71 dated December 19, 1961, paragraph (I). According to New York informant, during public meeting of Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC) on 1/31/62 at New York City, one of speakers claimed that FBI has been urging employers to dismiss employees with pro-Castro sympathies. He requested audience to furnish names, dates, and places of such instances so that they could be "published." In order to preclude possibility of FPCC making charges of this type against the Bureau, field should be circumspect in any contacts with employers of FPCC members or other pro-Castro sympathizers who are under investigation. No statements or comments should be made which could be interpreted as pressure to effect the dismissal of the employee. Moreover, during contacts with employers of individuals under investigation because of pro-Castro activities or sympathies, interviewing Agents should restrict such interviews to the acquisition of needed data without disclosing the basis for the investigation or other facts known to the FBI about the individual under investigation. These instructions are not aimed at discouraging contacts with employers where such action is a logical investigative step.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director


Enclosure for (E)

2/13/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-11

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

February 8, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7

~~One set of AFSAM 7 key lists for months of March,~~  
April, and May, 1962, being forwarded separately to all divisions  
except Washington Field which will receive none; three copies  
being furnished Bureau's Emergency Relocation Site; and three  
copies Seat of Government Code Room.

Acknowledge receipt of key lists promptly by routing  
slip, indicating serial numbers which appear thereon; return in  
a sealed envelope to the Bureau, attention FBI Laboratory, FBI  
Annex, the address label on individual tamperproofed envelope  
containing keys even though torn while opening package; and  
destroy, by burning, each monthly sheet thirty days after last  
effective date thereof, advising Bureau promptly by routing  
slip, attention FBI Laboratory, FBI Annex, this has been done.


It is essential address label mentioned above be  
returned in order to control security of shipment.

Key lists being distributed at this time are for use  
with AFSAR 4545-2/TSEC rotors. However, you are to retain the  
KAR 110/TSEC rotors assigned to your office until April 2, 1962,  
at which time KAR 110/TSEC rotors should be packaged securely  
and returned to the Bureau, attention FBI Laboratory, FBI Annex,  
by Railway Express, Protective Signature Service. Anchorage,  
Honolulu and San Juan use Registered Airmail, Return Receipt  
Requested.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 62-C  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

February 19, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

RE: MICROPHONE INSTALLATIONS -  
COMMON WALL PENETRATION

Penetration of a common wall between two buildings or between two rooms within the same building for the purpose of establishing a microphone surveillance is a well-established technique. Where physical conditions are such that access can be had to a common wall of the target area, this technique must be thoroughly explored and given consideration as a means of securing desired microphone coverage. Common wall penetration is particularly adaptable to those conditions where access to an area to be afforded microphone coverage is not possible or where peculiar security problems preclude the use of more direct methods available for installation of concealed microphones. No survey made for the purpose of determining feasibility of installing a concealed microphone can be considered complete until the possibility of utilization of this technique has been fully explored.

Careful analysis of each condition encountered will reveal that in most instances penetration of a common wall can be achieved without benefit of specialized tools or sophisticated drilling equipment. The particular approach and solution to each individual common wall penetration problem will depend largely upon the ingenuity and fortitude of the individuals making the microphone installation. In some situations, due to the nature of materials used in wall construction, thickness of walls or unusual security problems the need for specialized equipment to facilitate wall penetration may be indicated. Should a survey for microphone installation reveal that the latter condition exists, you should submit specific details to the Bureau, attention of the Laboratory. Analysis of details may enable the Laboratory to supply you with drilling tools or devices which will facilitate penetration of the particular common wall in question.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-16

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

March 8, 1962


WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) PERSONNEL MATTERS - FLOWER FUNDS -- SAC Letter 60-24 dated 5-10-60 authorized all field and Seat of Government divisions to maintain a flower fund on a voluntary basis. Disbursements were to be confined to the purposes for which the fund was established, such as to purchase flowers or appropriate gift for employees in case of illness and to provide flowers to immediate families of employees when a death occurs. The fund is not to be utilized to purchase a gift for an employee who resigns or is transferred. Bylaws or other administrative devices with reference to the fund were to be amended to comply with these instructions. SAC Letter 61-8 dated 2-21-61 called attention to the above instructions regarding proper use of the flower fund and instructed that there be no collections for birthdays, showers, baby and wedding gifts, transfers, resignations and the like. Furthermore, contributions to the flower fund should be strictly voluntary and held to an absolute minimum. Each field and Seat of Government division is to promptly advise the Bureau whether these instructions are being complied with or submit explanation for any deviation. Two copies of the bylaws of the flower fund should be submitted. Also advise whether any other fund exists from which similar expenditures are being made and, if so, identify the fund and submit two copies of the bylaws. Results should be submitted by airtel directed to the attention of the Personnel Section and should reach the Bureau within three days of receipt of this letter.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-20  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

April 3, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) POSITION CLASSIFICATION MATTERS - UTILIZATION OF CLERICAL PERSONNEL IN LIEU OF SPECIAL AGENTS - MASTER DESCRIPTIONS FOR INVESTIGATIVE CLERKS AND STANDARDIZED WRITE-UPS FOR EIGHT CLERICAL OPERATIONS -- Refer to SAC Letter No. 61-58 (B), dated 10-17-61, and subsequent Bureau correspondence related thereto. Bureau has studied program on a field-wide basis and has prepared master descriptions for Investigative Clerk positions in grades GS 5, 6, and 7; a supplemental standard for these positions; standardized write-ups for eight clerical operations; and list of additional duties which should be performed by clerical employees, all of which are attached to enclosed Instructions for Implementation. Carefully review all material enclosed and follow instructions set out therein. This material voids any descriptions for these particular operations which you may have submitted previously in connection with captioned program.

All material required by enclosed instructions should be submitted to Bureau within 10 days after receipt of this letter.

4/3/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-20-

(B) GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT POLICY -- There are enclosed two copies of Departmental Order 265-62 dated March 19, 1962, which sets forth regulations effectuating the nondiscrimination policy in the Department of Justice. The new Departmental Order supersedes Departmental Order 105-55 which heretofore has been maintained permanently on an appropriate bulletin board or boards in your office. Accordingly, Departmental Order 105-55 should be replaced by Departmental Order 265-62 which must be maintained permanently on an appropriate bulletin board or on whatever bulletin boards in your office necessary so that each employee will have ample opportunity to observe and read it. You should familiarize yourself with the contents of the new Departmental Order and it is suggested that it be used as background for your comments on this subject at employee conferences. If you need additional copies of the new Order, submit a request for the attention of the Personnel Section. Manual revisions are being prepared.

(c) IDENTIFICATION MATTERS - LATENT FINGERPRINT MATTERS -- The following devices and materials available on the market and advertised for use in connection with developing and recording latent fingerprints have been evaluated in the Identification Division. The results are being furnished for information of 11 Agents and should be of particular interest to personnel handling police schools:

"ID Fingerprint Powder" (Spray Powder)

This is essentially a fingerprint powder packaged in an aerosol can similar to those used for household insecticides, the powder being blown onto the surface. The entire surface is coated and then brushed to reveal the latent prints. The gray powder tested compared favorably with ordinary gray powder. The black powder does not produce as good a visual contrast as ordinary black powder. The sole advantage noted was its rapid application to large areas. Disadvantages are the danger of overcoating; powder sometimes issues in clumps or drops which will not brush off; powder settles on everything in an eight- to ten-foot radius in inside use; and would obviously be more expensive than regular powder to use.

"Magna Brush"

This is a device for applying magnetic fingerprint powder with a magnetic pencil instead of a brush. The pencil comes in a kit with four small bottles of powder. It cannot be used on iron or steel and due to the manner of application its use would be limited to small areas. Tests show that it will not perform any better than ordinary powders.

Application of Fingerprint Powder with Cotton

When exceptionally large surfaces are to be examined, the application of fingerprint powder by means of a wad of cotton may speed the job. A handful of cotton (obtainable in one pound rolls) should be torn from a roll so that it has a ragged wispy edge. This is used in the manner of a fingerprint brush by dipping the wad of cotton into a layer of fingerprint powder which has been spread out on paper and then dusting the powder over the surface. No pressure is to be exerted on the cotton during this operation. Any latent impressions made visible should be "cleaned up" with a fingerprint brush, not with the cotton. This technique should be used only on large areas and is in no way meant to displace the routine application of powder with the brush.

4/3/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-20

- 2 -

This information does not alter the long-standing prohibition against wrapping latent-bearing surfaces in cotton or cloth for shipment.

#### Etching Latent Prints on Glass with Hydrofluoric Acid

This process requires specially constructed equipment and a laboratory hood to dispose of escaping vapor. A rather detailed experimental report on this method shows that its success is dependent on the type of glass, the rate of etching is difficult to predict or control, requires two to six hours' exposure to acid vapor, and the results at best are not better than those achieved by the use of photography or fingerprint powder. This is a laboratory novelty.

#### "Foto-Focuser"

This is a metal attachment for fastening to the lens of a 4 x 5 inch "Graphic" camera to photograph latent prints natural size, as is done with the fingerprint camera. With the bellows properly adjusted, a latent print is in correct focus when it is flush with the end of the "Focuser." It has been suggested that this device would make the fingerprint camera unnecessary. A "Graphic" camera with the "Focuser" does not, of course, equal the fingerprint camera in simplicity and ease of operation. Some of the disadvantages found in the use of this device are constant slippage of the track lock when pressure is applied to hold the camera against a latent print, the obscuring of a sizable margin of the negative by the edges of the "Focuser"; excessive length and weight of the camera unit--21 1/2 inches and 8 pounds compared to 12 inches and 6 pounds for the fingerprint camera; exposures are all flash shots with over-exposure probable if made in ordinary room illumination or brighter light; extra expense of larger film and flash bulbs.

#### Possible Adaptation of Polaroid Camera to Fingerprint Work

Polaroid photographs do not show the sharp detail obtainable by conventional photographic methods. Test shots of inked fingerprints made with this camera do not show good ridge definition.

4/3/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-20

- 3 -

(D) VISIT OF THE SHAH OF IRAN TO THE UNITED STATES IN APRIL, 1962 -- The Shah and Empress of Iran are expected to arrive in the United States about April 10, 1962, on a State visit. Appropriate offices will be advised of the Shah's exact itinerary when it is available.

The Bureau has received information to the effect that dissident Iranian students in this country might possibly undertake an assassination attempt against the Shah during his visit. Moreover, the State Department has expressed concern as to the possible adverse effects of any large-scale demonstrations which might occur during the Shah's visit.

All offices should be most alert for any information regarding anti-Shah demonstrations, possible threats to the Shah or his party, or other data of intelligence interest in connection with his visit. Sources in a position to acquire such information should be alerted to the need for prompt reporting. Any data concerning possible violence or demonstrations should be immediately disseminated to local police authorities as well as to appropriate State Department security representatives locally. Bureau should be expeditiously advised of all such information received, including action taken locally.

4/3/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-20

- 4 -

(E) BUREAU APPLICANTS - SPELLING TEST FOR SPECIAL AGENT APPLICANTS -- In order to test the spelling ability of all Special Agent applicants, three spelling tests have been devised and are being forwarded to each office under separate cover. One of these should be administered to ~~both Bureau employees and outsiders who apply for the Special Agent position.~~ They should be submitted to the Bureau at the same time other examinations are forwarded. You should be guided by Section 6 A, 2 b, Manual of Instructions, in affording these tests the necessary security.

4/3/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-20

(F) BUREAU APPLICANTS - SPECIAL AGENT EDUCATIONAL AND AGE REQUIREMENTS -- Effective immediately the minimum age for the Special Agent position is being lowered from twenty-five to twenty-three years. In addition, the Bureau will consider for the Special Agent position Bureau employees currently on the rolls who have at least three years of continuous Bureau service and who possess either a four-year college degree or a Bachelor of Commercial Science Degree from a resident school.

Employees with a Bachelor of Commercial Science Degree must have successfully completed the Bureau Accounting Course at the time they apply. Upon application they must obtain a satisfactory grade on the Bureau Accounting Examination and the Academic Achievement Test. Employees with a four-year college degree must obtain a satisfactory grade on the Special Agent Law Examination and the Academic Achievement Test.

For the completion of Bureau records all division heads at the Seat of Government and all Special Agents in Charge should submit to reach the Bureau by April 16, 1962, the names of all employees who are now qualified under the above or who will qualify by October 1, 1962. Submit this information on Form FD-311, which specifically outlines the data necessary regarding each employee so listed. Employees meeting these new requirements and who are available for the New Agent Classes already scheduled, that is April 16, 1962, May 21, 1962, and June 25, 1962, should be processed immediately.

4/3/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-20

- 5 -



I want it clearly understood that interviews with Special Agent applicants must be most penetrative and only those applicants meeting the high standards of the Bureau are to be favorably recommended. No applicant should be recommended unless he creates an excellent initial impression and possesses the necessary maturity to properly handle the responsibilities of the Special Agent position.

4/3/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-20

(G) FEDERAL BANK ROBBERY AND INCIDENTAL CRIMES STATUTE-NIGHT DEPOSITORY THEFTS -- In the past, United States Attorneys have rendered divergent opinions as to whether a theft from a bank night depository constitutes a violation of the Federal Bank Robbery and Incidental Crimes Statute. This divergency of opinion often stemmed from the crucial question of whether deposits so made were within the care, custody and control of the bank. In most instances final determination hinged on the contractual relationship existing between the depositor and the bank.

United States Attorney's Bulletin, Volume 10, Number 6, dated March 23, 1962, states that, though the issue is not free from doubt in that there have been no test cases in the higher courts, thefts from bank night depositories are a violation of the statute regardless of the contractual relationship between the bank and the depositor. The view expressed resolves the question of care, custody and control with the comment that a bailment relationship is established between the depositor and the bank at the time the deposit is made. The element of notice to the bank, necessary for this bailment, is presumed since the bank in providing the night depository facility invites its use.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures for (A) & (B)

4/3/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-20

- 6 -



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

April 17, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) PERSONNEL - FORMS - FBI PERSONNEL STATUS FORM FD-285 -- Reference is made to Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part I, Section 16, A 2, which sets out data required to be submitted on Personnel Status Form FD-285. Section F of this form is being ~~deleted so that there will no longer be any yearly listing of~~ offices of preference on this form by Special Agent, Special Employee and Radio Personnel. The Bureau has on record the current offices of preference of such personnel. Henceforth, any employee entitled to list such offices of preference may send in designated changes at any time. Special Agent, Special Employee and Radio Personnel should utilize Form FD-314. Clerical employees are to use Form OF-10.

4/17/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-22

(B) ADMINISTRATION OF OFFICES -- ASSIGNMENT CARDS -- As a result of a suggestion, the following procedure with regard to the maintenance of assignment cards is brought to the attention of all offices for their information and use wherever practical.

Following preparation of the monthly administrative report:

(a) Assignment cards of cases that will remain current at the end of the month should be filed in accordance with present procedures.

(b) Assignment cards of cases that will be delinquent at the end of the month will be filed in the same manner, except that a divider will be placed between them and the current cases.

In this fashion the assignment card box will then consist of two separate parts and the cases that will be delinquent can be readily differentiated from those that will be current. This will allow delinquency lists to be prepared early in the month thus giving Agents earlier notice to clear these cases of their delinquent status. Throughout the month as a delinquent case is posted, the assignment card will be transferred from the "delinquent" section to the appropriate place in the "current" section.

(C) FEDERAL LAW ON SEARCH AND SEIZURE - TRAINING DOCUMENT #61 --  
Captioned training document will be distributed to all offices in the near future. It will serve two purposes. First, it will provide the necessary text for use by those law-trained Special Agents in your office who are designated to discuss the subject of search and seizure before police school groups. Second, and perhaps more important, it will give all investigative personnel a ready source of information on what the Federal law does and does not permit by way of search and seizure in a case under investigation.

You are to maintain this training document in such a manner that it is readily available at all times for both of its intended uses. Copies may be charged out to Special Agents and they may be kept in Resident Agencies. You will note that the document contains no classified information and no references to Bureau policy. The entire text is a matter of law only.

You should encourage the investigative personnel of your office to use this training document as a source of information on handling search and seizure problems in their cases, and to be sufficiently familiar with its contents that they fully understand the principal points of law involved. This training document should be viewed not as something to be put on the shelf and consulted infrequently but as a statement of the principles of law with which every Special Agent should be fully familiar at all times.

4/17/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-22

(D) SUPPLIES - PURCHASES FROM GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION RETAIL STORES -- The General Services Administration (GSA) has opened Interagency Retail Stores in selected cities throughout the continental United States. These are self-service stores stocking approximately 1,200 administrative supply items and some standard forms. These retail stores do not in any way replace regular agency requirements which are met through submission of purchase orders at regular intervals. The retail stores are primarily to meet emergency needs for standard supply items which otherwise might be purchased in the open market at much higher prices.

The few retail stores now in operation have proven very successful in effecting important economies throughout the Government. The opening of more such stores may be expected in

4/17/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-22

the near future. Should GSA inquire of your office as to the interest of the Bureau in these stores, to determine the feasibility of setting up a store to serve Government needs in your locality, you should advise them that the Bureau would participate to the degree that emergency purchases only would be made in this manner.

The retail stores operate in much the same manner as a self-service supermarket. Using a charge-plate, for identification and billing, the purchaser will select items required, exit past a checkout clerk who will register the cost of each item purchased.

In the event retail stores are opened in your GSA region, your office would be advised by GSA direct, together with instructions regarding the obtaining of the charge-plate. The Bureau must insist that the charge-plate issued be used only for identification, not for charging items. Cash payment from your imprest fund is authorized. Purchases made in this manner should be restricted to emergency requirements. The submission of quarterly requirements to the Bureau, through the purchase order forms, remains unchanged.

4/17/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-22

(E) SOLAR RESEARCH CORPORATION - 3200 N.E. 12TH AVENUE - OAKLAND PARK, FLORIDA - JACK NORMAN HOLCOMB, PRESIDENT -- Solar Research Corporation advertises itself as a manufacturer of "special security and intelligence devices." Principal items of equipment are those used for concealed listening devices (bugs), wire tapping and recording, most of which have been displayed to the Bureau. Holcomb advises company will sell only to duly constituted law enforcement agencies on presentation of official orders and payment vouchers. He states the company intends to hold bugging and wire-tapping school for selected police officers in the Spring of 1962. He claims his considerable experience is the basis of material used to prepare detailed, illustrated manuals on how to install, operate and record bugs and wire taps with the company's equipment.

He has solicited the Bureau's opinion of Solar equipment and whether its production and sale to police agencies would interfere with Bureau operations. The Bureau has advised him it expresses no opinion on merit of equipment, does not endorse or recommend any particular product or company, and in no way indicates to any organization what products should or should not be produced. Holcomb has been instructed that neither he nor his company is to indicate the Bureau is interested in Solar products nor are they to use the Bureau's name to promote sales of their equipment.

4/17/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-22

- 3 -

In addition to his own admission, Bureau records show that in 1955 Holcomb was acquitted by a Los Angeles County jury on charges of wire tapping in a divorce case for lack of specific evidence as to who actually did the tapping. Two codefendants, on Holcomb's acquittal, changed their pleas from guilty to not guilty and had the charges dismissed. In 1956 he offered his services to the police department, sheriff's office and private detectives in Houston, Texas. He is an auxiliary police officer at Oakland Park, Florida, and has used his equipment to assist local police departments and sheriffs' offices in that area.

Any dealing with Holcomb or any individual or company selling Solar products should be most circumspect. In no event should it be indicated that the Bureau is interested in Solar products except for the purpose of keeping abreast of new developments in the law enforcement field. Any use of the Bureau's name to promote Solar sales should be promptly reported.

4/17/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-22

- 4 -

(F) DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT OR MOTOR VEHICLES - FALSE REPORT --  
It should be re-emphasized to all investigative personnel that interviews in false report cases under the Destruction of Aircraft or Motor Vehicles Statute must be searching and thorough to insure that all pertinent facts are developed with regard to the circumstances of the threat.

This is particularly important, for example, in a case where the subject alleges he was only joking when he falsely claimed to have a bomb as he was about to board an aircraft. The circumstances under which he made the false statement may have warranted a person who heard the statement to infer that the subject intended to convey the idea that his purpose was to damage or destroy an aircraft. The intent, which must be considered as an element of this offense, is not the frame of mind claimed by the subject, but that which must be attributed to him as a result of the natural import of his words and the face value of his actions.

Information concerning the reaction of witnesses to the subject's false statement is necessary for the United States Attorney and the Department to enable them to make prompt decisions as to prosecution. If a witness indicates that he did not take the subject's false statement seriously, the facts on which he based his disbelief should be determined.


Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

4/17/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-22

- 5 -



PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 62-E  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

April 26, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

RE: BUREAU CODES  
~~AFSAM 7~~

One set of AFSAM 7 key lists for months of June, July, and August, 1962, being forwarded separately to all divisions except Washington Field which will receive none; three copies being furnished Bureau's Emergency Relocation Site; and three copies Seat of Government Code Room.

Acknowledge receipt of key lists promptly by routing slip, indicating serial numbers which appear thereon; return in a sealed envelope to the Bureau, attention FBI Laboratory, FBI Annex, the address label on individual tamperproofed envelope containing keys even though torn while opening package; and destroy, by burning, each monthly sheet thirty days after last effective date thereof, advising Bureau promptly by routing slip, attention FBI Laboratory, FBI Annex, this has been done.

It is essential address label mentioned above be returned in order to control security of shipment.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

May 8, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY - 1963 SESSIONS -- The dates for the National Academy classes to be held in 1963 are as follows: for the 71st Session, Monday, April 1 to Wednesday, June 19 and for the 72nd Session, Monday, August 19 to Wednesday, November 6.

5/8/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-27

(B) TRAINING - POLICE - SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS ON SEARCHES AND SEIZURES -- To be of assistance in the planning of your forthcoming schools on searches and seizures for local law enforcement agencies, the following model agenda for a one-day school is suggested. This is the same agenda used by the six divisions conducting the pilot program on searches and seizures and was found to be quite satisfactory.

- I. History of Federal Search and Seizures Law 1 hour
- II. Search of Persons 1 hour
  - A. By Search Warrant
  - B. Incidental to a Lawful Arrest
  - C. By Consent
- III. Search of Premises 3 hours
  - A. By Search Warrant
  - B. Incidental to a Lawful Arrest
  - C. By Consent
- IV. Search of Vehicles 2 hours
  - A. By Search Warrant
  - B. Incidental to a Lawful Arrest
  - C. By Consent
  - D. Search on Probable Cause Alone
  - E. Search on Lawful Impoundment
- V. Penalties for Illegal Searches and Seizures 1 hour

This agenda is sufficiently flexible to allow it to be tailored for schools of greater or lesser duration.

5/8/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-27

(C) AUTOMOBILES - TWO-WAY FM MOBILE RADIOS -- SAC Letter 57-40, dated July 9, 1957, pointed out the possibilities of explosion and fire in the trunk of an automobile due to the ignition of accumulated gasoline fumes by a spark from a two-way radio transmitter. This SAC Letter instructed that adequate steps be taken to insure that gasoline tanks on two-way radio cars were free from leaks which would permit fumes to enter the trunk compartment.



It has been noted during recent radio equipment maintenance inspections in several field offices that some two-way radio automobile installations have the two-way unit installed in the main part of the trunk directly above the gasoline tank. This is considered a very undesirable practice since there is very little space between the floor of the car trunk and the gasoline tank and it is quite easy to puncture the gasoline tank during the course of the radio installation.

No instances of gasoline fumes in the trunks of cars were noted during the maintenance inspections. However, the inherent danger is such that you are instructed that all future two-way radio installations in cars must have the radio unit mounted in such location and in such manner that there is no chance of any mounting screws penetrating the gasoline tank. Also, all field Electronic Maintenance Technicians should be instructed to carefully inspect all present two-way radio installations to assure that there is not now any gasoline fume leakage into automobile trunks and that the installations are completely safe in all other respects.

5/8/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-27

5/8/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-27

- 2 -

(D) CRIMINAL INFORMANTS - SECURITY IN CONTACTING -- It has recently come to the attention of the Bureau that top hoodlums and their associates may attempt to surveil Bureau Agents in an effort to identify our informants and other confidential sources.

You are again reminded that Agents should be most circumspect in contacting informants and other confidential sources to prevent their identity from becoming known. Any information received concerning attempts on the part of the hoodlum element to identify our informants and sources should be immediately brought to the attention of the Bureau.

5/8/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-27

(E) CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CRIMINAL MATTERS (CRIMDEL) -- The Crimdel program has been transferred from the Central Research Section of the Domestic Intelligence Division to the Criminal Intelligence and Organized Crime Section of the Special Investigative Division. Therefore, it is no longer necessary for you to include the initials "CRS" after the word "Crimdel" in the caption of your submissions.

As you are aware, the Bureau recently started issuing a number of letters captioned "Criminal Intelligence Digest" for Agents working in the field of organized crime. It is expected that this letter will be expanded in the future and that both it and the "Nationwide Criminal Activities" letter will be published by the Criminal Intelligence and Organized Crime Section on a continuing basis.

5/8/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-27

(F) FUGITIVES - UNLAWFUL FLIGHT INVESTIGATIONS -- A recent case points up the continuing need for the highest standards in the identification of fugitives by state officials requesting our assistance under the Fugitive Felon Act.

An eastern office was requested by a state prosecutor to apprehend a fugitive whom he identified by name and FBI number. After the individual identified by the local prosecutor had been apprehended as a result of an FBI alert, he denied his guilt. The local prosecutor discovered by further investigation that the person whose apprehension he had requested was not the individual responsible for the state crime.

5/8/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-27

The primary purpose of the Fugitive Felon Act is to permit the FBI to locate and apprehend fugitives who flee across state lines to avoid state justice. We do not have the responsibility of solving or investigating the state crime; however, we must be ever alert to detect any possibility that state officials have requested location of a person other than the one responsible for the state offense. In many instances, we will be interviewing persons who are also witnesses in the state case for the purpose of developing fugitive leads, background information and contacts of the subject. In connection with such interviews, we must be alert to any information which would suggest an erroneous identification may have been made by local authorities. Should such occur, the facts should be immediately brought to the attention of local authorities and the U. S. Attorney, and immediate steps taken to correct the situation, promptly furnishing full facts to the Bureau.

In an important area of our assistance to local authorities under the expanded Fugitive Felon Act, namely confinement cases, which include state parole violator fugitives, there is already a positive identification with a known fingerprint record. This identifying information should be obtained at the outset of the investigation.

An aggressive discharge of our responsibilities under the act requires the establishment of effective liaison with state parole and penal authorities.

As pointed out in the Manual of Instructions, Section 49, the Department has advised the Fugitive Felon Act is broad enough to include state parole and probation violators who flee interstate to avoid confinement after their probation or parole has been revoked for a state offense within the provisions of Title 18, Section 1073. Application of the act in such cases is not directed at the state parole or probation offense itself, which in some instances may not be a felony, but is directed toward the state offense for which the subject was originally convicted. Accordingly, in any case where the prior conviction was for a felony, the act might be applied.

The Department has given considerable latitude and discretion to U. S. Attorneys in the enforcement of the act and has not limited its application to a particular list of state crimes. The Department rather has advised U. S. Attorneys that the act may be applied except where the purpose of the local statute is the enforcement of a civil obligation, or where the local law or application thereof is discriminatory.

5/8/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-27

- 4 -

To be of maximum assistance to local authorities, you must insure prompt referral of cases from prosecutors, penal authorities and state parole officers, and must be alert to recognize any possibility that local authorities have made an improper identification.

(Security Letters on attached pages)

5/8/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-27

- 5 -

(G) SECURITY INFORMANTS AND SOURCES - PAYMENT OF INCOME TAXES --  
As a result of contemplated prosecutions under the Internal Security Act of 1950, Departmental attorneys are interviewing many informants and former informants as prospective witnesses in a number of our offices. This is to again remind you that Section 107, N, 6, Manual of Instructions, requires that informants who receive compensation for their services to the Bureau should be advised that such compensation must be reported as income when filing income tax returns.

When an informant or former informant is initially considered as a potential witness in a Bureau case, it is desirable when advising him of the approaching interview by Departmental attorneys to ascertain prior to such interview all necessary information concerning his tax status. If he has not paid his taxes, obtain all pertinent details and promptly submit your recommendations for handling this situation.

5/8/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-27

(H) SECURITY INFORMANTS - CHANNELIZING INFORMANT STATEMENTS --  
The following method for preparing informant statements, which are orally received and where multiple channelization is involved, is being brought to your attention for use if suited to the needs of your office.

Where the number of copies to be channelized requires the use of Multilith equipment, it is suggested that when typing up the original of the statement for authentication by the informant, the plain paper, devoid of Bureau markings or identification, should be inserted in the typewriter backed by Multilith Reproducing Carbon Paper, No. 200-837-100A, and a Multilith master in that order. In this manner as the original is typed, the same impression is recorded on the Multilith master. Then, after authentication of the original by the informant, the master is available to run off the requisite channelizing copies.

The cost to the Government of the aforementioned brand of carbon paper is about \$2.67 per 100 sheets which are 10 inches by 13½ inches in size. Experimentation with this paper, which is designed for one-time use, has disclosed that, by cutting it in half and using each half twice by reversing it top to bottom after each use, each full sheet may be used four times. The Bureau does not stock this paper; therefore, each office desiring to make use of this system is authorized to purchase it locally.

5/8/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-27

(I) CIRCUIT RIDERS, INC. -- It has recently come to the Bureau's attention that Circuit Riders, Incorporated, has published a book entitled "A Compilation of Public Records of 658 Clergymen and Laymen Connected With the National Council of Churches." A copy of this book was mailed directly to the Special Agent in Charge at one of our offices, and it is possible that other offices may receive copies of this book. For your information, the Circuit Riders is an organization made up primarily of laymen in the Methodist Church whose objective is to combat communism in the Methodist Church; however, the organization has no official connection with that Church. Myers G. Lowman is the Executive Secretary of the organization, and in recent years he has leveled numerous charges against clergymen, indicating they are sympathetic toward communism. Lowman has been critical in the past of speeches on communism by a Bureau official and while we accept information from Lowman, contacts are most circumspect with him.

Lowman, through his organization, has disseminated several other books of a similar type as the current one, which is a compilation of affiliations of the officers and clergymen of the National Council of Churches in pacifist organizations, one-world groups, socialist organizations, popular-front-type of action groups and communist front organizations, publications, petitions, et cetera. The reliability of the material in Lowman's book has not been established, and you should, therefore, appropriately mark this book, if you should receive a copy, to the effect that there has been no corroboration of the material it contains and the FBI should in no instance utilize it as a source by itself. In all cases, the original source, if there is one, should be utilized rather than the book.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

5/8/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-27

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PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 62-F  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

May 9, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

RE: TRAINING  
AGENTS' TECHNICAL

The Bureau desires that, at this time, you make arrangements to assure that Special Agents of your office having a need to know, namely, those engaged in security and criminal intelligence work, are aware of MISUR equipment currently available for field use. This presentation should be handled by a qualified, sound-trained Agent.


The sound-trained Agent should display available, representative MISUR equipment assigned your office. If samples of MISUR equipment are not readily available, he should describe the various specialized MISUR equipment set forth in the "Handbook of Technical Equipment." All MISUR equipment described in this manual is available to the field for authorized installations.

As a matter of information, a general distribution has been made to the field of FBI Laboratory-designed MISUR equipment, such as the MITE, MATE and MOUSE. Additional sophisticated MISUR equipment, presently under development by the FBI Laboratory, such as the "WASP" will be distributed to the field and included in the "Handbook of Technical Equipment" as soon as production is accomplished.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-32  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

June 5, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO MEXICO - JUNE 29 - JULY 1, 1962 -- President and Mrs. Kennedy will make an official visit to Mexico City, Mexico, June 29 to July 1, 1962.

In connection with this trip all offices should be alert for any data concerning possible threats to the personal safety of the President, Mrs. Kennedy, and members of his group. You should also be alert for information concerning anti-American demonstrations or any intelligence data of interest concerning this visit.

Sources and informants in a position to acquire the above-mentioned data should be alerted to the necessity for prompt reporting, and the Bureau should be immediately advised if any such data is received. Communications in this matter should be submitted under the above caption.

6/5/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-32


(B) SUPPLIES - BUREAU REPRINTS -- In order to clarify the proper method of ordering Bureau publications, attention is directed to the Field Publication List previously distributed to field offices. The following publications should be ordered from the Property Management Section, Administrative Division, by means of Form FD-218: Application Blanks; "Benefits of Working for the FBI"; "Facts About a Career in the FBI"; "How to Become a Fingerprint Technician with the FBI"; Job Descriptions (Clerical-Stenographic, Electronic Maintenance Technician, Laboratory [Technician], Laboratory Aide, Photographer, Radio Operator, Special Agent). All other publications listed in the Field Publication List should be ordered by routing slip from the Crime Records Division, Attention, Correspondence and Tours Section.

6/5/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-32

(C) BIENNIAL REPORT ON VOLUME OF RECORDS - FEDERAL RECORDS ACT OF 1950 -- In accordance with Federal Records Act of 1950, the Bureau is required to furnish on a biennial basis a statistical summary of its records holdings to the Department of Justice for submission to the National Archives and Records Services of the General Services Administration.

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT SENT TO  
NATIONAL ARCHIVES (JFKARCA)  
DATE 8/5/94 d ac





PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-32  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

June 5, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

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6/5/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-32

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6/5/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-32

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It is emphasized that this survey is conducted on a biennial basis and thus covers a two-year period. Those offices which submitted volume of records statistics for the fiscal year 1960-61 should be certain that those figures submitted by them for 1960-61 are included in the current survey.

~~In order for the Bureau to compile this summary, each~~ office must furnish the following statistics in the order set forth below:

- (1) Volume of records in cubic feet on hand as of 7-1-60.
- (2) Volume of records in cubic feet on hand as of 6-30-62.
- (3) Volume of records in cubic feet disposed of during the period 7-1-60 to 6-30-62.

This figure should include space reacquired as a result of consolidation or by conversion to shelf filing, as well as space reacquired by destruction of files.

All records must be taken into consideration. Records are defined as anything not being retained on a temporary basis.

Ticklers, preliminary work sheets, reference books, etc., are examples of nonrecord material.

The Bureau is required to submit this statistical data to the Department of Justice no later than 7-20-62; therefore, the field should furnish the figures to the Bureau no later than 7-6-62. It is not necessary to wait for the close of the fiscal year to make the above computations.

For additional information as to how to compute the cubic feet of records, refer to SAC Letter No. 59-36 (C) dated 6-9-59.

6/5/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-32

(D) FBIRA MATTER - INTEROFFICE FIREARMS COMPETITION (PPC)  
1962 -- The Annual Interoffice Firearms Competition for 1962 will be held during the third outdoor firearms training period. The "J. Edgar Hoover Firearms Trophy" will be presented to the office having the highest average percentage score of all Special Agents assigned to the office on July 1, 1962, not on limited duty.

6/5/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-32

- 2 -

In addition, I have approved a suggestion whereby the field offices will be divided into groups according to Agent complement. The winning office in each category will be cited for honorable mention.

The rules and method of reporting scores and the group categories of offices for purpose of determining honorable mention citations will be forwarded to you in the near future by the President of the FBIRA.

6/5/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-32

(E) USE OF FORM FD-217 TO OBTAIN BUREAU FILE NUMBER -- Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part II, Section 4, Page 3, Paragraph 14, requires that Form FD-217 be used by the field to obtain the Bureau file number when additional correspondence with the Bureau can be foreseen. Use of the Bureau file number on correspondence from the field reduces processing time and costs at the Seat of Government and is an aid to identification of the case both in the field and at the Seat of Government.

A number of instances have been noted at the Bureau where Form FD-217 is not attached to correspondence being submitted, the Bureau file number is not quoted, and it is apparent that additional correspondence will be had with the Bureau. You should insure that personnel in your office are properly utilizing Form FD-217 and that they are quoting the Bureau file number on correspondence when it is available. For your information, it is not necessary to quote the Bureau file number on applicant-type correspondence.

6/5/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-32

(F) TRAINING - POLICE - STATE ACCREDITATION -- Many instances have come to the Bureau's attention where funds have been made available for police training by state boards of education if certain requirements have been met. One requirement often is that all instructors participating in these schools be accredited to teach by the state board of education. Some offices have felt that FBI instructors should be given this accreditation and overtures of blanket accreditation for all FBI instructors have been made in at least one instance. Such accreditation is usually in the form of a vocational teaching certificate.

6/5/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-32

It is felt that this would be an opportune time to explore the requirements and procedures for obtaining state accreditation for our police instructors. SACs having offices covering capitals in states where police training is under the regulations of state boards of education should discreetly, through established sources, determine the requirements for state accreditation of police instructors.

The information obtained should be furnished the Bureau by June 22, 1962. Offices covering state capitals should send information copies of their communications to other offices in the state.

6/5/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-32

- 4 -

(G) CRIMINAL INFORMANTS - DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATION -- Reference is made to SAC Letter 62-19 (J) dated March 27, 1962, emphasizing the constant critical need for top quality informants. Many informants throughout the field supply a vast amount of information consistently which enables the Bureau to successfully conclude highly important matters. Many of these informants because of ~~their intimate knowledge of criminals and criminal activities~~ beyond their immediate communities have been successfully used in penetrating illegal operations in distant areas.

A survey of offices operating the most productive informants revealed these informants were developed as a result of initially carefully selecting individuals close to criminal operations and thereafter expending sufficient time and effort to further their development. The initial approach was for the ostensible purpose of interviewing the prospective informant as a suspect in a pending matter. The elimination of the potential informant as a suspect fostered a climate conducive to his further development since many criminals are apprehensive of being "set up" because of their past records. It was found that an extensive period of careful handling was vital to the exploitation of full potential of the informant. During this period, background concerning the individual under development was obtained to the extent that the prospective informant was convinced that the FBI was aware of the most minute details of his activities.

In most instances at the outset financial reward was not an important factor in the development of top flight informants. However, after the individual committed himself to cooperate, money became "all important" in maintaining his continued interest and productivity. Obtaining signed receipts presented no problem and was felt to be beneficial in most instances. Once payments were started to the informant, promptness in paying for information appeared to be more important to the informant than the actual amount paid.

Without exception respect for the FBI was the high motivating factor in his assumption of the informant role. In some cases distrust of police officers in the early stages of development included FBI Agents. This had to be overcome by a confident mature approach of the Special Agent in portraying the Bureau's high standard of operation and role.

6/5/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-32

- 5 -

of the confidential informant in bringing about the Bureau's successful accomplishments. Discussion with the informant as to the safeguards utilized by the Bureau to protect informants and how arrests and recoveries could be effected without disclosing an informant's identity were essential points in establishing the necessary confidence to induce the prospective informant to actively produce information for the Bureau.

In connection with the development and the subsequent handling of the informant it was frequently necessary to insure no action was taken by him which would arouse the suspicion of his criminal associates. Of necessity the Special Agent must exercise a high degree of ingenuity and maturity in guiding the informant.

An interesting facet of the criminal mind on which Special Agents have been able to capitalize is the intense dislike harbored by criminals for certain types of other criminals. Frequently the thief has contempt for the narcotics vendor; the armed robber intense dislike for the confidence man, and so on.

Giving the informant a sense of importance, showing respect for his judgment, accepting his past, and instilling a sense of accomplishment serve to promote the spirit of cooperation which results in increased productivity. Although some information may be trivial, it was important to take copious notes even on the most minute piece of information to impress the informant and to later evaluate his reliability.

The above is to assist you in this important phase of our operations which has such a direct bearing on our overall accomplishments.

(Security Letter on attached pages)

6/5/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-32

- 6 -

(H) ESPIONAGE AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS -- SURVEILLANCES OF SOVIET-BLOC PERSONNEL -- For years Soviet officials in the United States have made numerous and repeated trips throughout this country aimed at obtaining valuable data regarding our air bases, missile sites and other important defense installations. In recent years they have coordinated their activities in this regard with the satellite countries and in this way are getting coverage of areas in the United States closed to Soviet travel.

In connection with our responsibility in regard to coverage of Soviet-bloc activities, these Soviet-bloc officials have been placed under surveillance. Many offices have participated in these surveillances, and it appears that this activity on the part of the Soviet bloc will continue.

On May 16, 1962, a number of newspapers in the United States carried an Associated Press article, date line Moscow, May 15, 1962, reporting that a correspondent for "Izvestia," the official Soviet Government newspaper, alleged that during a recent tour of the United States he was constantly shadowed by the "American secret service." He also alleged newspaper reporters and television men had "close business connections with the FBI" because reporters met him at the railroad station in Portland, Oregon, when he arrived there. He alleged he was under heavy surveillance in Seattle, Washington, and furnished license numbers of two automobiles he alleged were conducting surveillance of him in Los Angeles, California.

The Bureau determined that the allegations of the Soviet correspondent were completely false and undoubtedly were an attempt by the Soviets to embarrass this Bureau and to curtail our counter-intelligence operations. There is a definite possibility other Soviet-bloc personnel may make similar charges in the future and in this connection may attempt to obtain proof of their allegations, such as obtaining photographs of Bureau cars or surveillance agents. It is known that bloc personnel have made numerous attempts to do this in the past.

We do not intend to allow a false allegation by the Soviet bloc to alter coverage of their activities. Our surveillances undoubtedly have hampered the Soviets in collection of intelligence data in the United States, and we can expect them to create or utilize any incident they can as a basis for protest against our coverage.

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It is desired, therefore, that the above facts be called to the attention of all agents. It should be pointed out that while the Bureau desires our coverage of Soviet-bloc officials to be as complete as possible, the surveillance must be discreet and every precaution must be taken to avoid giving the Soviets a basis for protest.

You should impress upon agents handling surveillances of Soviet-bloc personnel in the United States that they must constantly exercise keen alertness, careful planning and good judgment in handling all facets of our surveillance operations.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

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SAC LETTER NO. 62-32

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PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 62-G

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

July 25, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7

One set of AFSAM 7 key lists for months of September, October, and November, 1962, being forwarded separately to all divisions except Washington Field which will receive none; three copies being furnished Bureau's Emergency Relocation Site; and three copies Seat of Government Code Room.

Acknowledge receipt of key lists promptly by routing slip, indicating serial numbers which appear thereon; return in a sealed envelope to the Bureau, attention FBI Laboratory, FBI Annex, the address label on individual tamperproofed envelope containing keys even though torn while opening package; and destroy, by burning, each monthly sheet thirty days after last effective date thereof, advising Bureau promptly by routing slip, attention FBI Laboratory, FBI Annex, this has been done.

It is essential address label mentioned above be returned in order to control security of shipment.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

June 12, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) PRESENTATION OF CASES TO THE U. S. ATTORNEY -- Your attention is again directed to the need of carefully analyzing each matter which is brought to the attention of the U. S. Attorney for an opinion as to prosecution. Your attention has been previously directed to the fact that unwarranted and premature presentations of matters to the U. S. Attorney should not occur. It is a responsibility of your office to present a well-rounded and sufficiently developed set of facts to the U. S. Attorney in order that he may have the benefit of the investigation conducted by your office into a particular allegation.

The facts in each case should be carefully weighed in order to preclude presenting to the U. S. Attorney facts which have not been fully analyzed and developed in order that an appropriate decision may be reached by the U. S. Attorney as to whether (1) the facts, as alleged, warrant further investigation; and (2) whether prosecution is warranted.

Any report which is prepared reflecting the opinion of the U. S. Attorney should fully and completely set forth his opinion and you should continue to confirm any opinion obtained from the U. S. Attorney by an appropriate communication to the U. S. Attorney reflecting his opinion.

This matter must receive your most careful attention and consideration.

6/12/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-33

(B) VOLUNTARY OVERTIME (VOT) - TIME IN OFFICE (TIO) CARD FORMS (FD-329) -- Discrepancies and omissions continue to be noted in connection with the FD-329 forms from some offices. It is imperative that the following entries be completed: Work Type, Total Possible Work Days, Subtract Time Absent, Net Total Days Worked, Certification for Fifteen Per Cent Premium Overtime Pay, Initials of Division Head and Squad Number, where applicable. Entries for VOT and TIO must be legible and mathematically correct.

The FD-329 forms for Agents under transfer are to be forwarded promptly to the new office of assignment with the Time and Attendance Card.

Each office must forward forms to the Bureau in one package as soon as possible but no later than the close of the fifth working day of the following month. Cards are not to be held for the purpose of recording VOT performed while attending In Service training. Such VOT will be reported by the Training and Inspection Division. Failure to adhere to these instructions will be cause for administrative action.

/12/62

AC LETTER NO. 62-33

(C) TRAINING - POLICE -- JUVENILE DELINQUENCY - YOUTHFUL CRIMINALITY SCHOOLS -- At present there are 47 police instructors in 35 divisions qualified to teach on the subject of juvenile delinquency and youthful criminality. An analysis of the police training program relating to this topic discloses that there have been very few such specialized schools held in recent years. With the amount of juvenile crime that exists and the interest of law enforcement and the public in this problem, it is believed that every effort should be made to expand our police training efforts in this field. While you should not solicit schools, you must make every effort to let all cooperative law enforcement agencies know that these specialized schools are available from the FBI and that these schools are available at the Command Level, the Supervisory Level and the Patrolman Level.

You should immediately assure that the Agent personnel in your division qualified to lecture on juvenile delinquency and youthful criminality have current knowledge of all facets of the juvenile problem. You should insure that your existing reference materials and lecture outlines are not outdated and they should be reviewed for currency prior to scheduling of any specialized schools on this topic.

In organizing these schools, you should consider using National Academy graduates with specialized experience in juvenile work and acceptable outside experts as well as our own police instructors as lecturers. It is expected that each such school will be of a high quality and will utilize the best possible lecturers available. The curricula for these schools must be set up with great care to assure that we present a current factual school on the existing problems and means of combating juvenile delinquency and youthful criminality.

6/12/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-33

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(D) INFORMATION CONCERNING HOUSING CONDITIONS IN WASHINGTON, D.C., AND VICINITY - FBI FORM BOOK - BUREAU APPLICANTS -- Attached is a supply of the revised form FD-273, "Information Concerning Housing Conditions in Washington, D. C., and Vicinity." Copies of the old form in your possession should be destroyed. Place one copy in the FBI Form Book.

A new form, "Notification of Acceptance of Appointment and Request for Temporary Housing Accommodations," has been prepared and will be enclosed with each appointment letter. Appointees should execute this form indicating acceptance of appointment. If temporary housing accommodations are desired prior to entry on duty, appointees should also execute portion of this form pertaining to temporary housing reservations. At the time the agent contacts the appointee to determine if they have any problems in connection with their appointment, he should instruct the appointee to immediately execute this form and forward to the Bureau.

6/12/62

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(E) BUREAU APPLICANTS - ADDITIONAL NEW AGENTS' CLASS FOR 7-16-62 --  
A New Agents' Class is being scheduled for July 16, 1962. This class will be in addition to those already scheduled for June 25, 1962, August 6, 1962, September 10, 1962, October 15, 1962 and November 26, 1962.

(Security Letters on attached page)

6/12/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-33

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(F) SECURITY INFORMANTS' - CONTROL -- Department representatives have been interviewing security informants as possible witnesses in prosecutions under the Internal Security Act of 1950. In many cases, security informants have shown considerable reluctance to testify except in the event of a national emergency for fear of physical harm, social and business reprisals and other personal reasons. Instructions are now outstanding for informants to submit their information in such form that if they are called upon to testify their written statements will be available for introduction in court to back up their testimony.

Despite the fact that they realize they may be needed as witnesses in the future, some informants are reluctant to testify for the reasons noted above.

It is the responsibility of the Special Agents handling security informants to condition them to the fact that someday the knowledge they possess may be needed as evidence in court to assist our Government in combatting the evil of communism. All Special Agents handling security informants must, as a part of our over-all informant program, psychologically prepare the informants for the fact they may, at some future date, be called upon to render a still further contribution to their Government by testifying to the information they have furnished concerning security matters.

The proper indoctrination of informants in this regard is absolutely essential since it is incumbent upon the Bureau to provide witnesses whenever the Department initiates prosecution in security cases.

6/12/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-33

(G) SECURITY INFORMANTS - PAYMENTS FOR EXPENSES -- The exorbitant financial demands by the Nation of Islam (NOI) on its members was the subject of discussion at the Internal Security-Espionage Conference held at the Seat of Government on May 28-29, 1962. It was noted that each temple of the NOI sets the amount of dues which members must pay and also requires numerous other collections. Members are threatened with expulsion if they do not meet these demands. Informants in some cases, however, have been able to remain in the organization without making all these payments. All offices should carefully analyze the necessity for informants in any temple to pay the maximum required contributions of the NOI. Instruct informants to curtail their expenses and whenever possible have informants create the impression among the temple officials that they are having financial problems. Work closely with the informants in this regard and caution them that the Bureau will not automatically approve their expenses.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures for (D)

6/12/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-33



SAC LETTER NO. 62-34  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

June 19, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) VOUCHERS - TRAVEL - MAILING ADDRESS -- In order to facilitate the distribution of expense checks to employees, a change is being made in present regulations which require that Washington, D. C., be shown on the travel voucher in the space headed "Mailing Address." Effective July 1, 1962, all travel vouchers are to show, in the "Mailing Address" space, the headquarters office to which the check is to be sent. ~~Names of resident agency cities should not be used.~~ Where, because of a pending transfer or other factor, there is a question as to which office should be shown as the mailing address, list the office to which the employee is going unless there will be a delay of more than twenty days in leaving the office to which assigned at the time the voucher is prepared.

Appropriate manual changes will be forthcoming.

6/19/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-34

(B) PERSONNEL - CONDUCT AND ACTIVITIES - FBI PARTICIPATION IN PISTOL COMPETITIONS - FIREARMS -- The FBI's leadership in the firearms training field has been established through our police training schools and not in competitive shooting. The Bureau has no objection to employees participating in pistol matches where the individual is not identified as being an FBI employee and where the individual participates on his own time, using his own revolver and ammunition, and pays his own registration fee and travel expenses. Unfortunately, newspaper writers do not differentiate between an individual shooting as such and an individual representing the FBI; therefore, no Bureau employee will participate in a pistol match where he has to identify himself on registration as an employee of the FBI. No team of Bureau employees will be entered in a match as an FBI team or as representing the FBI without my personal approval. The wearing of distinctive clothing or caps with FBI lettering or insignia of any type is prohibited.

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(C) NEWS MEDIA CONTACTS -- SAC Letter 61-61 (F) dated 10-24-61 instructed that quarterly reports be submitted by each field office summarizing contacts with news media. The quarterly reports

submitted to date indicate substantial improvement throughout the field in contacts with news media, and quarterly reports will no longer be required. Hereafter, each field division will submit an annual report to reach the Bureau by May 15, in which a detailed summary of activities designed to maintain good relations with all types of news media is set forth. This report should contain the number of daily and weekly newspapers, radio and television stations in the division, together with the total number of contacts which have been made with representatives of these media. The report should specify the number of items such as Introductions to the Law Enforcement Bulletin and other material distributed during the year. It should also set forth future plans the division has for further developing its program for maintaining good relations with news media.

6/19/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-34

(D) PAYROLL - FEDERAL WITHHOLDING TAXES - FORM W-4 -- Form W-4 as revised July, 1960, provides for the listing opposite Item 6 of any extra Federal income tax to be withheld from the biweekly pay of an employee in addition to that which would normally be withheld. The first five items on the revised form, providing for the listing of personal and dependent exemptions, have not changed. It is no longer necessary or desirable that a memorandum be written requesting extra Federal income tax be withheld from an employee's salary since the revised W-4 Form is sufficient. The receipt of a new W-4 Form from an employee voids the previous W-4 Form as well as any other request for the withholding of additional taxes; therefore, complete information should be shown opposite each of the six items on the W-4 Form when submitted. Item 6 should show the entire amount of any additional tax to be withheld, including any amount previously authorized. Amounts listed opposite Item 6 must be in full dollar amounts. This form must always contain the personal signature of the employee. Form should include the payroll number. In the future, the Statement of Earnings will show the amount of any extra Federal income tax withheld when an employee has authorized the withholding of such extra tax. All employees of your office should be advised of the foregoing. In the event you do not have a supply of the W-4 Forms as revised in July, 1960, these should be requisitioned in the usual manner from the Bureau.

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(E) ' FOREIGN LANGUAGE TRAINING PROGRAM -- It has come to my attention that the view is prevalent that age and length of service are a bar to consideration for Foreign Language training and that such training will adversely affect consideration for office of preference transfers or administrative advancement.

I wish to emphasize that neither age nor length of service constitutes an automatic bar to consideration for Foreign Language training. The primary factors which are given weight are (1) the need of the Bureau, which must be paramount and, (2) the interest, ability, aptitude and availability of individual Agents. Training in a foreign language definitely does not prevent an Agent being considered for a transfer to an office of preference. Language-trained Agents are listed for their indicated offices of preference in exactly the same fashion as other Agents and come up for consideration for such assignments in the normal manner. As regards foreign language ability precluding consideration for administrative advancement, I wish to state that this is simply not so. There are numerous Bureau executives at all levels, both at the Seat of Government and in the field, who have language ability and have used it on regular investigative assignments. It has not hindered their advancement. As a matter of fact, there are positions where foreign language ability is a mandatory requirement for administrative advancement, such as Legal Attaches. The main factors considered in connection with administrative advancement are the interest, ability and availability of the Agent.

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SAC LETTER NO. 62-34

(F) SEARCHES AND SEIZURES -- Federal courts have recently ruled adversely to the government in two Bureau cases involving questions of search and seizure. These decisions illustrate again the need for all investigative personnel to know and closely follow the rules pertaining to the crucial search function in criminal cases.

In U. S. v. Rutheiser, 203 F. Supp. 891 (1962), Agents went to the defendant's home at 8:30 p.m. and obtained what they considered to be a valid consent to search the home. The search disclosed stolen goods and the carton in which the goods had arrived, both of which were specifically pointed out to the Agents by the defendant during the search. The court ruled, however,

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that although the "... defendant did acquiesce to the search by the agents," such acquiescence was "... not that consent which constitutes an unequivocal, free and intelligent waiver of a fundamental right." In reaching this conclusion, the court agreed with the defendant's argument that "... the presence of the agents in his home at night created an atmosphere of coercion and duress."

Cases such as this one admittedly pose a difficult problem. The truck driver from whom the defendant allegedly received the stolen goods was in the Bureau office at the moment, and an immediate search of the defendant's premises seemed both logical and necessary. Delay of the search until daytime might have resulted in the defendant becoming apprised of the investigation and disposing of the contraband.

Although the Federal courts vary considerably in their receptivity to consent searches, and a different court might well have upheld the search here, consent searches should always be viewed as difficult to sustain. Duress is often implied from such circumstances as an abnormal hour of search, words of demand rather than request to search, or any show of force such as a large number of officers on the premises.

Before attempting a search by consent, consideration should be given always to the possibility of obtaining a search warrant. Searches by warrant are preferable to searches by consent, and particularly so when premises are involved.

In Mosco v. U. S., 301 F2d 180 (1962), four separate searches were made but the results of only two were allowed into evidence. These two were a consent search of a vehicle and a consent search of the person, both made by Bureau Agents. To the contrary, the results of a search of premises by an Agent and a local officer, and a vehicle search by a local officer alone, were not allowed into evidence.

As to the search of premises, the court found that an Agent and a local officer properly went into the apartment of one of the two defendants to arrest him on a bank robbery charge but, on finding the defendant not there, improperly searched the apartment for evidence some thirty minutes in advance of the defendant's arrest when he returned to the apartment. There being no search warrant and no consent,

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the search could be sustained only if made incidental to the arrest, and it did not meet the requirements for this type of search because it was made before the arrest rather than immediately subsequent thereto as required by the law.

The search of the same defendant's vehicle by a local officer was ruled out because it was made on no legal basis whatsoever. Moreover, defendant's later consent to search his vehicle, obtained after his arrest, did not cure the illegality of the search made previously.

The court said, "All searches, such as they were, were reasonable. They were not such as would shock the conscience of justice, nor were they contrary to one's sense of fair play." Nevertheless, two of the searches were held insufficient to meet Federal constitutional standards. The result was that the conviction of one of the two defendants was reversed and remanded for new trial on lawfully acquired evidence only.

Bring this information to the attention of all investigative personnel. Additional instruction on the legal points involved in both decisions cited here is available in Training Document #61 entitled, "The Federal Law on Search and Seizure."

(Security Letters on attached pages)

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SAC LETTER NO. 62-34

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(G) REPORT WRITING - SECURITY - THOROUGHNESS -- The Bureau has recently noted a number of instances in security matter reports wherein some anticipated or planned activity is reported but there is no follow-up statement in the report that the activity did, in fact, take place. This has occurred even though the period of the report has encompassed the date of the alleged activity. This is obviously an undesirable practice as it leaves the reader "up in the air" as to whether the activity did or did not take place. Also, such a situation could imply inadequate investigation and thus prove embarrassing because of the responsibility the Bureau has for dissemination to other agencies which rely on the Bureau for the full facts in given situations.

This matter should be brought to the attention of all Special Agents engaged in security work who should be reminded of the necessity for thoroughness in the preparation of reports so as to eliminate the undesirable tendency noted above.

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SAC LETTER NO. 62-34

(H) CHINESE REFUGEE SITUATION -- In accordance with the President's request, the Attorney General and, under his direction, the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) are formulating a program to bring to the United States 3,209 Chinese refugees in Hong Kong. It is anticipated that these refugees will be arriving in the near future at the rate of 25-50 per day. The Bureau does not intend to investigate all of these refugees who, incidentally, reportedly have resided in Hong Kong from 8-10 years. The field should promptly alert all logical informants, potential security informants, confidential sources and sources of information for indications that any of these refugees is engaged in activities inimical to interests of the United States.

Inasmuch as these Chinese refugees are entering the United States as immigrants, field offices would normally be alerted to their presence under the current program of "Chinese Aliens Entering the United States for Permanent Residence." However, before investigation is considered, the following minimum criteria should be applied:

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1. The refugees must have resided or visited Communist China within past            years.

2. At the time refugee last departed Communist China he was between            and            years of age.

3. Possesses a minimum of            years of formal education.

4. At time of entry into the United States was unaccompanied by

Within this framework only those cases are to be investigated where there is reasonable evidence to indicate the refugee may have been recruited by Chinese Communists for intelligence operations in the United States, possesses intelligence information of interest to Bureau or other Government agencies or possesses informant, source and/or double agent potential.

In addition, the afore-mentioned criteria are to be applied to all cases coming within the following three programs currently in operation with regard to Chinese security matters:

1. Chinese Aliens Entering the United States for Permanent Residence (Bufile            )

2. Chinese Entering the United States Claiming United States Citizenship (Bufile            )

3. Chinese Who Have Formerly Resided in Communist China Entering the United States on Student Visas (Bufile            )

Field, when reviewing data furnished by INS under program Number 1, will initiate investigation only in those cases which meet new criteria.

Under program Number 2, Washington Field will continue to review records of State Department but will furnish Bureau and field only those cases which meet new criteria.

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SAC LETTER NO. 62-34

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Legal Attache, Tokyo, when reviewing records at United States Consulate, Hong Kong, under program Number 3, will furnish Bureau with only those cases which meet new criteria.

As in the past, Bureau will conduct indices search regarding subjects and sponsors in those cases referred by Washington Field and Legal Attache, Tokyo, for investigation and appropriate field offices will be advised of results. Those cases initiated by field regarding "Chinese Aliens Entering the United States for Permanent Residence" will be handled as heretofore.

The foregoing instructions should not be construed as precluding investigations of those Chinese whose actions and/or background logically indicate inquiries are warranted although not falling within the new criteria.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover

Director

6/19/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-34

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-47

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

September 7, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) "A STUDY OF COMMUNISM" - AVAILABILITY -- The FBI Recreation Association will handle orders from Bureau personnel for my ~~captioned new book on communism being published by Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., New York, New York, for release on October 1, 1962.~~ While this volume will retail for \$3.95, it will be available to Bureau employees at the special price of \$2.50. Each office should determine the total number of books desired by employees and advise the Bureau by September 27, 1962, by routing slip marked "Attention: Crime Research Section." One check covering the entire order and made payable to the FBI Recreation Association should accompany each office's request. "Masters of Deceit" and "The FBI Story" will, of course, still be available at the usual prices.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

October 5, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

RE: SECURITY INDEX - CUBA

SAC letter Number 60-54 established criteria for inclusion of individuals on the Security Index based on their pro-Castro sympathies and for the tabbing as "pro-Cuban" of other individuals already on the Security Index. In recognition of the mounting tension between Cuba and the United States, additional standards for placing individuals on the Security Index based solely on their pro-Castro activities and sympathies have been established to complement the standards outlined in SAC letter 60-54.

Aliens of Cuban nationality and aliens holding Cuban citizenship should be considered for the Security Index when it is determined that one of these (1) is likely to foster, encourage, or promote the policies, programs, or objectives of the Cuban Government, or collaborate with the Cuban Government or (2) is likely to engage in or attempt to engage in acts of espionage, sabotage or other activities inimical or detrimental to the defense or public safety of the United States as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

Activities on a subject's part which should be considered in determining whether his name should be added to the Security Index under the above would include but should not be limited to (1) participation in organizations supporting the Castro regime, (2) participation in picket lines formed in support of the Cuban Government, (3) contacts with Cuban agents operating in this country on behalf of the Cuban Government or, (4) statements or activities on a subject's part establishing reasonable grounds to believe that his loyalty would lie with the Cuban Government in the event of armed conflict between the United States and Cuba.

*Reviewed by  
M. Kelly  
9/7/75*



There must be a showing of activities of the type described above subsequent to October 1, 1960, and this must be verified by investigation. In essence, these standards have been established to cover Cuban nationals who have definitely evidenced support of Castro or a communist regime in Cuba since October 1, 1960.

This move is being made to insure special consideration is given those potentially dangerous individuals who retain basic loyalties to the procommunist, pro-Soviet Bloc and anti-U. S. regime in Cuba but who have found it expedient not to engage in activities to an extent which would bring them within the previously proscribed standards.

Effective immediately no cases-involving pro-Castro allegations against aliens of Cuban nationality and aliens holding Cuban citizenship are to be closed without consideration being given to whether the subjects thereof should be placed on the Security Index in keeping with this SAC letter. A statement showing why they do not qualify should be included on a cover page of the closing report or in other closing communication if the appropriate FD-122 recommending inclusion of the individual on the Security Index is not submitted. A systematic review of all Internal Security - Cuba and Registration Act - Cuba cases closed since October 1, 1960, should be conducted to select other potentially dangerous individuals who fall within these new criteria. Your 105-0 files and any other appropriate control files (such as those containing INS name check forms G-135a showing pro-Castro allegations have been made against Cuban aliens arriving in the U. S.) should also be reviewed.

Special consideration is to be given those individuals previously recommended for the Security Index but whose participation in organizational activities on behalf of Castro was not sufficient to come within the previously established criteria. Concerning those individuals whose investigative files show they clearly fall within the newly established criteria, it will only be necessary to verify their present employments and residences, submit a report containing this data and any unreported pertinent derogatory information, and forward FD-122 with accompanying succinct summary justifying recommendations for inclusion on the Security Index. In border-line cases where there are no concrete indications the individuals have clearly and unmistakably renounced their adherence to the policies of the present Cuban regime, their sympathies should be established by appropriate investigation, informant checks and/or checks with other reliable individuals in a position to know the individuals' true sympathies.

10/5/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-55

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In order that special handling may be afforded "pro-Cuban" Security Index subjects in the event of a limited emergency, each office should at this time set up a new category of the Special Section of the Security Index designated "Cuban." Existing instructions applying to the handling of Special Section Security Index cards as set forth on pages 52 and 53, Section 87 D, Manual of Instructions, should be adhered to.

The new "Cuban" Special Section will include all Security Index cards containing the identification "CUB," indicating Cuban organization affiliation or nationalistic tendency. In the immediate future Bureau will forward to each interested office amended Security Index cards designated in the upper right-hand corner "CUB" for this Special Section.

SAC letter 60-54 (F) provided for "pro-Cuban" tabbing of individuals carried on the Security Index for reasons other than their Cuban organization affiliations or nationalistic tendencies. The Security Index cards on such subjects are not to be placed in the new "Cuban" Special Section. In order that they may be readily identified, however, these cards in the Alphabetical Section of the Security Index should be tabbed with a metal tab of a color different from that used to tab "DETCOM" subjects. In the immediate future Bureau will forward to each interested office a list of those subjects whose names should be so tabbed. For your information, cards on such subjects contain the capital letter "C" on the left side of the card at the beginning of the second line.

Upon receipt of the foregoing amended cards and lists, all offices are to immediately verify the residences and employments of those Security Index subjects placed thereon on the basis of their pro-Castro activities as well as those other Security Index subjects tabbed "pro-Cuban." FD-122 showing changes should be expedited. Be certain arrangements are made to assure you are advised of any subsequent changes in their residences and employments.

All offices except Miami and New York should complete this review and advise the Bureau by October 31, 1962, as follows: (1) Number of individuals being recommended for Security Index based on field office's evaluation that they positively fall within the newly established criteria; (2) Number of cases being opened or reopened to establish whether the individuals fit the new criteria; (3) Statement that residences and employments of all subjects placed on the Security Index based solely on their

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pro-Castro activities and all Security Index subjects tabbed "pro-Cuban" have been verified or a statement as to the number of such individuals whose residences and employments have not been verified and when this will be accomplished. Miami and New York should advise the Bureau by November 15, 1962.

With regard to the "pro-Cuban" tabbing of current Security Index subjects, the following procedure is to be effected immediately. During the annual review of all Security Index cases special attention must be given to each case and a determination made as to whether those who have in any manner demonstrated strong sympathies for the present Cuban regime have backgrounds, employments or special aptitudes which would make them potential threats to engage in sabotage or other disruptive activities should there be hostilities with Cuba. For example, those with certain specialized military training, those employed at key facilities, and those who have received training in police work or the use of explosives would warrant special consideration. FD-122 with succinct summary should accompany the annual report in each case where "pro-Cuban" tabbing is believed warranted.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover


Director

10/5/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-55

- 4 -

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

October 16, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) HOUSEHOLD GOODS-COMMUTATION OF EXPENSES FOR TRANSPORTATION OF HOUSEHOLD GOODS AND PERSONAL EFFECTS -- The General Services Administration has revised the commuted rates for the transportation of household goods and personal effects. The new rates apply to any shipment which commenced on or after August 18, 1962. A copy of Circular Number 263 is attached. Additional copies of this circular will be forwarded to your office under separate cover.

All employees of your office who have occasion to submit vouchers claiming reimbursement for the cost of transportation and storage of household goods and personal effects should review the new rates to insure that vouchers are submitted correctly. Necessary manual changes will be forthcoming.

10/16/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-58

(B) COMMUNICATIONS - QUOTING BUREAU FILE NUMBERS -- You are again reminded that in addressing communications to the Seat of Government the Bureau file number, when available, should always be quoted. If the Bureau file number is not known and further correspondence between field office and Seat of Government is expected in the matter, Bureau file number should be requested by submitting FD-217 with the correspondence. By this relatively simple procedure the substantial cost of processing such mail at the Bureau is almost cut in half. Equally important is the increased speed with which the mail is handled with one hundred per cent accuracy if the number is quoted correctly. Not only should investigative employees be periodically reminded of this requirement, but also stenographers should be encouraged to request the dictator in every instance where it is known to furnish the Bureau file number for placement on communications addressed to the Bureau or to determine whether the dictator desires to request the Bureau file number by submitting FD-217.

10/16/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-58

(C) INTERVIEWS; CONFESSIONS; SIGNED STATEMENTS; WARNING OF RIGHTS -- A Federal judge in an eastern district recently inaugurated the practice of asking many probing questions concerning the voluntary nature of

guilty pleas entered in his court. Each defendant entering such a plea is asked to define "voluntary," and then asked if he was beaten, threatened, or given any promises by anyone in the U. S. Attorney's Office, or by the FBI or other law enforcement agency concerned.

~~It has been learned that the purpose of the new procedure~~ is to make doubly sure that the defendant will not have a basis for subsequently filing a Writ of Habeas Corpus charging that his guilty plea was made involuntarily; also, that this new procedure has been discussed at a judicial conference and it may become the general practice in other Federal districts.

All investigative and supervisory employees, including Inspectors and their aides, must make certain that there is full compliance with long-standing Bureau instructions against the use of brutality, threats or promises; that any statement taken fully reflects such compliance; and that the personnel concerned are in a position to testify truthfully to compliance should a question arise in court. When allegations to the contrary are made in court they are to be rebutted as soon as possible with all proof available.

(Security Letters on attached page)

10/16/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-58

- 2 -

(D) SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION CHARACTERIZATION - NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO ABOLISH THE HOUSE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES COMMITTEE (NCAHUAC) -- SAC Letter 62-38 (A) dated July 11, 1962, advised that characterizations contained in the various issues of the "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications" published by the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HCUA) should be utilized when characterizing an organization listed therein. The December 1, 1961, issue of HCUA's "Guide," page 115, contains a characterization of the "National Committee to Abolish the Un-American Activities Committee (NCAUAC)."

In view of the change in the name of this organization by the adding of the word "House" and in order to be accurate in all respects in characterizing this organization, it should be characterized in the future in the following manner. The citation as it appears on page 115 of the December 1, 1961, "Guide" should be set forth in its entirety with the following added as a final paragraph: "A source has advised that the NCAUAC changed its name on March 3, 1962, to include the word "House" in its name, thereby becoming known as the National Committee to Abolish the House Un-American Activities Committee." The source for the quoted material is CG 6474-S who has furnished reliable information in the past.

10/16/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-58

(E) CUBAN ALIEN REFUGEES -- Attention is directed to SAC Letter Number 61-13 dated March 14, 1961, paragraph J. All offices should make certain that copies of Immigration and Naturalization Service reports pertaining to Cuban alien refugees are being carefully reviewed. Afford all pro-Castro allegations expeditious and continuous investigative attention. Your investigation of these cases should be guided by the instructions set forth in SAC Letter Number 62-55 dated October 5, 1962.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosure for (A)

10/16/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-58

- 3 -



PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 62-H  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

October 24, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RE: BUREAU CODES

A number of field offices have sent to the Bureau recently enciphered messages which could not be deciphered. This causes delay and unnecessary expenditure of employee time in attempting to decode such garbled messages.

The AFSAM-7 Manual of Operation and Routine Maintenance, Section II B., subsection 2.g., page 12, instructs that an enciphered message is to be completely check-deciphered prior to transmission, preferably by another operator and, if available, on a second machine using a different set of rotors. This check-decipherment is mandatory.

If this check-decipherment procedure were followed meticulously on all messages by each office, failures to encode properly would be detected prior to transmission, and the majority of garbles in messages would be eliminated.

Explanations will be requested by the Bureau for messages received which are undecipherable, and if this is due to failure to check-decipher, appropriate administrative action will be taken.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 62-J

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

October 29, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7

Amendment No. 1 to KAM-1A/TSEC, Repair and Maintenance Instructions for TSEC/KL-7 (Bureau's AFSAM 7 cipher equipment), being disseminated as follows: one to each office except Washington Field; one to Code Room, Seat of Government; seven to Bureau's Relocation Site; one to each Legal Attache office, except Bern and Manila.

Comply with Letter of Promulgation which appears on front cover. Page 3, entitled List of Effective Pages, through page 313, shall be inserted as in the case of other manuals and superseded pages removed. Revisions listed as Amendments and Instructions, pages III through VI, should then be handled. Check Manual for completeness and accuracy and enter appropriate information on Record of Amendments included therein.

Execute all copies of Flyleaf Receipts. One copy requires signature of SAC in two places. Employee who made changes will sign all copies, each twice. That bearing the SAC's signature should be placed in Manual.

The address label of the individual envelope containing Amendment No. 1, two Flyleaf Receipts and all residue including Letter of Promulgation, Amendments and Instructions, superseded pages and back cover must be returned immediately to Bureau, attention FBI Annex.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director





PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 62-I  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

October 25, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7

One set of AFSAM 7 key lists for months of December, 1962, January and February, 1963, being forwarded separately to all divisions except Washington Field which will receive none; three copies being furnished Bureau's Emergency Relocation Site; and three copies Seat of Government Code Room.

Acknowledge receipt of key lists promptly by routing slip, indicating serial numbers which appear thereon; return in a sealed envelope to the Bureau, attention FBI Annex, the address label on individual tamperproof envelope containing keys even though torn while opening package; and destroy, by burning, each monthly sheet thirty days after last effective date thereof, advising Bureau promptly by routing slip, attention FBI Annex, this has been done.

It is essential address label mentioned above be returned in order to control security of shipment.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL

NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 62-K

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

October 30, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

RE: BUREAU CODES

The Bureau has two one-time cipher pad systems to serve as a "back-up" in the event both AFSAM 7 cipher machines become inoperative. Instructions for recourse to these systems are clearly set forth in Part II, Section 4, N, page 58, Manual of Rules and Regulations.

Detailed explanations of coding procedures involved in use of one-time cipher pads with the Seat of Government were furnished individual offices at the time each office received a set of pads. Similar instructions for operational use of Inter-Office pads appear in the first two pages of each Inter-Office pad and were supplied at the time these particular pads were distributed.

Thoroughly review instructions mentioned above and assure that employees who handle coding operations are completely familiar with all coding procedures and instructions pertinent thereto. If there are any questions whatever with regard to when or how the two "back-up" coding systems are to be used, immediately submit such questions to the Bureau, attention FBI Annex.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

October 26, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) WIRE AND RADIO COMMUNICATIONS-ADEQUACY OF TRAINED PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT -- In view of current international situation immediate attention should be given to the adequacy and availability of trained personnel and equipment to handle all phases of the Bureau's wire and radio communications.

Particularly, consideration should be given to:

(1) Availability of relief radio operators and code clerks. Code clerks should also be capable of handling interoffice cipher pad and one-time cipher pad messages. Prior Bureau approval of additional employees to be given code training required. Advise identities by teletype if necessary to insure adequate complement. Afford relief radio operators refresher practice if possible.

(2) Sufficient trained telephone and teletypewriter operators should be available for emergencies and to afford around-the-clock coverage. Train additional employees if necessary.

(3) Teletypewriter and telephone equipment capacity should be followed and immediate availability of additional equipment checked. Additional installations should not be made without prior Bureau authority.

Concerning the training of reserve and relief code clerks, teletypewriter and telephone operators, maximum utilization should be made of female personnel, bearing in mind the military demands that will be made upon male employees if the international situation worsens.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

November 20, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS - VISION - FBI FORM BOOK (FD-277 AND FD-300) -- Re SAC Letter 59-71, (L), dated November 24, 1959. Forms FD-277 and FD-300 have been revised effective immediately. Three copies of each of the revised forms are enclosed. Adequate supply being sent you separately. Place copy of each in the FBI Form Book. Henceforth, all offices must use FD-277 when transmitting to the Bureau physical examination reports containing medical examiner's notation that examinee should wear corrective glasses while driving a motor vehicle. FD-277 now contains a space for name of person who instructed employee he must wear corrective glasses when driving Bureau cars and date instruction given. Use of stamp containing such information not desired. FD-300 now informs medical examiners of Civil Service Commission's safe driving standard concerning distant vision.

11/20/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-66

(B) EXECUTIVE ORDER 10501 - SAFEGUARDING OFFICIAL INFORMATION IN THE INTERESTS OF THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES - FBI FORM BOOK -- Reference is made to SAC Letter 62-56 (D), dated October 9, 1962, concerning new regulations issued by the Attorney General in connection with Executive Order 10501. In order that there will be a record in personnel files that all new employees and present employees are aware of Section 107 of the new regulations on "Penalties for Violation" of Executive Order 10501, FD-291 concerning this subject has been revised to provide certification of this awareness by new employees in the Bureau's service, and an unnumbered form has been devised to provide for this for present employees.

A sufficient supply of the revised and unnumbered forms will be transmitted to you under separate cover. Upon receipt, have each present employee review and execute the unnumbered form and thereafter have each new employee execute the revised form FD-291 when he enters on duty. Your supply of the outdated FD-291 should be destroyed. The executed forms by present employees in your office should be submitted in one package to reach the Bureau, attention Personnel Section, no later than 30 days from the date of your receipt of the supply of forms. This should allow time for each employee to have an opportunity to review and execute a form.

Enclosed are three copies of FD-291, one copy of which should be placed in the FBI Form Book. Also enclosed is one copy of the unnumbered form for your information. The latter should not be placed in the FBI Form Book.

(C) THIRD AGENCY CONSIDERATION

11/20/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-66

(D) CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT BENEFITS -- Public Law 87-793 approved October 11, 1962, liberalized in several respects the retirement benefits granted by the Civil Service Retirement Act. The new benefits await implementation by Congressional appropriation of the necessary funds. This cannot occur until the 88th Congress convenes in January, 1963. Legislation will then be introduced looking toward appropriation of such funds.

The new benefits relate mainly to upward adjustment in amount of annuity and to increased survivor protection.

Provisions which would affect the amount of annuity include:

- (1) The annuity of each retired employee and survivor annuitant receiving or eligible to receive an annuity on January 1, 1963, would be increased 5 per cent. Annuities commencing between January 2, and December 31, 1963, would be increased 4 per cent; those commencing during 1964, 3 per cent; those commencing during 1965, 2 per cent; and those commencing during 1966, 1 per cent.
- (2) Beginning in January, 1964, yearly changes in the nation-wide cost of living will be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and whenever the cost of living rises at least 3 per cent, annuities will be further increased by a percentage matching the rise in the cost of living.
- (3) The reduction in an employee's annuity to provide for a survivor annuity will be changed from  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent of the first \$2400, plus 10 per cent of the balance to  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent of the first \$3600, plus 10 per cent of the balance. This will apply, once Congress appropriates funds, to all retiring employees separated on or after October 11, 1962, with an annuity commencing after that time.

11/20/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-66

Provisions which increase survivor protection include:

(1) The survivor has been eligible for 50 per cent of the annuity of the employee but the new law changes this to 55 per cent. This applies to annuities based on separations occurring on or after October 11, 1962, but again must await appropriation of the necessary funds. Furthermore, instead of requiring that a retiring married employee must specifically designate his spouse to receive a survivor annuity, such annuity will be payable automatically unless employee at the time he retires specifies otherwise in writing. This particular change is now in effect and requires no appropriation by Congress.

(2) Survivor annuity payments to a child otherwise eligible for annuity can continue beyond the former limit of age 18 and up to age 21 if he is a student regularly pursuing full-time residence study in a high school, trade school, technical or vocational institute, junior college, college, university or comparable recognized institution. This will apply where the parent employee or annuitant dies on or after October 11, 1962, or where the death occurred before that date but the surviving student-child is not 18 until on or after that date. The annuity of a student-child ends when he marries, dies, ceases to be a student or becomes 21, whichever occurs first. This benefit likewise must await appropriation of the necessary funds by Congress.

11/20/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-66.

(E) FBI SUGGESTION PROGRAM -- The figures set out below are the totals of suggestions submitted and adopted in each field office for the first quarter (July, August, September) of Fiscal Year 1963:

Office	Suggestions	Adopted	Not Adopted	Submissions	
				Agent	Clerk
Albany	2	0	2	1	1
Albuquerque	4	0	4	1	3
Anchorage	2	1	1	0	2
Atlanta	3	0	3	2	1
Baltimore	1	0	1	1	0
Birmingham	3	1	2	3	0
Boston	2	0	2	0	2
Buffalo	0	0	0	0	0
Butte	3	0	3	0	3
Charlotte	1	0	1	1	0
Chicago	3	0	2	3	0

11/20/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-66

Office	Suggestions	Adopted	Not Adopted	Submissions	
				Agent	Clerk
Cincinnati	5	0	5	2	3
Cleveland	0	0	0	0	0
Dallas	10	1	9	6	4
Denver	2	1	1	2	0
Detroit	2	1	1	1	1
El Paso	2	1	1	0	2
Honolulu	0	0	0	0	0
Houston	0	0	0	0	0
Indianapolis	1	0	1	0	1
Jacksonville	4	0	4	4	0
Kansas City	3	1	2	3	0
Knoxville	2	0	2	1	1
Las Vegas	1	0	1	1	0
Little Rock	0	0	0	0	0
Los Angeles	2	1	1	2	0
Louisville	2	0	2	0	2
Memphis	2	0	2	1	1
Miami	1	0	1	1	0
Milwaukee	5	1	4	3	2
Minneapolis	2	1	1	1	1
Mobile	6	1	5	3	3
Newark	6	1	5	3	3
New Haven	0	0	0	0	0
New Orleans	7	1	6	7	0
*New York City	16	2	13	9	7
Norfolk	4	1	3	4	0
Oklahoma City	0	0	0	0	0
Omaha	1	0	1	0	1
Philadelphia	2	0	2	1	1
Phoenix	0	0	0	0	0
Pittsburgh	0	0	0	0	0
Portland	1	0	1	1	0
Richmond	1	1	0	1	0
Saint Louis	0	0	0	0	0
Salt Lake City	0	0	0	0	0
San Antonio	1	0	1	0	1
San Diego	4	0	4	0	4
San Francisco	9	1	8	8	1
San Juan	4	0	4	2	2
Savannah	5	2	3	2	3
Seattle	5	0	5	4	1
Springfield	4	0	4	4	0
Tampa	2	0	2	1	1
Washington Field	4	2	2	2	2

11/20/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-66

Office	Suggestions	Adopted	Not Adopted	Submissions	
				Agent	Clerk
Bern	0	0	0	0	0
Bonn	0	0	0	0	0
London	0	0	0	0	0
Madrid	0	0	0	0	0
Mexico City	0	0	0	0	0
Ottawa	0	0	0	0	0
Paris	0	0	0	0	0
Rio de Janeiro	0	0	0	0	0
Rome	0	0	0	0	0
Tokyo	3	0	3	0	3
	<u>268</u>	<u>63</u>	<u>199</u>	<u>124</u>	<u>144</u>

\* - denotes offices having suggestions under consideration.

The foregoing totals disclose that during the first quarter of the current fiscal year 20 field offices and Legal Attache's offices submitted no suggestions. This fact is mentioned not to promote the submission of suggestions as a mere statistical achievement but to emphasize that we all share the mutual responsibility to insure the Bureau's operations are conducted as efficiently as possible. Therefore, any idea of any employee is valuable and vital and participation in the Suggestion Program is a logical means of bringing it to the Bureau's attention.

11/20/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-66

(F) ECONOMY - FISCAL YEAR 1963 -- An analysis at this time of the Bureau's financial condition projected through the end of the current fiscal year (1963) indicates many items of expense are being incurred at a rate that if continued would substantially exceed available funds. For example, (1) the Bureau is being required by the Bureau of the Budget to absorb an additional cost of about \$133,000 for postage rate increases to go into effect January 1, 1963, for which no additional funds will be made available; (2) higher costs of local, long distance, and teletype services; (3) higher travel costs; and (4) repairs and alterations to space. Your attention was called to the higher communications costs in item A of SAC Letter No. 62-45 dated August 28, 1962. Because of these higher costs, and in order to make sure no deficit will be incurred, the Bureau is making a corresponding reduction in the funds available for the purchase of equipment. This action means that only requests for absolutely essential supplies and equipment will be approved by the Bureau.



No requests for repairs or alterations to space should be made unless they are absolutely essential to the Bureau's proper and efficient operation. Requests submitted only on the basis that they are desirable will be turned down. In addition your full and complete cooperation is requested in keeping all other costs to an absolute minimum consistent with the proper performance of our work. With your full cooperation it is believed that the Bureau can avoid taking any more drastic steps.

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11/20/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-66

- 6 -

(G) TRADE EXPANSION ACT OF 1962 - PUBLIC LAW 87-794 - FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT -- Captioned law, signed October 11, 1962, provides for certain international trade agreements and for adjustment assistance to domestic industry, agriculture and labor when adversely affected by such agreements.

Section 319 of this law penalizes false statements for the purpose of obtaining financial assistance by companies which suffer economic dislocation caused by the Act with a fine of not more than \$5,000 and/or two years' imprisonment. Section 335 provides that false statements to obtain assistance on the part of workers claiming damage by the Act shall be penalized by a fine up to \$1,000 and/or imprisonment for one year.

In response to Bureau inquiry, the Department advised by letter dated November 1, 1962, that the Bureau has jurisdiction over reported violations of the penal provisions of the Act. Handle any reported offenses under the Fraud Against the Government classification.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures for (A) & (B)

11/20/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-66

- 7 -

(Field Office or Division) \_\_\_\_\_

(Date) \_\_\_\_\_

Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

In continuing my employment in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, I hereby agree that I will be governed by the following provisions.

1. That the strictly confidential character of any and all information secured by me or coming to my attention in connection, directly or indirectly, with my work as an employee of this Bureau, or the work of other employees of which I may become cognizant, is fully understood by me; and that neither during my tenure of service with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, nor at any time, will I violate this confidence nor will I divulge any information of any kind or character whatsoever that may become known to me to persons not officially entitled thereto, recognizing applicability to me of penalty provisions in case of any violation by me.
2. That information referred to in Item 1 above includes but is by no means limited to information in the interests of the defense of the United States marked "Top Secret," "Secret," or "Confidential," and that Department of Justice regulations provide specifically for penalty applicable to me for any violation of Executive Order 10501, the basic authority for safeguarding such information, as follows: "Any officer or employee who violates any provision of Executive Order No. 10501, as amended, or of these regulations shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action. Prompt and stringent administrative action shall be taken against any officer or employee determined to have been knowingly responsible for any release or disclosure of classified defense information or material except in the manner authorized by these regulations. Whenever a violation of criminal statutes may be involved in a deliberate unauthorized release or disclosure of classified defense information, criminal prosecution, in an appropriate case, shall also be instituted."

I further certify that the conditions specified herein are agreeable to me, and that I continue as an employee of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with a full knowledge of the conditions above set forth.

Very truly yours,

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Signature and Title of Position)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI

DATE:

FROM : SAC,

Attention: Personnel Section

SUBJECT:

- Remylet \_\_\_\_\_.
- ReBulet \_\_\_\_\_.

- Re physical examination \_\_\_\_\_.
- Dental work was completed on \_\_\_\_\_.
- Vision has been corrected to \_\_\_\_\_ . Employee specifically instructed  
\_\_\_\_\_ by \_\_\_\_\_ that he can operate a Bureau car  
(date) (name of person giving instruction)  
only when wearing the necessary glasses.

- Results of  chest X ray  patch test  urinalysis  serology were negative.
- Enclosed physician's statement indicates he is qualified for strenuous physical exertion and use of firearms.
- Enclosed are  paid  unpaid medical bills.
- Attached are Bureau of Employees' Compensation forms \_\_\_\_\_

- Physical examination reports are enclosed.
- Employee is scheduled for physical examination on \_\_\_\_\_.
- Physical examination report has been reviewed and initialed.
- Employee returned to active duty \_\_\_\_\_.
- Employee's physical condition is \_\_\_\_\_.
- UACB he is being removed from limited duty.
- UACB he is being placed on limited duty.

Remarks:

**Attachment to Standard Form 88, Report of Medical Examination  
For Information and Guidance of Medical Examiner**

Name of Examinee \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type or print) *Last* *First* *Middle*

The following portions of the attached examination report form need not be completed:

2	14	68
3	17	69
4	62	72
9	65	76
11	67	

- 45. Is necessary unless facilities for affording same are not readily available.
- 48. Not required unless examinee is over 35 years of age or examination indicates such is desirable.
- 49. Is necessary unless facilities for affording same are not readily available.
- 71. Audiometer examinations should be afforded whenever possible for all Special Agent applicants and Special Agents. Applicants for the Special Agent position will not be accepted if the hearing loss exceeds a 15 decibel average in each ear in the conversational speech range (500, 1000, 2000 cycles).

**For All Examinees, Whether Clerical or Special Agent Applicants or Employees:**

*The medical examiner should answer the following question:*

Examinee  is  is not qualified for strenuous physical exertion.

**To be Answered in the Case of All Male Employees and Male Applicants:**

1. Does examinee have any defects restricting or prohibiting his participation in defensive tactics and dangerous assignments which might entail the practical use of firearms?

No  Yes If "yes" please specify defects. \_\_\_\_\_

2. Does examinee have any defects prohibiting safe operation of motor vehicles?

No  Yes If "yes" please specify defects. \_\_\_\_\_

3. For safe driving of motor vehicles, Civil Service Commission requires distant vision must test at least 20/40 in one eye and 20/100 in the other, corrected or uncorrected. Should examinee wear corrective glasses while operating a motor vehicle?  Yes  No

If recommendation is based on a factor other than above standard, indicate basis \_\_\_\_\_

**Desirable Weight Ranges for Males**

Height	Small Frame	Medium Frame	Large Frame
5' 4"	117 - 125	123 - 135	131 - 148
5' 5"	120 - 129	126 - 139	134 - 152
5' 6"	124 - 133	130 - 143	138 - 157
5' 7"	128 - 137	134 - 148	143 - 162
5' 8"	132 - 141	138 - 152	147 - 166
5' 9"	136 - 146	142 - 156	151 - 170
5' 10"	140 - 150	146 - 161	155 - 175
5' 11"	144 - 154	150 - 166	160 - 180
6'	148 - 158	154 - 171	164 - 185
6' 1"	152 - 163	158 - 176	169 - 190
6' 2"	156 - 167	163 - 181	174 - 195
6' 3"	160 - 171	168 - 186	178 - 200
6' 4"	169 - 180	178 - 196	188 - 210
6' 5"	174 - 185	182 - 202	192 - 216

3. Examinee's frame is  small  medium  large

4. Considering above weight table, the examinee's frame, and other individual physical characteristics, I consider his present weight  Satisfactory  Excessive  Deficient

5. Under proper medical supervision, examinee should  lose \_\_\_\_\_ pounds  
 gain \_\_\_\_\_ pounds

Remarks: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
 (Signature of Medical Examiner)

\_\_\_\_\_  
 (Date)

(Present address) \_\_\_\_\_

(Date) \_\_\_\_\_

Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

In accepting an appointment to a position in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, I hereby agree that I will be governed by the following provisions:

1. That my retention in the Bureau will be contingent upon the performance of satisfactory services.
2. That the strictly confidential character of any and all information secured by me or coming to my attention in connection, directly or indirectly, with my work as an employee of this Bureau, or the work of other employees of which I may become cognizant, is fully understood by me; and that neither during my tenure of service with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, nor at any time, will I violate this confidence nor will I divulge any information of any kind or character whatsoever that may become known to me to persons not officially entitled thereto, recognizing applicability to me of penalty provisions in case of any violation by me.
3. That information referred to in Item 2 above includes but is by no means limited to information in the interests of the defense of the United States marked "Top Secret," "Secret," or "Confidential," and that Department of Justice regulations provide specifically for penalty applicable to me for any violation of Executive Order 10501, the basic authority for safeguarding such information, as follows: "Any officer or employee who violates any provision of Executive Order No. 10501, as amended, or of these regulations shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action. Prompt and stringent administrative action shall be taken against any officer or employee determined to have been knowingly responsible for any release or disclosure of classified defense information or material except in the manner authorized by these regulations. Whenever a violation of criminal statutes may be involved in a deliberate unauthorized release or disclosure of classified defense information, criminal prosecution, in an appropriate case, shall also be instituted."

I further certify that the conditions specified herein are agreeable to me, and that I am entering on duty as an employee of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with a full knowledge of the conditions above set forth.

Very truly yours,

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Signature and Title of Position)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

\_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 19 \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Signature of Officer)



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-70

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

December 11, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO BAHAMAS DECEMBER 19 - 20, 1962 -- President Kennedy will make an official trip to the Bahamas December 19 - 20, 1962.

In connection with this trip, all offices should be alert for any data concerning possible threats to the personal safety of the President or members of his group. You should also be alert for information concerning anti-American demonstrations or any intelligence data of interest concerning this trip. Information regarding travel to the Bahamas of security suspects or of eccentrics up to the time President Kennedy's visit is terminated should be immediately furnished to the Bureau.

Sources and informants in a position to acquire the above-mentioned data should be alerted to the necessity for prompt reporting and the Bureau should be immediately advised if any such data is received. Communications in this matter should be submitted under the above caption.

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SAC LETTER NO. 62-70

(B) VOUCHERS - AIR LINE TRAVEL - NO-SHOW PENALTY -- Reference is made to Paragraph (B) of SAC Letter Number 62-41, dated July 31, 1962. The no-show penalty provision has been extended to January 31, 1963. However, carriers are now required to exempt a traveler from the payment of a penalty when he presents himself at the airport ticket office within thirty minutes after the scheduled departure time of his flight, and the delay was occasioned on account of late arrival of ground transportation, heavy traffic, accident, flat tire, difficulty in locating parking space, congestion in terminal and/or concourse area, or a faulty public address system. In such cases, the employee should obtain from the ticket agent a written confirmation of the fact that he arrived within the time limit under one or more of the foregoing conditions.

The above matter should be brought to the attention of all personnel of your office.

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT SENT TO  
NATIONAL ARCHIVES (JFKARCA)  
DATE 8/5/94 dcl



(C) VOUCHERS - GOVERNMENT TRANSPORTATION REQUESTS - OFFICIAL TRAVEL BY BUREAU EMPLOYEES - USE OF FIRST-CLASS ACCOMMODATIONS -- You have previously been advised of the need for the reduction of travel expenses. The Bureau of the Budget has now advised that the percentage of first-class air flights by employees of any agency should be less than fifty per cent of the authorized travel. A survey of the travel performed by Bureau personnel during October, 1962, indicates that approximately sixty-nine per cent of all air flights were first-class.

Accordingly, effective immediately, any employee of the Bureau traveling first-class by air must have prior approval from the Special Agent in Charge or Assistant Director unless no other air accommodations are available and there is not sufficient time to obtain the authority of the Special Agent in Charge or Assistant Director. In any instance where first-class air travel is used, a statement must accompany the voucher claiming reimbursement justifying the use of the first-class accommodations.

The Department of Justice has also advised that rail travel for distances of less than 250 miles must be by coach unless there is some reason this is not feasible. Effective immediately, justification must accompany the voucher reflecting any first-class rail transportation of less than 250 miles.

Appropriate manual changes will be forthcoming.

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SAC LETTER NO. 62-70

(D) FBIRA MATTER - FBIRA-SPONSORED INTEROFFICE FIREARMS COMPETITION - 1962 -- I am pleased to announce the results of the 1962 FBIRA-Sponsored Interoffice Firearms Competition, computed from Practical Pistol Course Scores fired by Agent personnel during the third outdoor firearms period. The Anchorage Office won the over-all competition with an average score of 97.69. This was the third win for the Anchorage Division, thereby giving them permanent possession of the "J. Edgar Hoover Firearms Trophy," as provided for in SAC Letter 60-26.

The 5,482 Agents participating had an over-all average of 91.24, surpassing last year's average of 90.66. The increase in the average is an indication of the interest and enthusiasm displayed by Agent personnel and is most gratifying.

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In addition to the over-all winner, "Honorable Mention" citations will be presented to the winning office in each of four categories, the offices being divided according to Agent complement. Those winners are as follows:

Group 1 - Chicago

~~Group 2 - Seattle~~

Group 3 - Portland

Group 4 - Albuquerque

The relative standing of each office, according to group, is as follows:

Over-all win - Anchorage - 97.69

Group 1

1. Chicago	94.07
2. Newark	92.68
3. San Francisco	92.05
4. Los Angeles	91.18
5. Detroit	91.09
6. Miami	90.96
7. Seat of Government	90.92
8. New York	90.40
9. Washington Field	89.48
10. Philadelphia	88.87

Group 2

1. Seattle	93.71
2. New Orleans	92.86
3. Cincinnati	92.58
4. Indianapolis	92.37
5. Pittsburgh	92.00
6. Charlotte	91.60
7. Boston	91.20
8. Kansas City	90.64
9. Cleveland	89.26
10. Baltimore	89.09

Group 3

1. Portland	94.53
2. Jacksonville	93.28
3. Minneapolis	92.52
4. Phoenix	92.40
5. Springfield	92.39
6. New Haven	92.20
7. Houston	91.30
8. Dallas	90.98
9. Denver	90.93
10. Little Rock	90.86
11. San Diego	90.60
12. Mobile	90.49

13. Memphis	90.32
14. Savannah	90.28
15. Milwaukee	89.85
16. Buffalo	89.67
17. Albany	89.35
18. Oklahoma City	89.14
19. Louisville	89.08
20. St. Louis	88.95
21. Richmond	88.56
22. Tampa	87.57
23. San Antonio	87.22

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Group 4

1. Albuquerque	92.88	7. Las Vegas	91.56
2. Butte	92.45	8. Honolulu	91.46
3. Omaha	92.35	9. Birmingham	90.30
4. Knoxville	92.24	10. Atlanta	89.84
5. Salt Lake City	92.19	11. Norfolk	88.91
6. San Juan	91.62	12. El Paso	88.58

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(E) FEDERAL RESERVE ACT MATTERS - RESEARCH -- Enclosed for each office are two copies of a booklet entitled "Examination of Automation in National Banks" recently published by the Comptroller of the Currency, U. S. Treasury Department. This booklet while fairly technical provides information in layman's language concerning automatic data processing equipment, its various types of systems and machine functions as employed by National Banks. Because of the subject matter, it is felt the booklet will be of material assistance as background information to Special Agent Accountants in connection with their work in Federal Reserve Act cases. The booklet should be brought to the attention of all Special Agent Accountants and included in the library of each field office.

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SAC LETTER NO. 62-70

(F) FUGITIVES - HOLIDAY COVERAGE -- With the approaching year-end holiday season, you are reminded of the desirability of establishing appropriate coverage of relatives and close associates of fugitives so that you will be promptly alerted to any attempted contact at this time.

12/11/62  
SAC LETTER NO. 62-70

(G) SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT, 1948 - CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR MATTERS -- With increasing frequency members of the Nation of Islam (NOI) are requesting classification under the Selective Service Act, 1948, as conscientious objectors on the basis of their affiliation with and belief in the teachings of NOI. On the basis of FBI reports in these matters the Department prepares a summary, copies of which are furnished to a hearing officer and the registrant. Because of the method in which conscientious objector reports are handled and use made of them by the Department, they should contain nothing which would require classification under Executive Order 10501.

Conscientious objector reports on members and affiliates of the NOI should contain a current approved thumbnail sketch pertaining to the national organization of the NOI and/or Fruit of Islam (FOI) where applicable so the Department and the hearing officer may be apprised of the true character of these organizations. These two sketches, which are set forth in SAC Letter Number 62-38 (A) dated July 11, 1962, do not contain classified information under the provisions of Executive Order 10501 and their inclusion in a report is not a basis for classification.

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SAC LETTER NO. 62-70

(H) HOODLUM COVERAGE IN THE GREATER MIAMI, FLORIDA, AREA DURING WINTER SEASON 1962 - 1963 - CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM -- The Miami Office has established plans and programs to afford coverage on out-of-town hoodlums and racketeers during the coming winter season of 1962-1963. These plans include utilization of informants, sources and strategically located highly confidential sources.

In an effort to assist the Miami Office in inaugurating immediate coverage on hoodlums and racketeers converging on the Miami area during the coming winter season, field offices are instructed to furnish the Miami Office complete details as to the itinerary and appropriate descriptive details including intended mode of travel on hoodlums and racketeers visiting the Miami area. As soon as this data is ascertained this information is to be forwarded by whatever appropriate expeditious communication is deemed necessary in each instance which will enable the Miami Office to have sufficient notice to provide coverage.

In notifying the Bureau and Miami Office of the intended travel of a hoodlum, each field office should also include information on the availability of any highly placed informants in a position to travel to this area to provide coverage on the hoodlums' activities. The Bureau will thereafter decide if the travel of a particular informant is warranted.

(Security Letter on attached page)

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(I) SECURITY INDEX -- Your attention is directed to Section 87D of the Manual of Instructions, page 78, in which is set forth a requirement that cover pages to reports relating to Security Index subjects must contain a statement as to whether or not the Security Index card in the case is tabbed DETCOM and a statement as to whether subject's activities do or do not warrant such tabbing.

Some instances have been noted recently in which no observations concerning this matter are contained in the cover pages.

The necessity of specifically commenting upon the DETCOM status of Security Index subjects in cover pages to reports should be reiterated at this time to all Agents engaged in security investigations. Destroy all outdated Forms FD-305.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover.

Director

Enclosures for (E)

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SAC LETTER NO. 62-70

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



December 26, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) BUREAU AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS - FISCAL YEAR 1962 --

Detailed statistics concerning accidents reported to the Bureau involving Bureau cars during fiscal year 1962 are set forth below. Only those accidents have been included wherein there was some tangible property damage to either Bureau car or third party's car or where there were personal injuries. This data should be called to the attention of all employees charged with the responsibility of operating or caring for the Bureau's automotive equipment.

OFFICE	NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS		1962 INCREASE OR DECREASE OVER 1961	EMPLOYEES HELD RESPONSIBLE 1962	REPAIR COSTS TO BUREAU 1962	TOTAL MILEAGE DRIVEN 1962	ACCIDENT RATE PER 100,000 MILES 1962
	1962	1961	1961	1962	1962	1962	1962
any	3	7	-4	-	\$ 75.00	447,294	.7
Albuquerque	2	4	-2	-	---	437,157	.5
Anchorage	3	2	+1	-	88.46	76,734	3.9
Atlanta	8	6	+2	2	---	816,045	1.0
Baltimore	10	14	-4	3	471.66	690,981	1.4
Birmingham	2	2	-	-	802.43	300,421	.7
Boston	14	3	+11	2	238.70	842,894	1.7
Buffalo	1	3	-2	-	---	356,178	.3
Butte	1	1	-	-	472.50	521,285	.2
Charlotte	3	4	-1	1	---	1,096,484	.3
Chicago	24	14	+10	2	1,492.22	1,392,367	1.7
Cincinnati	3	4	-1	2	\$ ---	717,986	.4
Cleveland	4	1	+3	-	480.73	648,803	.6
Dallas	3	6	-3	-	167.93	848,765	.4
Denver	4	6	-2	1	121.45	574,395	.7
Detroit	10	10	-	-	366.67	1,266,606	.8
El Paso	1	0	+1	-	---	181,667	.6
Honolulu	2	1	+1	-	---	59,986	3.3
Houston	2	1	+1	-	177.72	447,904	.4
Indianapolis	5	6	-1	-	---	727,710	.7
Jacksonville	3	1	+2	1	130.64	490,080	.6
Kansas City	7	5	+2	-	325.00	830,631	.8
Memphis	4	4	-	1	87.50	444,331	.9
Las Vegas	2	0	+2	-	---	267,406	.7

OFFICE	NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS		1962 IN- CREASE OR DE- CREASE OVER 1961	EMPLOY- EES HELD RESPON- SIBLE 1962	REPAIR COSTS TO BUREAU 1962	TOTAL MILEAGE DRIVEN 1962	ACCIDE RATE P 100,00 MILES 1962
	1962	1961					
Little Rock	7	3	/4	4	415.00	536,192	1.3
Los Angeles	18	20	-2	4	537.25	1,850,980	1.0
Louisville	2	8	-6	1	---	593,757	.3
Memphis	2	5	-3	-	---	592,931	.3
Miami	6	9	-3	2	---	885,260	.7
Milwaukee	2	6	-4	-	205.00	431,151	.5
Minneapolis	3	2	/1	1	85.00	773,745	.4
Mobile	0	1	-1	-	---	423,464	-
Newark	9	14	-5	2	121.45	1,271,457	.7
New Haven	2	6	-4	1	---	387,868	.5
New Orleans	8	8	-	1	241.40	797,103	1.0
New York	13	32	-19	1	326.00	1,552,726	.8
Norfolk	2	2	-	-	---	231,636	.9
Oklahoma City	8	3	/5	-	758.78	731,451	1.1
Omaha	1	2	-1	-	---	439,664	.2
Philadelphia	7	10	-3	2	42.50	702,692	1.0
Phoenix	2	9	-7	-	---	619,437	.3
Pittsburgh	7	5	/2	1	545.07	795,427	.9
Portland	3	4	-1	1	---	396,110	.8
Richmond	6	0	/6	-	\$ 80.64	584,008	1.0
St. Louis	4	2	/2	-	---	469,353	.9
Salt Lake City	2	5	-3	-	73.88	267,526	.7
San Antonio	3	4	-1	-	---	396,333	.8
San Diego	4	2	/2	-	162.23	532,603	.8
San Francisco	9	8	/1	2	---	1,563,377	.6
San Juan	3	2	/1	-	---	232,954	1.3
Savannah	2	3	-1	1	---	505,101	.4
Seattle	2	3	-1	-	---	669,227	.3
Springfield	5	3	/2	-	399.78	595,901	.8
Tampa	2	4	-2	-	205.42	453,444	.4
WFO	15	13	/2	5	702.05	776,188	1.9
WJG	6	4	/2	-	152.04	292,359	2.1
Quantico	0	2	-2	-	---	222,091	-
Legal Attaches	0	0	-	-	---	58,382	-
Totals	286	309	-23	44	\$10,552.10	36,116,008	.8

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C LETTER NO. 62-72

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I am pleased to note the decrease in the over-all number of accidents during fiscal year 1962. The number of accidents was reduced from 309 in fiscal year 1961 to 286 for fiscal year 1962. A close analysis of this report reflects a favorable trend in several areas and I certainly hope this trend continues.

It should be noted that the principal cause of accidents was rear-end collisions which accounted for 65.9 per cent of all accidents in which Bureau employees were held responsible. Intersection collisions ranked second accounting for 22.7 per cent of those accidents in which Bureau employees were held responsible. A number of accidents which occurred in 1962 were the result of cars' striking parked vehicles, cars being sideswiped and drivers' pulling out from parked positions at the curb into moving traffic.

Last year instructions were issued that each employee must develop good defensive driving habits in order to keep the number of accidents at a minimum. These instructions should be reiterated at this time to endeavor to effect an even further reduction in accidents.

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SAC LETTER NO. 62-72

(B) INVESTIGATIVE MATTERS RECEIVED -- An examination of the Monthly Administrative Reports reflects there is a substantial decrease in the number of investigative matters being received, the cause of which must be immediately determined and necessary remedial action taken.

All offices showing a decrease in investigative matters received are requested to thoroughly review the situation so that the factors contributing to this decrease may be determined and steps taken to correct this undesirable trend which has occurred.

An examination of all sources from which cases are received should disclose any weaknesses in existence. It is desired that this study be completed within ten days of the receipt of this letter and that your findings, together with specific recommendations for corrective action taken by you, be submitted to the Bureau.

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SAC LETTER NO. 62-72

(C) FIELD CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO TECHNICAL MATTERS - TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT -- Henceforth, all correspondence concerning technical matters is to be reviewed by the senior sound-trained agent or technical supervisor prior to being approved by the Special Agent in Charge or other official acting for him. The purpose of this instruction is to insure that requests for technical equipment and other correspondence relating to technical matters are cleared through the individual in the office having the most current knowledge of equipment availability, equipment capability, technical procedures and technical policies. You should insure that this procedure is followed in your office.

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SAC LETTER NO. 62-72

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(D) SEIZURE OF MATERIAL UNDER INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF OBSCENE MATTER STATUTE -- The decision on November 5, 1962, by the Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, reversing the convictions of Arthur Abraham Peisner and Harry Morris Disman for violation of the Interstate Transportation of Obscene Matter Statute expresses views on probable cause which should be kept in mind during future investigations of this type.

In October, 1958, a reliable informant advised that Peisner would transport obscene material from Maryland to New York, probably over the week-end of October 31, 1958. He had previously been linked with the manufacture and sale of obscene material. Bureau Agents on November 1, 1958, observed Peisner and Disman loading packages into a car at Peisner's Maryland residence. They were observed driving through Delaware and into New Jersey where they entered the New Jersey Turnpike. Bureau Agents alerted the New Jersey State Police to the possibility that Peisner and Disman were transporting obscene material, and the subjects were arrested by the State Police while on the turnpike. More than 1,500 obscene books were taken from the car. A Federal complaint was filed, and both subjects were convicted for violation of the Interstate Transportation of Obscene Matter Statute.

On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the convictions of both subjects. The search of the automobile without a warrant was not based on sufficient probable cause to believe that the books being transported were obscene. Once examined, the obscenity of the books was admitted, but the information in possession of the officers at the time the search of the automobile was initiated was insufficient to meet a strict standard of probable cause for vehicle search in obscene literature cases. The court concluded that as a minimal requirement for a search for and seizure of publications thought to be obscene it is essential that some qualified individual, aware of the proper test of obscenity as announced in the case of Roth v. United States, 354 US 476 (1957), should have made a determination prior to search and seizure that a publication meets that test. (The proper test of obscenity as announced in the Roth case is "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." The court held that the test is the effect "not upon any particular class, but upon all those whom it is likely to reach.").

A different conclusion was reached in the case of Weise v. United States, 251 F 2d 867 (1958), in which the facts were strikingly similar and the "minimal requirement" demanded by the court

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SAC LETTER NO. 62-72

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in the Peisner decision was not present. The Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, upheld the conviction in the Weise case, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, thus leaving the conviction standing.

~~The conflict in the decision in the Peisner case and that in the Weise case leaves in doubt the standard of probable cause which will be followed by the next court hearing a case of a similar nature. The decisions in the two cases have been set forth for the information and guidance of Agent personnel handling Interstate Transportation of Obscene Matter Investigations. It is to be noted that a warrant of arrest had been obtained in the Weise case but not in the Peisner case. You are again reminded of the existing Bureau rule that, wherever possible, a warrant of arrest should be obtained.~~

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

12/26/62

SAC LETTER NO. 62-72

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-4

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

January 23, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) CHARACTERIZATION OF KLAN-TYPE AND HATE-TYPE ORGANIZATIONS -- Set forth below are revised and new thumbnail sketches of klan-type and hate-type organizations which should be utilized in communications when necessary to document these organizations. These sketches supersede those previously furnished the field and presently being used. All sources furnishing information in connection with these thumbnail sketches are described as having furnished reliable information in the past.

Activities of individuals and groups must be specifically identified with the correct klan organization. Terms such as "the klan" or "a klansman" must not be used unless it is clearly indicated to which klan organization reference is being made. Care should be taken to use the correct name of a klan-type and hate-type organization in reporting information.

A thumbnail of an affiliate organization includes a statement showing affiliation with the parent organization. When such a thumbnail is used the thumbnail of the parent organization should also be set forth.

When submitting characterizations of klan-type or hate-type organizations instructions set forth in the Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part II, Section 4, Page 21, should be closely followed.

AMERICAN NAZI PARTY,  
ALSO KNOWN AS WORLD UNION OF FREE  
ENTERPRISE NATIONAL SOCIALISTS,  
GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL PARTY

A source advised on February 27, 1959, that George Lincoln Rockwell of Arlington, Virginia, had held an organizational meeting of the World Union of Free Enterprise National Socialists (WUFENS) at his residence on February 26, 1959.

Six persons were present and they, according to the source, comprised the beginning of an officer corps of the organization. Rockwell told those present that the WUFENS would be an international movement, but that the section of the organization in the United States would be known as the American Party of the WUFENS.

Rockwell, on March 26, 1959, furnished to Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a copy of the program of the WUFENS, stating that he expects to become the President of the United States through the organization's platform. The main tenets of the WUFENS, as reflected in the program, call for the migration of Negroes to Africa and the trial and execution of all Jews guilty of Communist and Zionist treason.

A second source advised on August 15, 1962, that the main activity of the organization in furtherance of these objectives, has consisted of picketings with anti-Jewish and anti-Negro placards; talks by Rockwell attacking Jews as traitors to the United States; attempts by Rockwell to form Nazi groups in various cities in the United States; and attempts to form a group of international sympathizers. Rockwell prints large amounts of Nazi literature at American Nazi Party Headquarters, 928 North Randolph Street, Arlington, Virginia.

On June 29, 1962, the State of Virginia revoked the charter of the American Nazi Party.

On September 20, 1962, the State Corporation Commission of Virginia issued a charter for a "George Lincoln Rockwell Party." The second source mentioned above advised on September 24, 1962, that Rockwell will continue to carry on his activities, using the name American Nazi Party, and he obtained the charter for the George Lincoln Rockwell Party merely to be able to do business as a corporation.

Sources:

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**AMERICAN NAZI PARTY, ALSO KNOWN AS WORLD  
UNION OF FREE ENTERPRISE NATIONAL SOCIALISTS  
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

---

A source advised on August 15, 1962, that the American Nazi Party (ANP), whose leader is George Lincoln Rockwell, maintains its headquarters at 928 North Randolph Street, Arlington, Virginia.

The main activity of the ANP in Washington, D. C., consists of picketing with placards which contain anti-Jewish and anti-Negro remarks. During some of the demonstrations, ANP literature is passed out.

Source:

**AMERICAN NAZI PARTY, ALSO KNOWN AS WORLD  
UNION OF FREE ENTERPRISE NATIONAL SOCIALISTS  
CINCINNATI, OHIO**

---

David G. Schreibeis, 7267 Berwood Drive, Madeira, Cincinnati 43, Ohio, advised Special Agents of the FBI on November 20, 1961, December 11, 1961, June 21, 1962, and August 27, 1962, that he is an associate member of the American Nazi Party and is the American Nazi Party Organizer in Cincinnati, Ohio.

He stated he has been an Associate American Nazi Party Member since April 18, 1961, and advised that he is one of the two associate members of the American Nazi Party in the Cincinnati, Ohio, area.

Schreibeis said there is no American Nazi Party activity in the Cincinnati, Ohio, area; also, that the Cincinnati Branch of the American Nazi Party is affiliated with the American Nazi Party parent organization located in Arlington, Virginia.

Source:

**AMERICAN NAZI PARTY, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA,  
ALSO KNOWN AS AMERICAN NAZI PARTY,  
WESTERN DIVISION**

---

A source has advised that the Los Angeles branch of the American Nazi Party (LAANP), which branch has also been known as the American Nazi Party, Western Division (ANPWD), came into existence as follows:

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-4





The source stated that the American National Party continues to maintain a "mail drop" at Post Office Box 191, Gracie Station, New York 28, New York, but has no actual headquarters.

Source:

HORACE SHERMAN MILLER  
ARYAN KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN  
P. O. BOX 5062, WACO, TEXAS

On March 29, 1955, a source advised that Horace Sherman Miller, 1401 North 13th Street, Waco, Texas, formerly was a member-at-large of the U. S. Klans of Georgia, but in approximately 1947, he was ousted from that organization by E. L. Edwards, Imperial Wizard.

Isador Fred, of Waco, Texas, on August 4, 1962, and Waco's Chief of Police Jesse Gunterman, on August 17, 1962, furnished the following information: Miller self-styled himself as "The Aryan Knight" and began distributing his writings under the caption "Aryan Knights of the Ku Klux Klan Religion" in approximately 1957. He is a prolific letter writer and since 1957, he has published and distributed his pamphlets entitled, "The Aryan Views-White Folk News." This publication contains reprints of articles which have appeared in newspapers and magazines and are anti-Catholic, anti-Semitic; anti-Masonic, anti-Negro, and pro-klan propaganda. He has distributed leaflets which set forth the tenets of the "Aryan Knights of the KKK religion," and which request contributions from the readers.

Sheriff C. C. Maxey, Waco, Texas, on August 10, 1962, informed that Miller is a disabled World War I veteran who receives retirement benefits from the Railway Retirement Board which he uses to defray the cost of publishing this propaganda. In recent months, the leaflets have contained articles and letters which are critical of the U. S. Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Kennedy Administration, and Miller has attacked efforts to integrate public schools and public facilities in the South. Recently, he denounced integration of the public schools, in the city of Waco. According to Maxey, Miller is a "crack pot" who has no following and does not appear capable of resorting to

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violence in his efforts to prevent integration of the races. He is a semi-invalid who uses an electric typewriter in preparing letters, leaflets, and other propaganda, and frequently advises law enforcement officers that he is anxious to assist his Government at all times.

Sources:

ASSOCIATION OF ARKANSAS KLANS  
OF THE KU KLUX KLAN (AAK)

A source advised on April 22, 1959, as follows:  
AAK was formed on April 21, 1959, at Pine Bluff, Arkansas, for the purpose of promoting white supremacy and segregation of the races but violence was disavowed. Leaders of AAK were previously members of the Original Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (OKKKK). George F. Edwardes, Grand Dragon of OKKKK for the State of Arkansas, was carried over as the Grand Dragon of the new organization, AAK. A source advised that on August 11, 1960, George F. Edwardes disavowed violence. Another source advised that on January 21, 1962, the new Grand Dragon Bill Williams disavowed violence. George F. Edwardes is the Legal Counselor of the AAK. Another source stated the ritual used by OKKKK is taken from the "Kloran" of the Association of South Carolina Klans of the Ku Klux Klan (ASCK). Regarding the ASCK, the following is noted: A source advised on September 24, 1956, that the ASCK was organized in the Fall of 1955 and is patterned after the Association of Carolina Klans (ACK). The source stated the ASCK is a new organization and not a rebirth of the ACK, although all high-ranking officials of the ASCK had been members of the ACK. The announced purposes of this organization are to promote white supremacy and to combat integration of races; however, the use of violence is disavowed.

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A source advised on September 2, 1950, that the ACK was composed of groups formerly members of the Association of Georgia Klans (AGK), and although the ACK severed all connections with the AGK on November 14, 1949, the ideals, purposes and policies of the two organizations remained identical. The ACK became defunct after convictions and imprisonment of its highest official and other members in 1952.

The AGK has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Sources:

ASSOCIATION OF GEORGIA KLANS  
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN (AGK, KKKK)

A source advised on January 11, 1961, that the AGK, KKKK, was organized by Charles Homer Maddox in the Spring of 1960, with mailing address of Post Office Box 41, Bloomingdale, Georgia. This source stated that AGK, KKKK, is a new organization and is not affiliated in any way with the old Association of Georgia Klans which is defunct. It is patterned after the U. S. Klans, has the same general ritual and has the same titles for its klavern officers. Most officers and members are former members of the U. S. Klans. The announced purposes of this organization are to promote white supremacy and to fight integration and communism by peaceful means, and it is opposed to any type of violence. This source said AGK, KKKK, is affiliated with the National Ku Klux Klan.

The same source advised on May 9, 1962, that this Klan group continues to operate with the same aims and purposes and is localized in the area of Bloomingdale and Savannah, Georgia. It continues to be affiliated with the National Ku Klux Klan.

Source:

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ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH CAROLINA KLANS  
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN (ASCK)

A source advised on September 24, 1956, that the Association of South Carolina Klans (ASCK) was organized in the Fall of 1955 and is patterned after the Association of Carolina Klans (ACK). This source said ASCK is a new organization and not a rebirth of ACK, although all high-ranking officials of ASCK had been members of ACK. The source stated announced purposes of this organization are to promote white supremacy and combat integration of the races; however, the use of violence is disavowed.

A second source advised on September 2, 1950, that ACK was composed of groups formerly members of the Association of Georgia Klans (AGK) and although ACK severed all connections with AGK on November 14, 1949, the ideals, purposes and policies of the two organizations remained identical. ACK became defunct after conviction and imprisonment of its highest official and other members in 1952.

A third source advised on April 16, 1962, that ASCK continues to operate for the purpose of promoting white supremacy and combating integration by peaceful means by public speaking and propaganda.

This third source said that ASCK, using the name Majority Citizens League of South Carolina, published a monthly newspaper, "Southland Standard," from August through December, 1961, and dropped it due to lack of financial support.

AGK has been designated by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Sources:

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CHRISTIAN EDUCATIONAL ASSOCIATION

The Christian Educational Association of 530 Chestnut Street, Union, New Jersey, is the publisher of "Common Sense," a tabloid-size newspaper published twice monthly except during July and August. Current issues of this paper identify the editor as Conde McGinley and the publisher as the Christian Educational Association.

On December 17, 1954, the Committee on Un-American Activities of the United States House of Representatives published a "Preliminary Report on Neo-Fascist and Hate Groups" in which their growth and objectives are discussed at length. The report indicates that "Common Sense" has a circulation which fluctuates between 30,000 and 100,000 copies an issue. It describes "Common Sense" as a "hate sheet" vehicle which publishes "some of the most vitriolic hate propaganda ever to come to the attention of the Committee."

According to the report, "Common Sense" depicts Communism as Judaism and devotes its pages almost entirely to attacks on the Jewish and to a lesser extent, the Negro minorities in the United States. Sympathy for the former Nazi government in Germany is also shown in the paper.

CHRISTIAN KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN (CKKKK)

A source advised on December 17, 1959, that Post Office Box 45, Louisville, Kentucky, was rented by J. B. Stoner in July, 1959, for the CKKKK. The source stated that as of December 17, 1959, the Post Office Box was still being held by Stoner.

Another source advised on November 23, 1959, that J. B. Stoner stated that he started the CKKKK in Louisville, Kentucky, with people who were in bad financial condition; however, he felt that after the organization's activity became known, it would attract a higher class of individuals. He indicated at that time an interest in securing more members in the Louisville area.

The same source advised that in May, 1960, the first edition of the "Klan Bulletin" appeared. The source described the "Klan Bulletin" as the official publication of the CKKKK.

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The June issue of the "Klan Bulletin" disclosed the address of the CKKKK as Post Office Box 48, Atlanta, Georgia.

A third source advised on January 25, 1961, that the CKKKK was a functioning organization in Atlanta, Georgia, that meetings were held and literature distributed.

A fourth source advised on June 7, 1961, that the CKKKK was a paper organization and inactive. The source added Stoner collects some dues and uses this money for his personal benefit.

The same source advised on May 14, 1962, that the CKKKK was no longer functioning due to J. B. Stoner's being occupied as an attorney for racists in various southern cities.

Sources:

DIXIE KLANS, KNIGHTS OF THE  
KU KLUX KLAN, INC. (DK, KKKK)

Sources advised it was announced at a meeting of Klavern 1, U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., at Chattanooga, Tennessee, on September 17, 1957, that some former leaders of Klavern 1 and their close associates had been banished from U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., during the preceding week.

Sources advised those individuals who were banished formed a new klan organization known as Dixie Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., with headquarters in Masonic Hall, 2523 Glass Street, East Chattanooga, Tennessee. A general welfare charter was secured from the State of Tennessee on October 21, 1957, which charter lists some of the purposes of the organization as freedom of speech and association, rejection of forced integration,

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preservation of the Constitutions of the United States and of Tennessee, and preservation of the sovereignty of each state.

On April 26, 1962, source stated that the Dixie Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., has active klaverns in Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, and Virginia. This informant advised ~~attempts were made to organize~~ klaverns of this organization in Arkansas, Mississippi, Florida, South Carolina, and North Carolina, but the attempts at organization in these states have not been successful.

A source advised during the Fall of 1960 that a "den" of Klavern 1, DK, KKKK, Inc., Chattanooga, Tennessee, consisting of ten members and two alternates, including Jack William Brown, Imperial Wizard (National President) of DK, KKKK, Inc., Jack Leon Brown, Exalted Cyclops of Klavern 1, Chattanooga, Tennessee (the local chapter president), and others, all listed as members of Klavern 1, DK, KKKK, Inc., Chattanooga, Tennessee, during July, August, and September, 1960, were responsible for five bombings of residences of Hamilton County, Tennessee, during July and August, 1960. Some of these members and alternates of the "den" held closed meetings and discussed bombing and other acts of violence. These acts and meetings were reportedly closed and rank-and-file members of this organization unaware of such. All reported members and alternates of the "den" interviewed during another investigation denied knowledge of bombings or acts of violence, denied knowledge of the "den" of DK, KKKK, Inc., and the majority admitted membership in DK, KKKK, Inc.

Sources have reported Jack William Brown continually discusses commission of acts of violence, encourages such acts in relationship to integration, and boasts of having committed acts of violence. Information as to the "den" listed above and acts of violence boasted of by Brown have been unconfirmed.

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**DIXIE KLANS, KNIGHTS OF THE  
KU KLUX KLAN, INCORPORATED,  
GEORGIA**

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A source advised in May, 1962, the Dixie Klans has no state organization in Georgia but does have a few units located within the northern part of Georgia. The source stated that the units of Dixie Klans in Georgia are under the direct control and supervision of the headquarters of Dixie Klans located at 2523 Glass Street, East Chattanooga, Tennessee.

Sources:

**DIXIE KLANS, KNIGHTS OF THE  
KU KLUX KLAN, INC.,  
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE**

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A source advised on May 16, 1962, that for about the past four years a small klavern of the Dixie Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., has been in existence in Memphis, Tennessee. This Klavern is affiliated with and has been chartered under the national or parent organization name, the national headquarters of which is located in Chattanooga, Tennessee.

The aims and purposes of this Klavern are primarily directed toward doing everything legally possible to maintain racial segregation in the South, particularly in the Memphis and Shelby County areas, and toward maintaining states rights as opposed to a concentrated Federal Government.

This Klavern as of 1961 had about thirty members, most of whom were inactive. Until the Fall of 1961, it held weekly meetings in Memphis, Tennessee, with an average attendance of six to eight persons.

Due to lack of interest on the part of the membership, no meetings have been held since the Fall of 1961; no new members have been recruited and no members are known to have paid any dues since 1961.

Source:

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**DIXIE KLANS, KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN, INC.,  
VIRGINIA**

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On July 25, 1961, a source advised that Wilbur L. Schrum, Colonial Heights, Virginia, had received a charter from Dixie Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc. (DK, KKKK, Inc.), signed by Jack Brown, which designated Schrum as Grand Wizard of the State of Virginia of the DK, KKKK, Inc.

On December 6, 1961, a second source advised a klavern of DK, KKKK, Inc., with National Office in Tennessee, was organized in Colonial Heights, Virginia, around April, 1961, with Wilbur L. Schrum acting as its leader.

Records of the State Corporation Commission, Richmond, Virginia, showed an application for a Certificate of Authority to Transact Business in Virginia was filed by DK, KKKK, Inc., on April 4, 1962, by Jack W. Brown, President, 2523 Glass Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee, and a Certificate to Transact Business in Virginia was issued on April 6, 1962.

The application stated DK, KKKK, Inc., a nonprofit fraternal organization, was incorporated in the State of Tennessee in October of 1957, and the principal office is 2523 Glass Street, Chattanooga. W. L. Schrum, Sr., 613 Colonial Avenue, Colonial Heights, Virginia, described as an officer of the organization, was listed as the Registered Agent in Virginia.

**Sources:**

**FEDERATED KU KLUX KLANS, INCORPORATED**

A source advised on December 21, 1959, that Federated Ku Klux Klans, Incorporated, was organized in late 1959 originally in Alabama by William Hugh Morris who had headed a klan group of the same name in Alabama in the late 1940's or early 1950's.

Headquarters of the organization were located in Montgomery, Alabama. Morris claimed the organization was

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the successor to the original Ku Klux Klan, organized in 1866. The source advised that the aims and purposes of the organization included "pure Americanism," white supremacy and segregation of the races.

The same source advised in September, 1960, that Morris had moved from Alabama to Bremen, Georgia. This source reported in February, 1962, that Federated Ku Klux Klans, Incorporated, had gone out of existence in Alabama and that the members had affiliated with the United Klans of America, Incorporated, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.

A second source advised in May, 1962, that Federated Ku Klux Klans, Incorporated, which formerly had six or seven units in Georgia, had lost membership until only one unit remained.

A third source advised in November, 1962, that Federated Ku Klux Klans, Incorporated, had gone out of existence.

Sources:

FIGHTING AMERICAN NATIONALISTS  
(FAN)

On February 23, 1961, George Lincoln Rockwell, leader of the American Nazi Party (ANP), advised Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that the Fighting American Nationalists (FAN) was organized as an anti-communist organization in September, 1960. Rockwell said it is a separate and distinct group from ANP, but members of FAN are "frustrated Nazis" who do not like to wear the swastika or be associated with the principles of Adolf Hitler.

Rockwell stated individuals have expressed an interest in the FAN and since FAN is in consort with and guided by the ANP, these individuals soon realize the use of the swastika is the best method of getting recognition in their fight against communism. Soon these individuals will join the ANP, Rockwell said.

A source advised on February 17, 1961, that in talking to J. V. Kenneth Morgan, Deputy Commander, ANP,

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Morgan stated there is no legal connection between FAN and ANP but FAN was organized under the guidance of Rockwell and it is used as a front group dominated by the principles and objectives of the ANP and looks to George Lincoln Rockwell as its leader.

Source:

**FIGHTING AMERICAN NATIONALISTS  
NEW YORK CITY**

On May 8, 1962, Detective Tony Ulasewicz, Bureau of Special Services, New York City Police Department (NYCPD), advised that the Fighting American Nationalists (FAN) first made an appearance in New York City in October, 1960, when a small group picketed against John F. Kennedy, then a presidential candidate.

On July 12, 1962, a source advised that FAN, a front group of the American Nazi Party (ANP), formerly utilized P. O. Box 220, Murray Hill Station, New York 16, New York, as a mailing address, but since the latter part of June, 1962, has used P. O. Box 130, Highbridge Station, New York 52, New York, as a mailing address. The source stated that FAN, NYC, has no actual headquarters.

According to this source, FAN, NYC, was formed under the direction of George Lincoln Rockwell, leader of the ANP, Arlington, Virginia, and is composed of individuals who are in sympathy with the purposes of the ANP but who are reluctant to expose themselves publicly as ANP sympathizers. Although FAN, NYC, has no formal membership list, individuals who participate in FAN activities consider themselves FAN members.

The source further advised that Anthony Wells, a member of the ANP, who had been specifically designated by George Lincoln Rockwell as organizer of FAN, NYC, had appointed George Lincke, in the latter part of June, 1962, to the position of provisional leader of FAN, NYC.

Source:

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KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN (K K K K),  
also known as Southern Knights  
of the Ku Klux Klan (S K K K K),  
Southern-Northern Knights of the  
Ku Klux Klan (S N K K K K),  
Knights of the White Camellia (K O T W C),  
Knights of the White Camellia of the  
National Christian Church (K O T W C of the N C C)  
National Christian Church (N C C),  
Order of the Rattlesnake (O T R),  
Konsolidated Ku Klux Klans of the  
Invisible Empire

The August 23, 1949, issue of the Tampa, Florida, "Morning Tribune" newspaper contained an article concerning an interview with Bill Hendrix, Imperial Emperor of the S K K K K, relative to the formation of this new Klan. According to the article, Hendrix said the organization was an out-growth of the Klan set up in 1915 by William Joseph Simmons. Hendrix stated S K K K K was started under the Original Southern Klans, Incorporated, in June, 1948, a branch of which was formed in Tallahassee, Florida, in January, 1949.

Original Southern Klans, Incorporated, has been designated by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

On December 26, 1956, "The Klansman," described by Hendrix as the official publication of K K K K, ordered the above-named group to again become active in the fight against integration by all lawful means and to destroy Communism, Fascism, and Nazism.

On September 8, 1960, a source reported that all organizations named, with exception of Konsolidated Ku Klux Klans of the Invisible Empire, are merely other names of the K K K K which was still active at that time.

On June 23, 1961, this source advised that in June, 1961, Bill Hendrix commenced using the name Konsolidated Ku Klux Klans of the Invisible Empire for his Klan and that this is just another name for the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.

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Applications to join the Konsolidated Ku Klux Klans of the Invisible Empire state that it is a voluntary organization fighting for the freedom and rights of white Americans.

On May 17, 1962, this source advised that Bill Hendrix is still using the name Knights of the Ku Klux Klan as the name of his klan organization and the other names listed above are used whenever it suits him to use them.

Source:

KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN, INCORPORATED  
(KKKK, INC.)

Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., (KKKK, Inc.), was incorporated on December 7, 1959, in the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, on a petition signed by H. J. Jones, R. L. Bing, Sr., W. B. Parr, and J. T. Campbell.

A source advised on November 25, 1959, that at that time Jones and Bing were officials of the Jonesboro, Georgia, Unit of the U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc.

A second source stated in January, 1960, that Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., used the same ritual as the klan chartered in 1915 by William Joseph Simmons. The same source advised in 1960 that Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., had as its objectives the maintenance of white supremacy and segregation of the races.

The first source reported in May, 1962, that the organization is no longer in existence, having merged into United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, in July, 1961.

Sources:

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**NACIREMA, INCORPORATED,  
ALSO KNOWN AS WHITE CITIZENS**

Records of the Superior Court of Cobb County, Georgia, show that Nacirema, Inc., was granted a charter on June 1, 1961, at Marietta, Georgia.

At a meeting of Nacirema, Inc., on December 5, 1961, William B. Crowe stated that Nacirema, Inc., is a secret organization for Americans who want to fight to uphold the principles of our Constitution. He said white Americans have only a little freedom remaining, and Nacirema, Inc., has been formed by men who have pledged themselves to "restore freedom to white Americans." Crowe did not openly state that Nacirema, Inc., had participated in acts of violence, but he gave the distinct impression that such had been the case.

A source advised on July 25, 1961, that the organization was composed almost entirely of present and former klansmen who joined Nacirema, Inc., to get "more action."

The same source advised in October, 1961, that two leaders of the organization conducted an explosives school at which instructions were given in the assembling and detonation of explosives and incendiary devices with the use of easy-to-obtain materials.

A second source advised in December, 1961, that leaders of Nacirema, Inc., frequently spoke of the necessity of violence to "restore freedom to white Americans." They never spoke of specific acts of violence but gave the definite impression that members of the organization had participated in acts of violence.

The same source advised in July, 1962, that the organization held its last meeting on May 30, 1962, and had gone out of existence due to surveillances and interviews by detectives of the Atlanta, Georgia, Police Department.

Sources:

**NATIONAL KU KLUX KLAN  
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN  
(NKKK)**

A source advised that on May 22, 1960, the National Grand Council of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan met at Atlanta, Georgia, to discuss consolidation of the klans

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unity of effort and activities, to establish a National Fund and a National Secretary and to design a new flag. The meeting was attended by representatives of the Federation of Ku Klux Klan, Alabama; Association of Arkansas Klans, Arkansas; Florida Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Florida; Southern Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Florida; Association of Georgia Klans, Georgia; Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, North Carolina; Association of South Carolina Klans, South Carolina; Dixie Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Tennessee; and Hyksos Klan, Texas.

This source advised that at a consolidation meeting at Atlanta, Georgia, September 2-5, 1960, at which the North Carolina and Texas Klans were not represented, it was resolved and passed that their name be changed to National Ku Klux Klan.

This source also advised that at a consolidation meeting at Savannah, Georgia, October 23, 1960, it was resolved and passed that in any future meetings of this group the name "~~Majority Citizens League~~" was to be used.

A second source advised that at a national klonklave meeting at Texarkana, Texas, on February 11-12, 1961, a motion was carried that there were to be at least six national meetings a year to be held any time from one week to twelve weeks after the last meeting. The time and meeting place were to be decided by the newly elected chairman. This second source also advised that at each meeting a new chairman and acting secretary were to be elected to serve at the next meeting. A national secretary had not been appointed.

A third source advised that at a national meeting on November 11-12, 1961, United Klans of America, Inc. (UK) was invited to meet with NKKK and it was agreed they would meet together, but there was no talk of consolidation.

This third source further advised that as of the national meeting on May 5-6, 1962, no national fund, headquarters or secretary had been established and no plans had apparently been made to do so. A temporary chairman and acting secretary were to be appointed for each meeting. The name "Majority Citizens League" was not being used in connection with meetings.

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Sources:

NATIONAL STATES RIGHTS PARTY  
(NSRP)

On November 26, 1957, a source advised that the United White Party (UWP) was organized at a convention held in Knoxville, Tennessee, on November 10, 1957. An article in the November 26, 1957, issue of the "Greenville Piedmont," a newspaper of Greenville, South Carolina, reported "the recent formation of a new political party to be known as the United White Party." According to the article, the party was formed at a recently held meeting in Knoxville, Tennessee, at which many klansmen were represented. The UWP was reported as being opposed to all "race-mixing organizations and individuals."

The July, 1958, issue of "The Thunderbolt," self-described as the "official Racial Nationalist Organ of the National States Rights Party" (NSRP) reported that rank and file "States Righters" had merged with the UWP under "the banner of the National States Rights Party," with national offices at Post Office Box 261, Jeffersonville, Indiana.

In November, 1958, a source advised that the NSRP is composed of past members of klan-type organizations and notorious anti-Semites.

Issue Number 19, dated June, 1960, "The Thunderbolt," announced the address of the headquarters of the NSRP had been changed from Jeffersonville, Indiana, to Post Office Box 783, Birmingham, Alabama.

On June 17, 1960, a source advised that Edward R. Fields, the Information Director of the NSRP, is the individual who "runs the NSRP."

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"The Thunderbolt" continues to publish articles attacking Negroes and persons of the Jewish faith.

Sources:

NATIONAL STATE RIGHTS PARTY  
GEORGIA  
(NSRP)

Issue Number 35 dated October, 1961, of "The Thunderbolt," official organ of the NSRP, identified Reverend Henry G. White as State Chairman for Georgia of the NSRP with address of Post Office Box 604, Dalton, Georgia.

A source advised on October 14, 1961, that the NSRP group headed by Henry G. White at Dalton, Georgia, is the Georgia organization of the NSRP, which has its headquarters at Post Office Box 783, Birmingham, Alabama.

Sources:

NATIONAL STATE RIGHTS PARTY  
(LOUISIANA - MISSISSIPPI)  
(NSRP)

"The Thunderbolt," self-described "official white racial organ" of the National States Rights Party (NSRP), in Issue Number 27 dated March, 1961, published the name of the NSRP representative of Louisiana as Ray Leahart, 623 Jefferson Avenue, New Orleans, Louisiana, and the NSRP representative of Mississippi as Elmer G. Mabry, Route 1, Box 311C, Ocean Springs, Mississippi.

One source advised on August 9, 1961, that the Thunderbolts are the uniformed guard of the NSRP in New Orleans, but because of unfavorable publicity had changed their name to the Americanos Dedicados Nacionales (ADN) (National Dedicated Americans).

A second source reported on August 16, 1961, that the twelve members of the ADN are all members of the NSRP.

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The first source said on August 31, 1961, that the name of the ADN had been changed to the Blue Shirts of Louisiana (BSL) the aims of which are: (1) national Americanism; (2) preservation of all ethnic-cultural groups within the United States; (3) establishment of Corporative Councils including all workers, professions and employers, to institute economic justice for all people; (4) removal from the Government of all Communists and Social-Revolutionists regardless of race, creed, color or national origin; (5) establishment of local Blue Shirt units to defend the republic from Communists and Social-Revolutionists.

The same source said that Dr. Edward R. Fields was to attend a meeting of the NSRP in New Orleans, Louisiana, on September 26, 1961, but could not because of illness, and Roy E. Frankhouser, Jr., a national organizer of the NSRP, came instead.

A third source on September 26, 1961, reported that Frankhouser was assisted by Leahart in arranging this meeting, and it appeared that the local NSRP group is affiliated with the national organization of the NSRP.

Sources:

**NATIONAL STATES RIGHTS PARTY  
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE  
(NSRP)**

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A source advised on August 14, 1962, that since early 1961, the National States Rights Party (NSRP), with National Headquarters in Birmingham, Alabama, has had a Memphis, Tennessee, representative. This representative has engaged in no organizational or recruiting activities on behalf of the NSRP.

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It is strictly a paper-type organization which has never had more than nine inactive members and as of August, 1962, was completely inactive. The Memphis Chapter has no officers, no bank account, no meeting place and conducts no meetings.

Source:

ORIGINAL KNIGHTS OF THE  
KU KLUX KLAN  
(OKKKK)

On December 12, 1957, a source advised that the U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, chartered its first klavern in Rylie, Texas, in November, 1957. Roy E. Davis, Sr., of Dallas, Texas, was the Grand Dragon for the State of Texas.

On October 5, 1958, a second source advised that in June of 1958, Roy E. Davis, Sr., Grand Dragon of the U. S. Klans for the State of Texas, broke away from that organization and formed the Original Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. However, on October 4, 1958, E. L. Edwards, Imperial Wizard, U. S. Klans, visited Dallas at which time most of the klansmen in the Dallas area rejoined the U. S. Klans, having become disgusted with Davis over his handling of klan funds. This source advised the Original Knights of the Ku Klux Klan was formed for the purpose of combating integration and preserving segregation, and that Davis had stated that this should be done through legal means only.

On August 15, 1960, the first source advised there is no known activity of the Original Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in the State of Texas. Roy E. Davis, Sr., however, does have a few scattered followers and spends most of his time mailing various proklan literature from his home, Davis being retired.

Sources:

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**ORIGINAL KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN  
(ARKANSAS - LOUISIANA)  
(OKKKK)**

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A source advised on November 7, 1960, that according to the Exalted Cyclops of the Texarkana, Arkansas, Klavern of the Original Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (OKKKK), a meeting was held in Texarkana, Arkansas, on November 5, 1960, and six men from Shreveport, Louisiana, joined the OKKKK and those six were to form a klavern in Shreveport.

The same source advised that on December 1, 1960, Dr. Jerry Bristol of Shreveport, Louisiana, was in Texarkana, Arkansas, and had a letter from the Imperial Grand Dragon of the OKKKK establishing Bristol as Grand Dragon in Texarkana and Shreveport, Louisiana.

On January 21, 1961, another source obtained from Bristol a current document bearing the seal which read: "Original Knights, Ku Klux Klan, USA, Imperial Seal, Gen. H. R. Forrest, 1866."

A third source advised on October 18, 1961, that the aims of the organization are the promotion of Americanism, white supremacy, and segregation.

**Sources:**

**PALMETTO KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN,  
ALSO KNOWN AS GREENVILLE, SOUTH CAROLINA, KLAVERN NUMBER 460**

On May 10, 1962, a source advised the Palmetto Knights of the Ku Klux Klan was first organized in 1956, at Greenville, South Carolina, as the Greenville, South Carolina, Klavern Number 460 of the Association of South Carolina Klans.

On July 21, 1957, a large group of the members of this Klavern were involved in the beating of a Negro male near Travelers Rest, South Carolina, for allegedly associating with a white woman, as a result of which eleven of its members were arrested and tried in State Court at Greenville, South Carolina, in January 1958. Four of its members were convicted and sentenced to terms on the local chain gang.

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Following the arrests in connection with the beating of the Negro, the Association of South Carolina Klans severed its association with this Klavern, and the Klavern, after unsuccessful efforts to affiliate with two other klan organizations, became independent, and at a public rally on April 19, 1959, adopted the name Palmetto Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.

This organization never established any written or clear-cut program or objective; however, the principal members have openly advocated during meetings their belief in white supremacy and segregation of the races, and have suggested use of violence in intimidating the Negro race to keep them from establishing any form of integration, including integration of the schools in the Greenville area, even to the extent of dynamiting schools which might possibly be considered for integration.

The organization has held no formal klavern meeting since the Spring of 1959, with the exception of the reorganizational meeting on April 19, 1959, and as of July, 1962, was inactive.

Source: . . . . .

UNITED FLORIDA KU KLUX KLAN  
JACKSONVILLE  
(UFKKK)

A source advised on August 20, 1955, that a new organization known as Florida Ku Klux Klan (FKKK) had been formed at Macclenny, Florida, on August 14, 1955, by former members of the Association of Florida Ku Klux Klan (AFKKK).

The objectives of this group, according to a second source, are to oppose integration in the schools and to fight communism.

Regarding AFKKK, a third source advised that a former official of the Association of Georgia Klans (AGK) formed an organization on July 7, 1953, known as AFKKK. The "Morning Tribune," Tampa, Florida, newspaper, in its August 11, 1955, issue revealed AFKKK disbanded on that date.

A fourth source advised on October 25, 1956, that AFKKK operated under the same principles and bylaws as the AGK. The AGK has been designated by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

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A fifth source advised on February 17, 1958, that the FKKK was operating and maintaining the same objectives as set forth above.

The sixth source advised on June 28, 1961, that at a meeting held in Orlando, Florida, on June 25, 1961, the FKKK and the United Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., in Florida, consolidated and the new organization is known as the UFKKK.

On May 17, 1962, the sixth source advised that the UFKKK is still in existence in Florida and maintains the same objectives set forth above.

Sources:

UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.,  
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN (UNITED KLANS)

Records of Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, show that this Klan organization was granted a corporate charter on February 21, 1961, at Atlanta, Georgia, under the name United Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of America, Inc.

A source advised on February 27, 1961, that United Klans was formed as a result of a split in U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc. According to the source, the split resulted from a leadership dispute and United Klans has the same aims and objectives as the parent group. These are the promotion of Americanism, white supremacy and segregation of the races.

The first source and a second source advised in July, 1961, that United Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of America, Inc., merged with Alabama Knights, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. The merged organization established headquarters in Suite 401, The Alston Building, Tuscaloosa, Alabama. The organization is directed by Robert Shelton, Imperial Wizard, and is the dominant Klan group in the South with units in several southern states.

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On August 14, 1961, the second source advised that the organization formerly known as United Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of America, Inc., would be known in the future as United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. The second source said the name was changed by a resolution adopted at the National Klonvocation held July 8, 1961, at Indian Springs, Georgia.

Second source advised that at a meeting at Prattville, Alabama, on October 22, 1961, a majority of the Klaverns of the U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan merged with the United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.

Sources:

UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC., KNIGHTS  
OF THE KU KLUX KLAN, REALM OF GEORGIA  
(UNITED KLANS)

A source advised on May 16, 1962, that the State of Georgia organization of United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (United Klans) is called the Realm of Georgia. The Realm of Georgia has headquarters at 629 Peoples Street, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia.

The first source and a second source advised on May 16, 1962, that the Realm of Georgia is subordinate to the National Headquarters of United Klans in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, and receives its instructions and guidance from the National Headquarters which is headed by Imperial Wizard Robert Shelton.

Sources:

UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.,  
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN, LOUISIANA  
(UNITED KLANS)

In September, 1960, a source advised that Edgar Taylor of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, had communicated with an official of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in Georgia indicating he might be able to organize that group in Louisiana.

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A second source said that five individuals from the Baton Rouge-Denham Springs, Louisiana, area attended a Klan meeting in Demopolis, Alabama, on December 3, 1960, and a third source stated that after their return from Demopolis organizing of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan began in the Baton Rouge-Denham Springs area.

This source advised on February 20, 1961, that on December 5, 1960, he received a membership card in the organization in the Baton Rouge-Denham Springs area which states that the organization there is referred to as Klan 1, Realm of 1.

The first source advised on July 17, 1961, that in response to an application for charters to the United Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of America, Inc., Atlanta, Georgia, charters were issued for the Sidney L. Ballard Klavern (Klavern Number 1), Denham Springs, Louisiana, and for the Eldon L. Edwards Klavern (Klavern Number 1), Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

Sources:

**UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.,  
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN (N. C.)  
(UNITED KLANS)**

On May 16, 1962, a source advised that the United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in North Carolina, have two klaverns, one at Salisbury, North Carolina, and one at Monroe, North Carolina, which became affiliated with the national organization of the United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, in the Spring of 1961. The organization in North Carolina has the same aims and objectives as the parent group; that is, advocacy of segregation of the races and white supremacy.

Source:

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UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.,  
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN (S. C.)  
(UNITED KLANS)

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On May 14, 1962, a source advised that the United Klans of America, Inc., has a klavern at Spartanburg, South Carolina, which became affiliated with the national organization of the United Klans of America, Inc., headquarters in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, in the Spring of 1961. Bob Scoggins is the Grand Dragon of the United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in South Carolina, and the group in South Carolina has the same aims and objectives as the national group; that is, advocacy of segregation of the races and white supremacy.

Source:

UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.,  
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN, TENNESSEE  
(UNITED KLANS)

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On March 20, 1961, a source advised that a state meeting of the U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., was held at Harriman, Tennessee, on Sunday afternoon, March 19, 1961. George Compton, Grand Dragon, State of Tennessee, announced that the U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., was no longer in existence and Imperial Officer Wesley Morgan of Atlanta was present and announced the formation of a new organization, United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. The source stated that members present from the Maryville, Harriman, and Dayton, Tennessee, chapters of the U. S. Klans, KKKK, Inc., voted unanimously to affiliate with the United Klans of America, Inc., KKKK. The source advised that the Dayton, Tennessee, Klavern was not holding regular meetings and that only the Maryville and Harriman Klaverns were holding regular meetings.

On May 7, 1962, source stated that the Maryville and Harriman Klaverns continue to be the only chapters actively meeting.

Source:

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U. S. KLANS, KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN, INC.,  
ALSO KNOWN AS U. S. KLANS (USK)

A source advised on October 12, 1956, that Eldon Lee Edwards organized a new klan group in Atlanta, Georgia, in 1953. This organization received a corporate charter in Georgia in October, 1955, under the name U. S. Klans. The same source, and a second source, advised in May, 1960, that U. S. Klans has no direct affiliation with any previous klan group, but utilizes, with only minor changes, the klan Kloran or ritual written in about 1915 by William Joseph Simmons for use by the old Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (1915-1944).

These sources advised that the U. S. Klans has as its principal aims and objectives the promotion of Americanism, white supremacy and segregation of the races. On numerous occasions Edwards announced that these objectives would be attained by legal means and without violence.

The first source and a third source advised in February, 1961, that at that time a split occurred in U. S. Klans, which resulted in a great majority of the officers and members pulling out and forming a new klan group known as United Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of America, Inc.

These sources advised in May, 1962, that U. S. Klans is almost out of existence and only a few units remain.

Sources:

U. S. KLANS, KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN, INC.,  
ALSO KNOWN AS U. S. KLANS, REALM OF ALABAMA (USK)

A source advised that at a meeting in Prattville, Alabama, on October 22, 1961, the U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Realm of Alabama, affiliated with the parent group organized in Atlanta, Georgia, in 1953, and chartered in 1955, merged with the United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, with the exception of two or three Alabama klaverns.

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Source:

U. S. KLANS, KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN, INC.,  
ALSO KNOWN AS U. S. KLANS, REALM OF ARKANSAS (USK)

The "Arkansas Gazette," a Little Rock, Arkansas, daily newspaper, on June 5, 1959, reports that a charter and articles of incorporation for the U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., (USK), were filed with the Secretary of State, State of Arkansas, on June 4, 1959. The charter showed affiliation with the parent group, U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., which was incorporated October 24, 1955, at Atlanta, Georgia, with E. L. Edwards of Atlanta, Georgia, as president.

A source advised five members of the Little Rock, Arkansas, Klavern of USK, operating independently of the Klavern, were convicted for their participation in the 1959 Labor Day bombings at Little Rock, the Little Rock Klavern being the only one operating in the State of Arkansas. The same source advised in May, 1962, the Little Rock Klavern of USK had been relatively inactive during the last few years.

Source:

U. S. KLANS, KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN, INC.,  
ALSO KNOWN AS U. S. KLANS, FLORIDA (USK)

A source advised on November 7, 1956, that a number of members of the Florida Ku Klux Klan in Jacksonville, Florida, split away from that organization on November 6, 1956, and affiliated with the U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., which was headed by Eldon Lee Edwards of Atlanta, Georgia. The records of the office of the Secretary of State, Tallahassee, Florida, were reviewed on June 5, 1957, and revealed that the U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., was a Georgia nonprofit corporation and as such could not be chartered by the State of Florida. Under existing Florida laws, however, a permit to operate in Florida was issued this organization by the Secretary of State, Tallahassee, on October 29, 1956.

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A second source advised in May, 1962, that the U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., (Florida) has as its principal aims and objectives the promotion of white supremacy, segregation of the races and opposition to communism. According to the source, the organization advocates the attaining of these objectives without violence.

The second source and a third source advised in February, 1961, that at that time a split occurred in the U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., which resulted in the majority of the officers and members in Florida leaving the organization and affiliating with a new klan group.

The second source advised in May, 1962, that several units of the U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., (Florida) continue to operate in Florida and that these units closely follow the leadership of the Imperial Wizard and the parent or national organization in Georgia.

Sources:

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

1/23/63

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PERSONAL

No Number SAC Letter 63-A

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

January 30, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File #

RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7

One set of AFSAM 7 key lists for months of March, April, and May, 1963, being forwarded separately to all divisions except Washington Field which will receive none; three copies being furnished Bureau's Emergency Relocation Site; and three copies Seat of Government Code Room.


Acknowledge receipt of key lists promptly by routing slip, indicating serial numbers which appear thereon; return in a sealed envelope to the Bureau, attention FBI Annex, the address label on individual tamperproofed envelope containing keys even though torn while opening package; and destroy, by burning, each monthly sheet thirty days after last effective date thereof, advising Bureau promptly by routing slip, attention FBI Annex, this has been done.

It is essential address label mentioned above be returned in order to control security of shipment.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-6  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

January 29, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) TRAINING - FIREARMS - SAFETY -- In a recent firearms school being conducted by an FBI Field Office, an accident occurred which was caused by a participant's holstering a loaded weapon using one hand to hold the holster while forcing the revolver into the holster with the other hand. The safety strap caught in the trigger and caused the weapon to fire.

You will call this to the attention of all firearms experts in your office in order that additional emphasis can be placed on the safety rule prohibiting holstering a weapon using both hands. Where trainees are using holsters with safety straps, they should be cautioned to place the strap underneath the belt while engaging in quick-draw practice in order that it will not catch on the trigger while the revolver is being holstered.

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-6

(B) FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM - "TELEPHONE USERS GUIDE" - TELEPHONES AND TELETYPES -- As you have been previously advised, the Bureau does not intend to participate at this time in the Federal Telecommunications System, a nationwide, Government-wide communications network being set up by the General Services Administration. The Bureau has recently learned that the General Services Administration is distributing copies of a "Telephone Users Guide" for the Federal Telecommunications System which will go into effect February 15, 1963, in a number of cities where the Bureau has field offices. If copies of this guide are received by any field office they should be disregarded. Under no circumstances should Bureau personnel make any calls over the Federal Telecommunications System.

(C) CONTACTS WITH NEWS MEDIA - RE: BANK ROBBERY MATTERS -- In an all-out effort to combat the alarming increase in bank robberies, burglaries and larcenies, I desire immediate steps be taken to focus the full glare of publicity on this problem. Particular attention should be directed to tactfully obtaining full cooperation of all news outlets in your area not only in publicizing the crimes themselves, but also in affording equal coverage to the subsequent arrest and sentencing of guilty parties. All personnel should be instructed to stress the importance of such publicity in their normal contacts with representatives of mass communications media. Small town weekly and/or daily newspapers can be particularly helpful in this regard, since such crimes are usually of great news interest in rural areas. I feel that such publicity, especially that pertaining to the arrest and incarceration of the culprits, will serve as a definite deterrent to "amateurs" considering such crimes and convince them that the possibility of profit does not warrant the risk involved. One method to acquaint the public with this problem is through feature articles regarding successful investigations conducted by your respective offices in this field. Inquiries concerning guidance and assistance in obtaining material not in your possession should be submitted to the attention of the Crime Research Section.

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-6

(D) CRIMINAL INFORMANTS -- While generally good, there are indications that criminal informant coverage can and should be improved. Reports show that in some areas within field office territory no new informants were developed during the 1962 calendar year. While in some instances coverage afforded by informants previously developed may provide the effective type of coverage needed, continuing increased responsibilities being borne by the Bureau require constant revitalization of criminal informant coverage.

Each Special Agent in Charge should immediately make a critical analysis of the criminal informant coverage and furnish the Bureau within fifteen days after receipt of this letter answers to the following: Does informant program provide coverage of all prevalent criminal activity throughout territory? Is sufficient attention being devoted to developing productive informant coverage in Resident Agency territories? Is coverage

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current and developing or is it becoming stagnant and nonproductive? Is sufficient effort being devoted to developing new informants and in further cultivating existing informants? Has proper consideration been given to the potential of monetary reward, where such may be necessary? Is full value being received for funds currently being expended? Where shortcomings are indicated, advise what steps are being taken to increase the effectiveness of your program.

In connection with the criminal informant program, you are also reminded that all informant accomplishments should be set out each month in a letter to the Bureau captioned "Monthly Progress Letter - Criminal Informant Matters," as set forth in Section 108-H1b, Manual of Instructions. All arrests and dollar value of merchandise recovered in Bureau, other Federal and local cases attributed to your informants should be reported each month.

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-6

(E) -- LAW ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCES - 1963 -- BANK ROBBERY AND INCIDENTAL CRIMES -- You were informed in SAC Letter 63-3 (G) that the topic "Bank Robbery and Incidental Crimes" would be featured in the 1963 Law Enforcement Conferences. You should hold sufficient conferences to cover your territory adequately and should choose sites readily accessible to all law enforcement agencies and banking-type institutions in your area. You are authorized to prepare friendly but businesslike circular letters of invitation to be forwarded to law enforcement and representatives of all types of financial institutions and companies coming within the purview of the Bank Robbery and related Statutes. Conferences should be limited to four-to-six hours, of the open forum type, and necessary speeches restricted to not over fifteen minutes. Qualified speakers from local law enforcement, the banking profession, and the United States Attorney's office may be scheduled as panelists and a free exchange of ideas and discussions of mutual problems should be encouraged. The names of panelists must be searched through your office indices and the Bureau advised of the results. Attendance of undesirables should be avoided and commercial product representatives should not be invited. Nothing should be done at these conferences which could be construed as an attempt by the Bureau to instigate legislation or endorse commercial protective devices. Adjacent offices should be kept informed of your conference plans. Border offices may invite nearby Canadian and Mexican police officials. Resident Agents may attend conferences held in their territories.

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-6



Your conferences should be held between April 1 and June 1. The agenda of your proposed conferences, listing all speakers to be invited, as well as dates and sites, should be submitted to the Bureau UACB at least thirty days prior to the holding of your first conference. A national press release concerning these conferences will be made by the Bureau and the Attorney General shortly before April 1 and suggested press releases for local use will be provided in the near future. The Introduction in the April, 1963, Law Enforcement Bulletin will concern the bank robbery problem. The booklet "How Banks Can Help the FBI" and the decal for display in banking institutions showing that the FBI investigates bank robbery, burglary and larceny should be stressed during the conferences and their use encouraged. Advise Bureau by routing slip, Attention: Crime Records Division, by March 1 the number of copies of this booklet, the decal, Introductions to April, 1963, Law Enforcement Bulletin, and other materials you will require for your conferences. Bureau will not be able to prepare special exhibits or posters.

Refer to SAC Letter 61-16 (C) for proposed agenda; however, implementation and substitution of topics may be made in accordance with needs and interests in local territories.

Although your conferences should be closed to all but duly constituted law enforcement officers and those specifically invited to attend from the banking and related professions, you should plan each so that the last hour will be open to news media representatives and their attendance should be encouraged. A basic need in the drive to reduce crimes against banking institutions is the cooperation of various news media, especially with respect to their handling of news regarding such violations. Your conferences should be used to inform news media representatives, both executives and the reporters who gather and write crime and court news, of the problem and how they can help. This time should be arranged, if possible, so it will not conflict with news deadlines. It is suggested that you, a representative of the banking industry, and a spokesman for local law enforcement present a short summary of the various aspects of the conference during this last hour. All statements should, of course, present a united viewpoint and following the statements, the three representatives should make themselves available for questions by the news media. Where possible, it should be stressed to the news media that law enforcement and the banking industry seek the cooperation of the news media in stressing the importance of prominent presentation of news relating to the arrest and sentencing of bank robbers. Often the

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arrest and sentencing of a bank robber are not as interesting or newsworthy as the account of the crime itself. However, the prominent display of bank robbery stories without similar display of the accounts of arrest and sentencing of a robber might well lead others to attempt the crime with the mistaken feeling that it is a good way to get rich quickly. The recent general increase in crimes of this nature certainly demands the best efforts of all interested citizens to reduce these serious offenses.

Within a week after your last conference, advise Bureau of results of your conferences, giving the number of people in attendance, the number of different agencies represented (broken down according to law enforcement, banks, banking associations, Federal credit unions, insurance companies, surety companies, etc.), as well as dates and number of conferences completed. Provide specific statements of interest made by those in attendance, sampling of newspaper publicity received, and any suggestions heard for improvement of law enforcement conferences. Forward all correspondence, Attention: Training Division, Bufile 91-7953.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

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PERSONAL

NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 63-B  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

February 27, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7

Four sets of KAR-402/TSEC rotors for use with Bureau's coding equipment are being furnished each office with the exception of Chicago and San Francisco which will receive six sets and Washington Field which will receive none; twelve sets being furnished Seat of Government Code Room; and fourteen sets Bureau's Emergency Relocation Site. These will become effective April 1, 1963, replacing the AFSAR-4545-2/TSEC rotors presently in use. You will note that new rotors consist of twelve rotors per set; however, only eight of these will be used for any one daily arrangement.

Upon receipt of rotors carefully inspect package for evidence of tampering. Notify Bureau immediately of any irregularity. Acknowledge receipt by routing slip, listing serial numbers of each set; return in a sealed envelope to the Bureau, attention FBI Annex, the address label on inner wrapping, even though torn in opening package; and make appropriate inventory adjustments by FD-222. Promptly check rotors by actual use in AFSAM 7 pursuant to AFSAM 7 Manual of Operation and Routine Maintenance, Section IV, A, and afford rotors secure storage with other AFSAM 7 material.


Rotors being furnished you are Type B as described in Section II, A, Manual of Operation and Routine Maintenance, and should be assembled as explained therein. Do not attempt to remove alphabet ring. Proper depression of notch ring and wide ring will disassemble rotor.

Retain AFSAR-4545-2/TSEC rotors presently in use until May 1, 1963, on which date they must be packaged securely and forwarded to Bureau, attention FBI Annex, by Railway Express, Protective Signature Service. Anchorage, Honolulu and San Juan should use Registered Mail, Return Receipt Requested.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 63-C  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

March 6, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7

One set of AFSAM 7 key lists for months of April and May, 1963, being forwarded separately to all divisions except Washington Field which will receive none; three copies being furnished Bureau's Emergency Relocation Site; and three copies Seat of Government Code Room. Key lists being distributed at this time are for use with KAR-402/TSEC rotors.

Acknowledge receipt of key lists promptly by routing slip, indicating serial numbers which appear thereon; return in a sealed envelope to the Bureau, attention FBI Annex, the address label on individual tamperproofed envelope containing keys even though torn while opening package; and destroy, by burning, each monthly sheet thirty days after last effective date thereof, advising Bureau promptly by routing slip, attention FBI Annex, this has been done. Previously issued AFSAR-4545-2/TSEC key lists for April and May, 1963, should be destroyed by burning, advising Bureau promptly by routing slip, attention FBI Annex, this has been done.

It is essential the address label mentioned above be returned in order to control security of shipment.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



March 25, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

RE: TELEPHONES -  
SECURITY OF BUREAU TELEPHONE SERVICE

Telephone companies are rapidly extending the automation of telephone services. With this automation program they are increasing the number of unattended telephone exchanges. Some operating companies have found it economically necessary to incorporate facilities to permit operators to use a device, known as a "no test number" or a "busy verification test," to dial in and listen to the conversation on a busy telephone line. The number the operator must dial to override the busy signal is classified "SECRET" by the companies and is disseminated only on a "need-to-know" basis. This number, while classified "SECRET," may be inadvertently disclosed to an unauthorized person who may use it to monitor telephone conversations.

This "busy verification test" number, while limited to a relatively few isolated areas, is not restricted to local calls but can be extended to dialed long-distance calls. It is possible for a person, knowledgeable of the busy verification code number, to dial in on a busy telephone line in these isolated areas from any part of the United States and Canada, where direct distance dialing facilities are present, and to listen to the conversation on the busy line. The automatic accounting machines in the exchange will identify the telephone subscriber using the "secret number" in making the call as well as the number dialed but will report the call as being "non-billable."

The Bureau recognizes that the busy override feature is available in only a limited number of isolated areas; however, it is felt that, because of the potential security problem involved in any dial system, you should conduct a survey and advise Bureau of the number of exchanges which have the busy override feature. Your survey should be restricted to lines serving your office, resident agencies, any other official telephone lines and the home telephones of your supervisory and resident agent personnel who may handle official calls at their residences. In addition, you should indicate what steps you are taking to have those lines, which your survey indicates are available to the override feature, isolated from the override equipment. Further, you should outline what preventive measures you have effected to insure against the Bureau lines being subjected to this undesirable condition in the future.

All security checks of official lines shall, in the future, include inquiry concerning the busy override feature and, when applicable, verification that this feature no longer provides override onto Bureau lines.

Use of this technique constitutes a wire tap and thereby comes under all the legislative and administrative restrictions governing such matters.

There is attached, for the assistance of the Sound-trained personnel of your office, a technical discussion of the above-mentioned override device.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosure

3/25/63

NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 63-D

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March 19, 1963

**SECURITY OF TELEPHONE SYSTEMS-  
BUSY LINE VERIFICATION**

Concurrent with the inauguration of dial telephone systems the telephone operating companies provided a means for an operator and/or test deskman to verify a busy line condition. Most of the operating companies follow the practice of having only one special trunk line per 10,000 subscribers for use in making busy line verification tests and they restrict the use of this line to supervisory personnel. It is not possible, with this special trunk feature, for unauthorized individuals to seize or override a busy telephone line as the special trunk line is restricted to the perimeter of a single central office or exchange building where it is accessible to only a limited number of employees. It is not, therefore, available to persons dialing from subscriber and/or unauthorized stations.

The rapid extension of automated telephone services and the increased reliability of dial switching equipment have encouraged the operating telephone companies to increase the number of unattended dial exchanges. These unattended exchanges seldom require attention and therefore are, for the most part, visited by authorized personnel only when there is a need to repair a reported trouble. Testing of switching equipment and verification of busy line conditions are performed from a centrally located test center and/or operator-attended exchange building. All equipment testing between the test center and the unattended exchange and the busy line verification at the unattended exchange is done over high-quality, revenue-producing trunk circuits that must be taken out of service for these purposes.

In order to produce maximum revenue with existing facilities some operating companies have devised a secret number system whereby operators and/or test deskmen may call an unattended exchange over regular subscriber trunking paths to make busy line verification tests. This procedure releases revenue-producing telephone lines that would otherwise be tied up for test purposes. The number used for this busy line verification is classified "SECRET" by the operating companies and is disseminated to employees only on a "need-to-know" basis.

An operator or test deskman making a busy verification test will first dial the exchange, then the secret number or numbers, followed by the station code (last four digits). If the line is busy the employee making the call will first get a busy signal then

the connector will "override the busy line" and connect the caller to the conversation in progress. The connection will be made to the called subscriber's line without alerting the subscriber. If there is a conversation in progress the operator can report a "busy line" condition; however, if there is no conversation on the line the operator will usually report that the "line is out of order" and so advise the trouble desk. The attendant at the trouble desk will then dispatch craftsmen to repair the trouble.

The busy verification number, while classified "SECRET," may inadvertently be disclosed to an unauthorized person who may use it to monitor telephone conversations. The use of the busy verification, although limited to a relatively few isolated areas, is not restricted to local calls. It is possible for a person, knowledgeable of the busy verification code number, to dial in on a busy telephone line from any part of the United States and Canada where direct distance dialing facilities are available without being charged for the call. The automatic accounting equipment assigned to the calling telephone will record the called number, calling number, date and time of the call and because of the initial busy-back signal from the called number will record the call as "non-billable."

Persons knowledgeable of the busy verification code number can, by dialing the exchange code, then the busy verification code followed by the station code, cut in on conversations without alerting the called subscriber. Persons using this technique from a distant point will first dial the area code followed by the same number sequence mentioned above. If the called telephone line is not busy at the time a dialed long-distance call is connected to the called number, the automatic machine accounting equipment will treat the call as a regularly dialed long-distance call. On the other hand, if the called line is busy a short busy signal will be sent back to the calling station and then the connector will override the busy condition without alerting the called subscriber.

In making checks of telephone lines in areas with this feature you should verify, by dialing in on the busy line from another station, that the Bureau line cannot be subjected to this undesirable override device.

Any technical questions which arise from the survey or unusual technical data developed as a result of the survey should be brought to the attention of the Electronics Section, FBI Laboratory.





SAC LETTER NO. 03-13  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

March 12, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

(A) FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY - SEVENTY-SECOND SESSION -- The Seventy-second Session of the FBI National Academy will begin on Monday, August 19, 1963, and will graduate on Wednesday, November 6, 1963. It is desired that you submit to the Bureau by April 1, 1963, the names of the candidates from your territory whom you desire to recommend to attend that Session. You should strictly comply with existing instructions previously given as to the procedures to be followed in nominating candidates to attend the Academy.

All candidates recommended for attendance at the Academy must be personally known to the Special Agent in Charge. The Special Agent in Charge must have conducted a formal interview with each candidate being recommended unless such candidate has been previously interviewed and favorably recommended by the former Special Agent in Charge within the preceding six months. It will not be necessary, however, for the present Special Agent in Charge to reinterview any candidates he, himself, interviewed even though more than six months have elapsed since the time of the first interview.

You may designate more than one candidate for the Seventy-second Session since there is a possibility that your first candidate may not be accepted or that two or more representatives will be accepted from your office. Unless you advise to the contrary, any candidate investigated as an alternate to the Seventy-first Session who is not invited to attend that Session, will be considered as the first choice of your office for the Seventy-second Session, provided of course his investigation was completely favorable. In your letter listing your candidates, you must specifically set forth the results of the reviews of your field office indices concerning the applicants and their law enforcement agencies.

The Bureau is desirous of accepting at the National Academy only those candidates who are outstanding both as to personal appearance and ability. The weight standards for National Academy applicants are the same as for our own personnel. Applicants must be within the desirable weight limits as set forth on form FD-300. If you have previously submitted a physical examination on any candidate which will be more than six months old as of April 1, 1963, a current physical examination form must be executed with the accompanying FD-300.

The fingerprints of National Academy applicants are to be submitted at the time the results of the formal interview are forwarded to the Bureau. You should make a notation on the fingerprint

card that the fingerprints are those of a National Academy applicant. The card should be forwarded to the Bureau, attention: Training Division.

I shall expect each Special Agent in Charge to give very close personal attention to the selection and recommendation of candidates for attendance at the National Academy.

3/12/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-13

(B) *NAME AND TOWN OF RESIDENCE DELETED*  
VIRGINIA -- The captioned individual is a prolific letter writer who has written to numerous prominent persons in various parts of the United States concerning her alleged fear that the present administration is conspiring to permit communist domination of the United States. She has indicated that some FBI Officials have participated in the conspiracy.

Efforts to locate *NAME AND TOWN OF RESIDENCE DELETED* Virginia, to admonish her regarding these allegations have been unsuccessful to date and she is apparently constantly traveling because of her fear that her life is in danger due to her opposition to communism. One individual interviewed concerning her stated it is his impression she needs treatment for a mental disturbance. The Chief of Police in her area said she is considered to be a local "character" and mentally unstable, although to his knowledge she has never been in an institution.

In the event this person contacts your office, she should be admonished concerning her allegations regarding FBI personnel and, in the event her correspondence is referred to you by private individuals, you should furnish the Bureau and Richmond with copies of this material.

3/12/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-13

(C) DAILY REPORTS - NUMBER THREE REGISTERS - ADMINISTRATIVE - GENERAL -- SAC Letter Number 62-19 dated March 27, 1962, instructed all investigative personnel, with certain exceptions, to submit Daily Reports on FD-28. The Special Agent in Charge, the Assistant Special Agent in Charge, and appropriate field supervisors were instructed to make adequate spot checks to insure against irregularities, improper entries, alterations, and any apparent inequitable overtime. It has come to the Bureau's attention these checks are not including comparisons with the Auto Record (FD-73) and the FM Radio Station Log (FD-283).

3/12/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-13

Effective immediately, the Special Agent in Charge, the Assistant Special Agent in Charge, and appropriate field supervisors are instructed to insure these spot checks include comparisons of Daily Reports and Number 3 (Locator) Cards with the Auto Record and the Radio Log together with sufficient checks against investigative reports.

Previous Bureau instructions to destroy FM Radio Station Logs at the end of each month are hereby canceled. These Logs are to be retained by each field office from inspection to inspection and are to be destroyed only on instructions of the Inspector of each regularly scheduled inspection. Manual changes are forthcoming.

Furthermore, you are reminded that Daily Reports must be executed with meticulous accuracy insofar as concerns the Agent's accounting for his time. As a general rule, it should be possible for these to be executed currently as the Agent pursues his daily work. Exceptions to this might be warranted where the Agent must give precedence to a fast-moving case. In any event, however, the Bureau insists that whenever these reports are executed they must be completely reconcilable and consistent with all other records against which they might be checked. The Agent, as well as appropriate supervisory personnel, will be held accountable for any inaccuracies or irregularities.

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-13.

(D) PHOTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT - SUPPLIES -- Photographic paper known as Kodak Polycontrast type "F" will be made available on a limited basis for photographic enlargement work in the field. If you feel this paper could be used to the Bureau's advantage in your division, submit a specific request for the attention of the Administrative Division setting forth justification for its use and include information as to the technical knowledge of the employee or employees who will perform the work.

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(E) SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT - 1948 - DELINQUENT CITIZENS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES -- On February 18, 1963, the United States Supreme Court considered jointly Kennedy vs. Mendoza-Martinez and Rusk vs. Cort and handed down a written decision (5-4) declaring as unconstitutional those sections of the Nationality Act of 1940 and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 providing for the expatriation of citizens who leave or remain outside the United States to avoid military service in time of war or national emergency.

Francisco Mendoza-Martinez was born in California of Mexican extraction. In 1942 he fled to Mexico, a country that also considered him a national. He returned in 1946 and in 1947 he was convicted, sentenced and served one year and one day for violation of the Selective Service Act of 1940. Subsequently the U. S. Government determined his flight to Mexico to avoid military service in time of war effected his expatriation as of the date in 1944 that Section 401 (j) was added to the Nationality Act of 1940 (Public Law 431, 78th Congress) enacted as Section 801 (j), Title 8, U. S. Code. As a result of a deportation hearing he was ordered deported on September 11, 1953. A series of appeals culminated in the Supreme Court decision of February 18, 1963, which affirmed the ruling of U. S. District Court, Southern District of California, Northern Division, that Section 401 (j) was unconstitutional.

Joseph Henry Cort, a medical doctor, born December 27, 1927, at Boston, Massachusetts, registered for Selective Service May 25, 1951, and departed for England in June, 1951. He applied for political asylum in England claiming he faced loss of citizenship and prison if he returned to the United States. Political asylum in England denied, he then accepted asylum from Czechoslovakia where he continues to reside. Cort was indicted by Federal Grand Jury on December 17, 1954, for failure to report for induction in violation of Title 50 (App), 462 and 12 (a). Warrant issued December 18, 1954, is still outstanding. In February, 1960, State Department affirmed a previous administrative decision that Cort expatriated himself under provisions of Section 349 (a) (10), Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (Public Law 414, 82nd Congress), enacted as Section 1481 (a) (10), Title 8, U. S. Code. A series of appeals made by Cort culminated in the Supreme Court decision February 18, 1963, which affirmed the ruling of the U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia that this section is unconstitutional.

The Department is being requested to advise what effect the Supreme Court decision will have on the investigation and prosecution of Selective Service violations. Pending receipt of

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-13

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this advice, in future cases, where it is determined that a citizen has left the United States to avoid compliance with the Selective Service Act of 1948, the above rulings should be brought to the attention of the appropriate United States Attorney for his consideration in rendering a prosecutive opinion. Any problems that may arise should be brought to the attention of the Bureau.

(Security Letters on attached pages)

3/12/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-13

- 5 -

(F) SECURITY INFORMANTS - DESTRUCTION OF CHANNELIZING MEMORANDA --  
If applicable in your office, henceforth copies of informant's reports designated for the 100 classification case files of informants may be purged therefrom under the following conditions: on a yearly basis after the reports are a year old; thus, reports in file for 1961 or prior thereto are eligible for destruction as of January 1, 1962, those of 1962 will be eligible for destruction as of January 1, 1963; and, a memorandum must be prepared and placed in the file listing each item destroyed and the location of the original information.

3/12/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-13.

(G) SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION CHARACTERIZATION - "LABOR TODAY" --  
Set forth below is a thumbnail sketch on "Labor Today" which can be used by the various field offices.

In January, 1962, a source advised that on January 13, 1962, ~~NAME DELETED~~ whom the source described as ~~POSITION IN CPUSA DELETED~~ Communist Party, USA, remarked that the Party-supported trade-union publication would be issued in the near future and would appear under the name "Labor Today."

On January 5, 1962, records in the Assumed Name Section of the County Clerk's Office, Wayne County, Detroit, Michigan, indicated that Certificate Number 145344, issued for conducting business under an assumed name, was issued to "Labor Today" (a bi-monthly publication) having a business address at 12065 Wyoming, Detroit 4, Michigan. A certificate was filed January 2, 1962, and the names of the persons listed as owning, conducting and transacting the business were:

~~NAME DELETED~~  
~~ADDRESS~~ "  
Detroit, Michigan

~~NAME DELETED~~  
~~ADDRESS~~ "  
Detroit, Michigan

A second source advised on December 15, 1961, that Charles Walters was then a member of the Michigan District Communist Party (MDCP) State Committee; this source advised on September 18, 1959, that ~~NAME DELETED~~ was then a member of the MDCP State Committee.

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-13

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A third source advised on September 21, 1961, that as of September 17, 1961, ~~NAME DELETED~~ was a member of the North-West Section Club of the MDCP.

The Founding Statement contained in the first issue of "Labor Today" (Spring, 1962) indicated that two additional issues would be forthcoming in 1962 and beginning in 1963 "Labor Today" would appear regularly as a "bi-monthly journal."

The masthead of "Labor Today" describes the publication as "An Independent Journal of Discussion." Its managing editor is ~~NAME DELETED~~ and business and editorial offices are located at 12065 Wyoming, Suite 5, Detroit 4, Michigan.

First Source ~~SOURCE'S IDENTITY DELETED~~

Second Source is " "

Third Source " "

All sources utilized in the preparation of the characterization given above should be described as having furnished reliable information in the past. Careful consideration has been given to each source concealed and the source has been concealed only where necessary.

3/12/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-13

(H) SABOTAGE MATTERS - REQUESTS FOR PROSECUTIVE OPINIONS -- The Internal Security Division of the Department advised by letter dated March 4, 1963, "We believe that in the future it would be desirable to have sabotage matters handled in conformity with related internal security matters and, accordingly, we would appreciate your referring to this Division all future requests for opinions in sabotage cases as to whether the facts reflect a violation of the law or for a determination as to whether additional investigation is warranted."

In the future, sabotage cases are not to be discussed with or presented to United States Attorneys. All questions of law and jurisdiction and requests for prosecutive opinions are to be submitted to the Bureau for presentation to the Department. Appropriate Manual changes are being issued.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

3/12/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-13

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

March 19, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

(A) FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY - 1964 SESSIONS -- The Seventy-third Session of the FBI National Academy will be held March 16 to June 3, 1964. The Seventy-fourth Session will be held August 10 to October 28, 1964. You will be advised at a later date when nominations for these Sessions should be submitted.



(B) APPLICATION FOR PARDON AFTER COMPLETION OF SENTENCE INVESTIGATIONS (APACS) - IDENTIFICATION RECORDS - REPORT WRITING -- Effective immediately, it will no longer be necessary in APACS cases for the field office receiving a copy of the applicant's Identification Record to copy same into an investigative report. The Bureau will furnish two copies of the applicant's Identification Record with the investigative reports to the Pardon Attorney's Office when the investigation has been completed. One copy of the Identification Record will continue to be furnished to the field office conducting the initial interview with the applicant upon receipt of the flash notice at the Bureau. The Identification Record should be used for lead purposes.

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-14

(C) BUREAU APPLICANTS - MILITARY SERVICE RECORD CHECKS - REPORT WRITING -- For Veterans Preference Act purposes a veteran is an individual with active military duty between December 7, 1941, and July 1, 1955, inclusive; or one with service after the latter date who incurred a service-connected disability; or one who served in a campaign or expedition for which a service medal was authorized.

Some months ago a new medal was created, the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal, covering service in Lebanon (July 1 to November 1, 1958); Vietnam (July 1, 1958, to date to be announced); Quemoy and Matsu Islands (August 23, 1958, to date to be announced); Taiwan Straits (August 23, 1958, to January 1, 1959); Congo (July 14, 1960, to date to be announced); Laos (April 19, 1961, to date to be announced); and Berlin (August 14, 1961, to date to be announced). Also, the period for which the China Service Medal (Extended) is awarded was fixed at September 2, 1945, to April 1, 1957. The Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal may be awarded to members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard. The China Service Medal (Extended) may be awarded to members of the Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard.

The honorable discharge (DD 214) of an individual customarily lists any medals to which he may be entitled, and the Bureau is now requiring all appointees who have had military service to submit a copy of this form. However, it is possible for an individual to have had service qualifying him for the Armed Forces

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-14

- 2 -

Expeditionary Medal or China Service Medal (Extended) and to have been discharged before the medal was created. His discharge, therefore, would not reflect his entitlement to the medal. To help resolve this problem, every report of a military service record check in a Bureau applicant case must henceforth contain information as to the individual's foreign duty, showing dates and places. This requirement will apply only to those whose military service was after July 1, 1955. The requirement will remain in effect until you are advised of its discontinuance.

Information showing service-connected disability or the possibility thereof should continue to be reported in the service record check report.

3/19/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-14

(D) INVESTIGATIVE JURISDICTION - CRIMINAL MATTERS -- The investigative jurisdiction of the FBI has been, for the most part, clearly defined by statute, Department directive or agreements with other Federal agencies. In order to properly discharge our investigative obligations, it is necessary that all investigative personnel remain constantly aware of the scope of our jurisdiction, being alert to recognize violations of law in which we have an investigative interest and where appropriate, initiating prompt, vigorous and aggressive investigative action.

Attempts have repeatedly been made by various agencies to modify our agreements and circumvent our basic jurisdiction to the extent that our effectiveness would be lessened. Such efforts should be opposed without compromise. Each employee must be alert to this situation so that corrective measures may be immediately initiated should such a condition arise.

You must insure that matters within our jurisdiction are aggressively and thoroughly investigated so that our presentations to the United States Attorneys and their assistants are factual, concise and complete.

It is imperative that all investigative personnel be again reminded the Bureau's record of leadership in the field

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-14

- 3 -

of law enforcement can only be maintained by constant vigilance to insure matters within our jurisdiction are promptly referred by other agencies to us and cases investigated by the FBI are not referred for prosecution to local authorities for specious reasons.

Each instance wherein an attempt is made to encroach upon our investigative jurisdiction should be brought immediately to the Bureau's attention along with your comments as to action taken.

(Security Letter on attached page)

3/19/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-14

(E) SECURITY MATTERS - LETTERHEAD MEMORANDA - APPENDIX -  
RELIABILITY OF SOURCES USED -- The Bureau has recently noted  
that many letterhead memoranda (LHM) which are submitted and  
include an Appendix, but not an informant evaluation memorandum,  
fail to account for the reliability of the sources used in the  
Appendix. All Agents engaged in handling matters of this type  
should be reminded of the necessity for accounting for the  
reliability of all sources used in LHM's just as they must be  
accounted for when used in investigative reports. A suggested  
way of complying, when an informant reliability memorandum does  
not accompany an LHM, is to include a statement in the main  
body of the LHM concerning the sources used in the Appendix,  
such as "All sources not identified in the Appendix have furnished  
reliable information in the past," provided, of course, this is  
applicable.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

3/19/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-14

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PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 63-E  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

March 27, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

RE: SECURITY INFORMANTS AND SOURCES -  
INCOME TAXES

A system has been worked out with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) which will enable informants and sources to pay their Federal income tax on monies received from the Bureau without jeopardizing their security. This plan will go into effect immediately in the San Francisco and Philadelphia Offices for a trial period of one year. Payments for services to certain security informants and sources will be subject to a twenty per cent withholding tax. No tax is to be withheld from payments made (1) to other than security informants and sources, (2) for reimbursement of expenses, (3) under the authority of the SAC or (4) to informants who have been able to report Bureau income on their Federal tax returns without jeopardizing their security or without challenge from IRS. In the latter instance, the Bureau must be advised as to the identity of each informant and the method used by him to report his Bureau income.

Proper records must be maintained of amounts withheld and such amounts must be placed in a special checking account. At the end of the tax year, the tax liability will be determined on money paid by the Bureau to those informants from whom tax has been withheld. Necessary adjustments will be worked out with the informants and the net amount withheld forwarded to the Bureau. This money will be turned over to a special representative of IRS without disclosure as to identities of informants, except for coded numbers. These numbers can later be used for identification purposes in the event it becomes necessary to substantiate income tax payments.

Other offices may now utilize the withholding system where it would be helpful; however, where it is not used, continue to instruct all informants to pay their taxes on income received from the Bureau by such method as may be proper and feasible.

Detailed instructions and exhibits are enclosed concerning the procedure to be followed in the accounting and control of money withheld.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures (11)

March 27, 1963

WITHHOLDING OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX  
FROM PAYMENTS TO INFORMANTS AND SOURCES

INSTRUCTIONS AND PROCEDURES

Introduction:

A system has been worked out with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) which will enable informants and sources to pay their Federal income tax on monies received from the Bureau without jeopardizing their security. This will require the withholding of twenty per cent of any payments being made to such individuals for services rendered. Money so withheld will be immediately deposited to a special checking account, to be used for this purpose only, set up in the name of the SAC and ASAC. This account should, if possible, be in a different bank than that in which the regular office Confidential Fund (blue slip) or Double Agent (white slip) accounts are maintained. Any bank charges incidental to this special checking account are to be paid from the regular office Confidential Fund. Attached to these instructions are 10 Exhibits which are to be used as guides in setting up records for the maintenance and operations of the withholding accounts. Hereafter, any reference to informants refers to both informants and sources.

This plan will apply only to those informants or groups of informants authorized by the Bureau.

Accounting Instructions:

When a payment is to be made to an informant subject to this plan, the amount to be withheld for income tax purposes will be twenty per cent of the total for services. A check will be drawn on the regular office Confidential Fund to cover the total amount of the authorized payment. This check will be cashed and the amount for taxes immediately deposited in the special checking account set up for this purpose. A duplicate deposit slip is to be obtained for use in posting to the ledger accounts. Payment to the informant will then follow and the receipt to be executed by the informant for such payment should show not only the amount received as reimbursement for expenses and the authorized payment for services, but also the amount withheld for

Enclosures (10)

Federal income tax purposes (Exhibit 1). A Record of Income Tax Transactions (Exhibits 2 and 3) will be maintained on a calendar-year basis to record the informant's name, symbol number, period covered, and the amounts incidental to such transactions. Beginning with the first payment to an informant involving tax withholding, a new individual ledger sheet (Exhibits 4 and 5) must be set up. The amount of money withheld for income tax purposes should also be listed on the Blue Slip, Form FD 37, prepared with respect to the payment (Exhibit 6).

At the end of each month, entries in the Record of Income Tax Transactions and the individual informant's ledgers will be totaled and reconciled. A monthly report (Exhibit 7) is to be mailed to the Bureau in the same manner as the reports for the regular office Confidential Fund, no later than the 20th of the following month. All payments involving the tax account must be vouchered prior to the submission of this report.

In the event an informant subject to this plan is transferred to another field division, all records must be forwarded to the new field division, together with a check for the amount of income tax withheld.

#### Determining Informant's Tax Obligation:

At the end of the tax year, the contacting Agent will obtain from the informant his completed Federal income tax return based on his regular income, exclusive of money paid to him by the Bureau. The contacting Agent will not question the accuracy of the return except to point out obvious errors. The contacting Agent will furnish the informant's tax return to a qualified Special Agent Accountant who will prepare a separate return to include Bureau income. The accountant will compute the tax owed by informant on the combined earnings. The difference between the tax computed by the informant and that computed by the accountant will represent the amount of tax to be paid by the informant on money received from the Bureau. The accountant who prepared the return will sign on the line "Signature of Preparer Other Than the Taxpayer." The contacting Agent will have the informant sign the return prepared by the accountant as a certification that the informant has reviewed it and found it correct in every respect. The informant will file his original tax return with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The return prepared by the accountant, together with a Photostat of the informant's original return, will be maintained in the informant's subfile.

If the amount withheld from payments to the informant during the year exceeds the amount of tax for his Bureau income, the refund due the informant will be withdrawn from the special checking account and paid to him at the time he signs the return prepared by the accountant. A receipt (Exhibit 8) must be obtained from him. If the amount withheld during the year is not sufficient to cover the tax on Bureau income, the difference should be collected from the informant and a statement (Exhibit 9) obtained from him. Entries for any adjustments, ~~either refunds or additional payments~~, must be made in both the informant's ledger (Exhibits 4 and 5) and the Record of Income Tax Transactions (Exhibit 2) for the calendar year involved.

#### Instructions to Informants:

The contacting Agent must fully explain the withholding procedure to any informant concerned. With regard to the informant's original tax return, the informant should clearly understand that (1) neither the contacting Agent nor the Special Agent Accountant is in any way certifying to its accuracy, (2) if his original tax return is questioned by IRS, it will be up to him to settle the matter with IRS, and he cannot plead that it has been examined and approved by an Agent of the FBI, since such statement is false and the informant would be uncovered.

#### Transmittal of Tax to Bureau:

After all adjustments have been made in the income tax withholding on payments to informants, a report of Federal Income Tax Deductions (Exhibit 10) will be prepared. The net amount of the tax indicated on the Record of Income Tax Transactions (Exhibit 2) will be withdrawn from the special checking account by means of a check made payable to the Chief Clerk, FBI. This report and check will be forwarded to the Bureau, together with receipts for refunds that have been made and statements of additional tax collected. The necessary entries showing the transmittal of the tax funds to the Bureau should be made in the Record of Income Tax Transactions (Exhibit 2). When received at the Bureau, the tax money will be turned over to a special representative of IRS with the amounts for each informant identified by a coded number; thus, the informant's connection with the FBI will be protected. However, the coded number can be used for identification purposes in the event it becomes necessary to substantiate the informant's income tax payment.





NO NUMBER SAC LETTER NO. 00 1  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

April 29, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7

One set of AFSAM 7 key lists for months of June, July, and August, 1963, being forwarded separately to all divisions except Washington Field which will receive none; three copies being furnished Bureau's Emergency Relocation Site; and three copies Seat of Government Code Room.


Acknowledge receipt of key lists promptly by routing slip, indicating serial numbers which appear thereon; return in a sealed envelope to the Bureau, attention FBI Annex, the address label on individual tamperproofed envelope containing keys even though torn while opening package; and destroy, by burning, each monthly sheet thirty days after last effective date thereof, advising Bureau promptly by routing slip, attention FBI Annex, this has been done.

It is essential address label mentioned above be returned in order to control security of shipment.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 63-G  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

May 3, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7

Amendment No. 2 to KAM-1A/TSEC, Repair and Maintenance Instructions for TSEC/KL-7 (Bureau's AFSAM 7 cipher equipment), being disseminated as follows: one to each domestic and foreign office except Washington Field; one to Seat of Government Code Room; and seven to Bureau's Relocation Site.

Comply with Letter of Promulgation which appears on front cover. Page 3, entitled List of Effective Pages, through page 237 shall be inserted as in the case of other manuals and superseded pages removed. Revisions listed as Amendments and Instructions, pages III and IV, should then be handled. Check Manual for completeness and accuracy and enter appropriate information on Record of Amendments included therein.


Execute all copies of Flyleaf Receipts. One copy requires signature of SAC in two places. Employee who made changes will sign all copies, each twice. That bearing the SAC's signature should be placed in Manual.

The address label of the individual envelope containing Amendment No. 2, two Flyleaf Receipts and all residue including Letter of Promulgation, Amendments and Instructions, superseded pages and back cover of this Amendment must be returned immediately to Bureau, attention FBI Annex.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-27

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

June 11, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY'S TRIP TO ITALY, GERMANY AND IRELAND - JUNE, 1963 -- Commencing on or about June 20, 1963, President Kennedy will make an official visit to Germany, preceded by a short visit to Italy and followed by a visit to Ireland: ~~Entire trip will last~~ about one week, but the exact dates have not been announced.

In connection with this trip all offices should be alert for any data concerning possible threats to personal safety of the President or members of his group. You should also be alert for information concerning anti-American demonstrations or any intelligence data of interest concerning this trip. Information regarding travel to Italy, Germany and Ireland of security suspects or of potentially dangerous individuals up to the time the President's visit is terminated should be immediately furnished to the Bureau.

Sources and informants in a position to acquire the above-mentioned data should be alerted to the necessity for prompt reporting and the Bureau should be immediately advised if any such data is received.

Communications in this matter should be submitted under the above caption.

6/11/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-27

(B) INTERVIEWS -- It has been brought to our attention that interview rooms in some automobile agencies have been wired so that conversations carried on within them may be overheard. It has also been the practice in some instances to equip demonstrator models of automobiles with short-range transmitters so that conversations of potential customers may be overheard.

This information is being brought to your attention so that our Special Agents might be aware of the possibility of these practices and exercise proper caution in the event it becomes necessary to contact the personnel of automobile agencies in any official capacity.

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT SENT TO  
NATIONAL ARCHIVES (JFKARCA)  
DATE 8/5/94 *clal*

(C) PERSONNEL MATTERS - LEAVE - TRAVEL TIME -- Effective immediately, an employee who drives his personally owned automobile in effecting travel on official transfer will be granted travel time, without charge to leave, equal to the actual driving time, provided he averages a minimum of 300 miles per day for the direct route distance. The travel time starts when he departs on transfer. To illustrate this policy, the following examples are furnished:

An employee departed Washington, D. C., on a Saturday at 8 a.m., driving his personally owned automobile en route to New Orleans, Louisiana, on official transfer, and arrived at 7 p.m. the following Monday. Since he traveled 1,103 miles and his daily average was within the 300-mile requirement, no annual leave would be charged. However, if during the travel period the employee decided to stop over in Knoxville, Tennessee, for two days and therefore did not report for work in New Orleans until Thursday morning, annual leave would be charged for two days (Tuesday and Wednesday).

If the employee performs indirect travel in effecting a transfer, travel time allowable will be determined by applying the 300-mile-a-day average over the direct route distance.

Excess time involving workdays will be a charge against annual leave. As an example of this situation, an employee who departed Washington, D. C., on a Saturday for New Orleans, traveled via Miami, Florida, and reported for duty in New Orleans at the beginning of the workday the following Friday. He would only be entitled to travel time through Monday. Therefore, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday would be charged to annual leave.

6/11/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-27

(D) VIOLATIONS OF THE CRIME ABOARD AIRCRAFT STATUTE -- Although violations of the Crime Aboard Aircraft Statute, Title 49, Section 1472, U. S. Code, are criminal violations specifically assigned to the FBI, there have been indications recently that some airlines are delaying referrals of these violations to the FBI. This has seriously hampered our investigative effectiveness by preventing the immediate interviews of crew members and passengers prior to dispersal, which is of vital importance, particularly when the violation occurs in the air.

To remedy this situation, within thirty days each office is to personally contact the responsible officer of every air carrier and major terminal in its division to re-emphasize the scope of this statute, Bureau jurisdiction and the necessity of utilizing procedures which will insure all violations are reported directly and immediately to the appropriate field office. The Bureau is to be advised upon completion of these contacts.

6/11/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-27

(E) VENUE OVER OFFENSES NOT COMMITTED IN ANY DISTRICT, (TITLE 18, SECTION 3238, UNITED STATES CODE) CRIMES WITHIN THE MARITIME AND TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES -- On May 23, 1963, Public Law 88-27 was passed amending Title 18, Section 3238, which section provides for venue over offenses not committed within any State or district, by providing the trial of all offenses begun or committed upon the high seas, or elsewhere out of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district, shall be in the district in which the offender, or any one of two or more joint offenders, is arrested or is first brought; but if such offender or offenders are not so arrested or brought into any district, an indictment or information may be filed in the district of the last known residence of the offender or of any one of two or more joint offenders, or if no such residence is known the indictment or information may be filed in the District of Columbia.

It is now possible to prosecute joint offenders who have violated Federal Law upon the high seas or elsewhere out of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district, in any district in which either of them is arrested or first brought. Also it is possible to secure an indictment or file an information against any of such joint offenders without waiting for him to be arrested or brought into a judicial district which would suspend the running of any applicable statute of limitations.

Appropriate manual changes are being prepared.

(Security Letter on attached page)

6/11/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-27

(F) INVESTIGATIONS OF "RIGHTIST OR EXTREMIST" GROUPS -- "Rightist or extremist" groups operating in the anticommunist field are being formed practically on a daily basis. I wish to re-emphasize the necessity for the field to be alert to, and advise the Bureau concerning, the formation and identities of such groups. The field should also be alert to the activities of such groups which come within the purview of Executive Order 10450 or are in violation of Federal statutes over which the Bureau has investigative jurisdiction. Investigations, where warranted, should be initiated and handled pursuant to Bureau policy relating to the specific substantive violation. You are reminded that anticommunism should not militate against checking on a group if it is engaged in unlawful activities in violation of Federal statutes over which the Bureau has investigative jurisdiction.

Investigations of groups in this field whose activities are not in violation of any statutes over which the Bureau has jurisdiction are not to be conducted without specific Bureau authority. A request for authority to investigate such a group should include the basis for your recommendations regarding investigation.

The above instructions should be called to the attention of all investigative personnel of your office.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

6/11/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-27

- 4 -

(F) INVESTIGATIONS OF "RIGHTIST OR EXTREMIST" GROUPS -- "Rightist or extremist" groups operating in the anticommunist field are being formed practically on a daily basis. I wish to re-emphasize the necessity for the field to be alert to, and advise the Bureau concerning, the formation and identities of such groups. The field should also be alert to the activities of such groups which come within the purview of Executive Order 10450 or are in violation of Federal statutes over which the Bureau has investigative jurisdiction. Investigations, where warranted, should be initiated and handled pursuant to Bureau policy relating to the specific substantive violation. You are reminded that anticommunism should not militate against checking on a group if it is engaged in unlawful activities in violation of Federal statutes over which the Bureau has investigative jurisdiction.

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The above instructions should be called to the attention of all investigative personnel of your office.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

6/11/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-27

- 4 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
POSTPONEMENT INFORMATION SHEET (JFK MATERIALS)

54

Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file.  
One or more of the following statements, where indicated,  
explain this deletion (these deletions).

Deletions were made pursuant to the postponement rationale indicated below with no segregable material available for disclosure. All references relate to Section 6 of the "President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992."

Subsection 1A (intelligence agent's identity)

Subsection 1B (intelligence source or method)

Subsection 1C (other matter relating to military defense, intelligence operations or the conduct of foreign relations)

Subsection 2 (living person who provided confidential information)

Subsection 3 (unwarranted invasion of privacy)

Subsection 4 (cooperating individual or foreign government, currently requiring protection)

Subsection 5 (security or protective procedure, currently or expected to be utilized)

Information pertained to a matter unrelated to the JFK Assassination investigation.

For your information: \_\_\_\_\_

The following number is to be used for reference regarding this page (these pages):

62-116395-477

Bulky Part #4

XXXXXXXXXX  
XXXXXXXXXX  
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XXXXXXXXXX  
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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-26

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

May 28, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

(A) ECONOMY MATTERS - FISCAL YEAR 1964 - TELEPHONES -- Effective July 1, 1963, all calls from the Bureau Headquarters and Washington Field Office to field offices will be prepaid and sent by direct distance dialing. This action will enable the Bureau to reduce its cost here at the Seat of Government and to speed up the placing of such calls. This action will mean, of course, that the cost of such calls will not appear on your telephone bills and the costs will no longer be included in the figures you will report in the monthly economy reports for the cost of communications services. The Bureau will, however, in its accounting records charge the appropriate cost to the field divisions involved. This change in procedures will be taken into consideration when new base figures are furnished all field divisions for use during fiscal year 1964.

(B) CRIMINAL INFORMANTS SECURITY OF -- Security of informants must receive primary consideration both in the handling of the informants and the care given any correspondence relating thereto. By SAC letter number 62-27 dated May 8, 1962, you were reminded concerning possible attempts by the hoodlum element to conduct surveillances of Bureau Agents. Agents handling informants must continue to be constantly alert to this possibility. Avoid any patterns or habits which could unwittingly lead to detection by the hoodlum element.


Constant care must be exercised to avoid any disclosure to anyone which might permit identification of informants or even cast suspicion on them. Never relax your vigilance in protecting identities of informants. In this connection be certain that only authorized, experienced employees handle correspondence and memoranda regarding informants, and maintain criminal informant index under your personal supervision or that of Assistant Special Agent in Charge or criminal supervisor. (See Volume IV, Section 108 c 6 and 7, and 108 I 8, Manual of Instructions.)

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

5/28/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-26



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

June 25, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) PERFORMANCE RATINGS - 90-DAY WARNING OF UNSATISFACTORY ANNUAL RATINGS -- Annual performance ratings on noninvestigative personnel are due on September 30, 1963. Performance of such personnel should be appraised at this time to insure that 90-day written warnings (in form of special administrative performance ratings) are given to all those employees whose performances are considered to be unsatisfactory and to whom it is contemplated Unsatisfactory official annual performance ratings will be given. Insure that provisions of Section 5, Part I, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations are strictly adhered to.

6/25/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-30

(B) OFFICE SPACE - REPORT OF SPACE REQUIREMENTS TO GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION FOR FISCAL YEAR 1965 -- Reference is made to SAC Letter 59-45 dated July 21, 1959. Information regarding your space needs as set forth in referenced SAC Letter should be furnished to the Bureau, attention Administrative Division, no later than July 26, 1963.

Bureau of the Budget Bulletin Number 62-4 requires that all agencies justify and secure initial funding for general office space. Requests have been made by some offices for authority to contact the General Services Administration (GSA) for the purpose of securing space on a nonreimbursable basis. In line with the above Bureau of the Budget Bulletin, GSA will not honor such requests and the Bureau must reimburse GSA for the initial cost of such space if it is to be secured. Accordingly, the Bureau will not be able to secure new or additional space unless the cost can be defrayed through funds secured for this purpose in our budget. In view of the foregoing this survey must be detailed, accurate and comprehensive enough to insure that your future space needs are anticipated and the appropriate funding requested. Obviously, all requests for new or additional space must be accompanied by complete justification. You are also reminded that prior Bureau authority is necessary to contact GSA regarding the assignment of new or additional space in your division.

(C) RESEARCH ON ORGANIZED CRIME FOR FORD FOUNDATION -- It has recently come to the Bureau's attention that the Ford Foundation is sponsoring at least two research projects concerning organized crime. One of these is being directed by ~~NAME AND UNIVERSITY AFFILIATIONS AND POSITIONS DELETED~~

University. ~~NAME DELETED~~ contacted Bureau Headquarters concerning research on this topic in June, 1962, and was referred to statements which I have made as well as Uniform Crime Reports. He has an article entitled "An Overview of Organized Crime: Mores versus Morality" in the May, 1963, issue of "The Annals" of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. In this article he advocates legalizing various vices on which organized crime prospers so that law enforcement can concentrate more on combating organized crime in the labor or management fields. He proposes legalized gambling, prostitution, homosexual relations between consenting adults in private, the use of drugs under medical care and the reduction of liquor taxes.

In an interview on June 12, 1963, with ~~CITY DELETED~~ Chief of Police ~~NAMES DELETED~~ indicated his current research was on the extent of organized crime and the possible benefits of a national crime commission. He is known to have talked also to Chief of Police ~~NAME AND CITY DELETED~~

Another project being financed by the Ford Foundation will be under the supervision of ~~NAME DELETED~~ former Managing Editor of "The Courier-Journal" of Louisville, Kentucky, who is anti-FBI. Research on this project will be conducted primarily by ~~NAME DELETED~~ a reporter for "The Courier-Journal" who has been friendly toward the Bureau and has done extensive writing for newspapers on organized crime.

All offices should be alert to the presence of these individuals or others identified as working with them, and pertinent information regarding their activities should be promptly furnished to the Bureau and interested offices. Should these individuals contact your office seeking assistance, they should be tactfully referred to Bureau Headquarters. Any inquiry concerning these research projects should be answered with "No comment," and the matter referred to Bureau Headquarters.

6/25/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-30

(D) INFORMANTS - GENERAL -- Henceforth, in executing Form FD-209, reflecting each contact with an informant, unless there has been a change in the type of information the informant is in a position to furnish, the word "Same" may be placed in the "Coverage" block. To obviate the necessity of reviewing previous FD-209s to ascertain this data, Forms FD-237 and FD-238, the respective Criminal and Security Informant Review Sheets, are being revised to include a "Coverage" block to facilitate the location of the necessary information. However, in estimating the capability of the informant, the "Rating" block on Form FD-209 should show the specific evaluation each time the form is executed, although abbreviations such as "G" for "Good" and "VG" for "Very Good" and so forth may be used.

6/25/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-30

- 3 -

(E) NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY ACT MATTERS -- The Fraud Section, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, in an attempt to induce more vigorous action by U. S. Attorneys as regards prosecution of violations of the National Bankruptcy Act (NBA) is closely reviewing all Bureau NBA reports with particular attention being given to those wherein the U. S. Attorney declines prosecution. In connection therewith the Department has adopted a form letter addressed to the U. S. Attorney and signed by Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, which states in part:

"It is our opinion that the declination as set forth in the said FBI report does not conform to the Bankruptcy Section of the United States Attorneys' Manual, Title II, page 61. This section requires that in declining prosecution in bankruptcy matters that cogent and reasonably detailed reasons for such declination together with specific reference to the facts of the case shall be reported to the Attorney General (1) by report to the FBI or (2) by letter addressed to the Criminal Division, Department of Justice."

In keeping with the foregoing, it is imperative that in NBA cases wherein the U. S. Attorney declines prosecution that his reasons for so doing are set forth in sufficient detail to permit adequate evaluation thereof by the Department.

6/25/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-30

(F) INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF GAMBLING DEVICES - DEPARTMENTAL OPINION CONCERNING GAMBLING WHEELS -- Based on an inquiry from the field as to whether gambling wheels (a device sometimes known as a wheel of fortune) are gambling devices falling within the purview of the Interstate Transportation of Gambling Devices Statute, the Department has furnished an opinion that such gambling wheels do fall within the purview of the 1962 amendments to this statute.

This type of gambling wheel contains a series of numbers, which numbers correspond to a board on which a sum of money is placed on a particular number by the participant or customer. After the wheel is spun and stops on a particular number, the corresponding number on the board determines the winner. The winner, in turn, receives money or merchandise.

6/25/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-30

The Department advises the statute covers any mechanical device which is designed and manufactured for use in connection with gambling. Further, since the device is mechanical in nature it is apparently designed primarily for use in connection with gambling, and that by its operation a person who has paid the requisite consideration may become entitled to receive, as a result of the application of an element of chance, money or property.

In view of the Department's opinion, when complaints are received concerning gambling wheels, develop the facts and promptly contact the U. S. Attorney for his prosecutive opinion. At the same time promptly advise the Bureau of such investigations.


Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

6/25/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-30

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

July 19, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) DAILY REPORTS - TIME SPENT IN THE OFFICE - TIME SPENT ON DEVELOPING POTENTIAL CRIMINAL INFORMANTS - TIME SPENT ON DEVELOPING POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS -- Henceforth, daily reports will no longer be submitted by investigative personnel, special employees, radio personnel having special employee ratings, and clerks assigned to monitoring technical surveillances, assigned to headquarters city with the exception of those working outside of the divisional headquarters in excess of 24 hours, including absence in another division for the purpose of testifying. They will, of course, continue to be submitted by those personnel enumerated above who are assigned to resident agencies. Consequently, the Number Three (Locator Card) Register will be used by those investigative personnel now exempted from the submission of daily reports to indicate, in addition to those items presently entered thereon, their times of initial arrival and final departure and their daily tabulations of voluntary overtime and time in the office. Therefore, from now on, the Number Three Registers will be retained for a period of two years after which they will be destroyed on a monthly or other staggered basis if preferred.

In connection with the tabulation of time spent in the office, in addition to those activities presently excluded, it will no longer be necessary to include time spent therein on key interviews of subjects and witnesses, regularly scheduled conferences, and the review of accountancy-type books and records.

Further, it will no longer be necessary for agents to compute each day the total time spent on the development of potential criminal informants or potential security informants.

The elimination of these requirements in no way mitigates the necessity to insure that time in the office is kept at an absolute minimum and that agents are held accountable for any unjustifiable time so spent. With respect to the development of potential informants, both criminal and security, you are reminded that they are vital to success in the discharge of our investigative responsibilities and you must continue to stress the importance of these programs.

Appropriate manual changes incorporating the foregoing information are being prepared for issuance in the near future.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director





*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

**PERSONAL**  
**NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 63-H**  
**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE**  
**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

**July 26, 1963**

**WASHINGTON 25, D.C.**

**RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7**

One set of AFSAM 7 key lists for months of September, October, and November, 1963, being forwarded separately to all domestic and foreign offices except Washington Field which will receive none; six copies being furnished Bureau's Emergency Relocation Site; and six copies Seat of Government Code Room.


Domestic offices should acknowledge receipt promptly by routing slip and foreign offices by deferred cable, indicating serial numbers which appear thereon; return in a sealed envelope to the Bureau, attention FBI Annex, the address label on individual tamper-proofed envelope containing keys even though torn while opening package; and destroy, by burning, each monthly sheet thirty days after last effective date thereof, advising the Bureau promptly, attention FBI Annex, this has been done.

It is essential the address label mentioned above be returned in order to control security of shipment.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-39

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

August 6, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

RE: SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION CHARACTERIZATIONS  
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Set forth below are up-to-date thumbnail sketches of organizations and publications, each of which is of use to various field offices. No attempt is made to include all sketches which have been furnished to the Bureau for approval; only those sketches which are believed to have field-wide application are set forth. The sketches appearing in SAC Letters 58-41(F), 58-81(X), 59-8(O), 59-43(M), 60-34(F), 60-54(G), 61-37(E), 61-47(G), 61-58(C), 62-38(A), 62-58(D) and 63-13(G) should no longer be used.

In the event an office needs to characterize an organization not mentioned in this letter, listed in the various issues of the "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications" published by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, or designated by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450, a request should be made of the office of origin to furnish the required characterization. In describing a local affiliate of a national organization, in addition to characterizing the local affiliate, it will be necessary to set forth separately the characterization of the parent organization.

The evaluation and identities of the sources should be handled in accordance with instructions set forth in Part I, Section 49B 2m (1)(d), page 65, of the FBI Handbook.

For the purpose of evaluation all sources utilized in the preparation of the sketches listed below should be described as having furnished reliable information in the past. In each sketch utilized below, the field office submitting the sketch has advised that careful consideration was given to each source concealed.

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT SENT TO  
NATIONAL ARCHIVES (JFKARCA)  
DATE 8/5/94 *dal*

AMERICAN COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION

The April, 1963, issue of "ACA News," official publication of the American Communications Association (ACA), shows that the ACA is located at 18 John Street, New York, New York.

The "Report of the International Executive Board of ICA, CIO" at the 5th National Convention, Chicago, Illinois, April 8 through 13, 1940, discloses that the ACA had its origin at the 3rd National Convention of the American Radio Telegraphists Association (ARTA) held in New York City in August, 1937. At this convention it was agreed to change the name of the union from ARTA to ACA. This change was ratified by the union members on March 10, 1938.

The "Directory of National and International Labor Unions in the United States, 1955," published by the United States Department of Labor, lists on page 4, unions expelled from the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) on charges of communist domination. ACA was listed as having been expelled on June 15, 1950.

COMMITTEE TO SECURE JUSTICE FOR ND

ND "Following the execution of atomic spies ND in June, 1953, the 'Communist campaign assumed a different emphasis. Its major effort centered upon ND ND the ND codefendant. The National Committee to Secure Justice in the ND - a communist front which has been conducting the campaign in the United States - was reconstituted as the National ND ND Committee at a conference in Chicago in October, 1953, and then as the National Committee to Secure Justice for ND in the ND ..."

("Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications" dated December 1, 1961, issued by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, page 116.)

In September, 1954, the name "National Committee to Secure Justice for ND" appeared on literature issued by the Committee. In March, 1955, the current name, "Committee to Secure Justice for ND," first appeared on literature issued by the Committee.

8/6/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-39

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The Address Telephone Directory for the Borough of Manhattan, New York City, as published by the New York Telephone Company on April 16, 1963, lists the "Committee to Secure Justice for [redacted]" as being located at 940 Broadway, New York, New York.

EMMA LAZARUS FEDERATION OF JEWISH WOMEN'S CLUBS

"The Jewish Fraternalist" dated October, 1947, self-identified as the official publication of the Jewish People's Fraternal Order (JPF0) of the International Workers Order (IWO), on page 6, contained an article which disclosed that the Emma Lazarus Division (ELD) of the JPF0 was to hold its first national convention in New York City on November 15 and 16, 1947, after having been first established at a National Women's Conference called three years previously by the JPF0.

The "Morning Freiheit" on January 25, 1951, contained a report of the National Convention of the ELD of the JPF0 which took place in New York City on January 20 and 21, 1951. At this convention it was noted that the ELD changed its name to Emma Lazarus Federation of Jewish Women's Clubs (ELF) and adopted a new constitution.

On April 25, 1963, a source advised that the ELF is one of several mass organizations comprising the Jewish cultural progressive movement. [redacted] ELF Executive Director, who is a member of the New York State Communist Party (CP) Board and Committee, is the leading force in the organization, whose leadership is largely made up of communists.

The source stated that the ELF claims to be for peace and interested in protecting the rights of the foreign born. It is against the Ben Gurion Government of Israel, bomb testing, anti-Semitism, Negro discrimination, and the rearmament of West Germany.

The source related that the ELF renders support to and receives support from the "Morning Freiheit" and other Jewish progressive organizations.

The source also stated that the ELF is recognized by the CP, USA, as an important progressive national organization of women.

1-1-63

LETTER NO. 63-39

The address of the national office of the ELF is 160 Fifth Avenue, Room 911, New York City.

The IWO and JPF0 have been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

The "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications," revised and published as of December 1, 1961, to supersede Guide published on January 2, 1957, prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities, United States House of Representatives, Washington, D. C., contains the following concerning the "Morning Freiheit":

- "1. A 'Communist Yiddish daily' (Attorney General Francis Biddle, Congressional Record, September 24, 1942, p. 7686).
- "2. 'The Freiheit has been one of the rankest organs of Communist propaganda in this country for almost a quarter of a century.' (Special Committee on Un-American Activities House Report 1311 on the CIO Political Action Committee, March 29, 1944, p. 75)."

Sources: SD  
SD

### FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE

The April 6, 1960, edition of "The New York Times" newspaper contained a full-page advertisement captioned "What Is Really Happening In Cuba," placed by the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC). This advertisement announced the formation of the FPCC in New York City and declared the FPCC intended to promulgate "the truth about revolutionary Cuba" to neutralize the distorted American press.

"The New York Times" edition of January 11, 1961, reported that at a hearing conducted before the United States Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on January 10, 1961, identified himself and as organizers of the FPCC. He also testified he and Taber obtained funds from the Cuban Government which were applied toward the cost of the fore-mentioned advertisement.

8/6/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-39

On May 16, 1963, a source advised that during the first two years of the FPCC's existence there was a struggle between Communist Party (CP) and Socialist Workers Party (SWP) elements to exert their power within the FPCC and thereby influence FPCC policy. However, during the past year this source observed there has been a successful effort by FPCC leadership to minimize the role of these and other organizations in the FPCC so that today their influence is negligible.

On May 20, 1963, a second source advised that the National Headquarters of the FPCC is located in Room 329 at 799 Broadway, New York City. According to this source, the position of National Office Director was created in the Fall of 1962 and was filled by *ND* who now formulates FPCC policy. This source observed *ND* has followed a course of entertaining and accepting the cooperation of many other organizations including the CP and the SWP when he has felt it would be to his personal benefit as well as the FPCC's. However, *ND* has indicated to this source he has no intention of permitting FPCC policy to be determined by any other organization. *ND* feels the FPCC should advocate resumption of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States and support the right of Cubans to manage their revolution without interference from other nations, but not support the Cuban revolution per se.

The CP and the SWP have been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Sources: *SD* ;  
*SD*

#### B FOUR CONTINENT BOOK CORPORATION

According to the records of the Foreign Agents Registration Section, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., the Four Continent Book Corporation, 156 Fifth Avenue, New York City, is registered under the provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 as amended. One of the foreign principals listed in this registration is the Mezhdunarodnaja Kniga (International Book), Moscow, Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.

#### FREEDOMWAYS ASSOCIATES, INCORPORATED

The records of the New York Secretary of State, Albany, New York, show that the certificate of incorporation of Freedomways Associates, Incorporated, was filed on March 2, 1961.

8/6/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-39

The Spring, 1963, issue of "Freedomways" is self-described as "A Quarterly Review of the Negro Freedom Movement" published by Freedomways Associates, Incorporated, 799 Broadway, New York City.

On May 24, 1961, a source advised that a report was given on "Freedomways" at a meeting of the National Board, Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), held on May 24, 1961. It was stated that the original plan called for the publication to be openly Marxist, but that it was later decided it would not be avowedly a Marxist publication. Editorials are in the hands of a mixed group of Marxists and non-Marxists. It was stated that the central purpose of "Freedomways" is to develop a theory and positive criticism of currents in the Negro movement, as well as to raise the level of understanding and discussion taking place in Negro life today and to project a socialist and pro-Soviet orientation.

On May 25, 1961, another source advised that "Freedomways" was set up for the CPUSA by ND a member of the National Committee of the CPUSA.

Sources: SD  
SD

JEWISH CULTURAL CLUBS AND SOCIETIES,  
also known as Jewish Program Service  
Committee

A source advised on April 27, 1954, that the former leaders, including ND Executive Secretary, of the Jewish People's Fraternal Order (JPFO), Jewish nationality section of the International Workers Order (IWO), had established a committee at 1133 Broadway, New York, New York. Through this committee they were organizing cultural clubs and societies based on JPFO lodges which had been dissolved on December 15, 1953, in the course of proceedings by the New York State authorities culminating in the liquidation of the IWO.

A second source advised on March 15, 1961, that a meeting of the National Groups Commission of the Communist Party, United States of America, was held on March 2, 1961, in New York City. ND was among those present and spoke of his experiences in maintaining the Jewish lodges after the dissolution of the IWO, which, to avoid prosecution, have no national name or organization.

8/6/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-39

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Sandler stated that these lodges "lived" as clubs and societies by maintaining their cultural, fraternal and civic activities, but which activities are less political than in the former lodges. New York gave leadership to the rest of the country since the New York lodges were the strongest and had the more politically developed comrades.

These clubs and societies still maintain a medical plan, funeral benefits and mutual aid funds. There are 132 clubs and societies nationally, 63 of which are located in New York City.

A third source furnished information in May, 1963, that the clubs and societies are located at 1133 Broadway, Room 1429, New York, New York, under the name of the Jewish Program Service Committee, but are more widely known as the Jewish Cultural Clubs and Societies.

The IWO and the JPFO have been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Sources: SD  
SD  
SD

### JEWISH MUSIC ALLIANCE

An undated pamphlet entitled "The Story of the Jewish Music Alliance" (JMA) sets forth the following on page 2:

"The Jewish Music Alliance was founded in 1925, in order to coordinate the activities of all the Jewish people's choruses, to organize new choral groups and orchestras, public music, train and develop conductors, and generally stimulate the promotion and distribution of Jewish folk and labor music in the United States."

A source advised on April 25, 1963, that the JMA is part of a number of organizations comprising the Jewish cultural progressive movement in which the Yiddisher Kultur Farband (YKUF) is the most prominent. All of these organizations are directed and led by Jewish functionaries of the Communist Party, United States of America.

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The JMA National Headquarters is located at Room 711, 1 Union Square, New York City.

The YKUF has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Sources: SD  
SD

### JULY 26TH MOVEMENT

The July 26th Movement is a revolutionary organization founded and led by Fidel Castro, the present Prime Minister of Cuba. It was dissolved during late 1962 when it was absorbed into the integrated revolutionary organization in Cuba, along with the Communist Party of Cuba, and the other principal political parties.

### LABOR TODAY

In January, 1962, a source advised that on January 13, 1962, <sup>ND</sup> whom the source described as <sup>POSITION DELETED</sup> of the Communist Party, USA, remarked that the Party-supported trade-union publication would be issued in the near future and would appear under the name "Labor Today."

On January 5, 1962, records in the Assumed Name Section of the County Clerk's Office, Wayne County, Detroit, Michigan, indicated that Certificate Number 145344, issued for conducting business under an assumed name, was issued to "Labor Today" (a bi-monthly publication) having a business address at 12065 Wyoming, Detroit 4, Michigan. A certificate was filed January 2, 1962, and the names of the persons listed as owning, conducting and transacting the business were:

ND  
ADDRESS DELETED(AD)  
Detroit, Michigan

ND  
AD  
Detroit, Michigan

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A second source advised on December 15, 1961, that N D was then a member of the Michigan District Communist Party (MDCP) State Committee. This source advised on September 18, 1959, that N D was then a member of the MDCP State Committee.

A third source advised on September 21, 1961, that as of September 17, 1961, N D was a member of the North-West Section Club of the MDCP.

The Founding Statement contained in the first issue of "Labor Today" (Spring, 1962), indicated that two additional issues would be forthcoming in 1962 and beginning in 1963, "Labor Today" would appear regularly as a "bi-monthly journal."

The masthead of "Labor Today" describes the publication as "An Independent Journal of Discussion." Its managing editor is N D and business and editorial offices are located at 12065 Wyoming, Suite 5, Detroit 4, Michigan.

Sources: SD  
SD  
SD

U NATION OF ISLAM, formerly referred to as the Muslim Cult of Islam, also known as N D Temples of Islam  
FRUIT OF ISLAM  
MUSLIM GIRLS TRAINING

### Nation of Islam

In January, 1957, a source advised N D has described his organization on a nationwide basis as the "Nation of Islam" and "Muhammad's Temples of Islam."

On July 10, 1963, a second source advised N D is the national leader of the Nation of Islam (NOI); Muhammad's Temple of Islam No. 2,5335 South Greenwood Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, is the national headquarters of the NOI; and in mid-1960, N D and other NOI officials, when referring to N D organization on a nationwide basis, commenced using either "Mosque" or "Temple" when mentioning one of N D Temples of Islam."

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The NOI is an all-Negro organization which was originally organized in 1930 in Detroit, Michigan. ND claims to have been selected by Allah, the Supreme Being, to lead the so-called Negro race out of slavery in the wilderness of North America by establishing an independent black nation in the United States. Members following ND's teachings and his interpretation of the "Koran" believe there is no such thing as a Negro; that the so-called Negroes are slaves of the white race, referred to as "white devils," in the United States; and that the white race, because of its exploitation of the so-called Negroes, must and will be destroyed in the approaching "War of Armageddon."

In the past, officials and members of the NOI, including ND have refused to register under the provisions of the Selective Service Acts and have declared that members owe no allegiance to the United States.

On May 5, 1958, the first source advised ND had, upon advice of legal counsel, tempered his personal statements and instructions to his ministers concerning the principles of his organization in order to avoid possible prosecution by the United States Government; however, he did not indicate any fundamental changes in the teachings of his organization.

On July 10, 1963, a third source advised ND had early in July, 1958, decided to de-emphasize the religious aspects of the teachings of Islam and to stress the economic benefits to be derived by those Negroes who joined the NOI. This policy change, according to ND would help him acquire additional followers and create more interest in his programs.

Sources: SD  
SD  
SD

### Fruit of Islam

On July 10, 1963, a source advised that the Fruit of Islam (FOI) is a group within the Nation of Islam (NOI) composed of male members of the NOI. The purpose of the FOI is to protect officials and property of the NOI, assure compliance of members with NOI teachings and to prepare for the "War of Armageddon." Members of the FOI are required to participate in military drill and are afforded the oppor-

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tunity to engage in judo training. The FOI is governed by a military system wherein the members are controlled by general orders similar to those issued by regular military organizations.

Source: SD

### Muslim Girls Training

On May 19, 1960, a source advised that the Muslim Girls Training (MGT) is a group within the Nation of Islam (NOI) and is composed of all female members of the NOI. The MGT is similar in structure to the Fruit of Islam (FOI), which is composed of male members of the NOI, in that the MGT has officers similar to military organizations to whom other female members are accountable. MGT members receive instructions in homemaking, hygiene, calisthenics, and other subjects such as Muslim history and the English language. There also exists a Junior MGT; which is composed of female members of the NOI who are between the ages of 15 and 19 and who are afforded military-type drill.

Since 1957, various officers and "sisters" of the MGT have, at meetings of the MGT, used the term MGT so that it also means General Civilization Class. General Civilization Class refers to classes conducted within the MGT.

The above refers to activities of the MGT at  
ND Temple of Islam No. 2, 5335 South Greenwood,  
Chicago, Illinois.

On July 10, 1963, another source advised that the MGT is a group within the NOI which is composed of all female members of the NOI. The MGT is similar in structure to the FOI, which is composed of male members of the NOI. In theory, the MGT exists in all Temples of the NOI and is patterned after the MGT at ND Temple of Islam No. 2, Chicago. General Civilization Class refers to the collective group of classes held within the MGT.

Sources: SD  
SD

**NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO ABOLISH  
THE HOUSE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES  
COMMITTEE**

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The "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications" issued December 1, 1961, by the Committee on Un-American Activities, U.S. House of Representatives, page 115, contains the following citation regarding the National Committee to Abolish the Un-American Activities Committee (NCAUAC).

"Cited as a 'new organization' set up in the Summer of 1960 to lead and direct the Communist Party's 'Operation Abolition' campaign. Seven of the national leaders of this group have been identified as Communists."

(Communists on Un-American Activities, House Report 1278 on the Truth About the Film "Operation Abolition," Part 1, October 3, 1961, p. 5.)

A source has advised that the NCAUAC changed its name on March 3, 1962, to include the word "House" in its name, thereby becoming known as the National Committee to Abolish the House Un-American Activities Committee (HCAHUAC). A national meeting of this organization was held in Chicago, Illinois, on April 27 and 28, 1963.  
Source: SD

PERMANENT STUDENT COMMITTEE FOR  
TRAVEL TO CUBA

"The Columbia Owl," a weekly student newspaper of Columbia University, New York City, December 13, 1962, issue, page 1, contained an article entitled "Students to Visit Cuba During Holidays." This article stated in part that the Ad Hoc Student Committee for Travel to Cuba was formed October 14, 1962, by a group of students from New York City universities, the University of Wisconsin, Oberlin College and the University of North Carolina, who stated that as students they would like a chance to see and evaluate the situation in Cuba for themselves and had received an offer of transportation and two weeks' stay in Cuba from the Federation of University Students in Havana, Cuba, as guests of the Federation. The committee accepted the offer and applied to the U. S. State Department for passport validation which was refused; however, over 50 students planned to defy the State Department ban and go to Cuba.

A source advised on December 6, 1962, that during December, 1962, it was learned that the Ad Hoc Student Committee for Travel to Cuba had recently been formed by the "Progressive Labor" group.

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"Progressive Labor," Volume II, Number 1, issue of January, 1963, page 11, in an article captioned "State Dept. Pulls Strings to keep U. S. Students from Cuba" states that "For more information on the Cuban Trip contact the Ad Hoc Committee for Travel to Cuba, 42 St. Marks Place, New York 3, NY."

A second source advised on April 24, 1963, that a party sponsored by the Permanent Student Committee for Travel to Cuba was held on April 20, 1963, in New York City. At this party it was announced that the Ad Hoc Student Committee for Travel to Cuba is now known as Permanent Student Committee for Travel to Cuba.

The same source further advised that at this party it was announced that the committee had received a cable from the Federation of University Students in Havana inviting the students to spend the month of July, 1963, in Cuba and a new trip was planned whereby the students would leave New York City the last weekend of June, 1963, for Canada and travel by plane from Canada to Cuba.

Sources: SD  
SD

### PROGRESSIVE LABOR MOVEMENT

A source advised on January 15, 1962, that at a meeting of the ND faction in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on January 11, 1962, it was pointed out that this group was in touch with Communist Party (CP) and former CP members in various cities throughout the United States hoping to convene a National Conference in the Summer of 1962 for the purpose of establishing a National Marxist-Leninist organization.

"The Worker," an east coast communist newspaper, issue of January 7, 1962, page 10, column 3, reported the expulsion of ND former Labor Secretary of the New York State CP, from the CP.

A second source advised on July 2, 1962, that Progressive Labor groups held a conference in New York City, on July 1, 1962, where ND acted as chairman. He read a statement at this conference setting forth their intention to form a new Marxist-Leninist party in

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the United States. AD stated that a more formal organization was necessary, one which would provide a framework for all who wanted to join in a united effort to build an American vanguard. The functions of this new organization are to include consolidation of all existing forces around Progressive Labor and organizing additional forces, expand and improve political activities, win additional forces to an outlook of Marxism-Leninism and increase the open advocacy of socialism, develop a significant Marxist-Leninist program for the new party and organize a collective organization of leaders and members.

A third and fourth source advised in February, 1963, that this new Marxist-Leninist party has not yet been organized on a formal basis, but that Progressive Labor groups had been formed in several localities in line with proposals of AD. The sources advised as of February, 1963, that the leaders of this group are referring to it as the Progressive Labor Movement.

Sources: SD  
SD  
SD  
SD

#### PROGRESSIVE YOUTH ORGANIZING COMMITTEE

On February 9, 1961, a source advised that the Progressive Youth Organizing Committee (PYOC) was established at a national socialist-oriented youth conference held in Chicago, Illinois, December 30, 1960, through January 1, 1961. This conference was the result of a mandate issued by the National Executive Committee, Communist Party, USA, calling for a youth conference to establish an organizing committee whose objective would be to set up a national socialist-oriented youth organization. The conference scheduled a convention to be held within a year to found a new national socialist-oriented youth organization.

On June 18, 1962, a second source advised it was reported at the meeting of the National Council of the PYOC held in New York, New York, June 16 and 17, 1962, that although it had been planned to form a Marxist-oriented youth organization by the Fall of 1962, it would not be possible to form such an organization for the next few years.

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On May 7, 1963, a third source advised the PYOC has its headquarters at 80 Clinton Street, New York, New York.

Sources: SD  
SD  
SD

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TASS NEWS AGENCY

The Tass News Agency is the official Soviet Government news-gathering organization with headquarters in Moscow, USSR, and branches throughout the world.

UNITED ELECTRICAL, RADIO AND MACHINE WORKERS OF AMERICA

The "UE Shop Steward Guide," United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE) Publication Number 212, Sixth Edition, 1952, discloses on pages 32-34, "UE - the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America was established in 1936 at a convention in Buffalo, New York. At that time the organization was called the United Electrical and Radio Workers of America. Shortly thereafter, a large group of American Federation of Labor machinists' locals joined the UE and the full name became the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE).

"The UE is known as an 'International Union' because companies of both the United States and Canada are under contract."

"100 Things You Should Know About Communism and Labor," prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities, United States House of Representatives, Washington, D. C., 1951, relates the following information. In 1944 the Committee on Un-American Activities found the "United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (CIO)" to be one of the unions which was described as having "communist leadership... strongly entrenched." The "United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America" was listed as one of the unions which was expelled from the Congress of Industrial Organizations in 1950 because of its communist domination.

The "Internal Security Annual Report for 1957, Report of the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate," on page 61, refers to UE as "one of the strongest communist controlled unions in America."

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The International Headquarters of UE is located at 11 East 51st Street, New York, New York, according to the April 22, 1963, edition of "UE News," official organ of UE.

Very truly yours,


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John Edgar Hoover

Director

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

September 4, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) VISITS BY CIVIL RIGHTS GROUPS TO FIELD OFFICES AND RESIDENT AGENCIES -- On August 29, 1963, a group of Negroes, identified as the "Freedom Now Movement," headed by Conrad J. Lynn, a New York attorney, called at my office. Previously the Bureau had learned that this group might possibly institute a "sit-in" demonstration.

The group, upon arrival at 9:10 a. m., was courteously greeted and promptly ushered into my office. At that time, Mr. Lynn indicated that the Negro considered there was a lack of law enforcement on the part of the FBI, particularly with respect to prosecution of state and city police officials in civil rights cases. He, and other members of the group, talked about a number of cases, asserting that the FBI had not measured up to its responsibilities. William Worthy, a newspaperman who has been most critical of American foreign policy and who in 1962 was found guilty of traveling from Cuba to Miami, Florida, without a valid passport, was most sarcastic. He stated that he was disturbed that the FBI had not "prosecuted" anyone as a result of the "literally hundreds of bombings of Negro churches and homes throughout the country." Worthy added that it was only fair to let me know there was a rising tide of criticism against the FBI because of our failure to "prosecute." Worthy stated that while he was making no threat, he prophesied that FBI offices would be picketed in the future. He specifically mentioned the incident in which a demonstration was held at our Resident Agency at Danville, Virginia.

I told the group that I was happy to have the opportunity to answer their questions. I explained the FBI's jurisdiction and that we were an investigative and not a prosecutive agency. I emphasized that our investigations were penetrative in both the South and the North and that we constantly impress upon our Agents that they must be completely objective in all investigations, especially those involving civil rights. I told them that in many instances erroneous statements are made by extremists concerning the FBI's role in the civil rights field. I furnished facts regarding some specific cases they mentioned, and have since forwarded a letter to the leader of this group setting forth the facts in each case. As it turned out, the FBI had previously investigated each case the group brought up and the results of our investigations had been forwarded to the Department of Justice for consideration as to prosecution or further action.

The possibility exists that representatives of the "Freedom Now Movement" or other groups might call at our Field Offices or Resident Agencies. If they do, they are to be promptly and courteously received. The Special Agent

in Charge or the Senior Resident Agent, if available, is to conduct the interview. The group should be allowed to state the reason for its visit and its complaints heard. The Bureau's jurisdiction in the civil rights field should be thoroughly explained and questions in regard to the specific cases mentioned answered. If the interviewing Bureau official does not possess the facts on the cases, the group should be told that he will promptly check the matter and advise it of the true facts. Keep in mind the possibility of furnishing the group literature such as my recent article in the August, 1963, issue of "Yale Political" magazine concerning civil rights. At all times, the group should receive courteous attention and every effort made to assist its members in understanding the FBI's role in the civil rights field. The Bureau should be promptly advised of each such interview.

It is felt that by such an approach, not only can the Bureau forestall any "sit-ins" and unfavorable publicity, but do much to enable Negro leaders to understand the true role of the FBI in these investigations.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover

Director

9/4/63

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

September 17, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) BULKY EXHIBITS - SEMIANNUAL INVENTORY OF PROPERTY - SUBMISSION OF FD-192 -- In the past it has been the usual practice in handling FD-192 forms at the Bureau, when review discloses the case to be closed and no circumstances appear to exist for retention of the property listed, to so advise the field by letter instructing that a tion be taken for disposition.

In the future the following stamp will be utilized and a copy of the FD-192 so stamped will be returned to the field office for appropriate action.

"Noted case closed by report of SA \_\_\_\_\_ dated \_\_\_\_\_ or letter dated \_\_\_\_\_. Consider whether disposition can now be made of evidence maintained by your office."

The employees of your office who handle these matters should be advised of this procedure.

9/17/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-47

(B) TRAINING - POLICE - SEMINAR FOR POLICE TRAINING DIRECTORS --- One Field Division recently conducted a very successful three-day seminar for police training directors which evoked considerable interest and enthusiasm. Purpose of seminar was to bring together local law enforcement training directors for purpose of discussing teaching methods, techniques and training programs. Attendance was restricted to officers who handle training in their departments; the 30 men in attendance represented 28 law enforcement agencies. Although we coordinated the program and presented a substantial amount of the instruction, several competent, cooperative police training directors led discussions on topics which, logically, they could handle. Curriculum included such topics as The Police Training Library (Organization, Operation, Use), Basic-Recruit Training Programs, The Police Instructor (Selection, Training and Presentation Practices), Personnel Evaluation--Its Relation to Training, In-Service Training Programs, Evaluation of Training Programs Through Examination and Related Matters, Command Training Programs, Teaching Techniques, Teaching Methods, Visual Aids, Practical Problems as Form of Training, Specialized Training Programs, and Open Forum on Curriculum.

The above is called to your attention in line with Bureau's desire that you be apprised of successful innovations in the police training field. Similar training programs may be of assistance to local law enforcement in your area.

(c) FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM -- The open-season registration under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) will commence on 10-1-63 and must be completed by 10-15-63. Revised brochures on the various health benefits plans and on the "Open Season Instructions" will soon be made available to all divisions. Upon receipt, the Health Benefit Representative should give each employee a complete set of all applicable brochures. Extra copies of the brochures will be supplied for future distribution to new employees. Previous editions of all brochures will become obsolete on November 1, 1963, and should then be destroyed. Obtain supplements from the local Blue Cross-Blue Shield Office and add to the Service Health Benefit Plan Brochures prior to distribution. Copies of each of these brochures should be made a part of your defense plans for payroll (see page 5, Item (3) of Emergency Payroll Plan).

During this open season, eligible employees who previously elected not to enroll will be able to enroll and all employees enrolled in plans in the FEHBP may change from one health benefit plan to another, change options within the plan, or change from self only enrollment to self and family enrollment or the reverse. During this open season an SF-2809 should only be given to employees who desire to enroll or change their enrollment. Employees who enroll or change their enrollment due to open season should use 1 (One) under Item (2), Part D as the number of event which permits the enrollment or change. On changes in enrollment the old enrollment code number should be placed under Item (1), Part D. The Bureau will take the necessary action to cancel the old enrollment.

The effective date for open-season registration will be 11-10-63. This does not apply to new employees who register during this period or nonopen-season changes. The effective date for new employees and other nonopen-season changes will be the first day of the pay period following the pay period in which the form is submitted.

Employees enrolling in SAMBA due to open-season regulations are eligible for the minimum \$2,000 life insurance without evidence of insurability. Those applying for additional amounts of \$4,000 or \$9,000 must execute the Personal Health Statement. Those applying for Dependents Group Life Insurance must execute a health statement on spouse and each dependent child.

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-47

You should personally ensure that this open-season registration period is brought to the attention of each employee in your office. The Health Benefit Representative should carefully review all forms for legibility, completeness, and accuracy prior to their submission to the Bureau to avoid unnecessary delay in the processing of the forms.

(Security Letter on attached page)

9/17/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-47

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(D) COMMUNIST PARTY, USA - MEMBERSHIP -- Information now being submitted pursuant to current Bureau instructions and included under "Membership" in the administrative section of the Cover Pages of your quarterly reports captioned "Communist Party, USA," which pertains to the latest available statistics concerning the total number of Communist Party members in the area covered by your field office, should now be augmented through the inclusion of the following items: (1) the total number of Negroes included in the overall numerical strength of the Communist Party, USA, in your territory; (2) the name and title of each Negro included in this total who maintains a national level position; (3) the name and title of each Negro included in this total who maintains a district level position above the status of "club chairman." Those individual members of the Communist Party, USA, who are now carried as unidentified but who are known to be members of the Negro race, should be included in your total figure. Auxiliary offices should include this breakdown in the data which they submit to the Bureau and office of origin. These instructions should be put into effect immediately and should be included in your quarterly reports covering the period ending September 30, 1963.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

9/27/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-47

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OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

WASHINGTON, D. C.

TITLE 28--JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

CHAPTER I--DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

ORDER NO. 302-63

AMENDING THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY  
REGULATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
SO AS TO PRECLUDE DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES  
IN THE RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING OF  
DEPARTMENTAL PERSONNEL

By virtue of the authority vested in me by Executive Order No. 10590 of January 15, 1955, Part II of Executive Order No. 10925 of March 6, 1961, Section 161 of the Revised Statutes (5 U. S. C. 22), and Section 2 of Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1950, and in conformity with the regulations and instructions issued by the Civil Service Commission (5 C. F. R. 39.203(c) and 39.302(b); and F. P. M. Letters Nos. 330-2 and 410-5), Part 42 of Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations (relating to Equal Employment Opportunity in the Department of Justice) is hereby amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sections:

"§ 42. 25 Selecting employees for training.

"(a) It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Department of Justice that there shall be no discrimination



because of race, creed, color, national origin, or sex in the selection of employees of this department for training.

"(b) The Administrative Assistant Attorney General,

in carrying out his responsibilities under § 0.81 of this title (relating to the selection and training of departmental personnel in non-Government facilities), shall take steps to assure full compliance with the policy expressed in paragraph (a) of this section throughout the department.

"(c) Any complaint by an employee alleging unfavorable or discriminatory action in violation of the policy expressed in paragraph (a) of this section shall be deemed a complaint within the meaning of §42.6, shall be filed as provided in §42.7, and shall be handled in accordance with the procedures prescribed by § §42.8-42.17."

" §42.30 Selecting non-Government facilities for training.

"(a) It is the policy of the Department of Justice that non-Government facilities that discriminate because of race, creed, color, or national origin in the admission, or in the subsequent treatment, of students shall not be selected or used by this department to train personnel of this department. In addition, non-Government facilities

in which restrictions would be imposed upon trainees because of race, creed, color, or national origin shall not be selected or used by this department for Government-type training.

"(b) The Administrative Assistant Attorney General

shall take steps to assure full compliance with the policies expressed in paragraph (a) of this section throughout the department.

"(c) Whenever a non-Government facility is being considered by this department for selection as a training facility and this department lacks satisfactory evidence that such facility is operated without discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin, the facility shall be contacted and requested to provide the department with written assurances that it engages in no such discriminatory practices. If the facility declines to provide the requested assurances, or if the assurances it provides are deemed inadequate, there shall be no further consideration given to the selection of that facility. On the other hand, if the department has satisfactory reasons to know, either by its own experience or from the experience of others, that a facility does not engage in discriminatory practices, it shall be unnecessary to request written assurances.

"(d) Anyone possessing information indicating that a non-Government facility used by this department for training engages in discriminatory practices based upon race, creed, color, or national origin should submit such information to the Administrative Assistant Attorney General who shall investigate the matter and take such corrective steps as he may deem appropriate.

"(e) If training in process on the date of the issuance of this section is being conducted at a non-Government facility that does not qualify under paragraph (a) of this section, such training must be terminated at the conclusion of the current training unit."

"§42.35 Equal opportunity in recruitment.

"(a) The policy of the Department of Justice prohibits any arrangement with any private business, secretarial, trade, or similar private (non-public) school, or with any private employment agency or similar private referral or recruitment source that operates on a racially discriminatory or segregated basis.

"(b) Arrangements prohibited include arrangements for recruiting visits, formal or informal referrals of applicants or applications, participation in 'career days', and speeches by departmental representatives at such places.

"(c) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prohibit the transmittal of examination announcements and other publicity made available to the public generally to any school or recruitment source or to bar the acceptance of applications from students and former students of any school.

"(d) Whenever this department lacks sufficient evidence that a school or recruitment source, subject to paragraph (a) of this section, is operated without discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin, the school or source shall be contacted and requested to provide the department with written assurances that it engages in no such discriminatory practices. If the school or source declines to provide the requested assurances, or if the assurances it provides are deemed inadequate, any existing arrangement with that school or source shall be promptly cancelled and no new arrangement with that school or source shall be considered until the department is satisfied that the new arrangement would not be inconsistent with the policy expressed in paragraph (a). Whenever the department has satisfactory reasons for believing, either on the basis of its own experience or on

the basis of the experience of others, that a school or source does not engage in discriminatory practices, it shall be unnecessary to request written assurances."

Date: August 16, 1963

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Robert F. Kennedy  
Attorney General



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

October 1, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) "ACCIDENT FACTS" - TRAFFIC PUBLICATION - TRAINING - POLICE -- Under separate cover you are being furnished a copy of the 1963 edition of the booklet "Accident Facts." The booklet is furnished for use in connection with traffic instruction which our traffic instructors provide in field police training schools. Since the pamphlet contains current information on traffic and safety matters, all traffic instructors should become conversant with its contents. The pamphlet should also be made available to other Agent personnel such as police instructors who would have an interest in the subject matter. The pamphlet is expendable and need not be included in your office inventory.

10/1/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-50

(B) MATNAP - BREKID - FILING SYSTEM - DESTRUCTION OF FILES BY AUXILIARY OFFICES -- To conserve filing space, all auxiliary offices are hereby authorized to destroy reports and letters in their files relating to the MATNAP and BREKID cases which are more than 20 years old, provided the offices of origin and offices of prosecution have copies of these reports and letters. Under no circumstances should any material of evidentiary value or any statements, memoranda, or other significant material be destroyed. Any office which has been an office of origin or an office of prosecution at any time in the BREKID case should retain all material in its possession. In the event it becomes necessary to later obtain information which is more than 20 years old, auxiliary offices should communicate with the office of origin, which should retain the complete files, or the Bureau.

10/1/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-50

(C) FILMS - "THE FBI" - TWENTY-SEVEN-MINUTE DOCUMENTARY FILM -- The Bureau, in cooperation with Warner Brothers Studios, has produced a twenty-seven-minute documentary film which is narrated by Jack Webb of "Dragnet" fame. The film is in color except for the middle portion which is in black and white in that historical newsreels were used. This is a pure documentary and covers the Laboratory, the Identification Division, communications, jurisdiction, historical aspects and the training of a Special Agent. Much of the filming is new, particularly in regard to the training of an Agent, and was taken by the First Camera Unit of the United States Marine Corps, which is stationed at Quantico, Virginia.

This film can be loaned to groups or used in connection with speaking engagements. The same rules that govern the distribution of "A Day with the FBI" would apply to the new film, "The FBI."

It is noted that the film is twenty-seven minutes in length; ~~there is no objection to your lending it to local television stations for public service programs.~~

Warner Brothers has advised that they are shipping the Bureau the film the first part of October and we, in turn, will ship one copy to each field office. Upon receipt of the new film, you should destroy your copy of "A Day with the FBI."

10/1/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-50

(D) TRAINING - POLICE - POLICIES - RULES AND REGULATIONS -- By SAC Letter 62-17, dated March 13, 1962, you were furnished revised pages 19 and 20 of the pamphlet setting forth policies, rules and regulations regarding police training, bringing up to date copies of the pamphlet forwarded by SAC Letter 61-68, dated November 28, 1961. Enclosed are five copies of a revised version of this pamphlet; all copies now being retained in your office should be destroyed. Personnel in your division who have duties in connection with police training should be aware of the contents of this pamphlet.

(Security Letters on attached pages)

10/1/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-50

(E) COMMUNIST PARTY, USA - NEGRO QUESTION - COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN RACIAL MATTERS -- The history of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), is replete with its attempts to exploit, influence and recruit the Negro. The March on Washington, August 28, 1963, was a striking example as Party leaders early put into motion efforts to accrue gains for the CPUSA from the March. The presence at the March of around 200 Party members, ranging from several national functionaries headed by CPUSA General Secretary Gus Hall to many rank-and-file members, is clear indication of the Party's favorite target (the Negro) today.

All indications are that the March was not the "end of the line" and that the Party will step up its efforts to exploit racial unrest and in every possible way claim credit for itself relating to any "gains" achieved by the Negro. A clear-cut indication of the Party's designs is revealed in secret information obtained from a most sensitive source that the Party plans to hold a highly secretive leadership meeting in November, 1963, which will deal primarily with the Negro situation. The Party has closely guarded plans for Gus Hall to undertake a "barnstorming" trip through key areas of the country to meet Party people and thus better prepare himself for the November meeting.

In order for the Bureau to cope with the Party's efforts and thus fulfill our responsibilities in the security field, it is necessary that we at once intensify our coverage of communist influence on the Negro. Fullest consideration should be given to the use of all possible investigative techniques in the investigation of the CPUSA, those communist fronts through which the Party channels its influence, and the many individual Party members and dupes. There is also an urgent need for imaginative and aggressive tactics to be utilized through our Counterintelligence Program for the purpose of attempting to neutralize or disrupt the Party's activities in the Negro field. Because of the Bureau's responsibility for timely dissemination of pertinent information to the Department and other interested agencies, it is more than ever necessary that all facets of this matter receive prompt handling.

Because of the Party's intensified efforts to render influence in racial matters, the Bureau is closing its subfile 100-3-75 relating to CPUSA - Negro Question. All information to be reported relating to the Negro question, as well as communist influence in racial matters, should be hereafter reported in Bureau file 100-3-116 relating to CPUSA, Negro Question - Communist Influence in Racial Matters. This instruction as to the administrative handling of this matter is effective immediately and should be followed in the

10/1/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-50

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preparation of the quarterly report concerning the CPUSA for the quarter ending September 30, 1963. The necessary Manual changes will follow.

The contents of this SAC Letter should be brought to the attention of all appropriate Agent personnel so that they will be fully alert to the urgency of this matter. The following offices should submit to the Bureau, by letter under above caption due 30 days from date of this SAC Letter, an analysis of their current coverage of communist activities in the Negro field plus details of their plans for intensifying such coverage: Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Los Angeles, Newark, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, San Francisco and Seattle. Also, those 16 offices which are participating in the Counterintelligence Program on a continuing basis should include in their next monthly letters due at the Bureau by October 15, 1963, any plans they may have to neutralize or disrupt any Party activities in the Negro field. Such information should be set out under the category "Possible Counterintelligence Activity." After submission of the October letter, all offices will remain alert for future possible situations involving the Party and the Negro which have disruptive potential and submit them to the Bureau under the Counterintelligence Program caption.

10/1/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-50

(F) SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION CHARACTERIZATION - INTERNAL SECURITY - SAC Letter 63-39 dated August 6, 1963, provided a subversive organization characterization for the Progressive Labor Movement. Set forth below is an up-to-date characterization of this organization which replaces the one in SAC Letter 63-39. This thumbnail sketch also encompasses the Progressive Labor Party and the Movement's publication, "Progressive Labor," which are integral parts of the entire organization.

PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY;  
PROGRESSIVE LABOR MOVEMENT;  
"PROGRESSIVE LABOR"

A source advised on July 2, 1962, that Progressive Labor groups held a conference in New York City on July 1, 1962, where Milton Rosen acted as chairman. He read a statement at this conference setting forth their intention to form a new Marxist-Leninist Party in the United States. Rosen stated that a more formal organization was necessary, one which would provide a framework for

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-50

all who wanted to join in a united effort to build an American vanguard. The functions of this new organization are to consolidate all existing forces around Progressive Labor and organize additional forces; expand and improve political activities; win additional forces to an outlook of Marxism-Leninism and increase the open advocacy of socialism; develop a significant Marxist-Leninist program for the new party; and organize a collective organization of leaders and members.

"The Worker," an east coast communist newspaper, issue of January 7, 1962, page 10, column 3, reported the expulsion of Milton Rosen, former labor secretary of the New York State Communist Party, from the Communist Party, USA.

A second and third source advised in February, 1963, that this new Marxist-Leninist Party had not yet been organized on a formal basis but that Progressive Labor groups had been formed in several localities in line with proposals of Milton Rosen. The sources advised as of February, 1963, that the leaders of this group were referring to it as the Progressive Labor Movement.

The "Amsterdam News," a daily New York City newspaper, dated July 27, 1963, page 22, set forth that the "Progressive Labor Party is a new political formation based on Progressive Labor Movement, a Socialist organization with groups in all parts of the United States. The organization publishes a monthly magazine called Progressive Labor."

The July-August, 1963, issue of Progressive Labor" set forth that it is published monthly by Progressive Labor Company, G.P.O. Box 808, Brooklyn 1, New York.

First Source

Second Source is

Third Source is

All sources utilized in the preparation of the characterization given above should be described as having furnished reliable

10/1/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-50

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information in the past. Careful consideration has been given to each source concealed and the source has been concealed only where necessary.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures for (D)

5/1/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-50

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PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER S.C. LETTER 63-I  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

October 23, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7

One set of AFSAM 7 key lists for months of December, 1963, January and February, 1964, being forwarded separately to all domestic and foreign offices except Washington Field which will receive none; six copies being furnished Bureau's Emergency Relocation Site; and six copies Seat of Government Code Room.

Domestic offices should acknowledge receipt promptly by routing slip and foreign offices by deferred (State Department priority "Routine") cable, indicating serial numbers which appear thereon; return in a sealed envelope to the Bureau, attention FBI Annex, the address label on individual tamper-proofed envelope containing keys even though torn while opening package; and destroy, by burning, each moninly sheet thirty days after last effective date thereof, advising the Bureau promptly, attention FBI Annex, this has been done.

It is essential the address label mentioned above be returned in order to control security of shipment.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-59  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

December 10, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

In Reply, Please Refer to

File No.

(A) EMERGENCY MEDICAL IDENTIFICATION CARDS -- The American Medical Association has approved the use of a universal symbol to be used as a warning that any individual wearing or carrying it suffers from a physical disability or illness requiring special care such as, diabetes, epilepsy, allergy to certain drugs or medications, et cetera. The symbol may appear on an identification card or be affixed to a bracelet, pin, or similar ornamental device and consists of a hexagon on which has been superimposed a six-sided cross, "the Star of Life," on the upright arm of which is a staff with a serpent entwined about it, "the Staff of Aesculapius."

Although the American Medical Association is unable to state the extent of the use of the symbol, it has and will be given considerable publicity. A facsimile of the front and reverse side of a typical Emergency Medical Identification Card is enclosed.

12/10/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-59

(B) NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, D. C. - POLICE TRAINING -- Bureau has learned that a brochure has been forwarded to various law enforcement agencies announcing the National Administration Institute (NAI) will present, during 1964, a series of two-week training schools on police subjects for municipal, county, State and Federal law enforcement officers having arrest powers, and for foreign officials having law enforcement duties. This brochure gives no indication who will be connected with NAI; however, it was determined it is apparently a private undertaking by Neal M. Forney, a National Academy graduate no longer active in law enforcement, and has no connection with any law enforcement agency, organization or college. Forney plans to set up his Institute in Washington, D. C., but has indicated he will present instruction in other areas, if requested. Registration for the initial school closes 1/13/64; tuition for each school will be \$185.

You should make no comment at this time concerning this proposed police training organization, but you should be alert for information regarding Forney and NAI and advise the Bureau promptly. You are again reminded to insure that the police training program of your office is meeting the training needs of local law enforcement in your area.

(C) BANK ROBBERY MATTERS :- It has been suggested that bait money used by banks should be made up of used Federal Reserve Notes emanating from Federal Reserve Districts far removed from the area in which the bait money is being used. It is felt this procedure would help our bank robbery investigations in that it would be easier for tellers in other banks to check bills received against lists of stolen bait money. Since each Federal Reserve Note contains a large letter on its face denoting the Federal Reserve District from which it came, and those from districts far removed from locality in question would be received in relatively small volumes, the money used in bait packages could be more easily detected.

Accordingly, this proposal is brought to your attention for discussion with appropriate officials of banking institutions within your territory during the normal course of business or in connection with field conferences.

12/10/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-59

(D) HOODLUM COVERAGE IN THE GREATER MIAMI, FLORIDA, AREA DURING WINTER SEASON 1963-1964 - CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM -- The Miami Office has been making plans to afford coverage of the activities of out-of-town hoodlums who may visit the Miami area during the coming winter season. These plans include the utilization of informants and sources in places frequented by racketeers and development of information to establish highly confidential investigative techniques.

To assist the Miami Office in the prompt establishment of effective coverage on hoodlums and racketeers proceeding to the Miami area, field offices are instructed to furnish to the Miami Office background information, including criminal records, physical descriptions and details of itineraries of such hoodlums. When information is received from highly sensitive sources or informants concerning the travel of any hoodlum, appropriate precautions should be set forth to enable the Miami Office to plan investigative steps which will not jeopardize these sources and informants. Information on travel plans should be forwarded expeditiously by appropriate communication to enable the Miami Office to have as much notice as possible to provide coverage on the activities of these individuals where facts have been developed indicating the desirability of such coverage. To make coverage more efficient and discreet, the information developed should include identity of associates the traveling hoodlums are expected to meet in the Miami area. All surveillances instituted must be discreet and based on information from which it can logically be inferred that there is a definite, useful objective to be achieved.

12/10/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-59

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All offices should furnish a brief outline to Miami of public source data identifying any of these individuals as racketeers or members of organized criminal groups, such as La Cosa Nostra, to be made available, if necessary, to local law enforcement officials.

It should be borne in mind that hoodlums from various parts of the country visiting the Miami area will be renewing associations, reminiscing about past experiences and discussing future plans. This recreation atmosphere should provide better opportunities for our informants and sources to obtain valuable information in accordance with the objectives of the Criminal Intelligence Program.

When notifying the Bureau and Miami Office of the intended travel of hoodlums, each field office should include information on the availability of any highly placed informants in a position to travel to Florida to provide coverage of hoodlum activities. The Bureau will thereafter decide if the travel of a particular informant is warranted.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosure for (A)

12/10/63  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-59

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 63-61

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

December 17, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) FBIRA MATTER - INTEROFFICE FIREARMS COMPETITION (PPC) 1963 -- I am pleased to announce the results of the 1963 FBIRA-Sponsored Interoffice Firearms Competition (PPC). The Tampa Division won the over-all competition with an average score, including handicap, of 101.36 per cent (92.48 plus 8.88). The "J. Edgar Hoover Practical Pistol Course Trophy" is being sent to Tampa where it will remain until the winner of the 1964 competition is determined. A plaque is also being forwarded to Tampa, which is to be permanently retained by this Division.

In addition to the over-all winner, plaques for permanent retention will be presented to the second and third place winners, Minneapolis (93.89 plus 6.71) and Seattle (94.43 plus 6.11) respectively.

Again this year Divisions were divided into groups according to agent complement and the office having the highest average, plus handicap, in each is being cited for "Honorable Mention." Excluding the first three place winners, the Divisions winning the citations are as follows:

Group 1 - Chicago

Group 2 - Cincinnati

Group 3 - Memphis

Group 4 - Anchorage

The relative standing of each office, according to group, is as follows:

*Reviewed by  
M. Talley 8/7/75*



Group 1Group 2

	<u>Net</u>	<u>Gross</u>		<u>Net</u>	<u>Gross</u>
1. Chicago	93.64	99.76	1. Cincinnati	91.87	99.12
2. Newark	92.98	98.96	2. Atlanta	90.69	99.03
3. Los Angeles	92.04	98.82	3. Boston	90.92	98.44
4. Miami	90.60	98.29	4. Charlotte	91.76	98.09
5. Washington	89.79	97.95	5. Dallas	91.20	97.92
6. San Francisco	91.43	97.94	6. Baltimore	89.87	97.91
7. Detroit	91.03	97.57	7. New Orleans	91.57	97.66
8. Seat of Government	90.00	97.43	8. Pittsburgh	90.92	97.37
9. Philadelphia	89.29	97.36	9. Kansas City	89.50	96.35
10. New York	89.11	96.53	10. Cleveland	87.70	95.50

Group 3Group 4

	<u>Net</u>	<u>Gross</u>		<u>Net</u>	<u>Gross</u>
1. Memphis	91.82	99.54	1. Anchorage	97.56	99.74
2. San Juan	92.01	99.15	2. Norfolk	91.80	99.66
3. Las Vegas	92.90	98.96	3. Omaha	92.78	99.45
4. Buffalo	90.87	98.19	4. Mobile	91.86	98.94
5. Milwaukee	90.24	97.81	5. Portland	92.69	98.90
6. Springfield	91.36	97.72	6. Albuquerque	93.30	98.52
7. Houston	89.40	97.66	7. Honolulu	91.76	98.37
8. Louisville	90.23	97.61	8. Knoxville	92.56	98.32
9. Oklahoma City	89.40	97.56	9. San Diego	91.88	98.22
10. Jacksonville	91.94	97.37	10. Little Rock	91.61	98.18
11. St. Louis	89.56	97.21	11. Birmingham	90.26	97.95
12. New Haven	91.16	96.95	12. Albany	89.16	97.51
13. Denver	89.53	96.77	13. Salt Lake City	90.70	97.23
14. Phoenix	90.61	96.74	14. Butte	89.12	95.36
15. San Antonio	86.99	96.68	15. El Paso	87.44	94.97
16. Indianapolis	90.44	96.63			
17. Richmond	88.48	96.51			
18. Savannah	88.26	95.65			

The 5502 Agents participating in the 1963 competition surpasses last year's participation of 5482. The over-all average was 90.7 per cent which is an indication of the interest and enthusiasm displayed by Agent personnel and is most gratifying.

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-61

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(B) REPORT WRITING -- To avoid unnecessary dictation and typing, the attention of all investigative personnel should be directed to the general reporting rules set forth in the Handbook for FBI Agents. Particular emphasis should be placed on the provisions embodied in Part I, item 47, A, 10 and 11, on pages 32c and 32d of the Handbook ~~s~~ they relate to the use of inserts by auxiliary offices to report the results of investigations to an office of origin.

Good judgment should dictate the use of inserts wherever possible to report information ultimately destined for inclusion in a report. This will relieve the office preparing the report of the necessity of wholesale retyping of information to include it therein as is the case when the data is received from the auxiliary office in an airtel, letter, or similar communication.

12/17/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-61

(C) PERFORMANCE RATINGS - INVESTIGATIVE PERSONNEL -- The performance of all investigative personnel should be appraised at this time to insure that 90-day warnings (in the form of special administrative performance ratings) are given to all such employees whose performance is considered unsatisfactory and to whom it is contemplated an Unsatisfactory official annual performance rating will be given on March 31, 1964.

You should insure that all supervisory employees who will be preparing the ratings are completely familiar with the instructions in the Manual of Rules and Regulations and the contents of SAC Letter No. 61-28 (B) dated 5-23-61 and that these instructions are strictly adhered to.

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-61

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(D) PHOTOGRAPHS - INVESTIGATIVE AID -- It has been brought to our attention that the State of Montana has adopted the practice of requiring that a photograph of the driver be attached to the operator and chauffeur driving licenses issued by it. The licenses expire every two years and applicants are photographed at the time of initial application and each renewal. Montana thus joins several other states which have this requirement and, with the increasing trend toward uniformity in licensing procedures, it is anticipated that many more states will adopt this requirement in the future.

I need not elaborate on the value to our investigations of up-to-date photographs of subjects, suspects, et cetera, and you are reminded that all logical sources of obtaining them, such as that described above, should be exploited whenever possible.

(Security Letters on attached pages)

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SAC LETTER NO. 63-61

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(E) VISIT OF GERMAN CHANCELLOR LUDWIG ERHARD TO UNITED STATES - DECEMBER, 1963 -- Chancellor Ludwig Erhard of Germany and party of 12 are scheduled to visit the United States as guests of President Johnson December 27-29, 1963. Present itinerary indicates that Chancellor Erhard's visit will be confined to the State of Texas. Erhard's party is expected to visit Houston or San Antonio, Texas, on December 27, 1963, and Austin, Fredericksburg, Johnson City, and the LBJ Ranch, Texas, on December 28-29, 1963. In connection with this visit all offices should be alert for any information concerning any activity which may adversely affect the United States. Sources and informants in a position to acquire pertinent data should be alerted to the necessity for prompt reporting. Information concerning threats, violence or hostile demonstrations against Erhard or his government should be immediately furnished to the Bureau, to appropriate local police, to local Secret Service representative and local Office of Security, United States Department of State, where available, and to San Antonio which will be considered office of origin. Notify Bureau of dissemination made.

Communications in this matter should be submitted under above caption.

12/17/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-61

(F) SECURITY INDEX -- In connection with all security investigations in the case of individual subjects, the essential question for determination is whether the subject's activities are such as to depict him to be a potential danger to the national security of the United States in time of an emergency. In the event such a determination is made, his name should be included in the Security Index.

The Security Index criteria have been found to afford practical and workable guidelines in arriving at a conclusion as to whether a subject represents a potential danger and are sufficiently elastic so that when applied with the necessary judgment, the complex questions which may arise in connection with these cases can be resolved.

Section 87D of the Manual of Instructions contains a number of specific factors that must be taken into consideration when arriving

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†SAC LETTER NO. 63-61

at a conclusion as to whether a particular subject meets the Security Index criteria and represents a potential threat to the national security.

For your assistance, the assistance of your investigative personnel engaged in security work, and for the assistance of your supervisory staff, the following specific factors, in addition to the ones presently enumerated in Section 87D of the Manual of Instructions, are set forth for consideration in arriving at a determination as to whether a security subject falls within the Security Index criteria, represents a potential danger in time of an emergency, and thus should be included in the Security Index.

- (1) Contacts with Sino-Soviet-bloc establishments (including Cuba) where purpose of contact cannot be determined or contact indicates communist sympathies.
- (2) Contacts with Sino-Soviet-bloc, Cuban or Yugoslav intelligence agents where purpose of contact cannot be determined or contact indicates communist sympathies.
- (3) Individuals who have defected, revoked or sought revocation of their United States citizenship in favor of a Sino-Soviet-bloc country, who have returned to the United States, and who have taken no positive steps to counteract such action.
- (4) Statements or activities on a subject's part establishing reasonable grounds to believe that his loyalty would lie with a Sino-Soviet-bloc country in the event of armed conflict between the United States and a Sino-Soviet-bloc country.
- (5) Training and/or participation in espionage, sabotage, or intelligence activities.
- (6) A history of emotional instability or irrational behavior on the part of an individual with a subversive background whose prior acts depict a propensity for violence and hatred against organized government.

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The above factors, including the various factors presently set forth in Section 87D of the Manual of Instructions, are not all-inclusive but are set forth for the purpose of providing a more detailed guideline and all must be considered in evaluating the facts developed during the course of the investigation.

In view of our responsibilities in the internal security field, most careful attention must be afforded this aspect of our operations and all security cases should be closely examined for the purpose of determining whether sufficient facts are available to depict the subject as a dangerous person whose activities warrant the inclusion of his name in the Security Index. When such a determination is made, appropriate recommendation to include his name in the Security Index should be made promptly.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director


12/17/63

SAC LETTER NO. 63-61

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183-10291

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PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 60-A  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

January 15, 1960

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

RE: BUREAU CODES

Change No. 3 to KAM-1/TSEC, Repair and Maintenance Instructions for TSEC/KL-7(AFSAM-7)-Joint, being disseminated as follows: one to each office except Washington Field; one to Code Room, Seat of Government; five to Bureau's Relocation Site.

Comply with Letter of Promulgation which appears on front cover. Page 3, entitled List of Effective Pages, through page 226, shall be inserted as in the case of other manuals and superseded pages removed. Revisions listed as Corrections and Instructions, pages 3 and 4, should then be handled. Check Manual for completeness and accuracy and enter appropriate information on Record of Corrections included therein.

Execute all copies of Flyleaf Receipts. One copy requires signature of SAC in two places. Employee who made changes will sign all copies, each twice. That bearing the SAC's signature should be placed in Manual immediately following original Flyleaf Receipt.


The address label of the individual envelope containing Change No. 3, two Flyleaf Receipts and all residue including Letter of Promulgation, Corrections and Instructions, superseded pages and back cover must be returned immediately to Bureau, attention FBI Laboratory.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director





JUNE  
PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 60-B  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

January 22, 1960

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RE: MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCES

You are reminded that whenever requesting authority to install a microphone surveillance of any kind, complete details of the proposed installation must be furnished, specifically pointing out if trespass is involved and whether the microphone will be installed in the telephone or a telephone instrument will be utilized in any way. Mere statements that trespass is not involved or that microphone will be installed in a living room are not sufficient. Bureau desires specific details of each contemplated installation.

In addition, when advising that a microphone surveillance has been discontinued state whether you have been able to remove all equipment at the time of discontinuance. It is realized that due to lack of maximum security such removal may not be immediately effected and if such is the case keep the Bureau advised every 15 days after discontinuance of efforts being made to remove all evidence of the microphone surveillance.

Each Special Agent in Charge must continue to personally supervise all microphone surveillances and the Bureau will closely scrutinize each installation and discontinuance to insure that you are acting in compliance with the foregoing.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 60-C  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

January 25, 1960

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

*In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.*

RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7

One set of AFSAM 7 key lists for the months of March, April, and May, 1960, being forwarded separately to all divisions except Washington Field which will receive none; three copies being furnished Bureau's Emergency Relocation Site; and five copies Seat of Government Code Room.


Acknowledge receipt of key lists promptly by routing slip, indicating serial numbers which appear thereon; return address label of individual tamperproofed envelope containing the keys even though torn in opening package; and destroy, by burning, each monthly sheet thirty days after the last effective date thereof, advising the Bureau promptly by routing slip, attention FBI Laboratory, this has been done.

It is essential the address label mentioned above be returned. If the label is not returned, explanations will be secured and consideration given to appropriate administrative action.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-9

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

February 9, 1960

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY -- In the past the fingerprints of National Academy students have been taken on the opening day of the National Academy class. Hereafter the fingerprints will be taken in the field and forwarded to the Bureau for search prior to the issuance of the invitation for the officer to attend the Academy. This program will be implemented as follows:

1. As each applicant is interviewed by the SAC, following the submission of the application, the fingerprints will be taken and forwarded to the Bureau with the application and interview form.

2. The prints of those applicants who are presently being investigated for the 65th Session (beginning March 21, 1960) should be taken immediately and forwarded to the Bureau by routing slip, attention, Training and Inspection Division.

3. The prints of those applicants who have been interviewed but who are not being investigated for the 65th Session will be taken at such time as the Bureau orders the investigation of the applicant for a particular session, and forwarded by routing slip to the Bureau, attention, Training and Inspection Division.

2/9/60  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-9

(B) PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO SOUTH AMERICA-1960 -- Beginning February 22, 1960, the President is making an official visit to the following countries: Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. The President will return to Washington on March 6, 1960. The President will make overnight stops in both directions at Ramey Air Force Base, Puerto Rico. At the request of the White House, a Bureau representative will accompany the White House group on this trip. He will handle Bureau matters with both the White House staff and the United States Secret Service.

You are instructed to alert your sources for information that may be of interest to the White House group prior to and during the President's trip. You should be particularly alert for information concerning the activities of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico. Furnish pertinent information to the Bureau expeditiously and in a form suitable for dissemination using above caption.

(C) FORMS - SURVEY -- A detailed review should be conducted of all forms specifically approved for use in your office. Delete forms serving no useful purpose, consolidate forms with similar functions, and revise forms to improve and streamline operational procedures in your office. Forms proposed for adoption, revision, consolidation, or deletion must be accompanied by a communication justifying proposals and requesting Bureau approval in accordance with Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part II, Section 8, G, 1. Results of your survey, including all forms proposals, should be incorporated in one letter which must reach the Training and Inspection Division not later than February 19, 1960.

2/9/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-9

(D) LEAVE - STATUS OF EMPLOYEES -- It is the responsibility of each employee to know the status of his own leave account and employees should therefore be encouraged to maintain their own leave records. It is not the responsibility of supervisors to notify employees how much leave they have to their credit or will lose if they do not use it by the end of the year. Of course, any employee with a question in regard to his leave status may make inquiry concerning same.

2/9/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-9

(E) SPECIAL ACCIDENT AND TRAVEL INSURANCE - SATI -- Renewal applications for present members of captioned group have been sent out covering the new policy year which began February 8, 1960. This accident protection is available to all FBI employees and in addition, the wife of a member can be covered at the same rates.

SATI affords protection twenty-four hours a day, anywhere in the world, against all general accidents. In addition to the basic policy covering accidental death, dismemberment or permanent total disability, medical reimbursement and weekly accident indemnity coverage is also available. These provisions provide for reimbursement in full, up to the limit of protection purchased, for medical expenses resulting from an accident and for weekly indemnity payments if you are unable to work due to an accident. This policy offers protection on a full-time basis against accidents occurring in the office, while on Bureau business, while driving or riding in any automobile or as a pedestrian, as well as accidents that occur around the house, in the workshop, on vacation, on hunting or fishing trips, etc.

2/9/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-9

- 2 -

Brochures setting forth full details as to coverage and rates are being made available to all field offices. The availability of this protection should be brought to the attention of all employees. The premium for the coverage offered is very reasonable and it is worthy of consideration by any employee who desires this type of protection.

All applications should be forwarded to Parker and Company, 1300 Connecticut Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D. C. Further information can be secured if desired by contacting Mr. Frank Wright at the above company.

2/9/60  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-9

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(F) BUREAU APPLICANT MATTERS - CLERKS - SUMMER EMPLOYEES -- The following policy has been adopted regarding summer employment of clerical employees at Seat of Government this year. In view of limited need for such employees, only those applicants will be considered who have previously worked for Bureau as summer employees, with satisfactory work records, fulfilled their agreements to work at least 90 days, or their entire vacation period, and who agree to work during coming summer for minimum of 90 days, or their entire vacation period. In addition, sons and daughters of Bureau employees who have not previously been employed by the Bureau will be considered for summer employment. There will be no exceptions to this policy. All applications for summer employment should clearly reflect that applicant is interested only in employment during summer months, and such information should also be reflected on the interview sheet in every instance.

2/9/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-9

(G) BANK ROBBERY MATTERS -- The recommendations of all Special Agents in Charge concerning the dissemination program in bank robbery matters instituted by SAC Letter 59-43 (J), dated July 7, 1959, have been analyzed by the Bureau. Effective immediately the office of origin at the outset of the investigation in unsolved violations of the Federal Bank Robbery and Incidental-Crimes Statute will furnish to surrounding offices and other offices deemed pertinent by appropriate communication a succinct summary of the modus operandi and descriptions of the unknown subjects involved. Appropriate leads may also be set forth in this communication. In cases of an aggravated nature, such as those in which a large amount of loot is taken, a shooting occurs or a hostage is taken, the office of origin should prepare an appropriate communication for all continental offices. Unless some reason to the contrary exists, there will not be any necessity to furnish copies of such a communication to the Anchorage, Honolulu or San Juan Divisions.

Photographs and descriptions of subjects apprehended in violations of the Federal Bank Robbery and Incidental Crimes Statute should be furnished by the office of origin to those offices previously advised under this program,

2/9/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-9

- 4 -

and to any other pertinent offices developed during the investigation. Copies of communications concerning dissemination need not be furnished to the Bureau; however, an appropriate statement that the dissemination has been made should be set forth in the cover pages to the report submitted by the office of origin. Manual and Handbook changes are forthcoming.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover

Director

2/9/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-9

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-10

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

February 16, 1960

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM - FIELD SERVICE PROGRAM -- One-day training sessions relating to the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program will be conducted within each Civil Service Commission region in the immediate future. These sessions will cover: (1) a review of the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959; (2) proposed regulations; (3) discussion of some of the agency responsibilities; and (4) other pertinent information currently available. Regional Offices of Civil Service Commission will contact our field offices to determine identity of person or persons selected to attend these training sessions and to arrange for such attendance. Persons to attend training should be those assigned responsibility for the program in the field and those who will train and counsel other employees. Larger offices may want to designate several persons; smaller offices may desire to designate only one individual. Each office should have at least one ranking clerical employee, such as Chief Clerk or Assistant Chief Clerk, attend these sessions.

Within five days of receipt of this letter, every office should inform the Bureau as to the identity of the person or persons selected for this training, and unless you are advised to the contrary by the Bureau, it will be satisfactory for such personnel to attend the sessions.

2/16/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-10

(B) PHYSICAL EXAMINATION MATTERS - WEIGHT STANDARDS - FBI FORM BOOK -- Previous weight standards are now discontinued. New weight standards for Bureau male investigative employees and applicants for Bureau investigative positions are incorporated in the revised FD-300, which is the attachment to SF-88, "Report of Medical Examination." One of three copies attached should be placed in the FBI Form Book and additional copies are being sent separately for immediate use upon receipt. The new standards are based upon the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company table recently prepared following its current detailed study.

The only revision to FD-300 constitutes substitution of the new weight chart for the old one. This new chart makes no provision for maximum weights and it lists only desirable weight ranges for respective heights and frames. Employees not within desirable



weight ranges will be listed as overweight. The goal of having no overweight agents with all within desirable limits will continue. Administrative procedures for reporting overweight cases, following on conditions, certifying weights reported and analyzing those who are delinquent will continue as set forth in SAC Letter 59-68. Each division head must insure that this program is given close personal attention so that employees will maintain the highest degree of physical fitness and desirable appearance.

2/16/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-10

(C) FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY - RETRAINING SESSIONS -- By SAC Letter 59-63 (A) you were advised that there would be no retraining session for FBI National Academy graduates in Washington during 1960 and you should, therefore, continue with the present procedure of holding state and regional retraining sessions for the graduates in your area. The Bureau should be advised by June 30 or 30 days in advance of the retraining session, whichever is earlier, as to the dates and place of your 1960 retraining session, together with the detailed program to be followed. You are again reminded that in preparing your program you should place emphasis upon the training aspects of these retraining sessions and the program should be one that will be interesting, valuable, and timely. Those eligible to attend are National Academy graduates in good standing and actively engaged in law enforcement or regularly retired therefrom.

2/16/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-10

(D) TRAINING - POLICE - USE OF STUDY QUESTIONS BASED UPON "FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN" REPRINTS -- One office has had excellent results at police training schools by distributing Reprints from the "FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin" pertinent to various scheduled topics. The unusual feature, however, is that each Reprint is accompanied by a list of questions, based upon the contents, for the officers to answer after reading the article. This practice encourages the officers to read the Reprint with a purpose in mind and stimulates profitable study. Consider adopting this technique in your police schools for subjects to which it is applicable.

2/16/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-10

(E) VISIT OF CHANCELLOR KONRAD ADENAUER OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY TO THE UNITED STATES -- Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of West Germany will arrive in New York City by special plane on March 12, 1960. He will arrive in Washington, D. C., on March 15, 1960, to confer with President Eisenhower. He plans to leave Washington, D. C., on March 17, 1960, for the West Coast of the United States from whence he will depart for Japan.

In connection with Adenauer's visit, all offices should be alert for any data indicating anti-German demonstrations which may be fomented by Communist Party or nationality groups in the U. S., data indicating a threat to the personal safety of the Chancellor or members of his group and any intelligence data regarding proposals which may be discussed at the forthcoming conference, together with any related data revealing the reactions of any foreign Government to such matters.

Sources and informants in a position to acquire the above-mentioned data should be alerted to the necessity of prompt reporting and the Bureau should be immediately advised if any such data is received.

2/16/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-10

(F) U. S. ATTORNEYS - SUGGESTIONS -- The U. S. Attorneys' Conference at the Seat of Government will be held on April 4 and 5, 1960. One purpose of this conference is to give U. S. Attorneys an opportunity to resolve questions concerning the operation of their offices and the prosecution of their cases. Should any such problem concern the work of the Bureau, advance knowledge at Bureau headquarters should be of help in solving the difficulty during the forthcoming conference.

Each Special Agent in Charge should arrange a personal contact between himself and each U. S. Attorney in his field office territory in the near future. Any purely local problem or criticism offered by a U. S. Attorney should be made clear in all its details, and resolved promptly either by you or by referring the matter to the Bureau. Each contact, regardless of whether the U. S. Attorney has suggestions or problems, must be reported to the Bureau in a separate letterhead memorandum on each U. S. Attorney contacted. Submit an original and two copies of each memorandum by cover letter to the Bureau, attention Training and Inspection Division, not later than March 18, 1960. This deadline must be met.

2/16/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-10

If there is any doubt concerning the advisability of contacting a given U. S. Attorney, this fact should be brought promptly to the attention of the Bureau with the SAC's recommendation. If the U. S. Attorney has been contacted very recently and such a discussion was then held, another contact will not be required if you feel certain he has no problems to bring up. If this is the case, the Bureau should be so advised.

2/16/60  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-10

(G) FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY - 66TH SESSION -- By SAC Letters 59-28 (E) and 59-38 (D) you were advised of the starting and ending dates of the 66th Session of the FBI National Academy. The Bureau is changing the starting and graduation dates so that this class will now begin on Monday, August 15, and will graduate on Wednesday, November 2, 1960.

2/16/60  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-10

(H) FEDERAL AVIATION AGENCY - PILOT AND AIRCRAFT RECORDS -- The Federal Aviation Agency has advised that pilot and aircraft records are being transferred from Washington, D. C., to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on or about March 1, 1960. The address will be:

Examination and Records Division  
Bureau of Flight Standards  
Federal Aviation Agency  
Home State Life Building  
621 North Robinson Avenue  
Oklahoma City 2, Oklahoma

It is anticipated that operation at the new headquarters will begin by March 10, 1960.

Washington Field Office can handle requests for information regarding pilot certificates and ownership of aircraft through February 22, 1960, after which time such requests should be directed to Oklahoma City.

The Medical Records Branch will remain in Washington, D. C., and leads to review medical records should continue to be furnished to Washington Field.

2/16/60  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-10

- 4 -

(I) BUREAU APPLICANT MATTERS - APPLICANTS SUGGESTED BY BUREAU EMPLOYEES - FBI FORM BOOK -- In connection with recruitment of Bureau applicants, the Bureau has prepared for distribution to all Bureau employees, a form on which names and pertinent data of suggested applicants can be set forth. Upon receipt of these forms, copies should be immediately distributed to your employees. Copies should also be furnished to all new employees as they enter on duty.

There are enclosed three copies of FD-322, one of which should be placed in the FBI Form Book. An ample supply is being forwarded to you under separate cover.

(Security Letters on attached page)

2/16/60  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-10

- 5 -

(J) GESELLSCHAFT FUR KULTURELLE VERBINDUNGEN MIT DEM AUSLAND -  
(Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries) -- A  
number of SACS have indicated receipt by persons in their ter-  
ritories of copies of a form letter on the letterhead of  
Gesellschaft fur Kulturelle Verbindungen mit dem Ausland (Society  
for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries), Berlin, East  
Germany. This letter indicates mailing list obtained from Koba  
Bakery in Dresden, Germany. This bakery is famous for its fruit-  
cakes which are shipped all over the world. A copy of this letter  
has been translated by Bureau and consists of nostalgic reminders  
of life in Germany with communist propaganda overtones. It  
appears to be designed to influence recipients to come to East  
Germany. These letters should not be sent to Bureau unless  
unusual circumstances involved.

2/16/60  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-10

(K) INFORMANTS AND SOURCES, CHANNELIZATION OF INFORMATION RECEIVED  
FROM -- When a stencil is prepared to channelize information re-  
ceived from informants and sources to various files in the field  
office, the block stamp may be typed on the stencil. In such  
instances, the date to be used in the block stamp is the date the  
typing was completed.

For the information of those offices having multilith  
equipment, the Chicago Office has advised that the multilith  
company markets "duplimat stamp pad ink." Chicago has used such  
stamp pad ink in a regular stamp pad and has used a regular block-  
stamp machine in stamping the block stamp upon the multilith  
material before it is duplicated. The special ink thus block  
stamped on the material is fully reproduced when the material is  
run off. This special ink cannot be used for mimeographed  
reproduction.

If used, the above procedure should be confined to copies  
for use within your own office.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures for (B) & (I)

2/16/60  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-10

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PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 60-D  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

February 29, 1960

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.


RE: BUREAU CODES - AFSAM 7

In order to avoid undue correspondence with the field, when an employee is henceforth authorized to receive cipher machine training, you should insure that the training is handled promptly and the Bureau notified within a period of not more than 30 days that the employee is fully qualified to use the equipment and is thoroughly familiar with the AFSAM 7 Manual of Operation and Routine Maintenance.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-11  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

February 19, 1960

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) PERSONNEL MATTER - LIMITED DUTY AGENTS - PREMIUM OVERTIME ---  
I am concerned over the number of Special Agents whose physical limitations prohibit them from discharging the normal, everyday responsibilities expected of our agent personnel. In many instances physical limitations not only restrict such agents from performing arduous duties but also result in only token compliance with overtime requirements toward premium pay.

You should of course insure that each limited duty agent is assigned duties consistent with his physical limitations.

Each SAC should immediately review the performance of all limited duty agents within his office to ascertain in what respects the agent's physical limitations prevent him from handling all duties and overtime responsibilities inherent in the Special Agent position. In those instances where it is found that the Special Agent's physical disability prevents him from completely discharging normal agent duties including equitably sharing the office overtime, you should carefully analyze his case to determine if he is, in fact fulfilling all requirements necessary to qualify for premium overtime pay. Should it appear that his physical condition precludes his meeting all necessary requirements to qualify for premium pay benefits, he should not continue to be certified for such benefits. Particular attention should be given to those who are consistently below the office average overtime. The mere fact that he performs the amount of overtime necessary to qualify for premium pay is not sufficient. He must meet the necessary requirements as to frequency and type of overtime called for by the Fringe Benefits Act. This would include availability for weekend and emergency duty beyond normal working hours.

You should immediately submit your comments to the Bureau as to each limited duty agent in line with the foregoing, together with your recommendations concerning his continued eligibility for premium pay benefits.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-12

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

February 23, 1960

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) POSITION CLASSIFICATION MATTERS - GRADE GS 4 AND GS 5 FIELD STENOGRAPHER POSITIONS -- Enclosed are two copies each of master descriptions for Clerk-Stenographer GS 4 and Clerk-Stenographer GS 5 positions in the field office stenographic pools. It is desired that the GS 4 position be utilized in lieu of existing GS 4 stenographer positions in the stenographic pools. This will permit use of one standardized-type position description for all field offices instead of having individual positions on record for each office. Forward to the Bureau the two copies of the properly executed Position Description Form FD-243 (i.e., have appropriate employees sign lines 5, 6 and 7) and identify by official position title and number position(s), occupied or vacant, which are to be absorbed by the master description. Bureau records will be adjusted to reassign the employees occupying the positions listed.

Bureau has secured Civil Service Commission approval for a GS 5 straight stenographic position in the field office stenographic pools. Duties of position are set out in the enclosed position description for Clerk-Stenographer GS 5. Principal distinctions between the GS 4 and the GS 5 positions are: (1) the GS 5 takes somewhat more complex dictation at 120 words per minute as compared with 80 words per minute for the GS 4; (2) production of the GS 5 normally exceeds that of the GS 4 stenographer in a given field office by 20 to 30% or more; (3) the GS 5 makes less frequent reference to the stenographers' manual and requires less supervision; (4) the GS 5 must have served approximately a year as a GS 4 Bureau stenographer; and (5) the GS 5 prepares certain forms, airtels, letters, memoranda, and the like, on own initiative or on very general instructions.

Forward to the Bureau the two copies of properly executed FD-243 and identify the employees who are qualified for and whom you recommend for promotion to the grade GS 5 position. Include the 120 word-per-minute stenographic test, information regarding production, and usual justification for those who are to be promoted. The new Clerk-Stenographer GS 5 position will replace the position of Confidential Clerk (Stenography) GS 5 referred to in SAC Letter 58-42 (B) in offices having such a position unless there are circumstances in any particular office which would make such action undesirable. In the absence of such circumstances Bureau will adjust its records to show that all incumbents of the existing Confidential Clerk position are assigned to the Clerk-Stenographer GS 5 position when the latter is placed on record. If all incumbents of the Confidential Clerk (Stenography) GS 5 position do not presently meet production and other requirements of new Clerk-Stenographer GS 5



position, you should advise the Bureau and take immediate steps to see that employees become qualified.

Duties as set forth in the master descriptions are not to be amended or changed in any way; however, this does not preclude using the incumbents on commensurate grade-level duties of temporary emergency nature. Your replies are to be received by the Bureau, marked to attention of Personnel Section, within 30 days after receipt of this letter.

2/23/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-12

(B) FOREIGN LANGUAGE TRAINING PROGRAM -- It has been incumbent upon us to gradually extend this program for purpose of assuring our investigative responsibilities are discharged effectively. You should know, however, that results of field-wide surveys conducted during past year for candidates to attend foreign language schools - excepting case of Spanish - have been disappointing with regard to both quantity and quality of personnel, and following items being brought to your attention at this time.

Selection of Agents for training is a most important aspect which involves several considerations. First, it is Bureau's desire to train volunteers whenever possible since volunteers more than likely will have essential degree of interest. In addition, emphasis is placed on language background, scholastic achievement, availability, initiative, physical fitness, Reserve status and general over-all Bureau performance. Finally, considerable weight is given your personal recommendation with respect to whether you feel candidate can successfully assimilate training. Bearing in mind our investigative staff is composed primarily of lawyers and accountants rather than linguists, it has been Bureau's experience two essential characteristics for prospective trainees are motivation and above-average intelligence. To propose employee for some other reason such as first-office Agent because he will soon be due for transfer accomplishes nothing. To propose employee who already has another language skill used from day to day would certainly appear questionable if thereafter Bureau would have to train replacement. Careful selection of candidates is basis of successful program. This important step must be initially resolved in field. You are in by far best position to recommend most promising candidates.

All necessary measures being taken to anticipate and fill future needs for personnel capable of handling such specialized work by continuing program of instruction. Bureau intends to

2/23/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-12

- 2 -

maintain sufficient staff to provide for rotation on several types of assignments involved in foreign language field and avoid, for example, situation where Agent remains for undue period on technical surveillance because no other qualified employee available to handle job. Quite to contrary, realizing Bureau must derive equal return on investment by using for reasonable time skills these men have acquired at Government expense, language training should in no way adversely affect Agent by interfering with administrative advancement or ultimate transfer to office of preference. In this continuing program, divisions with appreciable work in foreign language field should have enough qualified personnel to meet their needs, thereby reducing to minimum movement of Agents on special assignment from one office to another. From realistic standpoint, however, there must be sufficient work to keep employee gainfully occupied in foreign language field and preclude gradual loss of linguistic fluency.

From Agent's individual standpoint, successful completion of Bureau school in which he becomes equipped to capably handle foreign language assignments is not only gratis education in itself but one for which he has actually been paid substantial salary to acquire, and benefits Agent personally by broadening his background and experience. Agents with capacity in foreign languages are invaluable to Bureau and decided assets to field's investigative potential. By volunteering for such intensive training, however, I realize Agent demonstrates most commendable attitude in offering to assist Bureau and Bureau does not intend to overlook this.

As result of recent survey to determine Bureau's language needs projected over next two years, arrangements being made for following courses at Army Language School, Monterey, California: Albanian; Chinese, Mandarin dialect; Chinese, Toyshan dialect; Czech; Hungarian; Polish; Rumanian; Serbo-Croatian. These require forty-seven weeks except Rumanian which is of thirty-seven weeks' duration. Candidates must be available without qualification and must execute agreement to remain in Bureau for three years upon completion of training. Canvass all Agents and furnish Bureau, attention FBI Laboratory, by March 15, 1960, names of those interested in above schools together with comments on: (1) availability of each man; (2) his motivation, initiative, physical fitness, language background, Reserve status; (3) whether you feel he could successfully assimilate training; (4) your personal recommendation accompanied in unfavorable cases by reasons therefor.

2/23/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-12

- 3 -

(C) REPORT WRITING - FBI FORM BOOK -- Henceforth, all material which may become testimony is to be put on one form, a revised FD-302. These forms are being prepared and a supply will be sent to the field in the near future. Enclosed are three copies, one of which should be placed in the FBI Form Book.

(Security Letter on attached page)

2/23/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-12

- 4 -

(D) INVESTIGATIONS OF SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS - INTERNAL SECURITY -- Recent anti-Semitic incidents have received nationwide publicity.

The Communist Party (CP), always alert to capitalize on any event which may cause or increase discord among the so-called minority groups, and for any evidence of the revival of fascism, has been publicizing those incidents. It is possible the CP may form front organizations to further spread the publicity efforts of the CP. Also, those incidents may stimulate the formation of organizations similar to the former German-American Bund.

You should be alert to the formation of any subversive organizations in this regard. Information relating to such organizations should be submitted to the Bureau promptly under caption of the individual organization. Your communication should set forth all information available concerning the organization, together with your recommendation as to whether an investigation should be initiated under the provisions of Section 87 E of the Manual of Instructions. No investigation should be initiated without prior Bureau authority.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures for (A) & (C)

2/23/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-12

- 5 -



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-14  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

March 8, 1960

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) REGISTERED MAIL - POST OFFICE RETURN RECEIPT CARDS -- Survey reflects Bureau currently receiving from field approximately 250 pieces of registered mail per month with Post Office return receipt cards attached for which no apparent need can be discerned requiring use of such receipt cards. These cards cost 10 cents each.

Existing manual instructions require only that Post Office return receipt cards be used for transmission of confidential blue slips, vouchers and reports on confidential funds, items of evidence in unusual cases, and for Secret or Top Secret National Defense material being sent outside the Bureau. In the interest of economy, be certain that Post Office return receipt cards are used only where necessary.

3/8/60  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-14

(B) RADIO - POLICE RADIOS IN BUREAU CARS -- Due to the increasing need for additional communications channels, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has ruled that state and local police agencies must fully convert to narrow-band (split-channel) operation on or before November 1, 1963. In order to accomplish this, existing police frequency wide-band equipment must be modified or replaced with new narrow-band equipment.

One provision of the FCC ruling requires that police departments operating on frequencies above 42 mc. must reduce transmitter deviation to plus or minus 5 kc. on or before August 1, 1960. This is only a partial transition to full narrow-band operation and can be accomplished in most instances by adjustment of the modulation control on wide-band transmitters. While this is the only requirement which must be met by the August 1, 1960, date, it is possible that some police agencies will take additional steps to improve operational efficiency and some agencies will probably make the full narrow-band conversion by that date. Other agencies, particularly those operating on frequencies below 42 mc., possibly will not fully convert to narrow-band operation until the November 1, 1963, deadline.

The Bureau equipment operating on police frequencies must be modified or replaced with narrow-band equipment at such time as the change to narrow-band operation is made by the respective

police agencies. It is contemplated that Bureau equipment will be changed to the same extent and at the same time as the change is made by police agencies.

Since the receiver conversion is the most expensive phase of the change from wide-band to full narrow-band operation, it is expected that many police agencies will not fully convert wide-band receivers until sometime after August 1, 1960. However, minor changes to increase the audio recovery of receivers will probably be necessary when the transmitter deviation is reduced to plus or minus 5 kc.

Some of the Bureau equipment operating on police frequencies is nearing the end of its useful life. Therefore, it is anticipated that after July 1, 1960, some of the older units can be replaced with new equipment. In view of this, any narrow-band modifications made to the older equipment, i.e., General Electric Model 4ETR6B, should be only to the extent necessary to continue operation on the police frequency until such time as new equipment can be furnished.

You should maintain close liaison with police agencies on whose frequencies Bureau equipment is operating so as to be aware of the steps to be taken toward narrow-band conversion by the police agencies. This information, as soon as available, should be furnished the Bureau with the number, make and model of Bureau radios which must be modified or replaced in order to continue operations on the police frequency.

There is attached further information regarding narrow-band conversion of mobile radio equipment presently in use by the Bureau on police frequencies. This attachment should be brought to the attention of your Electronics Maintenance Technician or other interested personnel for use in requesting narrow-band conversion kits from the Bureau when needed.

3/8/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-14

(C) IDENTIFICATION MATTERS - FORMS - SUBMISSION OF PHOTOGRAPHS - FBI FORM BOOK -- Form FD-198 is being discontinued; remove from FBI Form Book and destroy supply. In the future, photographs should be submitted by routing slip (legible longhand satisfactory) to the attention of the Identification Division.

3/8/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-14

- 2 -

Each photograph should contain on reverse side the name of the subject; his FBI or other identifying number and the name of office submitting.

3/8/60  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-14

(D) 1960 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING -- A census of population and housing is to be taken by the Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce, beginning April 1, 1960. In addition to information normally required in such a census, occupants of one out of every four housing units will be required to furnish supplemental data relating to employment. Principally the employment information will relate to the name of the employer, kind of business, kind of work, place of employment, number of weeks worked in 1959, earnings in 1959, and whether employment is by private enterprise or by Governmental agency.

Material made available by the Bureau of the Census shows that inquiries made in connection with the taking of the census as a matter of law must be answered completely and accurately and, of course, the Bureau desires its employees to respond correctly to authorized inquiries of census enumerators. At the same time all employees should be reminded of the confidential nature of the Bureau's official information. In the event any attempts are made by census enumerators to obtain confidential Bureau information or otherwise unauthorized information, the Bureau should immediately be advised.

3/8/60  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-14

(E) FEDERAL TRAIN WRECK STATUTE MATTERS (NEW CLASSIFICATION) --  
Federal Train Wreck Statute matters are now supervised in the  
Investigative Division.

In all future correspondence carrying the character  
ederal Train Wreck Statute the classification 160 should be  
used. In all new cases opened under this character, the clas-  
sification 160 should be used.

Changes for manuals and handbooks are being prepared  
and will be forwarded to your office.

(Security Letters on attached pages)

3/8/60  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-14

- 4 -



(F) SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS -- Security subjects who are past or present members of the Communist Party or other basic revolutionary organizations have obtained Christmas season employment at post offices and have falsified their employment applications by denying subversive affiliations. These violations of Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1001, will not be brought to the attention of the Bureau at the Seat of Government or in the field automatically because national agency checks are not made on these applicants. Violations will be discovered usually by a check of post office records during security investigations. Christmas post office employment applications (Form POD 1744) are maintained by postmasters for one year and consideration should be given to checking them in the course of security investigations. Note that violators have included housewives and persons who held other full-time employment.

3/8/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-14

(G) ESPIONAGE - DOUBLE AGENT PROGRAM - CREATING COVER STORIES TO SUPPORT THE DOUBLE AGENT -- A recent development in an espionage operation involving a Bureau double agent has illustrated the importance of creating proper cover stories to support statements made by a double agent to his principal and his acquisition of information passed to the principal. In this instance, the double agent had furnished information which he had obtained from a third person whom he had recruited in accordance with the instructions of his principal. After he had passed the information, the principal asked a number of searching questions such as: 1. Where and how did he (the third person) keep the notes of his observations until he passed them on to the double agent. 2. To obtain information, what type of people does he intend to contact and does he intend to start with a specific person. 3. In what manner was the data obtained which related to the displacement of a ship which was in port. 4. How does he explain to his family when he takes a trip to obtain information for "us" and does his family know about "our business."

This is furnished for your guidance and you must insure that adequate and appropriate cover stories are developed to support every double agent operation and to support all of the information "acquired" by the double agents for passage to their principals.

3/8/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-14

- 5 -

(H) NUCLEAR ACCIDENT CONTROL - DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY -- The Department of the Army has prepared a procedure for use of United States Continental Army Command to control and/or minimize the hazardous effect of an accident involving nuclear weapons (an atomic warhead with its adaption kit, the nuclear and nonnuclear components of an atomic demolition munition, or the nuclear and nonnuclear components of an atomic artillery shell). An accident of this type is defined by the Army as an event involving a nuclear weapon or component resulting in loss or serious damage to the weapon, detonation of the weapon, radioactive contamination, or public hazard. Each Continental Army Command is instructed to notify the nearest local FBI office upon the occurrence of a nuclear accident. The Bureau will not investigate these accidents as such, since this is responsibility of Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center (refer to SAC Letter Number 58-79 (C), December 9, 1958.) If facts as reported by a Continental Army Command indicate violation of statutes within Bureau's jurisdiction (for example, Sabotage, Federal Train Wreck, Destruction of Government Property, Espionage, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and so forth), institute investigation to resolve matter. Promptly advise Bureau if Continental Army Command refers accidents of this type to your office.

Procedures have also been adopted by the Army for handling of incidents (defined by the Army as minor occurrences) involving nuclear weapons, but these are not to be referred to the Bureau by a Continental Army Command.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosure for (B)

3/8/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-14

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60-1400

## Narrow-Band Conversion of Mobile Two-Way Radios

General Electric Transmitter Model 4ET6B1, 2, 3. Conversion involves:

- (1) Changing crystal multiplication factor from 24 to 12
- (2) ~~Adding a new crystal~~
- (3) Adding a postlimiter filter
- (4) Reducing modulation setting

Only item 4 must be completed for frequencies above 42 mc. by August 1, 1960. Full conversion (all items) must be completed for all police frequencies by November 1, 1963.

Conversion Kit PL-4032566-G3 provides all components, except crystal, for making full narrow-band conversion. Crystal #4032125-P1 also required.

General Electric Receiver Model 4ER6B1, 2, 3. Conversion involves:

- (1) Changing low IF frequency to 455 kc.
- (2) Replacing low IF transformers (3)
- (3) Replacing discriminator transformer
- (4) Replace second converter crystal with new crystal cut to 5545 kc.
- (5) Increasing gain of audio amplifier to compensate for the lower audio recovery by the receiver discriminator
- (6) Modifying squelch circuit to compensate for the reduced noise level at the discriminator output resulting from the narrower pass-band

Conversion Kit #4032571-G1 contains all necessary parts, including crystal, to convert receiver to narrow-band operation.

Motorola Model FMTR-140D-C3R3(A) 1D. Transmitter chassis #PA8693B - (suffix 11 and higher do not require kit #SK9468). Conversion involves:

- (1) Reducing modulation setting
- (2) Adding audio filter kit (in chassis #PA8693B with suffix below 11)

Audio Filter Kit is Motorola part #SK9468.

Receiver chassis #PA9244R3. Conversion involves:

- (1) Replacing filter with narrow-band "Permakay" filter
- (2) Audio/squelch modification

Conversion Kit #SK9483 contains all necessary parts for receiver narrow-band conversion.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

March 22, 1960

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) FBI FORM BOOK -- Enclosed are revised Tables of Contents for Volumes I and II, and pages 1 through 6, 8 through 10, 12, and 13 of the Index for the FBI Form Book. The forms listed below have been revised by change in format, by transfer to Optional Form 10, "United States Government Memorandum" (replacing Standard Form 64, "Office Memorandum - United States Government"), or both:

- FD-1b -- Assignment Card
- FD-5 -- File - Serial Charge Out
- FD-65 -- Fugitive Form Letter
- FD-67a -- Acknowledgment of Transfer Orders and Contemplated Departure and Arrival Dates
- FD-85 -- Error Form (Field and SOG)
- FD-109 -- Records Transferred of Agent Transferred
- FD-111 -- Semiannual Motor Vehicle Report, Cost of operation and Accrued Mileage of Bureau-owned Vehicles
- FD-122 -- Recommendation for Preparation of, or Change in, Security Index Card
- FD-132 -- Request for Approval of Local police School and/or Assignment of Bureau Instructors
- FD-184 -- Record of Preliminary Checks and Interview Concerning Plant Informant
- FD-196 -- Request for Search in National Fraudulent Check File
- FD-197 -- File Locate
- FD-200 -- Request for Stenographers
- FD-208 -- Illnesses and Deaths
- FD-220 -- Deserter Fugitive Airtel
- FD-220a -- Deserter Fugitive Airtel (copy for Armed Forces)
- FD-227 -- Request for Mail Cover Authorization
- FD-298 -- Letter Instructing the Cincinnati Office to Request Search of Company Files
- FD-305 -- Insert to Cover Pages in Security Index Cases Accompanying Reports to the Bureau
- FD-316 -- Request for Name Check and Fingerprint Searches on Field Maintenance Employees

Place one of the three enclosed copies of each of the revised forms in your FBI Form Book. Present supplies of these forms will be depleted before revised forms are distributed.

Form FD-30a, "General Appearance Form," has been discontinued and replaced by Form 1-68a, which will be used exclusively by the Identification Division. Remove FD-30a from the FBI Form Book and destroy all copies.

(B) ADMINISTRATIVE - FILING SYSTEM -- A time-saving suggestion has recently been adopted in a field division. It involves using a Kardex in lieu of a 3 x 5 card index box, which is now generally used throughout the field, for assigning new case numbers by the clerical employee who opens new cases. The advantage is the time saved by merely flipping a Kardex pocket rather than having to pull a 3 x 5 card for each new case number. Kardex pockets are labeled by classification number. Consider utilizing the Kardex system if you feel it would be advantageous in your office.

3/22/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-16

(C) VOLUNTARY OVERTIME - PREMIUM PAY BENEFITS -- It has been noted during a review of the records of overtime performance by Special Agents over an extended period that in many instances the average voluntary overtime of individuals is consistently substantially below that of the office. In some instances this is apparently due to physical disability; in other instances since the individual appeared able, it was apparently due to lack of inclination. These Agents were being certified by their Special Agents in Charge to receive premium pay benefits. The payment of these benefits to Agents who either cannot or do not carry their fair share of the workload is manifestly unfair to the vast majority who willingly and cheerfully accept their responsibility.

If an Agent is unable to perform the average overtime being performed by his office, or being able does not do so, he should not be assigned work that would require overtime and should not be certified to receive premium pay benefits.

This must be accepted as a personal responsibility to be looked into by the division head.

Instances of consistently below-average overtime should be discussed by the division head with the individual. Instances where there is no probability that physical condition will permit equitable sharing of the workload should not be certified. Instances involving ability but apparent lack of inclination to do so should likewise not be certified. Appropriate spot checks will be made by the Bureau to insure that this responsibility is being carried out.

3/22/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-16

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(D) REPORT WRITING - FORM FD-302 -- SAC Letter 60-12 (C) instructed that henceforth all material which might become testimony is to be put on one form, a revision of Form FD-302. In the interests of economy, you may continue to use any existing supplies of the old FD-302 in reporting interviews which might become testimony. The latest revision of FD-302 (Revised 1-25-60) should be used for material which might become testimony other than interviews, such as results of crime scene search by an agent or similar data which might be used as testimony formerly recorded on form OF-10. When your supplies of the old form are exhausted, then the latest revision should be used for both types of material. In the event you have supplies of plastiplate preprinted masters of FD-302, you should continue using them where needed for reporting interviews, or you may find it practicable to use correction fluid in blocking out the words "Interview Report" at the top of the form, and the words "Interview With" and "Special Agent" at the bottom. This would provide a plastiplate master substantially like the latest revision of the form.

3/22/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-16

(E) POLICE COOPERATION - STRESSING ITS IMPORTANCE -- Recently, there have been several public statements indicating that many people are not aware of the outstanding cooperation which exists at all levels among law enforcement agencies throughout the Nation. Such inaccurate appraisals can be a definite threat to effective law enforcement.

As the recognized leader in establishing and fostering better cooperation in the law enforcement field, it is imperative that we not allow the American people to be unaware of this cooperation. We must insure that all law enforcement agencies are fully acquainted with all of our cooperative functions and that the public is informed regarding our accomplishments in this regard. Too, we must not create or allow to exist any impression that we do not receive excellent cooperation and assistance from other law enforcement agencies.

Each Bureau speaker and police instructor should endeavor to work into every appearance some reference to cooperation, citing, where practical, actual cases in which success has been realized as a result of members of different agencies working together. The various booklets, reprints, interesting case write-ups and similar items which are sent to you from time to time contain a wealth of excellent material which can be used in this regard. In addition to stressing the topic of cooperation in

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SAC LETTER NO. 60-16

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public appearances, each Special Agent should be alert for opportunities to emphasize the proven value of cooperation among law enforcement agencies during his daily contacts.

With respect to the booklets and reprints which are issued at the Seat of Government, these are of no value whatever unless they are placed ~~in the hands of persons who have an~~ interest in the contents. Many of these items are written especially for police officers, prosecuting attorneys, United States attorneys and other persons associated with law enforcement work, and whenever there is a change of personnel in these positions, the new individuals should be furnished copies. As new and revised booklets and reprints are sent to you, they should be distributed to all appropriate persons.

One of the best methods of informing the public about the extent of cooperation between the FBI and other agencies is through feature stories in newspapers and other publications. You should immediately take steps to encourage newspapers in your area to publish feature articles which point out the effectiveness of cooperation in the fight against crime. Friendly local authorities should be encouraged to "talk up" cooperation during their daily contacts and especially in their dealings with representatives of the press.

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SAC LETTER NO. 60-16

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(F) DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT OR MOTOR VEHICLES -- Recent major commercial aircraft disasters and their resultant tragic loss of life are matters of grave concern. In view of their importance and the necessity that the Bureau be in a position to investigate any violations arising from such disasters efficiently and aggressively, the following procedures are to be placed into effect immediately.

Action To Be Taken By SAC

The SAC will

1. Immediately advise the Bureau by telephone of any major commercial aircraft disaster;
2. Immediately thereafter proceed to the scene of the disaster in order to develop any information indicating a Federal violation within the Bureau's jurisdiction. To this end he will
  - a. Establish close liaison with local law enforcement officers and Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) authorities in order to insure that evidence is properly identified and protected. This will materially aid those responsible for examining the evidence among whom will be a representative of the Bureau Laboratory.
  - b. Closely follow investigation by CAB authorities to insure that full scale Bureau investigation is initiated immediately upon receipt of indication that a violation has occurred.
  - c. Arrange to obtain a passenger manifest and initiate whatever inquiries are necessary to determine sufficient background data concerning each passenger so that an immediate and efficient check may be made of Bureau indices and the indices of the field office covering the residence of the passenger. This action will assist the Bureau Disaster Squad in its efforts to positively identify passengers killed or injured in the crash, and develop at the earliest possible moment pertinent data in Bureau files indicating the possibility of an actual violation.

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- d. Personally direct appropriate investigative activity of any matters within our jurisdiction to insure same is handled expeditiously.
- e. Afford on-the-spot direction to logical immediate investigative activity pertinent to determining whether a violation within Bureau's jurisdiction has occurred. Consideration should be given to the following:
  - (1) Preparation of appropriate photographs of and sketches of the scene of the crash and photographs of pertinent portions of the aircraft.
  - (2) Interviews with survivors, eye witnesses, individuals who heard the plane before the crash.

#### Press Inquiries

The Special Agent in Charge should respond to any press inquiries received by indicating that he has arrived at the scene to develop any information indicating a Federal violation. It should also be stated that the Special Agent in Charge is extending the cooperative facilities of the FBI Laboratory and Identification Division.

#### Action To Be Taken By Laboratory Representative

Henceforth in connection with each major commercial aircraft disaster, a representative from the FBI Laboratory will accompany members of the Bureau Disaster Squad to the scene. The representative of the Laboratory will

1. Effect technical liaison with interested Government representatives.
2. Render all possible assistance on the scene to such authorities and where desired arrange for the use of the facilities of the FBI Laboratory.
3. In relation to the Bureau's interests, evaluate technical problems associated with Laboratory matters and evidence at the scene.

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SAC LETTER NO. 60-16

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4. Keep the Special Agent in Charge advised of pertinent developments in the technical investigation so that if a violation is indicated investigation may be initiated at the earliest possible moment.

The Bureau desires and expects the Special Agent in Charge to personally take command in relation to the Bureau's interests in these instances; however, necessary action cannot be delayed due to his absence.

These matters must be handled in a vigorous and expeditious manner to insure that the Bureau's interests are fully protected.

(Security Letter on attached page)

3/22/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-16

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(G) 1960 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING - SECURITY INFORMANTS - CRIMINAL INFORMANTS - PLANT INFORMANTS -- SAC Letter 60-14 (D) instructed that all Bureau employees answer census inquiries accurately but that they should be reminded of the confidential nature of the Bureau's official information. Our confidential informants are not Bureau employees and for this purpose can well be regarded as independent contractors. All informants should be alerted, however, that they must answer inquiries of census enumerators but any questions should be answered without disclosing their relationship with the Bureau.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures for (A)

3/22/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-16

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

April 27, 1960

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7

~~One set of AFSAM 7 key lists for months of June, July,~~  
nd August, 1960, is being forwarded separately to all  
divisions except Washington Field which will receive none;  
three copies being furnished Bureau's Emergency Relocation  
Site; and three copies Seat of Government Code Room.

Acknowledge receipt of key lists promptly by routing  
slip, indicating serial numbers which appear thereon; return  
address label of individual tamperproofed envelope containing  
keys even though torn when package opened; and destroy, by  
burning, each monthly sheet thirty days after last effective  
date thereof, advising Bureau promptly by routing slip,  
attention FBI Laboratory, this has been done.

It is essential address label mentioned above be  
returned in order to control security of shipment.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 60-F  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

May 10, 1960

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RE: BUREAU CODES

You should make the following manual changes in your KAM-1/TSEC, Repair and Maintenance Instructions for TSEC/KL-7 (AFSAM 7) - Joint: 1. page 117, paragraph 6405, line 4, change "4-1/2" to "2-1/2"; 2. page 118, paragraph 6501, line 1, after "31-D" add "and figure 58" 3. page 118, paragraph 6501C, after last sentence, add "Tips of pressure contacts K6 and those of the A, D, and E-prefixed groups should require 2-1/2 to 8 ounces to depress the tips flush with upper surface of contact panel."; 4. page 118, paragraph 6504, line 2, change "4-1/2" to "2-1/2"; and 5. pages 227-228, figure 31-C, change "4-1/2" to "2-1/2."

On page 5, Record of Corrections, above-mentioned manual, enter appropriate information reflecting that the changes have been made and advise by routing slip, attention FBI Laboratory, upon completion.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

June 21, 1960

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) PERFORMANCE RATINGS - 90-DAY WARNING -- You should appraise the services of all non-investigative personnel for whom annual performance ratings normally would be due September 30, 1960, to insure that 90-day warning for unsatisfactory performance is given in appropriate cases. Adhere strictly to instructions contained in Part I, Section 5, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations. Ninety-day warning does not guarantee 90 days' grace to an employee when position is such that substantive improvement could be reasonably expected earlier. Employees can be separated for unsatisfactory performance during 90-day period but cannot be given Unsatisfactory annual rating sooner than 90 days after warning.

6/21/60  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-30

(B) PHYSICAL EXAMINATION MATTERS - WEIGHT STANDARDS -- There have been some recent indications that all Special Agents are not aware of the Bureau's weight standards and requirements, new weight chart as contained on FD-300 revised 2-9-60, and Bureau's desire that all Special Agents be within desirable weight limits. It should be the goal of every Special Agent to remain within desirable weight limits. Insure that all Special Agents and officials are well aware of these aspects as contained in SAC letters 59-68(I) and 60-10(B). In the future, lack of knowledge on the part of any Special Agent as to the Bureau's weight standards and weight goal will not be accepted as an excuse for failure to comply.

The Bureau has noted too many recent instances of division heads lackadaisically submitting medical reports concerning Special Agents where the report clearly shows that the employee exceeds the desirable weight limit and no action has been taken or recommendation made. It is again reiterated that it is your prime responsibility to take the appropriate action or submit an appropriate recommendation in such cases. You should take steps to insure that either you or the ASAC has medical reports in such cases referred to you before transmittal to the Bureau to insure such action rather than leaning on the Bureau to initiate the appropriate action. It will be necessary to consider administrative action in the event future failures are noted.

(Security Letter on attached pages)

(C) SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS - RESERVE INDEX --  
The presently constituted Communist Index will henceforth be known as the "Reserve Index."

Institute a review of the Reserve Index. In conducting his review the following minimum steps are to be taken in all instances.

1. Verify residence and employment.

2. Conduct an indices search and file review to determine whether investigation is warranted at this time or whether an interview with the individual is deemed desirable. Interviews with the individuals will be handled in accordance with current Bureau instructions set forth in Section 87D of the Manual of Instructions.

3. If additional investigation is conducted or if there is unreported information of a subversive nature contained in the files, a report must be submitted.

The re-examination of the Reserve Index may be made in equal monthly divisions for one year. Advise the Bureau quarterly of your progress.

Recognizing that some individuals included in the Reserve Index represent a greater potential threat in time of an emergency than do others, this Reserve Index is being divided into two sections, Section A and Section B. Each is discussed separately herein.

#### SECTION A

Section A of the Reserve Index is designed to represent a special group of individuals who should receive priority consideration with respect to investigation and/or other action following the apprehension of our Security Index subjects.

Section A of the Reserve Index should include those individuals whose subversive activities do not bring them within the Security Index criteria, but who, in a time of national emergency, are in a position to influence others against the national interest or are likely to furnish material financial aid to subversive elements due to their subversive associations and ideology. Included in Section A will be those individuals falling within the following categories:

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1. Professors, teachers and educators.
2. Labor union organizers or leaders.
3. Writers, lecturers, newsmen, entertainers and others in the mass media field.
4. Lawyers, doctors and scientists.
5. Other potentially influential persons on a local or national level.
6. Individuals who could potentially furnish material financial aid.

During the course of the re-examination of the Reserve Index, those individuals falling within the above criteria for inclusion in Section A should be selected therefrom, handled in accordance with the above instructions and, thereafter, nominated for inclusion in Section A of the Reserve Index. Appropriate forms for this purpose will be forwarded all offices in the immediate future. Attached to the form recommending the inclusion of the individual's name in Section A of the Reserve Index should be a succinct summary setting forth the basis for your recommendation. If no further investigation is warranted in the case at this time or if no report is accompanying the recommendation, a statement to that effect should appear on the page containing the succinct summary.

Investigations of individuals listed in Section A of the Reserve Index are to be brought up to date annually, and they are to be considered for Security Index status or retention in the Reserve Index. As a minimum, the previously mentioned investigative steps will be taken, including the submission of reports in the event additional subversive data is developed. Changes in residence and/or employment should be submitted to the Bureau on forms to be furnished the field in the immediate future. The administrative handling of the reopening of these cases should be similar to that in the case of annual reports in Security Index cases.

Section A of the Reserve Index will be maintained in the field and at the Seat of Government in the same manner as our Security Index except that this Index will be maintained only alphabetically. A copy of the Index will be relocated away from headquarters city in the same manner as the Security Index and at the same location. To avoid confusion with the Security Index, however, distinctive colored cards and forms used in connection therewith will be utilized.

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SAC LETTER NO. 60-30

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## SECTION B

Section B, containing the names of the remaining individuals included in the Reserve Index, will be maintained in the field in the same manner in which the Communist Index is now being maintained.

Upon the deletion of a subject's name from the Security Index based upon the application of the Security Index criteria, it will be necessary to consider whether his name should then be placed in Section A of the Reserve Index. If his name should so be included, submit an appropriate recommendation. If the facts do not justify the inclusion of his name in Section A, the canceled Security Index card should be filed in Section B in accordance with current practice.

### Standards for Inclusion of Names in the Reserve Index

The standards for inclusion of individual's names in the Reserve Index were discussed at the Internal Security - Espionage Conference composed of representatives from certain field offices and Bureau supervisors and officials held at the Bureau on June 9-10, 1960. The Conference recommended revision of our present standards for the inclusion of individual's names in the Reserve Index to insure that it fully represents a list of individuals who should be considered for investigation and/or other action following apprehension of our Security Index subjects. The revised standards follow:

1. Membership in a basic revolutionary organization subsequent to January 1, 1949, together with some indication of sympathy or association with such an organization or a subversive front organization subsequent to the reported membership and no reliable evidence of defection.
2. Investigation has failed to substantiate allegations of membership in a revolutionary organization within the past five years, coupled with some evidence or information indicating activity, association or sympathy for the subversive cause within the same period, and no reliable evidence of defection.
3. The individual, within the past five years, by his associations, writings, financial support or conduct in relation to and support of subversive organizations or the international communist movement is in a position to influence others at the time of a national emergency and no reliable evidence of defection.

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SAC LETTER NO. 60-30

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4. Leadership or substantial activities in a major subversive front group over three years ago, together with some evidence of continuing activity, association or sympathy for the subversive cause within three years and no reliable evidence of defection.

5. Membership in a subversive front organization within the past three years and no reliable evidence of defection.

It is not desired that a wholesale review of closed security cases be conducted in efforts to identify additional individuals whose names should be included in the Reserve Index under the revised standards. However, such names should be added as the cases come to the attention of Agents handling security work.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

6/21/60  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-30

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JUNE  
PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 60-G  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

July 1, 1960

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RE: THE CONCEALED AUTO TRANSMITTER (CAT)

The Bureau has developed a small radio transmitter, designated as the Concealed Auto Transmitter (CAT), especially designed for secret installation within an automobile. The CAT may be installed either to broadcast conversations in a subject's vehicle for reception and recording by Agents in a surveilling car or to broadcast a musical tone which can be of assistance in a physical surveillance of the subject's automobile.

Due to the excellent results obtained from some of these installations and in anticipation of increased requests for use of this technique, selected Bureau personnel in five offices have been trained to make authorized installations of this equipment. These Laboratory-trained employees, located at Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, and Washington, will handle CAT installations in their own or nearby territories.

For a CAT installation a secure area must be provided, such as a garage where heavy tools and a car lift or set of jacks are available. Approximately five hours are required for a CAT installation and secure possession of the subject's automobile for such a period of time is essential.

CAT installations are currently in use in the highest level security and criminal cases. Since disclosure of these installations brought about through promiscuous use would be highly undesirable, CAT installations are normally approved only in those cases where extremely important information is anticipated. Should it appear that a CAT installation would be productive in a particular case, you should submit complete justification to the Bureau and request authority for its use.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

June 28, 1960

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) PERSONNEL - PERSONNEL ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS -- When submitting recommendations for any type of personnel action in respect to investigative personnel, if the most recent medical report containing the latest available weight shows that employee exceeds the desirable weight limit under the new weight standards effective since February 9, 1960, it will be mandatory that you supply employee's current weight, height and frame when forwarding such communications to the Bureau. If such employee is found to be over the desirable weight limit, also advise concerning his intentions, insuring that he understands any weight reduction should be under medical supervision.

6/28/60  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-32

(B) PERSONNEL - SURVEY OF SPECIAL AGENTS -- The Bureau has a need for Special Agents possessing creative writing ability. Each SAC should survey the personnel of his office and submit the names of men who have exhibited ability and a flair for writing. The men should be adept in the handling of correspondence and interested in administrative advancement. The results of the survey should be submitted by letter under the caption, "Survey of Special Agents-- Writing Ability, Research (Crime Records)," no later than July 8, 1960.

6/28/60  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-32

(C) FORMS - FBI FORM BOOK -- Future revisions of the Table of Contents and Index for the FBI Form Book and pertinent instructions thereto will be forwarded to your office by cover sheets rather than by SAC Letters. File these cover sheets as a last section in the FBI Form Book for ready reference. Forms matters requiring immediate distribution with specific instructions will be forwarded by SAC Letter or Routing Slip, Form O-7. Record and file the routing slips as a permanent record for future reference.

6/28/60  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-32

(D) PRESIDENT'S APPEAL FOR CHILE DISASTER RELIEF -- The President has made an appeal to help the stricken people of Chile. This is an emergency solicitation appeal as provided for by Federal Fund-Raising Policy. The accounting and reporting procedures prescribed by Federal Policy are waived for this appeal. However, an employee who desires to keep his gift private may place it in an envelope of

his choice. No goals or quotas have been assigned and you should insure that, in accordance with SAC Letter 59-58 (D), all contributions are voluntary.

Contributions of personnel outside the Washington area are to be forwarded to the local chapter of the American Red Cross. Upon request, the local chapter will furnish posters and instructions regarding the solicitation period, required reports, and delivery of contributions. Advise the Bureau of the results of solicitation.

(Security Letter on attached page)

6/28/60  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-32

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(E) SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS - INDIVIDUALS TRAVELING ABROAD - TOUR GROUPS -- When information is received that an individual with a subversive background is forming a tour group for foreign travel or an organization which is considered subversive is sponsoring such a tour, take the following action:

~~Advise appropriate offices under the caption of the~~ tour name or the organization sponsoring the tour, of the identities of the individuals participating in the tour. Also furnish the Bureau a memorandum suitable for dissemination to the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and appropriate Legal Attaches, including therein all readily available information pertaining to the tour, such as itinerary, pertinent dates, names of individuals making up the tour with addresses, if available, and a thumbnail sketch of the organization or individual sponsoring the tour. In the event additional pertinent information relative to the tour is received at a later date, it should also be submitted to the Bureau in form suitable for dissemination.

Memoranda relating to the tours will be disseminated by the Bureau with a statement that as individuals participating are identified recipients will be furnished with memoranda under individual case caption where those individuals are found to have subversive backgrounds. Therefore, it will be incumbent upon the field to immediately identify and submit individual memoranda prepared in accordance with provisions in Section 87D of the Manual of Instructions concerning individuals traveling abroad, with the one exception that the details of travel will be replaced by a reference to the memorandum previously prepared under the caption of the organization sponsoring the tour. The fact that the individual who formed the tour group has a subversive background or that the organization which sponsored the tour is considered subversive does not constitute a basis for the preparation of individual memoranda in the absence of subversive information on the individual traveling.

In addition to the submission of individual memoranda on all members of the tour group with subversive backgrounds, each office should submit a letter to the Bureau, under the organization caption, listing therein the names of those individuals residing within its territory who are traveling with the tour group and on whom no subversive information was found.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

6/28/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-32

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

July 5, 1960

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

(A) TRAINING - POLICE -- You have previously been instructed concerning the necessity of operating our Police Training Program with an economical use of manpower. Occasionally, Bureau finds it desirable to direct a letter to a field office pointing out it appeared a certain police instructor, generally one assigned to a Resident Agency near the locality of a particular school, should handle instruction in the school rather than the instructor originally scheduled to do so.

Bureau is well aware that some police instructors are particularly well qualified to handle certain subjects because of their background, training, or experience. Also, Bureau is aware of the desirability of planned rotation of instructors in our police schools so as to achieve a degree of freshness and at the same time broaden the instructor's experience. In instances wherein you wish to use a certain instructor in a particular police school, even though another apparently qualified instructor is assigned nearer the locality of the school, you should set forth the specific reasons why you are assigning that instructor to handle the instruction, and indicate he will be used unless advised to the contrary by Bureau. Bureau will then consider the assignments on the basis of justification set forth.

You should keep in mind the necessity of economical use of manpower in police training; however, it is not desired that economy be arbitrarily practiced to the sacrifice of the other considerations mentioned herein.

7/5/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-33

(B) SUPPLIES - BUREAU PURCHASES - TRADING STAMPS -- As you are aware, various business firms throughout the country offer trading stamps which are redeemable for merchandise. The Comptroller General of the United States has ruled that such stamps are in the nature of a discount, rebate, or reduction in the price paid, and that it would be in the best interests of the Government to redeem stamps received for Government purchases. However, he has further ruled that the disposition of such stamps is to be handled with the least administrative burden.

Pursuant to decisions made by the Comptroller General of the United States concerning trading stamps, the General Services Administration (GSA), by Circular Number 190 revised, dated May 19,

1960, advised Federal agencies as to the disposition to be made in connection with trading stamps received for Government purchases. As a result of the instructions issued by the GSA, the Bureau desires that all trading stamps received by you and the employees of your office who have occasion to make purchases on behalf of the Bureau be collected, and on a monthly basis turned over to the nearest Federal hospital or other similar Federal institutions operated, managed, or supervised by any one of the following: (1) Veterans Administration, (2) Public Health Service, and (3) Department of Defense. Of this group, preference should be given to the institution which your office uses for physical examinations.

Prior to the transfer of such trading stamps, you should determine that the proposed recipient is prepared to receive and utilize stamps. The transfer of stamps is to be made without reimbursement or accountability. However, you should retain in your files minimum data for record purposes, to show the disposition made of them by your office.

(Security Letter on attached page)

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SAC LETTER NO. 60-33

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(c)

*Third Agency Consideration*

Very truly yours,  
John Edgar Hoover  
Director

7/5/60  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-33

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PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-34

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

July 12, 1960

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(A) RADIO SCRIPT -- The Bureau has prepared a new radio script which is approximately thirty minutes in length and is an informal discussion of the activities of a typical FBI field office. This script can be adapted so that it will be suitable for any office. Copies of the new script are available at the Bureau and requests should be sent marked Attention: Crime Records Division.

7/12/60  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-34

(B) HEALTH MATTER -- Employees with certain allergies and health problems should be alerted that there are commercial firms which manufacture bracelets and medallions in stainless steel and sterling silver on which a particular health problem is inscribed. Some of these health problems pertain to diabetics allergic to penicillin, individuals allergic to bee stings, persons taking cortisone, those allergic to tetanus antitoxin, penicillin, or sulfa drugs, epileptics, and free bleeders. Hospitals, health organizations and service clubs in a number of cities throughout the nation are distributing these bracelets and medallions to such individuals. Experience has shown in a number of cases that data contained thereon alerts a physician rendering emergency treatment which has saved lives. The Bureau is unable to purchase such items for its employees, and it is not practical to set up any formal program for the distribution of cards containing health problems for employees to carry on their person. However, the above information should be disseminated to your employees since some with health problems may desire to purchase such items privately or carry a card which might alert a physician as to an individual health problem. Employees interested should contact their local medical sources for specific data in respect to obtaining the desired item.

7/12/60  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-34

(C) TRAINING - AGENTS' SEMIANNUAL AND TECHNICAL -- The present system of holding Agents' general and technical conferences semiannually is hereby discontinued. Henceforth, the general conference for Agents is to be held annually, following my annual conference with you at the Seat of Government. It is your

responsibility to hold other conferences of all personnel whenever circumstances dictate. Continue to advise Agents of important matters on a current basis at squad conferences (or office conferences in small offices) and at such gatherings as firearms sessions, et cetera.

All Special Agents in Charge who have been to the Seat of Government for conference between January 1 and June 30 of this year need not hold another conference until after their next scheduled conference at the Seat of Government. Each Special Agent in Charge who has not been to the Seat of Government for conference should postpone the present scheduled conference until after his visit to the Seat of Government. Other than the change from semiannual to annual, the instructions set out in the Manual of Rules and Regulations concerning the semiannual general conference will apply to the annual Agents' conference.

Agents are to be given practical technical training at firearms sessions, through the use of equipment on actual cases, and at other convenient and practical times. The required specialized training given to selected Agents should continue to be offered as at present. The technical conference discussions which were scheduled for the July - December period should be given at the next annual general conference. You will be held responsible for seeing that the required training is carried out satisfactorily. Inspectors will check during field inspections to see that technical training is being implemented in an effective manner.

7/12/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-34

(D) PAY INCREASES -- The Bureau is arranging to include the salary increases approved by Congress for employees whose salaries are fixed by the Classification Act in the checks for the pay period beginning July 10, 1960, through July 23, 1960, inclusive, which will be dated August 5, 1960. Under the terms of the law (Public Law 86-568, approved July 1, 1960), the increases are effective the first day of the first pay period beginning on or after July 1, 1960, which for Bureau employees is July 10, 1960. Salaries of employees fixed by Wage Boards are not affected. Copies of Salary Table Number 40 compiled by the General Accounting Office will be forwarded as soon as they are available which is expected to be within the next two weeks.

(Security letters on attached pages)

7/12/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-34

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(E) INTENSIFICATION PROGRAM (COVERAGE OF SOVIET-BLOC "LEGAL" NETWORKS) -- At the Internal Security - Espionage Conference held at the Bureau June 9-10, 1960, the Conference carefully considered our programs aimed at Soviet-bloc officials and official establishments such as the Double Agent, Defector and DESECO Programs. It was recognized that we have two basic objectives. Penetration of the intelligence organizations through the development of double agents, informants, and sources, etc., and neutralization through persona non grata action, prosecution, disruption, etc. In light of the developments subsequent to the U-2 incident, the Conference was of the opinion that the time is now ripe for the Bureau to redirect our approach to apply more pressure against the Soviet-bloc intelligence services in such a way as to have a neutralizing or disruptive effect. As a result of the recommendations of the Conference, the following action has been approved. Each agent handling investigations of Soviet-bloc officials in the United States should become thoroughly familiar with this information.

1. Persona non grata - Each double agent case should be carefully evaluated and in those instances where it appears that we cannot build the double agent into a long-term penetration operation, careful consideration should be given to recommending that the State Department declare the Soviet-bloc principal persona non grata accompanied by publicity. In those instances where the State Department seeks our views as to persona non grata action, the Bureau will not object to such action in cases involving temporary-type double agents with limited intelligence potential provided the action is accompanied by publicity.

2. Prosecution - In those instances involving Soviet-bloc officials who do not have strict diplomatic immunity (as employees of Amtorg Trading Corporation and the United Nations Secretariat) our operations are to be directed toward prosecution wherever possible as a means of focusing public attention on Soviet-bloc espionage even though the officials may thereafter be allowed to depart the United States rather than serve prison sentences.

3. Use of DESECO - Individuals should be recruited on a selective basis who have access to classified information to put in contact with Soviet-bloc officials. When the officials request the individuals to furnish

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such information whenever possible the officials should be confronted with the information in their possession. (Specific Bureau authority should be obtained, however, before implementing the above.)

4. Physical surveillances - When you learn that a Soviet-bloc intelligence official plans to depart for his home country, you should intensify your physical surveillances on him until he departs and wherever possible a defection approach should be made both as a means of possible defection and as a disruptive tactic. (Specific Bureau authority should be obtained before making any approaches however.)

5. Soviet-bloc photography - In those instances where Soviet-bloc officials are observed taking photographs of military installations or national defense facilities, you should give consideration to accosting them and confiscating the photographs under the espionage statute which prohibits photographs of certain national defense installations. (Such action, of course, would be taken only with Bureau authority.)

6. Speeches and public appearances - All offices should be alert to public appearances and speeches made by Soviet-bloc officials in this country. The Bureau should be advised in each instance.

It is necessary that each office obtain Bureau clearance prior to initiating the above action. You should, therefore, communicate with the Bureau by appropriate means depending upon the urgency of the situation and in addition keep the Bureau advised as to the results of any action taken.

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(F) SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION CHARACTERIZATIONS - INTERNAL SECURITY - C -- Set forth below are up-to-date thumbnail sketches of organizations and publications, each of which is of use to various field offices. You are instructed that the sketches set forth in SAC Letters 58-41 (F), 58-81 (K), 59-8 (O), and 59-43 (M) should no longer be used. In the event an office needs to document an organization not mentioned in instant letter, listed in the various issues of the "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications" published by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, or

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designated by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450, a request should be made of the office of origin to furnish the required documentation. You are instructed that in describing a local affiliate of a national organization, in addition to characterizing the local affiliate, it will be necessary to set orth separately the characterization of the parent organization.

The evaluation and identities of the sources should be handled in accordance with instructions set forth in Section 49B 2m (1)(d), page 64, of the FBI Handbook.

For the purpose of evaluation all sources utilized in the preparation of the sketches listed below should be described as having furnished reliable information in the past.

In each sketch utilized below, the field office submitting the sketch has advised that careful consideration was given to each source concealed.

FOUR CONTINENT BOOK CORPORATION

According to the records of the Foreign Agents Registration Section, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., the Four Continent Book Corporation, 822 Broadway, New York City, is registered under the provisions of the Foreign Agents — Registration Act of 1938, as amended. One of the foreign principals listed in this registration is Mezhdunarodnaja Kniga, Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, (International Book). Four Continent Book Corporation also occupies the second and sixth floors of the building at 821 Broadway, New York City.

NATION OF ISLAM, formerly referred  
to as Muslim Cult of Islam, also known  
as Muhammad's Temples of Islam  
FRUIT OF ISLAM  
MUSLIM GIRLS TRAINING

Nation of Islam

In January, 1957, a source advised that Elijah Muhammad had described his organization on a nationwide basis as the "Nation of Islam" and "Muhammad's Temples of Islam."

On May 18, 1960, another source advised that the Nation of Islam (NOI) is an all-Negro organization which was originally organized in 1930 in Detroit, Michigan. Muhammad, its present

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national leader, claims to have been selected by Allah, the Supreme Being, to lead the so-called Negro race out of slavery in the wilderness of North America by establishing an independent black nation in the United States.

Members following Muhammad's teachings and his interpretation of the "Koran" believe there is no such thing as a Negro; that the so-called Negroes are slaves of the white race, referred to as "white devils," in the United States; and that the white race, because of its exploitation of the so-called Negroes, must and will be destroyed in the approaching "War of Armageddon."

In the past, officials and members of the NOI, including Muhammad, have refused to register under the provisions of the Selective Service Acts and have declared that members owe no allegiance to the United States.

On May 5, 1958, the first source related that Muhammad, upon advice of legal counsel, had tempered his personal statements and instructions to his ministers concerning the principles of his organization in order to avoid possible prosecution by the United States Government. However, he did not indicate any fundamental changes in the teachings of his organization.

On May 16, 1960, another source reported that Muhammad, early in July, 1958, had decided to de-emphasize the religious aspects of the teachings of Islam and to stress the economic benefits to be derived by those Negroes who joined the NOI. This policy change, according to Muhammad, would help him to acquire additional followers and create more interest in his programs.

Sources:

DELETED  
DELETED  
DELETED

#### Fruit of Islam

On May 18, 1960, a source advised that the Fruit of Islam (FOI) is a group within the Nation of Islam (NOI) composed of male members of the NOI. The purpose of the FOI is to protect officials and property of the NOI, assure compliance of members with NOI teachings and to prepare for the "War of Armageddon." Members of the FOI are required to participate in military drill and are afforded the opportunity to engage in judo training. The FOI is governed by a military system wherein the members are controlled by general orders similar to those issued by regular military organizations.

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Source: CG 6021-S

Muslim Girls Training

On May 19, 1960, a source advised that the Muslim Girls Training (MGT) is a group within the Nation of Islam (NOI) and is composed of all female members of the NOI. The MGT is similar in structure to the Fruit of Islam (FOI), which is composed of male members of the NOI, in that the MGT has officers, to military organizations, to whom other female members are accountable. MGT members receive instructions in homemaking, hygiene, calisthenics, and other subjects such as Muslim history and the English language. There also exists a Junior MGT, which is composed of female members of the NOI who are between the ages of 15 and 19 and who are afforded military-type drill.

Since 1957 various officers and "sisters" of the MGT have, at meetings of the MGT, used the term MGT so that it also means General Civilization Class. General Civilization Class refers to classes conducted within the MGT.

The above refers to activities of the MGT at Muhammad's Temple of Islam No. 2, 5335 South Greenwood, Chicago, Illinois.

On May 16, 1960, another source advised that the MGT is a group within the NOI, which is composed of all female members of the NOI. The MGT is similar in structure to the FOI, which is composed of male members of the NOI. In theory the MGT exists in all Temples of the NOI and is patterned after the MGT at Muhammad's Temple of Islam No. 2, Chicago. General Civilization Class refers to the collective group of classes held within the MGT.

Sources: DELETED  
DELETED

"POLITICAL AFFAIRS"

The April, 1960, issue of "Political Affairs" identified itself as "A Theoretical and Political Magazine of Scientific Socialism."

While under direct examination as a defense witness in the case of the "United States versus Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, et al.," Criminal Docket C 136-7, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, on October 20, 1952, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn testified that "Political Affairs" is the theoretical organ of the Communist Party of the United States and has been so since the magazine was "set up" in 1945.

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"The Worker," an east coast communist weekly newspaper, in its issue dated January 3, 1960, identified Elizabeth Gurley Flynn as a Vice Chairman of the Communist Party of the United States.

WORKERS WORLD PARTY

On April 17, 1959, a source advised that on February 12, 1959, a Socialist Workers Party (SWP) minority group, under the leadership of national committee member Sam Ballan, known in the SWP as Sam Marcy, split from the SWP.

The source stated that this minority group referred to as the Marcyites, after many years of program and policy differences on varied issues concerning tactics and interpretation of political events, split from the SWP on the grounds that the Party was liquidating itself by departing from the Marxist precepts of Leon Trotsky and retreating from the fight for the world socialist revolution. The final issue which ultimately forced the split was the minority's opposition to the SWP regroupment policy which involved cooperation with the Communist Party (CP) periphery - individuals characterized by the minority as petty-bourgeois.

The minority program, according to the source, advocates the unconditional defense of the Soviet Union and has as its goal the building of a revolutionary party with a complete proletarian orientation for the purpose of overthrowing capitalism in the United States and throughout the world.

On May 12, 1960, the source advised that this minority group had chosen the name Workers World Party with headquarters located at 46 West 21st Street, New York, New York.

The SWP and the CP have been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Source: DELETED

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover

Director

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PERSONAL  
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 60-H  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

August 1, 1960

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RE: BUREAU CODES  
AFSAM 7

One set of AFSAM 7 key lists for months of September, October, and November, 1960, being forwarded separately to all divisions except Washington Field which will receive none; three copies being furnished Bureau's Emergency Relocation Site; and three copies Seat of Government Code Room.

Acknowledge receipt of key lists promptly by routing slip, indicating serial numbers which appear thereon; return address label of individual tamperproofed envelope containing keys even though torn when package opened; and destroy, by burning, each monthly sheet thirty days after last effective date thereof, advising Bureau promptly by routing slip, attention FBI Laboratory, this has been done.

It is essential address label mentioned above be returned in order to control security of shipment.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION  
SAC LETTER NO. 60-36  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to

July 19, 1960

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

File No.

(A) REGISTERS -- It no longer will be necessary to prepare No. 1 Registers for the purpose of listing resident agency cities and the names of Agents assigned thereto for use in headquarters city. ~~Time and Attendance clerks should refer to the daily reports of such Agents for the various items of Leave information previously transferred to the No. 1 Register. Manual revisions are being prepared.~~

7/19/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-36

(B) THE FBI'S ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE 1959 FISCAL YEAR -- Paragraph (C) of SAC Letter 59-63 dated October 20, 1959, advised that two copies of the FBI's Annual Report for the 1959 Fiscal Year were being sent each field office, and that the Bureau's Annual Report should not be distributed to outsiders until the Attorney General had released the Department's Annual Report.

The printed Annual Report of the Department of Justice for the 1959 Fiscal Year has now been made available to the public. Accordingly, you may distribute the Bureau's Annual Report to press contacts and other individuals who may have a special interest in the data contained therein. For your use in this regard, three additional copies of the FBI's Annual Report are being sent each field office. It is pointed out, however, that the Annual Report is available only in limited quantities, and that projects which might involve mass distribution of it should not be undertaken by the field.

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SAC LETTER NO. 60-36

(C) FIELD OFFICE MAILING LIST FOR IDENTIFICATION ORDERS, WANTED FLYERS AND CHECK CIRCULARS -- In order that Identification Orders, Wanted Flyers and Check Circulars have the most productive results it is necessary that they be distributed to individuals and organizations which are likely to come in contact with fugitives and these individuals and organizations be willing to alert the FBI. Each year every office is required to purge its mailing list of businesses which have merged or ceased to exist and individuals who are no longer in a position to be of assistance.

In order to assure that all individuals and businesses who may be of assistance receive Identification Orders, Wanted Flyers and Check Circulars, you are instructed at the time the mailing list is purged yearly that a survey be conducted by Agents to consider whether additional names should be added to the field office mailing list. ~~Agents should be alerted to their responsibility of keeping the field office mailing list up to date at all times.~~ Consider at this time whether state employment offices may be willing to post Identification Orders, Wanted Flyers and Check Circulars so that consideration may be given to adding them to your field office mailing list.

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SAC LETTER NO. 60-36

(D) VOCATION RECORD FORMS - REVISION - SUBMISSION -- There are attached three copies each of revised vocation record forms FD-287 and FD-287a, one copy each of which should be placed in the FBI Form Book. These forms have been revised to secure more precise and in some cases not previously requested data so that the information on forms will be more responsive to demands which experience has demonstrated have been made on this information. In view of the additional or revised data requested, the Bureau desires that each Bureau employee, except those who are employed for summer only, execute a new form. Agents must prepare two copies of form FD-287a and the clerks must prepare one copy of form FD-287. These must be forwarded to the Bureau within thirty days after date of this letter. No additional copies need be prepared unless you desire such for use in your office.

The Bureau is making increased use of information on these forms, and it is imperative that information be entirely complete. You should emphasize this to all employees and afford any assistance necessary to insure that execution of the forms is proper. An ample supply of the forms is being forwarded under separate cover. Upon receipt, destroy obsolete forms.

7/19/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-36

(E) TRAINING DOCUMENTS - USE OF -- You are reminded and should bring to attention of police instructors and Bureau approved speakers that Bureau desires continued attention to matters of local interest in connection with Training Documents. Police instructors' classes have been advised that such material should be added either as annotations or insertions in Training Documents,

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and that each man must remain alert to information, local incidents, case examples, newspaper articles, and the like that would increase the instructional value of Training Documents. For instance, an abstract of a newspaper or magazine article illustrating a certain point might either be clipped and mounted or abstracted and inserted. It is also highly desirable to ~~annotate these documents with pertinent state laws where applicable,~~ and it is the responsibility of every police instructor to see that this is done.

In each office one police instructor shall be assigned to be responsible for supervising use of Training Documents. This instructor shall make quarterly inspections of Training Documents to ascertain whether they are being used, that they are readily available, that useful material of local interest is being added, and that in applicable cases, annotations relative to state laws are noted in the appropriate place.

A tally shall be kept for the next six months and a report submitted to the Bureau February 6, 1961, showing which documents have been used and how many times. Spot checks will be made during inspections to check the quality of the additions of material of local interest.

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SAC LETTER NO. 60-36

(F) ANNUAL CONFERENCE - INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE (IACP) - STATLER-HILTON HOTEL - WASHINGTON, D. C. - OCTOBER 1-6, 1960 -- The International Association of Chiefs of Police will be holding its Annual Conference in Washington, D. C., during the period from October 1, through October 6, 1960. It is anticipated that approximately 2,500 delegates and guests will be attending. I have accepted an invitation to address the morning session of this Conference on October 3, 1960.

As part of the scheduled program I have offered to make special tours of our facilities available for the law enforcement officials, as well as their relatives and friends, who will be in attendance at this Conference. These tours will include a visit to the FBI Laboratory and Identification Division, various exhibits of interesting criminal and security cases, as well as a firearms demonstration. Arrangements for these tours can be made by contacting one of the Bureau's representatives at the Conference or by telephoning the Tour Unit at FBI Headquarters after arrival in Washington, D. C.

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Publicity concerning these tours has already been given or will be inserted in such publications as "The Police Chief," the official magazine of the IACP, the FBI National Academy Associates Newsletter, and our Law Enforcement Bulletin. In addition to this coverage you should advise all law enforcement officials in your division who plan to attend the Conference of ~~the availability of these special tours.~~ You should also promptly advise the Bureau of any good friends who plan to attend with specific recommendations for any special courtesies to be extended.

These tours will present an excellent opportunity for the delegates to this Conference, and their guests, to become intimately acquainted with the cooperative services of the Bureau which are at the disposal of local law enforcement agencies. You should insure that this matter is given your continued personal attention and, of course, all investigative personnel should be alerted in order to capitalize on this information in their daily contacts.

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SAC LETTER NO. 60-36

(G) USE OF CONFIDENCERS ON TELEPHONES IN NOISY LOCATIONS -- The Bell Telephone Companies are now offering a special type of microphone for use in telephone instruments in noisy locations. This unit, known as a Confidencer, is a noise-cancelling microphone manufactured by the Roanwell Corporation, 180 Varick Street, New York 14, New York. It is designed as a direct replacement for the standard F1 or T1 mouthpiece microphones used in Bell System and Western Electric instruments. There are two models, the R-60 for the 200, 300 and 400 series telephones and the C-500 for the 500 type set.

The Confidencer serves to cancel out much of the outside or background noise normally picked up by the regular microphone. At the same time, the voice spoken directly into it is transmitted with clarity and proper volume. Sound originating at an angle to the unit is reduced considerably in volume, so the mouthpiece must be held directly in front of the user's lips and not off to one side or down on the chin. The Confidencer may be used to advantage where background noise interferes with the intelligibility of conversation or where it is undesirable that any background conversation be overheard by an outside party. This may occur at locations such as reception desks, Number Three Register desks and radio dispatching rooms.

7/19/60

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You are authorized to use Confidencers at those locations where their features will serve a definite purpose. They are not to be installed on an indiscriminate basis due to the extra expense involved. The local Bell System company will supply Confidencers for instruments serviced by them. Usually, there is no service (installation) charge, but there will be a continuing monthly charge of approximately 75 cents for each unit. For privately owned Western Electric type handsets, such as those used on radio transmitters, the Confidencer may be purchased from the local distributor of Roanwell products at \$12 each. If unavailable locally, the units may be ordered through the Bureau.

(Security Letter on attached page)

7/19/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-36

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(H) COVERAGE OF SOVIET-BLOC OFFICIALS IN THE UNITED STATES -- At a conference at the Bureau held on June 9-10, 1960, attended by representatives of the offices handling the major portion of the Bureau's security work, the problem of coverage of Soviet-bloc officials was thoroughly discussed. In light of the U-2 incident and subsequent developments, the conference recommended that the Bureau endeavor to apply more pressure against the Soviet-bloc intelligence services in an effort to neutralize or disrupt their activities. In this connection, it was suggested that action be taken to focus attention on and curtail the repeated traffic violations of Soviet-bloc personnel. It was noted that Soviet-bloc officials are notoriously speedy drivers and have indicated utter disregard for traffic laws.

In the future, when you observe Soviet-bloc officials violating traffic laws, you are authorized to call such violations to the attention of the local police authorities who have the responsibility of enforcing traffic laws. These authorities may desire to write to the State Department concerning such violations thus providing the State Department with ammunition in considering the harassing tactics employed against our attaches and officials who travel in Soviet-bloc countries.

It is believed that the above-suggested action if handled judiciously can result in partial disruption of Soviet intelligence activities and in the reduction of hazards involved in surveillance as well as the danger to lives of American citizens. You should advise the Bureau in each instance where you contact local authorities in this matter and furnish the Bureau the results thereof so that information regarding this matter can be correlated. You should specifically inform the Bureau whether the violations have been noted in the police records which are available to the press.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures for (D)

7/19/60

SAC LETTER NO. 60-36

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